WHO VS.

AQUINO

Facts: Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant
Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12) crates, were allowed free entry
from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates
“contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application
of the COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal
effects of Verstuyft.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to
immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions
pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant be suspended. The Solicitor
General accordingly joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge
nevertheless summarily denied the quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.

Issue: Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the
diplomatic immunity.

Held: Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised
respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law
officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and
asked for the quashal of the search warrant.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed
by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the
Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in
conducting foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic
immunity of petitioner Verstuyft

DFA VS. NLRC

Facts: On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against Asian
Development Bank. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the
Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well
as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings,
guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing
the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement
Between The Bank and The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the
"Headquarters Agreement").

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its
diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor Magnayi. The ADB did not appeal
the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the
DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from
the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue 1: Whether or not ADB is immune from suit.

Held: Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of
every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase,
sale and underwriting of securities. The Bank’s officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts
performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these
immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine
government which must be respected.

Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of
the municipal law. "One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local
jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country
where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority
of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their
operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such
subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities
impartially on behalf of its member-states."

Issue 2: Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition.

Held: Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and
institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged, entitles it to seek
relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations. The DFA
must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility
of the Philippine government before the international community. When international agreements are
concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that
their agreements are duly regarded. In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the
highest executive department with the competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the international
arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:

"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic
immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court
that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,' where the foreign state or the
international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a
determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is
immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a 'suggestion' that the
defendant is entitled to immunity.

"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure
an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign
Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission vs.
Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it
enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the
U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of
the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent
Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion' in a manifestation and memorandum as amicus
curiae.
"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this
Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its
memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.

"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the
respondents through their private counsels. In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office,
the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and
transactions involved."

LIANG VS. PEOPLE

Facts: Petitioner Jeffrey Liang, an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), was
charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong with two counts of grave oral defamation for allegedly uttering
defamatory words against a fellow ADB worker. Liang was arrested but later released. The next day, the
judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that Liang is
covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government. Based on the said protocol communication, the judge, without notice to the
prosecution, dismissed the two criminal cases. The RTC set aside the MeTC ruling and ordered the latter
court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. Liang appealed arguing that he is covered by immunity
under the Agreement.

Issue 1: Whether or not the judge is correct in dismissing the cases on the basis of protocol communication
without notice to the prosecution.

Held: No. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner
is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu proprio
dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was
violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution.
The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for
its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled
that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.

Issue 2: Whether or not Liang covered with immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government.

Held: No. Under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing
missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:

a.)....... immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except
when the Bank waives the immunity."

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in "official
capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a).
Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded
the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.

Likewise, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws
do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. It is well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.
Moreover, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner
is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action
relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving
state outside his official functions. As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of
official duty.

REYES VS. BAGATSING

Facts: Retired Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought for a permit from the
City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 starting from Luneta to the gates of
the United States embassy. The objective of the rally was to peacefully protest the removal of all foreign
military bases and to present a petition containing such to a representative of the Embassy so it may be
delivered to the United States Ambassador. This petition was to initially compel the Mayor of the City of
Manila to make a decision on the application for a permit but it was discovered that a denial has already
been sent through mail. It also included a provision that if it be held somewhere else, permit may be issued.
The respondent mayor alleges that holding the rally in front of the US Embassy is a violation of the
resolutions during the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961 and of which the
Philippines is a signatory. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines has to comply with such generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The petitioner, on the other hand,
contends that the denial of the permit is a violation of the constitutional right of the freedom of speech and
expression.

Issue: Whether or not the Anti-Bases Coalition should be allowed to hold a peaceful protest rally in front of
the US Embassy.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled to allow the rally in front of the US Embassy to protect the exercise of the
rights to free speech and peaceful assembly and on the ground that there was no showing of the existence
of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of the permit. These rights
are not only assured by our constitution but also provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Between the two generally accepted principles of diplomatic relations and human rights, the former takes
higher ground. The right of the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly is highly ranked in the scheme
of constitutional values.

GTZ VS. CA

Facts: The Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified and agreement which
lead to the Social Health Insurance—Networking and Empowerment (SHINE) program wherein the program
seeks to provide health care to Filipino families, especially the poor. The Republic of Germany assigned
the GTZ as the implementing corporation for the program, while the Philippines designated the Department
of Health and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation. Private respondents, as employed by GTZ for
the implementation of the SHINE, had a misunderstanding with the Project Manager of SHINE. This lead
to an exchange of letters which was interpreted to be the resignation of the private respondents. Private
respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter. GTZ contends that it is immune
from suit as it is the accredited agency of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Issue: Whether or not the GTZ is immune from suit.

Held: A state may waive its immunity through a general or specific law. The special law can take the form
of the original charter of the incorporated government agency. In this case however, GTZ presented any
evidence to support their claim that they are immune from suit, and has failed to obtain a certification of
immunity from suit from the Department of Foreign Affairs. If GTZ has done so, then there would be no
ambiguity in their claim that they are immune from suit.
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION COMMISSION (ICMC) VS. CALLEJA

Facts: ICMC an accredited refugee processing center in Morong Bataan, is a non-profit agency involved
in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative status II. It has the activities parallel to those of the
International Committee for Migrtion (ICM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

On July 14, 1986, Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry
of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed
by the ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it enjoys diplomatic immunity.

On Februaury 5, 1987 Med – Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition of
TUPAS for lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal, The Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations reversed the Med – Arbiter’s Decisionand ordered
the immediate conduct of a certification election.

This present Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction assailing the BLR Order.

Issue: Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from
the application of Philippine labor laws.

Held: The Petition is GRANTED, the order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for Certification election is SET
ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued is made PERMANENT.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed
by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . . or
other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so
exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign
relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the
action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.

Basis:

Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine Government and ICMC provides that
ICMC shall have a status “similar to that of a specialized agency.”

Article III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular
case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall
extend to any measure of execution.