CASE DIGESTS

IN
CRIMINAL LAW I

FINALS

JHOANNA PAULA N.
BITOR
2017-0575
FRIDAY
5:30 PM- 8:30 PM
 FCJ 302
No. Case Date Reference Page no.
1 People v. Guevarra October 29, 2008 G.R. No. 182192 2
2 People v. Dela Cruz December 11, 2008 G.R. No. 174371 4
3 People v. Gayeta December 17, 2008 G.R. No. 171654 6
4 People v. Abdul July 13, 1999 G.R. No. 128074 7
5 People v. De Guzman February 4, 2009 G.R. No. 173477 9
6 People v. Regalario March 31, 2009 G.R. No. 174483 10
7 People v. Delpino June 18, 2009 G.R. No. 171453 12
8 Esqueda v. People June 18, 2009 G.R. No. 170222 13
9 People v. Bohol December 10, 2008 G.R. No. 178198 15
10 Herrera v. Sandiganbayan February 13, 2009 G.R. No. 119660- 17
61
11 People v. Abello March 25, 2009 G.R. No. 151952 21
12 People v. Ceballos September 14, 2007 G.R. No. 169642 24
13 People v. Tampus June 16, 2009 G.R. No. 181084 27
14 People v. Ong Chiat Lay October 26, 1934 G.R. No. L-39086 29
15 People v. Tibo-Tan April 24, 2009 G.R. No. 178301 30
16 People v. Gensola September 30, 1969 G.R. No. L-24491 32
17 People v. Tamayo November 17, 1922 G.R. No. L-18289 33
18 People v. Verzola December 21, G.R. No. L-35022 35
1977
19 People v. Abay February 24, 2009 G.R. No. 177752 37
20 People v. Pantaleon March 13, 2009 G.R. No. 158694 39
21 People v. Guillen January 18, 1950 G.R. No. L-1477 42
.
22 People v. Toling January 17, 1975 G.R. No. L-27097 43
23 People v. Araneta January 28, 1926 G.R. No. L-24622 44
24 US v. Hernandez December 24, 1914 G.R. No. L-9405 45

25 People v. Gayeta December 17, 2008 G.R. No. 171654 46

26 People v. Ramos October 12, 1998 G.R. No. 118570 47
27 People v. Pascual January 19, 2009 G.R. No. 172326 50
28 People v. De Leon October 8, 1926 G.R. Nos. L- 52
25375 and 25376
29 People v. Jaranilla February 22, 1974 G.R. No. L-28547 53
30 People v. Molina March 13, 2009 G.R. No. 184173 54
31 People v. Morales March 12, 1935 G.R. No. 42924 55
32 El Pueblo de Filipinas v. San Juan January 15, 1940 G.R. No. L-46896 55
33 People v. Navales February 14, 1934 G.R. No. 40390 56
34 People v. De Jesus October 31, 1936 G.R. No. 45198 59
35 Baking v. Director of Prisons July 28, 1969 G.R. No. L-30364 62

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36 People v. Santiago November 28, 2007 G.R. No. 175326 63
37 People v. Fajardo May 25, 1938 GR No. 43466 64
38 Sable v. People April 7, 2009 G.R. No. 177961 68
39 People v. Dumlao March 2, 2009 G.R. No. 168918 70
40 Republic v. Desierto August 5, 2005 G.R. No. 131966 72
41 Petralba v. Sandiganbayan August 16, 1991 G.R. No. 81337 73
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AGRIPINO GUEVARRA y MULINGTAPANG alias
BOY DUNGGOL

October 29, 2008 G.R. No. 182192

FACTS:

That on or about August 24, 2002 at around 9:15 oclock in the evening at Ebora Road,
Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a caliber .45 pistol, a deadly weapon, with
intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and repeatedly shot with said firearm suddenly and
without warning one P/Chief Inspector Marcos Barte y Paz while the latter was unarmed and
completely defenseless, thereby hitting him on different parts of his body which directly caused
the victims death.

That the special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm is attendant
in the commission of the offense.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 4 July 2006 convicting appellant of murder.
Appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay the heirs of Inspector
Barte the amounts of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages, P109,250.00 as actual damages,
P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, P4,212,312.72 for loss of earning capacity, and
cost of suit. The accused maybe credited with his preventive imprisonment if he is entitled to any
and directed to be immediately committed to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City.

Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 16 October 2007, the appellate court
promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision. It held that an
additional amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages should also imposed on appellant
because the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing of Inspector Barte.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether not the aggravating circumstance of the use of treachery is attendant

(2) Whether not the special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm
is attendant

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RULING:

We agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm attended the
killing of Inspector Barte.

It is settled that aggravating/qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information

and proven during the trial before they can be appreciated.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which
the victim might make. The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack
that renders the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and
severity of the attack. Two essential elements are required in order that treachery can be
appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure
the offenders safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party who has, thus, no
opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means,
methods or manner of execution.

Inspector Barte was sitting inside the jeep when appellant suddenly appeared and
approached him. Appellant asked Inspector Barte if he was Major Barte. However, before
Inspector Barte could respond or utter a word, appellant quickly shot him several times in the
head and chest with a caliber .45 pistol. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the appellants
attack rendered Inspector Barte defenseless and without means of escape. There is no doubt that
appellants use of a caliber .45 pistol, as well as his act of waiting for Inspector Barte to be seated
first in the jeep before approaching him and of shooting Inspector Barte several times on the
head and chest, was adopted by him to prevent Inspector Barte from retaliating or escaping.
Considering that Inspector Barte was tipsy or drunk and he was seated inside the jeep where the
space is narrow, there was absolutely no way for him to defend himself or escape.

In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the information and all its elements were duly
established by the prosecution.

WHEREFORE, after due deliberation, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR H.C. No. 02367, dated 16 October 2007, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

(1) the civil indemnity of appellant is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00;

(2) the indemnity for Inspector Bartes loss of earning capacity is increased from P4,212,312.72
to P4,213,551.00; and

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(3) an interest on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from this date until fully paid is
imposed.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WARREN DELA CRUZ Y FRANCISCO

December 11, 2008 G.R. No. 174371

FACTS:

On May 9, 1999, at around 2:45 p.m., Leonardo Cayetano, Danilo Valeriano and Felix
Valeriano were on their way to the cockpit arena in Dampalit, Malabon. Leonardo was walking
ahead of Danilo and Felix at the rice paddies at a distance of four (4) arms-length away.

All of a sudden, Leonardo heard a couple of gunshots. Turning his back, he saw Danilo
and Felix already sprawled and bloodied on the ground. Despite this, three (3) persons continued
shooting them. He recognized the person firing a .38 caliber as appellant Warren dela
Cruz.

Fearing for his life, Leonardo ran as fast as he could to an old storehouse. When the
assailants left the crime scene, Leonardo ran towards the victims to help them, but they were
already dead.

The autopsy conducted by Dr. Manuel Lagonera revealed that Danilo and Felix died of
multiple gunshot wounds. Felix sustained two (2) gunshot wounds in the body and one (1) in his
head. Danilo had a gunshot wound in the left temporal region of his head. Dr. Lagonera opined
that the fatal wounds were fired at close range.

On December 23, 2003, the RTC rendered a joint decision convicting appellant of two (2)
counts of murder. The RTC held that the defense of denial cannot prevail over the positive
identification of Cayetano that appellant was one of the assailants. No ill motive can be imputed
to Cayetano. The flight of appellant also belies his innocence. The RTC also ruled that the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was absent but there was treachery. The
means of execution employed by the assailants did not give the victims opportunity to defend
themselves or retaliate. It was also deliberately or consciously adopted. There was abuse of

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superior strength considering the number of armed assailants against the unarmed victims. The
element of treachery, however, absorbed abuse of superior strength.

Appellant directly appealed to this Court. In accordance with Our decision in People v.
Mateo, We referred the case to the CA for proper disposition. On February 15, 2006, the CA
rendered a decision affirming with modification that of the RTC. The appellate court held that
the testimony of lone eyewitness Cayetano is credible. Like the RTC, the CA held that appellants
bare denial cannot prevail over Cayetano’s straightforward and unwavering identification.
Inconsistency in his testimony is only minor and does not affect his credibility. Appellant’s flight
also evinces a consciousness of guilt and a silent admission of culpability. The CA agreed with
the RTC that treachery was present. The manner of attack employed by appellant and his two (2)
companions was deliberate and unexpected. It did not give the victims the opportunity to defend
themselves. They were shot from behind.

ISSUE:

Whether not the aggravating circumstance of the use of treachery is attendant

RULING:

Treachery qualified the killings to murder; treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength.
Appellant argues that treachery was not present in the commission of the crime. He claims that
the prosecution failed to present any positive proof that he has resolved to commit the crime.
There was no proof that the death of the victims was the result of mediation, calculation or
reflection. There is treachery when the offender commits the crime employing means, methods
or forms of execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to ensure its execution without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make. The elements of treachery
are: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberate or consciously
adopted.

Here, Danilo and Felix were shot from behind while they were innocently walking on
their way to the cockpit arena in Dampalit, Malabon. They were unaware of the impending death
that awaited them. In fact, they were unarmed. They were shot unceremoniously. The absence of
warning denied them the opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate. Treachery was clearly
present.

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 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but
MODIFIED in that appellant is also liable to pay the heirs of the victims exemplary damages in
the amount of P25,000.00 apiece

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN GAYETA y ROBLO alias "FREDDIE"

December 17, 2008 G.R. No. 171654

FACTS:

While spouses Benjamin and Conchita were drinking tuba in their home, two armed men
barged into their house and declared a hold-up who were later identified as herein appellant and
one Reano. Benjamin was kicked and boxed until the latter bled and lost consciousness, by
which Conchita surrendered P2,500. The two armed men then left and barged into another
couple’s home and demanded them for money. The wife, accompanied by the appellant, went to
their store to get money. In the store, the appellant forced the wife to have sexual intercourse
with him. After they had returned to their home, she told her husband that she had been sexually
abused. The husband had an altercation with the two perpetrators which resulted in him being
hit on the shoulder with a bullet.

The two denied that they took part in the crime claiming that it was physically impossible
for them to be at the scene of the crime for Gayeta was in Muntinlupa doing his rounds as a
member of the Voluntary Lakas Brigade, while Reano was in another town.

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ISSUE:

Whether the accused was guilty of the crimes of robbery and robbery with rape with his
presentation of the Voluntary Lakas logbook.

RULING:

The inherently weak alibi presented by the accused does not hold a stronger bearing as
compared to the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses which is given full
faith by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, presented logbook was
neither authenticated nor identified by the persons who supposedly issued them.

The aggravating circumstance of dwelling was properly appreciated in both robbery and
robbery with rape. There being no evidence to show that the accused purposely sought nighttime
to facilitate the commission of the offense, this circumstance was ruled out. The original penalty
of death is therefore reduced to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

ISA ABDUL, MINYA ABDUL, MALDIS ABDUL, INGGAT DOE, and JOWEN
APPANG

July 13, 1999 G.R. No. 128074

FACTS:

1. That about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of August 19, 1988, Minya Abdul, Isa Abdul,
Maldis Abdul, Inggat Doe and Jowen Appang, went to Sibago Island, Tuburan, and invited
Sahdiya Tanjing, Jubaira Tanjing, Ani Tanjing, Abraham Annudin, Suri Jannuh, Abdulbaser
Tanjiri and Idil Sahirul to go with them to Langil also at Tuburan Municipality, Province of
Basilan for a luncheon (salo-salo); that these aforenamed persons went with these group of
persons because they were friends. And they do not have any inkling in their minds that these
five (5) persons have sinister plan against their lives and properties.

2. That while they were at Langil at the store of Hadji Salidon, Minya Abdul and Isa
Abdul offered to Ani Tanjing and Abraham Anuddin soft drinks (coke) and biscuits.

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 3. That while these Ani Tanjing and Abraham Anuddin were drinking the soft drinks,
Minya Abdul got the M16 armalite of Ani Tanjing which the latter was carrying, at that time and
with the said rifle fired at Ani Tanjing resulting in the latters instant death; and at the same time
Isa Abdul also grabbed the M16 rifle of Abraham Anuddin which the latter was also carrying at
that time and with that same armalite, isa Abdul fired at Abraham Anuddin which also resulted
in the latter instant death. And Jowen Appang also grabbed the M79 rifle of Idil Sahirul which he
also used in firing toward Idil Sahirul and Abdulbaser Tanjiri.

4. That these accused having already armed themselves fired their guns which they took
from Ani Tanjing, Abraham Anuddin and from Idil Sahirul, toward Abdulbaser Tanjiri, Suri
Jannuh and Idil Sahirul who were already running away when they saw Minya Abdul and Isa
Abdul shoot and killed Ani Tanjing and Abraham Anuddin.

5. That after killing Ani Tanjing and Abraham Anuddin, Minya Abdul and Isa Abdul
took the necklace of Abraham Anuddin and the wrist watch of Ani Tanjing. And with the three
(3) firearms, that of Ani Tanjing, Abraham Anuddin and Idil Sahirul, which these accused got
from these victims, the accused left the scene of the shooting

On July 1, 1996, the lower court rendered its decision finding the accused, Minya Abdul,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with double homicide and triple
frustrated homicide.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is attendant

(2) Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery is attendant

RULING:

(1) No. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proved:

1.) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;

2.) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination;
and

3.) sufficient time between such determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.

Absent any of these requisites, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. We are not
convinced that evident premeditation was sufficiently proven. The prosecution’s evidence did

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not clearly establish beyond reasonable doubt two of the three requisites of evident
premeditation, viz., a.) the time when Abdul and his co-accused determined to commit the crime;
and b.) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. Although there are badges of premeditation in the
present case, we can only speculate as to the time elements required to appreciate evident
premeditation. Evident premeditation must be established by clear and positive evidence and
cannot be inferred nor presumed no matter how logical and probable such inferences or
presumptions might be.

