Continental Steel Manufacturing

Corporation vs Voluntary Arbitrator Allan

Montaño
April 26, 2014
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603 SCRA 621 – Labor Law – Labor Standards – Death Benefits for the Death of a Dependent –
A Fetus is a Dependent
Civil Law – Civil Personality – When does civil personality start – When does life begin

In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the death of
their unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, then filed
death benefits claim from his employer, the Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation which
denied the claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration and both parties agreed to
have Atty. Allan Montaño act as the arbitrator. Montaño ruled that Hortillano is entitled to his
claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Montaño.

On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the CBA, death
benefits are awarded if an employee’s legitimate dependent has died; but that in this case, no
“death” has occurred because the fetus died inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no
juridical personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code which
provides a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born; that the fetus was not born
hence it is not a legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as
contemplated under civil laws.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent?

2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die?

HELD:

1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put in
question, hence they are presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate. Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate
dependent the moment it was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg cell).

2. No. Death is defined as “cessation of life”. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is no
need to discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality – that is not the
issue here. But nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the
Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not
explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this
case, Hortillano’s fetus had had life inside the womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life
for 38 weeks before the unfortunate miscarriage. Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence
Hortillano as an employee is entitled to death benefit claims as provided for in their CBA.
 G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997
FACTS:

This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T.

Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she represented
that she was single although she was married. When management found out, she was made to
explain. However, her explanation was found unsatisfactory so she was subsequently dismissed
from work.

Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB. According to the Labor
Arbiter, Grace, who had already gained the status of regular employee, was illegally dismissed
by PT&T. Moreover, he ruled that Grace was apparently discriminated against on account of her
having contracted marriage in violation of company rules.

On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action.

Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because of her
concealment of the fact that she was married. Such concealment amounted to dishonesty, which
was why she was dismissed from work.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for
employment was discriminatory
 Whether or not Grace’s act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss
of confidence
 Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed

HELD:

There was discrimination

Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the
marriage of a female employee.

Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker
who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all
women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s
assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the
record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the
company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not
merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty

Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not
be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did
mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she
was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil
status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for
termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty
committed by the employee and not on the employer’s caprices. Furthermore, it should never be
used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.

However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be
sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted
temporary suspension of Grace from work.

Grace attained regular status as an employee

Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal.
When she was served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the
probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September
2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding
down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning
security of tenure.

There was illegal dismissal

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without
just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and
to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.

On Stipulation against Marriage

In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&T’s policy against marriage is that it strikes at the very
essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the
family as the foundation of the nation.

Petition dismissed.
Facts:

Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine

Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment
of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services
of an employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman,
contrarily argues that what really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her
having contracted marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner
in its company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross
violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of
the Labor Code.

Issue: WON the policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage is valid?

Held: Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution.

The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost
all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective
provisions. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional
guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required,
as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual
under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence
of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, one’s labor
being regarded as constitutionally protected property. The government, to repeat,
abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT&T. The
Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to

require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
marriage.”

In the case at bar, it can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private
respondent by the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, that “you’re
fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was
verbally instructed to you.” Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same
branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from
the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over
and on top of that, was her violation of the company’s policy against marriage (“and
even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in
our company.”

Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor
Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage
in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public
policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a
privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable
right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should
not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to
its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioner’s policy against legitimate
marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the
sacrament of marriage
RAMON JESUS P. PAJE v. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, GR No. 207257, 2015-02-03

Facts:

In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a government agency organized
and established under Republic Act No. (RA) 7227,[4] and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation
(TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing their... intention to
build a power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay
Industrial Park (SBIP).[5]

On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby TCC undertook to build
and operate a coal-fired power plant.[6] In the said MOU, TCC identified 20 hectares of land at
Sitio Naglatore, Mt. Redondo, Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) as... the suitable area for the
project and another site of approximately 10 hectares to be used as an ash pond.[7] TCC intends
to lease the property from SBMA for a term of 50 years with rent fixed at $3.50 per square
meter, payable in 10 equal 5-year... installments.[8]

