IMBONG VS OCHOA

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS
IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Power of Judicial Review

2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:

PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern
a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting
of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity
of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component
rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect,
and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple
or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that
the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which
is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such
statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the
presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:

SUBSTANTIAL

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members
could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.”

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception” according
to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that
conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection
of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only
those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from
passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s
womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term
“primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the
IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate
safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec.
10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices
will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials
have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-
abortificient and effective”.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures (a)
is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the
authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow
religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus,
the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary
to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the
provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional
safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the
State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the
institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage
(Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the
written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be
required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved
is “non-surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived
of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject
the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-
and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children with
the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right
and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory
RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by
the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a
“public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to
“private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning
methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and
“knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the
needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care
to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not
prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children.
The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a
need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to
consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to render 48
hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH
service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of
being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened
to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
 are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech
and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority
to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss
these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive
branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time
and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise
directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental
importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one
occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot
deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially
the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the
law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding
objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the
goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b)
allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without
the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent
only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a
reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in
so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

IN RE: JUDGE RODOLFO MANZANO (1988)

22 Oct 2017

[166 SCRA 246, October 05, 1988] Political Law| Courts| Judiciary| Administrative Functions

IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.

FACTS:
Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, an Executive Judge in RTC in Bangui, Ilocos Norte was appointed as a member of Provincial
Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential EO 856. Petitioner requested the Court to allow him to accept the
appointment and to consider his membership in the committee as neither violative to his judicial function. He also added that his
membership in the said Committee is still part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.

Upon examination of EO 856 reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of
cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local
jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are—

3.3 RECEIVE COMP LAIN TS AGAINST ANY APPRE HENDING OFFICER, JAI L WARDEN,

FINAL OR JUDGE WHO MAY BE FOUND TO HAVE COMMITTED ABUSES IN THE

DISCHARGE OF HIS DUTIES AND REFER THE SAME TO PROPER AUTHORITY FOR

APPROPRIATE ACTION;

3.5 RECOMMEND REVISION OF ANY LAW OR REGULATION WHICH IS BELIEVED

PREJUDICIAL TO THE PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE.

ISSUE:
Whether the membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee discharges as administrative functions and
will be in violation of the Constitution.

HELD:
Yes. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for;
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

Angara v. Electoral Commission

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member
of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect
of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled,
passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far
been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On
Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a
Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming
that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a
writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among
the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve
the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and
duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform,
closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly.
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Provincial Committee on Justice involves the exercise of administrative
functions, hence, it will be in violation of the Constitution.

Petition is denied.

Casibang v. Aquino
G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979
Makasiar, J.

Facts:

Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the
1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed a protest against the
election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the
appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open
voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.

In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued
Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on
November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution;
and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17,
1973; and on March 31, 1973, the Supreme Court declared that there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect.

Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact
had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost
jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally) Section 9 of Article
XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu
contended that “... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973
Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New
Constitution under its Article XI.” He further submitted that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year
term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section
9 of Article XVII.

The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article
XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones
authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted
or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof
entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a local government
code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short,
for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take
cognizance of a question or policy in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive
branch of the government.

Issue:

whether the issue involves a political question and therefore beyond judicial ambit

Held:

No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest cases.
The constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were
incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as
indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under
protest or contest” and that “subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions,
it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory
right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced
proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect’s right to the contested
office.

The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of
Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a
result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions
and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly,
they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision.

Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor
rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him
the electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure
of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.

There is a difference between the ‘term’ of office and the ‘right’ to hold an office. A‘term’ of office is the period during
winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments.
A ‘right’ to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other
words, the ‘term’ refers to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein
whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of
the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the ‘right’ of the
private respondents to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is
the ‘term’ to the office, although the ‘right’ of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the ‘term’
thereof,” and that “it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the
private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. They hold their respective
offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite.
 The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide election
protests: “Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that ‘all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly. ‘And there has been no amendment,
modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election
contest against those proclaimed elected,” and “according to Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution ‘all courts existing
at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in
accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in
force.’ Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their
jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners.”

While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2
of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal elective
positions.

General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9 of Article
XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional provision.

General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests of municipal
elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction
of the Judiciary to decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of
the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued
by the President or his duly designated representative or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under
Proclamation No. 1081.

In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable
controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the
Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The
term “political question” connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure”.

The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an
issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive
determination to which deference must be paid. Political questions should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the President or
Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon.

Tanada v. Cuenco
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone
opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a
senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the
SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following:
3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only
one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed
this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators
then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al
(members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco
argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and
Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political
Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to decide upon the official
acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid –
which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform
legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members) must not come from the
majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats
(even though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to
those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such
rules comply with the Constitution.

