VASSAR INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION (VIEU) vs.
for the workers of private respondent Vassar Industries, then it should continu
HON. FRANCISCO L. ESTRELLA; as Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor R
elations, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), and VASSAR INDUSTRIES, INC
. G.R. No. L-46562 March 31, 1978
FACTS:
There was in existence a collective bargaining agreement between private respo
ndents Associated Labor Unions and Vassar Industries, Inc.. Prior to its expirati
on, 111 of a total number of 150 employees of such firm disaffiliated from the fo
rmer labor organization and formed their own union. Thereafter, they filed an a
pplication for registration of their union with the Bureau of Labor Relations, co
mplying with an the requirements of both the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations. While such application was pending, petitioner Union filed a petitio
n for certification as bargaining agent for the rank-and-
file employees of the company. The Med-
Arbiter denied their plea on the ground that the union was not duly registered
with the Department of Labor.
The Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, denied, the application for
registration on the ground that there is a registered collective bargaining agent
in the company.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an application for registration should be denied just because the
re is already a registered collective bargaining agent in the company.
RULING:
No. As long as an applicant union complies with all of the legal requirements for
registration, it becomes the BLR’s ministerial duty to so register the union. It suf
fices then to order that petitioner Union be registered, there being no legal obst
acle to such a step and the duty of the Bureau of Labor Relations being clear. Th
en there is this ruling in Philippine Labor Alliance Council v. Bureau of Labor Rel
ations that calls for application that “once the fact of disaffiliation has been dem
onstrated beyond doubt, as in this case, a certification election is the most exped
itious way of determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargai
ning representative.” In the meanwhile, if as contended by private respondent la
bor union the interim collective bargaining agreement which was entered durin
g the pendency of the petition of the petitioner, has much more favorable terms
e in full force and effect until the appropriate bargaining representative is chose
n and negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement thereafter conclud
ed. This is one way of assuring that both the social justice, and the protection to
labor provisions would be effectively implemented without sanctioning an atte
mpt to frustrate the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction in a pending case.
SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY vs DRILON Case Digest
SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY vs. HON. FRANKLIN DRILON
193 SCRA 271
Facts: Singer Machine Collectors Union-Baguio filed a petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all collectors of Singer
Sewing Machine. The company opposed the petition mainly because the union
members are not employees but independent contractors as evidenced by the
collection agency agreement which they signed.
Med-Arbiter ruled that there exists an employee-employer relationship and
granted the certification election which was affirmed by Sec. Drilon. The
company files the present petition on the determination of the relationship. The
union insist that the provisions of the Collection Agreement belie the company’s
position that the union members are independent contractors.
Issue: Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between
the parties.
Ruling: The present case calls for the application of the control test, which if not
satisfied, would lead to the conclusion that no employee-employer relationship
exists. If the union members are not employees, no right to organize for the
purpose of bargaining or as a bargaining agent cannot be recognized.
The following elements are generally considered in the determination of the
relationship: the selection and engagement of the employee, payment of wages,
power of dismissal and the power to control the employee’s conduct which is
the most important element.
1

The nature of the relationship between a company and its collecting agents
depends on the circumstances of each particular relationship. Not all collecting
agents are employees and neither are all collecting agents independent
contractors. The agreement confirms the status of the collecting agents as
independent contractor. The requirement that collection agents utilize only
receipt forms and report forms issued by the company and that reports shall be
submitted at least once a week is not necessarily an indication of control over
the means by which the job collection is to be performed. Even if report
requirements are to be called control measures, any control is only with respect
to the end result of the collection since the requirements regulate the things to
be done after the performance of the collection job or the rendition of service.
The plain language of the agreement reveals that the designation as collection
agent does not create an employment relationship and that the applicant is to
be considered at all times as an independent contractor.
The court finds that since private respondents are not employees of the
company, they are not entitled to the constitutional right to form or join a labor
organization for the purposes of collective bargaining. There is no constitutional
and legal basis for their union to be granted their petition for direct
certification.
METROLAB INDUSTRIES, INC., v. ROLDAN-CONFESOR G.R. No. 108855 /
254 SCRA 182
Topic: Confidential Employees
FACTS:
Private respondent Metro Drug Corporation Employees Association-Federation
of Free Workers (hereinafter referred to as the Union) is a labor organization
representing the rank and file employees of petitioner Metrolab Industries, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as Metrolab/MII) and also of Metro Drug, Inc.
The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Metrolab and the Union
expired. The negotiations for a new CBA, however, ended in a deadlock.
The Union filed a notice of strike against Metrolab and Metro Drug Inc.
The parties failed to settle their dispute despite the conciliation efforts of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
SECRETARY OF LABOR Ruben D. Torres: issued an assumption order of
jurisdiction over the entire labor dispute at Metro Drug, Inc. - Metro Drug
Distribution Division and Metrolab Industries Inc.
SECRETARY OF LABOR: issued an order resolving all the disputed items in the
CBA and ordered the parties involved to execute a new CBA.
The Union filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR).
During the pendency of the MR, Metrolab laid off 94 of its rank and file
employees.
The Union filed a motion for a cease and desist order to enjoin Metrolab from
implementing the mass layoff, alleging that such act violated the prohibition
against committing acts that would exacerbate the dispute as specifically
directed in the assumption order.
Metrolab contended that the layoff was temporary and in the exercise of its
management prerogative.
Thereafter, on various dates, Metrolab recalled some of the laid off workers on a
temporary basis due to availability of work in the production lines.
ACTING SEC. OF LABOR Nieves Confesor: a resolution declaring the layoff of
Metrolabs 94 rank and file workers illegal and ordered their reinstatement with
full backwages.
After exhaustive negotiations, the parties entered into a new CBA. The
execution, however, was without prejudice to the outcome of the issues raised
in the reconsideration and clarification motions submitted for decision to the
Secretary of Labor.
2

The Union filed a motion for execution. Metrolab opposed.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari with application for issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not public respondent Labor Secretary committed grave abuse of
discretion and exceeded her jurisdiction in declaring the subject layoffs
instituted by Metrolab illegal on grounds that these unilateral actions
aggravated the conflict between Metrolab and the Union who were, then, locked
in a stalemate in CBA negotiations.
2. Whether or not the Public Respondent Secretary of DOLE gravely abused her
discretion in including executive secretaries as part of the bargaining unit of the
rank and file employees
RULING:
1. NO, because the Secretary of Labor is expressly given the power under the
Labor Code to assume jurisdiction and resolve labor disputes involving
industries indispensable to national interest. The disputed injunction is
subsumed under this special grant of authority.
Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code specifically provides that:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute
and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration.
Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining
the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or
certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to
work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek
the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this
provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
2. NO, because Article I (b) of the 1988-1990 CBA provides:
b)Close Shop. - All Qualified Employees must join the Association immediately
upon regularization as a condition for continued employment. This provision
shall not apply to: (i) managerial employees who are excluded from the scope of
the bargaining unit; (ii) the auditors and executive secretaries of senior
executive officers, such as, the President, Executive Vice-President, Vice-
President for Finance, Head of Legal, Vice-President for Sales, who are excluded
from membership in the Association; and (iii) those employees who are referred
to in Attachment I hereof, subject, however, to the application of the provision
of Article II, par. (b) hereof. Consequently, the above-specified employees are
not required to join the Association as a condition for their continued
employment.
On the other hand, Attachment I provides:
Exclusion from the Scope of the Close Shop Provision
The following positions in the Bargaining Unit are not covered by the Close
Shop provision of the CBA (Article I, par. b):
1. Executive Secretaries of Vice-Presidents, or equivalent positions.
2. Executive Secretary of the Personnel Manager, or equivalent positions.
3. Executive Secretary of the Director for Corporate Planning, or equivalent
positions.
4. Some personnel in the Personnel Department, EDP Staff at Head Office,
Payroll Staff at Head Office, Accounting Department at Head Office, and Budget
Staff, who because of the nature of their duties and responsibilities need not
join the Association as a condition for their employment.
5. Newly-hired secretaries of Branch Managers and Regional Managers.
Both Metro Drug and Metrolab read the exclusion of managerial employees and
executive secretaries as exclusion from the bargaining unit. They point out that
managerial employees are lumped under one classification with executive
secretaries, so that since the former are excluded from the bargaining unit, so
must the latter be likewise excluded.
The exclusion of managerial employees, in accordance with law, must therefore
still carry the qualifying phrase from the bargaining unit in Article I (b)(i) of the
1988-1990 CBA. In the same manner, the exclusion of executive secretaries
3
should be read together with the qualifying phrase are excluded from
membership in the Association of the same Article and with the heading of
Attachment I. The latter refers to Exclusions from Scope of Close Shop Provision
and provides that [t]he following positions in Bargaining Unit are not covered
by the close shop provision of the CBA.
The basis for the questioned exclusions, it should be noted, is no other than the
previous CBA between Metrolab and the Union. If Metrolab had undergone an
organizational restructuring since then, this is a fact to which we have never
been made privy. In any event, had this been otherwise the result would have
been the same. To repeat, we limited the exclusions to recognize the expanded
scope of the right to self-organization as embodied in the Constitution.
The Court concurs with Metrolab contention that executive secretaries of the
General Manager and the executive secretaries of the Quality Assurance
Manager, Product Development Manager, Finance Director, Management
System Manager, Human Resources Manager, Marketing Director, Engineering
Manager, Materials Manager and Production Manager, who are all members of
the company’s Management Committee should not only be exempted from the
closed-shop provision but should be excluded from membership in the
bargaining unit of the rank and file employees as well on grounds that their
executive secretaries are confidential employees, having access to vital labor
information.
Confidential employees cannot be classified as rank and file. The nature of
employment of confidential employees is quite distinct from the rank and file,
thus, warranting a separate category. Excluding confidential employees from
the rank and file bargaining unit, therefore, is not tantamount to discrimination.
DISPOSITIVE: Metrolab Industries Inc. partially won. The executive secretaries
of petitioner Metrolabs General Manager and the executive secretaries of the
members of its Management Committee are excluded from the bargaining unit
of petitioners rank and file employees.