On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) No. EC-SBFZ-ECC-69-21-500 in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International
Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC,[9] for the construction, installation, and... operation of
2x150-MW Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio
Naglatore.[10]

On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU dated July 28, 2006 to
Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy),[11] a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines with the primary purpose of building,... owning, and operating
power plants in the Philippines, among others.[12] Accordingly, an Addendum to the said MOU
was executed by SBMA and RP Energy.[13]

On June 8, 2010, RP Energy and SBMA entered into a Lease and Development Agreement
(LDA) over a 380,004.456-square meter parcel of land to be used for building and operating the
coal-fired power plant.[20]

On July 8, 2010, the DENR-EMB issued an amended ECC (first amendment) allowing the
inclusion of additional components, among others.[21]

Several months later, RP Energy again requested the DENR-EMB to amend the ECC.[22]
Instead of constructing a 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant, as originally planned, it now sought
to construct a 1x300-MW coal-fired power plant.[23] In... support of its request, RP Energy
submitted a Project Description Report (PDR) to the DENR-EMB.[24]

On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the request and further amended the ECC (second
amendment).[25]
On August 1, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Zambales issued Resolution No. 2011-
149, opposing the establishment of a coal-fired thermal power plant at Sitio Naglatore, Brgy.
Cawag, Subic, Zambales.[26]

On August 11, 2011, the Liga ng mga Barangay of Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 12,
Series of 2011, expressing its strong objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy
source.[27]

On July 20, 2012, Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño, Hon. Raymond V. Palatino, Hon. Rafael V.
Mariano, Hon. Emerenciana A. De Jesus, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., Hon. Rolen C. Paulino, Hon.
Eduardo Piano, Hon. James de los Reyes, Hon. Aquilino Y. Cortez, Jr., Hon. Sarah Lugerna

Lipumano-Garcia, Noraida Velarmino, Bianca Christine Gamboa Espinos, Charo Simons,

Gregorio Llorca Magdaraog, Rubelh Peralta, Alex Corpus Hermoso, Rodolfo Sambajon, Rev. Fr.
Gerardo Gregorio P. Jorge, Carlito A. Baloy, Ofelia D. Pablo, Mario Esquillo, Elle Latinazo,
Evangeline

Q. Rodriguez, and John Carlo delos Reyes (Casiño Group) filed before this Court a Petition for
Writ of kalikasan against RP Energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity as
Secretary of the DENR.[

On July 31, 2012, this Court resolved, among others, to: (1) issue a Writ of kalikasan; and (2)
refer the case to the CA for hearing and reception of evidence and rendition of judgment.[

On September 11, 2012, the Petition for Writ of kalikasan was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
00015 and raffled to the Fifteenth Division of the CA.[31] In the Petition, the Casiño Group
alleged, among others, that the power plant project would cause... grave environmental
damage;[32] that it would adversely affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of
Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo;[33] that the ECC was issued and
the LDA entered into... without the prior approval of the concerned sanggunians as required
under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code (LGC);[34] that the LDA was entered
into without securing a prior certification from the National Commission on Indigenous

Peoples (NCIP) as required under Section 59 of RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act
of 1997 (IPRA Law);[35] that Section 8.3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 (DAO
2003-30) which allows amendments of ECCs is ultra vires because the

DENR has no authority to decide on requests for amendments of previously issued ECCs in the
absence of a new EIS;[36] and that due to the nullity of Section 8.3 of DAO 2003-30, all
amendments to RP Energy's ECC are null and void.[37]

On October 29, 2012, the CA conducted a preliminary conference wherein the parties, with their
respective counsels, appeared except for Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño, Hon. Rafael V. Mariano, Hon.
Emerencia A. De Jesus, Clemente G. Bautista, Mario Esquillo, Elle Latinazo, Evangeline Q.