(2) Yes. The lower court also appreciated treachery as an aggravating circumstance.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to insure
its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. Treachery can be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in crimes complexed with
crimes against persons provided that the two elements of treachery concur: (1) the employment
of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted. As can be seen
from the facts of the case, the mode of attack was sudden and unexpected. The accused-appellant
and his cohorts, relying on the friendship they had with their victims, deceived them into
voluntarily giving their firearms to the accused-appellant for the purpose of testing and
examining said firearms. Thereafter, accused-appellant together with Isa Abdul, suddenly,
without warning, shot their victims who were not aware of the danger against them and were not
in a position to defend themselves. The court a quo therefore correctly found the presence of
treachery as an aggravating circumstance.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED,
and the accused-appellant is found GUILTY OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE and is
sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of
Annih Tanjing and Abraham Anuddin P50,000.00 each as death indemnity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCO DE GUZMAN a.k.a. FRANCISCO V. DE

GUZMAN, JR.,

February 4, 2009 G.R. No. 173477

FACTS:

On November 14, 2003 in the evening, the accused Franco de Guzman armed with a
handgun and with a use of a motorcycle to facilitate the commission of the offense, shoot and hit
Dr. Fidelito Manaois several times, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in the vital parts of
his body causing his death.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not aggravating circumstance of Evident Premeditation is attendant

RULING:

Yes, the court ruled that evident premeditation and treachery is present. The essence of
treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected
manner of execution affording the helpless and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape. In this case, the victim Dr. Fidelito Manaois was shot fourteen times resulting in
numerous wounds in his body. The victim was attacked suddenly and unexpectedly. Thus, the
manner of the commission of the crime was deliberately adopted when the assailants purposely
stopped their motorcycle, turned around and followed the tricycle where the victim and the
eyewitness rode. The assailants then attacked the victim and the eyewitness in a secluded area to
ensure that no one could witness the crime or come to the victims aid.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

RAMON REGALARIO, MARCIANO REGALARIO, SOTERO REGALARIO,

BIENVENIDO REGALARIO and NOEL REGALARIO

March 31, 2009 G.R. No. 174483

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FACTS:

On the night of February 22, 1997, a public dance and singing contest was held in Ligao,
Albay. There was a commotion in the area assigned to accused Ramon Regalario. When he
approached the group where the disturbance was taking place, Rolando Sevilla suddenly
emerged from the group and fired a shot at him. Instinctively, and in order to disable Sevilla
from firing more shots, he struck his assailant with his nightstick and hit him at the back of his
head.

Sotero arrived and Ramon told him that Rolando still had the gun. So, Sotero plunged at
Rolando and they wrestled on the ground for the possession of the gun. Ramon knocked the gun
off his hand and it fell near the place where Jose Poblete was standing. Poblete just arrived at the
scene along with Marciano Regalario. Poblete picked up the gun. He was instructed by Marciano
to keep it until it is turned over to the authorities.

Bienvenido Regalario, the barangay tanod, was instructed by Marciano, the barangay
captain to effect the arrest of Rolando Sevilla for the crime of shooting Ramon. So, he tied the
hands and feet of Rolando Sevilla for fear that he might be able to escape.

On the early morning of February 23, a team of policemen went to Natasan and found the
dead body of Rolando Sevilla.

For automatic review is the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification, an
earlier decision of the RTC, finding accused-appellants Ramon, Marciano, Sotero, Bienvenido
and Noel, all surnamed Regalario guilty of murder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in not finding that the deceased was killed in self-
defense and/or defense or relative

RULING:

When self-defense is invoked by an accused charged with murder or homicide he

necessarily owns up to the killing but may escape criminal liability by proving that it was
justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. Hence, the three (3) elements of self-
defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on

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the part of the person defending himself, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
However, without unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, either complete or
incomplete.

By Ramon’s own account, after he was shot, he hit the victim at the back of the latter’s
head and he continued hitting the victim who retreated backward. From that moment, the
inceptive unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased to exist and the continuation of the
offensive stance of Ramon put him in the place of an aggressor. There was clearly no longer any
danger, but still Ramon went beyond the call of self-preservation. In People v. Cajurao, SC held:

…The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender
no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying
circumstance. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and
limb, the necessity for the person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary ceases. If he
persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-
defense. Self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating
from the fray.

Ramon’s claim of self-defense is further belied by the presence of two (2) stab wounds
on the neck, four (4) lacerated wounds on the head, as well as multiple abrasions and contusions
on different parts of the victim’s body. Indeed, even if it were true that the victim fired a gun at
Ramon, the number, nature and severity of the injuries suffered by the victim indicated that the
force used against him by Ramon and his co-accused was not only to disarm the victim or
prevent him from doing harm to others.

Considering the foregoing, as well as the manner in which the attack against Rolando was
carried out, and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses positively identifying the accused-
appellants as the assailants, SC concur in the rulings of the CA, affirming those of the trial court,
in (a) disregarding Ramon Regalario’s declaration that he attacked the victim in self-defense and
(b) holding that all the accused-appellants acted in concert and killed Rolando.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL DELPINO

June 18, 2009 G.R. No. 171453

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FACTS:

On December 16, 1993, around 10:00 p.m., Mark Lorica (principal witness) and his
father Gabriel (victim) were watching TV inside their house in Sampaloc, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
when they heard a knock at the door. The victim asked who was knocking, but no one answered.
The victim opened the door, and while he was stooping down to get his slippers, Manuel Delpino
(appellant), armed with a short firearm, shot him on his neck. When the victim fell down,
appellant approached him and verified whether he was already dead.

Mark tried to sneak to his aunt’s house but failed because the culprit remained at the
place. He returned to their house and waited for his mother who was still working at Philocean.
When his mother arrived at 10:00 p.m., he told her about the incident

ISSUE:

Whether or not Treachery is attendant in the circumstances in the case at bar

RULING:

Yes. Treachery qualified the killing to murder, neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances attended the commission of the felony. Hence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
was properly imposed

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated December 19, 2005 of the CA in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 01513, finding accused-appellant Manuel Delpino guilty of the crime of murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICTION in that the award of actual damages is deleted, and, in lieu thereof, accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Gabriel Lorica y Canon ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages, in addition to ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

EDGAR ESQUEDA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

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 June 18, 2009G.R. No. 170222

FACTS:

Edgar Esqueda and one John Doe were charged with two (2) counts of Frustrated Murder
in two (2) separate Amended Informations. Accused Edgar entered a plea of not guilty. Accused
John Doe remains at-large.

On December 12, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City, Branch 33,
rendered a Decision acquitting the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 14612 and convicting him in
Criminal Case No. 14609. The CA rendered a Decision dated August 19, 2004 dismissing the
appeal and affirming the decision of the RTC.

Hence, this petition assigning the following error:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE AND IN
TOTALLY DISREGARDING HIS DEFENSE.

Petitioner's defense is anchored on alibi and denial. His witnesses, Claudio, Domingo and
Viviana, aver that during the time of the incident, petitioner was out at sea fishing. Petitioner,
when called to the witness stand, denied having committed the crime.

ISSUE:

Should the petition be granted?

RULING:

No. We have unfailingly held that alibi and denial being inherently weak cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. In the present case,
petitioner was positively identified by Venancia and Gaudencio as the author of the crime.

Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere
else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the
accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places. Where there is least chance for the accused to be
present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.

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 Aside from the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses that he was fishing at Cawitan, Sta.
Catalina from 8 o'clock in the evening of March 3, 1999 until 2 o'clock in the morning the
following day, petitioner was unable to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime.

During the trial of the case, both the prosecution and defense witnesses testified that
Nagbinlod and Cawitan, Sta. Catalina, were merely more than 5 kilometers apart which would
only take about 20 to 40 minutes’ ride. Thus, it was not physically impossible for the petitioner
to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.

In addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent,
especially where such identification is credible and categorical.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EVELYN BOHOL y TALAOGAN a.k.a. EVELYN
BOHOL, a.k.a. EVELYN BOHOL DAVIS, a.k.a. DIANITA BOHOL DAVIS,

December 10, 2008 G.R. No. 178198

FACTS:

The victim, Steven Alston Davis (Steven), a 31-year old British national, was the Chief
Technology Officer of JC Software, a local subsidiary of Hong Kong based corporation
JADECOOL Entertainment. Together with his business associate and long-time friend Michael
Thomas Dunn (Michael), a Canadian citizen, Steven resided at a two-storey apartment unit at
No. 5958 Firmina Street, Barangay Poblacion, Makati City.

Steven married appellant Evelyn Bohol in Hong Kong sometime in March 1997, when
the latter was only 17 years old. Together with their two minor children, Steven and the appellant
shared a house at No. 1823 Fifth Street, Villasol Subdivision in Angeles City, Pampanga. Steven
spent his weekdays in the Makati apartment, and stayed with his family in Angeles City during
weekends.

On July 17, 2002, Steven and Michael worked until around ten oclock in the evening at
the principal office of JC Software in Makati. At about 10:45 p.m., they headed to their rented
apartment. Steven proceeded to his room, did some computer work, then went to sleep. At about
11:30 p.m., Michael went to the airport to fetch his girlfriend Jennifer Castillo (Jennifer), who
was then arriving from Hong Kong. Michael and Jennifer returned to the apartment at one oclock
in the morning of July 18, 2002. They went to bed a short moment thereafter.

At around two oclock in the morning, Jennifer told Michael that a person seemed to be
moving and flashing a light outside their room. Suspecting that the person outside the room was
Steven, and that the latter was just trying to play a practical joke on them, Michael inquired What
are you doing tonight? Instead of Steven answering back, three men with drawn handguns
suddenly entered their room. These three individuals were later positively identified during the
trial to be Arnold Adoray (Arnold), Alexander Dagami (Alexander), and accused-turned-state-
witness Robin Butas (Robin). Arnold, whose gun was aimed at Michael, asked, Ito ba? Ito ba?
Alexander thereafter grabbed Jennifer by the hand and locked her inside Michaels bathroom.
After taking Michaels keys, wallet, and cellular phone, the three men proceeded to Stevens room.
Upon seeing the then sleeping Steven, Arnold fired four consecutive shots upon the former,
hitting the latter at the back. The three men then hurriedly left the house. After he was sure that
Arnold, Alexander and Robin were no longer inside the apartment, Michael immediately went to
Stevens room. There, Michael saw the lifeless body of Steven. After checking Stevens pulse,
Michael administered cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on the formers chest but he no
longer made any response. Thereafter, Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel arrived at the

16
scene of the crime; then an ambulance took Stevens body to the Makati Medical Center where he
was pronounced dead on arrival.

Michael made numerous attempts to reach the appellant by phone immediately after the
incident, but his efforts were all in vain. Finally, he was able to contact her through her mobile
phone at around six oclock in the morning; the former immediately informed the latter of the
killing of her husband. When Michael met Evelyn at ten oclock in the morning, he readily
observed that appellant showed no signs of sadness or mourning despite the violent death of her
husband.

After the autopsy of the cadaver in the afternoon of July 18, 2002, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Medico-Legal officer found that Steven sustained four gunshot wounds at
the upper left portion of his back, including four bullet holes at the back of his upper left arm,
just below the shoulder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery is attendant

RULING:

Yes. Murder is committed by any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), kills another, if the killing is committed with treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Hence, for treachery to
be appreciated, two conditions must be met, to wit: (1) the employment of means,
methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offenders safety from any defense or
retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and
(2) the offenders deliberate or conscious choice of means, method or manner of execution.

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an

unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission without risk to himself.

The circumstances obtaining in the instant case show that treachery attended the killing
of the victim. It is undisputed that the killing occurred at around two oclock in the morning, an
hour when generally people are asleep. The witnesses are also one in saying that upon entering
Stevens room, the assailants immediately shot the former and caused the latters death. Both the

17
testimonial and the physical sets of evidence also show that Steven was shot from behind.
Evidently, the victim was caught unaware, totally defenseless against the armed invaders.

PAT. EDGARDO HERRERA y BALTORIBIO and PAT. REDENTOR MARIANO y

ANTONIO vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

February 13, 2009 G.R. Nos. 119660-61

FACTS:

Pat. Edgardo Herrera and Pat. Redentor Mariano, together with Pat. Roberto Barrera and
Pat. Rodolfo Alcalde, all members of the Paranaque Police Station, were charged with 2 counts
of murder, for killing Shi Shu Yang and George Go, before the Sandiganbayan (SB).

(NOTE: The other two accused, Barrera and Alcalde, did not file any more pleading after they
were convicted that’s why they are not part of the case.)

The two original Informations, both dated December 4, 1990, against Herrera and
Mariano alleged that: On December 28, 1989 in Paranaque, Herrera and Mariano who were then
public officers, being then members of the Paranaque Police Force, armed with guns, and
conspiring, confederating, mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill and with
treachery and by taking advantage of their public positions as members of the Paranaque Police
Force, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously shoot Shi Shu Yang and George Go on different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious mortal wounds upon the victim thereby inflicting
serious and mortal wounds upon the victim which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death. (One Information for each victim)

During the arraignment, Herrera and Mariano pleaded not guilty. They also filed a Joint
Petition for Bail and raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for failure of the prosecution to allege
in the Information that they committed the crimes “in relation to their office.”

HOWEVER, on the same day, Sandiganbayan ordered the amendment of the

Informations and stated that the evidence adduced during the pre-trial of the case and the hearing
on the petition of the bail shall be deemed automatically reproduced as evidence during the trial
of the case on the merits.

The amended Informations, both dated July 15, 1992, alleged that: On December 28,
1989 in Paranaque, Herrera and Mariano who were then public officers, being then members of
the Paranaque Police Force, armed with guns, and conspiring, confederating, mutually helping

18
and aiding one another, committing the offense in relation to their public position or office, with
intent to kill and with treachery and by taking advantage of their public positions as members of
the Paranaque Police Force, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously shoot Shi Shu Yang and
George Go on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious mortal wounds upon the
victim thereby inflicting serious and mortal wounds upon the victim which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death. (Again, one Info per victim)

Herrera and Mariano were arraigned anew on September 1992, and both entered their
pleas of not guilty. They also withdrew their prior objections to the issue of lack of jurisdiction
of the SB.

During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated that Herrera and Mariano were public officers
at the time of the commission of the crimes and thus the cases were consolidated and a joint trial
on merits ensued.

According to the prosecution, this is basically what happened:

The police officers were lighting firecrackers near Chow Chow which is the restaurant
owned by Go, and when Go came down with his pistol, he was apprehended by Pat. Barrera who
introduced himself as a policeman, asked for the license of the .45 caliber pistol, and told Go that
he will bring the firearm to the police station for verification. Barrera ordered Go and his
Taiwanese friend Shi Shu to board their jeepney. (In short, kinda like entrapment/ instigation)
The police officers also ordered the Go and Yang to undergo medical examination and thus they
were taken to the Paranaque Community Hospital (PCH). Thereafter, Go and Yang were brought
to Timothy Street, Multinational Village where they were killed.

