Local Government Units
members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and
A. The Barangay
1. Katarungang Pambarangay
MORATA vs GO
FACTS:
 October 5, 1982: SPS. Victor and Flora Go
- Filed a case against Petitioners, Julius Morata and Ma. Luisa
Morata for Sum of Money plus Damages amounting to PhP 49,
400 at CFI Cebu
 Petitioners: Motion to Dismiss
- On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-
litigants are all residents of Cebu Cityciting as grounds therefor,
the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the
plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D.
1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or
Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been
reached by the parties.
- The motion was opposed by private respondents.
 Respondent Judge Valeriano Tumol: denied the MTD
 MR: denied
 SC: by reason of MTDs denial
- Resolution dated Dec. 2, 1982: SC required respondents to
file an Answer, and likewise granted a temporary restraining
order enjoining respondent judge from requiring petitioners to
file their answer and enter into trial in Civil Case No. R-22154.
ISSUES:
1. W/N a conciliation proceeding under PD 1508 is also a pre-
requisite in filing a case in court for cases falling under the RTC?
HELD: YES
"SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of
complaint. — No complaint, petition, action for proceeding
involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided
in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other
government office for adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested
by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has
been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in
the following cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[1] Where the accused is under detention;
[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal
liberty calling for habeas corpusproceedings;
[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support
pendente lite; and
[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of
Limitations." library
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. —
The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
j properties
" [1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
" [2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the
dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
" [3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or
a fine exceeding P200.00;
" [4] Offenses where there is no private offended
party:jgchanrobles.com.ph
" [5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may
in the interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of
the law, the Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes
involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality. The
law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to
the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at the
barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed
upon the Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its
authority over criminal cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon’s
authority, Section 2 of said law employed the universal and
comprehensive term "all", to which usage. We should neither add
nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory
construction that "where the law does not distinguish, We should not
distinguish."
By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the
intervention of the barangay leader and other respected members of the
barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court litigations between
cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation
process at the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage
indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged
dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it.
Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively
cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective. Worse, it
would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would stop a party, say
in an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from
bloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of
the inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D.
1508? And why, indeed, should the law seek to ease the congestion of
dockets only in inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts where the
log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could not
have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation.ch
There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon
"the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same
city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes, . . .," its obvious
intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive an
authority as possible as would bring about the optimum realization of the
aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be half-met and easily
thwarted if the Lupon’s authority is exercised only in cases falling within
the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.
Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22
issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, embodying the directive "to
desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in
cases falling within the authority of said Lupons," has been addressed not
only to judges of city and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the
courts of first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts
and courts of agrarian relations, now known as regional trial courts under
B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted by president Ferdinand E. Marcos
in a Letter of Implementation, dated November 12, 1979, the first
paragraph of which reads as follows: "with the view to easing up the log-
jam of cases and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of all
government offices involved in the investigation, trial and adjudication of
cases, it is hereby ordered that immediate implementation be made by all
government officials and offices concerned of the system of amicably
settling disputes at the barangay level as provided for in the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No. 1508]."
Therefore, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, We now declare that
the conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a
pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for
cases falling under the exclusive competent of the metropolitan and
municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts
as well.
UY vs CONTRERAS
FACTS:
 Felicidad Uy: subleased from Susana Atayde the other half of the
2nd floor of the a building located at corner Reposo and Oliman
Streets, Makati
- She operated a beauty parlor
- Sublease Contract: expired on April 15, 1993
o However, she was not able to remove all her movable
 April 17, 1993: An argument arose between Uy and Atayde when
the former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her
remaining movable properties such as cabinets, shelves, frames, a
mirror, a shampoo bowl, and an airconditioning casing
- Resulted to a scuffle between Uy and Atayde, and several of
Atayde’s employees, including Winnie Javier (Private respondent)
 April 21, 1993: Private Respondents have themselves medically
examines for alleged injuries inflicted by Uy
 April 23, 1993: Private Respondents filed a Complaint with the
Barangay Captain of Valenzuela, Makati
 April 28, 1993: Confrontation Schedule
- Only Uy appeared
- Reset on May 26, 1993
 May 11, 1993: Office of the Prov. Prosec of Rizal filed 2
Informations for Slight Physical Injuries against Uy with MTC Makati,
Br. 61
 May 21, 1993: Judge Maximo Contreras ordered Uy to submit her
Counter-Aff
 Uy’s CounterAffidavit:
1. Petitioner specifically alleged the prematurity of the filing of the
criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings as
she and the private respondents are residents of Manila
2. She also attached to it a certification by the barangay captain of
Valenzuela, Makati, dated 18 May 1993, that there was an
ongoing conciliation between Atayde and the petitioner in
Barangay Case No. 1023
 Uy: filed a Motion to Dismiss for non-compliance with the
requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong
 Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure, as a ground
 MTC Judge: denied MTD
 MR: denied
 SC: Certiorari
ISSUE: W/N respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss
considering that the private respondents failed to comply with the
mandatory requirement of P.D. No. 1508, now embodied in Section 412 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 and further required under the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
HELD: YES
The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by P.D.
No. 1508 which was enacted on 11 June 1978. However, the Local
Government Code of 1991, specifically Chapter 7, Title I, Book III
thereof,[13] revised the law on the katarungang pambarangay. As a
consequence of this revision, P.D. No. 1508 was expressly repealed
pursuant to Section 534(b) of the Code.
In the proceedings before the court a quo, the petitioner and the
respondents had in mind only P.D. No. 1508. The petitioner further
invoked the aforequoted Section 18. None knew of the repeal of the
decree by the Local Government Code of 1991. Even in her instant
petition, the petitioner invokes the decree and Section 18 of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. However, the private respondents, realizing
the weakness of their position under P.D. No. 1508 since they did refer
their grievances to what might be a wrong forum under the decree,
changed tack. In their Comment, they assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde
"filed a complaint against petitioner before the barangay council of
BarangayValenzuela,Makati, in compliance with the requirements of theKat
arungang Pambarangay Law under the Local Government Code."[20] Yet, in
a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd, which is condemnable for it
disregards the virtue of candor, they assert that the said law is not
applicable to their cases before the court a quo because (a) the petitioner
and respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in the same city or
municipality; (b) the law does not apply when the action, as in the said
cases, may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and (c) even
assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has
substantially complied with it.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exerted
enough diligence to inquire from the private respondents if prior referral to
the lupon was necessary before filing the informations.
Respondent judge did not do any better. His total unawareness of
the Local Government Code of 1991, more specifically on the
provisions on the katarungang pambarangay, is distressing. He
should have taken judicial notice thereof, ever mindful that under
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily
required to take judicial notice of "the official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines."
We have ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
rules.[21] He should have applied the revised katarungang
pambarangay law under the Local Government Code of 1991. Had
he done so, this petition would not have reached us and taken
valuable attention and time which could have been devoted to
more important cases.
In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the first
scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the mediation
was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slight physical
injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time
before such date. The filing then of Criminal Cases Nos. 145233
and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was premature
and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local
Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should have
granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot
justify its denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508
(more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code
of 1991) which states that the parties may go directly to court
where the action is about to prescribe. This is because, as earlier
stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the
prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum
period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private
respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela,
Makati.
Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay
Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are estopped from disavowing
the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. Their act of
trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the
scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away
with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak
havoc on the barangay conciliation system.
Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the alleged physical
injuries, the offense for which she may be liable would only be slight
physical injuries under paragraph (2), Article 266 of the Revised Penal
Code, considering that per the medical certificates[22] the injuries sustained
by the private respondents would "heal" in nine days "in the absence of
complication" and there is no showing that the said injuries incapacitated
them for labor or would require medical attendance for such period. The
penalty therefor would only be "arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos and censure." These penalties are light under Article 25 of the
Revised Penal Code and would prescribe in two months pursuant to Article
90.
Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases
Nos. 145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the
prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months thereafter.
Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the private
respondents' complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April
1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22
June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said
period of suspension and, accordingly, a certification to file action is
issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which
to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. Evidently, there
was no basis for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception
provided for in paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.
Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the respondent Judge that
the petitioner "had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings
before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati, considering that the accused
and the complainant are residents of different barangays." The petitioner
did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of
Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended the
scheduledconciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the pre-condition of
referral to the lupon in her counter-affidavit.[23]
Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private respondents that
the parties could not agree on a compromise and that they had to request
the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action.[24] The request is
dated 23 June 1993,[25] or nearly one and a half months after Criminal
Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed with the court a quo. Evidently,
this was done to support their contention in the said court that, in any
event, there was substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to
thelupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to
appear at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were
filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action.
The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing
to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234.
Before closing these cases, this Court wishes to emphasize the
vital role which the revised katarungang pambarangay law plays in the
delivery of justice at the barangay level, in promoting peace, stability, and
progress therein, and in effectively preventing or reducing expensive and
wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable by thelupon should,
with sincerity, exhaust the remedies provided by that law, government
prosecutors should exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with
it, and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions
for non-compliance thereof.
WINGARTS vs MEJIA
FACTS:
 Johan L.H Wingarts and Ofelia Wingarts: jointly filed 3 letter
complaints against Judge Servillano Mejia of MTC Sta. Maria, Bulacan
- These complaints were offshoot of the 3 criminal cases decided
by Judge Mejia involving Wingarts and Col. Rodulfo Munar
a. Malicious Mischief and Grave Threats: Wingarts
was the accused for both cases
b. Usurpation of Authority: Countercharge of
Wingarts
 1ST Administrative Complaint (relative to Malicious Mischief)
1. Judge was charged with Malicious Delay in the administration of
justice.
2. The case allegedly dragged for one year and four months in
respondent's sala and was ultimately dismissed in a decision
dated June 8, 1994.
 2nd Administrative Complaint (relative to Grave Threats)
1. incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of authority for
taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2664, entitled "People vs.
Leo Wingarts," for grave threats and for issuing a warrant of
arrest against him despite lack of prior barangay conciliation.
The said case was later dismissed and indorsed to the barangay
official concerned.
 3rd Administrative Complaint (relative to Usurpation)
1. unjust decision in usurpation of authority.
 Judge Mejia: COMMENT
1. he took cognizance of the case for Grave Threats in the belief
that there had been substantial compliance with the
requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law since a
certification of the barangay captain regarding a confrontation of
the parties, the fact that no amicable settlement was reached by
them, and that he was endorsing the filing of the case in court,
had been duly submitted to respondent judge
(hindi ko na nilagay mga di related sa LGC)
 Office of the Court Administrator:
o Charge of incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of
authority: meritorious
 Had respondent Judge exercised greater
prudence, he could have known at the outset
that under Art. 408 (c), Chapter 7, Title One,
Book III, R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the BONIFACIO LAW VS. JUDGE BELLOSILLO
Local Government Code of 1991 (The Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law), offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one
(1) year or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) require prior barangay
conciliation. The crime of grave threats
punishable under Art. 282 of the Revised Penal
Code falls within the (p)urview of that section.
 Had respondent Judge observed the mandate of
the aforequoted provision of law he could have
remanded the case to the lupon instead of taking
cognizance thereof and prematurely issuing the
warrant of arrest against the accused.
 Administrative Sanction: was imposed against Judge Mejia

ISSUES:
1. W/N Judge Mejia is liable for incompetence and
ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of the case
for Grave Threats despite the legal obstacles thereto?
MENDOVA VS. JUDGE AFABLE
HELD: YES

Although there is no clear proof of malice, bad faith, bias or partiality on

his part, respondent judge should have exercised the requisite prudence,
especially under the environmental circumstances of the aforesaid criminal
case where personal liberty was involved. He should have carefully
examined all relevant facts and issues and avoided the improvident
issuance of the warrant of arrest without a circumspect review of the case
which, after all, did not exhibit abstruse factual matters or complicated
legal questions. The present controversy could have been avoided had he
kept faith with the injunction that a member of the bench must
continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential
developments because the learning process in law never ceases.
In the present case, assuming that he did not act with malice or bad faith
and that he subsequently issued an order to recall the warrant or prevent
the arrest of complainant, such considerations can mitigate but will not
altogether exculpate him from the charge of incompetence and ignorance
of the law, which accordingly warrants the imposition of an appropriate
penalty on him. If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by
law, there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but
even oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.
Moreover, judges are directed to desist from improvidently
receiving and desultorily acting on complaints, petitions, actions
or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa. 15We have repeatedly ruled that the proceedings
before the lupon are a precondition to the filing of any action or
proceeding in court or other government office. Such an initiatory
pleading, if filed without compliance with the precondition, may
be dismissed on motion of any interested party on the ground
that it fails to state a cause of action. 16
In any event, respondent judge deserves to be appropriately penalized for
his regrettably erroneous action in connection with Criminal Case No. 2664
of his court. We have repeatedly stressed that a municipal trial judge
occupies the forefront of the judicial arm that is closest in reach to the
public he serves, and he must accordingly act at all times with great
constancy and utmost probity. 20Any kind of failure in the discharge of this
grave responsibility cannot be countenanced in order to maintain the faith
of the public in the judiciary, especially on the level of courts to which
most of them resort for redress.
WHEREFORE respondent Judge Servillano M. Mejia is ORDERED to pay a
fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
CORPUZ VS. CA
2. Sangguniang Kabataan
MONTESCLAROS ET AL., V. COMELEC
GR 152295 July 9, 2002
Facts: Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this petition as a
taxpayer's and class suit, on their own behalf and on behalf of other
youths similarly situated.
Petitioners allege that public respondents "connived, confederated and
conspired" to postpone the May 6, 2002 SK elections and to lower the
membership age in the SK to at least 15 but less than 18 years of age.
Petitioners assail the alleged conspiracy because youths at least 18 but not
more than 21 years old will be "summarily and unduly dismembered,
unfairly discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly
disassociated and obnoxiously disqualified from the SK organization."
The SK is a youth organization originally established by Presidential Decree
No. 684 as the Kabataang Barangay (KB). The KB was composed of all
barangay residents who were less than 18 years old, without specifying the
minimum age.
