C. LEDESMA VS. MUN. OF ILOILO et al lots Nos. 537 and 703.
lots Nos. 537 and 703. The other defendants answered the petition and
G.R. No. L-26337 Dec. 17, 1926
FACTS:
-Lopez owns lot 228. In March 1915, Lopez sold to the City of Iloilo a
PART of said lot, now numbered 537 and 703, payable in 10 years
– a TCT was issued in favor of Lopez, including 537 and 703 (The inclusion
of said lots in said TCT was evidently an error on the part of someone
connected with the office of the registrar of titles)
– Lopez sold to Kalaw and wife said lot 228, including lots 537 and 703
evidently by mistake. It is said that the inclusion of said lots 537 and 703
was a mistake because Lopez as well as Kalaw and wife were ignorant of
the fact that said lots were included in that TCT.
– Lopez, representing. Kalaw, sold said lots (228, 537 and 703) to J.
Ledesma, which sale was ratified by the couple. Later a TCT was issued in
favor of J. Ledesma. According to the admissions of J. Ledesma lots 537
and 703 were included by mistake
– J. Ledesma sold a portion of the lot. Lot 228 was made into two lots, 228-
A and 228-B. Lot 228-A remained the property of J. Ledesma. Said lots
537 and 703, according to said TCT, remained the property of J. Ledesma.
– J. Ledesma sold to the appellant herein lots Nos. 228-A, 537, and 703.
Again, according to J. Ledesma, lots 537 and 703 were included in the
transfer of lot No. 228-A to C. Ledesma by mistake.
This action was commenced in CFI of Iloilo. Its purpose was to recover
from defendant the municipality of Iloilo a sum as the value of the two lots
Nos. 537 and 703 which, the plaintiff claimed, the defendant municipality
had illegally appropriated, together with damages and costs.
The recovery of said sums was opposed by the defendants upon the ground
that the plaintiff and appellant was not and never had been the owner of said
supported the contention of the municipality.
After hearing the evidence upon the issue presented, the CFI absolved the
defendants from all liability under the complaint. From that judgment the
plaintiff appealed
The theory of the appellant is that, by reason of the fact that said lots 537
and 703 had been included in the registered title of Lopez in 1915, and
Lopez included in each succeeding transfer of title to him said lots, that he
was the indisputable owner thereof, and because the City of Iloilo had
appropriated said lots, that he was entitled to recover the value of said lots
together with damages.
ISSUE: WON the inclusion of lots 537 and 703 in the TCT of C. Ledesma
made him the owner of such properties
HELD: NO
An examination of the records shows that as early as April, 1915, said lots
had been turned over by Lopez to the City of Iloilo under a contract of sale
for street purposes. That fact was well known. The said lots had been
included as a part of the streets in the City of Iloilo. The same were
therefore illegally included, in accordance with the provisions of section 39
of Act No. 496, in the certificate of title issued to Lopez. That fact was
recognized by Lopez as well as by each of the subsequent purchasers of said
lots.
The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens system,
does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property
described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens system,
which include by mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered
under the Torrens system, he does not, by virtue of said certificate
alone, becomes the owner of the lands illegally included.
The inclusion of public highways in a certificate of title does not
thereby necessarily give to the holder of such certificate said public
highways. The appellant, therefore, even though a part of said streets
(lots 537 and 703) had been included in the original certificate of title
and in the subsequent transfer of title, did not become the owner of said
lots and is not therefore entitled to recover their value from the City of
Iloilo nor the damages prayed for.
Legarda vs Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; GR No. 8936, October 2, 1915
Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and
Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land where it stands is registered in
the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the
decree of registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for
registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree
issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall and the strip of land
where it stands.
Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has
been registered under the name of two persons?
Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords
no remedy. However, it can be construed that where two certificates
purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one
continues to hold title and will prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to
land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except
claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or
which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once
a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to
avoid the possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into
the Torrens system.
Caragay-Layno v. CA recalculation must however be made to specify the exact
Mariano De Vera died in 1951. His widow administered his measure of land belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be
property until her death in 1966. De Vera’s nephew retained by Juliana (portion which she actually occupies)
(Salvador Estrada) took over as administrator of De Vera’s and 5020 sq. m. should go to de Vera’s estate.
estate. Prior to the widow’s death, she made an inventory
showing that De Vera’s property (located in Calasiao,
Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq. m (more or less). Estrada
however noticed that the Torrens title under De Vera
indicated that his property measures 8752 sq. m. He
learned that the discrepancy is the 3732 sq. m. being
occupied by Juliana. Estrada sued to evict Juliana.
Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the
concept of an owner of the land since 1921; that they’ve
been paying taxes; that the title held by Estrada was
registered in 1947 but it only took them to initiate an action
in 1967 therefore laches has set in.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed portion should be
adjudged in favor of De Vera’s estate.
HELD: No. The inclusion of Juliana’s land in De Vera’s title
was erroneously done. It was shown that Juliana, an
unlettered woman, agreed to have Mariano de Vera borrow
her title for the purposes of Mariano obtaining a loan during
de Vera’s lifetime; that when de Vera registered his portion
of land adjoined to that of Juliana, the latter’s land was
erroneously included.
The error is highlighted by the fact that de Vera’s widow, in
her inventory before she died, attested that de Vera’s
portion of land is only 5417 sq. m. more or less. The
discrepancy approximates the portion of land actually being
occupied by Juliana. By that, the only portion that can be
adjudged in favor of de Vera’s estate is that which was
being claimed by the widow (in her inventory). A
RODIGUEZ v. LIM
Reynaldo and Nancy Rodriguez
v. Concordia Lim, Eurestes Lim, Elmer Lim
November 30, 2006
Callejo, Sr., J.
Edited by Carmela Fojas
Topic: Torrens System
Facts:
 Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. filed a complaint for the cancellation of
certificate of title, and injunction against the spouses Rodriguez.
 Pablo Goyma Lim’s allegations:
o He is the illegitimate son of Dominga Goyma, who was the owner
of 2 parcels of land. Both were registered in her name in 1948,
under TCT No. T-2857. The first parcel had an area of 28,051 sqm.
and was situated in Pagbilao Municpality, Quezon. The second
parcel had an area of 260,590 sqm. and was situated in Atimonan
Municipality, Quezon.
o Dominga died in 1971 and Pablo succeeded to her rights of
ownership and possession. However, Sps. Rodriguez allegedly
unlawfully and fraudulently made it appear that they had
purchased the 2 lots from persons who do not own them.
o Sps. Rodriguez allegedly caused the cancellation of TCT No. T-
2857. (1) TCT T-2587 was cancelled, and a new TCT was issued in
favor of Frisco Gudani – the estranged husband of Dominga; (2)
The second TCT was cancelled again, and a new one issued in favor
of Eduardo Victa; (3) The third TCT was cancelled, and a new one
was issued in favor of the Sps. Rodriguez. These TCTs were all
issued on the same date.
o In May 1975, the Sps. Rodriguez tried to enter and occupy the two
lots by force and intimidation, hence Pablo’s complaint that the
Sps. be permanently enjoined from entering the said lots, that TCT
T-2857 in the name of Dominga Goya be reinstated, and that the
Sps. be ordered to pay Pablo damages.
 Spouses Rodriguez’s allegations:
o Dominga was not Pablo’s mother
o The lots were conjugal property of Frisco Gudani and Dominga,
and that Frisco was her only surviving heir upon her death
o They were purchasers in good faith as Frisco Gudani executed an
instrument of extrajudicial settlement of the estate and Dominga’s
share was adjudicated in his favor. Frisco later sold the lots to
Eduardo Victa, who in turn sold the lots to the Sps. Rodriguez.
 Efforts of the parties to enter into an amicable settlement of the case fell
through.
 Pablo died in 1988 in the course of the trial, and was then substituted by
herein respondents – his wife Concordia Lim, and his children Eurestes
and Elmer.
 The Lims presented various documentary exhibits:
o Deed of Absolute Sale wherein 4 parcels of land, including the 2
subject lots, were sold to Dominga
o Marital Consent executed by Frisco Gudani and Dominga
o Pablo’s birth certificate indicating Dominga was his mother
o Dominga’s statement of assets, income, and liabilities wherein she
indicated Pablo as her son
o Income tax returns wherein she indicated that she was the head of
the family and had been separated from her husband
o Real property tax receipts
 Documentary evidence adduced by Sps. Rodriguez:
o Deed of Absolute Sale showing that they acquired the lots from
Eduardo Victa
 Deposition of Frisco Gudani:
o He and Dominga lived together for 11 months then separated
o It was Atty. Aguilan who prepared a false affidavit and told him to
sign it otherwise the property he will receive will be forfeited in
favor of the government
o He does not know anything about the two parces of land.
 TC: Ruled in favor of Pablo and his family, and against the Sps.
Rodriguez, finding that all the transactions involving the subject lots
were fraudulent and made through the machinations of one Atty.
Aguilan. All transfer transactions were null and void, and the TCT was
reinstated in Dominga’s name. Sps. Rodriguez were liable for damages,
and were ordered to vacate the premises. The decision was based on
these factual findings:
o Frisco Gudani and Dominga were married, but Frisco abandoned
the conjugal home after 11 months. 10 years after their marriage
they executed a document of marital consent, however Dominga
later cohabited with Pablo Lim, Sr. and the couple had a son.
 o The subject lots were purchased by Dominga using her personal
funds and Frisco Gudani had not contributed anything in such
purchase, as they had already been separated at that time. Dominga
had taken possession of the lots during her lifetime and had given
the TCT to her son Pablo before her death. Pablo then immediately
took possession of said lots.
o 2 years after Dominga’s death Frisco was informed of the lots. A
lawyer, Atty. Aguilan, made Frisco believe that the lots would be
forfeited in favor of the government should he refuse to acquire
them, hence he signed: (1) An affidavit claiming the properties; (2)
A petition before the CFI for the issuance of a second owner’s
duplicate copy of the TCT; (3) An affidavit of loss for the loss of the
owner’s duplicate; (4) An affidavit stating that Pablo Lim, Jr. was
not Dominga’s son.
o The lawyer then made Frisco, a simple laborer, sign the Deed of
Absolute Sale of the lots in favor of Eduardo Victa. Frisco only
received P5,000 for the sale because the lawyer said that he had not
contributed anything to the acquisition of the lots.
o The court found that the Sps. Rodriguez were purchasers in bad
faith because they had prior knowledge of Pablo Lim Jr.’s claim
over the lots, and even knew of his plans to file a case against them.
Moreover, the TCTs were all issued on the same date, which is
highly irregular.
o Even if the fraud was not enough to invalidate the transactions,
they would still be void because Frisco Gudani had not authority to
sell. Dominga acquired the lots after her de facto separation from
Frisco, who had not contributed anything to the acquisition of said
lots. The estate left by Dominga should have first been partitioned
to determine if Frisco had any valid claim over such. As there was
no proceeding, he had no valid claim, and as such had not
authority to sell.
 CA: Affirmed the decision. Pablo’s right to succession was transmitted
upon the death of the decedent (Dominga), following Art. 777, CC. As
such, Frisco Gudani could not dispose of the said lots before partition of
the estate and without authority given by Pablo. MR by the Sps. was
denied, hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in ruling in favor of Pablo Jr. (in ruling that Pablo was a
co-owner of the lots, in ruling that Frisco Gudani could not dispose of the
lots before partition and authority of Pablo, in ruling that Sps. Rodriguez
were purchasers in bad faith, in ruling that Frisco Gudani and Eduardo
Victa were indispensable parties and were not impleaded)
Held: NO.
Dispositive: Wherefore, the petition is denied. The decision dated July 18,
1995 and Resolution dated October 5, 1998 of the Court of Appeals are
affirmed in toto.
Ratio:
 The factual findings of the trial court regarding Pablo’s illegitimacy
shall not be disturbed. Such filiation is established in the same manner
as that of legitimate children (established by record of birth or an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned). Or in absence
thereof, it may be proven by open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court or special laws. The recognition of an illegitimate child in birth
records is a consummated act of acknowledgement and is sufficient.
Pablo’s family presented various documentary exhibits, and their
authenticity was not refuted by petitioners.
 The affidavits signed by Frisco Gudani, upon recommendation of Atty.
Aguilan, contained falsehoods.
 It has consistently been held that “when the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of
another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the
court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution
can validly be made only in case of loss of the original certificate
(Eastworld Motor Industries v. Skunac Corporation).” The decision
authorizing the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate certificate of title
may be attacked at any time.
 As a result, all of the TCTs issued may be nullified as they stem from a
void document – the second owner’s duplicate TCT. TCTs may be
annulled if issued based on void documents.
 Petitioners cannot raise the defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens
title with respect to their TCT, as the principle of indefeasibility of
Torrens title does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the
title. The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud (Sacdalan v.
 CA). The fact that all of the TCTs were issued on the same date is highly
irregular, and further points to the Sps. being purchasers in bad faith.
 Frisco Gudani and Eduardo Victa are not indispensable parties, as their
interests will not be affected by the court’s action in the litigation. Final
determination of the case could be had without their participation. The
complaint was for the cancellation of the Sps. Rodriguez’s TCT and for
injunction against the Sps. These would not affect the interests of Frisco
Gudani and Eduardo Victa.