Rodriguez, and the SBMA.[

Issues:

Petitioners (Casiño Group)

1. Whether x x x the DENR Environmental Compliance Certificate ('ECC' x x x) in favor of

RP Energy for a 2x150 MW Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant Project ('Power Plant,' x x
x ) and its amendment to 1x300 MW Power Plant, and the Lease and Development
Agreement between SBMA and RP

Energy complied with the Certification Precondition as required under Section 59 of Republic
Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 ('IPRA Law,' x x x);

2. Whether x x x RP Energy can proceed with the construction and operation of the 1x300
MW Power Plant without prior consultation with and approval of the concerned local
government units ('LGUs,' x x x ), pursuant to Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No.
7160 or the Local

Government Code;

3. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 ('DAO No. 2003-
30,' x x x ) providing for the amendment of an ECC is null and void for being ultra vires;
and
4. Whether x x x the amendment of RP Energy's ECC under Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-
30 is null and void.

. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 can be collaterally attacked;

1.1 Whether x x x the same is valid until annulled;

2. Whether x x x petitioners exhausted their administrative remedies with respect to the

amended ECC for the 1x300 MW Power Plant;

2.1 Whether x x x the instant Petition is proper;

3. Whether x x x RP Energy complied with all the procedures/requirements for the issuance
of the DENR ECC and its amendment;

3.1 Whether x x x a Certificate of Non-Overlap from the National Commission on Indigenous

Peoples is applicable in the instant case;

4. Whether x x x the LGU's approval under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government
Code is necessary for the issuance of the DENR ECC and its amendments, and what
constitutes LGU approval;
5. Whether x x x there is a threatened or actual violation of environmental laws to justify the
Petition;
5.1 Whether x x x the approved 1x300 MW Power Plant complied with the accepted legal
standards on thermal pollution of coastal waters, air pollution, water pollution, and acid deposits
on aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems; and

6. Whether x x x the instant Petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the
requirements of proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping with respect
to some petitioners.

Respondent DENR Secretary Paje

1. Whether x x x the issuance of the DENR ECC and its amendment in favor of RP Energy
requires compliance with Section 59 of the IPRA Law, as well as Sections 26 and 27 of
the Local Government Code;
2. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 can be collaterally attacked in this
proceeding; and
3. Whether x x x Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 is valid.

Ruling:

On January 30, 2013, the CA rendered a Decision denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan
and the application for an environment protection order due to the failure of the Casiño Group to
prove that its constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was... violated or
threatened.[53] The CA likewise found no reason to nullify Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30. It
said that the provision was not ultra vires, as the express power of the Secretary of the DENR,
the Director and Regional Directors of the EMB... to issue an ECC impliedly includes the
incidental power to amend the same.[54] In any case, the CA ruled that the validity of the said
section could not be collaterally attacked in a petition for a writ of kalikasan.[55]

Nonetheless, the CA resolved to invalidate the ECC dated December 22, 2008 for non-
compliance with Section 59 of the IPRA Law[56] and Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC[57] and
for failure of Luis Miguel Aboitiz (Mr. Aboitiz), Director of

RP Energy, to affix his signature in the Sworn Statement of Full Responsibility, which is an
integral part of the ECC.[58] Also declared invalid were the ECC first amendment dated July 8,
2010 and the ECC second amendment dated May 26, 2011 in view of the... failure of RP Energy
to comply with the restrictions set forth in the ECC, which specifically require that "any
expansion of the project beyond the project description or any change in the activity x x x shall
be subject to a new Environmental Impact Assessment."[59] However, as to the ECC third
amendment dated November 15, 2012, the CA decided not to rule on its validity since it was not
raised as an issue during the preliminary conference.[60]

The CA also invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy as it was issued without
the prior consultation and approval of all the sanggunians concerned as required under Sections
26 and 27 of the LGC,[61] and in violation of Section 59, Chapter
VIII of the IPRA Law, which enjoins all departments and other governmental agencies from
granting any lease without a prior certification that the area affected does not overlap with any
ancestral domain.[62] The CA noted that no CNO was secured from the