DOCTRINE: Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to
join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees,
jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those
who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act
in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to
sensitive and highly confidential records.
[G.R. No. 84433 June 2, 1992] REYES vs.TRAJANO
FACTS: Public Respondent Trajano as OIC of the Bureau of Labor Relations
sustained the denial by the Med Arbiter of the right to vote of one hundred
forty-one members of the “Iglesia ni Kristo” (INK), all employed in the same
company, at a certification election at which two labor organizations were
contesting the right to be the exclusive representative of the employees in the
bargaining unit.
The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of
Labor Relations among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation. The
competing unions were Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor
Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade
Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS).
The final tally of the votes showed the following results:
TUPAS 1, TUEU-OLALIA 95, NO UNION 1, SPOILED 1, CHALLENGED 141
The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were
segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between
the competing unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that the INK
members should not be allowed to vote “because they are not members of any
union and refused to participate in the previous certification elections.”
The INK employees promptly filed a petition to cancel the election alleging that
it “was not fair” and the result thereof did “not reflect the true sentiments of the
majority of the employees.” TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition contending that
the petitioners “do not have legal personality to protest the results of the
election,” because “they are not members of either contending unit, but . . . of the
INK” which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming
any labor organization . . . .”
ISSUE: W/N employees who are not part of any union may validly exercise their
right to vote in a certification election
HELD: YES. Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the “right to self-
organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.” This is made plain by no less
than three provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a
labor union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to
join, and to engage in concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of
collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, or for their
mutual aid and protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of
their rights and interests.
The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the
right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that
just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so
also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The
4
fact that a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union does
not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such membership.
The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the
wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to
be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case,
by which particular labor organization. If the results of the election should
disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any
union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union may properly be
certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit in
dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment. The minority employees — who wish to have a
union represent them in collective bargaining — can do nothing but wait for
another suitable occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that
the results will be different. They may not and should not be permitted,
however, to impose their will on the majority — who do not desire to have a
union certified as the exclusive workers’ benefit in the bargaining unit — upon
the plea that they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of self-
organization and collective bargaining.
The respondents’ argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote because
they “are not constituted into a duly organized labor union” — “but members of
the INK which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or
forming any labor organization” — and “hence, not one of the unions which vied
for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative,” is
specious. Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that
only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a
certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment
of the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the
bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not.
Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote
because they “did not participate in previous certification elections in the
company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form,
join or assist labor organizations,” persuade acceptance. No law, administrative
rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect
to exercise the right in past certification elections.
GENERAL RUBBER AND FOOTWEAR CORP vs. BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS G.R. No. 74262
TOPIC: Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Unit; Effect of Prior
Agreement
FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing rubber
sandals and oilier rubber products. In 1985, the Samahang Manggagawa sa
General Rubber Corporation — ANGLO was formed by the daily paid - rank and
file employees as their union for collective bargaining, after the expiration on
October 15, 1985 of the collective bargaining agreement previously executed by
petitioner with General Rubber Workers Union.
On July 17, 1985, the monthly — paid employees of the petitioner-corporation,
after forming their own collective bargaining unit, the National Association of
Trade Unions of Monthly Paid Employees-NATU, filed a petition for direct
certification with the Bureau of Labor Relations which petition was opposed by
herein petitioner.
the Med-Arbiter issued an Order for the holding of a certification election after
finding that a certification election is in order in this case and observing that it
is the fairest remedy to determine whether employees of petitioner desire to
have a union or not. On appeal, the Bureau of Labor Relations denied both the
appeal and motion for reconsideration interposed by petitioner and affirmed
the ruling of the Med-Arbiter. Hence, the present petition, imputing serious
errors of law and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Bureau of Labor
Relations in issuing the assailed order which sanctioned the creation of two (2)
bargaining units within petitioner-corporation.
ISSUE: WON BLR is correct in upholding two bargaining units in petitioner
corporation
RULING: Yes.
Although it is unusual to deal with 2 bargaining units, there is no one to blame
except petitioner itself for creating the situation it is in. From the beginning of
the existence in 1963 of a bargaining limit for the employees up to the present,
5
petitioner had sought to indiscriminately suppress the members of the private
respondent’s right to self-organization provided for by law. Petitioner, in
justification of its action, maintained that the exclusion of the members of the
private respondent from the bargaining union of the rank-and-file or from
forming their own union was agreed upon by petitioner corporation with the
previous bargaining representatives namely: the General "Rubber Workers
Union PTGWO the General Workers Union — NAFLU and the General Rubber
Workers Union (independent). Such posture has no leg to stand on. It has not
been shown that private respondent was privy to this agreement. And even if it
were so, it can never bind subsequent federations and unions particularly
private respondent-union because it is a curtailment of the right to self-
organization guaranteed by the labor laws.
However, to prevent any difficulty. and to avoid confusion to all concerned and,
more importantly, to fulfill the policy of the New Labor Code as well as to be
consistent with Our ruling in the Bulletin case, the monthly-paid rank-and-file
employees should be allowed to join the union of the daily-paid-rank-and-file
employees of petitioner so that they can also avail of the CBA benefits or to form
their own rank-and-file union, without prejudice to the certification election
that has been ordered.
SEARCH FOR THIS CASE LATER
Knitjoy v. Calleja, 214 SCRA 174
https://www.scribd.com/document/318090558/Labor-Case-Digests
PAN-AM WORLD AIRWAYS, INC. V. PAN-AM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
Topic: Extent and scope of right
FACTS:
Union filed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor and the union
declared and maintained a strike against the Airways. Then, President of the
Philippines certified the strike to the respondent Court of Industrial Relations as
being an industrial dispute affecting the national interest, the parties being
called to a conference.
Several conferences were held between them before the Judge of the said Court.
The Union contends that its members would not resume the performance of
their duties unless its officers were likewise included in the return-to-work
order.
But the Airway’s stand was that the workers will return to work but not the five
officials of Union. It alleged that the strike was illegal, being offensive to a no-
strike clause of an existing collective bargaining agreement the result being that
the officials could, as the responsible parties, be liable for dismissal.
Consequently, it was not agreeable to their being allowed to return to the
positions held by them prior to the strike as they would not be only lacking in
"incentive and motivation for doing their work properly" but would likewise
have the opportunity to cause "grave and irreparable injury to petitioner."
Management did offer, however, to deposit their salaries even if they would not
be working, with the further promise that they would not even be required to
refund any amount should the right to remain in their positions be considered
as legally terminated by their calling the alleged illegal strike.
Court of Industrial Relations: Ordered to accept 5 union officers.
MR: Denied. Hence this petition
ISSUE: WON the five union workers should be excluded from a return to work
order on the ground of having led an illegal strike, which can be a sufficient
cause for dismissal?
6

RULING: NO. The moment management displays what in this case appears to be
grave but unwarranted distrust in the union officials discharging their functions
just because a strike was resorted to, then the integrity of the collective
bargaining process itself is called into question. It would have been different if
there were a rational basis for such fears, purely speculative in character.
The record is bereft of slightest indication that any danger, much less one clear
and present, is to be expected from their return to work. Necessarily, the union
officials have the right to feel offended by the fact that, while they will be paid
their salaries in the meanwhile they would not be considered as fit persons to
perform the duties pertaining to the positions held by them. Far from being
generous such an offer could rightfully, be considered insulting.
The greater offense is to the labor movement itself, more specifically to the right
of self-organization. There is both a constitutional and statutory recognition
that laborers have the right to form unions to take care of their interests vis-a-
vis their employers. Their freedom organizations would be rendered nugatory if
they could not choose their own leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain
for them.
If petitioner were to succeed in their unprecedented demand, the laborers in
this particular union would thus be confronted with the sad spectacle of the
leaders of their choice condemned as irresponsible, possibly even constituting a
menace to the operations of the enterprise. That is an indictment of the gravest
character, devoid of any factual basis. What is worse, the result, even if not
intended, would be to call into question their undeniable right to choose their
leaders, who must be treated as such with all the respect to which they are
legitimately entitled. The fact that they would be paid but not be allowed to
work is, to repeat, to add to the infamy that would thus attach to them
necessarily, but to respondent union equally.
Apparently, respondent Court was alive to the implication of such an
unwarranted demand, the effect of which would have been to deprive
effectively the rank and file of their freedom of choice as to who should
represent them.
For what use are leaders so undeserving of the minimum confidence. To that
extent then, their constitutional and statutory right to freedom of association
suffers an impairment hardly to be characterized as inconsequential.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied. Union won.
DOCTRINE: In right of self-organization, there is both a constitutional and
statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form unions to take care of
their interests vis-a-vis their employers. Their freedom organizations would be
rendered nugatory if they could not choose their own leaders to speak on their
behalf and to bargain for them.
https://www.scribd.com/document/333037102/Digest-Union-of-Supervisors-
v-SOL
https://www.scribd.com/document/98012694/Alliance-of-Nationalist
Reynaldo Bautista vs. Hon. Amado Inciong G.R. No. L-52824, March
16, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed by Associated Labor Unions(ALU) as organizer. Bautist
a went on leave and when he went back to work, he was informed that he was al
ready terminated. The Director ruled in favor of Bautista. The Deputy Minister o
f Labor, however, set aside the order of the Director finding that his membershi
p coverage with the SSS which shows that respondent ALU is the one paying the
employer’s share in the premiums is not conclusive proof that respondent is the
petitioner’s employer because such payments were performed by the responde
nt as a favor for all those who were performing full time union activities with it t
o entitle them to SSS benefits. He then ruled that there was no emplore-
employee relationship between ALU and Bautista by the fact that ALU is not an
entity for profit but a duly registered labor union whose sole purpose is the repr
esentation of its bonafide organization units.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be employer-
employee relationship between a labor union and its member.
HELD:
Yes, the mere fact that the respondent is a labor union does not mean that it can
not be considered an employer of the persons who work for it.
