Kuroda vs Jalandoni 83 Phil 171

Facts
Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes.
As he was the commanding general during such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and
permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and
prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of of the laws and customs of war. Kuroda, in his petition, argues that
the Military Commission is not a valid court because the law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is
unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis the Hague Convention’s Rules and Regulations covering
Land Warfare for the war crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such rules
in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the
two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue
1.Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional
2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case

Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes Office and prescribing
rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with
Sec 3,Article 2 of the Constitution which states that “The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the nation.” The generally accepted principles of international law includes
those formed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international jurisprudence
established by United Nations. These include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty
of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in violation of
laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abides by these
principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed
againsts its citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere incorporation of
such principles in the constitution. The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have
been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue
of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and
representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law.
Agustin v Edu (1979) 88 SCRA 195
Facts:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction 229 and its
implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car already had warning lights
and did not want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed on a vehicle to
reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars.
The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or highway for 30 minutes. It
was mandatory.
Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal protection, and due
process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at the expense f car
owners at 56-72 pesos per set.
Hence the petition.
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the unconstitutionality and
undue delegation of police power to such acts.
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a regulation.
To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power.

Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?

Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less than the
power of government inherent in every sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property to promote the general welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, and general welfare of the people.
J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also intend to enable a citizen to
obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of factual record in
over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation in overthrowing the
statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that the statute was oppressive
was fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the driver is concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because it’s installed when parked for 30 minutes
and placed from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesn’t violate any constitutional
provision.
LOI 229 doesn’t force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes rge
requirement from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement for installation of
ewd’s. Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the decvlaration of principles in the Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled legal doctrines.
Ichong vs Hernandez
Ichong vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995 , 101 Phil. 115
May 31, 1957

[Petitioner: Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by RA 1180
Respondents: Jamie Hernandez, Secretary of Finance and Marcelino Sarmiento, City Treasurer of Manila]

Facts:
Petitioner Lao H. Ichong brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that Republic Act 1180 is
unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending
that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without
due process of law; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act
violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines. In answer, the Solicitor-General and
the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the
State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival.

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 1180 violates the equal protection of laws.

Held/Ruling:
No. According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police power
cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The enactment clearly falls within the scope
of the police power of the State. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor
the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens
already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The petition is hereby denied, with costs
against petitioner.
Ramon Gonzales vs Rufino Hechanova

9 SCRA 230 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Treaty vs Executive Agreements – Statutes Can
Repeal Executive Agreements
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with
Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a
certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice.
Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice
from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and
Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of
rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except
in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status
of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance
of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one
which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only
admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given
as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our
constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our
courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the
nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter
to an act of Congress.
In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 985
Facts:

Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils. without submitting to the
required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others that he is a filipino citizen born
in bacolod city of filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice
law profession in spain under the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of
profession between the republic of the phils.

Issue:

Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar.

Held:

The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between the
republic of the phils. and spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. said treaty was intende to
govern filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in spain. The treaty could not have been
intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the phils., for
the reason the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the supreme court to
promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the phils. The power to repeal, alter or
supplement such rules being reserved only to the congress of the phils.
Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the
Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl
Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as
authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect
or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate any
favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not
violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed
that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not
denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine
Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general
concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’
Calalang vs. Williams

70 Phil 726

Facts:

Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works promulgated rules and
regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a
year in prohibition against respondent-public officers. Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules and
regulations complained of infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well
being and economic security of all people

Issue:

Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice

Held:

Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and
of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
Ondoy v. Ignacio No. L-47178, 97 SCRA 611 [May 16, 1980]

Facts.

Ondoy, a fisherman, was indisputably drowned while employed in the fishing enterprise of Ignacio. In
the hearing for the claim for compensation filed by petitioner, Ignacio submitted affidavits executed by
the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel to the effect that Ondoy, undeniably a member of the
working force of the ship, was in that ship, but after being invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the
vessel, and thereafter was found dead. On the other hand, the affidavit of the chiefmate of the fishing
enterprise stated that “sometime in October 1968, while xxx Ondoy xxx was in the actual performance
of his work with [the] fishing enterprise, he was drowned and [he] died on October 22, 1968. That the
deceased died in [the] line of duty.” The hearing officer summarily ignored the latter affidavit, and
dismissed the claim for lack of merit.