REPUBLIC v. AGUNOY
Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic
G.R. No. 179987
Facts:
1. On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for
original registration of title covering a parcel of land in Silang,
Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he and
his predecessors in interest had been in open, notorious, exclusive
and continuous possession of the said land for more than 30 years.
2. Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by
his great-grandfather which passed down to his four sons. By 1966,
one of the sons became the administrator of the properties which
the son of the latter succeeded his parents. One of the properties
therein was the one sold by the Velazco.
1. They also presented an evidence on the classification of
land to be alienable and disposable by the DENR on
March 15, 1982.
3. The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the
case of Republic v Hebierto.
Issue: Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed
Held: No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we would need
to dissect them. The case settles down the correct interpretation of Sec. 14
(1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141
1. It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48
(b) vests the right to ownership to those who satisfy its
prerequisites, while PD 1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights.
One did not repeal the other.
2. It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and
disposable” from “agricultural” by PD 1073 did limit the lands to
be registered, as we may take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.
The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is Naguit,
not Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case where the MTC
did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original registration. Thus:
1. The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is
satisfied when at the time of the application, the land is already
classified as alienable and disposable. Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
2. A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the
presumption of the right nugatory and the provision inoperative,
aggravated by the fact that at the time the Philippine is still not an
independent state.
3. The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective
of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. If the
reverse is true, then there is already an intention on the part of the
State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of
interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil
Code.
1. It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the
commerce of men and the patrimonial property of the State can be
subject to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
2. It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public
dominion when no longer in use, is converted into patrimonial
property, if and only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or
Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a positive act of the executive or
legislative declaring lands to be such.
3. Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a
positive act, regardless if the land was classified as alienable and
disposable, that the land sought to be registered, can be acquired
through prescription.
Applying to the case at bar:
1. Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented
was 1948. No other substantive evidence was presented.
 2. Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared
as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence
that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article
422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change
its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2)
of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Petition Denied.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANNA PROPERTIES, INC.
FACTS: Applicant-appellee filed an Application for the registration of
title of two (2) parcels of land. Copies of the application, postal
money orders for publication purposes and record were forwarded to
the Land Registration Authority by the Court a quo. The Opposition to
the application stated, among others, that the applicant is a private
corporation disqualified under the new Philippine Constitution to hold
alienable lands of public domain. Applicant-appellee presented its
president Jose Tanyao, who testified on the acquisition of the subject
property as well as Manuel Sobrepeña, co-owner of the subject
property, who testified on the possession of the applicant-appellee’s
predecessors-in-interest.
The documentary evidence presented were: 1.) Survey Plan 2.)
Technical Description of lots; 3) Certificate in lieu of Lost Surveyor’s
Certificate; 4) Certificate of Latest Assessment;5) Notice of Initial
Hearing; 6) Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing
by the LRA, by the National Printing Office; and by the Circulation
Manager of the Ilocos Herald; 7) Clipping of the Notice of Initial
Hearing; 8) Whole Issue of the Ilocos Herald dated July 12, 1995; 9)
Page 3 of Ilocos Herald dated January 12, 1995; 10) Sheriff’s Return
of Posting; 11) Certificate of Notification of all adjoining owners of the
Notice of Initial Hearing on July 18, 1995.
Thereafter, the court a quo rendered a Decision granting the
application. The OSG, appearing on behalf of petitioner Republic of
the Philippines ("petitioner"), promptly appealed the trial court’s
decision to the CA. CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner asserts that Manna Properties has failed to prove its
possession of the land for the period of time required by law.
Petitioner alleges that the trial court and the Court of Appeals based
their findings solely on their evaluation of the tax declarations
presented by Manna Properties. Petitioner claimed in its opposition
to the application of Manna Properties that, as a private corporation,
Manna Properties is disqualified from holding alienable lands of the
public domain, except by lease. Petitioner cites the constitutional
prohibition in Section 3 of Article XII in the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner also claims that the land in question is still part of the
public domain.
On the other hand, Manna Properties claims that it has established
that the land in question has been in the open and exclusive
possession of its predecessors-in-interest since the 1940s. Thus, the
land was already private land when Manna Properties acquired it
from its predecessors-in-interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manna Properties Sufficiently Established
Possession of the Land For the Period Required by Law.
HELD: NO – The evidence on record does not support the
conclusions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The
governing law is Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) Sec.
48(b): Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the
predecessors-in-interest of Manna Properties have been in
possession of the land in question since this date, or earlier, Manna
Properties may rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the land. SC
ruled that the land in question has not become private land and
remains part of the public domain.
The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove the required
length of possession consists of the testimony of one of its
predecessors-in-interest, Manuel Sobrepeña ("Manuel"), transferee’s
affidavits, and several tax declarations covering the land in question.
While a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it
may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession. However, the
tax declarations presented by Manna Properties do not serve to
prove their cause. Although Manna Properties claimed during trial
that they were presenting the tax declaration proving possession
since 12 June 1945, a scrutiny of the tax declaration reveals that it is
not the tax declaration Manna Properties claimed it to be. It was in
fact a substitute tax declaration allegedly issued on 28
November 1950. The annotation at the back of this tax declaration
indicates that it was issued to replace the 1945 tax
declaration covering the land in question. A substitute is not
enough.
The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the
date, 12 June 1945, is material to this case. CA 141 specifically fixes
the date to 12 June 1945 or earlier. A tax declaration simply stating
that it replaces a previous tax declaration issued in 1945 does not
meet this standard. It is unascertainable whether the 1945 tax
declaration was issued on, before or after 12 June 1945. Tax
declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax declaration issued
in 1945 may have been issued in December 1945. Unless the date
and month of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the
reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be established.
Also, the tax declaration allegedly executed in 1950 and marked as
it bears several irregularities. A small annotation found at the bottom
of the back page states that it cancels a previous tax declaration.
Beyond stating that the cancelled tax declaration was issued in 1945,
it does not provide any of the required information that will enable
this Court or any interested party to check whether the original 1945
tax declaration ever existed.
The form used to prepare the tax declaration states that it was
"FILED UNDER SECTION 202 OF R.A. 7160." Republic Act No.
7160 is the Local Government Code of 1991. The sworn undertaking
by the Deputy Assessor who allegedly prepared the tax declaration
reads, "Subscribed and sworn before me this 28 day of Nov.
1950…" This means that the tax declaration was issued more
than forty (40) years before the form used came into
existence. Manna Properties gave no explanation why its tax
declaration used a form that did not exist at the time of the alleged
issuance of the tax declaration. The totality of these circumstances
leads this Court to conclude that the tax declaration was fabricated
for the sole purpose of making it appear that Manna Properties’
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land in
question since 12 June 1945.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA
and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining
the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over
the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the
land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization
of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands
of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by
native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective
of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
REPUBLIC v. MUNOZ
Facts:
On June 14, 1996, Munoz filed an Application for Registration of Title of a
parcel of residential land in Albay. He averred that no mortgage or
encumbrance of any kind affects his property and that no other person has
an interest, legal or equitable, on the subject lot. He further declared that he
acquired the property through donation inter vivos from sps. Apolonio
Munoz and Anastacia Vitero in 1956 who have been in possession thereof
since time immemorial for more than 70 years. The OSG opposed the
opposition of various grounds, among which is that the land in question is
part of the public domain and thus, not subject to appropriation.
Issue:
Whether or not the property alienable and disposable property of public
domain?
Held:
CA 141 (Public Land Act) is the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of public domain. It empowers the
President to classify lands of the public domain into “alienable and
disposable” lands of the public domain. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all
lands of public domain belong to the State, therefore, Public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of alienable public
domain. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied from the government. The person claiming title to
public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any
other mode of acquisition recognized by law. To prove that the land is
alienable, he must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation, EO, administrative action,
investigation reports, or an act. He must also secure a certification from the
Government that said land is alienable and disposable. Here, Munoz failed
to submit a certification from the proper government agency that the land in
question is indeed alienable and disposable. A CENRO certificate, which he
failed to secure, could have evidenced the alienability of the land.
Petition granted, application for registration filed by Munoz is denied.
[G.R. No. 163757. November 23, 2007.]
GORDOLAND DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
QUISUMBING, J p:
The instant petition assails the Decision 1 dated January 13, 2003 and the
Resolution 2 dated May 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 62545 which reversed and set aside the Decision 3 dated January 16,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55, Mandaue City and
denied the corresponding motion for reconsideration, respectively.
DHITCc
Petitioner is engaged in the business of real property development. On
November 18, 1996, it filed with the RTC, Branch 55, Mandaue City, an
application docketed as LRC Case No. N-547 4 for original registration of
title over eight parcels of land totaling 86,298 square meters located in
different barangays within the Municipality of Lilo-an, Cebu.
Petitioner avers it obtained title over said parcels in 1995 by virtue of
several deeds of sale and assignments of appurtenant rights from the alleged
owner-possessors whom petitioner claims had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation as would entitle them to
acquire title by acquisitive prescription, under Commonwealth Act No. 141,
5 or the Public Land Act, in relation to Republic Act No. 496 6 and
Presidential Decree No. 1529. 7
The petitioner presented (1) testimonies of its predecessors-in-interest with
respect to the eight parcels of land and (2) documentary exhibits; among
them: tax declarations, certifications from the Register of Deeds that there
are no subsisting titles over the subject properties, and certifications from