7
Moreover, the four elements in determining the existence of an employer-
employee relationship was present in the case at bar. The Regional Director cor
rectly found that the petitioner was an employee of the respondent union as refl
ected in the latter’s individual payroll sheets and shown by the petitioner’s mem
bership with the Social Security System (SSS) and the respondent union’s share
of remittances in the petitioner’s favor. Bautista was selected and hired by the u
nion. ALU had the power to dismiss him as indeed it dismissed him. And definite
ly, the Union tightly controlled the work of Bautista as one of its organizers
KAPATIRAN VS. CALLEJA
Topic: Right to Self-organization – Extent and scope of right
FACTS:
1984-1987: TUPAS (Kapatiran) was the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the workers in the Meat and Canning Division of the Universal
Robina Corp, with a 3-yr collective bargaining agreement which was to expire
on November 15, 1987
Within the freedom period of 60 days prior to the expiration of its CBA, TUPAS
filed an amended notice of strike as a means of pressuring the company to
extend, renew, or negotiate a new CBA with it
The NEW ULO (composed mostly of workers belonging to the INC sect)
registered as a labor union
TUPAS staged a strike
ROBINA obtained obtained an injunction against the strike, resulting in an
agreement to return to work and for the parties to negotiate a new CBA
The NEW ULO filed a petition for a certification election at the BLR
TUPAS moved to dismiss the petition
- for being defective in form and
- the members of the NEW ULO were mostly members of INC sect which 3 yrs
previous refused to affiliate with any labor union
- accused company of using the NEW ULO to defeat TUPAS’ bargaining rights
Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a certification election with 20 days
TUPAS appealed to BLR; In the meantime, it was able to negotiate a new 3-yr
CBA with ROBINA, which was signed on December 3, 1987 and to expire on
November 15, 1990
BLR Director Calleja dismissed the appeal. TUPAS’ MR was denied. Hence, this
petition alleging that BLR acted in excess of her jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the Med-Arbiter’s order for a certification
election
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the formation of NEW ULO as a labor union was proper
2. Whether or not the petition filed by TUPAS was proper
RULING:
1. YES, because This Court's decision in Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union, upholding the right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join
a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the
members of that sect from forming their own union. The public respondent
correctly observed that the "recognition of the tenets of the sect ... should not
infringe on the basic right of self-organization granted by the constitution to
workers, regardless of religious affiliation."
2. YES, because the fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with
ROBINA within the 60-day freedom period of the existing CBA, does not
foreclose the right of the rival union, NEW ULO, to challenge TUPAS' claim to
majority status, by filing a timely petition for certification election on October
13, 1987 before TUPAS' old CBA expired on November 15, 1987 and before it
8
signed a new CBA with the company on December 3, 1987. As pointed out by
Med-Arbiter Abdullah, a "certification election is the best forum in ascertaining
the majority status of the contending unions wherein the workers themselves
can freely choose their bargaining representative thru secret ballot." Since it has
not been shown that this order is tainted with unfairness, this Court will not
thwart the holding of a certification election
DISPOSITIVE: TUPAS won.
DOCTRINE:
Upholding the right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a
labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the
members of that sect from forming their own union. The "recognition of the
tenets of the sect ... should not infringe on the basic right of self-organization
granted by the constitution to workers, regardless of religious affiliation."
A "certification election is the best forum in ascertaining the majority status of
the contending unions wherein the workers themselves can freely choose their
bargaining representative thru secret ballot."
FEU-DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL FOUNDATION, INC. vs. TRAJANO
[G.R. No. 76273 July 31, 1987 ]FEU-DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL
FOUNDATION, INC. vs. TRAJANO
FACTS: The petitioner, Far Eastern University-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Memorial
Foundation, Inc., has a work force of about 350 rank and file employees,
majority of whom are members of private respondent Alliance of Filipino
Workers.
On February 13, 1986, private respondent filed a Petition for Consent and/or
Certification Election with The Ministry of Labor and Employment. The
petitioner opposed the petition on the ground that a similar petition involving
the same issues and the same parties is pending resolution before the Supreme
Court,
Apparently as early as May 10, 1976, private respondent filed a similar petition
for certification election with the Ministry of Labor and Employment but the
petition was denied on the ground that the petitioner was a non-stock, non-
profit medical institution, therefore, its employees may not form, join, or
organize a union pursuant to Article 244 of the Labor Code. Private respondent
filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court assailing the
constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code. Pending resolution of the
aforesaid petition Batas Pambansa Bilang 70 was enacted amending Article 244
of the Labor Code, thus granting even employees of non-stock, non-profit
institutions the right to form, join and organize labor unions of their choice. In
the exercise of such right, private respondent filed another petition for
certification election with the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
ISSUE: W/N rank and file employees of non-profit organization are covered by
the right to self-organization
HELD: YES. At the time private respondent filed its petition for certification
election on February 13, 1986, Article 244 of the Labor Code was already
amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, to wit:
Art. 244. Coverage and employees’ right to self-organization. — All persons
employed in commercial, industrial and charitable, medical or
educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right
to self-organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective
bargaining. Ambulant intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people,
rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for the purpose of enhancing and defending their interests and
for their mutual aid and protection. (underscoring supplied).
Under the aforequoted provision, there is no doubt that rank and file employees
of non-profit medical institutions (as herein petitioner) are now permitted to
form, organize or join labor unions of their choice for purposes of collective
bargaining. Since private respondent had complied with the requisites provided
by law for calling a certification election (p. 15, Rollo), it was incumbent upon
respondent Director to conduct such certification election to ascertain the
bargaining representative of petitioner’s employees (Samahang Manggagawa
Ng Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Noriel, 134 SCRA 152).
FILOIL REFINERY CORP V. FILOIL SUPERVISORY & CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION GR NO. L-26736
Topic: Workers with right to self organization; supervisors
FACTS:
1. Respondent association is a labor organization duly registered with the
Department of Labor. It is composed exclusively of the supervisory and
confidential employees of petitioner corporation. There exists another entirely
distinct labor association composed of the corporation's rank-and-file
employees, the Filoil Employees & Workers Association (FEWA) with which
petitioner executed a collective bargaining agreement. This collective
bargaining agreement expressly excluded from its coverage petitioner's
9
supervisory and confidential employees, who in turn organized their own labor
association, respondent herein.
2. Respondent association filed on February 18, 1965 with the industrial court
its petition for certification as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent
of all of petitioner's supervisory and confidential employees working at its
refinery in Rosario, Cavite.
3. Petitioner corporation filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds
of lack of cause of action and of respondent court's lack of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter, under its claim that supervisors are not employees within the
meaning of Republic Act 875, the Industrial Peace Act, and that since they are
part of management, they do not have the right to bargain collectively although
they may organize an organization of their own.
4. CIR: denied the dismissal motion. It ruled that under the express provisions
of section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act, "(I)ndividuals employed as supervisors
shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of employees under
their supervision but may form separate organizations their own."
5. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S: WON the supervisors (and confidential employees) has right to self
organization?
RULING: YES, they (both) do.
Petitioner's arguments go in reality to the wisdom and policy of the Industrial
Peace Act which expressly grants supervisors the right to organize and bargain
collectively, which are beyond the Court's power of review. Thus, the argument
that "it is axiomatic in the law of self-interest that an employer must give a
"better deal" to those who act in his interest and in whom he has trust and
confidence. These are the supervisors and confidential employees" and that "In
the United States there was a move to have a part of the supervisory group to be
aligned with labor. But the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act put an end to this
move."
1. So with petitioner's thesis that "(T)o then give supervisors the right to
compel employers to bargain would in effect align labor and management
together against stockholders and bondholders (capital) and inexorably tilt the
balance of power in favor of these hitherto confliction forces. This is contrary to
the nature and philosophy of free enterprise." This further serves to point up
the validity and rationale of the Industrial Peace Act's provision, since the
supervisors and confidential employees, even though they may exercise the
prerogatives of management as regards the rank and file employees are indeed
employees in relation to their employer, the company which is owned by the
"stockholders and bondholders (capital)" in petitioner's own words, and should
therefore be entitled under the law to bargain collectively with the top
management with respect to their terms and conditions of employment.
2. Petitioner's argument that the express provisions of section 3 of our
Industrial Peace Act must give way to the intendment of the Taft-Hartley Act
which exempts employers from the legal obligation to recognize and negotiate
with supervisors is tenuous and groundless. The language of our own statute is
plain and unambiguous and admits of no other interpretation.
3. The other principal ground of petitioner's appeal questioning the
confidential employees' inclusion in the supevisors bargaining unit is equally
untenable. Respondent court correctly held that since the confidential employee
are very few in number and are by practice and tradition identified with the
supervisors in their role as representives of management vis-a-vis the rank and
file employee such identity of interest has allowed their inclusion in the
bargaining unit of supervisors-managers for purposes of collective bargaining
in turn as employees in relation to the company as their employer.
4. No arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion can be attributed against
respondent court's allowing the inclusion of the confidential employees in the
supervisors' association for as admitted by petitioner itself, supra, the
supervisors and confidential emplyees enjoy its trust and confidence.
Thisidentity of interest logically calls for their inclusion in the same bargaining
unit and at the same time fulfills the law's objective of insuring to them the full
benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, which
could hardly be accomplished if the respondent association's membership were
to be broken up into five separate ineffective tiny units, as urged by petitioner.
DISPOSITIVE: Filoil supervisors and confidential employees won.
DOCTRINE: Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act "explicitly provides that
"employees" — and this term includes supervisors — "shall have the right to
self-organization, and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representations of
their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection" and that "individuals
employed as supervisors ... may form separate organizations of their own".
Indeed, it is well settled that "in relation to his employer," a foreman or
supervisor "is an employee within the meaning of the Act" ... For this reason,
supervisors are entitled to engage in union activities and any
10
discrimination against them by reason thereof constitutes an unfair labor
practice."
