MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, G.R. No.
122156; which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
February 3, 1997
TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing
Constitutional Provisions
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel
(MHC).
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the
MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC
sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent
letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October
1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the
Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel
has been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle
and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and
requires implementing legislation(s).
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly
Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
RULING:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as
those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative
act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation.
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003
Facts:
- On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the
House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings,
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules
approved by the 11th Congress.
-On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted
a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice
“to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
-On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada
filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was
endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred
to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on
13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint
was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same
on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
-The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by
at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
-Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against
the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates
the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.”
Issues:
-Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second
impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
-Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the
Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
-Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Rulings:
-This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is
beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme
Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
- Any discussion of this issue would require the
Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question
which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is
clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
- Courts will not touch the issue of
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable
and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
-The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of
Congress is unconstitutional.
-Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power
to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by
the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were
intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations
on its power to make rules.
-It is basic that all rules must not contravene the
Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would
by necessary implication have the power to alter or
amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of
referendum.
-It falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the
act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral
to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action
taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may
not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
-Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was
filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices
of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
-Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23,
2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI
of the Constitution.
Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary
194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials –
Members of the Cabinet – Singularity of Office – EO 284
FACTS:
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries
to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions subject to limitations
set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this
EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The
constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU
on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to
Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution,
namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7;
and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1),
Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple
offices or employment in the government, except in
those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as
above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet
members (then called Ministers) as examples during the
debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down
for all appointive officials should be considered as mere
personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s
understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in
relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
hold in addition to their primary position to not more
than 2 positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention
of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
Endencia vs Saturnino David
93 Phil. 699 – Political Law – The Judiciary – Te
Legislature – Separation of Powers
Statutory Construction – Who May Interpret Laws
FACTS:
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue,
ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and
Justice Fernando Jugo’s (and other judges’) salary
pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which
provides that
No salary wherever received by any public officer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax, payment of which is
hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
The judges however argued that under the case of
Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from taxation –
this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation
of powers, i.e., the executive, to which the Internal
Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that
under the Constitution, the judiciary is independent and
the salaries of judges may not be diminished by the
other branches of government; that taxing their salaries
is already a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see
Section 9, Art. VIII, Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states
that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was rendered
ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No.
590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is
constitutional.
HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the
separation of powers. Only courts have the power to
interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts
interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already
encroaching upon the functions of the courts when it
inserted the phrase: “payment of which [tax] is hereby
declared not to be a diminution of his compensation
fixed by the Constitution or by law.”
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes
upon judges is not a diminution of their salary. This is a
clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the
meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office,” found in Section 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries
of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the
Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province
and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
“The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature
cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of
what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any
binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition
of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its
meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature
would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution
and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide
therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may
not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying
the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting
said statute, especially when the interpretation sought
and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest
court of the land.
Judge David Nitafan vs Commissioner of Internal
Revenue
152 SCRA 284 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The
Judicial Department – Judicial Autonomy – Income Tax
Payment By The Judiciary
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the
Manila Regional Trial Court seek to prohibit the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from making
any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries
or compensation for such would tantamount to a
diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional.
Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the Court en banc
had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice
which directs the continued withholding of taxes of the
justices and the judges of the judiciary – but the SC
decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the
issue once and for all.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are
exempt from the payment of income tax.
HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution, based on their deliberations, was NOT to
exempt justices and judges from general taxation.
Members of the judiciary, just like members of the
other branches of the government, are subject to
income taxation. What is provided for by the
constitution is that salaries of judges may not be
decreased during their continuance in office. They have
a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and
caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall
be subject to the general income tax as well as other
members of the judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be
increased?
Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary
of the members of the judiciary and such increase will
immediately take effect thus the incumbent members
of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the law
increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of
the members of the judiciary but such will only be
applicable to members of the judiciary which were
appointed AFTER the effectivity of such law.
Note: This case abandoned the ruling in Perfecto vs
Meer and in Endencia vs David.
Aglipay vs Ruiz
Facts of the Case:
The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila
newspapers that he would order the issuance of
postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress celebration in the
City of Manila. The said event was organized by the
Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay,
the petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a
member of the Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the
President. The said stamps in consideration were
actually issued already and sold though the greater part
thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps
was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the
Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress
Held:
No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by
issuing and selling the commemorative postage stamps.
Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which
contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving the
Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the
issuance of new postage stamps would be
“advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the
phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not
authorize the violation of the Constitution. In the case
at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not
intended by Ruiz to favor a particular church or
denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman
Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale
of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of
issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of
an international event considered to be a great
opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a
result attract more tourists to the country. In evaluating
the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of
the Philippines instead of showing a Catholic chalice.
The focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and
it also bore the inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In
considering these, it is evident that there is no violation
of the Constitution therefore the act of the issuing of
the stamps is constitutional.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of
prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.
People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and
Romulo Intia y Morada
G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977)
FACTS:
Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was
charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed the
case on the ground that her court “has no jurisdiction to
take further cognizance of this case” without prejudice
to the re-filing thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he
believed that jurisdiction over 16 years olds up to under
21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance
of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which
defines youthful offenders as those over 9 years of age
but under 21 at the time of the commission of the
offense.
ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the
accused from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court.
HELD:
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly
confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over
“criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of
age at the time of the filing of the case”. The
subsequent issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as
“one who is over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time
of the commission of the offense” did not by such
definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years of age
from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court.
LATIN MAXIM:
35
Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis.
A thing not being expected must be regarded as coming
within the purview of the general rule.
VALERA VS. TUASON
80 Phil. 823 TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Abra dismissing a petition for certiorari.
It results that a complaint for forcible entry was filed in
the justice of the peace court of Lagayan over which
Judge Federico Paredes presided. Finding himself
disqualified, by reason of relationship to one of the
parties, to try the case, Judge Paredes transferred it to
the justice of the peace of La Paz, the nearest
municipality to Lagayan. The latter justice of the peace,
over the objection of the attorney for the defendants,
proceeded with the trial, after which he gave judgment
for the plaintiff and returned the record of the case with
his decision to the justice of the peace of Lagayan. In
the meantime, a new justice of the peace had been
appointed for Lagayan Mariano B. Tuason, one of the
respondents in the petition for certiorari. After the case
was received in the court of the justice of the peace of
Lagayan, the defendants moved for a new trial
impeaching the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace of
La Paz. The new justice of the peace of Lagayan found
the challenge well founded, declared the judgment null
and void, and ordered the case reset for hearing before
him.
The Lagayan justice's ground for unvalidating the
decision of the justice of the peace of La Paz is that "the
designation of another justice of the peace to hear, try
and decide a given case, when the justice having
jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the same disqualifies
himself, is not in law given to the disqualiying justice but
'to the judge of the district' who 'shall designate the
nearest justice of the peace.' (Section 211, Rev. Adm.
Code)." He believes that the circular of the Secretary of
Justice of January 17, 1940, in pursuance of which the
case was transfered, is legally wrong. (The circular
states that "when a justice of the peace is merely
disqualified to try a certain case, he should transmit,
without notifying the district judge, the record thereof
to the justice of the peace of the nearest municipality in
accordance with section 73 of the Code of Civil
Procedure".)
The annulment by the newly-appointed justice of the
peace of Lagayan of the proceedings before the justice
of the peace of La Paz and the latter's decision was
sustained on appeal by Honorable Patricio Ceniza, Judge
of the Court of First Instance, but on a different ground.
Judge Ceniza does not agree that section 211 of the
Revised Administrative Code has repealed section 73 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190.) He is of the
opinion that it is the new Rules of Court which have
abrogated the last-named section.
Section 73 of Act No. 190 as amended provides:
In every case, whether civil or criminal, of
disqualification of a justice of the peace upon any
ground mentioned in section eight of this Act, the
regular justice shall notify the auxilliary, who shall
thereupon appear and try the cause, unless he shall be
likewise disqualified or otherwise disabled, in which
event the cause shall be transferred to the nearest
justice of the peace of the province who is not
disqualified.
Section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides :
Auxilliary justice Qualifications and duties. The auxilliary
justice of the peace shall have the same qualifications
and be subject to the same restrictions as the regular
justice, and shall perform the duties of said office during
any vacancy therein or in case of the absence of the
regular justice from the municipality, or of his disability
or disqualification, or in case of his death or resignation
until the appointment and qualification of his successor,
or in any cause whose immediate trial the regular
justice shall certify to be specially urgent and which he
is unable to try by reason of actual engagement in
another trial.
In case there is no auxilliary justice of the peace to
perform the duties of the regular justice in the cases
above mentioned, the judge of the district shall
designate the nearest justice of the peace of the
province to act as justice of the peace in such
municipality, town, or place, in which case the justice of
the peace so designated shall have jurisdiction and shall
receive the total of his own salary and seventy-five per
centum of the salary of the justice of the peace whom
he may substitute.