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, declaring that there
are no subsisting public land applications with respect to the same.
After submitting its formal offer of exhibits and resting its case, the
petitioner filed a Manifestation 8 dated November 14, 1997 with an
attached photocopy of a Certification 9 dated January 10, 1996 from the
Cebu CENRO declaring that, aSTAIH
. . . per projection and ground verification . . . a tract of land with list of lot
numbers attached herewith containing an area of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY EIGHT POINT FOUR SIX FIVE SEVEN (138.4657) hectares,
more or less, situated in the Barangay at Sta. Cruz, San Vicente and Lataban
Lilo[-]an, Cebu. As shown and described in the Sketch Plan at the back
hereof . . . The same was found to be:
A. Within the Alienable and Disposable Block-1, land classification
project no. 29 per LC Map no. 1391 of Lilo[-]an, Cebu. Certified under
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-537 dated July 31, 1940; and
xxx xxx xxx
(signed) (signed)
EDUARDO M. INTING ATTY. ROGELIO C. LAGAT
Community Environment and Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer Natural Resources Officer
(Emphasis supplied.) aCcADT
However, the list of lot numbers referred to in the certification was not
included in the certification, nor was it attached to the Manifestation. The
list was never submitted to the trial court. The petitioner's Manifestation
merely informed the court that it had failed to include the said certification
in its formal offer of exhibits, and that it was "submitting" the same "in
compliance with the requirements of the application." Petitioner did not
move to re-open the proceedings to present the certification in evidence,
have it authenticated and subjected to cross-examination, or have it marked
as an exhibit and formally offered in evidence. The original was never
submitted.
The State, through the Director of Lands, entered its formal opposition to
the application, asserting that registration should be denied on the following
grounds:
1. [T]hat neither the applicant/nor his/her/their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open[,] continuous[,] ex[c]lusive[,] and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or
prior thereto . . . [;]
2. [T]hat the muniment/s of title and/or tax declaration/s and tax
payment/s receipt/s of applicant/s if any, attached to or alleged in the
application, do/es not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a
bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his/her/their open,
continuous, exclusive[,] and notorious possession and occupation . . . [;]
ScaAET
3. [T]hat the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish
Title or grant can no longer be availed of by the applicant/s who have failed
to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six (6)
months from February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892.
10 From the records, it appears that the instant application was filed on
November 18, 1996[;]
That the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the [N]ew
Philippine Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain . . .
4. [T]hat the parcel/s applied for in/are portions of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation. 11
On January 16, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision granting the
application, and directed the issuance of the respective decrees of
registration for each of the eight parcels of land, all in petitioner's name.
WHEREFORE, premises con[s]idered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the issuance of title to the lands designated as follows:
[1.] Lot No. 4221 described in the Technical [D]escription (Exhibit
"L"), situated at San Vicente, Lilo-an, Cebu[,] containing an area of Ten
Thousand Two Hundred [F]orty[-][E]ight (10,248) square meters, more or
less; caIEAD
2. Lot No. 4222 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit "T"),
situated at Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu[,] containing an area of Two Thousand
[F]our [H]undred [T]wenty-[O]ne square meters (2,421), more or less;
3. Lot No. 4242 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit
"AA"), situated at San Vicente, Lilo-an, Cebu, containing an area of Three
Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Eight (3,428) square meters, more or less;
4. Lot No. 7250 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit
"MM"), situated at Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu, containing an area of Forty-Six
Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Seven (46,487) square meters, more or
less;
5. Lot No. 7252 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit
"XX"), situated at Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu, containing an area of Seven
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Two (7,932) square meters, more or less;
6. Lot No. 7260 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit
"QQQ"), situated at Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu, containing an area of Two
Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty (2,920) square meters, more or less;
CcAHEI
7. Lot No. 7264 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit
"CCC"), situated at Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu, containing an area of Two
Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Seven (2,787) square meters, more or
less;
8. Lot No. 7269 described in the Technical Description (Exhibit
"III"), situated at Barangay Lataban, Lilo-an, Cebu, containing an area of
Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Eight (9,978) square meters, more
or less;
All in [f]avor and in the name of Gordoland Development Corporation, a
corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine
Laws with address at Suite 801, Ermita Center Building, Roxas Blvd.,
Manila.
Upon finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration
be issued in favor of applicants in accordance with Section 39, P.D. 1529.
SO ORDERED. 12
The State filed its notice of appeal. IEDaAc
Meanwhile, on February 23, 1998, the trial court received a Report 13 from
the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Office of the Director, Department
on Registration, which declared that LRA was not in a position to verify
whether or not the subject lands were covered by land patents, or within the
area classified as alienable and disposable. It recommended that the Land
Management Bureau (LMB) in Manila, the CENRO and the Forest
Management Bureau (FMB) in Cebu be ordered to determine and make a
finding if the lots were alienable and disposable.
Thereafter, the trial court, acting upon the LRA report, directed the LMB,
Cebu CENRO and FMB to report on the true status of the lands. 14 It did
not, however, recall or suspend its judgment in the main.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, upon the
following grounds:
WHEREFORE, finding merit to the appeal of [respondent] Republic of the
Philippines, the Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City, Branch 55 dated January 16, 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 15 aEAIDH
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence,
the instant petition, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION
AND THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WERE
DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF AUTHORITY FROM THE
CORPORATION'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES WERE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE PUBLIC LAND.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THAT PETITIONER AND ITS PREDECESSOR[S]-IN-INTEREST
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 30-YEAR POSSESSION REQUIRED
BY LAW. 16 CHcETA
Stated simply, the petitioner raises the following issues, to wit: (1) whether
or not its petition for registration is defective; (2) whether or not the subject
parcels of land are alienable and disposable; and (3) whether or not
petitioner's predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the properties for a period of at least 30 years.
Petitioner contends that its petition for registration is not defective because
the Rules of Court is not applicable in land registration cases, 17 the parcels
of land are alienable and disposable as can be readily gleaned from the
annexes to its application, 18 and it presented more than enough
documentary and testimonial evidence to show possession of the subject
parcels of land in the nature and duration required by law, even going way
back to World War II. 19
On the other hand, respondent contends that petitioner's petition for
registration is defective because Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga, petitioner's
counsel, was not authorized by petitioner's board of directors to file the
application and sign the certification on non-forum shopping. 20
Respondent also contends that petitioner failed to prove that the subject
lands were alienable and disposable public lands, 21 and to present
convincing proof that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject lands in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years. 22 caADIC
Anent the first issue, this Court has consistently held that the requirement
regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such
requirement is a condition affecting the form of the pleading; non-
compliance with this requirement does not necessarily render the pleading
fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that
the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
faith. 23 Further, the purpose of the aforesaid certification is to prohibit and
penalize the evils of forum-shopping. Considering that later on Atty.
Paderanga's authority to sign the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping was ratified 24 by the board, there is no circumvention of the
aforestated objectives.
We now go to the second issue. At the outset we note that this issue involves
a question of fact. As a general rule, this Court does not resolve questions of
fact in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not
reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following
recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures; aAIcEH
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners'
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record. 25 SHECcD
Exception (7) as quoted above is present in this case. In its decision the trial
court found that the subject parcels of land were within the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals found that petitioner had not been able to prove that the subject
parcels of land were indeed alienable and disposable. 26
A review of the records shows that the conclusions of the Court of Appeals
are well-founded. There is no evidence on record showing that the subject
lots have already been classified as alienable and disposable.
The CENRO certifications offered in evidence by petitioner, particularly
exhibits "DD," "OO," "ZZ" and "SSS" only similarly, except as to the lot
numbers, state:
This is to certify that according to the records available in this office, Lot
Nos. 4221, 7264, 7260, 7270 and 4325, Pls-823, Liloan, Cebu are not
covered by any subsisting public land application. 27
There is no mention in any of these certifications that the subject lots are
within the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The photocopy of a Certification dated January 10, 1996 from the Cebu
CENRO, attached to petitioner's Manifestation before the trial court, cannot
be given any probative value. As suitably explained by the Court of
Appeals: SETaHC
. . . What was attached to the Manifestation quoted above is merely a
photocopy of the Certification dated January 10, 1996 without the list of lot
numbers attached thereto. It does not appear that said Certification was ever
utilized by Gordoland in support of its application, neither was the original
copy or certified true copy thereof ever presented nor submitted to the lower
court to form part of the records of the case. It was not marked and formally
offered in evidence. Evidence not formally offered before the trial court
cannot be considered on appeal, for to consider them at such stage will deny
the other parties their right to rebut them. (Ong v. Court of Appeals, 301
SCRA 387 [1997]). The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of
evidence that has not been formally offered is to afford the other party the
chance to object to their admissibility (Ong Chia v. Republic, 328 SCRA
749 [2000]).
It is true that the trial court had noted the said Certification in its questioned
decision of January 16, 1998. Thus:
"In resolving the Opposition interposed by the State, . . . And as certified to
by the CENRO, these lots are already within the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain and therefore susceptible to private
appropriation." . . .
Verily, the trial court just adopted entirely the statements embodied in the
said Certification, a photocopied document, which had not been formally
offered in evidence, without inquiring into the supposed attachments
thereto, without examining the contents thereof, and without verifying
whether such Certification really pertained to the lands in question. The trial
court simply could not ascertain such facts, for nowhere in the records can
be found the alleged attachments. 28 HDICSa
It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable.
29
In view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the subject lots were
already classified as alienable and disposable lands of the government, and
when they were so classified, there is no reference point for counting
adverse possession for purposes of an imperfect title. The Government must
first declare the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before
the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be
counted for purposes of an imperfect title. 30 Consequently, there is no
point in discussing the third issue on the length of petitioner's possession.
In conclusion, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the Court of
Appeals, which we find supported by evidence on record. In our considered
view, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:

The facts and circumstances in the record render untenable that Gordoland
had performed all the conditions essential to reinforce its application for
registration under the Property Registration Decree. . . .

The Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 4221, Lot No.
4222, Lot No. 4242, Lot No. 7250, Lot No. 7252, Lot No. 7260, Lot No.
7264, and Lot No. 7269 form part of the public domain not registrable in
the name of Gordoland. To reiterate, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands
belong to the State. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its
basic rights over the same as dominus . . . 31 ECDHIc

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The

Decision and the Resolution dated January 13, 2003 and May 20, 2004,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
Decision dated January 16, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55,
Mandaue City, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC VS. CA and LAPINA
-On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348,
Cad, 91.77 sq. m., situated in San Pablo City from one Cristeta
Dazo Belen whom inherited the land from her father, Pedro Dazo
who has been in possession of the lot since 1937 - corroborated by
the sister of Cristeta that taxes were paid and their father had
introduced improvements and that Cristeta inherited it. There was
also a report from the Bureau of Lands together with a letter from
the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned
lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone of the
government.

-At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then

natural-born Filipino citizens.

-On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for

registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. This time, however, they
were no longer Filipino citizens. They’re already Canadian citizens
thru naturalization.
RTC granted the application for registration. CA also affirmed the
decision.
Issue: Whether or not, the applicant considering that he is a
foreign national can apply for the registration of title over a parcel
of lot he acquired when he was still a Filipino citizen.
YES. SC ruled that, it is undisputed that private respondents were
undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested
rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the
concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their
predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. Their purpose
in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their title over
the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been the owners
of the same since 1978.
Also, Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the
contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article
XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions,
to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7
of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship
may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law,
the relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has
the legal capacity to enter into a contract under
Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private
land up to a maximum area of one thousand
square meters, in the case of urban land, or one
hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him
as his residence. In the case of married couples,
one of them may avail of the privilege herein
granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the
same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the
maximum herein fixed.
-In the case at bar it must be noticed that the predecessor-in-
interest has been in possession of the land since 1937, the public
land act requires that the applicant must prove: (a) the land is
alienable public land (b) his possession, in the concept above
stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribe in the Public Land Act. Which was complied with as
presented in the evidence (certificate from Bureau of Land and
BoFD and the affidavit of sister proving inheritance)
-What is important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a
private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with
the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution.
- Considering that private respondents were able to prove the
requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-
in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of
title must perforce be approved. -(it matters not whether the
vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property
for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for
confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-
interest. - Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended
by PD 1073 sec 4)
Note: This case was compared to Director of Lands v.
Buyco wherein application was denied because they had failed to
prove possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time
immemorial or possession in such a manner that the property has
been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their
application, as American citizens, they have acquired no vested
rights over the parcel of land.
Republic v. Villanueva
Facts:
Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan, with an
area of 313 square meters and an assessed value of P1,350 were acquired by
INC on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot with an
area of 247 square meters owned by the said church.
The said lots were already possessed by Perez in 1933. They are not
included in any military reservation. They are inside an area which was
certified as alienable or disposable by the Bureau of Forestry in 1927. The
lots are planted to santol and mango trees and banana plants. A chapel exists
on the said land. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes. Realty
taxes had been paid therefor.
On September 13, 1977, INC filed with the CFI Bulacan an application for
the registration of the two lots. It alleged that it and its predecessors-in-
interest had possessed the land for more than thirty years.
The trial court ordered the registration of the two lots.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the registration of two lots.
Held:
Section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution stated that "no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area".
INC, as a corporation sole or a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or
hold alienable lands of the public domain, like the two lots in question,
because of the constitutional prohibition already mentioned and because the
said church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of section 48(b)
which applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole
has no nationality (Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land
Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu
Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and sec. 49 of the Public Land Law).
The contention in the comments of the INC that the two lots are private
lands, following the rule laid down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands,
48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private land in the Susi
case was a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time
immemorial, as in Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed.
594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to be registered in this
case do not fall within that category. They are still public lands. A land
registration proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is
public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA
641, 644).
As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, "all lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-
in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest."
In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the right of an occupant
of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of his title under section
48(b) of the Public Land Law is a "derecho dominical incoativo" and that
before the issuance of the certificate of title the occupant is not in the
juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
The lower court's judgment is reversed and set aside. The application for
registration of INC is dismissed with costs against said applicant.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. IAC
FACTS:
 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by
Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel,
members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
 possession of the Infiels over the landdates back
before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan
 land sought to be registered is a private land
pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by
them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain
 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced
more than P45M worth of improvements
 ownership and possession of the land sought to be
registered was duly recognized by the government when the
Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
 donated part of the land as the townsite of
Maconacon Isabela
 IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES
2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their
acquisition by private corporations or associations applies-
NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
1. YES
 already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient
 it had already ceased to be of the public domain
and had become private property, at least by presumption
 The application for confirmation is mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent.
 The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
 If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already
private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and
transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it
from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a
perfect right to make such acquisition
 The only limitation then extant was that corporations
could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in
excess of 1,024 hectares
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. BUYCO
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In its Decision of 5 February 1985,[1] Branch 82 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) at Odiongan, Romblon granted the application of the private
respondents, who are American citizens, to bring within the operation of the
Land Registration Act a parcel of land with an area of 3,194,788 square
meters (319.4788 hectares) which spreads across the barangays of
Canduyong, Anahao and Ferrol in the municipality of Odiongan, Province
of Romblon, and to confirm their title thereto.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals; he alleged therein
that the trial court erred (a) in not declaring the private respondents barred
by the Constitution from applying for registration because they are
American citizens and are thus disqualified from acquiring lands in the
Philippines, (b) in holding that private respondents had established
proprietary rights over the land even before acquiring American citizenship
through naturalization, and (c) independently of the issue of alienage, in not
dismissing the application for registration on the basis of the private
respondents' failure to overthrow, by conclusive or well-nigh
incontrovertible proof, the presumption that the land applied for is public
land belonging to the State.[2]
In its Decision of 21 November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824,[3] public
respondent dismissed the appeal "for lack of merit."[4]
Petitioner consequently filed this petition on 11 January 1990 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Reiterating the issues he raised before the respondent
Court, he seeks a review and reversal of the latter's decision.[5]
In the Resolution of 11 July 1990, this Court gave due course to the petition
after the filing by the private respondents of their Comment to the same and
by the petitioner of his reply thereto.[6] On 17 April 1991, the parties were
required to file their respective Memoranda.[7]
The records disclose the following material operative facts and procedural
antecedents:
A certain Charles Hankins, an American who was married to Laura Crescini
and who resided in Canduyong, Odiongan, Romblon, died on 31 May 1937
leaving a will (Exhibit "N"). He was survived by his widow; his sons
Alexander and William; and his grandchildren Ismael, Samuel and Edgar,
all surnamed Buyco, who are the legitimate issues of his deceased daughter
Lilia and her husband Marcelino Buyco. The will was submitted for probate
before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Romblon. Charles Hankins' son Alexander was appointed administrator of
the estate in Special Proceedings No. 796.
Laura Crescini died on 22 December 1941.
It appears that in a Project of Partition dated 25 June 1947 (Exhibit "O") and
submitted to the probate court in the aforesaid Special Proceedings No. 796,
one of the properties of Charles Hankins described as "a parcel of