NCIP prior to the execution of the LDA,[63] and that the CNO dated October 31, 2012 was
secured during the... pendency of the case and was issued in connection with RP Energy's
application for a 2x300-MW coal-fired power plant.[64]

On May 22, 2013, the CA issued a Resolution[70] denying the aforesaid motions for lack of
merit. The CA opined that the reliefs it granted in its Decision are allowed under Section 15,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases as the reliefs... enumerated therein are
broad, comprehensive, and non-exclusive.[71] In fact, paragraph (e) of the said provision allows
the granting of "such other reliefs" in consonance with the objective, purpose, and intent of the
Rules.[72] SBMA's... contention that the stoppage of a project for non-compliance with Section
59 of the IPRA Law may only be done by the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous
peoples was also brushed aside by the CA as the Casiño Group did not file a case under the
IPRA Law but a Petition... for a Writ of kalikasan, which is available to all natural or juridical
persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened
to be violated.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority's Motion

for Reconsideration dated 18 February 2013, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Secretary Ramon Jesus P. Paje's Motion for Reconsideration dated 19 February 2013,... and
Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 22 February 2013, as
well as petitioners' Omnibus Motions for Clarification and Reconsideration dated 25 February
2013, are all DENIED for lack of merit.
Paje vs Casino (749 SCRA 39)
FACTS:
 In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a government agency
organized and established under Republic Act No. (RA) 7227, and Taiwan Cogeneration
Corporation (TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing
their intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and
affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP).
 On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby TCC undertook to
build and operate a coal-fired power plant.
 On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), a
subsidiary of TCC, for the construction, installation, and operation of 2x150-MW
Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio Naglatore.
 On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU dated July 28,
2006 to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy).
 RP Energy then contracted GHD Pty., Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for the proposed coal-fired power plant and to assist RP Energy in
applying for the issuance of an ECC from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
 The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 131,
Series of 2008, expressing the city government’s objection to the coal-fired
power plant as an energy source and urging the proponent to consider safer
alternative sources ofenergy for Subic Bay.
 On December 22, 2008, the DENR, through former Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., issued
an ECC for the proposed 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant.
 Sometime thereafter, RP Energy decided to include additional components in its
proposed coal-fired power plant. On July 8, 2010, the DENR-EMB issued an amended
ECC (first amendment) allowing the inclusion of additional components, among others.
 Several months later, RP Energy again requested the DENR-EMB to amend the ECC.
Instead of constructing a 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant, as originally planned, it now
sought to construct a 1x300-MW coal-fired power plant.
 On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the request and further amended the ECC
(second amendment).
 The Sangguniang Panglalawiganof Zambales issued Resolution No. 2011-149,
opposing the establishment of a coal-fired thermal power plant.
 The Liga ng mga Barangayof Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 12, Series of
2011, expressing its strong objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy
source.
 Hon. Casino’s group filed for a writ of kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, DENR. The
Casiño Group alleged, among others, that the power plant project would cause
environmental damage. that it would adversely affect the health of the residents of the
municipalities of Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo.
  While the case was pending in the CA, RP Energy applied for another amendment to its
ECC proposing the construction and operation of a 2x300-MW coal fired power plant

CA:
Denied the writ of kalikasan due to the failure of the Casiño Group to prove that its
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or threatened
- no reason also to nullify sec 8.3 of DAO 2003-30) which allows amendments of ECCs.
Not ultra vires, as the express power of the Secretary of DENR, director and regional
directors of the EMB to issue an ECC impliedly includes the incidental power to amend
the same.
- The validity of the said section cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for a writ of
kalikasan
But invalidated the ECC for non-compliance with the IPRA law and LGC and failure to affix
the signature in the sworn statement of full responsibility
- Non-compliance with sec 59 of IPRA Law (enjoins all departments and other
governmental agencies from granting any lease without a prior certification that the
area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain)
- The CA also invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy as it was
issued without the prior consultation and approval of all the sanggunians
concerned as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC
- For failure of Luis Miguel Abolitz, director of RP Energy to affix his signature in the sworn
statement of full responsibility (integral part of the ECC)
- The first and second amendment for failure to comply with the restrictions in the ECC
which requires that any expansion of the project beyond the project description or any
change in the activity shall be subject to a new environmental impact assessment
Invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy
- Issued without prior consultation and approval of all the sanggunians concerned as
under secs 26 and 27 of the LGC
- In violation of sec 59 chapter VIII of the IPRA Law which enjoins all departments and
other governmental agencies from granting any lease without a prior certification that
the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain
- no CNO was secured from the NCIP prior to the execution of the LDA and that
the CNO dated October 31, 2012 was secured during the pendency of the case
and was issued in connection with RP Energy’s application for a 2x300 MW Coal
fired plant
ISSUE

1. Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan; and
2. Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan

Ruling

1. Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases) allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions
of fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court— because
of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan.

2. Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ
is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to
a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude
that transcends political and territorial boundaries.

A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the
issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but
must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the
defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation
of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude
contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and
the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.

In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even
attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the
perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.
The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casino group FAILED to substantiate its
claims that the construction and operation of the power plant will cause environmental
damage of the magnitude contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. On the other hand,
RP Energy presented evidence to establish that the subject project will not cause grave
environmental damage through its environmental management plan which will ensure
that the project will operate within the limits of existing environmental laws and standars.

OTHER ISSUES:
 CA erred in invalidating the ECC on the ground of lack of signature of Mr. Abolitz
in the ECC’s statement of accountability relative to the copy of the ECC
submitted by RP Energy to the CA. The circumstance of the case show that the
DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised of the issue of lack of
signature in order for them to present controverting evidence and arguments on
 this point, as the issue only arose during the course of the proceedings upon
clarificatory questions from the CA.
 CA erred when it ruled that the first and second amendments to the ECC were
invalid for failure to comply with a new EIA and for violating DAO 2003-30 and
the Revised Manual. DENR reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring
an ERMP and a PDR for the first and second amendment respectively.
Through these documents which the DENR reviewed, a new EIA was
conducted relative to the proposed project modifications. No showing of
grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality.
 CA erred when it invalidated ECC for failure to comply with sec 59 of the IPRA
Law. The ECC is not the license or permit contemplated under sec 59.
There is no necessity to secure the Certificate of Non Overlap (CNO) under
sec 59 before and ECC may be issued and the issuance of the subject ECC
without first securing the aforesaid certification does not render it invalid.
 CA erred when it ruled that compliance with sec 27 in relation to sec 26 of the
LGC (approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement) is necessary prior to
issuance of the subject ECC) issuance of the ECC does not, by itself, result in
the implementation of the project. Hence, there is no necessity to secure prior
compliance with the approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement
and the issuance of the subject ECC without first complying with the
aforesaid requirement does not render it invalid.
 G.R. No. 211362 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Academic Freedom

Remedial Law – Mandamus – Ministrant vs Discretionary Function

Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa Class
of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class had a lesson examination in their Operations
Research (OR) subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.

However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said
teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next
class (English). Later, the English teacher reported Cudia for being late.

In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a bit late.
The tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said
that their OR class was dismissed late because the OR teacher said she never dismissed her class
late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring hours because of said infraction.

Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content with the
explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior
tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his appeal.

In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR class was
dismissed at 3pm while his English class started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on
record, and based on the interview with the teachers concerned, the OR teacher did not dismiss
them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that
besides, under PMA rules, once a student submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed from
said class and may be excused to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well
before 3pm; that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed late because again, on
that day in the OR class, each student was dismissed as they submit their examination, and were
not dismissed as a class; that if Cudia was ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such
transaction was initiated by the teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his query to
the teacher), although there were at least two students with Cudia at that time querying the
teacher, the three of them cannot be considered a “class”; Cudia could just have stated all that
instead of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The STO sustained the
decision of the TO.

Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating the
Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal when he said his class was dismissed
late hence, as a result, he was late for his next class.