One of the well-established rules of statutory
construction enjoins that endeavor should be made to
harmonize the provisions of a law or of two laws so that
each shall be effective. In order that one law may
operate to repeal another law, the two laws must
actually be inconsistent. The former must be so
repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act. (U.
S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil., 208.) Merely because a later
enactment may relate to the same subject matter as
that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to
cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law
may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.
(Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 634.)
The above-quoted provisions can stand together. By a
fair and reasonable construction, section 73 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, as amended, may be said to apply to
disqualifications under section 8 of that Act, and section
211 of the Revised Administrative Code to
disqualifications or disabilities not embraced in the
Code of Civil Procedure.
From another angle the presumption against repeal is
stronger. A special law is not regarded as having been
amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent
to repeal or alter is manifest. Generalia specialibus non
derogant. And this is true although the terms of the
general act are broad enough to include the matter in
the special statute. (Manila Railroad Company vs.
Rafferty, 40 Phil., 224.) At any rate, in the event
harmony between provisions of this type in the same
law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision
controls unless the statute, considered in its entirety,
indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the
legislature. Granting then that the two laws can not be
reconciled, in so far as they are inconsistent with each
other, section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being a
specific law, should prevail over, or be considered as an
exception to, section 211 of the Administrative Code,
which is a provision of general character. A general law
is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and
does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging
to such class, while a special act is one which relates to
particular persons or things of a class. (Statutory
Construction, Crawford, p. 265.)
But the history of the two laws gives positive indication
that they were designed to complement each other.
This history reveals that the two enactments have
different origins, one independent of the other, and
have been intended to operate side by side. This intent
is apparent from the fact that, in their respective
process of evolution, they, at one time, in Act No. 1627,
met and were lodged in adjoining sections 7 and 8 each
maintaining a separate and independent identity; and
while, later, section 7 of Act No. 1627 was amended by
section 3 of Act No. 1741, section 8 was given a
different direction by being amended by another law,
section 1 of Act 1888. We further note that the final
section of the Administrative Code expressly repealed
section 7 of Act 1627 and the entire Act 1741 but made
no reference whatever to section 73 of Act 190, section
8 of Act. 1627, or section 1 of Act 1888. The purpose to
keep both laws in force and subsisting can find no
clearer proof than this unless it be an express
declaration of intention.
For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs,
Judge Ceniza's opinion that the Rules of Court have
replaced and absorbed section 73 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is clearly erroneous. It may be said that there
is less reason to hold that this section has been
impliedly repealed by the Rules of Court than that it has
been abrogated by section 211 of the Revised
Administrative Code; for the authority of a judge to try a
case is a matter of substantive law, not embraced by
the purposes and scope of the Rules of Court, which
concern "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts
of the Philippines, and the admission to the practice of
law therein." (Introductory section of the Rules of
Court.)
Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed with costs
against the appellee.
Feria, Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO
FACTS:
For resolution is the problem of whether RA No. 6126
may be held applicable to the case at bar. For
convenience we reproduce the pertinent provisions of
law in question:
“Section 1 – no lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on
which another’s dwelling is located shall, during the
period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the
monthly rental agreed between the lessor and the
lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental
does not exceed 300php a month.
Section 6- This At shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved June 17, 1970
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6126 will have
retroactive effect at the case at bara
Held:
It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by
the trial court that the case at bar is covered by the
aforecited law. We rule, otherwise. Established and
undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of
the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, while the
law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a
period of one year and a half after the increase in
rentals had been effected.
Likewise the claim of private respondent that the
act is remedial and may. Therefore given retroactive
effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions
discloses that far from being remedial, the statute
affects substantive rights and hence a strict and
prospective construction therefore is in order. Article 4
of the civil code ordains that law shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and
that where the law is clear. Our duty is equally plain.
The law being a temporary measure designed to meet a
temporary situation, it has limited period of operation
as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal
language that “no lessor of a dwelling unit or land shall
during the period of one year from March 31, 1970,
increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the
lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this act.
Hence the provision against the increase in
monthly rental was effective only from March 1970 up
to March 1971. Outside and beyond that period the law
did not by the express mandate of the Act itself,
operate. The said law did not, by express terms, purport
to give retroactive effect.