The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB to SK and limited SK
membership to those youths "at least 15 but not more than 21 years of
age." The SK remains as a youth organization in every barangay tasked to
initiate programs "to enhance the social, political, economic, cultural,
intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical development of the youth." The
SK in every barangay is composed of a chairperson and seven members,
all elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Katipunan ng Kabataan in
every barangay is composed of all citizens actually residing in the barangay
for at least six months and who meet the membership age requirement.
On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros
(Montesclaros) sent a letter to the Comelec, demanding that the SK
elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. Montesclaros also urged
the Comelec to respond to her letter within 10 days upon receipt of the
letter, otherwise, she will seek judicial relief.

On February 20, 2002, Alfredo L. Benipayo (Chairman Benipayo), then

Comelec Chairman, wrote identical letters to the Speaker of the House and
the Senate President about the status of pending bills on the SK and
Barangay elections. In his letters, the Comelec Chairman intimated that it
was "operationally very difficult" to hold both elections simultaneously in
May 2002. Instead, the Comelec Chairman expressed support for the bill of
Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay elections in
May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to November 2002.

Ten days lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of

Montesclaros. Subsequently, petitioners received a copy of Comelec En
Banc Resolution No. 476311 dated February 5, 2002 recommending to
Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but
holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled.
On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed
their respective bills postponing the SK elections. On March 11, 2002, the
Bicameral Conference Committee (Bicameral Committee) of the Senate
and the House came out with a Report13 recommending approval of the
reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill No. 205014 and House Bill No.
4456.15 The Bicameral Committee's consolidated bill reset the SK and
Barangay elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in
the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age.
On March 11, 2002, petitioners filed the instant petition.
On March 11, 2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committee's
consolidated bill and on March 13, 2002, the House of Representatives
approved the same. The President signed the approved bill into law on
March 19, 2002.
Petitioners' prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed
bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual
justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review
because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no
duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal
effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to
declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that
would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act
of Congress.
The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject
of bills that Congress should enact into law. The judicial power to review
the constitutionality of laws does not include the power to prescribe to
Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to compel Congress
by mandamus to enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of their age,
to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. To do so would
destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the
Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches
of government.
The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters to vote
or be voted for in an election that is limited under RA No. 9164 to youths
at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is needed to allow all those
who have turned more than 21 years old on or after May 6, 2002 to
participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Youths from 18 to 21 years
old as of May 6, 2002 are also no longer SK members, and cannot
participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Congress will have to decide
whether to enact an amendatory law. Petitioners' remedy is legislation, not
judicial intervention.
Issue: WON the lowering of the age from 15-21 to 15-18 is
unconstitutional
Held: No, Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for
SK membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment
in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK
membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on
a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from
voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right protected
by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law.
Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even withdraw the
statutory right.
A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states,
a "[P]ublic office is a public trust." No one has a vested right to any public
office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office.
Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from
the very start that no one has a proprietary right to public office. While the
law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government
legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners a proprietary
right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils.
The constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any
proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy directing "equal
access to opportunities for public service" cannot bestow on petitioners a
proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-
officio public offices.
Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youth's involvement in
public affairs, this policy refers to those who belong to the class of people
defined as the youth. Congress has the power to define who are the youth
qualified to join the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who
do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as the youth
cannot insist on being part of the youth. In government service, once an
employee reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke any
property right to cling to his office. In the same manner, since petitioners
are now past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they cannot
invoke any property right to cling to their SK membership.
B. The Municipality
APOLINARIO MUÑEZ V JUDGE CIRIACO ARIÑO
AM MTJ-94-985 Feb. 21 1995
Facts: Mayor Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur summoned to his office
herein complainant Apolinario S. Muñez for conference respecting a land
dispute which Muñez had with one Tirso Amado. As complainant failed to
attend the conference, Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against him.
Complaint was filed against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and
usurpation of judicial function with the Office of the Ombudsman as well as
administrative complaint4 for violation of the Constitution, misconduct in
office and abuse of authority with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Agusan del Sur.
After preliminary investigation, the investigating officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman filed a case5 for usurpation of judicial function against Mayor
Asuero Irisari in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Loreto, Agusan del Sur.
Originally raffled to the judge of that court, the criminal case was later
assigned to respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño
Accused Irisari moved to quash the information on the ground that the
acts complained of did not constitute a crime under the law. He contended
that under § 143(3) of the former Local Government Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337), mayors were authorized to issue warrants of arrest.
Respondent Judge Ariño denied the motion to quash on the ground that
the power of mayors to issue warrants of arrest had ceased to exist as of
February 2, 1987 when the Constitution took effect.
For its part the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, acting on the administrative
complaint against the mayor, found him guilty of misconduct in office and
abuse of authority and accordingly ordered him suspended for eight (8)
months without pay. On appeal, however, the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) reversed on the ground that what the mayor had
issued to the complainant, although denominated "Warrant of Arrest," was
actually just an invitation or a summons.
Mayor Irisari filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial of
respondent judge, invoking the resolution of the DILG.
Respondent Judge Ariño reconsidered his previous order and dismissed the
case.
Upon receipt of this order, complainant Muñez sent two letters dated July
5 and 12, 1933 to the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission charging
respondent Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño with knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment for dismissing the case against Mayor Irisari. The matter was
indorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman which, as already stated,
referred it to this Court for possible disciplinary action against respondent
judge.
Issue: WON the respondent judge correctly dismissed the complaint
Held: No, the issuance of the warrant when there was before him no
criminal case, but only a land dispute as it is now being made to appear,
only made it worse for the mayor, for it would then appear that he
assumed a judicial function which even a judge could not have done. All
the more, therefore, respondent judge should not have dismissed the
criminal case against the mayor.
It cannot be pretended that Mayor Irisari merely intended to invite or
summon Muñez to his office because he had precisely done this the day
before he issued the warrant of arrest, and he ordered the arrest of
complainant because the latter had refused to appear before him. The
summons issued by Mayor Irisari shows clearly that he understood the
difference between a summons and a warrant of arrest.
WHEREFORE, a FINE of P5,000.00 is imposed on respondent Judge
Ciriaco Ariño. He is enjoined to exercise greater care and diligence in the
performance of his duties as a judge and warned that a repetition of the
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
GREATER BALANGA DEVT. CORP. V MUN. OF BALANGA, BATAAN
GR 83987 Dec. 27, 1994
Facts: This case involves a parcel of land situated in Barrio San Jose,
Municipality of Balanga, Province of Bataan. It is registered under the
name of petitioner Greater Balanga Development Corporation. Petitioner is
a domestic corporation owned and controlled by the Camacho family,
which donated to the Municipality of Balanga the present site of the
Balanga Public Market. The lot in dispute lies behind the Balanga Public
Market.

Petitioner conducted a relocation survey of the area. It discovered that
certain portions of the property had been "unlawfully usurped and
invaded" by the Municipality of Balanga, which had
"allowed/tolerated/abetted" the construction of shanties and market stalls
while charging market fees and market entrance fees from the occupants
and users of the area. A portion of the lot had also been utilized as an
unloading site "bagsakan" of transient vegetable vendors, who were
charged market and entrance fees by the municipality.