They presented many witnesses and testimonies such as (1) Reynaldo Ong, the manager
of Chow Chow; (2) Edna Go, wife of Go; (3) Winterhalter, a foreigner who witnessed the killing
using a pair of binoculars (woah); (4) Dr. Garcia who conducted the autopsy important
details: Go sustained 8 fatal gunshot wounds and has blood type B, Yang sustained 3 gunshot
wounds and has blood type A; (5) Forensic Chemist of NBI who reported that the victims never
fired a gun based on a paraffin test.

The defense on the other hand claims that Herrera and Mariano were just assisting
Barrera in bringing some persons for medical examination. Prior to the shooting incident, they
were informed that George Go was previously arrested by Barrera for illegal possession of
firearm. They brought Go and Yang to the PCH and on the way back to the police station, they
heard a struggle ensue at the back of the patrol van as Alcalde said, “George, bitawan mo ang
baril ko.” And then they heard successive shots. When they looked back, they saw Go grappling
for the possession of a firearm (later on, they said it was an armalite) with Alcalde, they stopped
the car and alighted to pacify the trouble but alas there were more shots and they found Go and
Young bloodied. (Basically, Herrera and Mariano testified individually but they said almost the

19
same things.) The defense also presented Dr. Soliven’s findings that Go was positive for alcohol
and that Go had no signs of physical injuries.

What really happened: Mariano parked the patrol van along Timothy Street which was a
practically deserted area, isolated from traffic and pedestrians. Alcalde, Barrera, and petitioner
Herrera brought out the two handcuffed victims from the back portion of the patrol van in order
to eventually salvage them. Petitioner Mariano appeared to be faking an alleged interrogation
and was trying to get the name of Shi Shu Yang, whose identity was then not yet immediately
known. Later, petitioner Mariano also participated in shooting at the unarmed victims.

The SB convicted Herrera and Mariano each for 2 counts of murder, and denied
petitioners’ Joint Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, Herrera and Mariano filed a petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not H&M’s conviction will place them in double jeopardy

RULING:

1. NO, the rule on double jeopardy does NOT apply.

H&M insist that SB erred in convicting H&M for the crime of murder under the amended
Information as they had earlier been arraigned under the original information for murder and
their arraignment under the amended information placed them in double jeopardy. HOWEVER,
the SC found this argument untenable.

SB ordered the amendment of the information and made it of record that the evidence
adduced during the pre-trial of the case and the hearing on the petition for bail shall be deemed
automatically reproduced as evidence during the trial of the case on the merits. Double jeopardy
did not attach by virtue of petitioners’ plea of not guilty under the amended information. For a
claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid
arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is
otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.

In the present case, H&M pleaded not guilty to the two original Informations for the
crimes of murder. Thereafter, in their Joint Petition for Bail, H&M raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction on the ground that the prosecution failed to allege in the information that the crimes
were committed “in relation to their office.” On the same day, public respondent ordered the
amendment of the Informations accordingly. Thus, the first requirement for double jeopardy to
attach, i.e., that the Informations against the petitioners were valid, has not been complied with.

20
 Likewise, the fourth element was lacking. H&M cannot be validly convicted on the basis
of the original Informations as the prosecution failed to allege in the Informations that the crimes
were committed “in relation to their office.” Thus, petitioners were not placed in danger of being
convicted when they entered their pleas of not guilty to the two original Informations which were
insufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction. There was also no dismissal or
termination of the cases.

Furthermore, it was well-within the power of SB to order the amendment of the two
original Informations. Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that if the
motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or Information which can be
cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. If it is based on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the
court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or Information still suffers from the
same defect despite the amendment.

There were also issues about:

(1) Conducting further cross-examinations H&M were not deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses against them

(2) Credibility of the foreigner Winterhalter has no reason to falsely implicate H&M

(3) Self-defense a person invoking self-defense still in effect admits that he has killed the
victim, and burden is shifted on him to prove the essential elements of self-defense so that he can
use it as a justifying circumstance

(4) Absence of evidence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime can be inferred
from the acts of the accused

(5) Presumption of regularity requisites of this defense are not established

(6) Guilt beyond reasonable doubt murder is sufficiently established as the killing was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as frontal attack can be treacherous when
sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed

(7) Civil indemnity award of damages are awarded to the heirs

21
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Sandiganbayan’s Decision finding
petitioners Pat. Edgardo Herrera y Baltoribio and Pat. Redentor Mariano y Antonio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals for two (2) counts of murder, for the killing of Shi Shu
Yang and George Go y Tan, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the time of their sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification for public office is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in
that petitioners are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Shi Shu Yang and George Go y Tan each in
the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as exemplary
damages. Petitioners are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of George Go y Tan the amount of
P11,500 for actual damages and P1,433,418 in the form of unrealized earnings and income.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HERACLEO ABELLO Y FORTADA

March 25, 2009 G.R. No. 151952

FACTS:

Appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada (Abello) was convicted of one count of rape by
sexual assault and two counts of sexual abuse under the Child Abuse Law committed against his
step daughter, AAA. The following information for rape was filed against the appellant: (note
there are three Informations filed, one for rape and two for sexual assault).

1. “That on or about the 8th day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim
AAA,4 with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously putting his penis inside the mouth of said AAA, against her will and
without her consent”

The victim was a 21 year old girl who contracted polio when she was just 7 months. On
June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock morning, AAA was sleeping in their house in Navotas with

22
her sister-in-law and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when Abello mashed her breast.
Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m, Abello again mashed the breast of AAA under the same
situation while the latter was sleeping. In these two occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello
because of the light coming from outside. Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m, Abello
placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA. The victim on the same date reported the incident
to her sister-in-law and mother.

The RTC found Abello guilty under all three Informations. The CA affirmed Abello’s
conviction on appeal and increased the penalties imposed. Abello now appeals his conviction for
rape on the ground that the mode of commission provided for in the information is different from
that proven during the trial. He also questions his conviction for sexual abuse since AAA does
not fall under those protected by RA 7610 (Child Abuse Law).

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the appellant shall be acquitted due to the difference between the
modes of commission provided for in the Information for rape and that proven at the trial.

2. Whether or not appellant is guilty of sexual abuse under the Child Abuse Law. If he’s
not, if he can be liable for an offense other than that stated in the information.

3. Whether or not the alternative circumstance of stepfather-stepdaughter relationship

should be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

4. Whether or not aggravating circumstances not mentioned in the Information can be

considered to increase the penalty.

RULING:

1. NO, variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if
he fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than
what was alleged. The Information alleges “force and intimidation” as the mode of commission.
However, AAA testified during the trial that she was asleep at the time it happened and only
awoke to find Abello’s male organ inside her mouth. This variance is not fatal to Abello’s
conviction for rape by sexual assault. A variance in the mode of commission of the offense is
binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed
in a different manner than what was alleged. In the present case, Abello did not object to the
presentation of evidence showing that the crime charged was committed in a different manner
than what was stated in the Information. Thus, the variance is not a bar to Abello’s conviction of
the crime charged in the Information.

23
 2. NO, appellant cannot be held guilty under the Child Abuse Law but he can be held for
Acts of Lasciviousness. AAA cannot be considered a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610
which states that “Children” refers to person below 18 years of age or those over but are unable
to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition. AAA was neither below
18 nor was she fully unable to take care of herself. Though Abello cannot be held liable under
RA 7610, he is still liable for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. The character
of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated; the crime committed is
determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.
In the present case, although the two Informations wrongly designated R.A. No. 7610 as the law
violated; the allegations therein sufficiently constitute acts punishable under Article 336 of the
RPC whose elements are:

a. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness;

b. That the offended party is another person of either sex; and

c. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

i. By using force or intimidation; or

ii. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

iii. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.

3. NO, the relationship should not be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Though

the three Informations all alleged the stepfather-stepdaughter relationship between AAA and
Abello, this modifying circumstance, was not duly proven in the present case.
The prosecution failed to present the marriage contract between Abello and AAA’s mother. If
the fact of marriage came out in the evidence at all, it was only via an admission by Abello of his
marriage to AAA’s mother. This admission is inconclusive. The court is strict on considering
relationship as an aggravating circumstance because it increases the imposable penalty, and
hence must be proven by competent evidence.

4. NO, the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and knowledge of disability cannot be

considered. Although not alleged in the information, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling
was proven during the trial. Additionally, Article 266-B (penalties for rape) of the RPC
recognizes “knowledge by the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or
physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime” as a
qualifying circumstance. This knowledge by Abello of AAA’s polio was also proven during the
trial but not alleged in the Information. Though these aggravating and qualifying circumstances

24
of dwelling and Abello’s knowledge of AAA’s physical disability were not considered in
imposing the penalty, they may be appreciated in awarding exemplary damages.

Therefore, appellant is found guilty of rape by sexual assault and acts of lasciviousness.

1) For the crime of rape, he is sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten years of prision mayor, as maximum. He is ordered
to pay P30,000.00 as civil liability; P30,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages;

2) For each count of acts of lasciviousness, he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as
maximum. He is further ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P30,000.00 as moral damages and P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, in each case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE CEBALLOS JR. y CABRALES

September 14, 2007 G.R. No. 169642

FACTS:

AAA was born on October 13, 1984 while BBB was born on October 16, 1981 Criminal
Case No. C-55119: One nighttime in December 1997, AAA and four of her siblings were
sleeping at the second floor of their house in Caloocan City when their father-herein appellant
Enrique Ceballos Jr. y Cabrales touched AAA's breast and vagina, catching her by surprise.

25
Appellant thereafter removed her short pants and underwear and tried to insert his penis inside
her vagina but failed, drawing him to, while AAA was in a lying position, instead insert his
finger inside her vagina and mash her breasts. She boxed appellant but she was subdued by him.
And she cried, but appellant covered her mouth, rendering it difficult for her to breathe.

Appellant thereafter dozed off to sleep.

Criminal Case No. C-55120: Nighttime sometime in January 1998, while AAA was
sleeping with her five siblings at the upper floor of their house, she was awakened as appellant
forcibly undressed her and again succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. She tried to
resist appellants moves by boxing his chest, but to no avail. And whileshe cried, appellant again
covered her mouth.

Criminal Case No. C-55121: On the night of February 14, 1998, while AAA was sleeping
with her siblings, she was again awakened as appellant touched her vagina. He removed her
underwear, inserted a finger and then inserted his penis inside her vagina. She resisted by boxing
him but appellant held her hands and told her to give in; otherwise, he would harm her. She was
frightened, but she did not cry anymore because she did not want appellant to cover her mouth
again to render her unable to breathe.

Criminal Case No. C-55122: On March 26, 1998, three days before her graduation from
grade school, AAA was awakened as appellant took off her clothes and directed her to, as she
did, lie down on her side. With appellant at her back, he inserted his penis inside her vagina. She
could not offer any resistance, however, on account of her position. While she initially cried, the
fear that appellant would again cover her mouth prompted her to stop. After appellant ejaculated,
he went to sleep

Criminal Case No. C-55123: On November 5, 1998, between 2 and 3am, appellant
removed AAA's short pants and had sexual intercourse with her. She offered no resistance as she
was afraid that he would beat her again. Besides, it would just be an exercise in futility.
Appellant thereafter went to sleep, while AAA put on her short pants and went downstairs to
clean the house.

On November 19, 1998, AAA narrated to her classmates in high school what she had
been through. On November 21, 1998, SPO4 Bayani Feria of the Northern Police District (NDP)
who had in the meantime been informed of AAA's plight, accompanied AAA to the NDP
Headquarters where she executed a sworn statement charging appellant, who was soon after
arrested, with rape. In the Provisional Medical Certificate which Dr. Bernadette Madrid of the
PGH Child Protection Unit issued, she gave her impression that:Physical findings are highly
suspicious of sexual abuse.

26
 Criminal Case No. C-57126: On December 25, 1995 at 2am, BBB was awakened to find
appellant on top of her. Appellant succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina, following
which he went to sleep.

When BBB eventually learned that appellant had also raped her younger sister AAA, she
broke her silence. Enrique was charged with six counts of rape, five on complaint of his minor
daughter AAA, and one on complaint of another minor daughter BBB. The Informations were
filed on November 23, 1998 before the RTC of Caloocan.

RTC Caloocan City convicted appellant of rape in all the charges except that in Criminal
Case No. C-55119 where it convicted appellant only of acts of lasciviousness. CA affirmed the
decision with some modifications.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the conviction for rape against the appellant is in order

(2) Whether or not the conviction for the acts of lasciviousness against the appellant is in

order

RULING:

(1) Yes. AAA and BBB displayed an air of confidence and sincerity in their narration.
Their testimony was straightforward, categorical and convincing. Showing no signs of remorse,
they braved the embarrassment and stigma of a public trial, came forward and courageously
revealed the dastardly acts of their own father.

Appellant's argument that the acts complained of could not have been committed due to
the presence of other people fails. As repeatedly held by this Court, lust is no respecter to time
and place. The nearby presence of the relatives of the victim, the cramped condition of the room,
the presence of other people therein, or the high risk of being caught, have been held as not
sufficient and effective to deter the commission of rape.

As for appellant's allegation that AAA and BBB falsely charged him as he was strict and
had had quarrels with his wife CCC, the same was correctly brushed aside by the appellate court
as puerile and . . . too flimsy to merit even scant consideration.

One of appellant's letters sent to CCC and children, strongly reflects his admission of
guilt to thus negate his professed innocence.

27
 The acts constituting the crime of rape and its qualifying circumstances as averred in the
information in each of said cases, which were all filed under the then A335 of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, are substantially the same as those required to be stated under A266-
A, paragraph 1, and 266-B of the said Code, hence appellants right to be informed of the charges
against him was not violated.

(2) Yes. While under R.A. No. 8353, which was already in effect when the criminal act
was committed in December 1997, the act of inserting a finger into another's genital is penalized
as rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of A266-A of the RPC, the Information charged
appellant with rape still under A335 of the RPC.

Thus, appellant cannot be convicted of rape by means of sexual assault even if it was
established that he inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA. To do so would violate his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him. It bears noting,
however, that the crime of acts of lasciviousness is necessarily included in the crime of rape. The
appellate court, however, erred in finding that no AC was alleged and proven in the case for acts
of lasciviousness. Relationship, which was alleged in the information and admitted by appellant,
is under A15 of the RPC (alternative circumstances) aggravating in acts of lasciviousness.

DECISION:

In Criminal Case Nos. C-55120, C-55121, C-55122, C-55123 and C-57126, sentence:

RP without eligibility for parole, and to pay the victim AAA in each of the first four cases and
the victim BBB in the last case P75k as moral damages, P25k as exemplary damages, and
another P75k as civil indemnity.