We therefore rule that R.A. No. 6126 is not
applicable at the case at bar. As the language of the law
is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what
it plainly says.
Homeowners’ Association of the Phils., Inc. vs. The
Municipal Board of Manila, et al. and Villegas
G.R. No. L-23979 August 30, 1968
FACTS
The Mayor and the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila passed Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 on
December 31, 1963, to take effect on January 1, 1964,
declaring a state of emergency in view of the prevailing
scarcity of lands and buildings for residential purposes
in the City of Manila which shall provide housing
accommodations especially for the poor at reasonable
rates. An action was brought by the Homeowners’
Association of the Philippines, Inc. and its President,
Vicente A. Rufino against the Mayor and the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila to nullify the
aforementioned Municipal Ordinance.
ISSUE
Whether or not Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 is
constitutional?
HELD
The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment
declaring said ordinance “ultra vires, unconstitutional,
illegal and void ab initio upon the ground that the
power to “declare a state of emergency … exclusively
pertains to Congress”; that “there is no longer any state
of emergency” which may justify the regulation of
house rentals; that said ordinance disconstitutes an
unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the use of
private properties and arbitrarily encroaches on the
constitutional rights of property owners”; that the
power of the City of Manila to “regulate the business of
… letting or subletting of lands and buildings” does not
include the authority to prohibit what is forbidden in
said ordinance; and that the same cannot be deemed
sanctioned by the general welfare clause in the City
Charter.
Tolentino v Sec. of Finance
Facts:-
House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act
Restructuring the VAT System to Widen its Tax Base
and Enhance its Admin., Amending for these
Purposes…)
-Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill
completely different from that of the House Bill
-Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2nd
and 3rdreading of the Bill on the same day
-Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee
and become enrolled bill which the EVAT
law.Procedural
Issue:
(1)WoN RA 7716 originated exclusively from the House
of Rep. in accordance with sec 24, art 6 of Consti
(2)WoN the Senate bill violated the “three readings on
separate days” requirement of the Consti
(3)WoN RA 7716 violated sec 26(1), art 6 - one subject,
one title rule.NOTE: This case was filed by PAL because
before the EVAT Law, they were exempt from taxes.
After the passage of EVAT, they were already included.
PAL contended that neither the House or Senate bill
provided for the removal of the exemption from taxes
of PAL and that it was inly made after the meeting of
the Conference Committee w/c was not expressed in
the title of RA 7166
Held:
(1)YES! Court said that it is not the law which should
originate from the House of Rep, but the revenue bill
which was required to originate from the House of Rep.
The initiative must come from the Lower House because
they are elected in the district level
– allocation is not exceeded.
meaning they are expected to be more sensitive to the
needs of the locality. Also, a bill originating from the
Lower House may undergo extensive changes while in
the Senate. Senate can introduce a separate and distinct
bill other than the one the Lower House proposed. The
Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of
a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
House bill, so long as action by Senate is withheld
pending the receipt of the House bill.
(2) NO. The Pres. certified that the Senate bill was
urgent. Presidential certification dispensed the
requirement not only of printing but also reading the
bill in 3 separate days. In fact, the Senatea ccepted the
Pres. Certification.
3) No. Court said that the title states that the purpose of
the statute is to expand the VAT system and one way of
doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of
the exemptions granted before. Itis also in the power of
Congress to amend, alter, repeal grant of franchises for
operation of public utility when the common good so
requires. One subject rule is intended to prevent
surprise upon Congress members and inform people of
pending legislation. In the case of PAL, they did not
know of their situation not because of any defect in title
but because they might have not noticed its publication
until some event calls attention to its existence.
PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article VI Section 25 -
Appropriations]
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General
Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any
members of the Congress the REalignment of Allocation
for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones
authorized under the Constitution to realign savings,
not the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions
of the law and imposed certain provisional conditions:
that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings
to augment the pension funds under the Retirement
and Separation Benefits of the AFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section
25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House are allowed to approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds
to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the transfer
is for the purpose of augmenting the items of
expenditures to which said transfer to be made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of
Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the
Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may
be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP
Chief of Staff may not be given authority.
IBP VS ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review;
Civilian supremacy clause]
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec
18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in
verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP
Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and campaign for a temporary period only.
The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of
the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review.
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the
case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of
the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of
the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the
foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover,
the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does
not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of
the military in the task of law enforcement in violation
of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint

visibility patrols violate the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the
military.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1,

Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice

to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are

raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied
with, namely:

(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;

(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and