Daza v. Singson

FACTS:
The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties represented in that chamber in
accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in
the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing their former party to only 17 members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the CoA by withdrawing the seat
occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the chamber elected a new set of representatives
consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the
LDP.

Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat by the Singson. Acting
initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO that same day to prevent both
Daza and Singson from serving in the CoA.

Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is permanent. He claimed that the
reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is
not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

RULING:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the House of
Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the
wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.

The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.
Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Garcia v. Exec. Sec

In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties,
taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This
additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the
Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous
5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan,
avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such
power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills
is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by
the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions
as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions
as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the
Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

Araneta v. Dinglasan
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for
residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and
the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which
he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO
192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from ’49-‘50] pursuant to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold the national elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT
OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already inoperative and that all EOs
issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress
met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of
law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration
of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may
“consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to the
corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or repealed by the
National Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs,
otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
Tablarin v. Gutierrez
Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the
Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for
securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987.
The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic
objectives in the following manner:

"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education;
(b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in
the Philippines."

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute
include the following:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;

xxx

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate;
and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of
Medical Education;”

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:

"Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent
jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in
science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a
certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing
in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance
requirements that may be deemed admissible.”

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985,
established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for
issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-
1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the
selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in
the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by
the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of
each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis
for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are
constitutional.

Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission
to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure
and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community. An important
component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one
can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is
whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical
school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is
perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical
quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of
limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical
practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and
medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that
the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of
"upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the
country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a
writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
 Rodriguez v. Gella
Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of
P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces
and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. They sought to have Vicente
Gella, then National Treasurer, be enjoined from releasing funds pursuant to said EOs. These EO’s were pursuant to Commonwealth
Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was
vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. Note also that CA 671 was
already declared inoperative by the Supreme Court in the same case of Araneta vs Dinglasan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EO’s are valid.
HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The
president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been
intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to
the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight.
For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For “while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be
able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take
them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law.” Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency,
whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way
that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the
agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.

Art XVI Sec 3: METRAN v PAREDES

Before the Court of Industrial Relations a petition was filed in case No. 36-V entitled “National Labor Union, versus
Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran),” wherein petitioner alleged that it was alegitimate labor organization, thirty of
whose affiliated members were working and under the employ of the respondent; that the respondent “is a semi-governmental
transportation entity, popularly known as‘Metran,’ and after several other allegations concluded with the prayer that its nine
demands at length setforth in said petition be granted.In behalf of the so-called respondent an oral petition for dismissal of the
case was made before the courton October 22, 1946. “on the ground that the respondent belongs to the Republic of the
Philippines andas such, it cannot be sued”
ISSUE
:
W/N METRAN can invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit
or Sec 3 of Art XVI of the 1987Constitution (The State may not be sued without its consent)
HELD
: “Upon the whole, we are clearly of opinion that the proceedings had in the Court of IndustrialRelations and now subject of this
appeal are null and void [and] that the said court should be, as it ishereby, enjoined from taking any further action in the
case inconsistent with this decision.”
RATIO
: It is beyond dispute that the Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) is and was at the timescovered by the petition in the
Court of Industrial Relations an office created by Executive Order No. 59and operating under the direct supervision and control
of the Department of Public Works andCommunications. The said office not being a juridical person, any suit, action or
proceeding against it, if itwere to produce any effect, would in practice be a suit, action or proceeding against the
Governmentitself, of which the said Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) is a mere office or agency.The Bureau of
Public Works under whose supervision the Metropolitan Transportation Service(Metran) has been organized and functions in is
an integral part of the government, just as the said officeor agency. And apart from the consideration that neither said Bureau nor
said office has any juridicalpersonality to be sued for reasons already set forth, any suit or action attempted against either
willnecessarily be a suit or action against the government itself In a republican state, like the Philippines, government immunity
from suit without its consent is derivedfrom the will of the people themselves in freely creating a government “of the people, by
the people, andfor the people
 Santos vs Santos
G.R. No. L-4699
November 26, 1952

FACTS:

Teodora Santos and her nieces Emiliana and Josefina surnamed Santos complain that from 1945 to 1949,
Leoncio Santos collected from the Army of the United States of America rentals for the use and occupation of a parcel of land
situated in the Municipality of Las Piñas, Province of Rizal. Futhermore, according to the petitioners, the said land is owned by
them and Leoncio Santos and when they demanded their share for the rental., Leoncio Santos failed and refused to give their share.

They also complained that when they demanded to have the lot partitioned among them Leoncio Santos refused to do so, and
instead sold the lot to the Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.

Upon these allegations they pray that:

a. Leoncio Santos be ordered to render an accounting of the rentals and such other fruits, products and benefits as he might
have received and to pay and deliver to Teodora Santos and to Josefina and Emiliana Santos

b. That the parcel of land be partitioned among them;

c. That the purported sale by Leoncio Santos to the National Airports Corporation, the predecessor to the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, insofar as theirs shares are concerned be declared null and void[

d. That the Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Administration be directed to vacate the portions of the lot belonging to them
and pay a reasonable rental until after possession of their shares in the lot shall have been restored to them and to pay damages and
cost.

The Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Administration moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and insufficiency
of the complaint against him, invoking the case of Metropolitan Transportation Service METRAN vs. Paredes, where it has been
held that the suit was against the state which could not be brought without its consent. This motion was granted on the ground that
the Civil Aeronautics Administration not being a juridical person has no capacity to sue and be sued and for that reason it cannot
come under the jurisdiction of the court.

Issue: Can the Civil Aeronautics Administration, not being a juridical person be sued by the petitioners?

Held: Civil Aeronautics Administration may be sued and that the principle of state immunity from suit does not apply to it. The
Civil Aeronautics Administration, even if it is not a juridical entity, cannot legally prevent a party or parties from enforcing their
propriety rights under the cloak or shield of lack of juridical personality, because it took over all the powers and assumed all the
obligations of the defunct corporation which had entered into the contract in question.

When the state or its government enters into a contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose
and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise
therefrom, and if the law granting the authority to enter into such contract does not provide for or name the officer against whom
action may be brought in the event of a breach thereof, the state itself may be sued even without its consent, because by entering
into a contract the sovereign state has descended to the level of the citizen and its consent to be used is implied from the very act
of entering into such contract.

Other Principles from the Case:

1. The principle that the state or its government cannot be sued without its consent has its root in the juridical and practical
notion that the state can do no wrong.

2. Demandable and enforceable obligations which may be the subject of judicial action come into being either by law, contract,
quasi-contract, acts or omissions punishable by law, acts which do not constitute
or amount to a crime or a misdemeanor known at common law as torts and in civil law as culpa aquiliana or extra contractual.

3. An obligation or liability of the state created by statute is enforceable against the officer or agent charged with the duty to
execute the law. If there should be anything demandable which had been paid or delivered to or collected by officers or agents of
the state without the authority of law, the action would not be against the state but against the responsible officers or agents who
received what was not due the state or made the unauthorized collection.

4. Punishable acts or omissions committed by officers or agents of the state are crimes and violations of law perpetuated by
such officers or agents and not by the state.

5. If the dignity of the state, the sacredness of the institution, the respect for the government are to be preserved and the dragging
of its name in a suit to be prevented, the legislative department should name the officer or agent against whom the action may be
brought in the event of breach of the contract entered into under its name and authority. And the omission or failure of the legislative
department to do so is no obstacle or impediment for an individual or citizen, who is aggrieved by the breach of the contract, to
bring an action against the state itself for the reasons already adverted to, to wit; the descent of the sovereign state to the level of
the individual or citizen with whom it entered into a contract and its consent to be sued implied from the act of entering into such
contract.

In National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro *, G.R. No. L-5122, 30 April 1952, we held that the Civil Aeronautics Administration
may be sued and that the principle of state immunity from suit does not apply to it.

Pedro Syquia et. al. vs. Natividad Almeda Lopez, Et. al. G.R. No. L-1648 August 17, 1949

Facts: Petitioners Pedro, Gonzalo and Leopoldo Syquia are joint owners of properties in Manila, namely, the North Qyauia
Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments. In 1945, they executed contracts for lease of the apartments to
USA, with the term being until the war has ended and six months after, or unless terminated sooner by USA, as the buildings
were used for billeting and quartering officers of te US armed forces stationed in the Manila Area. George Moore, a
Commanding General of the US Army, and Erland Tillman, Chief of the Real Estate Division to the US Army in Manila who
was under the command of Moore, was said to be in control of the apartment buildings and had authority in the name of USA to
assign officers of the army to the buildings or order them to vacuate the same. When Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945,
the lease would be terminated six months after. The petitioners approached the predecessors of Moore and Tillman and requested
the buildings to be returned to them, as per contract agreement. However, they were advised that the US Army wanted to
continue their occupancy of the buildings, and refused to execute new leases but advised that they will vacate the premises before
February 1, 1947, not the original terms of the contract agreement. Petitioner-plaintiffs sued before the Municipal Court of
Manila with the demand to get the properties as their agreement supposedly expired, and furthermore asked for increased rentals
until the premises were vacated. Respondent-defendants were part of the armed forces of the US moved to dismiss the suit for
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. The MC of Manila granted the motion to dismiss the suit, sustained by the CFI of
Manila, hence the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the Philippine Courts have a lack of jurisdiction, considering, under the doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, that
USA has not given their consent to be a respondent.

Ruling: The case was dismissed, the Supreme Court affirming in majority the decision of the Municipal Court of Manila.

Reason: Considering the circumstances, the real defendant party is the United States of America, as it was the U.S. Army who
were occupying the buildings, with the rent being paid for by their government. USA has not given their consent to be sued in
this case, and any action against them without the consent would constitue a lack of jurisdiction.