TOYOTA MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION LABOR UNION
vs. TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION EMPLOYEES AND WORK
ERS UNION, TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, and DOLE-SEC
G.R. No. 135806, 8 August 2002
FACTS:
TMPCLU filed a petition for certification election before Med-
Arbiter which dismissed TMPCLU’s petition on the ground that the labor organi
zation’s membership was composed of supervisory and rank-and-
file employees in violation of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, and that at the time of t
he filing of its petition, TMCPLU had not even acquired legal personality yet;
The Supreme Court ruled that since TMPCLU’s membership list contained the n
ames of at least twenty-
seven (27) supervisory employees in Level Five positions, “the union could not,
prior to purging itself of its supervisory employee members, attain the status of
a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, it cannot possess the requisite pe
rsonality to file a petition for certification election.Two months after, responden
t TMPCEWU filed a Petition for Certification Election before the Med-
Arbitration. TMPCLU intervened contending that the decision of the Supreme Co
urt had not ripened into a final and executory judgment so the Med Arbiter dism
issed TMPCEWU’S petition for CE. Then the SC’s Decision has become final and e
xecutory. TMPCEWU revived its Petition for Certification Election but was dismi
ssed because it was violative of the “one-union in one-
company” policy and likewise dismissed TMPCLU’s Petition-in-
Intervention for lack of legal personality.
ISSUE: Whether or not possession of a certificate of registration is an adequate a
nd unassailable proof that it possesses the requisite legal personality to file a Pe
tition for Certification Election.
RULING:
No. The Court said that the issuance of a certificate of registration in its favor is
an adequate and unassailable proof that it possesses the requisite legal personal
ity to file a Petition for Certification Election. Not necessarily. It was evident that
the union has been issued a certificate the day after it applied for it considering
that processing course had to pass through routing, screening, and assignment,
evaluation, review and initialing, and approval/disapproval procedure, among o
thers, that a 30-
day period is provided for under the Labor Code for this purpose. As emphasize
d in Progressive Development Corp. –
Pizza Hut v. Laguesma, if a labor organization’s application for registration is vit
iated by falsification and serious irregularities, a labor organization should be d
enied recognition as a legitimate labor organization. And if a certificate of regist
ration has been issued, the propriety of its registration could be assailed directl
y through cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance with Arts. 238
and 239 of the Labor Code, or indirectly, by challenging its petition for the issua
nce of an order for certification election. We believe the procedural requirement
s to impugn the registration by petitioner were more than adequately complied
with as shown in the 1997 case of Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyo
ta Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union.
There is no reason to belabor the primordial importance of strictly complying w
ith the registration requirements of the Labor Code. As we have explained in a l
ong line of cases, the activities of labor organizations, associations and unions ar
e impressed with public interest, hence, must be protected.
DUNLOP SLAZENGER
VS
SEC. OF LABOR (RUIZ)
300 SCRA 120
[DECEMBER 11, 1998]
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
-Respondent union filed a Petition for Certification Election among the
supervisory, and technical employees of the petitioner company before the
DOLE, Regional Office No. III.
-Petitioner company filed a motion to dismiss based on 1) that the respondent
union is comprised of supervisory and rank-and file employees and
cannot act as bargaining agent for the proposed unit; (2) that a single
certification election cannot be conducted jointly among supervisory and rank-
and-file employees; and (3) that the respondent union lacks legal standing since
it failed to submit its books of accounts.
11
-Respondent alleges that it is composed only of supervisory employees and that
it has no obligation to attach its books of accounts since it is a legitimate labor
organization.
-The mediator arbiter granted the petition of the union. It said that the
contention of the respondent that the petitioning union is composed of both
supervisory and rank and file employees is not sufficient to dismiss the petition.
It can be remedied thru the exclusion-inclusion proceedings wherein those
employees who are occupying rank and file positions will be excluded from the
list of eligible voters. The secretary of labor affirmed.
HELD
The petition is meritorious. We agree with the public respondent that
supervisors can be an appropriate bargaining unit. This is in accord with our
repeated ruling that “[a]n appropriate bargaining unit is a group of employees
of a given employer, composed of all or less than the entire body of employees,
which the collective interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to the
employer, indicate to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the
parties under the collective bargaining provisions of law. Otherwise stated, it is
a legal collectivity for collective bargaining purposes whose members have
substantially mutual bargaining interests in terms and conditions of
employment as will assure to all employees their collective bargaining rights. A
unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have
substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and
other subjects of collective bargaining.” The critical issue, however, is whether
or not the respondent union can file a petition for certification election to
represent the supervisory employees of the petitioner company. The resolution
of this issue depends on whether the respondent union is composed solely of
supervisory employees or of both supervisory and rank-and-file employees.
Article 245 of the Labor Code clearly provides that “supervisory employees
shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-
file employees . . . .”
To determine who are supervisory and rank-and-file employees reference
has to be made to Article 212 (m) of the Labor Code, as amended, as well as
Section 1 (t), Rule I, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
as amended, viz:
Managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to
lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend,
layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees
are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such
managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees
not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-
file employees for purposes of this Book [these Rules].
Determining the status of supervisory and rank-and-file employees is
not a hard row to hoe in labor law. The test of supervisory status as we have
repeatedly ruled is whether an employee possesses authority to act in the
interest of his employer, which authority should not be merely routinary or
clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. Corrollarily,
what determines the nature of employment is not the employee’s title, but his
job description.
In the instant case, the list of monthly paid employees submitted
by the petitioner company contains the names of about twenty seven (27)
supervisory employees, six (6) managerial employees, one (1) confidential
employee and twenty six (26) office and technical employees holding various
positions. The list reveals that the positions occupied by the twenty six (26)
office and technical employees are in fact rank-and-filepositions. We also do not
agree with the ruling of the respondent Secretary of Labor that the infirmity in
the membership of the respondent union can be remedied in “the preelection
conference thru the exclusion-inclusion proceedings wherein those employees
who are occupying rank-and-filepositions will be excluded from the list of
eligible voters.” Public respondent gravely misappreciates the basic antipathy
between the interest of supervisors and the interest of rank-and-file employees.
Due to the irreconcilability of their interests we held in Toyota Motor
Philippines v. Toyota Motors
Philippines Corporation Labor Union viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, based on this provision [Article 245, Labor Code], a labor
organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no
labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate
labor organization. Not being one, an organization which carries a mixture of
rank-and-file and supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a
legitimate labor organization, including the right to fileapetition for certification
election for the purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes necessary,
therefore, anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification election,
to inquire into the composition of any labor organization whenever the status of
the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of the Labor
Code.
Needless to stress, the respondent union has no legal right to file a
certification election to represent a bargaining unit composed of supervisors for
so long as it counts rank-and-file employees among its members.
12
PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. VS. TORRES [231 SCRA 335; G.R.
NO.98050; 17 MAR 1994]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with
the Department of Labor and Employment a petition for certificationelection
among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory
union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was
seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate
Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order
directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the superintendents and the
professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed
an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent
not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its
professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties
therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider
the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related
documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and
directing the holding of a certification election among the "supervisory,
professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses,
midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed the
order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered
a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal.
PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the
instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which
the mediator-arbiter was under.
Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrativeproceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its
position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted
for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was
sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was
afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could
have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the
witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its
position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the
opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
G.R. No. 85915 January 17, 1990
PAGKAKAISA NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA TRIUMPH INTERNATIONAL-UNITED
LUMBER AND GENERAL WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (PMTI-ULGWF) vs.
PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
AND THE CONFEDERATION OF FILIPINO WORKERS (CFW), PROGRESSIVE
EMPLOYEES UNION (PEU-TIPI)
FACTS:
The petitioner is the recognized collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of Triumph International with which the latter has a valid and
existing collective bargaining agreement effective up to September 24, 1989.
On November 25, 1987, a petition for certification election was filed by the
respondent union with the Department of Labor and Employment.
On January 30, 1988, a motion to dismiss the petition for certification election
was filed by Triumph International on the grounds that the respondent union
cannot lawfully represent managerial employees and that the petition cannot
prosper by virtue of the contract-bar rule. On the same grounds, the petitioner,
as intervenor, filed its opposition to the petition oil February 18, 1988.
On April 13, 1988, the Labor Arbiter issued an order granting the petition for
certification election and directing the holding of a certification election to
determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all monthly-paid
administrative, technical, confidential and supervisory employees of Triumph
International.
On appeal, the public respondent on August 24, 1988 affirmed the Labor
Arbiter’s order.
On September 5, 1988, Triumph International filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the public respondent in a resolution dated October 28,
1988.
HELD:
There is no evidence in the records which sufficiently distinguishes and clearly
separates the group of employees sought to be represented by the private
respondents into managerial and supervisory on one hand or supervisory and
rank-and-file on the other. The respondents’ pleadings do not show the
distinctions in functions and responsibilities which differentiate the managers
from the supervisors and sets apart the rank-and-file from either the
managerial or supervisory groups. As a matter of fact, the formation of a
supervisor’s union was never before the Labor Arbiter and the Bureau of Labor
Relations and neither is the issue before us. We, therefore, abide by the public
13
respondent’s factual findings in the absence of a showing of grave abuse of
discretion.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the petitioner is the exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of Triumph
International. A careful examination of the records of this case reveals no
evidence that rules out the commonality of interests among the rank-and-file
members of the petitioner and the herein declared rank-and-file employees who
are members of the respondent union. Instead of forming another bargaining
unit, the law requires them to be members of the existing one. The ends of
unionism are better served if all the rank-and-file employees with substantially
the same interests and who invoke their right to self-organization are part of a
single unit so that they can deal with their employer with just one and yet
potent voice. The employees’ bargaining power with management is
strengthened thereby. Hence, the circumstances of this case impel us to disallow
the holding of a certification election among the workers sought to be
represented by the respondent union for want of proof that the right of said
workers to self-organization is being suppressed.
Once again we enunciate that the proliferation of unions in an employer unit is
discouraged as a matter of policy unless compelling reasons exist which deny a
certain and distinct class of employees the right to self-organization for
purposes of collective bargaining.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP VS LAGUESMA
Topic: Managerial Employees
FACTS:
Petitioner Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines is engaged in the
manufacture of paper and timber products
PICOP-Bislig instituted a Petition for Certification Election to determine the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory and technical staff employees
of PICOP for collective bargaining agreement (CBA) purposes.