pastureland, riceland and coconut land containing an area of about 250
hectares, 21 ares and 63 untares x x x assessed at for P6,950.00 as per Tax
Declaration No. 15853," was partitioned among his heirs as follows:
"x x x
TO LAURA C. HANKINS, x x x
(a) 157 acres x x x comprised in what is known as Carabao Pastureland and
Milk-Cow Pasture. (This land is a portion of the land described in tax
declaration No. 15853 x x x).
xxx
TO ALEXANDER HANKINS, x x x
(a) 80 acres of land (pasture) which is a portion of the land described in
Tax declaration No. 15853 x x x.
xxx
TO LILIA HANKINS, x x x
(a) 100 acres of pastureland situated in the barrio of Canduyong and which
is a portion of the entire parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853 x x x.
(b) 25 acres of pasture land situated in the barrio of Canduyong and which
is a portion of the entire parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853.
xxx
TO WILLIAM B. HANKINS, x x x
(a) 100 acres of pastureland situated in the barrio of Canduyong and which
is a portion of the entire parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853 x x x
(b) 25 acres of pasture land situated in barrio Anajao and which is a
portion of the entire parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853 x x x."[8]
The total area so adjudicated is 487 acres, or 197.086 hectares (1 hectare =
2.471 acres).
On 30 July 1948, Laura's share in the estate of her husband Charles was
partitioned among her children, Alexander and William, and her
grandchildren, Ismael, Samuel and Edgar who were represented by their
father Marcelino Buyco (Exhibit "P"). Thereafter, on the same date, William
sold his hereditary shares in the estate of his parents to Marcelino Buyco
(Exhibit "R").
On 20 August 1962, Marcelino Buyco donated to his children the property
acquired from William together with other properties (Exhibit "S").
On 8 September 1970, the Buyco brothers partitioned among themselves the
properties acquired by inheritance from their grandparents and by donation
from their father (Exhibit "T"). However, Ismael waived his right to his
share therein in favor of Samuel, one of the private respondents in this case.
Edgar and Samuel Buyco became naturalized American citizens on 29
January 1972 and 12 September 1975, respectively.
On 14 October 1976, Edgar and Samuel, through their attorney-in-fact,
Rieven H. Buyco, filed before the then Court of First Instance of Romblon
an application for the registration of a parcel of land, described as follows:
"A parcel of land (Lot I, under surveyed for the heirs of Lilia Hankins
situated in the barrios of Canduyong, Anahao and Ferrol, Municipality of
Odiongan, province of Romblon, Tablas Island under PSU 127238) LRC
Record No._________: Bounded on the North by properties of the heirs of
Rita Fiedacan and Alexander Hankins; on the Northeast, by Canduyong
River and property of Alexander Hankins; on the East, by properties of
Andres Cuasay, Escolastica Feruelo, Candido Mendoza, Raymundo Goray,
Pedro Goray, Manuel Yap, Feliza Fedri and Silverio Mierculecio; on the
Southeast, by properties of Candido Mendoza, the Heirs of Benita
Formilleza, Silverio Mierculecio, Zosimo Llorca, Lot 2, and properties of
Beatrice Hankins and Zosimo Llorca; on the West, by properties of Maria
Llorca and Miguel Llorca; and on the Northwest, by property of Catalino
Fabio. Point 'I' is S. 33 deg. 24'"., 4075.50 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Odiongan,
Romblon. Area THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT (3,194,788) SQUARE
METERS, more or less as Exhibit 'C'."[9]
which they claim to own in fee simple as they acquired the same by
inheritance and donation inter vivos. However, they allege in paragraph 9 of
the application that should the Land Registration Act be inapplicable, the
benefits provided for under C.A. No. 141, as amended, be made to extend to
them since both they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession thereof since time immemorial. The application was docketed as
Land Registration Case No. N-48 LRC Record No. N-51706.
The above description is based on a survey plan prepared by private land
surveyor Santiago Español in 1950 (Exhibit "C") and subsequently
approved by the Director of Lands. While in their application, private
respondents invoked the provisions of the Land Registration Act,[10] they
eventually sought for a confirmation of imperfect title pursuant to paragraph
(b), Section 48 of the Public Land Act[11], as further amended by P.D. No.
1073.
While only the herein petitioner filed an opposition thereto, the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) manifested that the portion of
the property pertaining to Samuel Buyco is covered by a mortgage in its
favor. After the jurisdictional facts had been established during the initial
hearing and a general order of default entered against all other parties, the
lower court designated the Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Odiongan
as commissioner to receive the evidence for the parties. Samuel Buyco,
William Hankins, Manuel Firmalo and Jacinta Gomez Gabay (who was 83
years old when she took the witness stand in October of 1979) testified for
the applicants. The first two (2) recounted the history of the tract of land up
to the time of the abovementioned partitions and the alleged possession of
the entire area by the applicants (private respondents herein).
On 5 February 1985, the land registration court handed down a
Decision[12] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby orders the registration of
title to the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1 Psu-127238 and its
technical description together with all the improvements thereon, in the
name of the herein applicants, recognizing the interest of the Development
Bank of the Philippines to be annotated on the certificate of title to be
issued as mortgagee for the amount of P200,000.00with respect to the share
of applicants (sic) Samuel H. Buyco.
Upon the decision become (sic) final let the corresponding decree and
certificate of title be issued accordingly."
The favorable decision is based on the court's conclusion that:
"The oral and documentary evidence indubitably show applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest -- their grandparents Charles Hankins and Laura
Crescini, to their uncle Alexander Hankins, to them thru their administrators
Gregorio Gabay and later Manuel Firmalo -- have possessed the property
herein sought to be registered in the concept of owners thereof, and such
possession has been continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open and public for
a period of more than eighty years. And their right over the property is duly
recognized by the adjoining owners in their individual affidavits marked as
Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-21", inclusive. Moreover, none of the adjoining
owners filed any opposition to the herein land registration case, thereby
indubitably showing their recognition of the correctness of the boundary
(sic) between their individual lots and that of applicants' land subject of this
registration.
The late Charles Hankins declared said land for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 15853 (please see description of lot in Exh. "N") and
thereafter in the name of applicants and/or their father Marcelino Buyco
since 1949 up to the present time (Exhs. "W", "W-1" to "W-19").
Applicants have also paid the real estate taxes thereon since 1948 up to the
present time (Exhs. "X", "X-1" to "X-194").
In 1950, the land of applicants was surveyed by Private Surveyor Santiago
Español and its exact metes and bounds were determined with accuracy in
his survey plan PSU-127238 (Exh. "C"). This survey corrected the
impreciseness of the land area as mentioned in the several instruments -- the
will, project of partition, deed of partition, deed of sale (Exhs. "N", "O",
"P", and "R") -- under which applicants acquired the land in question. The
correctness of this survey is further shown by the fact that none of the other
heirs, like Alexander Hankins nor (sic) the adjoining owners ever made a
claim over any portion of the lot shown in said Psu-127238.
The land in question has been primarily devoted to cattle graxing (sic) and
to the cultivation of rice and coconut and it was (sic) the applicants and
their predecessors-in-interest have (sic) been reaping the fruits thereof.
The evidence further show (sic) that applicants can rightfully and did
validly acquire title and ownership over the land in question because they
were then Filipino citizens, their father Marcelino Buyco being a Filipino
citizen himself (please see personal circumstances of Marcelino Buyco in
Exhs. "P" and "R") and their modes of acquisition -- by inheritance,
intestate succession, and donation inter-vivos -- are all legally recognized
modes to transfer ownership to them from their predecessors-in-interest.
Since time immemorial, applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have
exercised all the attributes of dominion and absolute ownership over the
land in question, and have therefore established their vested proprietary
rights and registrable (sic) title over the land in question, rights which they
have acquired long before they became citizens of the United States (Edgar
Buyco became a U.S. citizen only on January 29, 1972; while Samuel H.
Buyco, only on September 12, 1975. As a matter of fact, applicant Samuel
H. Buyco mortgaged in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines
(Exhs. "U", "U-1" and "U-2") the portion belonging to him in Lot 1, Psu-
127238.
From the foregoing evidence it has been satisfactorily established that the
applicants have acquired an imperfect and incomplete title over the parcel
of land subject of this registration proceedings in their own right as citizens
of the Philippines so as to entitle them to a confirmation and registration of
said lot in their names. Consequently Section II, Article XVII of the 1973
Constitution does not apply to this case, neither (sic) does this case fall
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 713."[13]
More specifically, the conclusion regarding possession is based on the
testimonies of Manuel Firmalo, William Hankins and Jacinta Gomez Gabay
which, as summarized by the court, are as follows:
xxx
"Witness Manuel Firmalo testified that from 1970 to 1978 he was the
administrator, of the property of applicants; that the said property is located
in the Barrios of Anahao, Canduyong, and Tubigon (now forming part of
the municipality of Ferrol) and the same is shown in the survey map marked
as Exh. "C" (Psu-127238); that said lot is separated from the adjacent
properties by concrete monuments, big trees and some barb (sic) wire fence
(sic); that previous to his administration thereof, the same property was
administered by his father-in-law, Gregorio Gabay; x x x that during his
administration, a large part of the land was devoted to cattle grazing and a
little portion, to coconut (sic) which are now fruit bearing; that when he
took over the administration of the ranch, there was a total of 120 heads of
cattle and at the time of termination of his administration there were 300
heads; that from time to time, some cattle in the ranch were sold by him and
he rendered an accounting to the applicants, the owners of the ranch; that he
employed cowhands to help him ran (sic) the ranch of applicants and the
salaries of said cowhands were paid out of the funds of applicant Samuel
Buyco from the sale of the cattle; that the proceeds of the coconuts
harvested, the money was (sic) deposited with the bank and a portion was
used for the payment of the real estate taxes on the land; that during his
administration no third person ever claimed ownership over applicants'
land; that he was the one who procured the execution of the affidavits of
adjoining owners (Exhs. "V", "V-1" to "V-21") which were used to support
the real estate mortgage with the DBP over said land; that from the proceeds
of the sale of the copra harvested from the land of applicants, he paid the
real estate taxes thereon specifically the taxes covered by Exhs. "X-83" to
"X-144"; x x x that his administration over said land was adverse, open
continuous and public.
William Hankins, then 72 years old and resident (sic) of Odiongan,
Romblon, testified x x x; that ever since he was still a small kid, he know
(sic) that the big tract of land subject of their partition was already owned
by his father (Charles Hankins); that the possession of his father was in the
concept of owner, continuous, adverse, public, and open, up to his (Charles
Hankins) death; that after receiving his hereditary share from the estates of
his father and mother, he sold his said shares to Marcelino Buyco, father of
applicants by executing a Deed of Sale (Exh. "R") dated July 30, 1948; that
during the lifetime of Charles Hankins, the big tract of land was devoted
primarily to cattle grazing and to coconut and rice; that after he sold his
hereditary share of (sic) Marcelino Buyco, the latter took possession of his
said portion; that after Marcelino Buyco died, the property of Marcelino