In Criminal Case No. C-55119, sentence: 6m AM as minimum to 6y PC, and to pay the
victim AAA P30,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as exemplary damages.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BARTOLOME TAMPUS and IDA

MONTESCLAROS

28
 June 16, 2009 G.R. No. 181084

FACTS:

ABC, is the daughter of appellant, Montesclaros, and was a minor at the time of the
incident. Montesclaros worked as a waitress in a beer house. Montesclaros and ABC were
renting a room in a house owned by Tampus, who was a barangay tanod. On April, 1995, ABC
stated that she was in the house with Montesclaros and Tampus who were both drinking beer.
They forced her to drink beer and when she became intoxicated she was now very sleepy then
she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Montesclaros that he be allowed to have sexual
intercourse with her. Montesclaros agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he was
finished. Montesclaros left for work essentially leaving Tampus alone with the victim. She fell
asleep and when she woke up she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose and rolled
down to her knees. She suffered pain all over her body noticed that her panties and short pants
were stained with blood which was coming from her genitals. Montesclaros arrived home from
work the following morning, she kept on crying but appellant ignored her.

A similar incident ensued on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the
room since her mother was at work at the beer house. Tampus went inside their room and
threatened to kill her if she would report the previous incident to anyone. Same thing happened
as Monteclaros ignored her again when the victim told her about the incident.

Without other recourse she filed two Complaints. She accused Tampus of rape she
declared in her Complaint that this was done in conspiracy with co-accused Montesclaros, her
mother, who gave permission to Tampus to rape her. The victim also stated a similar incident
effectively filing two separate cases.

The trial court appreciated in Montesclaros’ favor the mitigating circumstance of illness
which would diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her of the consciousness of
her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court convicted Tampus
of two counts of rape and found Montesclaros guilty as an accomplice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court’s decision to implicate Ida Montesclaros as an accomplice
in the rape of ABC accurate?

29
RULING:

Yes, Montesclaros is accountable as an accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC.

Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

The requisites that are needed are fulfilled to find Montesclaros guilty as an accomplice
to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was community of
design between Montesclaros and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Montesclaros had
knowledge of and agreed to Tampus' intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. She
forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus,
with the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus' plan to have sexual
intercourse with her daughter. It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by
the accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she
would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation.

30
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ONG CHIAT LAY, ET AL.

October 26, 1934 G.R. No. L-39086

FACTS:

Appellant and two others, Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, were jointly informed against by
the provincial fiscal of Zamboanga, charging them with having feloniously burned a building in
which was located a store belonging to the appellant. Upon a plea of "not guilty," appellant and
his codefendants were tried jointly upon said information; and, after trial, while Ong Ban Hua
and Kua Sing were acquitted, appellant was found guilty of the crime of arson and sentenced to
suffer sixteen years and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by
law, to indemnify Francisco Barrios and Mariano Atienza in the sums of P16,000 and P5,000,
respectively, and to pay one-third of the costs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ong Chiat Lay is liable of the crime of Arson due to Conspiracy

RULING:

No. In order to convict a defendant as principal in the commission of a crime, it must be

shown either (1) that he took a direct part in the execution of the criminal act; (2) that he directly
forced or induced another or others to commit it; or (3) that he cooperated in the commission of
the offense by an act without which it would not have been accomplished. (Revised Penal Code,
Article 17).

While the crime charged in the present case is not conspiracy as a distinct offense, it is
clear from the nature of the evidence presented that appellant alone could not have committed
the unlawful act. As already stated the theory of the prosecution was that he conspired with or
induced his codefendants to commit the crime. The gravamen of the charge was conspiracy, and
the acquittal of his codefendants is clearly inconsistent with appellant's guilt. They take direct
part in the execution of a criminal act who, participating in the criminal design, proceed to carry
out their plan and personally take part in its execution by acts which directly tend to the same
end. While the facts proved in the present case are sufficient to raise grave suspicions against the
appellant, they fall far short of establishing his guilt clearly and satisfactorily, as required by the
well-settled rules of evidence. The chain of circumstances which would have pointed to the

31
appellant as the guilty person was broken by the acquittal of Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing. As
already explained, the acquittal of his said codefendants is not only consistent with the
hypothesis that the appellant is innocent, but is inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is guilty.
It results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed and the appellant acquitted, with
costs de oficio

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROLANDO Botong MALIBIRAN and BEVERLY

TIBO-TAN

April 24, 2009 G.R. No. 178301

FACTS:

In the 70's when Reynaldo left his common-law wife, Rosalinda Fuerzas (Rosalinda), and
their two (2) children, Jessie and Reynalin, in Davao, and went to Manila to seek greener
pastures. While in Manila, Reynaldo met and had a relationship with appellant, Beverly Tibo-
Tan. They eventually married in 1981. Reynaldo and appellant begot three (3) children Renevie,
Jag-Carlo and Jay R.

In 1984, Reynaldo's and Rosalinda's paths crossed again and they resumed their
relationship. This led to the souring of Reynaldo's relationship with appellant; and in 1991,
Reynaldo moved out of the conjugal house and started living again with Rosalinda, although
Reynaldo maintained support of and paternal ties with his children.

On that fateful day of February 5, 1995, Reynaldo and appellant were in Greenhills with
their children for their usual Sunday gallivant. After finishing lunch at the Kimpura restaurant,
the family separated at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to do some shopping. Later, they
regrouped and purchased groceries at Unimart. At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the
family stepped out of the shopping mall and Reynaldo proceeded to the parking lot to get his red
Honda Accord, while the rest of his family stayed behind and waited. Immediately thereafter, the
family heard an explosion coming from the direction where Reynaldo parked his car. Appellant
and Renevie got curious and proceeded to the parking lot. There, they saw the Honda Accord
burning, with Reynaldo lying beside the driver's seat, burning, charred and bleeding profusely. A
taxi driver named Elmer Paug (Elmer) appeared and pulled Reynaldo out of the car. Reynaldo
was then rushed to the Cardinal Santos Medical Hospital where he eventually died because of the
severe injuries he sustained. The underlying cause of his death was Multiple Fracture & Multiple
Vascular Injuries Secondary to Blast Injury.

ISSUE:

32
 Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of Treachery, Evident Premeditation and
Use of explosives are attendant to the crime of Parricide committed

RULING:

Yes. Based on the foregoing, the testimonies of Janet and Oswaldo clearly link appellant
to the planning of the crime. True, as intimated by appellant, she may not have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of the explosion; but then again, if she was, then she would have suffered
the same fate as Reynaldo. Moreover, the nature of the crime and the manner of its execution,
i.e., via a booby trap, does not demand the physical presence of the perpetrator at the very time
of its commission.

In fact, the very manner in which it was carried out necessitated prior scheming and
execution for it to succeed. Thus, appellant's absence from the actual scene of the crime does not
negate conspiracy with Rolando in plotting the death of her husband. A conspiracy exists even if
not all the parties committed the same act, but the participants performed specific acts that
indicated unity of purpose in accomplishing a criminal design. Moreover, direct proof of
previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy -- conspiracy may
be proven by circumstantial evidence. The testimonies of Janet and Oswaldo established the
following set of circumstances which, if taken collectively, show the guilt of appellant: that
appellant and Rolando conspired, planned and agreed to kill Reynaldo using a grenade; that
appellant duplicated the key to the red Honda Accord of Reynaldo so that Rolando could gain
access to the car; that appellant thereafter gave the duplicate key to Rolando; that on February 5,
1995, appellant told Oswaldo to follow the red Honda Accord of Reynaldo until the latter parked
the car; that appellant told Oswaldo to thereafter pick up Rolando at Katipunan and bring the
latter to where Reynaldo parked his red Honda Accord. Reynaldo died soon after due to injuries
he sustained from an explosion caused by grenades planted in his car.

Moreover, considering the manner in which appellant and Rolando planned and executed
the crime, the RTC was correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
evident premeditation, and use of explosives. Thus, appellant is guilty of the crime of Parricide

33
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUFINO GENSOLA, FIDELINA TAN and
FELICISIMO TAN

September 30, 1969 G.R. No. L-24491

FACTS:

Rufino Gensola was the driver of Gelveson No. 17, while Felicisimo and Fidelina Tan
were the conductors. They suspected Miguel Gayanilo for puncturing the tires of the truck while
it was parked in Gerona st., Guimbal, Iloilo on November 18, 1958. The next day, around 6:30
P.M., Miguel Gayanilo was crossing the street from the public market inthe direction of his
carinderia with Rufino Gensola, who had a stone in his right hand as big as a man’s fist. After
crossing the street, Fidelina Tan shouted, “Rufino, strike him”. Thereafter, Rufino did strike him
with the stone on the left face. Felicisimo followed striking the back of Rufino’s head with a
piece of iron. And, Fidelina also struck the victim on the left forehead with the piece of iron. The
victim died of traumatic shock. On trial, Rufino assumed sole responsibility of the crime. But,
the trial court found the three defendants guilty as principals of the crime of murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was conspiracy between the three defendants, qualifying them to be
principals of the crime

RULING:

The Court did not agree that the defendants are guilty as principals on the ground of
conspiracy. Fidelina’s muttering of “He does not appear because I will kill him” and shouting of
“Rufino, strike him”, and the blows given by Felicisimo andFidelina after Rufino’s strike did not

34
show previous concert of criminal design. In the absence of conspiracy, the liabilityof the three
appellants is individual, that is, each appellant is liable only for his own act

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE TAMAYO, ET AL.

November 17, 1922 G.R. No. L-18289

FACTS:

On the morning of July 17, 1921, Catalino Carrera, in company with his brother,
Francisco Carrera, and a youth of thirteen years, named Juan Gonzales, who was living with the
deceased, repaired to a field belonging to the deceased, in the barrio of San Felipe, municipality
of Binalonan, to do agricultural work, preparatory to the planting of palay. For the
accomplishment of these labors, it was necessary to turn water into the paddy from an irrigating
ditch flowing nearby; and the deceased accordingly intercepted the flow of the water in this ditch
by constructing a dirt dam, thereby diverting the water entirely to his own land. While the
deceased was engaged in working in and around the irrigating ditch, his brother Francisco was
occupied nearby in leveling the soil with a light rake, and the boy, Juan Gonzales, mounted on a
carabao, was using a harrow to smoothen the surface of the field a few rods away.

While the three mentioned were busy as above stated, the five appellants herein arrived
from the barrio of Asingan, which is the place of their abode, to begin work preparing another
plot of land for cultivation, adjacent to or near the paddy upon which the deceased was at work.
Upon arriving upon the scene of their intended labors, the five appellants found that no water
was available for watering the land which they intended to prepare, owing to the fact that all the
water in the canal was being appropriated by the deceased. The five therefore approached the
deceased and either Hilario or Ramon Tamayo asked him to allow the water, or some of the
water, to flow on through the canal to their land, as it was dry and water was necessary. In reply
the deceased told them to wait for the rain of heaven. The appellants were not content with this
rejoinder, and the request for water was repeated, upon which the deceased told them that they
should await his pleasure.

35
 Seeing that their request for water was disregarded, the anger of the appellants was
aroused, and Hilario Tamayo advanced towards the irrigating ditch, and toward the deceased,
with the intention, so Hilario states, of breaking the dam with his hands, thereby releasing the
water so that it would continue its course in the ditch. This movement on the part of Hilario
Tamayo was met with a demonstration of resistance on the part of the deceased, and struggle
ensued, the salient features of which are in our opinion established clearly enough, though some
of the more minute details are obscure.

At this point it may be stated that when the five appellants approached the deceased to
ask for water, Basilla Orensia, the wife of the latter, had just arrived in the field, bringing food
for her husband and his assistant, as the day was getting hot and the hour was approaching when
agricultural laborers are accustomed to take rest and refreshment. She therefore was present at
the quarrel from the beginning and is one of the two adult witnesses for the prosecution, the other
being Francisco Carrera, the brother of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ramon Tamayo is guilty as principal of the offense of Homicide

RULING:

No. It is evident that the judgment finding Ramon Tamayo guilty as principal, or co-
author, in this homicide cannot be sustained, and we proceed to consider whether he can be
adjudged guilty in the character of accomplice, under article 14 of our Penal Code, by reason of
having cooperated in the commission of the deed by previous or simultaneous acts. By the
overwhelming weight of authority, the same community of purpose and intention is necessary to
justify the conviction of an accused person in the character of accomplice that is necessary to
sustain conviction in the character of principal. In this connection we may quote words that have
been so often repeated by the supreme court of Spain as to constitute a classical formula for the
expression of a generally recognized truth. Say the court: "It is an essential condition to the
existence of complicity, not only that there should be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attribute to the person charged as accomplice, but it is furthermore necessary
that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way."

From what has been said it result that the judgment appealed from must be affirmed in so
far as it finds Jose Tamayo guilty of the offense of homicide and sentences him to undergo
imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months and one day, reclusion temporal, with the
accessories prescribed in article 59 of the Penal Code and requires him to pay indemnity to the

36
heirs of the deceased in the amount of P650; with proportional costs of this instance against the
appellant. The judgment must bee reversed as to all the other appellants; and as to Ramon
Tamayo, judgment will be entered declaring him guilty of homicide, in the character of
accomplice, and requiring him to undergo imprisonment for eight years and one day, prision
mayor, with the accessories prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and imposing upon him
liability to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P350, and to pay proportionate
costs of both instances; it being understood that as between Jose Tamayo and Ramon Tamayo
the satisfaction of indemnity shall be effected in accordance with article 125 of the Penal Code

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICARDO VERZOLA & JOSEFINA MOLINA

G.R. No. L-35022 December 21, 1977

FACTS:

On September 28, 1969, Bernardo Molina was clubbed to death by Ricardo

Verzola in the presence of appellant Josefina Molina inside Molina's house at Barrio Lipcan,
Bangued, Abra. The body of the victim was subsequently carried by the two appellee to the
ground and left at the foot of the stairs. Appellant Verzola then went to his house, changed his
clothes and threw his blood stained sweater undershirt and underwear, including the piece of
wood be used in clubbing the deceased, inside their toilet. Afterwards, he went to the municipal
building and reported to the police authorities that Bernardo had died in an accident. The police
authorities together with the Municipal Health Officer, the Municipal Judge and a photographer
went to Lipcan to conduct the investigation. They found the body of the deceased Bernardo
Molina sprawled at the foot of the bamboo ladder. Blood had oozed from the mouth, nose and
ears. There were bloodstains on the floor of the bedroom of the house, on the mat, as well as on
the beddings of the deceased. The bloodstains led to the bamboo ladder where some of the stains
could be found on the steps of the ladder. When questioned by the police, Josefina revealed that
the assailant of her husband was Ricardo Verzola.

