MARTINEZ VS CA The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the case of
Republic v Hebierto.
G.R. No. 170409 January 28, 2008
FACTS:
Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr. who during
his lifetime inherited the properties from his mother, Rosa Martinez
Emitaño, who in turn inherited them from her own mother, Celedonia
Martinez (Celedonia). The complaint alleged that sometime in 1992,
petitioner, Gregoria Merquines, represented herself as Gregoria
Martinez and as thus one of the descendants of Celedonia and under
that name applied for free patents over the properties with the CENRO.
Unbeknownst to private respondents, the corresponding OCTs were
thus issued in the name of Gregoria Martinez. When private
respondents later filed an application for land registration over the same
properties, petitioner opposed the same. This impelled private
respondents to file the instant complaint.
The only issue raised at the trial was whether the free patents and land
titles should be annulled due to fraud and misrepresentation in their
procurement. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the
cancellation of petitioner’s titles. Before the Court of Appeals, she
argued the titles secured were already indefeasible in view of the lapse
of one -ear from the issuance of the titles.
Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of the titles issued to petitioner,
the Court of Appeals ruled that the argument is untenable since
petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings which led to the issuance
of the free patents and the titles.
ISSUE:
Whether or not titles of the petitioner are already indefeasible and
incontrovertible following the lapse of one year from their issuance?
RULING:
No, the titles of the petitioner are not considered indefeasible and
incontrovertible notwithstanding the lapse of one year from their
issuance since the certificate of title in this case has been issued on the
basis of free patent procured through fraud manifested in the facts that
Gregoria Merquines has misrepresented herself as Gregoria Martinez
who happened to be one of the descendants of Celedonia.
Under the recent jurisprudence, a certifcate of title issued on the basis
of free patent procured through fraud or in violation of the law maybe
cancelled since such title is not cloaked with indefeasibility.
Furthermore, the principle of title is unavailing where fraud attended the
issuance of the free patents and titles. The petition is denied.
HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS. REPUBLIC
GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009
FACTS:
On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for original
registration of title covering a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite which he
purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his predecessors in
interest had been in open, notorious, exclusive and continuous
possession of the said land for more than 30 years.
Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his
great-grandfather which passed down to his four sons. By 1966, one of
the sons became the administrator of the properties which the son of
the latter succeeded his parents. One of the properties therein was the
one sold by the Velazco.
They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be
alienable and disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed
HELD:
No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we would need to
dissect them. The case settles down the correct interpretation of Sec.
14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141
It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b)
vests the right to ownership to those who satisfy its prerequisites, while
PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not repeal the
other.
It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and
disposable” from “agricultural” by PD 1073 did limit the lands to be
registered, as we may take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.
The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1)
is Naguit, not Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case
where the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original
registration. Thus:
1. The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is
satisfied when at the time of the application, the land is already
classified as alienable and disposable. Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
2. A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the
presumption of the right nugatory and the provision inoperative,
aggravated by the fact that at the time the Philippine is still not an
independent state.
3. The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. If the reverse is true, then there is already an intention on
the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.
The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of
interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil
Code.
1. It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the
commerce of men and the patrimonial property of the State can
be subject to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
2. It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public
dominion when no longer in use, is converted into patrimonial
property, if and only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or
Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a positive act of the executive or
legislative declaring lands to be such.
3. Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is
a positive act, regardless if the land was classified as alienable
and disposable, that the land sought to be registered, can be
acquired through prescription.
Applying to the case at bar:
1. Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations
presented was 1948. No other substantive evidence was
presented.
2. Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification
of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the
public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Petition Denied.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN V. REPUBLIC
GR No. 179987 September 3, 2013 (on motion for reconsideration)
FACTS:
This case is a resolution of the Motions for Reconsideration, filed by the
parties who both assail the decision of the Court promulgated on April
29, 2009. In the decision, the Court upheld the ruling of the Court of
Appeals which denied the application of the petitioners for the
registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang,
Cavite, on the ground that they had not established by sufficient
evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either
section 14 (1) or 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree (P.D.
1529).