Buyco (including his share (sic) hereditary share sold under Ex. (sic) "R")
was transmitted to his children, namely: Edgar H. Buyco, Ismael Buyco and
Samuel H. Buyco (Samuel and Edgar Buyco, the (sic) applicants herein);
that he knows that at present the owners in possession of the property
subject of this registration proceedings are applicants Samuel Buyco and
Edgar Buyco; that the said land is devoted to cattle grazing and planted with
coconuts and rice.
xxx
Jacinta Gomez Gabay, 83 years (as of October, 1979) x x x testified that she
knew the spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini because since the
time she can remember, she stayed with said spouses up to the (sic) their
death (sic); that having stayed with the Hankins couple, she knew of their
properties because she lived with them in Canduyong where the property
was situated; that the property is a big tract of land; x x x that when she was
living with the Hankins spouses, said spouses already owned and were in
possession of this big tract of land, and this land was fenced off with barbed
wires, and that said big tract of land has been used for grazing purposes
since she reached the age of reason up to the present time; that during all the
time that she has been with said Hankins spouses, nobody ever claimed any
portion thereof; that this property extended from barrio Canduyong up to
barrio Anahao; that after Charles Hankins died, his property was divided
among his children Alexander Hankins, William Hankins and Lilia Hankins
and the latter's share was received by her children named Ismael, Samuel
and Edgar all surnamed Buyco; that before Charles Hankins' estate was
partitioned it was placed under the administration of Alexander Hankins
(one of the heirs); that after the partition, the portion (sic) that went to the
Buyco children (as heirs of Lilia Hankins) were administered by her
husband Gregorio Gabay; that her husband's administration over said
property started 3 or 4 years after the war which (sic) lasted about 25 years
or until Gregorio Gabay died; that his son-in-law Manuel Firmalo took over
the administration of applicants' property; that the land she was referring to
is utilized as a pasture land and it has been a pasture land since the time it
was owned by spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini up to the
present time; that Edgar, Samuel and Ismael, all surnamed Buyco have been
receiving the fruits of the portion that went to Lilia Hankins; that Charles
Hankins' possession of that big tract of land was in the concept of owner,
continuous, adverse, open and public; that a portion of this big tract of land
went to Edgar H. Buyco, Samuel H. Buyco and Ismael H. Buyco as the
heirs of Lilia Hankins; that the possession of the said heirs of the late Lilia
Hankins over the portion that went to them was in the concept of owner,
continuous, adverse, open and public up to the present time; that as far as
she can remember the Hankins family possessed said property for more than
eighty (80) years."[14]
The land registration court also summarized the testimony of private
respondent Samuel H. Buyco as to possession in this wise:
"Applicant Samuel H. Buyco testified that he was 51 years of age, x x x;
that prior to the death of his grandfather Charles Hankins, that big parcel of
pastureland was about 500 to 550 hectares, the boundaries of which were
marked off by concrete monuments, some big trees, some big stones until it
was partitioned in 1948, and to fix the actual boundaries, the land was
surveyed by private surveyor Español (Exh. "D"); that during the lifetime of
their grandfather Charles Hankins this big land was primarily used as a
ranch and it was fenced off by barb (sic) wires to prevent the cattle from
getting out; that after the death of his grandfather Charles Hankins, the
property was administered by his uncle Alexander Hankins, and such
administration was terminated when there was a partition in 1948 in
accordance with the will of his grandfather; that during the administration
of the property by Alexander Hankins, this property was used as a cattle
ranch, even during the Japanese time; that after receiving their share from
the partition of the estate, they initially planted rice and coconut and later on
they reverted to cattle ranch operation (sic); that after he and his brother
Edgar became the possessor (sic) of said land, they were the one (sic) who
have been harvesting the fruits of the land; that they did not personally
managed (sic) the land but hired in 1949 the services of Mr. Gregorio
Gabay to administer the estate for them until 1970 when the latter died, and
Manuel Firmalo was hired to take over the administration until 1977 when
applicant took over active management of the property because he obtained
a loan of P200,000.00 from the Development Bank of the Philippines; x x x
that the land was declared in their name (sic) for taxation purposes by their
administrator Gregorio Gabay in 1949 (Exhs. "W", "W-1" to "W-19",
inclusive) and that the taxes thereon were paid out of their own money since
1948 up to the present (Exhs. "X", "X-1" to "X-194", inclusive); that
applicants' possession in the concept of owner over the property sought to
be registered has been open, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse and
public."[15]
As earlier adverted to, petitioner's appeal from the said decision was
dismissed by the public respondent for lack of merit. As to the private
respondents' title to the land subject of the application, public respondent
makes the following findings:
"Undisputably, applicants-appellees anchored their title to the land in
question by means of hereditary succession as well as donation from their
own father, Marcelino Buyco, who purchased the entire hereditary share of
William Hankins (Exh. "R"). Subsequently, applicants-appellees and their
brother, Ismael, partitioned their hereditary share from their grandparents,
the spouses Hankins, including the property donated by their father,
Marcelino Buyco, in an instrument dated September 8, 1970 (Exh. "T"). In
this partition, the share of Ismael H. Buyco went to applicant-appellee
Samuel H. Buyco (Exh. "T-1").
From the records extant in this case, it is Our considered view that from
almost (sic) time immemorial or a period of eighty (80) years, applicants-
appellees through their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,
continuous, and peaceful possession of the property in question so that the
inescapable conclusion is that all along it is private land and had been
segregated from the dominium (sic) of the State. Thus, We sustain the
conclusion reached by the court a quo that the latter (applicants-appellees)
thru their predecessors-in-interest have acquired title by acquisitive
prescription over the same, x x x."[16]
As to the issue of the private respondents' citizenship, public respondent
held that:
"x x x it is beyond per adventure (sic) of doubt that applicants-appellees
were still Filipinos when they acquired their title thereto. From the death of
their grandfather Charles Hankins on May 31, 1937, applicants-appellees'
right of succession was already vested. Moreover, as early as the year 1962,
their father Marcelino Buyco transferred his title thereto by donation inter-
vivos so that on September 8, 1970, when the Buyco brothers partitioned
the property in question among themselves, they could validly register the
same as they already possess the necessary qualifications to have their title
perfected under the Torrens system of registration."[17]
The petition is meritorious.
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do
not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory
information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private
respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-
interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo
real" or royal grant; (b) the "concession especial" or special grant; (c)
the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de
compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or
possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a
gratuitous title.[18] The primary basis of their claim is possession, by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The
land registration court and the public respondent are of the opinion, and so
held, that the private respondents had this in their favor. Thus, both courts
declared that the land applied for had been segregated from the public
domain and had become private land.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in
possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be
upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands:[19]
"x x x All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant
and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part
of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest. (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law.
ed., 594.)[20] The applicant does not come under the exception, for the
earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in
1880."
This exception was reiterated in Susi vs. Razon,[21] where the first possessor
was in possession for an undetermined period of time prior to 1880. We
stated therein:
"x x x In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et
de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
[22]
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by
the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land
of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since
July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. x x x If by a legal fiction, Valentin
Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least
by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of
Lands."
Although this additional pronouncement was rippled by the ruling
in Manila Electric Co. vs. Castro-Bartolome[23] to the effect that land would
cease to be public only upon the issuance of a certificate of title to any
Filipino citizen claiming it under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
[24]
and that a piece of land over which an imperfect title is sought to be
confirmed remains public, this Court, speaking through then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, in Director of Lands vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[25] reiterated the Cariño and Susi doctrines,
thus:
"The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that
the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed
to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases
already referred to,[26] is that alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public
Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure."
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a)
the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept
abovestated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled in
both Cariño and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos vs. Court of Appeals,
[27]
adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate
Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., now a distinguished member of this Court,
that an applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act
must secure a certification from the Government that the lands which he
claims to have possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are
alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its
positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove
that the property subject of the application is an alienable and disposable
parcel of land of the public domain. On the contrary, based on their
own evidence, the entire property which is alleged to have originally
belonged to Charles Hankins was pasture land. According to witness Jacinta
Gomez Gabay, this land has been pasture land, utilized for grazing
purposes, since the time it was "owned" by the spouses Charles Hankins
and Laura Crescini up to the present time (i.e., up to the date she testified).
In Director of Lands vs. Rivas,[28] this Court ruled:
"Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under section 1, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution. Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural
lands (disposable) from grazing lands (inalienable)."
The instant application was filed, heard and decided under the regime of the
1973 Constitution.
As to the second matter to be proved, the applicant must present evidence of
an imperfect title such as those derived from the old Spanish grants. He may
also show that he has been in continuous, open and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership and for the period prescribed under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.[29]Simply put, a person who seeks the
registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself
and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and
convincing evidence; he should not rely on the weakness of the evidence of
the oppositors.[30]This rule is certainly not new. In the 1913 case of Maloles
vs. Director of Lands,[31] this Court already held that in order that a
petitioner may be entitled to have a parcel of land registered under the