37
 Upon her request, she was brought to the Office of the Chief of Police of Bangued, where
at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 29, 1969 she gave a written statement
narrating the circumstances surrounding the incident in question and pointing to appellant
Verzola as the assailant of her husband. In that extra-judicial statement, she stated that
immediately after 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28. 1969, appellant Ricardo Verzola
went to their house in Barrio Lipcan, Bangued Abra entered the room where she was sleeping
with her husband, Bernardo Molina, woke her up and had carnal knowledge of her; that when
Bernardo Molina woke up and attempted to rise from the floor, that was the moment when
Verzola clubbed Bernards, hitting him on the head several times that afterwards, she heard the
sound of a body being dragged downstairs and the voice of Verzola saying that he was leaving
and warning her not to say anything about the incident. She looked out of the door and saw her
husband already lying prostrate at the foot of the stairs. This statement was sworn to by her
before Municipal Judge Francisco T. Valera. On that same morning, appellant Verzola was
picked up by the police and brought to the municipal building, and there he also executed a
written statement admitting that he clubbed the victim several times. Both appellants admit that it
was appellant Verzola who inflicted the fatal blows on the victim.

The trial court convicted Verzola as principal and Josefina Molina as an accessory to the
crime of murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not assisting the principal in bringing the body of the deceased to the ground
will make one an accessory to the crime

RULING:

An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission
of the felony, but with knowledge of the commission of the crime, he subsequently takes part in
three (3) ways: (a) by profiting from the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing the body, effects
or instruments of the crime in order to prevent its discovery; and (c) by assisting in the escape or
concealment of the principal of the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public functions or
the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. Even if she assisted her co-
appellant without duress, simply assisting Verzola in bringing the body down the house to the
foot of the stairs and leaving said body for anyone to see, cannot be classified as an attempt to

38
conceal or destroy the body of the crime. The concealing or destroying of the body of the crime,
the effects or instruments thereof, must be done to prevent the discovery of the crime.

In the case at bar, the body was left at the foot of the stairs at a place where it was easily
visible to the public. Under such circumstances there could not have been any attempt on the part
of Josefina to conceal or destroy the body of the crime. Thus, Josefina Molina is acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO ABAY y TRINIDAD

February 24, 2009 G.R. No. 177752

FACTS:

Sometime in December 1999, AAA testified that the appellant, Roberto Abay y Trinidad,
her mother’s live-in partner, had been sexually abusing her since she was seven years old.
Whenever her mother was working or was asleep in the evening, appellant would threaten her
with a bladed instrument and force her to undress and engage in sexual intercourse with him.

City of Manila, Philippines, Roberto Abay y Trinidad, appellant, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly commit sexual abuse and
lascivious conduct against [AAA], a minor, 13 years of age, by then and there kissing her breast

39
and whole body, lying on top of her and inserting his penis into her vagina, thus succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of her, against her will and consent thereafter threatening to kill her
should she report the incident, thereby gravely endangering her survival and normal growth and
development, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA].

ISSUE:

Whether or not Roberto Abay y Trinidad is guilty of Sexual Abuse under Section 5(b) of
RA 7610 or of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code

RULING:

Roberto Abay y Trinidad is guilty of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code. Under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim
of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse
but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with
reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be
charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A
(except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of
both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A
person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape
cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the
Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape)
cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.

In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime was committed
against her. The Information against appellant stated that AAA was 13 years old at the time of
the incident. Therefore, appellant may be prosecuted either for violation of Section 5(b) of RA
7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. While the
Information may have alleged the elements of both crimes, the prosecution’s evidence only
established that appellant sexually violated the person of AAA through force and intimidation by
threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial designs. Thus,
rape was established.

Indeed, the records are replete with evidence establishing that appellant forced AAA to
engage in sexual intercourse with him on December 25, 1999. Appellant is therefore found guilty
of rape under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to reclusion

40
perpetua. Furthermore, to conform with existing jurisprudence, he is ordered to pay AAA
P75,000 as civil indemnity ex-delicto and P75,000 as moral damages.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TEOFILO G. PANTALEON, JR. and JAIME F.

VALLEJOS

March 13, 2009 G.R. Nos. 158694-96

FACTS:

The appellants Teofilo G. Pantaleon, Jr. (Pantaleon) and Jaime F. Vallejos (Vallejos),
former Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of
Castillejos, Zambales, were found by the Sandiganbayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three

41
(3) counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents, defined and
penalized under Article 217, in relation with Articles 48 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

The joint affidavit-complaints filed by municipal officials, led by the town’s vice-mayor,
before the Office of the Special Prosecutor of Zambales alleged that the appellants, Ken Swan
Tiu, and Engr. Ramos conspired to illegally disburse and misappropriate the public funds of the
Municipality of Castillejos, Zambales in the amounts of P166,242.72 (under Disbursement
Voucher No. 101-9803-328), P154,634.27 (under Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9803-349),
and P90,464.21 (under Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9804-415), by falsifying the supporting
documents relating to three (3) fictitious or "ghost" construction projects, namely: (a) the
upgrading of barangay roads in Barangays Looc, Nagbayan, Magsaysay, and San Pablo; (b) the
upgrading of barangay roads in Barangays Looc proper-Casagatan, Nagbayan proper-Angeles,
and San Pablo-Sitio San Isidro; and (c) the construction of market stalls at the public market of
Castillejos.

The affidavit-complaints further alleged that the disbursement vouchers were not signed
by the municipal accountant and budget officer; that the Sangguniang Bayan did not adopt a
resolution authorizing Pantaleon to enter into a contract with La Paz Construction and/or Ken
Swan Tiu; and that no projects were actually undertaken by the Municipality of Castillejos.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) recommended the filing of an Information for
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents against the appellants
and Ken Swan Tiu, and the dismissal of the complaint against Engr. Ramos.The Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon approved the Joint Resolution of the OSP, with the modification
that the complaint against Ken Swan Tiu be dismissed for lack of probable cause. The Office of
the Ombudsman approved the Review Action of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon.

During trial Vallejos argued that the signature of the accountant did not appear in the
three (3) vouchers because the accountant simply refused to sign it. He also insisted that the
budget officer’s signature likewise did not appear in the vouchers because she was always out of
her office. He explained that he paid the vouchers despite the absence of the accountant’s
signature because the projects were already completed and the sub-contractor was already
demanding payment and was threatening to sue him if he would not pay.

Pantaleon testified that he signed the vouchers and allowed the treasurer to pay the
amounts stated because the accountant and the budget officer were reluctant to sign. He also
claimed that the signatures of the accountant and budget officer were not important. He added
that he approved the release of the money because the treasurer told him that there was an
appropriation in the approved annual budget. He also insisted that the owner of La Paz
Construction entered into a contact with the municipality. He maintained that he physically

42
inspected the projects, and ordered the treasurer to pay because the project in Nagbayan road had
been completed

ISSUE:

Did the accused commit the complex crime of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents?

RULING:

Yes. All the elements of the crime charged are present in these cases.

The essential elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code are the following:

(a) That the offender be a public officer.

(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.

(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable.

(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or

negligence, permitted another person to take them.

Pantaleon and Vallejos were the municipal mayor and municipal treasurer, respectively,
of the Municipality of Castillejos at the time of the crimes charged. In short, they were public
officers within the meaning of the term as defined above.

As a required standard procedure, the signatures of the mayor and the treasurer are
needed before any disbursement of public funds can be made. The appellants, therefore, in their
capacities as mayor and treasurer, had control and responsibility over the funds of the
Municipality of Castillejos.

The funds for which malversation the appellants stand charged were sourced from the
development fund of the municipality. They were funds belonging to the municipality, for use by
the municipality, and were under the collective custody of the municipality’s officials who had to
act together to disburse the funds for their intended municipal use. The funds were therefore
public funds for which the appellants as mayor and municipal treasurer were accountable.

Through the appellant’s explicit admissions, the witnesses’ testimonies, and the
documentary evidence submitted, the prosecution duly established the fourth element of the
crime of malversation. It is settled that a public officer is liable for malversation even if he does

43
not use public property or funds under his custody for his personal benefit, if he allows another
to take the funds, or through abandonment or negligence, allow such taking. The felony may be
committed, not only through the misappropriation or the conversion of public funds or property
to one’s personal use, but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of or misappropriate
the funds. The felony may thus be committed by dolo or by culpa. The crime is consummated
and the appropriate penalty is imposed regardless of whether the mode of commission is with
intent or due to negligence.

The appellants were likewise guilty of falsification under paragraph 5 of Article 171.
Engr. Ramos testified that Pantaleon and Vallejos instructed him to place the dates January 5,
1998 on the first and third programs of work, and January 14, 1998 on the second program of
work, although he prepared the programs only in March 1998. Thereafter, the appellants affixed
their signatures on these programs of work. The projects covered by these programs of work
served as basis for the issuance of the disbursement vouchers. The falsification was a necessary
means to commit the crime of malversation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JULIO GUILLEN

44
 January 18, 1950 G.R. No. L-1477

FACTS:

The accused Julio Guillen, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and multiple frustrated murder after his attempt to assassinate the President of the
Philippines, Manuel Roxas on March 10, 1947.

During the 1946 Presidential Elections, Guillen voted for the opposing candidate of
Manuel Roxas. According to the accused, he was disappointed with the latter for failing to
redeem and fulfill promises made by President Roxas during the elections. Consequently, the
accused determined to assassinate the President and found the oppoturnity to do so on the night
of March 10, 1947 when the President attended a popular meeting by the Liberal Party at Plaza
de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila. Guillen first intended to use a revolver to accomplish his goal but
he had previously lost his licensed firearm, so he thought of using two hand grenades which were
given to him by an American soldier in exchange for two bottles of whisky. The accused stood
on the chair he had been sitting on and hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had
just closed his speech. A general who was on the platform saw the smoking grenade and kicked
it away from the platform towards an open space where he thought the grenade was likely to do
the least harm. The grenade exploded in the middle of a group of persons standing close to the
platform and grenade fragments seriously injured Simeon Varela, who died the next day due to
the mortal wounds caused, and several other persons. Guillen was arrested and he readily
admitted his responsibility.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in
regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to the other
injured persons

RULING:

The facts do not support the contention of the counsel for the appellant. In throwing the
hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with malice
and is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act. As provided by Art. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wronful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury
caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice. As held by thie Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered reckless imprudence.

45
 The sentence of the trial court is affirmed by unanimous vote and death sentence shall be
executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE

TOLING y ROVERO

January 17, 1975 G.R. No. L-27097

FACTS:

Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, boarded the Bicol express train. While in transit,
both picked each a pair of scissors and started stabbing and butchering their co- passengers,
thereby causing several casualties. Eight (8) of the passengers dead and one 1 got wounded as a
result of the incident. They were charged with multiple Murder and an attempted Murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the incident made by Toling constitutes a complex crime or eight (8)
counts of Murder and one (1) attempted Murder

RULING:

The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one (1) attempted murder. The eight (8)
killings and one (1) attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they
cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which refers to cases where a single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other. Moreover, the Supreme court ruled to
similar cases on the individuality and distinction of crimes, reference can be made from the case
of People vs. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058 where the accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed sixteen
persons and wounded others, was convicted of sixteen separate murders, one frustrated murder
and two attempted murder; and the case of People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes
committed by means of separate acts were held to be complex on the theory that they were the
product of a single criminal impulse or intent.

46
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GERMINIANO ARANETA

January 28, 1926 G R No. L-24622

FACTS:

That on or about the 17th of August, 1923, in the municipality of Dauis, Province of
Bohol, Philippine Islands, the above-named accused being as he was then a public officer,
employed in the municipality treasury of said municipality of Dauis, and as such in charge of
collecting and receiving the fees for permit to kill large cattle of the said municipality of Dauis,
he collected and received the sum of P1.50 from one Crispo Penales in payment of the fee for
permit to kill a cow belonging to Baldomero Doldole; that said defendant , simulating, falsifying
and counterfeiting the stub-book (sic) of the permit to kill large cattle no. 68, which is a public
document previously issued to Damaso Penales, erased the name of the latter and in lieu thereof
he put, inserted and substituted that of Baldomero Doldolea; instead of the word Mayacabac,
which indicated the place of residence of the owner of the cow described in the same permit to
kill No. 68, he erased said word and in lieu thereof, he put and inserted the word Poblacion;
instead of No. 1, which indicated the age of the cow to be killed according to said permit No. 68,
he erased said number and put inserted in lieu thereof the numbers 1½ and the mark of the
owner, DP, which appears in said permit No. 68, was erased by him and in lieu thereof he put
and inserted the mark D, thus making it appear in the aforesaid permit to kill large cattle No. 68
previously issued to Damaso Penales as though it had been originally issued for the cow of
Baldomero Doldolea, after making all the alterations aforementioned, and for the deliberate
purpose of damaging the interest of the Government, he did willfully, unlawfully and criminally
appropriate and convert to his own use and benefit the aforesaid sum of P1.50 which formed a
part of the public funds that were under his custody by reason of his office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Germiniano Araneta is guilty of the complex crime of Misappropriation

of public funds through Falsification of public documents

RULING:

47
 No. The defendant is found guilty of each of the separate crimes of misappropriation of
public funds and of the falsification of public documents. Misappropriation of public funds is
now punished under section 2672 of the Administrative Code, while the crime of falsification of
public documents by a public employee falls under article 300 of the Penal Code; one of the two
offenses being punishable under the Penal Code and the other under an ordinary Act of the
Legislature, they must be regarded as two separate and distinct offenses.

THE UNITED STATES v. ADEL HERNANDEZ ET AL.

December 24, 1914 G.R. No. L-9405

FACTS:

An informant and a DEA agent posing as his wife met the defendant in a coffee shop,
during which the two testified there was talk of a cocaine transaction. The two later met the
defendant at a service station and followed him to his tire shop. At that time, two packages of
cocaine were presented, and the defendant was arrested on the way to the place where payment
was to be made. At trial, the prosecution elicited testimony, over the defendant’s objection, from
the DEA agent, that an investigation had been opened as a result of a tip from another federal
agency that defendant was a drug smuggler. The testimony was reiterated and embellished
during closing argument. Defendant appealed on the grounds that the testimony was
inadmissible.

ISSUE:

Whether the statements by the agent that another agency had tipped off the DEA that the
defendant was drug smuggler constituted reversible error?

RULING:

Yes. The statements were made out of court by someone other then the declarant, and
they were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. They were not offered to prove state
of mind, which was irrelevant, but rather to show that the defendant was, in fact, a drug
smuggler. These statements were inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence (“F.R.E.”) Rules
802, 403 and 404(b).