On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased
the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land
registration covering the property in the RTC in Tagaytay City, Cavite,
claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby
entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. To prove such,
Malabanan presented during trial a certification issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
DENR. The RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application
for land registration. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed
the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that
the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. The CA promulgated
its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto
(Herbieto), the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification
of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should
be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting
that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been
declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s
possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of
computing Malabanan’s period of possession.
DISCUSSION:
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership. It is of public dominion if it:
(a) is intended for public use; or
(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although
of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public
service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land
that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it
belongs to a private individual. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine
(Jura Regalia), all lands of the public domain belong to the State. All
lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to
have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.
Classifications of public lands according to alienability
1935 Constitution: lands of the public domain were classified into -
agricultural, timber and mineral.
Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution: lands of the public
domain were classified into - agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land,
with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications.
1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935
Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but
added national parks. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may
be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories:
(a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands
of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without
limitation; and
(b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided
by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must
only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition
unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the
Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and
the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing
laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. If,
however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is
no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from
the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion
must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or
by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law to that effect.
Disposition of alienable public lands
 Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the
manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of:
(1) For homestead settlement; (2) By sale; (3) By lease; and (4) By
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles; (a) By judicial
legalization; or (b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of
Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which
expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. Bearing in mind such limitations under the
Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in
order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, to wit:
In the case at bar, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession - possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since
June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it
as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against
the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the
land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or
the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.
PETITION DENIED

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has

LUNINGNING DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN V. REPUBLIC AND CA
been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the
GR No. 158449 | October 22, 2004
application;
FACTS:
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive,
In 1998, the Igtibens filed an application for registration of land under
and notorious;
PD 1529, Sec. 14. They alleged that they acquired the 2,988 m2 lot in
Brgy. Malabag, Silang, Cavite by purchase, and that they, by
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of
themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
acquisition of ownership;
actual, continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, and adverse possession
of the lot in the concept of owner for more than 30 years. No opposition
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June
so the Igtibens presented their evidence.
12, 1945, or earlier; and
The history of possession of the lot was traced back to 1958, when it
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of
was first declared for tax purposes by Justina Hintog. In 1968 the lot
the public domain.
was possessed by Teodoro Calanog then it was allegedly inherited by
his daughter, Agatona Calanog. Her husband, Alfredo Tonido
In sum, these are the rules relative to the disposition of public land or
supposedly purchased the same from Teodoro, his father-in-law. Alfredo
lands of the public domain, namely:
Tonido planted palay, sayote, coffee, guyabano and other fruit-bearing
trees. When Agatona died, widower Alfredo Tonido and his children
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands
shared possession of the lot. In 1995, the Tonido family sold On 21
of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that
November 1995, the Tonido family sold the lot to petitioners, as
are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. The history was supported by
the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
tax declarations from 1958 to 1998.
(2) Exceptions:
MCTC: approved application for registration
CA: set aside MCTC and dismissed petition for registration because
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
failed to prove OCEN possession and occupation since 12 June 1945 or
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under
earlier.
Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
ISSUE:
agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as
WoN the Igtibens are entitled to registration/judicial confirmation of
alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
imperfect or incomplete title
applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June
12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the
HELD:
applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government
No. Requisite #2 for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
grant arises, and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue
under the Public Land Act was not met.
of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already
ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private
An applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title
property.
under the Public Land Act must be able to prove that: (1) the land is
alienable public land; and (2) his OCEN possession and occupation of
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as
the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period
no longer intended for public use or for the development of national
prescribed in the Public Land Act.
wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are
considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private
CAB: #1 is undisputed, it is alienable public land. #2 is the issue in this
ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes
case
of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition
is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073,
been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite
presently requires, for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance
title, the possession and occupation of the piece of land by the
of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not
applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest,
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
CAB: The earliest period that the applicants could claim ownership over
the property is in 1958 through a tax declaration. This is far later than
June 12, 1945, the date prescribed by law that the applicants
possession under claim of ownership should have begun at the latest.