Petitioner applied with the Office of the Mayor of Balanga for a business
permit to engage in business in the said area. On the same day, Mayor
Melanio S. Banzon, Jr. issued Mayor's Permit, granting petitioner the
privilege of a "real estate dealer/privately-owned public market operator"
under the trade name of Balanga Public Market. The permit was to expire
on December 31, 1988. Petitioner likewise registered "Balanga Central
Market" as a trade name with the Bureau of Trade Regulations and
Consumer Protection.
On February 19, 1988, however, the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga
passed a Resolution annulling the Mayor's permit issued to petitioner and
advising the Mayor to revoke the permit "to operate a public market."
Pursuant to said Resolution, Mayor Banzon, on March 7, 1988, issued
Executive Order No. 1, s-88 revoking the permit insofar as it authorized the
operation of a public market.
On July 13, 1988, petitioner filed the instant petition with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction or
restraining order aimed at the reinstatement of the Mayor's permit and the
curtailment of the municipality's collection of market fees and market
entrance fees. The Court did not issue the preliminary reliefs prayed for.
Respondent asserted that as the local chief executive, the Mayor may
issue, deny or revoke municipal licenses and permits. They contended that
the resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan, the basis of Executive Order No.
1, s-88, was a legitimate exercise of local legislative authority and, as such,
the revocation of petitioner's permit was not tainted with any grave abuse
of discretion.
Petitioner replied that since it had not violated any law or ordinance, there
was no reason for respondents to revoke the Mayor's permit issued to it.
In their Rejoinder, respondents pointed out that petitioner had violated an
existing municipal ordinance when it failed to disclose the true status of
the area involved in the permit and when it did not secure separate
permits for its two businesses, i.e., one as "real estate dealer" and another
as "privately-owned public market operator." Respondents referred to
Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code which, inter alia, enjoins an
applicant for a Mayor's permit from making a false statement in his
application and provides for the penalties for violation of any existing
ordinance regulating business establishments.
Respondents claim that petitioner (1) deliberately made a false statement
in the application form when it failed to provide the information that their
place of business is the subject of adverse claims; and (2) failed to apply
for two separate permits for the two lines of business it proposed to
engage in.
Issue: WON the revocation of the permit is valid
Held: No. the court find that the manner by which the Mayor revoked the
permit transgressed petitioner's right to due process he alleged violation of
Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in the order
of revocation, and neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation
until the Rejoinder was filed in the instant case. In fact, with all the more
reason should due process have been observed in view of the questioned
Resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.
The knowledge of the pendency of a Civil Case could not ipso facto nullify
any claim petitioner had on the lot. This necessitated first and foremost a
determination of the exact parameters of the lot and a finding that
petitioner is not the true owner thereof. The finding that the Civil Case was
already settled by the Supreme Court should have apprised respondents of
the possibility that the decision therein may have already been executed.
If only for the violation of due process which is manifest from Executive
Order No. 1, s-88 and Resolution No. 12, s-88, the Mayor's arbitrary action
can be annulled.
In view of the undisputed fact that the respondent Municipality is not the
owner of Lot 261-B-6-A-3, then there is no legal basis for it to impose and
collect market fees and market entrance fees. Only the owner has the right
to do so.
Be that as it may, the Mayor's permit issued on January 11, 1988 cannot
now be reinstated despite the nullity of its revocation. The permit expired
on December 31, 1988.
C. The City
LIM & GARAYBLAS V. CA
FACTS: On December 7, 1992, New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden
Restaurant (Bistro) filed before the trial court a petition[5] for mandamus
and prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, against Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of
Manila. Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lims instructions
inspected and investigated Bistros license as well as the work permits and
health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistros
night club and restaurant operations.[6] Lim also refused to accept Bistros
application for a business license, as well as the work permit applications
of Bistros staff, for the year 1993.[7]
In its petition, Bistro argued that Lims refusal to issue the business license
and work permits violated the doctrine laid down this Court in De la Cruz
vs. Paras,[8] to wit:
Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. They
may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. RTC
issued the TRO and thereafter granted Bistros application for a writ of
prohibitory preliminary injunction. However, despite the trial courts order,
Lim still issued a closure order on Bistros operations effective January 23,
1993, even sending policemen to carry out his closure order.
Bistro filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt against Lim and the policemen
who stopped Bistros operations. At the hearing of the motion for contempt
on January 29, 1993, Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that Lim
would respect the courts injunction. However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26
and 27, and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting through his agents and
policemen, again disrupted Bistros business operations. Meanwhile, on
February 17, 1993, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order of
January 20, 1993 and to dismiss the case. Lim insisted that the power of a
mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and their staff
is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or
revoke business permits and licenses. This statutory power is expressly
provided for in Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City
of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the Local Government
Code of 1991. The trial court denied Lims motion to dissolve the injunction
and to dismiss the case.
Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. CA denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration and ruled out that respondent Judge did not act
improvidently in issuing the assailed orders granting the writ of preliminary
injunction in order to maintain the status quo, while the petition is pending
resolution on the merits.
ISSUE: 1. DID RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING HIS SAID ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDERS?(No)
HELD: The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is
beyond question. The law expressly provides for such authority. Section 11
(l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, reads:
Sec. 11. General duties and powers of the mayor. The general duties and
powers of the mayor shall be:
x x x.
(l) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to
revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which they were
granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinances are being
committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in
which the business for which the same have been granted is carried on, or
for any other reason of general interest. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code
provides:
Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers, Duties and Compensation: xxx.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of
which is the general welfare of the City and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code, the City Mayor shall:
(3) x x x.
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any
violation of the condition upon which said licenses or permits had been
issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied)
From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor
to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary
power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the
power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly
premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses.
The laws specifically refer to the violation of the condition(s) on which the
licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue
such licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the
prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor
must observe due process in exercising these powers, which means that
the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be
heard.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private
commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses and permits. However, the mayor has no power to order a police
raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating
these commercial establishments. Lim acted beyond his authority when he
directed policemen to raid the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden
Restaurant.
The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be
exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of
the people to due process and equal protection of the law.[21] Such power
cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant
case, we find that Lims exercise of this power violated Bistros property
rights that are protected under the due process clause of the Constitution.
Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its
business license or permits. Still, Lim closed down Bistros operations even
before the expiration of its business license on December 31, 1992. Lim
also refused to accept Bistros license application for 1993, in effect
denying the application without examining whether it complies with legal
prerequisites.
F. The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
DISOMANGCOP V. DATUMANONG
FACTS:
Challenged in the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction are the constitutionality and validity of Republic Act No. 8999
entitled “An Act Establishing An Engineering District in the First District of
the Province of Lanao del Sur and Appropriating Funds Therefor,” and
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Department Order No.
119 on the subject, “Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office.”
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734),
entitled “An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao,” was enacted and signed into law on 1 August 1989.