The statements made by someone else to the DEA agent were out of court statements
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Even if it were accepted that the statements were
offered for some non-hearsay reason, the statements were still overly prejudicial as compared to

48
their probativeness, failing the F.R.E. Rule 403 balancing test. Moreover, evidence of past
crimes to show propensity was inadmissible under F.R.E Rule 404(b). As a result, the statements
constituted reversible error and the conviction was overturned.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN GAYETA y ROBLO alias "FREDDIE"

December 17, 2008 G.R. No. 171654

FACTS:

While spouses Benjamin and Conchita were drinking tuba in their home, two armed men
barged into their house and declared a hold-up who were later identified as herein appellant and
one Reano. Benjamin was kicked and boxed until the latter bled and lost consciousness, by
which Conchita surrendered P2,500. The two armed men then left and barged into another
couple’s home and demanded them for money. The wife, accompanied by the appellant, went to
their store to get money. In the store, the appellant forced the wife to have sexual intercourse
with him. After they had returned to their home, she told her husband that she had been sexually
abused. The husband had an altercation with the two perpetrators which resulted in him being
hit on the shoulder with a bullet.

The two denied that they took part in the crime claiming that it was physically impossible
for them to be at the scene of the crime for Gayeta was in Muntinlupa doing his rounds as a
member of the Voluntary Lakas Brigade, while Reano was in another town.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused was guilty of the crimes of robbery and robbery with rape with his
presentation of the Voluntary Lakas logbook.

RULING:

The inherently weak alibi presented by the accused does not hold a stronger bearing as
compared to the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses which is given full

49
faith by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, presented logbook was
neither authenticated nor identified by the persons who supposedly issued them.

The aggravating circumstance of dwelling was properly appreciated in both robbery and
robbery with rape. There being no evidence to show that the accused purposely sought nighttime
to facilitate the commission of the offense, this circumstance was ruled out. The original penalty
of death is therefore reduced to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENEDICTO RAMOS y BINUYA alias Bennie

October 12, 1998 G.R. No. 118570

FACTS:

a) Plaintiff-Appellee’s Arguments (Pp. - Win)

Filed a case against Defendant with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with
murder

Argued that Defendant kidnapped a certain Alicia Abanilla. Defendant forcibly took Abanilla in
a taxi and continuosly threatened her with a firearm. Defendant was able to extort a ransom of
200 000 from Abanilla’s manager in MERALCO. In a desperate effort to free herself, Abanilla
opened the left rear door and jumped out of the cab; unfortunately, her blouse was caught in the
process. As a consequence, she was dragged by the vehicle. Defendant then suddenly stopped the
taxi, and as Abanilla attempted to rise, he aimed his gun at the back of his hapless victim, fired at
her twice, hitting her just above her nape and killed her.

Trial court rendered a decision convicting Defendant of two (2) separate crimes — kidnapping
for ransom and murder — instead of the complex crime charged in the Information. It held that
there was no proof that the victim was kidnapped for the purpose of killing her so as to make the
offense a complex crime. Thus, the killing of the victim was found to be merely an afterthought
making accused-appellant liable for two (2) separate offenses

b) Defendant-Appellant’s Arguments (Ramos - Lost)

Argued that kidnapping was never sufficiently established. He maintains that all throughout the
incident the victim was not under detention at any moment nor was she deprived in any manner
of her liberty; that if there was some kind of pressure or force employed upon the victim, such

50
pressure or force did not amount to a deprivation of liberty but was merely a matter of persuasion
that moved the victim to go with him voluntarily

Appealed to SC the decision of CA

ISSUE:

Whether or not Defendant is guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping for
ransom with murder

RULING:

The Defendant is guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with
murder. He is sentenced to death and ordered to pay the heirs of victim Alicia Abanilla in the
amount of P50,000.00 plus P105,150.00 for burial expenses.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping as defined and penalized under Art. 267 of The
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 8 of RA No. 7659, 7 is the actual deprivation of the
victim's liberty coupled with an indubitable proof of intent on the part of the malefactor to effect
such restraint on the offended party' liberty. The term "actual deprivation of liberty" consists not
only of placing a person in an enclosure but also of detaining a person or depriving him in any
manner of his liberty.

For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an
enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. It is enough that, as in the instant case, she was
in any manner deprived of her liberty, unable to move — and get out — as she pleased

RA No. 7659 amended Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code by adding thereto a last
paragraph which provides — When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention,
or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed.

This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of "special complex
crime" of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by
the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought
by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was
merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in
the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely
an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art.

51
48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the
last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.

In this case, actual restraint of the victim's liberty was evident from the moment she was
forcibly prevented by accused-appellant from going to work at Meralco and taken instead against
her will to Bulacan. Her freedom of movement was effectively restricted by her abductor who,
armed with a .22 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver which instilled fear in her, compelled her to
go with him to Bulacan. This is clear from the testimonies of witnesses Bradshaw and Pineda

The claim of the defense that the force or pressure employed against the victim was in
fact merely a matter of persuasion and not constitutive of restraint on the victim's liberty, taxes
credulity. Definitely, the acts of forcibly pulling the victim out of the car of witness Bradshaw,
strangling her while inside the taxi of Pineda, pulling her back into the cab when she attempted
to flee, and eventually shooting the victim twice in the head and hitting her, can hardly be
considered as "merely a matter of persuasion." On the contrary, these circumstances are positive
indications of the victim's detention by appellant against her will.

Considering the evidence extant on record, we agree with the trial court that victim Alicia
Abanilla was indeed kidnapped for ransom and then murdered by accused-appellant. But the
kidnapping for ransom and murder should not be treated as separate crimes for which two (2)
death penalties must as a consequence be imposed. Instead, under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal
Code, as amended by RA No. 7659, accused-appellant should be convicted of the special
complex crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER and impose upon him the
maximum penalty of DEATH.

Obviously, the instant case falls within the purview of the aforequoted provision of Art.
267, as amended. Although the crime of kidnapping for ransom was already consummated with
the mere demand by the accused for ransom — even before the ransom was delivered — the
deprivation of liberty of the victim persisted and continued to persist until such time that she was
killed by accused-appellant while trying to escape. Hence, the death of the victim may be
considered "a consequence of the kidnapping for ransom.

Thus, the Defendant is guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with
murder. He is sentenced to death and ordered to pay the heirs of victim Alicia Abanilla in the
amount of P50,000.00 plus P105,150.00 for burial expenses

52
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO PASCUAL Y ILDEFONSO

January 19, 2009 G. R. No. 172326

FACTS:

The conviction of accused-appellant stemmed from an Amended Information dated

February 23, 2001, filed with the RTC for the crime designated as Rape with Homicide and
Robbery. During trial, the defense presentedas witness, Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, forensic chemist
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Said witness testified on the result of the DNA analysis which she conducted on the
specimens submitted by the trial court consisting of the victim's vaginal smear and panty.
According to her, no DNA sample from the suspect was present on the aforesaid specimens. On
cross-examination, she declared that based on DNA testing, she could not determine if a woman
was raped or not. She further declared that in this case, it was possible that the stained vaginal
smear prevented a complete and good result for the DNA profiling. Upon being questioned by
the court, the forensic chemist confirmed that DNA testing on the subject specimens was
inconclusive and that the result was not good, as the specimens submitted, i.e., the stained
vaginal smear and the dirty white panty, had already undergone serological analysis.

53
 The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court's decision. Hence,
accused-appellant seeks for a final review of his case and makes much of the result of the DNA
analysis conducted by the NBI that his profile was not in the victim's vaginal smear. As such, he
argues he is innocent of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Does the result of the DNA examination entitle the accused-appellant to an acquittal

RULING:

In People v Yatar, the Supreme Court held that in assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed
in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, while the DNA analysis of the victim's vaginal smear showed no
complete profile of the accused-appellant, the same is not conclusive considering that said
specimen was already stained or contaminated which, according to the forensic chemist, Aida
Villoria-Magsipoc, deters a complete and good result for DNA profiling. She explained in her
testimony that generally, with the vaginal smear, they could see if there is a male profile in the
smear. However in this case, when they received the vaginal smear on the stained slide, the same
had already undergone serological analysis. Hence, according to the chemist, the DNA testing
conducted on the specimen subject of this case was inconclusive. In light of this flawed
procedure, we hold that the result of the DNA examination does not entitle accused-appellant to
an acquittal.

54
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICENTEDE LEON Y FLORA

October 8, 1926 G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376

FACTS:

Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de Leon y Flora entered the yard of
Vicente Magat's house on Domingo Santiago Street, Manila, and without violence or
intimidation against persons nor force upon things, took, with intent to gain, two game roosters
which were in the yard, one with colored plumage valued at P8 belonging to Diego Magat, and
the other with white plumage and black spots, valued at P10, belonging to Ignacio Nicolas.

Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal court for two crimes of theft, on
the theft of Magat's rooster and the other that of Nicolas'. Upon being arraigned, the accused
pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the municipal court in each to suffer the penalty of three
years, six months and one day presidio correcional, to return the stolen roosters to their
respective owners and to pay the costs in both cases. The accused appealed from this judgment to
the Court of First Instance, and, upon being arraigned upon the same informations, pleaded not
guilty in both cases, which were tried jointly by agreement of the parties approved by the court.

55
ISSUE:

Whether there is an existence of a continued crime

RULING:

Under sound principles, the act of taking the two roosters, in response to the unity of
thought in the criminal purpose on one occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the
accidental circumstance that the article unlawfully belonged to two distinct persons. There is no
series of acts here for the accomplishment of different purposes, but only one of which was
consummated, and which determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the
roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an
independent existence of their own, because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two
intentions that characterize two separate crimes.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a thing belonging
to another on one occasion and in the same place, constitutes the commission of only one crime
of theft; and fact that the things taken belong to different persons does not produce a multiplicity
of crimes, which must be punished separately.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, FRANCO BRILLANTES and HEMAN
GORRICETA

February 22, 1974 G.R. No. L-28547

FACTS:

The case is an appeal of the defendants Elias Jaranilla, Ricardo Suyo, and Franco
Brillantes from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilo-ilo which convicted the accused
of robbery and with homicide, and sentenced each of them to Reclusion Perpetua and ordered the
accused to pay solidarily the sum of six thousand pesos to the heirs of Ramonito Jabatan and the
sum of five hundred pesos to Valentin Baylon as the value of five fighting cocks.

It should also be noted that the accsued, Elias Jaranilla, has escaped from the provincial
jail and no record shows that he has been appreheanded.

ISSUE:

56
 Whether or not defendants Suyo and Brillantes are liable as co-principal in the crime of
Homicide

RULING:

The killing of the peace officer is characterized as homicide because the act was made
during the spur of the moment and the treacherous mode of attack was not consciously or
deliberately adopted by the offender. In addition, only persons who perpetrated the killing is
responsible for such action. Furthermore, mere presence in the crime scene does not necessarily
make a person co-principal thereof.

Hence, only the accused, Elias Jaranilla, who perpetrated the killing is responsible and liable for
robbery and homicide. The co-accused, Suyo and Brillantes, are convicted of theft. Therefore,
the decision of the lower court is reversed and sentenced the accused, Ricardo Suyo and Franco
Brillantes, as co-principals in the crime of theft.

No promulgation as to the accused, Elias Jaranilla, that being stated that the accused has
escaped from the provincial jail.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDITO MOLINA, JOHN DOE and JOSELITO

TAGUDAR

March 13, 2009 G.R. No. 184173

FACTS:

On 4 October 2002, at a wake of Carmen Daganato at the latter’s house located in Brgy.
Barbarsic, Ba-ug, San Juan, Abra, many adults and children were playing cards when suddenly a
shooting incident occurred, as testified by Allan Montorio, who saw two persons shooting at
their direction with an armalite and clad in black long-sleeves shirts, short pants and bonnets.
However, despite the fact that the aforesaid persons were wearing bonnets, Allan Montorio still
recognized them as the appellant Joselito Tagudar and Judito Molina because the masks that they
were wearing were like those of a ski-mask, which exposed their faces.

As a result of the shooting incident on that night, 4 people died, namely: Rog[e]e
Montorio, Eric Pacur[z]a, Jansen [Bersamin] and Algie Parcur[z]a; and fourteen (14) other

57
people were injured, namely: Ronald Ta[-]a, Crisanto Bar[u]ela, Robert Bar[u]ela, Carmelo
Daganato, Jomar Pillor, Allan Montorio, Filomeno Bulosan, Jerome Bayubay, Philip Eugene
Bar[u]ela, Gilbert Bar[u]ela, Rommel Pacur[z]a, Sammy Abundo and [Roger] Bersamin.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision dated May 24, 2006, finding the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of Murder and fourteen (14) counts
of attempted Murder. Subsequently, the appellant appealed the aforesaid decision to the Court of
Appeals.

Therafter, on 16 January 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the
trial court's Decision dated May 24, 2006. The appellate court held that, indeed, the prosecution
was able to discharge the burden of proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt
for the crimes of murder and attempted murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of Treachery must be appreciated

RULING:

Yes. Due to the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the Supreme Court
holds that the attack was undoubtedly treacherous. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime, depriving the victim
of any chance to defend himself or repel the aggression, thus, insuring its commission without
risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the victim. In the case at bar, the
appellate court enunciated in its Decision, that the prosecution was able to show that the assault
made upon the victims at the time of the shooting incident was so sudden and unexpected as to
have caught them unprepared to meet the assault.

The presence of treachery qualifies the killings of the four victims to murder. With
respect to the 14 injured victims, the crime committed by the appellant is attempted murder, as
the appellant already commenced the criminal acts by overt acts but failed to perform all the acts
of execution as to produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous
desistance. Similarly, treachery qualifies the attempted killings.