RA 6940 (which requires possession and occupation of land for 30
years) DID NOT REPEAL Public Land Act, Sec. 48 (b).The section that
the Igbitens rely on is for free patents, not for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title.
SUMMARY
(1) Public Land Act, Sec. 44, as amended by RA 6940, which provides
for a prescriptive period of 30 years possession, applies only to
applications for free patents;
(2) CAB: judicial application for confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title over the lot covered by Public Land Act, Sec. 48(b); and
(3) Public Land Act, Sec. 48(b) requires for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title the continuous possession of the land since
12 June 1945, or earlier, which petitioners herein failed to comply with.
Petition denied for lack of merit. CA affirmed.
ROMAN CATHOLIC VS. CRESENCIA STA. TERESA RAMOS
G.R. 179181 November 18, 2013
FACTS:
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) filed an application for
registration of title of two (2) parcels of land in the Regional Trial Court
of Rizal acting as land registration court. To support the claim of
ownership, RCAM presented technical description of two (2) lots, a
surveyors certificate and tax declarations issued on 1966. On the other
hand, Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos filed her opposition. She alleged
that the property formed part of the entire property that her family owns
and has continuously possessed and occupied from the time of her
grandparents during Spanish time, up to the present. To further support
her claim and her prayer for confirmation of imperfect title, she
presented the death certificates of her parents, marriage certificate and
several photographs of their established business on the subject lots
claiming possession over the property. The Regional Trial Court denied
the petition of RCAM and affirmed the ownership of Cresencia but
refused to issue title in Cresencia’s name. The Court of Appeals on the
other hand, affirmed the decision of RTC with modification, confirming
the incomplete and imperfect title of Cresencia. RCAM questions the
propriety of the CA’s confirmation of Cresencia’s title over the property
since she was not an applicant and merely the oppositor in the
confirmation and registration proceedings RCAM filed.
ISSUE:
Can the Court of Appeals confirm oppositor’s title over the property on
the basis of the documents presented by Cresencia?
HELD:
NO. While the Supreme Court upholds the authority of the Court of
Appeals to confirm the title of the oppositor in a confirmation and
registration proceedings, the court did not agree with the conclusion
reached by the Court of Appeals in confirming the title of Cresencia. The
various pieces of documentary evidence that Cresencia presented to
support her own claim of imperfect title hardly proved her alleged actual
possession of the property. Like RCAM, Cresencia was bound to
adduce irrefutable evidence that proves her compliance with the
requirements for confirmation of title.
Further, both parties failed to prove the first and most basic requirement
to confirm a title that is the presentation of competent and persuasive
evidence in proving that the property is alienable and disposable.
SPOUSES PEDRO AND NENA TAN V. REPUBLIC
GR No. 177797 December 4, 2008
FACTS:
The subject property was declared alienable and disposable on 31
December 1925. Prior to the spouses Tan, the subject property was in
the possession of Lucio and Juanito Neri and their respective spouses.
Lucio and Juanito Neri had declared the subject property for taxation
purposes in their names under Tax Declarations No. 8035 (1952), No.
1524 and No. 1523 (1955). The spouses Tan acquired the subject
property from Lucio and Juanito Neri and their spouses by virtue of a
duly notarized Deed of Sale of Unregistered Real Estate Property dated
26 June 1970. However, a certain Patermateo Casiño (Casiño) claimed
a portion of the subject property, prompting the spouses Tan to file a
Complaint for Quieting of Title against. On 29 August 1989, the RTC
rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 88-204 favoring the spouses Tan
and declaring their title to the subject property thus "quieted". Refusing
to give up, Casiño filed an Application for Free Patent on the subject
property before the Bureau of Lands. On 8 December 1999, Casiño's
application was ordered cancelled by Officer Ruth G. Sabijon of DENR-
CENRO, Cagayan de Oro City, upon the request of herein petitioner
Pedro Tan, the declared owner of the subject property.
In 2000, the spouses Tan filed their Application for Registration of Title
25 to the subject property. The application of the spouses Tan invoked
the provisions of Act No. 496 26 and/or Section 48 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended. In compliance with the request 28 of the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) dated 29 August 2000, the spouses
Tan filed on 5 October 2000 an Amended Application for Registration of
Title to the subject property.