The law called for the holding of a plebiscite in the provinces of Basilan,
Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del
Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and thecities of Cotabato, Dapitan,
Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa
andZamboanga. In the plebiscite, only four (4) provinces voted for the
creation of an autonomousregion, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces became the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
The law contains elaborate provisions on the powers of the Regional
Government and the areas of jurisdiction which are reserved for the
National Government. President Aquino issued E.O. 426, entitled “Placing
the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the DPWH within the ARMM
under the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other
purposes.”Nearly nine (9) years later, then DPWH Secretary Gregorio R.
Vigilar issued D.O. 119(Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and
facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del
Sur.)Almost two years later, President Estrada approved and signed into
law R.A. 8999(establishing engineering district in lanao del sur).Congress
later passed R.A. 9054, entitled “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for
the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734,entitled An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended.”On 23 July 2001,
petitioners addressed a petition to DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong,
seeking the revocation of D.O. 119 and the non-implementation of R.A.
8999. No action, however, was taken on the petition.[Petitioners allege
that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and that itviolates
the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the
challenged Department Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office with functions that have already been devolved to the
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. Petitioners also
contend that R.A. 8999 is a piece of legislation that was not intelligently
and thoroughly studied, and that the explanatory note to House Bill No.
995 (H.B. 995) from which the law originated is questionable. Petitioners
assert as well that prior to the sponsorship of the law, no public hearing
nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was made. The House Committee
on Public Works and Highways (Committee) failed to invite a single official
from the affected agency. Finally, petitioners argue that the law was
skillfully timed for signature by former President Joseph E. Estrada during
the pendency of the impeachment proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are unconstitutional and were
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:
Yes, Republic Act 8999 never became an operative and was superseded or
repealed by Republic Act 9054. RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA
9054 which is a later law. RA 9054, which is anchored on the 1987
Constitution advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the
powers of the ARMM which covers among others Lanao del Sur. However,
RA 8999 ventures to re-establish the National Government's jurisdiction
over the infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. RA 8999 is patently
inconsistent with RA 9054, and it destroys the latter law's objective of
devolution of the functions of DPWH in line with the policy of the
Constitution to grant LGUs meaningful and authentic regional autonomy.
DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has
jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del
Sur is violate of the provisions of EO 426 which implements the transfer of
control and supervision of the DPWH to the ARMM in line with RA 6734.
The office created under DO 119 having essentially the same powers with
the District Engineering Office of Lanao del Sur as created under EO 426,
is a duplication. The DO in effect takes back powers which have been
previously devolved under EO 426. RA 9054 however has repealed DO
Department Order 119.
Thus, R.A 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both
ARMM Organic Acts. It contravened true decentralization which is the
essence of regional autonomy. And, D.O were issued unconstitutional and
were issued grave abuse of discretion
ABBAS V. COMELEC
FACTS:
The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces
and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, 1 scheduled for November
19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao." These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and
the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the
COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts
thereof, unconstitutional.
The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be
categorized into either of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts
thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli
Agreement.
ISSUE: Whether RA 6734 violates the Constitution
HELD:
We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the
nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine
Government whether under public international or internal Philippine law.
In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the
creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao.
As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in
Muslim Mindanao is made effective upon the approval "by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose"
[Art. X, sec. 18]. The question has been raised as to what this majority
means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in
all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or
both? We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.
If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a
majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated.
Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution
shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this with the
provision on the creation of the autonomous region, which reads:
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called
for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2].
It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made
to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will
of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso
underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was
to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply
adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the
Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose."
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple
majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units
and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together,
as well as in the individual constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the
sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under
Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they
ratified the Constitution.
PANDI v CA
Facts: Assailed decision: The Court of Appeals granted the Petition for a
Writ of Quo Warranto filed against petitioners Dr. Lampa I. Pandi and Dr.
Jarmila B. Macacua. After which declared Dr. Amer A. Saber declared
entitled to the position of Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial
Health Office-Amai Pakpak General Hospital ("IPHO-APGH" for brevity),
Lanao del Sur.
Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of the
Department of Health of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
("DOH" and "ARMM", respectively, for brevity), issued a Memorandum
designating Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary,
as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. In the same
Memorandum, Macacua detailed Dr. Mamasao Sani ("Sani" for brevity),
then the provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, to the
DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City. The next month, Lanao del
Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued Office Order No. 07
designating Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del
Sur.
Sani filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur,
Branch 10, Marawi City challenging the August 9, 1993 Memorandum
transferring him to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City,
alleging that he is the holder of a permanent appointment as provincial
health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.
Saber filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for quo warranto with
prayer for preliminary injunction, claiming that he is the lawfully
designated Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. On
October 14, 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining Pandi from further discharging the functions and duties as
Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur
CA: rendered the assailed decision - denied Pandi and Macacua's motion
for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration of the
decision
ISSUE: WON the quo warranto filed was valid? And WON there was an
amendment of the Organic act of 1989 after promulgating LGU code?
HELD: An act of the Regional Assembly of ARMM cannot amend the
Organic Act nor can it amend the 1991 LGC. The 1991 LGC and the 1987
Administrative Code cannot amend the Organic Act.
The Court of Appeals' reliance on Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code as
Provincial Governor Mutilan's authority to appoint Saber is misplaced.
Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code, which provides that "[T]he
appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for provincial, city and
municipal governments," is not a grant of power to governors and mayors
to appoint local health officers. It is simply a directive that those
empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so. In
short, the appointment of local health officers, being essential for
public services, is a mandatory obligation on the part of those
vested by law with the power to appoint them. Moreover, the 1991
LGU Code did not amend the Organic Act of 1989.
The 1991 LGU Code, however, although a later law like the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, did not amend the Organic Act of 1989
because the Organic Act could only be amended through the ratification
process laid out in the Organic Act itself. Section 526 of the 1991 LGU
Code provides that:
"Section 526. Application of this Code to Local Government Units in the
Autonomous Regions. This Code shall apply to all provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays in the autonomous regions until such time as
the regional government concerned shall have enacted its own local
government code."
Section 526, however, should apply only to autonomous regions created
after the effectivity of the 1991 LGU Code, or in the absence of a statute
governing a specific situation within a region. Otherwise, Section 526 of
the 1991 LGU Code will collide directly with Section 3, Article XVIII of the
Organic Act of 1989.
Thus, even after the passage of the 1991 LGU Code, the Secretary of
Health continued to be the appointing power of provincial health officers
who remained national government officials. The Secretary of Health also
continued to exercise the authority to assign provincial health officers to
any province within the region. This situation, however, was only
temporary, arising from the need for a phased transfer of the personnel,
equipment, properties and budgets of the Department of Health in the
ARMM to the Regional Government pursuant to Section 4, Article XIX of
the Organic Act of 1989.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 15, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32242 is SET
ASIDE. The designation on September 15, 1993 of Dr. Amer A. Saber as
Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office of Lanao del
Sur is declared void. On the other hand, the designation on November 6,
1993 of Dr. Lampa I. Pandi as Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated
Provincial Health Office of Lanao del Sur, and the assignment on
November 6, 1993 of Dr. Mamasao Sani to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office
in Cotabato City, are declared valid. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G. Cordillera Administrative Region
ORDILLO v COMELEC
FACTS: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of
Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No.
6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.”
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite
showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of
5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected
by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No.
2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or
ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
The petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification
of the Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can
be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be
composed of more than one constituent unit.