The Supreme Court rendered a decision in consideration of the Court of Appeals’

decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02327 - finding herein appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of four counts of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count and to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count; and of 14
counts of attempted murder and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years and

58
4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
maximum, for each count, and to pay P20,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count - is hereby
AFFIRMED with the modifications that (1) moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00, should also be awarded for each count of murder; and (2) moral damages of P10,000
and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 for each count of attempted murder should also be given
to each victim.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANSELMO MORALES (alias ARSENIO PABLO)

March 12, 1935 G.R. No. 42924

FACTS:

That on or about the 8th day of October, 1932, in the municipality of Mariquina, Province
of Rizal, Philippine Islands, the said accused, Anselmo Morales (alias Arsenio Pablo), through
false representations, that is, posing himself as a physician, diagnosed the ailment of one
Remedios Suarez and induced, convinced, received and took from the latter the amount of P3 for
which he pretended to purchase the necessary drug for the said Remedios Suarez, but the said

59
accused, once in possession of the said amount, far from complying with his obligation to
purchase and deliver to the offended party herein the medicine which he promised to buy, with
intent to defraud, did then and there wilfully and feloniously, appropriate the said sum to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Remedios Suarez in the
aforesaid amount of P3.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of Recidivism must be appreciated

RULING:

Yes. The aggravating circumstance of recidivism must be appreciated but it must be

offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. The offense committed falls within the
purview of article 315, subsection 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty
should be imposed in its medium degree, that is, from three months and eleven days to four
months and twenty days of arresto mayor. Appellant is therefore sentenced to three months and
eleven days of arresto mayor, and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P3, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

While it ia well settled that a plea of guilty admits all the material allegations in the
information, including that of habitual delinquency, in the case before us the information failed
to allege the date of appellant's last conviction or release. It simply averred that the crime herein
complained of was "committed within the period of 10 years from the date of his last
conviction". Apart from the fact that such averment is a mere conclusion of fact, the law
specifically provides that a person shall be deemed a habitual delinquent if within a period of ten
years from the date of his release or last conviction, he is found guilty of the crime of estafa a
third time or oftener. It is thus clear that what is material is not the date of commission of the
subsequent offense, but that of his conviction thereof, in relation to the date of his release or last
conviction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE NAVALES Y CALALANG

February 14, 1934 G.R. No. 40390

FACTS:

60
 From the evidence of record and the confession of guilt of the appellant, it appears that
on August 11, 1933, he took a piece of ham valued at P3.20 in the Quinta Market of the City of
Manila, without the knowledge and consent of Ong Siong, the owner thereof; that said appellant
had already been convicted once of estafa and four times of theft; and that he finished serving his
last sentence only on March 14, 1931, that is, scarcely two years and five months before the
commission of the offense of which he pleaded guilty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is discretionary on the part of this court to impose or not the additional
penalty prescribed in article 62 of the Revised Penal Code upon a habitual delinquent

RULING:

The appellant’s contention is erroneous in view of the express and unequivocal

provisions of said article 62 of the aforesaid Code. Said provisions enjoin that in all cases the
habitual delinquent should be punished not only with the penalty prescribed for the offense of
which he was last found guilty but also with the additional penalty prescribed therein, which
penalty varies according to the circumstances and the number of times said delinquent has been
convicted of any of the offenses therein enumerated. The only discretionary power granted by
the law to the courts is to fix said additional penalty within the limits specified in the aforesaid
article, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of each case. (People v.
Tanyaquin, 57 Phil., 426; and People v. Chua Buan, p. 106, ante.)

According to paragraph (c) of rule 5 of said article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, the
additional penalty which should be imposed upon the appellant, taking into consideration the fact
that he is a recidivist for the sixth time and that he is furthermore a habitual delinquent, is prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, that is, from ten years
and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal.

Wherefore, taking into consideration the fact that the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism, which was present in the commission of the crime of which the appellant has pleaded
guilty, is compensated by the mitigating circumstances of a voluntary confession of guilt, the
judgment appealed from should be as it is hereby modified, sentencing said appellant to two
months and one day of arresto mayor with the corresponding accessory penalties (article 309, 6th
case of the Revised Penal Code), instead of one month and one day of said penalty, and being a

61
habitual delinquent, to suffer the additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor
and to pay the costs. So ordered.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BASILIO DE JESUS Y JAVIER

October 31, 1936 G.R. No. 45198

62
FACTS:

Basilio de Jesus y Javier was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila in
criminal case No. 52270 of said court, of the theft of an umbrella and a buri hat valued at P2.65
committed, according to the information, on April 28, 1936. He was therein sentenced to one
month and one day of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties, to indemnify Francisco
Liwanag in the sum of P2.50 representing the value of the umbrella which was not recovered,
and being a habitual delinquent, the additional penalty of two years, four months and one day
ofprision correccional with the corresponding accessory penalties was also imposed upon him in
conformity with the provisions of subsection 5, paragraph (a), of article 62 of the Revised Penal
Code. Not agreeing with said penalties he appealed from the sentence undoubtedly for the review
of his case.

The appellant's counsel de oficio in this instance, considering the appealed sentence in
accordance with law, recommends the affirmance thereof in all respects in his short brief.

Due to the amount involved, the theft imputed to the appellant is punishable with arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods the duration of which is from one month and one day
to four months (art. 309, subsection 6, Revised Penal Code); and the minimum period of said
penalty is from one month and one day to two months. It appears therefrom that the penalty
questioned by the appellant is the minimum period, as no other less penalty could have been
imposed upon him because said penalty in itself already constitutes the minimum limit under the
law. The reasons which prompted the lower court to be lenient with the appellant were
undoubtedly his voluntary confession before the prosecution presented its evidence, which
constitutes a mitigating circumstance (art. 13, subsection 7, Revised Penal Code), and the
apparent absence of all allegation in the information of some aggravating circumstance that may
compensate said mitigating circumstance (art. 63, rule 1, Revised Penal Code).

The imposition of the additional penalty of two years, four months and one day upon the
appellant is justified by his own admission of guilt because the rule is well settled in this
jurisdiction that when one pleads guilty of the crime imputed to him in an information, it is
understood that he admits all the material facts alleged therein (U. S.vs. Barba, 29 Phil., 206;
U.S. vs. Santiago, 35 Phil., 20), not excluding those alleging his former convictions of other
crimes (U.S. vs. Burlado, 42 Phil., 72); and in the information filed against the appellant, it was
alleged:

That the said accused is a habitual delinquent within the purview of rule 5 of article 62 of
the Revised Penal Code, he having been convicted by final judgments of competent courts of the
following crimes: On January 4, 1933, he was convicted of theft and sentenced to one month and
one day of imprisonment, and on November 18, 1935, he was convicted of qualified theft and
sentenced to serve two months and one day of imprisonment, the date of his last release being
January 10, 1936.

63
ISSUE:

Whether or not, the appellant as a habitual delinquent, recommends that instead of

affirming his principal penalty of one month and one day of arresto mayor, it be increased to the
minimum of the medium period of that prescribed by law for his crime, or two months and one
day of arresto mayor, considering the aggravating circumstance of recidivism established but
compensated by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession.

RULING:

We should not lose sight of the fact that when the Legislature incorporated the provision
relative to habitual delinquency into the Revised Penal Code, it was aware — this, at least, is the
presumption of law — that recidivism was, as it continues to be in the majority of cases to this
date, an aggravating circumstance the effect of which, as the name itself implies, is to aggravate
the criminal responsibility of the delinquent. But unlike other circumstances, as treachery,
evident premeditation, sex, craft, relationship, public position, dwelling, not to mention several
others so as not to be tedious, which may be aggravating, qualifying and inherent as the case may
be, recidivism is and can be nothing else but an aggravating circumstance. This is the general
rule; but as such it certainly is not without its exception as other general rules. The exception is
found in the case of habitual delinquency, as recidivism is precisely one of those that constitute
and give it existence, the other being former conviction, but it is not necessary that both be
present at the same time.

Treachery, evident premeditation and relationship are aggravating circumstances in

crimes against persons and when one of them is present, for instance, in a case of homicide, the
crime committed ceases to be homicide and becomes murder or parricide, as the case may be. In
such cases, that of the said three circumstances which has raised the crime committed from the
category of homicide to that of murder or parricide, ceases to be an aggravating circumstance to
become a qualifying circumstance and, once accepted as such, it cannot, by virtue of the legal
maxim non bis in idem be considered as an aggravating circumstance at the same time (U. S.
vs.Estopia, 28 Phil., 97; U. S. vs. Vitug, 17 Phil., 1; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
November 13, 1871). So must recidivism be considered in habitual delinquency. We have taken
it into consideration in imposing the principal penalty and we cannot again take it into
consideration in imposing the additional penalty because inasmuch as recidivism is a qualifying
or inherent circumstance in habitual delinquency, it cannot be considered an aggravating
circumstance at the same time. Consequently, the additional penalty to be imposed upon the
appellant must be the minimum of the prescribed by law as, with the exception of recidivism, no
other circumstance or fact justifying the imposition of said penalty in a higher period has been
present.

64
 The proposition based on rules 1 and 2 of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, that if
recidivism is considered an inherent or qualifying circumstance of habitual delinquency it should
not be taken into account in the imposition of the principal penalty, seems to us untenable
because it is based upon the erroneous assumption that the habitual delinquency is a crime. It is
simply a fact or circumstance which, if present in a given case with the other circumstances
enumerated in rule 5 of said article, gives rise to the imposition of the additional penalties therein
prescribed. This is all the more true because the law itself clearly provides that the habitual
delinquent must be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for his last crime in addition to the
additional penalty he deserves.lâwphi1.nêt

In view of the foregoing facts and considerations and furthermore taking into account the
provisions of article 62, rule 5, paragraph (a), of the Revised Penal Code, we deem it clear that
the appellant deserves the additional penalty imposed by the lower court upon him. The penalty
prescribed by said rule is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, or from two
years, four months and one day to six years. What was imposed upon the appellant is the
minimum of said penalty and he has absolutely no reason to complain because after all he can
not be exempt from the additional penalty by reason of his admission at the trial that he is a
habitual delinquent, having committed the crime of theft for the third time before the expiration
of ten years from the commission of his former crime.

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 ANGEL C. BAKING and SIMEON G. RODRIGUEZ v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

July 28, 1969 G.R. No. L-30364

FACTS:

Petitioner has been in detention for 18 years of preventive imprisonment for the crime of
rebellion. He is claiming for allowance for good conduct as provided for by Art 97 of the RPC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art 97 of the RP is applicable to detention prisoners or prisoners who are
just serving preventive imprisonment.

RULING:

The term "any prisoner" in the English text of Art. 97 regarding good conduct allowance
is, in the Spanish text, "el penado," who is a convict or a person already sentenced by final
judgment. There is no doubt that Article 97 does not embrace detention prisoners within its
reach. Because it speaks of the buena conducta observada por el penado - not one under "prison
preventiva." The allowance for good conduct "for each month of good behavior" then
unquestionably refers to good behavior of a prisoner while he is serving his term as a convict and
not otherwise. Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in
Spanish, the Spanish text governs.

66
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO SANTIAGO y GATDULA, VICENTE
SANTIAGO y GATDULA, and VLADIMIR AMADO y SANTIAGO

November 28, 2007 G.R. No. 175326

FACTS:

On 8 April 1999, at around 10:00 in the evening, an informant approached Inspector

Cortez at the latters Narcotics Office in Imus, Cavite, and reported the drug trafficking activities
of appellants in Binondo, Manila. Inspector Cortez instructed the informant to contact the
appellants and arrange a transaction between him (Inspector Cortez) and the appellants for the
purchase of shabu. The informant called the appellants and told them that an interested buyer
wants to procure from them 300 grams of shabu for P300,000.00. Appellants agreed to the
transaction. Thereafter, Inspector Cortez formed a team and planned a buy-bust operation. The
team agreed that Inspector Cortez would act as the poseur-buyer while SPO1 Yatco, a certain
PO3 Wilfredo Luna (PO3 Luna), SPO1 Marcelino Male (SPO1 Male), PO3 Rolando Paternal
(PO3 Paternal), PO3 Ben Almojuela (PO3 Almojuela), PO3 Albert Colaler (PO3 Colaler), PO2
Allan Lising (PO2 Lising) and PO1 Aldrin Agravante (PO1 Agravante) would act as back-up
during the buy-bust operation. The team also prepared bundles of boodle money appearing to be
worth P300,000.00. The moneys were marked with the signature of PO3 Paternal.

On 9 April 1999, at about 6:30 in the morning, the team went to the Manila Western
Police District Command (WPDC) and coordinated the planned entrapment of appellants.
Afterwards, the team proceeded to the residence of the informant at P. Solano Street, Binondo,
Manila, arriving thereat at around 8:45 in the morning. Inspector Cortez and the informant
waited for appellants at the second floor of the informants house while SPO1 Yatco and PO3
Luna positioned themselves outside the house. The rest of the team members stayed within the
perimeter of the area. Later, Vladimir arrived and met the informant and Inspector Cortez. The
informant told Vladimir that Inspector Cortez was the interested buyer of shabu he referred to in
their previous conversation. Vladimir asked Inspector Cortez to show him the money. Inspector
Cortez opened the briefcase he was holding and displayed the boodle money. Vladimir then left
the two.

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 After a few minutes, Vladimir returned, this time accompanied by Edgardo and Vicente.
Edgardo introduced himself as a barangay kagawad and told Inspector Cortez, Walang problema
sa hulihan dito. Sagot ka namin dito. Vicente also uttered, Pare dito sa amin maganda ang klase
ng aming shabu. Puwede kang bumalik bukas ng hapon o sa kamakalawa para ka makapag-
purchase ng another 300 grams of shabu. Edgardo then brought out three transparent plastic bags
containing shabu while Vicente brought out a digital weighing scale. The appellants assisted
each other in weighing the three plastics bags of shabu. Each of the plastic bags weighed 100
grams. Subsequently, Vladimir handed the three plastic bags of shabu to Inspector Cortez, while
the latter turned over the briefcase containing the boodle money to the former. Inspector Cortez
then wiped his face with a handkerchief as pre-arranged signal to his back-up team. Thereupon,
he drew his service firearm, introduced himself as a narcotics agent, and declared the arrest of
appellants. Instead of yielding peacefully, appellants ganged up on Inspector Cortez. Vladimir
grappled with Inspector Cortez for the possession of the latters service firearm while Edgardo
and Vicente pushed Inspector Cortez to the wall. At this juncture, SPO1 Yatco and PO3 Luna
arrived and subdued the appellants. Thereafter, the rest of the back-up team entered the
informants house and assisted Inspector Cortez, SPO1 Yatco and PO3 Luna. The arresting
officers then seized the three plastic bags of shabu, the weighing scale, and the briefcase
containing the boodle money.

The three plastic bags of shabu recovered from appellants were submitted to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, for
laboratory examination. PNP Forensic Chemist Lorna Tria (PNP Forensic Chemist Tria) found
the contents of the three plastic bags to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. Upon being weighed, the three plastic bags were found to be containing 104 grams,
104.43 grams, and 103.77 grams of shabu, respectively, or a total of 312.2 grams.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 14 May 2001, finding appellants guilty of
violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, and imposing upon them the penalty of death. Aggrieved, appellants elevated the instant
case directly to this Court for review. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo, we
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for disposition. On 29 March 2006, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of organized/syndicated crime group under

Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated

RULING:

68
 No. Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 23 of Republic Act No.
7659, mandates that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any
person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group. The same article defines an
organized/syndicated crime group as a group of two or more persons collaborating,
confederating, or mutually helping one another for the purposes of gain in the commission of any
crime.