Issue.

Should the claim for compensation be granted?

Held.

Yes. There is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the deceased was drowned while “in the
actual performance of his work” with said shipping enterprise. Even without such evidence, the
petitioner could have relied on the presumption of compensability under the [Workmen’s
Compensation] Act once it is shown that the death or disability arose in the course of employment, with
the burden of overthrowing it being cast on the person resisting the claim. [The affidavit] to the effect
that the deceased left the vessel for a drinking spree certainly cannot meet the standard required to
negate the force of the presumption of compensability. This court, in recognizing the right of petitioner
to the award, merely adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this Court in resolving all
doubts in favor of the claimant. The principle of social justice is in this sphere strengthened and
vitalized. As between a laborer, xxx and the employer xxx, the law has reason to demand from the latter
stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection. Social justice cannot be
invoked to trample rights of property owners nor can it nullify a law on obligations and contracts.
Almeda v. Court of Appeals No. L-43800, 78 SCRA 194 [July 29, 1977]

Facts.

Respondent Gonzales is an agricultural share tenant of the Angeles family, on the latter’s land devoted
to sugar cane and coconuts. The landowners sold the property to petitioners without notifying Gonzales
in writing. Gonzales then filed a complaint for the redemption of the land under his alleged right of
redemption provided by the Code of Agrarian Reforms. Notably, under said Code, among those
exempted from the automatic conversion of the tenancy system to agricultural leasehold upon its
effectivity are sugar lands. Petitioners countered by saying that Gonzales was indeed first offered the
sale of land but the latter said that he had no money and that Gonzales made no tender of payment or
any valid consignation in court at the time he filed the complaint for redemption. Decision was rendered
in favor of Gonzales. Hence this appeal.

Issue.

Is the right of redemption available to tenants in sugar and coconut lands?

Held.

Yes. Though the Code expressly exempts sugar lands from the automatic conversion to agricultural
leasehold, there is nothing readable or even discernible [therein] denying to tenants in sugar lands the
right of preemption and redemption under the Code. The exemption is purely limited to the tenancy
system; it does not exclude the other rights conferred by the Code, such as the right of xxx
redemption.40 It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, property ownership is impressed with
social function. Property must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The State,
in the promotion of social justice, may “regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and
disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property xxx ownership and profits.” One
governmental policy of recent date projects the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil
and the transfer to them of the ownership o the land they till. Nevertheless, while the Code secures to
the tenantfarmer this right of redemption, the exercise thereof must be in accordance with law in order
to be valid.41 “As between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources
to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand stricter compliance from the latter. Social
justice in these cases is not equality but protection.”
Salonga v. Farrales No. L-47088, 105 SCRA 359 [July 10, 1981]

Facts.

Respondent Farrales is the owner of a parcel of residential land in Olongapo City. Prior to the acquisition
of the land, petitioner Salonga was already in possession as lessee of a part of the land, on which she
had erected a house. Due to non-payment of rentals, Farrales then filed an ejectment case against
Salonga and other lessees. Decision was rendered in favor of Farrales. Meanwhile, Farrales sold to the
other lessees the parcels of land on which they respectively occupy so that when the decision was
affirmed and executed on appeal, the ejectment case was then only against Salonga. Salonga
persistently offered to purchase the subject land from Farrales but the latter consistently refused.
Salonga filed an action for specific performance praying that Farrales be compelled to sell to him, but it
was dismissed. In this appeal, she now invokes Art II, Sec 6 of the 1973 Constitution on social justice.

Issue.