Torrens system, he has to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee
simple, of the said land; moreover, it is the duty of the court, even in the
absence of any oppositor, to require the petitioner to show, by a
preponderance of the evidence and by positive and absolute proof, so far as
it is possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of the land in question.
In Santiago vs. de los Santos,[32] this rule was to find anchorage in policy
considerations based no less on one of the fundamental objectives of the
Constitution, namely the conservation and utilization of our natural
resources. We held in the said case that there would be a failure to abide by
its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to
private ownership of real estate. This Court then set the quantum of
evidence needed to be established by the applicant, to wit: well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence.
In the instant case, private respondents' evidence miserably failed to
establish their imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation of
possession since time immemorial, which was conceded by the land
registration court and the public respondent, is patently baseless. There is an
evident failure to comprehend the meaning and import of the
term immemorial. As defined, immemorial simply means beyond the reach
of memory,[33] beyond human memory, or time out of mind.[34] When
referring to possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means
possession of which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence
of which he has learned from his elders.[35] Such possession was never
present in the case of the private respondents. The trial court and the public
respondent based the finding of the more than eighty (80) years of
possession by the private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest on
the sole testimony of Mrs. Gabay who was eighty-three (83) years old when
she testified in October of 1979. Thus, she must have been born in 1896. If
the asserted possession lasted for a period of more than eighty (80) years at
the time she testified, the same must have commenced sometime in 1899, or
at the time that she was barely three (3) years old. It is quite impossible that
she could fully grasp, before coming to the age of reason, the concept of
possession of such a big tract of land and testify on the same some eight (8)
decades later. In short, therefore, she cannot be relied upon to prove the
possession by Charles Hankins of the said property from 1899.
Charles Hankins was an American citizen. There is no evidence to show the
date of his birth, his arrival in the Philippines -- particularly in Odiongan,
Romblon -- or his acquisition of the big tract of land; neither is there any
evidence to prove the manner of his acquisition thereof. Thus, there does
not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents
and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty
(80) years, much less since time immemorial. In Oh Cho vs. Director of
Lands,[36] possession which began in 1880 was not considered as possession
"since time immemorial."
There is, as well, no evidence on record to show that Charles Hankins
cultivated, had control over or used the whole or even a greater portion of
the big tract of land for grazing purposes. None of the witnesses testified as
to the number of heads of cattle which were brought by Charles into the
land. There is likewise no competent proof that he declared the land in his
name for taxation purposes or that he had paid the taxes thereon. Although
his will (Exhibit "N") made mention of Tax Declaration No. 15853, neither
the said declaration nor any tax receipt was presented in evidence. Because
of such non-production, it cannot be determined when Charles initially
declared his alleged land for taxation purposes and what exactly were its
natural boundaries, if any. It is clear that the non-production of this tax
declaration accounted for the obvious inability of the witnesses to testify
with certainty as to the extent of the area of the property. As correctly
observed by the petitioner, none of the private respondents' witnesses could
give the court a definite idea thereon. Thus, Samuel Buyco declared:
"I really don't know the exact area, but it is between 500 to 550 hectares."[37]
while William Hankins admitted:
"I cannot exactly tell because that is a very big estate."[38]
On the other hand, witness Jacinta Gomez Gabay averred:
"I could not exactly tell but I have heard that it was a big tract of land
because we were staying there."[39]
In any event, even if Charles had indeed declared the property for taxation
purposes and actually paid taxes, such facts are still insufficient to justify
possession thereof, much less a claim of ownership thereon. This Court has
repeatedly held that the declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment
on the payment of the tax is not sufficient to prove ownership.[40]
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that Charles
Hankins had possessed the property -- allegedly covered by Tax Declaration
No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will and testament and the
project of partition of his estate among his heirs -- in such a manner as to
remove the same from the public domain under
the Cariño and Susi doctrines. Thus, when he died on 31 May 1937, he
transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his
heirs. This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of the
private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their application. It
would have been entirely different if the possession of Charles was open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and under a bona fide claim of ownership
as provided under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. Even if he were an
American citizen at that time, he would have had the same civil rights as
Filipino citizens pursuant to the original ordinance appended to the 1935
Constitution. The pertinent portion of said ordinance reads:
"(17) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in the
Commonwealth of the Philippines all the civil rights of the citizens and
corporations, respectively, thereof."
The import of said paragraph (17) was confirmed and reinforced originally
by Section 44 of Act No. 2874 and Section 127 of C.A. No. 141 (The Public
Land Act of 1936); the latter provided that:
"SEC. 127. During the existence and continuance of the
Commonwealth, and before the Republic of the Philippines is established,
citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy the same rights
granted to citizens and corporations of the Philippines under this Act."
This right, however, vanished with the advent of the Philippine Republic on
4 July 1946.[41]
Verily, private respondents had to rely exclusively on their own possession.
Under the applicable law at the time, it was incumbent upon them to prove
that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural land of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.[42]
By their own evidence, private respondents admitted that they were never in
actual possession of the property prior to the filing of their application.
During the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 796, the estate of Charles
Hankins appeared to have been administered by his son Alexander. This
administration was terminated in 1948 upon the execution of the Project of
Partition. Private respondents and their brother Ismael did not take
possession of the share which pertained to their mother, Lilia; instead, they
allegedly hired Gregorio Gabay to administer the same. There is, however,
no competent evidence to show the extent of such administration.
Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that Gregorio had the property declared
for taxation purposes, the correct area and boundaries of the same have not
been proven. As evidenced by the Project of Partition, the share of Lilia was
only 125 acres or 50.59 hectares, which is clearly not the portion applied
for. The area applied for consists of 319.4788 hectares of land based on a
survey plan prepared by private land surveyor Español on the basis of a
survey conducted in 1950. Obviously, therefore, the plan was not prepared
to determine Lilia's share alone for, as admitted by the private respondents
themselves, this plan includes William Hankins' share which was sold to
Marcelino Buyco, private respondents' father, and the other properties
which the latter donated to the private respondents and Ismael Buyco on 20
August 1962 (Exhibit "S"). However, there is no competent evidence as to
the respective boundaries and areas of the properties constituting the said
share of William Hankins; neither are there reliable descriptions of the other
alleged properties belonging to Marcelino Buyco. Be that as it may, when
the survey was conducted by Español, private respondents and their brother
Ismael did not immediately acquire the portion originating from William Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before
Hankins and the other alleged properties of Marcelino Buyco; hence, there such filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no vested right,
was no valid basis for the inclusion of said properties in the survey. And consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before they lost their
even if both William's share and Marcelino Buyco's properties were Philippine citizenship.
included, there would still be nothing to support the application for the
entire 319.4788 hectares considering that as per the Project of Partition, the WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of
share pertaining to William consisted only of 50.59 hectares. There was, the public respondent of 21 November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824 is
moreover, no evidence to show the extent of the alleged "other properties" hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision of 5 February 1985 of Branch 82 of
of Marcelino Buyco. Given such circumstances, it would be reasonable to the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in Land Registration Case No. N-48,
presume that what was surveyed in 1950 was the entire pasture land alleged LRC Record No. N-51706 is REVERSED.
to form part of the estate of Charles Hankins, covered by Tax Declaration Costs against the private respondents.
No. 15853, and which necessarily included the share of Alexander Hankins.
Significantly, per Exhibit "O", the latter's share is specified as part of the SO ORDERED.
property covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853. The inclusion then of
Alexander's share in the survey and the plan may provide the clue to this
unusual increase in the area covered by the survey plan.
Nevertheless, even if We are to assume for argument's sake that there was
nothing irregular in the inclusion in the survey plan of the share of William
Hankins and the other properties of Marcelino Buyco, the fact remains that
the "ownership" thereof could have been acquired by the private
respondents and Ismael Buyco only on 20 August 1962 upon the execution
of the deed of donation in their favor. To be thus benefited by the possession
of William or Marcelino for purposes of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, there should be proof that said predecessors had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof.
Unfortunately, no such proof was offered.
It is palpably obvious then that at the time Land Registration Case No. N-48
was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon on 14 October 1976,
private respondents did not have in their favor an imperfect title over that
which they claimed to have inherited, by representation, from the estate of
Charles Hankins. With greater force does this conclusion likewise apply
with respect to the properties donated to them in 1962 by their father
Marcelino Buyco. This is because they were not able to prove open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the application,[43] or from 12 June
1945.[44]
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appelant, vs. THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
FACTS:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941.
The registration was interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish
the registration but was denied by the register of deed on ground that, being
an alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed
to the Court.
residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had
not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections.
Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect,
that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express
authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands
the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate
land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land
merely by way of reciprocity.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential
land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that
was already of private ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions
is applicable at the case at bar?