We agree with appellants contention, as affirmed by the OSG and the Court of Appeals,
that the RTC erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of organized/syndicated crime
group and in imposing the maximum penalty of death.

While the existence of conspiracy among appellants in selling shabu was duly
established, there was no proof that appellants were a group organized for the general purpose of
committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of the aggravating circumstance of
organized/syndicated group under Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, the above-
mentioned aggravating circumstance was not specifically alleged in the information. Both law
and jurisprudence require aggravating circumstances to be expressly and specifically alleged in
the complaint or information; otherwise, the same will not be considered by the court even if
proved during the trial.

Moreover, to secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential
elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. In
prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. Jn
the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish through testimonial, documentary and object
evidence the said elements.

Lastly, there is no proof on records showing that Inspector Cortez had ill motive in
testifying against appellants. The prosecution witnesses and appellants did not know each other
prior to the buy-bust operation. Appellants themselves admitted that they did not have any idea
why the buy-bust team had arrested and charged them with illegal sale of shabu.

69
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PASCUAL FAJARDO

May 25, 1938 GR No. 43466

FACTS:

In criminal case No. 9730 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Pascual Fajardo was
convicted of the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence and sentenced to pay
a fine of P270.10 and the costs. He appealed to this court, but his appeal was dismissed for the
reason that no brief was submitted within the reglementary period. Judgment was entered against
him and the record was returned to the lower court.

When the judgment was to be executed, it was found that the accused was insolvent, for
which reason the sheriff returned the writ unsatisfied. The clerk of court informed the provincial
fiscal to this effect and the latter replied that the accused should suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment although he was not so sentenced in the judgment. The clerk of court
reported the case to the court which, by order of March 13, 1935, held that the accused could not
be compelled to suffer subsidiary imprisonment because he was not so sentenced in the
judgment, and ordered his release, which was carried out. The fiscal appealed from said order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an accused who has been sentenced only to pay a fine may be compelled
to undergo subsidiary imprisonment, in the manner prescribed by law, in case he is found
insolvent because he has no property with which to pay

70
RULING:

No. The Solicitor-General strongly maintains in the affirmative and, in a nutshell, argues
that, under article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, the subsidiary imprisonment need not be
imposed in the judgment and may be automatically served if the offender is found to be
insolvent, however, the Supreme Court does not agree with this contention.

Following the principle in Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, it is clear that, when an
accused that has been sentenced by final judgment to pay a fine only and is found to be insolvent
and could not pay the fine for this reason, he or she cannot be compelled to serve the subsidiary
imprisonment provided for.

Moreover, the first paragraph of article 39 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

"Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty. If the convict has no property with which to meet the pecuniary
liabilities mentioned in paragraphs 1st, 2nd and 3rd of the next preceding article, he shall be
subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each 2 pesos and 60 centavos,
subject to the following rules:

Article 78 of Chapter V of the same Code, in its pertinent part, which deals with the execution
and service of penalties, provides:

"Art. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. No penalty shall be executed except by
virtue of a final judgment.

"A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with any
other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby."

It is a fundamental principle consecrated in section 3 of the Jones Law, the Act of

Congress of the United States of America approved on August 29, 1916, which was still in force
when the order appealed from was made, that no person may be deprived of liberty without due
process of law. This constitutional provision was in a sense incorporated in article 78 of the
Revised Penal Code prescribing that no penalty shall be executed, except by virtue of a final
judgment. As the facts show that there is no judgment sentencing the accused to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine imposed upon him, because the said
subsidiary imprisonment is not stated in the judgment finding him guilty, it is clear that the court
could not legally compel him to serve said subsidiary imprisonment. A contrary holding would

71
be a violation of the laws aforementioned. That subsidiary imprisonment is a penalty, there can
be no doubt, for, according to article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, it is imposed upon the
accused and served by him in lieu of the fine which he fails to pay on account of insolvency.

There is not a single provision in the Code from which it may be logically
inferred that an accused may automatically be made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in a case
where he has been sentenced merely to pay a fine and has been found to be insolvent. Such
would be contrary to the legal provisions above-cited and to the doctrine laid down in United
States vs. Miranda (2 Phil., 606, 610), in which it was said: "The judgment of the lower court
fails to impose subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency for indemnification to the owner
of the banca, but only imposes subsidiary punishment as to costs. In this respect the judgment is
erroneous and should be modified."

LOURDES A. SABLE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. ENRIQUETA

LOQUILLANO-BELARMINO

April 7, 2009 G.R. No. 177961

FACTS:

Petitioner, together with Concepcion Abangan (Concepcion), Ildefonsa Anoba

(Ildefonsa) and Valentine Abellanosa (Valentine), is accused in Criminal Case No. CBU-35455
of Falsification of Public Documents under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner and co-accused Ildefonsa were arraigned on 20 July 1994 while co-accused
Concepcion was never arrested. During the initial trial, Atty. Gines Abellana, counsel for all the
accused, manifested that co-accused Valentine was already dead and requested that his name be
dropped from the information.

By virtue of the Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs, Lot No. 3608 was subdivided into two
lots, namely, 3608-A and 3608-B; and OCT No. RO-2740 was cancelled. Lot No. 3608-A was
transferred to the name of co-accused Concepcion and was registered under Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 113266. With respect to Lot No. 3608-B, petitioner was able to execute a

72
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of one Perpetua Sombilon, and accordingly, the title to the lot
was transferred to the name of the latter under TCT No. 113267.

On 28 November 2000, the RTC convicted petitioner of the crime of Falsification of

Public Documents under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, but
acquitted Ildefonsa.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said RTC Decision on 20

January 2001. After several postponements due to the vacancy in the court a quo, the motion was
submitted for resolution only on 29 June 2001. The same was denied by respondent Judge
Enriqueta Loquillano-Belarmino in an Order dated 20 November 2003. On 13 December 2002, a
copy of the Order denying reconsideration of the judgment was received by petitioner’s counsel.

Subsequently, in an Order dated 22 July 2003, respondent Judge denied the Motions to
Recall Warrant of Arrest and to Vacate Entry of Judgment. Petitioner’s Notice of Appeal was
also denied for having been filed out of time.

On 25 August 2003, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the 22 July 2003 Order
and intimated her desire to apply for probation instead of appealing the judgment of
conviction.11 In a Motion12 dated 15 October 2003, petitioner again prayed for the Recall of the
Warrant of Arrest against her, while her Motion for Reconsideration and her application for
probation were pending resolution before the RTC.

Finally, on 20 November 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 81981, raising the sole issue of whether or not the respondent
court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for probation.

The petitioner prays that the instant petition be granted by allowing her to apply for
probation and ordering the RTC through respondent Judge to act on the application for probation
by the petitioner, based upon the recommendation of the probationer who may be assigned to
conduct the investigation of said application.

Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It

essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his
liability and save the state the time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the petition is procedurally flawed for being an improper recourse;

73
 2. Whether it should be denied for non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of
the law that an application for probation must be filed within the period for perfecting an appeal.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is
hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated 14 December 2006 and Resolution dated 21 February
2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

HERMENEGILDO DUMLAO y CASTILIANO and EMILIO LAO y GONZALES

March 2, 2009 G.R. No. 168918

FACTS:

This is an appeal to the Sandiganbayan resolution which granted the motion to

dismiss/quash of respondent Dumlao and dismissed the case against him.

On July 1991 an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging respondents
Dumlao and others with violation of section 3 of republic act no. 3019 known as anti-graft and
corrupt practices act.

The accused are members of the board of trustees of GSIS charged with unlawful entry to
contract of lease-purchase with La'o private person.

74
 When arraigned, Dumlao pleaded not guilty, and as agreed a joint stipulation of facts and
admission of exhibit was submitted to the court on January 2005

After the pre-trial, Dumlao filed a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, that the alleged board resolution was not approved by the
GSIS board of trustees because some signatures did not appear in the minutes therefore
concluding that there was no qourum. And was held meritorious.

But on September 2005, people of the Philippines represented by the office of the
ombudsman and thru the office of the prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the Sandiganbayan resolution.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the court acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence when it
dismissed the criminal case against dumlao and others?

(2) Whether or not the signatures of the majority of the GSIS board of trusteea are
necessary on the minutes of the meeting to give force and effect to resolution

(3) Whether or not the validity of the contract is an essential element of violation of
section

(4) Whether or not the court acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence when it
resolved to archive the case against respondent La'o?

On the other hand, Dumlao's contention were the following: (1) ombudsman's petition
will place him in double jeopardy (2) the Sandiganbayan could not be said to have gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction because it only followed the rule in pre-
trial and decided the case on the basis of the facts stipulated in the pre-trial (3) the facts agree by
the prosecution and respondents Dumlao in the pre-trial was approved by the Sandiganbayan
showed that Dumlao did not commit any crime (4) continuing prosecution of Dumlao, excluding
the other GSIS trustees constitutes unfair discrimination and his right to equal protection of the
law

Petitioner further contended that they were denied due process because Sandiganbayan
has dismissed the case after re-trial before they could present witnesses and offer exhibits.

RULING:

75
 Insufficiency of evidence is not of the grounds of motion to quash. Insufficiency is
ground for dismissal only after the prosecution rests its case. In this case, Sandiganbayan
deprived the prosecution to present its evidence in doing so violated the rights to due process.

Sandiganbayan erred in confusing the resolution and the minutes of the meeting which
allegedly approved the lease-purchase agreement. A resolution is distinct and different from the
minutes of the meeting.

In the issue of double jeopardy, the court did not agree with Dumlao because the first
jeopardy has not yet attached due to the premature dismissal.

In the issue of jurisdiction, in this case there was no error of judgment but a denial of due
process resulting in loss of jurisdiction.

In the issue of discrimination, the court is not convinced because Dumlao was the only
one left to be prosecuted because his co-conspirators are all dead.

The petition was granted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, as Ombudsman,

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., MARIA CLARA L. LOBREGAT, ROLANDO DELA
CUESTA, JOSE M. CONCEPCION, JOSE R. MENDOZA, HERMENEGILDO C.
ZAYCO, EMMANUEL M. ALAMEDA, AMADO C. MAMURIC, DOUGLAS LU YM,
JAIME GANDIAGA, NARCISO M. PINEDA, DANILO S. URSUA

August 31, 2005 G.R. No. 131966

FACTS:

Desierto and Cojuangco et.al., are members of the Boards of Directors of United
Coconut Planter Bank and United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. They are charged with taking undue
advantage of their public office and close relationship with Dictator Marcos in unlawfully

76
misappropriating huge amounts of coconut levy funds in connection with the acquisition of 16
oil mills in order to establish a monopoly, violating RA 3019 (Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices
Act). The PCGG then transmitted the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate
action, OMB-0-90-2811. Thereafter, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Amanete, issued a
resolution recommending the dismissal of said case, finding no sufficient evidence to believe that
violation of Anti-Graft Law was committed. The Republic of the Philippines petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the information charged against Maria Clara Lobregat should be
dismissed and in effect, extinguishes criminal liability due to her death

RULING:

Yes. During the pendency of this petition, respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat died on
January 2, 2004. The death of an accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.21 Consequently, the case should be dismissed
with regard to her. The Court’s Decision dated September 23, 2002 is MODIFIED to the effect
that the charges against deceased respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat in OMB-0-90-2811,
pending preliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman, is ordered dismissed and
any criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto that might arise from said case is declared
extinguished by reason of her death.

RICHARD V. PETRALBA v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES

August 16, 1991 G.R. No. 81337

FACTS:

Petitioner Richard V. Petralba was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal

Treasury of Alcoy Cebu on October 23, 1 979. Fourteen (14) months after designation,
petitioner's cashbook balance was audited by Auditors Constantino Alagar and Rene Flores. He
was found short of P28,107.00, Petitioner, theretofore, was charged with, and convicted of, 31

77
counts of "Malversation of Public Funds," "Illegal Use of Public Funds" and "Falsification of
Public Documents." Petitioner was granted probation and continued his function as Municipal
Treasurer of Alcoy Cebu, from December 23, 1980 until he was succeeded by Mrs. Lilia Suico
on March 15, 1981.

Petitioner's cash and accounts from the period of December 23, 1980 to March 15, 1981
were audited by Leticia Trazo and Flora Pacana. Petitioner was found short in the amount of
P50,447.06. On December 4,1981, the Trazo Team sent a letter (Exhibit "H") to the petitioner
demanding the turnover of the latter's cash accountability. Vouchers amounting to P43,468.84,
which were previously allowed by Auditors Constantino Alagar and Rene Flores, were presented
by petitioner to Auditors Trazo and Pacana. Only the amount of P21,348.87 was allowed
reducing the petitioner's accountability to only P29,098.19 while the remaining vouchers
amounting to P22,119.97 were disallowed for want of administrative approval.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the information charged of Malversation of public funds, in violation of

Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code should be dismissed and criminal liability should be
extinguished due to the petitioner’s death pending the case

RULING:

Yes. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, death of the convict extinguishes
criminal liability. In view of the fact that one of the juridical conditions of penalty is that it is
personal. Actio personalis moritur cum persona; actio peonalis in haeredem non datur nisi forte
ex damno locupletior haeres factus sit. (A personal right of action dies with the person. A penal
action is not given against an heir, unless, indeed, such heir is benefited by the wrong.)

On August 10, 1989, while the case of Malversation of public funds, in violation of
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code was pending before the Supreme Court, petitioner's
counsel filed a manifestation that the petitioner, Richard V. Petralba, had died, evidenced by a
death certificate dated July 10, 1989.

Criminal liability does not only mean the obligation to serve the personal or
imprisonment penalties but it also includes the liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties.
Pecuniary liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment. (Art. 89(l), Revised Penal Code). In the case at bar, petitioner Richard V. Petralba
died pending appeal and before any final judgment therein. Hence, the death of Richard V.
Petralba extinguished his personal and pecuniary (such as the fine) liabilities.

78
 Though the death of an accused-appellant during the pendency of an appeal extinguished
his criminal liability, his civil liability survives. Extinction of criminal liability does not
necessarily mean that the civil liability is also extinguished. In People vs. Navoa, 132 SCRA
410, and in People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, We ruled that only the criminal liability
(including the fine, which is pecuniary but not civil) of the accused is extinguished by his death,
but the civil liability remains. The claim of the government for the civil liability survives
Petralba but only if the offense can be proved.

79