Is the constitutional provision on social justice applicable in this case? Held. No. It must be remembered
that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under the
Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in our Constitution
was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled
thereto. Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and contracts,42 and is
therefore, beyond the power of Courts to grant.
Meyer v. Nebraska 262 US 390 [1922]

Facts. Meyer, a teacher in Nebraska, was convicted for unlawfully teaching the subject of reading in the
German language to a 10 year-old child who has not passed 8th grade. He was prosecuted under the law
“An Act Relating to the Teaching of Foreign Language in the State of Nebraska”, which prohibited
teaching any subject in any language other than English to any person who has not passed 8th grade.
The statute was enacted to promote civic development by inhibiting training and education of the
immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and acquire American ideals
inimical to the best interests of the U.S. It is thus argued that the enactment comes within the police
power of the State.

Issue. May the State prohibit teaching the German language to children who has not reached 8th grade
in the exercise of its police power?

Held. No. Evidently the legislature has attempted materially to interfere with, among others, the power
of parents to control the education of their own. The power of the State xxx to make reasonable
regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not
questioned. [But] our concern is xxx [that] no emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child
of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent
infringement of rights long freely enjoyed. The statute as applied is thus arbitrary and without
reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 US 510 [1925]

Facts. The State of Oregon passed a law requiring children ages 8-16 be sent to public schools in order to
compel general attendance at public schools. The Society of Sisters, which operates a private school,
filed suit to strike down the law as unconstitutional. It is argued that the statute is an unreasonable
interference with the liberty of parents xxx to direct the upbringing of their children.

Issue. May the State lawfully require these children to attend only public schools?

Held.

No. No question is raised concerning the power of the State to reasonably regulate all schools xxx.
[However,] rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of
liberty xxx excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only. The child is not [a] mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.
People v. Ritter 194 SCRA 690

FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a hotel room in
Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted a foreign object to the vagina of
Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an
object inside her vagina. Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object has already been removed from
her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and
confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove the object inside her vagina using forceps
but failed because it was deeply embedded and covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis. She told the
attending physician that a Negro inserted the object to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape
with homicide. RTC found him guilty of rape with homicide.

ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide

HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the incident with Ritter
happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As evidence, she received 300 from Ritter
the following morning. A doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by
Ritter was different from that which caused her death. Rosario herself said to Jessie the following day that the
object has been removed already. She also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago.
Ritter was a Caucasian.

However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award to the victim’s heirs. It
does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action. Ritter was deported.
Department of Education vs. San Diego180 SCRA 533

Facts:
Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The
petitioner claims that he took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) three times and flunked it as many
times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the three-flunk
rule that a student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive
failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. He then filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela petition for mandamus. He invoked his constitutional rights to
academic freedom and quality education. Respondent judge held that the private respondent had been
deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of police power.

Issue:
Whether or not the admission rule by the petitioner is an arbitrary exercise of police power.

Held:
The court held that police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be acco mplished and
not und uly oppressive upon individ uals. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the
ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and
health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. It is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. The right to quality education invoked
by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that “every citizen has the right to
choose a profession or cour se of stud y, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable ad missio n and
academic requirements. The decision of the respondent court is reversed, with costs against the private
respondent.
Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge No. L-47841, 82 SCRA 191 [Mar 21, 1978]

Facts. 17-year old Virtuoso was arrested for robbery of a TV set and was required to post bail in the
amount of P16,000. In the proceedings, it was ascertained that he was a youthful offender, one who is
over 9 and under 18 at the time of the commission of the offense. His counsel verbally petitioned for his
release under the Child and Youth Welfare Code.

Issue.

May Virtuoso be released by reason of the Child and Youth Welfare Code?

Held.

Yes. Virtuoso, being 17 years old, is a youthful offender. As such, he is entitled to the Child and Youth
Welfare Code and could thus be provisionally released on recognizance in the discretion of a court. This
Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is an
implementation of this specific constitutional mandate: xxx (now Art II, Sec 13). He was hence released
upon recognizance of his parents and counsel.
Villavicencio v. Lukban GR 14639, 39 Phil 778 [Mar 25, 1919]

Facts.