The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of their cadets.
Any violation thereof may be a ground to separate a cadet from PMA.

Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine (9)
cadets, conducted an investigation. After two hearings and after the parties involved were heard
and with their witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the members cast their vote. The
initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules (Honor
System), a dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a practice of
chambering where the members, particularly the dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is
to avoid the “tyranny of the minority”. After the chambering, the dissenter was convinced that
his initial “not guilty vote” was improper, hence he changed the same and the final vote became
9-0. Thus, Cudia was immediately placed inside PMA’s holding center.

Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the Superintendent of
the PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.

Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military officers requesting
for a re-investigation. It was their claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done by
the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred to the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).

Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) where
it was alleged that PMA’s “sham” investigation violated Cudia’s rights to due process,
education, and privacy of communication.

Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff.
But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia.

PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition
as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that the court should avoid
interfering with military matters.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper.

2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.

HELD:

I.

Mandamus is not proper

Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudia’s prayer that PMA should be compelled to
reinstate him as well as to give him his supposed academic awards is not proper. The Courts,
even the Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to do so because the act of restoring Cudia’s rights
and entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a discretionary act. Mandamus cannot be
availed against an official or government agency, in this case PMA, whose duty requires the
exercise of discretion or judgment. Further, such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to
perform is within PMA’s academic freedom as an educational institution – and such performance
is beyond the jurisdiction of courts.

Certiorari is allowed

The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA and its
responsible officers acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. Under the
Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide actual controversies and to determine
whether or not a government branch or instrumentality acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into military affairs is not proper as a matter
of policy. Suffice it to say that judicial non-interference in military affairs is not an absolute rule.

On the civil liberties of PMA cadets

One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they enrolled in the PMA, have
surrendered parts of their civil and political liberties. Hence, when they are disciplined and
punished by the PMA, said cadets cannot question the same, much less, question it in the courts.
in short, they cannot raise due process.

On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by enrolling at
PMA, must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of the
educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a student at a civilian
public school. However, a cadet facing dismissal from PMA, whose private interests are at stake
(life, liberty, property) which includes his honor, good name, and integrity, is entitled to due
process. No one can be deprived of such without due process of law and the PMA, even as a
military academy, is not exempt from such strictures. Thus, when Cudia questioned in court the
manner upon which he was dismissed from the PMA, such controversy may be inquired upon by
the courts.

(Author’s note: PMA, in essence, raised that due process, as contemplated by the Constitution, is
not needed in dismissing a cadet yet, as can be seen in the below discussion, PMA presented
evidence that due process was, in fact, complied with.)

II. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still
worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this case, the investigation of
Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the
PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given the
opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire
process that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after
he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team
submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC
thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for
formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal
investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and given the right to enter his
plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present
evidence in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to
have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the
Academy level – from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the
Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also
conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ
(AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB.
Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the
PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he
had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.
And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the findings of facts by these bodies.

Academic freedom of the PMA

Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by
the PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor Code
violation is not among those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets considering that the
Honor Code and the Honor System (manner which PMA conducts investigation of Honor Code
violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically terminated or dismissed from service.

Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory
authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act
No. 1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power by the President may be
delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control over the
cadets.

Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic freedom. Academic
freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher
learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.

The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;

a. the right to determine who may teach;

b. the right to determine what may be taught;

c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;

d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.

The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. If it
determines that a cadet violates it, then it has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case, based
on its findings, Cudia lied – which is a violation of the Honor Code.

But Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes any
form of lying. It does not have a gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of the PMA as
to what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia enrolled at PMA, he agreed to abide by the Honor
Code and the Honor System. Thus, while the punishment may be severe, it is nevertheless
reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -also considering that
Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.
PRC vs. De Guzman, G. R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004
Constitutional Law: Police Power

Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila.
They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine
(Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful
examinees in the medical licensure examination.

Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from
Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem)
and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima
examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem,
and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from
Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison
of the performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely,
the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking
phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination.

For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician
Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.”

The Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging respondents with "immorality, dishonest
conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It
recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. Trial court’s judgment is rendered
ordering the respondents to allow the petitioners and intervenors to take the physician’s oath and to register
them as physicians without prejudice to any administrative disciplinary action which may be taken against
any of the petitioners for such causes and in the manner provided by law and consistent with the
requirements of the Constitution as any other professionals.

Issue: Whether or not the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 (prescribes that a person who aspires to practice
medicine in the Philippines, must have “satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination) known
as The Medical Act of 1959 a valid exercise of police power.

Held:

Yes. It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or
course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like
all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the
police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general
welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or
technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their
chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public
from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice
medicine.

*satisfactorily- defined as “sufficient to meet a condition or obligation” or “capable of dispelling doubt or

ignorance”

It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an
occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner.
A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and
grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require
giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license.
Ondoy vs. Ignacio et. al. 97 SCRA 252 G.R. No. L-47178 May 16, 1980
[Estrella B. Ondoy, petitioner vs. Virgilio Ignacio, Proprietor M/B Lady Estrellita and/or
Imperial Fishing Enterprises and/or the Secretary of Labor and/or The Compensation Appeals
and Review Staff, Department of Labor, Respondents]

Facts: The petitioner, Estrella Ondoy, is a mother of one Jose Ondoy, an employee who worked
under Virgilio Ignacio. According to the chief engineer and oiler, Jose Andoy was aboard the
ship of the respondent’s enterprise as part of the workforce. He was invited by friends to a
drinking spree, left the ship and thereafter was found dead due to drowning. Thus the petitioner
asked for compensation, however, the testimonies by the chief engineer were dismissed by the
hearing officer due to lack of merit. Afterwards, a motion for reconsideration was also filed
before the Secretary of Labor, but was denied again due to lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not the compensation for Jose’s death is constitutional. Whether or not Social
Justice has a role in this case.

Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition, granting Estrella Ondoy 6,000 pesos as
compensation for Jose’s death, 300 pesos for burial fees and 600 pesos as attorney’s fee with the
costs against respondent, Ignacio.

Ratio Decidendi: The principle of social justice applied in this case is a matter of protection, and
not equality. The Supreme Court recognized the right of petitioner to claim a compensation from
the respondent, as Jose did drown while “in the actual performance of his duty.” To fortify this
ruling, the SC cited cases wherein, with accordance to the constitutional scheme of social justice
and protection to labor, Workmen’s Compensation Act, which dealt with the right of workers for
compensation for personal injury, was applied. Among them is a case where there was no direct
testimony attesting that the deceased drowned while in the performance of his duty, however, the
compensation was sustained. Lastly from another case, the SC quoted that “as between a laborer,
usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the
law has reason to demand from the latter strict compliance. Social justice in these cases is not
equality but protection.
 Ondoy v. Ignacio
G.R. No. L-47178 May 16, 1980
Fernando, C.J.

Held:

The principle of social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. As between a
laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice,
the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases is not
equality but protection.
Estrella Ondoy
vs
Virgilio Ignacio

Art II Sec 10 of the Constitution of the Philippines : The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development.
Facts:

Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the employ of Virgilio Ignacio. According to the
chief engineer and oiler, Jose Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of the workforce. He was invited by
friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. Therefore, Estrella was
asking for compensation from the death of her son while in the respondent’s employ. However, the
statement given by the chief engineer and oiler was ignored by the hearing officer and therefore
dismissed the claim for lack of merit. Even when a motion for reconsideration was filed, this was also
denied by the Secretary of Labor for the same reason, that is, lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy is constitutional; is social justice
applicable in this case?

Ruling:

Yes.

Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of the Department of Labor. It merely disregarded
the statements made by the chief engineer and oiler. Secondly, the principle of social justice applied in
this case is a matter of protection, not equality. The Court recognized the right of the petitioner to the
claim of compensation because her son was shown to have died while “in the actual performance of his
work.” To strengthen the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, The Court
quoted another case “as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has
resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter the stricter
compliance.”