ISSUE: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province
of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of
the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute
such Region.
RULING: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The
keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical
areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense
means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that
the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.
Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must
join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other
relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in
this case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the
Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera
government consisting of the Regional Government and local government
units. It further provides that:
“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and
functions necessary for the proper governance and development of all
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous
Region . . .”
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended
that a single province may constitute the autonomous region.
Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having
two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of
regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers
over exactly the same small area.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of the
Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an
autonomous region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary
of Justice, the February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary,
Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null
and void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared to be still in force and
effect until properly repealed or amended.
SO ORDERED.
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V COA
Facts:
In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the (Cordillera Administrative
Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment
of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of' the autonomous
region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a
plebiscite. Relative to the creation of autonomous regions, the constitution,
in Article X, provides:
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS - Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic
act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of
the regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for
the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly,
both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions
of this Constitution and national laws
EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers
under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the Constitution, created the CAR. It was
created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to
prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the
local government units as well as with the executive departments of the
National Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying,
planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region. It
shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local
government projects in the region. The CAR shall have a Cordillera
Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive
Board as an implementing arm. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive
Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is
established and organized. In these cases, petitioners principally argue
that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the exercise of her legislative
powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under the
1987Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated
task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras.
Issue: (1) WON EO 220 is valid?
(2) WON CAR is a territorial and political subdivision?
(3) WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee
of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-
Apayao and Mountain Province) andcity (Baguio City) which compose the
CAR?
RULINGS:
(1) Yes A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually
envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of
services of line departments and agencies of the National Government
in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step
preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not
create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It
merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the
enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous
region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not
necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on
autonomous regions, as we shall show later. Moreover, the transitory
nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner
Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in
the Cordilleras". The Constitution provides for a basic structure of
government in the autonomous region composed of an elective
executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family and
property law jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No.
220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created
a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with
the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation
of programs and services. To determine policy, it created a
representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular
session, tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and
development programs. To serve as an implementing body, it created
the Cordillera Executive Board. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do
not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they
autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the
mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local
governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-
linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
(2) No We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region
in the Cordilleras contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, we now
address petitioners' assertion that E.O. No. 220contravenes the
Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision.
After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that
it did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge
existing ones into a larger subdivision. Firstly, the CAR is not a public
corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a
separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and
municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally
granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued,
the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its
own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created
primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs
and services in the covered areas. The creation of administrative
regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services is
nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was
made as part of the law of the land by virtue of PD 1, established
11regions, later increased to 12, with definite regional centers and
required departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the
National Government to set up field offices therein. The functions of
the regional offices to be established pursuant to the Reorganization
Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and
regulations of the department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to
provide economical, efficient and effective service to the people in the
area; (3) to coordinate with regional offices of other departments,
bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with local
government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions
as may be provided by law.CAR is in the same genre as the
administrative regions created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit
under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires the
participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the
National Government but also the local governments, ethno-linguistic
groups and non-governmental organizations in bringing about the
desired objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for that
purpose.
(3) No, It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local
autonomy in the Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of
local government units or, cast in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority. Local autonomy is not
unique to the1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the
1973 Constitution. And while there was no express guarantee under
the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy
Act(R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185),
which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of
local autonomy in the country. On the other hand, the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is
 peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political
autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions.
Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional
government with a basic structure consisting of ane xecutive
department and a legislative assembly and special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the
autonomous regions. As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere
transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for
political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the
process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political
subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an
autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
Anent petitioners' objection, we note the obvious failure to show how the
creation of the CAR has actually diminished the local autonomy of the
covered provinces and city. It cannot be over-emphasized that pure
speculation and a resort to probabilities are insufficient to cause the
invalidation of E.O. No. 220.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
H. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent. G.R. No.
135962, March 27, 2000 Sec. 11, Art. X, Constitution R. A. 7924
FACTS
MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in
Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-
stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air
Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Neptune Street is owned by
respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village, a private
residential subdivision in the heart of Makati City. It runs parallel to
Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general public. Dividing the
two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall.Respondent received from
petitioner a notice requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public
vehicular traffic. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the
perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan
Avenue would be demolished.
The trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
opening of Neptune Street and prohibit the demolition of the perimeter
wall. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the implementation of the MMDA’s proposed action. The appellate court
rendered a decision finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the
opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the
demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the
City Council of Makati by ordinance.
ISSUE
Whether MMDA has the power to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. (No);
Whether MMDA is a “special metropolitan political subdivision” as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. (No)
HELD: The governing board and policy-making body of the MMDA is the
Metro Manila Council. For the purpose of establishing and administering
programs providing services common to the area, Metropolitan Manila
had a “central government,” i.e., the MMC which fully possessed legislative
and police powers. Whatever legislative powers the component cities and
municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the MMC.
The Constitutionrecognized the necessity of creating metropolitan regions
not only in the existing National Capital Region but also in potential
equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao. Section 11, Article X of the
1987 Constitution thus provided:
“Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan
political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10
hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic
autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative
assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby
be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.”
The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law,
create “special metropolitan political subdivisions” which shall be subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic
services requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities
comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their own
local executive and legislative assemblies. Pending enactment of this law,
the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the President of the
Philippines the power to constitute the Metropolitan Authority, viz.:
“Section 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may
constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of all
local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila area.”
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 392 and
constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and
functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. When R.A. No. 7924
took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a “special development and
administrative region” and the MMDA a “special development authority”
whose functions were “without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected
local government units.”
There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 (An Act Creating the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, defining its powers
and functions, providing funds therefor and for other
purposes)that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power.Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units,
there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA
or its Council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare” of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila.
It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative
councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at
bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its
proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court
of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power. It is not even a “special
metropolitan political subdivision” as contemplated in Section 11,
Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a “special
metropolitan political subdivision” requires the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. R.A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the
inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the
MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by
the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may
be assigned to him by the President,57 whereas in local
government units, the President merely exercises supervisory
authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the
MMDA.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
MMDA v GARIN G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005
Section 11, Art. X, Constitution
R.A. 7924
FACTS
At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of R.A. 7924 creating the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to
confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s licenses in the enforcement of
traffic laws and regulations.
The issue arose from an incident involving respondent Dante O. Garin, a
lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver’s
license confiscated for parking illegallyon 05 August 1995.
ISSUE
Whether MMDA is authorized to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s
licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations without need of
any other legislative enactment. (No)
HELD
A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may
withhold in the exercise of its police power. The MMDA is not vested with
police power.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,
the Court categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the
MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its
functions are administrative in nature.We restate here the doctrine in the
said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power, having been
lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be exercised by any
group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units (LGUs).
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local
government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a “special development and
administrative region” and the administration of “metro-wide” basic
services affecting the region placed under “a development authority”
referred to as the MMDA. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local
government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers
the MMDA or its Council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a “development
authority.” It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for
the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature.
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power
delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDA’s functions.
Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood
by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the
power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses
without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an
unauthorized exercise of police power.
Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules
and regulations.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the “Functions and Powers
of the Metro Manila Development Authority.” The contested clause in Sec.
5(f) states that the petitioner shall “install and administer a single ticketing
system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations
of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature,
and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in the enforcement
of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 413618
and P.D. No. 160519 tothe contrary notwithstanding,” and that “(f)or this
purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro
Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of
the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security
guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be
delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements
as the Authority may impose.”
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the
legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been
delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded—
and in fact is duty-bound—to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’
licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic
management, as well as the administration and implementation of all
traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs.
This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a
development authority created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector,
which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
Petitioner must be reminded that its must be authorized by a valid law, or
ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source.
Petition dismissed.
Municipal Officers and Employees
A. Elective Officials
1. Qualifications
ABELLA VS. COMELEC
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor
of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, Raul R.
Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that
Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or
position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that
his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second
Division of the Comelec granted the petition. The MR filed by Frivaldo
remained unacted upon until after May 8, 1995 elections. So his candidacy
continued and was voted for by majority vote with Raul Lee with the
second highest of votes.
Lee filed a supplemental petition praying for his proclamation as
the duly-elected Governor. The Comelec en banc directed "the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the
purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning
gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June
29,1995. At 8:30 in the evening of Jung 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed
governor.
On July 6, 1995 Fivaldo filed with Comelec a new petiton praying
annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and seeks
for his own proclamation.Frivaldo alleged that at 2 in the afternoon, he
took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition
for repatriation under PD 725 which he filed in September 1994 had been
granted granted on June 30, 1995.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or nor Frivaldo's repatriation was valid and legal. And if so,
whether it seasonably cures his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be
proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given
retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino
citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold
the governorship of Sorsogon?
HELD:
1. Yes. Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Unlike
in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into
Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former
natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his
previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly
a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his
country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United
States.
Reckoning date: Under the LGC (Section 39), the law does not specify
any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one
year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and
age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 the
very day the term of office of governor began he was therefore
already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said
date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his
native Sorsogon. Itshould be noted that Section 39 of the LGC speaks
of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS,"NOT OF CANDIDATES.
Literally, such qualifications unless otherwise expressly
conditioned, as in the case of age and residence should thus be
possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern.
Jurisprudence states that “if the purpose of the citizenship requirement
is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by
aliens, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achievedby
construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of
citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not
necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate
of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code gives any voter,
presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question
the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate.The remedy of Quo
Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation"of the
winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of
ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And
since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June
30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen,
having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the
same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as
he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the
immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured
his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time,
he was no longer ineligible.
The SC also ruled that PD 725 being a remedial law has a
retroactive effect at creates new rights and gives new remedy. As
such, must be given retroactive effect which shall reckoned from
the date of filing for repatriation which is in September 1984.
2. *NOTE: It was not Frivaldo’s first time to run for an elective position
and he’d been denied TWICE BEFORE because of his citizenship. Lee
assails that the court’s decision on Frivaldo’s non-citizenship on those
cases must similarly/continuously apply in this case to hold Frivaldo
disqualified to assume position.
NO. Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality.
This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter
lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose.
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable
in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has
to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands."
RAMON LABO VS. COMELEC AND ROBERTO ORTEGA
FACTS: Labo filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for mayor of Baguio
City on March 23, 1992. Petitioner Roberto Ortega (Ortega) filed his COC
for the same position on March 25, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo
before COMELEC seeking to cancel Labo's COC on the ground that Labo
made a false representation when he stated therein that Labois a "natural-
born" citizen of the Philippines.
Labo's COC was denied by COMELEC ON May 9, 1992. On the same date,
Labo filed a motion to stay implementation of said resolution until after he
shall have raised the matter before the Court.
On May 10, respondent COMELEC issued an order declaring the May 9,
1992 resolution final and executory ONLY AFTER 5 DAYS from
promulgation and that Labo may still continue to be voted upon as
candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the
final outcome of the case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme
Court either on appeal or certiorari.
On May 13, 1992, COMELEC motu proprio suspends the proclamation of
Labo in the event he wins in the election.
On May 15, 1992, Labo filed petition for review with prayer among others
for the issuance of a TRO to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of
respondent Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino
citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation
in the event he wins in the contested elections. On the same date, Ortega
filed before the Comelec an urgent motion for the implementation of its
May 9, 1992 resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy.
On May 26, 1992, COMELEC denied Ortega’s motion in view of the pending
case.
On June 1, 1992, Ortega filed petition for mandamus praying for
implementation of May 9 resolution.
Ortega argues that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution
notwithstanding the fact that said resolution disqualifying Ramon Labo has
already become final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not Labo hasre-acquired Filipino citizenship
thus qualifying him to hold an elective position.
HELD: No. Labo failed to submit a scintilla of proof to shore his claim that
he has indeed reacquired his Philippine citizenship. The fact remains that
he has not submitted in the instant case any evidence, if there be any, to
prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship either before this Court or
the Comelec.
(Note: In the case of Labo v COMELEC decided in 1989, the Court
ruled that Labo is not a Filipino citizen although he claims that his
Australian citizenship was annulled because his marriage with his
Australian wife was bigamous. The court rejected his claim since
he acquired an Australian citizen by taking an oath of Allegiance.
Under PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does
not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not
point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly
conferring Philippine citizenship upon him.)
Petitioner claims that he has reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his
application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship filed before the Office
of the Solicitor General pursuant to PD 725 and Letter of Instruction No.
270. To date, however, the Special Committee on Naturalization had
yet acted upon said application for repatriation. In the absence of
any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere
application for repatriation, does not, and cannot, amount to an
automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship.
In this case moreover, Labo claims that Sec. 722 of the Omnibus
Election Code "operates as a legislatively mandated special
repatriation proceeding" and that it allows his proclamation as
the winning candidate since the resolution disqualifying him was not
yet final at the time the election was held.
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted.If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the
COMELEC can legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his
reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially so
where, as in this case.
Therefore, Labo’s status remains unchanged. He was was
disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does
not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the
possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding
public office.
MERCADO v. MANZANO and COMELEC
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999
FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent
Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The proclamation of private
respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification alleging that private respondent was not a citizen of
the Philippines but of the United States. The record shows that private
respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of
Filipino parents.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition holding that
under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
However the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second
Division and declared private respondent qualified to run and held that
when respondent registered and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998, he effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law.
Thus, under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
Accordingly, respondent was proclaimed vice mayor of the City of
Makati. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Manzano is qualified to run for and or
hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati. (Yes)
HELD: To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such
a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state
which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of
an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides:
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law. Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on
citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with
dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence,
the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No.
7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. By
electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens.
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath
that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with.
The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with
the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an
exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may
or should interfere with its operation and application.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true
faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist,
and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
COQUILLA v. COMELEC and ALVAREZ
G.R. No. 151914. July 31, 2002
FACTS: Petitioner Teodulo Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras,
Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined
the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S.
citizen. From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while
on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after his retirement from
the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and
took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips
to the United States. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation
under R.A. No. 8171 to the Special Committee on Naturalization which was
approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines and was issued Certificate of Repatriation.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a
voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. On February 27, 2001, he filed his
certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of
Oras, Eastern Samar for two (2) years.