Initial hearing was set. Paper Industries Corp failed to file any comment or
position paper. Meanwhile, private respondents Federation of Free Workers
(FFW) and Associated Labor Union (ALU) filed their respective petitions for
intervention.
An Order was issued granting the petitions for interventions of the FFW and
ALU. Another Order issued on the same day set the holding of a certification
election among PICOP's supervisory and technical staff employees in with four
choices, namely: (1) PICOP Bislig Union; (2) FFW; (3) ALU; and (4) no union.
Paper Industries Corp appealed the Order which set the holding of the
certification election contending that the Med-Arbiter committed grave abuse of
discretion in deciding the case without giving the corporation the opportunity
to file its comments/answer, and that PICOP-Bislig Union had no personality to
file the petition for certification election.
PICOP questioned and objected to the inclusion of some section heads and
supervisors in the list of voters whose positions it averred were
reclassified as managerial employees in the light of the reorganization
effected by it.
PICOP’s contention: the company was divided into four (4) main business
groups, namely: Paper Products Business, Timber Products Business, Forest
Resource Business and Support Services Business. A vice- president or
assistant vice-president heads each of these business groups. A division
manager heads the divisions comprising each business group. A department
managerheads the departments comprising each division. Section heads and
supervisors, now called section managers and unit managers, head the
sections and independent units, respectively, comprising each department.
PICOP advanced the view that considering the alleged present authority of
these section managers and unit managers to hire and fire, they are
classified as managerial employees, and hence, ineligible to form or join
any labor organization.
Med-Arbiter ruling: supervisors and section heads of the petitioner are
managerial employees and therefore excluded from the list of voters for
purposes of certification election.
14

DOLE Under Sec Laguesma: issued an order declaring that the subject
supervisors and section heads are supervisory employees eligible to vote in the
certification election.
ISSUE: W/N the positions Section Heads and Supervisors, who have been
designated as Section Managers and Unit Managers, were converted to
managerial employees under the decentralization and reorganization program
RULING: No, they are not managerial employees
RATIO: A thorough dissection of the job description of the concerned
supervisory employees and section heads indisputably show that they are not
actually managerial but only supervisory employees since they do not lay down
company policies. PICOP's contention that the subject section heads and unit
managers exercise the authority to hire and fire is ambiguous and quite
misleading for the reason that any authority they exercise is not supreme but
merely advisory in character. Theirs is not a final determination of the company
policies inasmuch as any action taken by them on matters relative to hiring,
promotion, transfer, suspension and termination of employees is still subject to
confirmation and approval by their respective superior. Thus, where such
power, which is in effect recommendatory in character, is subject to evaluation,
review and final action by the department heads and other higher executives of
the company, the same, although present, is not effective and not an exercise of
independent judgment as required by law.
DISPOSITIVE: Under Sec. Laguesma was correct. The members of the labor
unions won.
DOCTRINE: Managerial employees are ranked as Top Managers, Middle
Managers and First Line Managers. Top and Middle Managers have the
authority to devise, implement and control strategic and operational policies
while the task of First-Line Managers is simply to ensure that such policies are
carried out by the rank-and- file employees of an organization. Under this
distinction, "managerial employees" therefore fall in two (2) categories, namely,
the "managers" per se composed of Top and Middle Managers, and the
"supervisors" composed of First-Line Managers. Thus, the mere fact that an
employee is designated manager" does not ipso facto make him one.
Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of the
employee, for it is the job description that determines the nature of
employment.
G.R. No. 122226 March 25, 1998
UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU), petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS,
PHILIPPINES, INC. respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March
20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the
route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition
was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees
and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art.
245 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of
supervisory employees. — Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist
or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may
join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order, dismissed.
Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence
of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be
ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III, §8 of the
Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are
managerial employees and
(2) whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from
forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, §8 of the Constitution.
15
HELD: YES and NO
As a class, managers constitute three levels of a pyramid: (1) Top management;
(2) Middle Management; and (3) First-line Management [also called
supervisors].
FIRST-LINE MANAGERS — The lowest level in an organization at which
individuals are responsible for the work of others is called first-line or first-level
management. First-line managers direct operating employees only; they do not
supervise other managers. Examples of first-line managers are the “foreman” or
production supervisor in a manufacturing plant, the technical supervisor in a
research department, and the clerical supervisor in a large office. First-level
managers are often called supervisors.
MIDDLE MANAGERS — The term middle management can refer to more than
one level in an organization. Middle managers direct the activities of other
managers and sometimes also those of operating employees. Middle managers’
principal responsibilities are to direct the activities that implement their
organizations’ policies and to balance the demands of their superiors with the
capacities of their subordinates. A plant manager in an electronics firm is an
example of a middle manager.
TOP MANAGERS — Composed of a comparatively small group of executives, top
management is responsible for the overall management of the organization. It
establishes operating policies and guides the organization’s interactions with its
environment. Typical titles of top managers are “chief executive officer,”
“president,” and “senior vice-president.” Actual titles vary from one
organization to another and are not always a reliable guide to membership in
the highest management classification.
A distinction exists between those who have the authority to devise, implement
and control strategic and operational policies (top and middle managers) and
those whose task is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the
rank-and-file employees of an organization (first-level managers/supervisors).
What distinguishes them from the rank-and-file employees is that they act in
the interest of the employer in supervising such rank-and-file employees.
“Managerial employees” may therefore be said to fall into two distinct
categories: the “managers” per se, who compose the former group described
above, and the “supervisors” who form the latter group.
#1: It appears that this question was the subject of two previous determinations
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, in accordance with which this case
was decided by the med-arbiter.
To qualify as managerial employee, there must be a clear showing of the
exercise of managerial attributes under paragraph (m), Article 212 of the Labor
Code as amended. Designations or titles of positions are not controlling. As to
the route managers and accounting manager, we are convinced that they are
managerial employees. Their job descriptions clearly reveal so (Worker’s
Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., Nov. 13,
1991)
This finding was reiterated in Case No. OS-A-3-71-92. entitled In Re: Petition for
Direct Certification and/or Certification Election-Route Managers/Supervisory
Employees of Pepsi-Cola Products Phils.Inc.
* doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative
proceedings
Thus, we have in this case an expert’s view that the employees concerned are
managerial employees within the purview of Art. 212.
At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination
compels respect for the finding of the Secretary of Labor that route managers
are managerial employees as defined by law in the absence of anything to show
that such determination is without substantial evidence to support it.
The Court now finds that the job evaluation made by the Secretary of Labor is
indeed supported by substantial evidence. The nature of the job of route
managers is given in a four-page pamphlet, prepared by the company, called
“Route Manager Position Description,” the pertinent parts of which read:
A. BASIC PURPOSE
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the sales plan; and you achieve
this objective through the skillful MANAGEMENT OF YOUR JOB AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF YOUR PEOPLE.
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route Manager. Within these
functions — managing your job and managing your people — you are
accountable to your District Manager for the execution and completion of
various tasks and activities which will make it possible for you to achieve your
sales objectives.
Xxxx
Distinction is evident in the work of the route managers which sets them apart
from supervisors in general. Unlike supervisors who basically merely direct
operating employees in line with set tasks assigned to them, route managers are
responsible for the success of the company’s main line of business through
management of their respective sales teams. Such management necessarily
involves the planning, direction, operation and evaluation of their individual
teams and areas which the work of supervisors does not entail.
The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors
because their work does not only involve, but goes far beyond, the simple
direction or supervision of operating employees to accomplish objectives set by
those above them.
16
While route managers do not appear to have the power to hire and fire people
(the evidence shows that they only “recommended” or “endorsed” the taking of
disciplinary action against certain employees), this is because thisis a function
of the Human Resources or Personnel Department of the company.
# 2: Constitutionality of Art. 245
Art.245 is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in 1989 by R.A. No.
6715, otherwise known as the Herrera-Veloso Law. Unlike the Industrial Peace
Act or the provisions of the Labor Code which it superseded, R.A. No. 6715
provides separate definitions of the terms “managerial” and “supervisory
employees,” as follows:
Art. 212. Definitions. . .
(m) “managerial employee” is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to
lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are
those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such
managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees
not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file
employees for purposes of this Book.
The distinction between top and middle managers, who set management policy,
and front-line supervisors, who are merely responsible for ensuring that such
policies are carried out by the rank and file, is articulated in the present
definition. 30 When read in relation to this definition in Art. 212(m), it will be
seen that Art. 245 faithfully carries out the intent of the Constitutional
Commission in framing Art. III, §8 of the fundamental law.
*Framer’s Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is on Section 7, page 2, line 19,
which is to insert between the words “people” and “to” the following:
WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. In
other words, the section will now read as follows: “The right of the people
WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS to form
associations, unions, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.”
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8 infringed by a ban
against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III,
§8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes “not
contrary to law.” In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting
managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations.
PETITION is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 80882 April 24, 1989
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (SPFL), petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE PURA FERRER CALLEJA, Director, Bureau of Labor Relations,
Department of Labor and Employment, public respondent. MINDANAO
MINERS EMPLOYEE UNION SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO
(SANDIGAN), forced intervenor-private respondent. APEX MINING COMPANY,
INC., employer-private respondent.
Proculo P. Fuentes, Jr. for petitioner.
Valeriano F. Pasquil and Ruben V. Abarquez for respondent Apex Mining Co., Inc.
. Raul C. Nengasca and Antonio G. Jolejole for respondent Sandigan.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Order issued by
public respondent Director Pura Ferrer Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations
dated June 23, 1987 which certified the respondent union, Mindanao Miners
Employees Union-Sandigan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (MMEU-Sandigan), as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees
of respondent Apex Mining Company (Apex) after the said public respondent
denied the motion of herein petitioner to exclude one hundred ninety-seven
(197) employees from voting in the certification election. The denial is based on
the ground that they are rank-and-file employees.