On 28 February 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
granting the appeal of the Republic, and reversing and setting aside the
9 May 2001 Decision of the RTC on the ground that the spouses Tan
failed to comply with Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073, which requires possession of the subject property to
start on or prior to 12 June 1945.
ISSUE:
Whether the Spouses Tan had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land. (NO)
HELD:
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty years or
more is not sufficient. It must be shown, too, that possession and
occupation had started on 12 June 1945 or earlier.
It is worth mentioning that in this case, even the spouses Tan do not
dispute that the true reckoning period for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title is on or before 12 June 1945. They also
admit that based on the previous evidence on record, their possession
and occupation of the subject property fall short of the period prescribed
by law. The earliest evidence of possession and occupation of the
subject property can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the
name of their predecessors-in-interest only in 1952. However, the
spouses Tan are now asking the kind indulgence of this Court to take
into account Tax Declaration No. 4627 issued in 1948, which they had
attached to their Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals
but which the appellate court refused to consider. Just as they had
argued before the Court of Appeals, the spouses Tan point out that Tax
Declaration No. 4627 was not newly issued but cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 2948; and should the Court take judicial notice of the
fact that tax assessments are revised every four years, then Tax
Declaration No. 2948 covering the subject property was issued as early
as 1944.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the
court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. On the
basis thereof, it is clear that evidence should have been presented
during trial before the RTC; evidence not formally offered should not be
considered. In this case, it bears stressing that Tax Declaration No.
4627 was only submitted by the Spouses Tan together with their Motion
for Reconsideration of the 28 February 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals. The reason given by the Spouses Tan why they belatedly
procured such evidence was because at the time of trial the only
evidence available at hand was the 1952 tax declaration. More so, they
also believed in good faith that they had met the 30-year period required
by law. They failed to realize that under Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, a mere showing of
possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient because what the
law requires is possession and occupation on or before 12 June 1945.
This Court, however, finds the reason given by the spouses Tan
unsatisfactory. The spouses Tan filed their application for registration of
title to the subject property under the provisions of Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. It is incumbent upon them as
applicants to carefully know the requirements of the said law.
REPUBLIC vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO
G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005
FACTS:
This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the CA, affirming
the decision of the MTC granting the application for land registration of
the respondents. Respondents filed a single application for two parcel of
lands located at Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu. They claim to be the
owner of said lots by virtue of its purchase from respondents’ parents.
They also submitted pertinent documents to prove their claim and with
emphasis on the Certifications by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the
Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963. An initial hearing
was set on Sept. 3, 1999 and notifications were posted in conspicuous
places on the subject lots and on the municipal hall. The notice was also
published in the official gazette on Aug. 2 1999 and on the Freeman and
Banat news on Dec. 19, 1999.
MTC rendered a decision granting title to the respondents. Petitioner
assailed said decision on the grounds of: 1.) Jurisdiction, since there
was a procedural defect in the filing of a single application for two
parcels of land; 2.) Respondents failed to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse
possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June
1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:
1.) Does the MTC have the jurisdiction?
2.) Did the respondents had open, continuous, and adverse possession
of the Subject Lots
in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
HELD:
1.) On Jurisdiction – the procedural defect or the misjoinder, wherein
two or more distinct
or contradicting rights or demands are joined, does not remove the
court’s jurisdiction.
HOWEVER, in the case at hand there was indeed a lack of jurisdiction
not because of the misjoinder but because of: a.) THE REQUIREMENT
FOR PUBLICATION, it is mandatory that the publication be made in the
official gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation before the
initial hearing. As we can notice the publication on the Freeman and the
Banat News was only done 3 months after the hearing which renders
inutile the intention of the mandatory publication.
2.) Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession
of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of
imperfect or incomplete title. The said lots are public lands classified as
alienable and disposable only on June 25, 1963 and the respondents
were seeking for a confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title through
judicial legalization. Under Sec.48 of the Public Land Act, which is the
ruling law in this case, Respondents were not able to prove their
continuous ownership of the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
because said lands were only classified as alienable and disposable
only on June 25, 1963.