170 women who lived in the segregated district for women of ill repute in Manila were, by orders of
respondent Mayor Lukban and the chief of Police, isolated from society; and without their consent and
opportunity to defend their rights, the 170 women were forcibly hustled on board vessels for
deportation to Mindanao. Such order was given for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice.
Deportees petitioned for habeas corpus and contended that they were illegally restrained of their
liberty.

Issue.

Does Mayor Lukban who is acting in good faith have the right to deport said women of ill-repute against
their privilege of domicile in restraint of their liberties?

Held.

No. No law, order or regulation authorized Mayor Lukban to force citizens of the Philippines to change
their domicile. No official, no matter how high is above the law. The courts shall not permit a
government of men, but instead a government of laws. Petition granted.
People v. Lagman GR L-45892, L-45893; 66 Phil 13 [July 13, 1938]

Facts.

Respondents Lagman and de Sosa are charged with violation of the National Defense Law which
establishes compulsory military service. Both refused to register to military service. Lagman avers he has
a father to support, has no military leanings and does not wish to kill or be killed. Sosa reasons he is
fatherless, and has a mother and an 8 year-old brother to support. Respondents question the
constitutionality of said law.

Issue.

Is the National Defense Law unconstitutional?

Held.

No. The National Defense Law, insofar as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against
Art II, sec 2 (now sec 4) of the Constitution but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The
duty of the govt to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the govt excusable
should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. The right of the govt to require
compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State.
Oposa v. Factoran GR 101083, 224 SCRA 792 [July 30, 1993]

Facts.

Concerned over the continued deforestation of the country, petitioners, all minors represented by their
parents, instituted a civil complaint as a taxpayers’ class suit “to prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforest” and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.” They pray for the cancellation of all existing
timber license agreements (TLA) in the country and to order the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) to cease and desist from approving new TLAs. On motion of then DENR Sec.
Factoran, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a cause of action. Factoran avers that the
petitioners raise an issue political (whether or not logging should be permitted) which properly pertains
to the legislative or executive branches. Petitioners, claiming to “represent their generation as well as
the generation yet unborn”, allege their fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology was
violated by the granting of said TLAs.

Issues.

(1) Do petitioners have a cause of action “to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforest” and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth”?

(2) Do the petitioners have a locus standi to file suit?

Held.

(1) Yes. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. xxx Thus, the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as the DENR’s duty to protect and advance the said right.43

(2) Yes. The case is a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest
to all citizens of the Philippines and the petitioners are numerous and representative enough to ensure
the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for filing of a valid class suit44 are
present. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and
for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. We find enough averments to show, prima facie, the
claimed violation of their rights on which reliefs may be granted. The case cannot be thus said to raise a
political question. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-à-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. Petition granted.
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals GR 110120, 231 SCRA 292 [Mar 16, 1994]

Facts.

The City Govt of Caloocan maintains an open garbage dumpsite at the Camarin area. Residents of the
area filed a letter of complaint with the Laguna Lake Devt Authority (LLDA) praying to stop the operation
due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the
surrounding water. LLDA hence issued a cease and desist order (CDO), enjoining the Caloocan City Govt
to completely halt dumping wastes in the said dumpsite. The City Govt moved to set aside the CDO
asserting their authority in their territorial jurisdiction in accordance to the general welfare provision of
the Local Govt Code. LLDA contends that as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and
adjudicatory powers and functions by RA 4850 and its amendatory laws, it is invested with the power
and authority to issue a CDO. RTC and CA ruled in favor of the City Govt hence this petition for review.

Issue.

Does the LLDA have the authority to issue the CDO?

Held.

Yes. LLDA is specifically mandated by RA 4850 and its amendatory laws to adjudicate pollution cases in
the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces including Caloocan. Said laws expressly authorizes
LLDA to “make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution” and “to make whatever
order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction”. The authority to issue a CDO is, perforce,
implied. It is permitted in situations such as the case at bar precisely because stopping the continuous
discharge of pollutive xxx effluents into the rivers xxx cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation
xxx. The issuance of said order providing an immediate response to the demands of “necessities of
protecting vital public interests” gives vitality to Art II, Sec 16 of the Constitution.