As summarized by the Solicitor General in his Comment, the facts are as follows:
On December 29, 1986, petitioner Southern Philippines Federation of Labor
filed a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of
private respondent Apex Mining Company, Incorporated with the Department
of Labor in Region XI, Davao City.
On February 6, 1987, Med-Arbiter Conrado 0. Macasa, Sr. issued an Order
calling for the holding of the certification election on February 23, 1987 among
the rank-and-file employees of APEX with the following choices:
l. Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL)
2. Mindanao Miners Employees Union-Sandigan ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(MMEU-Sandigan) and
3. No union.
17
On February 9, 1987, a pre-election conference was conducted among the
petitioner Union; private respondent Union, MMEU-Sandigan; and APEX to
settle details in the conduct of the election such as the venue of the election and
the list of employees qualified to vote in the election.
During the pre-election conference, the parties agreed to delete from the list of
workers prepared and submitted by APEX numbering One Thousand Seven
Hundred Sixteen (1,716), the names of nineteen (1 9) managerial employees
and seventy-three probationary employees who were statutorily disqualified
from voting. Petitioner Union objected to the inclusion in said list of the
following: (1) employees occupying the positions of Supervisor I, II, and III; (2)
employees under confidential/special payrolls; and (3) employees who were
not paying Union dues. The petitioner Union contends that the aforementioned
employees were disqualified from participating in the certification election
since the Supervisors were managerial employees while the last two were
disqualified by virtue of their non-membership in the Union and their exclusion
from the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement.
In view of the lack of agreement among the parties on the list of qualified voters,
Med-Arbiter Macasa issued an Order on February 20, 1987, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, premises considered it is hereby declared that the following groups
of workers be not included in the list of employees qualified to vote in the
consent election on February 23, 1987, as follows:
1 Nineteen (19) managerial employees;
2 Seventy-three (73) probationary employees; and
3 Nineteen (19) Supervisors 1;
All other workers except the foregoing will be allowed to vote."
On February 23, 1987, the day of the certification election, petitioner Union filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of Macasa's Order dated February 20, 1987. The
certification election was nonetheless conducted, with the result as follows:
l. Southern Philippines Federation of Labor............. 614
2. Mindanao Miners
(MMEU- Sandigan)................................................... 528
3. No Union......................................................................... 9
4. Challenged Ballots......................................................197
5. Spoiled............................................................................25
TOTAL VOTES CAST............................................................1,373
On the basis of the foregoing results, respondent Union filed an Urgent Motion
to Open the Challenged Ballots, with the prayer, to wit:
"Wherefore, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this
Honorable office that this instant motion be given due course and that an order
be issued to open and count the challenged ballots in order to determine, once
and for all, the winner in the certification and/or consent election and
thereafter certify the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of
all rank-and-file employees and workers of Apex Mining Company,
Incorporated."
xxx xxx xxx
On March 11, 1987, APEX filed a Manifestation and Motion manifesting its
interest in the speedy resolution of the case and primary concern for "the
restoration of normalcy and the preservation of industrial peace in the already
explosive situation in the mining area."
xxx xxx xxx
On March 19, 1987, Med-Arbiter Macasa issued an Order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, the interest of industrial peace considered, it is hereby directed
that the challenged ballots be opened and inventoried on 26 March 1987 at 3:00
p.m., before the entire records of the case be indorsed to the BLR for review."
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner Union appealed Macasa's Order dated March 19, 1987 to the Bureau
of Labor Relations. On April 14, 1987, BLR Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja issued
an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Appeal of petitioner Southern Philippines Federation of
Labor (SPFL) is hereby dismissed for lack of merit and the Med- Arbiter's Order
dated 19 March 1987 is affirmed with modification that the 197 ballots should
Employees union be opened and canvassed by Labor Regional Office XI, Davao City. Let, therefore,
the records of this case be immediately remanded to the said office, for the
immediate implementation of this Resolution."
Petitioner Union moved for a reconsideration of the resolution dated April 14,
1987. Meanwhile, on May 21, 1987, Med-Arbiter Macasa opened and canvassed
the 197 challenged ballots with the result as follows:
18
SPFL 12 votes Code; b) those performing supervisory functions; and c) those holding
SANDIGAN 178 votes confidential positions as determined by the company. Therefore, the employees
No Union 2 votes holding the positions of Supervisors II and III and those in the confidential
Spoiled 4 votes payrolls should be excluded from joining the bargaining unit and from voting in
Envelop with the certification election. Likewise, those employees who are not paying union
no ballots 1 vote dues should be excluded from the same since the existing CBA contains a Union
shop provision.
__________
TOTAL 197 votes The contentions have no merit.

As a consequence of the opening and canvass of the challenged ballots, the
outcome of the certification election became:
SPFL 626 votes
SANDIGAN 706 votes
No Union 11 votes
___________
TOTAL 1,343 votes
Based on the aforementioned results, respondent Union filed a Manifestation
with the BLR with prayer for the issuance of Certification Order certifying it as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees
of APEX. On June 23, 1987, Director Calleja issued an Order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Motion for reconsideration of Petitioner SPFL is hereby
denied for lack of merit. Meanwhile, intervenor Mindanao Employees Union-
Sandigan Ng Manggagawang Pilipino (MMEU- SANDIGAN) is hereby certified as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees
of respondent Apex Mining Company, Inc. Accordingly, the management of Apex
Mining Company, Inc., is directed to negotiate with (MMEU-SANDIGAN) for the
conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)."
Although we have upheld the validity of the CBA as the law among the parties,
(see Planters Products, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 78524, January 20, 1989), its
provisions cannot override what is expressly provided by law that only
managerial employees are ineligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization (See Art. 247, Labor Code). Therefore, regardless of the challenged
employees' designations, whether they are employed as Supervisors or in the
confidential payrolls, if the nature of their job does not fall under the definition
of "managerial" as defined in the Labor Code, they are eligible to be members of
the bargaining unit and to vote in the certification election. Their right to self-
organization must be upheld in the absence of an express provision of law to the
contrary. It cannot be curtailed by a collective bargaining agreement.
Hence, it is important to determine whether the positions of Supervisors II and
III are considered "managerial" under the law.
As defined in the Labor Code and as we have held in the case of Franklin Baker
Company of the Phils. v. Trajano, (1 57 SCRA 416, 421-423, [1988]):
A managerial employee is defined as one who is vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or
to effectively recommend such managerial actions. (Reynolds Phil. Corp. v.
Eslava, 137 SCRA [1985], citing Section 212 (K), Labor Code.)

Hence, this petition. xxxxxxxxx

The issue raised in this petition is whether or not the public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the 197 employees to vote in
the certification election when, as alleged by the petitioner, they are disqualified
by express provision of law or under the existing collective bargaining
agreement.
It is maintained by the petitioner that under the Labor Code, managerial
employees are excluded from forming or joining a collective bargaining unit;
and under the collective bargaining agreement executed between Apex and
respondent union, among those who are excluded from the bargaining unit are:
a) managerial employees as defined in paragraph K, Article 212 of the Labor
The test of "supervisory" or "managerial status" depends on whether a person
possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer in the matter specified
in Article 212 (k) of the Labor Code and Section 1 (m) of its Implementing Rules
and whether such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature, but
requires the use of independent judgment. Thus, where such recommendatory
powers as in the case at bar, are subject to evaluation, review and final action by
the department heads and other higher executives of the company, the same,
although present, are not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment
as required by law (National Warehousing Corp. v. CIR, 7 SCRA 602-603
[1963]).

19
Furthermore, in line with the ruling of this Court, subject employees are not
managerial employees because as borne by the records, they do not participate
in policy making but are given ready policies to execute and standard practices
to observe, thus having little freedom of action (National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority v. NWSA Consolidated, L-18938, 11 SCRA 766 [1964]).
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration before the public respondent
outlined the job description of Supervisors. In the category of Supervisory II, the
"General Summary" provides:
GENERAL SUMMARY:
Assists the Foreman in the effective dispatching/distribution of manpower and
equipment to carry out approved work. (p. 30, Rollo)
while the first duty enumerated in the position of Supervisor III states:
1. Executes and coordinates work plans emanating from his supervisors. (p. 32,
Rollo)
Thus, it is clear from the above provisions that the functions of the questioned
positions are not managerial in nature because they only execute approved and
established policies leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement
the said policies or not. The respondent Director, therefore, did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioner's appeal from the Med-
Arbiter's Order to open and count the challenged ballots in denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in certifying the respondent Union
as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file
employees of respondent Apex .
As regards the employees in the confidential payroll, the petitioner has not
shown that the nature of their jobs is classified as managerial except for its
allegation that they are considered by management as occupying managerial
positions and highly confidential. Neither can payment or non-payment of union
dues be the determining factor of whether the challenged employees should be
excluded from the bargaining unit since the union shop provision in the CBA
applies only to newly hired employees but not to members of the bargaining
unit who were not members of the union at the time of the signing of the CBA. It
is, therefore, not impossible for employees to be members of the bargaining unit
even though they are non-union members or not paying union dues.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
https://www.scribd.com/document/339125372/Philtranco-v-BLR
https://www.scribd.com/document/197740772/Case-Digest-golden-Farms-
vs-Sec-of-Labor
Pier 8 Arrastre v. Roldan-Confessor
Facts:
1. The corporation and private respondent union enetered into a collective
bargaining agreement. During the freedom period, NAFLU questioned the
majority status of the union by filing for a petition for certification election (CE).
The private respondent union won the CE and was certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees. However, the
negotiations for the CBA collapsed. The Sec. of Labor took over the dispute and
resolved the bargaining deadlock and ordered that the position of foremen,
secretaries, and timekeepers were lumped together as part of the rank-and-file.
2. The petitioner contended that supervisors (foremen) and the legal secretary
should be excluded from the bargaining unit.
