IVLER VS.
SAN PEDRO Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August
2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner
pleaded guilty to the charge on the first
delict and was meted out the penalty of
public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information
for the second delict for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity
of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from
the MTC the suspension of proceedings in
criminal case, including the arraignment his
arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the
MTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled
his bail and ordered his arrest.
denying petitioner’s motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment
until after his arrest. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.
ISSUES/S:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing
to seek relief from his petition for certiorari
when the MTC ordered his arrest following
his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent; and
2. Whether petitioner’s constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of respondent
Ponce’s husband.
RULING:
The accused negative constitutional right not
to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense" protects him from,
among others, post-conviction prosecution
for the same offense, with the prior verdict
rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,
submitting that the two cases concern the
same offense of reckless imprudence. The
MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries is an entirely separate offense from
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising
from the same facts, were prosecuted under
the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall
not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that
quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple,
are distinct species of crime, separately
defined and penalized under the framework
of our penal laws, is nothing new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under
Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself
and not merely a means to commit other
crimes such that conviction or acquittal of
such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied
to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second
prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused
facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
True, they are thereby denied the beneficent
effect of the favorable sentencing formula
under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the
certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime
effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as
here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
Congress can re-craft Article 365 by
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing
formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a
single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or
light offenses. This will still keep intact the
distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties
under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying
a lower rung of culpability, should cushion
the effect of this ruling.
Petition granted.
INTOD VS. CA
FACTS:
Sulpicio Intod and 3 other men went to
Salvador Mandaya’ s house to ask him to go
with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. The group had a meeting
with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya
that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed
because of a land dispute between them and
that Mandaya should accompany the 4 men
otherwise he would also be killed. At 10:00
p.m. of that same day, Intod and
companions, all armed with firearms arrived
at Palangpangan’ s house. Thereafter,
petitioner fired at the said room. It turned
out the Palangpangan was in another city
and her home was then occupied by her son-
in-law and his family. No one was in the
room when the accused fired. No one was hit
by the gunfire. The RTC convicted Intod of
attempted murder. Petitioner Intod seeks a
modification of the judgment on the ground
that he is only liable for an impossible crime
{Art. 4(2)}. Petitioner contends that,
Palangpangan's absence from her room on
the night he and his companions riddled it
with bullets made the crime inherently
impossible. On the other hand, Respondent
People of the Philippines argues that the
crime was not impossible instead the facts
were sufficient to constitute an attempt and
to convict Intod for attempted murder.
Respondent likewise alleged that there was
intent. Further, In its Comment to the
Petition, respondent pointed out that “xxx.
The crime of murder was not consummated,
not because of the inherent impossibility of
its accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due
to a cause of accident other that petitioner’ s
and his co-accused’ s own spontaneous
desistance (Art. 3) Palangpangan did not
sleep at her house at that time. Had it not
been for this fact, the crime is possible, m
not impossible.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is liable only for an
impossible crime.
RULING:
Under Article 4(2) of the RPC, the act
performed by the offender cannot produce
an offense against person or property
because: 1) the commission of the offense is
inherently impossible of accomplishment; or
2) the means employed is either a)
inadequate or b) ineffectual.
To be impossible under this clause, the act
intended by the offender must be by its
nature one impossible of accomplishment.
There must be either 1) legal impossibility, or
2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act in order to qualify the act as an
impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the
intended act, even if complete would not
amount to a crime. Thus: legal impossibility
would apply to those circumstances where
1) the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law; 2)
there is intention to perform the physical
act; 3) there is a performance of the
intended physical act; and 4) the
consequence resulting from the intended act
does not amount to a crime. The
impossibility of killing a person already dead
falls in this category.
On the other had, factual impossibility
occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended
crime. One example is the man who puts his
hand in the cot pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter’ s wallet and
finds the pocket empty.
The case at bar belongs to this category.
Petitioner shoots the place where he
thought his victim would be, although in
reality, the victim was not present in said
place and thus, the petitioner failed to
accomplish his end.
The factual situation in the case at bar
presents a physical impossibility which
render the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such
is sufficient to make the act an impossible
crime.
JACINTO VS CA
FACTS:
n June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner
-collector of Mega Foam, a post dated
checked worth P10,000 as payment for
Baby’s purchases from Mega Foam
International, Inc. The said check was
deposited to the account of Jacqueline
Capitle’s husband-Generoso. Rowena
Recablanca, another employee of Mega
Foam, received a phone call from an
employee of Land Bank, who was looking for
Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO
check deposited had been dishonored.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhenga talked to Baby
to tell that the BDO Check bounced.
However, Baby said that she had already
paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August
1997 as replacement for the dishonored
check.
Dyhengco filed a compliant with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked
out an entrapment operation with its agents.
Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were
arrested. The NBI filed a criminal case for
qualified theft against the two (2) and
Jacqueline Capitle.
RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita
and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and
each of the sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five (5)
months and Eleven (11) days to Six (6) years,
Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is correctly
convicted for the crime of Qualified Theft.
RULING:
NO. Petitioner is guilty of committing an
impossible crime of theft only. ,
The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1)
that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act
was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible,
or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual.
Petitioner’s evil intent cannot be denied, as
the mere act of unlawfully taking the check
meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to
gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for
the fact that the check bounced, she would
have received the face value thereof, which
was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only
due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to
petitioner at the time, that prevented the
crime from being produced. The thing
unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to
be absolutely worthless, because the check
was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam
had received the cash to replace the value of
said dishonored check.
Petition granted. Decision is MODIFIED.
Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY
of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of six (6) months of
arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.
VALENZUELA VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
While a security guard was manning his post
the open parking area of a supermarket, he
saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela,
hauling a push cart loaded with cases of
detergent and unloaded them where his co-
accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting.
Valenzuela then returned inside the
supermarket, and later emerged with more
cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela
hailed a taxi and started loading the boxes of
detergent inside. As the taxi was about to
leave the security guard asked Valenzuela
for the receipt of the merchandise. The
accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were
subsequently apprehended at the scene. The
trial court convicted both Valenzuela and
Calderon of the crime of consummated
theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court
of Appeals, arguing that he should only be
convicted of frustrated theft since he was
not able to freely dispose of the articles
stolen. The CA affirmed the trial court’s
decision, thus the Petition for Review was
filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is

guilty of frustrated theft.

RULING:

No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a

felony is consummated when all the
elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present. In the crime of
theft, the following elements should be
present – (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done
without the consent of the owner; and (5)
that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidating of
persons or force upon things. The court held
that theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property by one with
intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the
offender is able or unable to freely dispose
the property stolen since he has already
committed all the acts of execution and the
deprivation from the owner has already
ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft
cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only
be attempted or consummated.