RULING:

1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. This
means to say that, under the provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not
allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the
Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of
the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and
void per se and ab initio.

2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874
sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only
by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in
this section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural,
REGISTER OF DEEDS vs UNG SIU SI TEMPLE
GR. No. L-6776 May 21,1955
FACTS:
A Filipino citizen executed a deed of donation in favor of the Ung Siu Si
Temple, an unregistered religious organization that operated through
three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The Register of Deeds refused
to record the deed of donation executed in due form arguing that the
Consitution provides that acquisition of land is limited to Filipino
citizens, or to corporations or associations at least 60% of which is
owned by such citizens.
ISSUE:
Whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a
religious organization whose founder, trustees and administrator are
Chinese citizens should be registered or not.
RULING:
Sec. 5, Art. 13 of the Constitution provides that save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines. The Constitution does not make any exception in favor
of religious associations.
The fact that appellant has no capital stock does not exempt it from the
Constitutional inhibition, since its member are of foreign nationality.
The purpose of the 60% requirement is to ensure that corporations or
associations allowed to acquire agricultural lands or to exploit natural
resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the
Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock,
controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.
As to the complaint that the disqualification under Art. 13 of the
Constitution violated the freedom of religion, the Court was not
convinced that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession or worship.
ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF
DAVAO v. LRC
FACTS:
 October 4, 1954: Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident
of the City of Davao, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land
in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao Inc.(Roman), a corporation sole organized and existing
in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis
Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent.
 The Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, having in mind
a previous resolution of the CFI in Carmelite Nuns of Davao
were made to prepare an affidavit to the effect that 60% of the
members of their corp. were Filipino citizens when they sought
to register in favor of their congregation of deed of donation of
a parcel of land, required it to submit a similar affidavit
declaring the same.
 June 28, 1954: Roman in the letter expressed willingness to
submit an affidavit but not in the same tenor as the Carmelite
Nuns because it had five incorporators while as a corporation
sole it has only one and it was ownership through donation and
this was purchased
 As the Register of the Land Registration Commissioner
(LRC) : Deeds has some doubts as to the registerability, the
matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en
consulta for resolution (section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151)
 LRC:
 In view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article
XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee was not
qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in
the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the
capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually
owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there being no
question that the present incumbent of the corporation
sole was a Canadian citizen
 ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny
registration of the deed of sale in the absence of proof
of compliance with such condition
  action for mandamus was instituted by Roman alleging the land  presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay
is held in true for the benefit of the Catholic population of a members of this religion fully covers the percentage of
place Filipino citizens required by the Constitution
ISSUE: W/N Roman is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in  fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole
the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the to receive bequests or gifts of real properties (which were the
Constitution main source that the friars had to acquire their big haciendas
during the Spanish regime), is a clear indication that the
requisite that bequests or gifts of real estate be for charitable,
HELD: YES. Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to benevolent, or educational purposes, was, in the opinion of the
register the deed of sale legislators, considered sufficient and adequate protection
 A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his against the revitalization of religious landholdings.
successors (who will always be one at a time), in some  as in respect to the property which they hold for the
particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give corporation, they stand in position of TRUSTEES and the
them some legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of courts may exercise the same supervision as in other cases of
perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have trust
had.
 In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a
bishop, or dens, distinct from their several chapters
 corporation sole
1. composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of
the diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the
purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever
2. only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities
located in the territory comprised by said corporation sole
and such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the
faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation
sole
3. has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent and
ordinary has nothing to do with the operation, management or
administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the
citizenship of the faithful connected with their respective
dioceses or corporation sole.
 Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the
controlling membership should be composed of Filipino
citizens. (Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple)
 undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic
Apostolic faith within the territory of Davao are predominantly
Filipino citizens
TALUSAN VS. TAYAG & HERNANDEZ (2001)
G.R. No. 133698
FACTS: The case involves auction sale of a condominium unit,
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651 and located in
Building IV, Europa Condominium Villas, Baguio City.
Elias imperial, the former owner, sold his condominium unit to
Antonio Talusan and Celia Talusan, as evidenced by an Absolute
Deed of Sale.
Juan Hernandez, the City Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter to
Imperial informing him that the property would be sold at public
auction if Imperial failed to satisfy the delinquent real estate taxes,
penalties and cost of sale, amounting to Php4,039.80. Unbeknownst
to Hernandez, Imperial and his family had already migrated to
Australia.
The property was sold through auction sale to Hermenegildo Tayag
for Php4,400.00 and a final bill of sale was issued in his favor.
The Talusans, who were still in possession of the property, offered to
pay the same to Tayag were rejected. They filed for writ of
preliminary injunction.
RTC of Baguio, Branch 6, ruled in favor of Tayag, finding that Tayag is
not bound to the Deed of Sale between Imperial and the Talusans
because such was never registered with the Register of Deeds.
The Talusans sought for the annulment of the auction sale, but the
legality of the sale was upheld. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the auction sale was not valid because of non-
publication of delinquent real estate taxes.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the respondents.
Cases involving an auction sale of land for the collection of
delinquent taxes are in personam, unlike land registration
proceedings. Thus, notice by publication, though sufficient in
proceedings in rem, does not as a rule satisfy the requirement of
proceedings in personam. Mere publication of the notice of
delinquency would not suffice, considering that the procedure in tax
sales is in personam. It was, therefore, still incumbent upon the city
treasurer to send the notice of tax delinquency directly to the
taxpayer in order to protect the interests of the latter.
In the present case, the notice of delinquency was sent by registered
mail to the permanent address of the registered owner in Manila. In
that notice, the city treasurer of Baguio City directed him to settle
the charges immediately and to protect his interest in the property.
Under the circumstances, we hold that the notice sent by registered
mail adequately protected the rights of the taxpayer, who was the
registered owner of the condominium unit.
For purposes of the real property tax, the registered owner of the
property is deemed the taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner
is entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and other proceedings
relative to the tax sale. Not being registered owners of the property,
petitioners cannot claim to have been deprived of such notice. In
fact, they were not entitled to it.
 Spouses Yu vs. Pacleb (G.R. No. 172172, Feb. 24, 2009)
FACTS:
Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife Angelita Chan are
registered owners of an 18,000-square meter parcel of land in Barrio
Langcaan, Dasmariñas,Cavite, covered by TCT No. T-118375 (Langcaan
Property).
On Feb. 27, 1992, Spouses Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita Chan
sold the property to Rebecca del Rosario.
On May 7, 1992, the lot was thereafter sold to Ruperto Javier.
On Nov. 10, 1992, a Contract to Sell was entered into between
Javier and Spouses Yu wherein petitioner spouses agreed to pay Javier
P200,000 as partial payment and P400,000 to be paid upon execution of
the contract, and Javier undertook to deliver possession of the Langcaan
Property and to sign a deed of absolute sale within 30 days from
execution of contract.
All the aforementioned sales were not registered.
In 1993, spouses Yu filed a complaint with the RTC for specific
performance and damages against Javier, contending that Javier
represented to them that the Langcaan Property was not tenanted, but
after they already paid P200,000 as initial payment and entered into the
agreement of sale on Sept. 11, 1992, they discovered that it was
tenanted by Ramon Pacleb, son of Baltazar Pacleb. Subsequently,
spouses Yu demanded for the cancellation of the agreement and for the
return of their initial payment.
On March 10, 1995, spouses Yu, Ramon, and the latter’s wife
executed a “Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at
Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan, where spouses Yu paid Ramon
P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights over the subject
property. But on Oct. 12, 1995, Baltazar Pacleb filed a complaint for
annulment of the deed of sale to Javier, alleging that the deed of sale
executed between him and his late first wife Angelita was spurious as their
signatures were forgeries. Meanwhile, on Nov. 23, 1995, spouses Yu filed an
action for forcible entry against respondent with the MTC alleging that they
had prior physical possession of the Langcaan Property through their trustee
Ramon until the latter was ousted by respondent in Sept. 1995. MTC ruled in
favor of spouses Yu, affirmed by the RTC, but set aside by CA.
His first action for annulment of deed of sale having been
dismissed, respondent filed action for removal of cloud from title on May 29,
1996, contending that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife
and Rebecca del Rosario could not have been executed on Feb. 27, 1992,
because on said date, he was residing in the U.S. and his late first wife died
20 years ago. During pendency of the case, respondent died, succeeded by
his surviving spouse and representatives of children with his first wife. RTC
held that spouses Yu are purchasers in good faith, but on appeal, CA
reversed and set aside lower court’s decision and ordered for the
cancellation of the annotation in favor of spouses Yu on the TCT of
Langcaan Property.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers
for value and in good faith.
HELD: Petitioner spouses are not innocent purchasers for value,
and they are not in good faith. Several facts should have put petitioner
spouses on inquiry as to the alleged rights of their vendor, Javier, over the
Langcaan property.
First, the property remains to be registered in the name of
respondent despite the 2 Deeds of Absolute Sale from respondent to Del
Rosario then from the latter to Javier, and both deeds were not even
annotated in the title of the subject property.
Second, the 2 deeds of absolute sale were executed only 2
months apart containing identical provisions.
Third, the fact that the Langcaan Property is in the possession of
Ramon, son of the registered owners, this should have made petitioner
spouses suspicious as to the veracity of the alleged title of their vendor,
Javier. Petitioner spouses could have easily verified the true status of the
subject property from Ramon’s wife, since the latter is their relative.
 The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from
the registered owner himself. Corollarily, it requires a higher degree of
prudence from one who buys from a person who is not the registered Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit, G.R. No. 144057 (January
owner, although the land object of the transaction is 17, 2005)
registered. While one who buys from the registered owner does not need
to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not Alienation of Public Agricultural Lands
the registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate
of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine Facts:
if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his capacity
to transfer the land. On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration of title of
Therefore, petitioner spouses cannot be considered as innocent
a parcel of land. The application sought a judicial confirmation of
purchasers in good faith, and respondent has a better right over the
Langcaan Property as the true owner thereof. imperfect title over the land.

The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Angeles

opposed the petition. The court issued an order of general default
against the whole world except as to Angeles and the government.

The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was originally
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Urbano in 1945.
Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of
Maming, wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property
and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in
1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed
of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon
started occupying the same.

Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and

administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted
trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60
years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject
land.

Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land

openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any
private person or even the government until she filed her
application for registration.
The OSG argued that the property which is in open, continuous and
exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land
was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not
have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable.
The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before
June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as
alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
Held:
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original
registration proceedings, provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for
registration of title under Section 14(1) – that the property in
question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that
the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of Section 14
virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving
it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation
would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945,
the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable
and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving
the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has
already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this
case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of title

under Section 14(1) had been met by Naguit. The parcel of land had
been declared alienable; Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land evidenced by the 50 to 60-year old trees
at the time she purchased the property; as well as the tax
declarations executed by the original owner Urbano in 1954, which
strengthened one's bona fide claim of ownership.