Issue: W/N the foremen and secretaries should be excluded from the rank
and file bargaining unit
RULING: Yes. Art. 245 of the Labor Code applies. The foremen and are
supervisory employees and therefore cannot be part of the rank and file. Legal
secretaries are neither managers or supervisors but confidential workers hence,
they cannot be part of the ran and file as well. With respect to the timekeepers,
they should not be excluded from the bargaining unit of the rank and file. The
test of supervisory or managerial status is whether an employee possesses
authority to act in the interest of his employer, and such authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment.
What determines the nature of the employment is not the title bu the job
description.
20
G.R. No. 110399 August 15, 1997
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION AND
ERNESTO L. PONCE, President V. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA
IN HIS CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
HONORABLE DANILO L. REYNANTE IN HIS CAPACITY AS MED-ARBITER
AND SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
FACTS: Petitioner union filed before DOLE a Petition for Direct Certification or
Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.
Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of
certification election among the abovementioned employees of the different
plants as one bargaining unit.
San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal,
pointing out, among others, the Med-Arbiter’s error in grouping together all
three (3) separate plants, into one bargaining unit, and in including supervisory
levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential in nature.
The public respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent
company’s Appeal and ordered the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter of
origin for determination of the true classification of each of the employees
sought to be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.
Upon petitioner-union’s motion, Undersecretary Laguesma granted the
reconsideration prayed for and directed the conduct of separate certification
elections among the supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4)
and the exempt employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando
and Otis.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the
company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from joining a
union.
2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three plants
constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.
RULING:
(1) On the first issue, this Court rules that said employees do not fall within the
term “confidential employees” who may be prohibited from joining a union.
They are not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who, under
Article 245 of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. In the very same provision, they are not allowed membership in a
labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form
separate labor organizations of their own.
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity,
(2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies
in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be
met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee — that is, the
confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor,
and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor
relations.
The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of
their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is
a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the ”confidential employee
rule.” The broad rationale behind this rule is that employees should not be
placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests. “Management
should not be required to handle labor relations matters through employees
who are represented by the union with which the company is required to deal
and who in the normal performance of their duties may obtain advance
information of the company’s position with regard to contract negotiations, the
disposition of grievances, or other labor relations matters.”
The Court held that “if these managerial employees would belong to or be
affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the
Union in view of evident conflict of interest. The Union can also become
company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union
membership.”
An important element of the “confidential employee rule” is the employee’s
need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining the confidentiality
of certain employees, a key question frequently considered is the employee’s
necessary access to confidential labor relations information.
(2) The fact that the three plants are located in three different places, namely, in
Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San Fernando,
Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be completely disregarded if
the communal or mutual interests of the employees are not sacrificed.
An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as “a group of employees of a
given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the
employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of
the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.”
21
A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have
substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other
subjects of collective bargaining.
[G.R. No. 96663 August 10, 1999] PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR,
FACTS: The Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a petition
for certification election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive
bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines, Inc. (PEPSI).
The Med-Arbiter granted the Petition, with the explicit statement that it was an
affiliate of Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (federation) together with
two (2) rank and file unions. Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity (PCLU) and Pepsi-Cola
Employees Union of the Philippines (PEUP).
PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to Set Aside, Cancel
and/or Revoke Charter Affiliation of the Union, entitled PCPPI v. PCEU-UOEF on
the grounds that (a) the members of the Union were managers and (b) a
supervisors’ union can not affiliate with a federation whose members include
the rank and file union of the same company.
ISSUE: Whether or not a supervisors’ union can affiliate with the same
Federation of which two rank and file unions are likewise members, without
violating Article 245 of the Labor Code (PD 442), as amended? W/N confidential
employees may join rank and file employees union.
HELD: In Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma, 205 SCRA 121 [1992], as
members it was ratiocinated:
xxx xxx xx
The prohibition against a supervisors’ union joining a local union of rank and
file is replete with jurisprudence. The Court emphasizes that the limitation is
not confined to a case of supervisors’ wanting to join a rank-and-file
union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors’ local union applying for
membership in a national federation the members of which include local
unions of rank and file employees. The intent of the law is clear especially
where, as in this case at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling with
those employees whom they directly supervise in their own bargaining
unit.
As regards the issue of whether or not confidential employees can join the labor
union of the rank and file, what was held in the case of National Association of
Trade Unions (NATU) — . . A confidential employee is one entrusted with
confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and
protection of the employer’s property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles
out managerial employee as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential
employees are similarly disqualified.
G.R. No. 77951 September 26, 1988
COOPERATIVE RURAL BANK OF DAVAO CITY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS,
MOLE, MANILA; FELIZARDO T. SERAPIO, MED-ARBITER DESIGNATE,
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. XI, MOLE, DAVAO CITY; and FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS, respondents.
Herbert P. Artes for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for Public respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the
issue is whether or not the employees of a cooperative can organize themselves
for purposes of collective bargaining.
The record of the case discloses that the herein petitioner Cooperative Rural
Bank of Davao City, Inc. is a cooperative banking corporation operating in Davao
City. It is owned in part by the Government and its employees are members and
co-owners of the same. The petitioner has around 16 rank-and-file employees.
As of August, 1986, there was no existing collective bargaining agreement
between the said employees and the establishment. On the other hand, the
herein private respondent Federation of Free Workers is a labor organization
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. It is interested in
representing the said employees for purposes of collective bargaining.
On August 27, 1986, the private respondent filed with the Davao City Regional
Office of the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a verified Petition for
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. 1The
same was docketed as Case No. R-325 ROXI MED-UR-73-86. On September 18,
1986, the herein public respondent issued an Order granting the Petition for
certification election.
On October 3, 1986, the petitioner filed an Appeal Memorandum and sought a
reversal of the Order of the Med-Arbiter.2 The petitioner argues therein that,
among others, a cooperative is not covered by the Rules governing certification
elections inasmuch as it is not an institution operating for profit. The petitioner
also adds that two of the alleged rank-and-file employees seeking the
22
certification election are managerial employees disqualified from joining
concerted labor activities. In sum, the petitioner insists that its employees are
disqualified from forming labor organizations for purposes of collective
bargaining.
On October 8, 1986, the private respondent filed a "Motion to Dismiss the
Appeal." On October 15, 1986, the petitioner filed its opposition to the said
Motion.
On February 11, 1987, the herein public respondent Bureau of Labor Relations
Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja issued a Resolution affirming the Order of the Med-
Arbiter and dismissing the Appeal. 3 The pertinent portions of the said
Resolution are as follows—
It is beyond doubt that respondent-appellant, Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao
City falls within the purview of Article 212, paragraph C of the Labor Code,
acting as such in the interest of an employer. To argue otherwise would amount
to closing one's eyes to the realities of today's cooperative banking institutions.
....
Moreover, basic is the right of every worker in any establishment whether
operated for profit or not to organize and engage in concerted activity, mutually
beneficial to their interest. Such right is sacredly enshrined and protected in our
fundamental law, granting every worker the right to organize into a collective
group and engage in concerted activities for purposes of promoting their well
being, subject only to such limitations as may be provided for by law.
xxx xxx xxx
As this Office has consistently ruled and applied in various cases, being a
member of a cooperative organization does not preclude one from forming or
joining a labor union provided that such person or persons are not among those
disqualified by law. Nowhere in the records can we find any piece of evidence
showing that the signatories in the petition are among those disqualified to
form or join a union.
Finally, we cannot give credence to (the) employer's allegation that two of the
signatories thereof, are managerial employees, since no evidence showing such
fact can be found from the records.
xxx xxx xxx
In a Motion dated March 2, 1987, the petitioner asked for a reconsideration of
the said Resolution. 4 The petitioner reiterated therein its view that its
employees are disqualified from forming the labor organization so
contemplated. The petitioner also called attention to an Opinion rendered by
then Solicitor General and Minister of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza dated August
14, 1981.5 The Opinion states that employees of an electric cooperative who are
themselves members/co-owners of the same cannot form or join labor
organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. The Opinion also states that
the duty to bargain exists only between an employer and his/its employees, and
that an employer has no duty to bargain with his co-owners of a corporation
who are also its employees. The petitioner submits that the said Opinion calls
for application in the present controversy.
On March 26, 1987, director Calleja issued a Resolution denying the
reconsideration sought by the petitioner.6 Thus, the certification election was
scheduled in the morning of April 23, 1987.
Finding the action taken by the Bureau unsatisfactory, the petitioner brought
the case directly to this Court on April 9, 1987 by way of the instant Petition for
certiorari. The petitioner maintains that the public respondents both acted
without jurisdiction or in excess thereof, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in allowing the certification election sought by
the private respondent despite the arguments of the petitioner in opposition
thereto. The petitioner reiterates its argument that employees of cooperatives
who are members and co-owners of the same cannot form and join labor
organizations for purposes of collective bargaining.
On April 15, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
Bureau of Labor Relations from proceeding with the certification election
scheduled on April 23, 1987. 7 The certification election nonetheless pushed
through as scheduled for the alleged reason that the temporary restraining
order was not seasonably transmitted to Davao City.8
This court also required the respondents to file their Comment on the Petition.
The respondents complied as instructed. The Office of the Solicitor General
represented the public respondents.
The Solicitor General intimated to this Court that the instant Petition has been
rendered moot and academic inasmuch as the certification election sought to be
enjoined had already been conducted. The Solicitor General added that the
public respondents did not commit any jurisdictional error. 10
In due time, the parties submitted other pleadings. On January 6, 1988, the case
was deemed submitted for decision.
After a careful examination of the entire record of the case, We find the instant
Petition meritorious.
Contrary to the view espoused by the Solicitor General, this case cannot be
considered moot and academic simply because the certification election sought
to be enjoined went on as scheduled. The instant Petition is one for certiorari as
a special civil action. Errors of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents
23
are alleged in the Petition itself. If the public respondents had indeed committed
jurisdictional errors, the action taken by both the Med-Arbiter and the Bureau
Director will be deemed null and void ab initio. 11 And if this were so, the
certification election would, necessarily, have no legal justification. The
arguments raised in the instant Petition strike at the very heart of the validity of
the certification election itself.