Application for land registration was dismissed.
UNGAY vs. IAC
G.R. No. 69997. September 30, 1987
FACTS:
On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted mining
patents on mineral claims located at Ungay Malobago, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay to herein petitioners and other private individuals. Way back on
October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos assigned
their rights to their mining claims in favor of the petitioner. The
assignment of rights was recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder
of Albay on December 2, 1959. The aforestated mining patents, after
their issuance on July 20, 1962, were all recorded in the Office of the
Mining Recorder of Albay on August 28, 1962 and transcribed on
September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds of
Albay. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued the
respective original certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of Act
No. 496 in the names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the
petitioner. Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, tree patents were
granted by the respondent Director of Lands and the corresponding
original certificates of titles were issued by the Register of Deeds to
private respondents. All of the above patents covered portions of the
lots covered by the patents belonging to the petitioner. The petitioner
filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of patents against the
private respondents and prayed that all the free patent titles issued in
their favor for properties over which original certificates of title had
already been issued in its favor be declared null and void. The trial court
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint The CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
a) Whether or not the lands in question belong to the public domain;
b) Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the complaint
on the ground that the petitioner had no personality to institute the same
HELD:
No. Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provides: "All
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant." (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, applying the aforequoted provision to the case at bar, we
conclude that the issuance of the lode patents on mineral claims by the
President of the Philippines in 1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to
it only the right to extract or utilize the minerals which may be found on
or under the surface of the land. On the other hand, the issuance of the
free patents by the respondent Director of Lands in 1979 in favor of the
private respondents granted to them the ownership and the right to use
the land for agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and
the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or
under the surface. There is no basis in the records for the petitioner's
stand that it acquired the right to the mineral lands prior to the effectivity
of the 1935 Constitution, thus, making such acquisition outside its
purview and scope.
Anent the second issue, the petitioner has no personality to institute the
action below for annulment and cancellation of patents. The mineral
lands over which it has a right to extract minerals remained part of the
inalienable lands of the public domain and thus, only the Solicitor
General or the person acting in his stead can bring an action for
reversion.
REPUBLIC vs. RIZALVO
G.R. No. 172011 March 7, 2011
and disposable zone, certified as such since January 21, 1987.
Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership
and possession. The MTC and the CA both agreed that respondent has
presented sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence to show that
he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question.
However, the third requirement, that respondent and his predecessors-
in-interest be in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
has not been satisfied. Respondent only managed to present oral and
documentary evidence of his and his mother’s ownership and
possession of the land since 1958 through a photocopy of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and
Bibiana P. Rizalvo. He presented Tax Declaration for the year 1948 in
the name of Eufrecina Navarro and real property tax receipts beginning
in 1952. Even assuming that the 1948 Tax Declaration in the name of
Eufrecina Navarro and the tax payment receipts could be taken in this
case as proof of a claim of ownership, still, respondent lacks proof of
occupation and possession beginning June 12, 1945 or earlier. What is
categorically required by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification
and report is enough to signify that the land is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth, respondent is
still not entitled to registration because the land was certified as
alienable and disposable in 1987, while the application for registration
was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen (13) years after and far
short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws on
prescription.

FACTS:
On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before
the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, an
application for the registration of a parcel of land, located in Bauang, La
Union. Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of the
subject parcel of land, that he obtained title over the land by virtue of a
Deed of Transfer5 dated December 31, 1962, and that he is currently in
possession of the land. In support of his claim, he presented, among
others, Tax Declaration for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of
Payment of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing
of the application.
On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an
Opposition. The MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration
court, rendered its Decision, approving respondent’s application. The
Republic of the Philippines through the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal.
However, the CA found no merit in the appeal and promulgated the
assailed Decision, affirming the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent have shown indubitably that he has
complied with all the requirements showing that the property, previously
part of the public domain, has become private property by virtue of his
acts of possession in the manner and length of time required by law.
HELD:
NO. Under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, applicants for registration of title
must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The certification and
report dated July 17, 2001 of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La
Union, states that the entire land area in question is within the alienable