We come now to the main aspect of the case.
Article 243 of the Labor Code 12 enumerates who are eligible to form, join, or
assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining, to wit —
ART. 243. Coverage and employees' right to self-organization. — All persons
employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in
religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating for
profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist
labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.
....
The recognized exception to this enumeration is found in Article 245 of the
same code, which provides for the ineligibility of managerial employees to join
any labor reorganization, viz-
ART. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization.
Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization.
From the foregoing provisions of law it would appear at first blush that all the
rank and file employees of a cooperative who are not managerial employees are
eligible to form, join or assist any labor organization of their own choosing for
the purpose of collective bargaining.
However, under Section 2 of P.D. No. 175, a cooperative is defined to mean
"organizations composed primarily of small producers and of consumers who
voluntarily join together to form business enterprises which they themselves
own, control, and patronize." Its creation and growth were declared as a policy
of the State as a means of increasing the income and purchasing power of the
low-income sector of the population in order to attain a more equitable
distribution of income and wealth . 13 The principles governing it are:
a) Open membership—"Should be voluntary and available without artificial
restriction, or any social, political, racial or religious discrimination, to all
persons who can make use of its services and are willing to accept
responsibilities of membership;"
b) Democratic control.—"Irrespective of the number of shares owned, each
member can only cast one vote in deciding upon the affairs of the cooperative;"
c) Limited interests to capital.— "Share capital shall earn only limited interest,
the maximum rate of interest to be established by the Department of Local
Government and Community Development from time to time;" and
d) Patronage refund — "Net income after the interest on capital has been paid
shall be redistributed among the members in proposition to their patronage." 14
While cooperatives may exercise the same rights and privileges given to
persons, partnership and corporations provided under existing laws, operate
business enterprises of all kinds, establish rural banks, enjoy all the privileges
and incentives granted by the NACIDA Act and other government agencies to
business organizations under existing laws, to expropriate idle urban or rural
lands for its purposes, to own and dispose of properties, enter into contracts, to
sue and be sued and perform other acts necessary to pursue its
objectives, 15 such cooperatives enjoy such privileges as:
a) Exemption from income tax and sales taxes;
b) Preferential right to supply rice, corn and other grains, and other
commodities produced by them to State agencies administering price
stabilization program; and
c) In appropriate cases, exemption from application of minimum wage law upon
recommendation of the Bureau of Cooperative Development subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Labor. 16
A cooperative development loan fund has been created for the development of
the cooperative movement. 17
It may be, further stated that the Department of Local Govemment and
Community Development through the Bureau of Cooperative Development is
vested with full authority to promulgate rules and regulations to cover the
promotion, organization, registration, regulation and supervision of all types of
cooperatives. 18 Electric cooperatives, however, are under the regulation and
supervision of the National Electrification Ad. Administration, 19 while it is the
Monetary Board of the Central Bank that has exclusive responsibility and
authority over the banking functions and operations of cooperative banks . 20
A cooperative, therefore, is by its nature different from an ordinary business
concern, being run either by persons, partnerships, or corporations. Its owners
and/or members are the ones who run and operate the business while the
others are its employees. As above stated, irrespective of the number of shares
owned by each member they are entitled to cast one vote each in deciding upon
the affairs of the cooperative. Their share capital earn limited interests. They
enjoy special privileges as — exemption from income tax and sales taxes,
preferential right to supply their products to State agencies and even exemption
from the minimum wages laws.
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An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner
thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner
cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. In the opinion of August 14, 1981
of the Solicitor General he correctly opined that employees of cooperatives who
are themselves members of the cooperative have no right to form or join labor
organizations for purposes of collective bargaining for being themselves co-
owners of the cooperative. 21
However, in so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are not
members or co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to
exercise the rights of all workers to organization, collective bargaining,
negotiations and others as are enshrined in the Constitution and existing laws of
the country.22
The questioned ruling therefore of public respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja must
be upheld insofar as it refers to the employees of petitioner who are not
members or co-owners of petitioner. It cannot extend to the other employees
who are at the same time its members or co-owners.
The Court upholds the findings of said public respondent that no persuasive
evidence has been presented to show that two of the signatories in the petition
for certification election are managerial employees who under the law are
disqualified from pursuing union activities.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is hereby GRANTED and the resolution of
public respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja, Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, of
February 11, 1987 is hereby MODIFIED to the effect that only the rank and file
employees of petitioner who are not its members or co-owners are entitled to
self-organization, collective bargaining, and negotiations, while the other
employees who are members or co-owners thereof can not enjoy such right.
SO ORDERED.
Central Negros Electric Cooperative vs DOLE
GR 94045
Facts:
On August 15, 1987, CENECO entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with CURE, a labor union representing its rank-and-file employees, providing
for a term of three years retroactive to April 1, 1987 and extending up to March
31, 1990. On December 28, 1989, CURE wrote CENECO proposing that
negotiations be conducted for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
On January 18, 1990, CENECO denied CURE’s request on the ground that, under
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, employees who at the same time are
members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join a union.
Prior to the submission of the proposal for CBA renegotiation, CURE members,
in a general assembly held on December 9, 1989, approved Resolution No. 35
whereby it was agreed that ‘tall union members shall withdraw, retract, or
recall the union members’ membership from Central Negros Electric
Cooperative, Inc. in order to avail (of) the full benefits under the existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by and between CENECO and
CURE, and the supposed benefits that our union may avail of under the renewed
CBA.
However, the withdrawal from membership was denied by CENECO on
February 27, 1990 under Resolution No. 90.
Issue: WON the employees of CENECO who withdrew their membership from
the cooperative are entitled to form or join CURE for purposes of the
negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement proposed by the latter.
Held:
The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their
withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out by CURE, the
resignation of the member- employees is an expression of their preference for
union membership over that of membership in the cooperative. The avowed
policy of the State to afford fall protection to labor and to promote the primacy
of free collective bargaining mandates that the employees’ right to form and join
unions for purposes of collective bargaining be accorded the highest
consideration.
Thus, member employees of a cooperative may withdraw as members of the
cooperative in order to join labor union. Membership in a cooperative is
voluntary; inherent in it is the right not to join.
NOTES: (San Jose Electric Service Cooperative vs. Ministry of Labor)
1. A cooperative, therefore, is by its nature different from an ordinary business
concern being run either, by persons, partnerships or corporations. Its owners
and/or members are the ones who run and operate the business while the
others are its employees.
2. An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner
thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner
cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. Employees of cooperatives who
are themselves members of the cooperative have no right to form or join labor
organizations for purposes of collective bargaining for being themselves co-
owners of the cooperative.
3. However, in so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are not
members or co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to
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exercise the rights of all workers to organization, collective bargaining, women, not labor organizations. The latter are merely the instrumentalities
negotiations and others as are enshrined in the Constitution and existing laws of through which their welfare may be promoted and fostered. That is the raison
the country. d’etre of labor unions. The utmost care should be taken then, lest in displaying
an unyielding, intransigent attitude on behalf of their members, injustice be
[ G.R. No. L-30241 June 30, 1972] MACTAN WORKERS UNION and TOMAS committed against opposing labor organizations. In the final analysis, they alone
FERRER vs.DON RAMON ABOITIZ are not the sole victims, but the labor movement itself, which may well be the
recipient of a crippling blow. Moreover, while it is equally understandable that
FACTS: Defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. in Lapulapu City is their counsel would take advantage of every legal doctrine deemed applicable
employing laborers and employees belonging to two rival labor unions. or conjure up any defense that could serve their cause, still, as officers of the
Seventy-two of these employees or laborers whose names appear in the court, there should be an awareness that resort to such a technique does result
complaint are affiliated with the Mactan Workers Union while the rest are in clogged dockets, without the least justification especially so if there be
members of the intervenor Associated Labor Union. On November 28, 1964, the insistence on flimsy and insubstantial contentions just to give some semblance
defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. and the Associated Labor of plausibility to their pleadings. Certainly, technical virtuosity, or what passes
Union entered into a ‘Collective Bargaining Agreement’ … the pertinent part of for it, is no substitute for an earnest and sincere desire to assure that there be
which, Article XIII thereof, [reads thus]: ‘… justice according to law. That is a creed to which all members of the legal
profession, labor lawyers not excluded, should do their best to live by.
The [Company] agrees to give a profit-sharing bonus to its employees and
laborers, to be payable in two (2) installments, the first installment being
payable in March and the second installment in June, each year out of the profits
in agreement. Said profit-sharing bonus shall be paid by the [Company] to
[Associated Labor Union] to be delivered by the latter to the employees and
laborers concerned and it shall be the duty of the Associated Labor Union to
furnish and deliver to the [Company] the corresponding receipts duly signed by
the laborers and employees entitled to receive the profit-sharing bonus within a
period of sixty (60) days from the date of receipt by [it] from the [Company] of
the profit-sharing bonus. If a laborer or employee of the [Company] does not
want to accept the profit-sharing bonus which the said employee or laborer is
entitled under this Agreement, it shall be the duty of the [Associated Labor
Union] to return the money received by [it] as profit-sharing bonus to the
[Company] within a period of sixty (60) days from the receipt by the [Union]
from the [Company] of the said profit-sharing bonus.'”Defendant Cebu Shipyard
& Engineering Works, Inc. delivered to the ALU for distribution to the laborers
or employees working with the defendant corporation to the profit-sharing
bonus corresponding to the first installment for the year 1965.

Again in June 1965 the defendant corporation delivered to the Associated Labor
Union the profit-sharing bonus corresponding to the second installment for
1965. The members of the Mactan Workers Union failed to receive their shares
in the second installment of bonus because they did not like to go to the office of
the ALU to collect their shares. In accordance with the terms of the collective
bargaining after 60 days, the uncollected shares of the plaintiff union members
was returned by the ALU to the defendant corporation. Hence the collection suit
before the RTC.

HELD: Nevertheless, it is not to be forgotten that what is entitled to

constitutional protection is labor, or more specifically the working men and

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