Respondent Neil M. Alvarez sought the cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made
a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that
he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided
therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took
his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted private
respondents petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioners
certificate of candidacy for being short of the one-year residence
requirement before the May 14, 2001 elections. COMELEC en banc
affirmed. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as
what he represented in his COC. (No)
HELD: First, 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160)
provides:
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case
of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect. (Emphasis added)
The term residence is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile
or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at
birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues
until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice).
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by
becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then
on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the
Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as
a visitor or as a resident alien. By having been naturalized abroad, he lost
his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner
did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.
Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he
reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to
prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax
Certificate in that year and by constantly declaring to his townmates of his
intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001
elections. The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be
waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a
resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the
same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an
individual may obtain an immigrant visa under 13 of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR)
and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may
acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473,
as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in
which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as
a non-resident alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when
he entered the country on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October
16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement Philippine Immigration
Balikbayan in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5,
2000, the stamp bore the added inscription good for one year stay. Under
2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term
balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in
a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is
entitled, among others, to a visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period
of one (1) year (3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered
the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan
visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner
can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-
resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of
the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency
to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.
Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter
of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his
residency as a candidate because 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least
six months immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray,
however, registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent
case questioning a candidates lack of residency.
The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had
been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two years at the time he filed
such certificate is not true. Petitioner made a false representation of
a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such
certificate liable to cancellation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
2. Disqualifications
CAASI v. CA and MERITO C. MIGUEL
G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990
FACTS: Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor
of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the local elections of January 18, 1988. His
disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on
the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private
respondent was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a
permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by
the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent
resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for
convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his
periodic medical examination and to visit his children there.
COMELEC held that the possession of a green card by the
respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned
his residence in the Philippines. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a
permanent resident of the United States. (Yes)
2. Whether or not respondent Miguel had waived his status as a
permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local
elections on January 18, 1988. (No)
HELD: Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his
children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the
intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an
immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of
his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
authority to reside there permanently.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of
immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of
permanent residence.
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country."
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in
the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his
green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and
done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without
such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec.
68, Omnibus Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card,
which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United
States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had
waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of
Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was
disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not
hard to find. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for
elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of
candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public
office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government
Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a
permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a
period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the
Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that
municipality on January 18, 1988.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent
residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting
to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent
resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines.
The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his
application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable
waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local
elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to
run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
WHEREFORE, the election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as
municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled.
MARQUEZ v COMELEC
G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995
FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor
of the province of Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and this prompted
Marquez to file a quo warranto proceedings against Marquez for being
disqualified as a candidate because he is a “fugitive from justice” which is
against Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government Code.
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here
or abroad
Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal
charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of
personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los
Angeles, USA. A warrant was issued for his arrest, but which remained
unserved because he already went to the Philippines then.
Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive
from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid
prosecution.
Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight
Committee who drafted the IRR for the Local Government Code. In the
deliberations, it could be seen that there was confusion as to the
implications of defining what a fugitive from justice really is. There was a
pronouncement from the Chairman that fugitive means somebody who is
convicted by final judgment, and this was adapted verbatim in Art. 73 of
the IRR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC
is said to be facing criminal charges before a foreign court and evading a
warrant of arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice”.
RULING:
NO. Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive
from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been
convicted by final judgment" is an inordinate and undue circumscription of
the law.
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by
the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable
weight. The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no
obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to
apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither
expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.
There was no clear ruling on the instance of Rodriguez because Comelec
never made a determination as to his status as a fugitive from justice.
Case was remanded to Comelec.
 RODRIGUEZ v COMELEC
G.R. No. 120099. July 24, 1996
FACTS:
In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and respondent Marquez ran for Governor of
Quezon Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory
via a Quo Warranto on the ground that there is a charge pending against
him at the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims,
grand theft, etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from justice.
COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court, it
was held that: Fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment, but also those who after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The case was remanded to the
COMELEC to determine WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.
In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor. Marquez filed a
Petition for Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same ground that he
is a fugitive from justice. COMELEC then consolidated both cases and
found Rodriguez guilty based on the authenticated copy of the warrant of
arrest at LA Court and of the felony complaint.
Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his proclamation,
the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed him.
Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation.
Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice as defined by the
Court in the MARQUEZ Decision?
RULING:
No. A fugitive from justice is defined as “not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee
to avoid prosecution.” This indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and
there can only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment when the
fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a
promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a
candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already
been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time
of flight. This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez
arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of
the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and
of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was
clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony
complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in
fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of
yet at such time.
Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot
be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
DELA TORRE v COMELEC
G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the COMELEC from
running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995
elections on the ground that he was convicted by the MTC of violation the
Anti-Fencing Law, citing Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of
1991 which provides as follows:
“Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
“(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving
sentence;”
Petitioner contended that the provision is not applicable to him because he
was granted probation by the MTC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)’s applicability.
RULING:
1. Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
The elements of the crime of fencing which are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery
or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which have been derived from the proceeds of
the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another.”
Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by
the “fence” of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same
degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which
animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of
moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the
unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and
the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful
dominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the process “private
duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society” in a manner “contrary to
xxx accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or
good morals.” The duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired
either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key
provisions of the Civil Code on “Human Relations” and “SolutioIndebiti.
2. No. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the
sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing subsists and remains totally
unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of
conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused
applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the
application for probation.
Magno vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147904; October 4, 2002
Facts: Carlos Montes filed a petition for the disqualification of Nestor
Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija during the May
14, 2001 elections on the ground that the latter was previously convicted
by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery. COMELEC granted
the petition and declared Magno disqualified from running for the position
of mayor since direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, citing
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides as follows:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared
by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen (18) months, or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate
and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon,
or granted amnesty.
According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as Magno completed the service of
his sentence on March 5, 1998 when was discharged from probation, his
five-year disqualification will end only on March 5, 2003. COMELEC denied
the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Magno argued that direct bribery is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
Likewise, he claims that Section 40 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, is the law applicable to the case, not the
Omnibus Election Code as claimed by the COMELEC. Said provision reads:
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence.
xxx
Magno insists that he had already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998
when he was discharged from probation. Such being the case, the two-
year disqualification period imposed by Section 40 of the Local
Government Code expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, he was qualified to
run in the 2001 elections.
Issue: 1) Whether or not direct bribery is a crime involving moral
turpitude (Yes)
2) What law should apply in the case? (LGC prevails vs.
Election Code)
Held:
1) Moral turpitude is defined as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity
in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.”
However, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. It frequently
depends on the circumstances surrounding the violation of the law. In this
case, by applying for probation, Magno in effect admitted all the elements
of the crime of direct bribery:
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or
present by himself or through another;
3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be
received by the public officer with a view to committing some
crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does
not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he
executes is connected with the performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact
that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and
deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an
official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious
intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which
he owes his fellowmen and society in general.
Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is
a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct
clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice,
honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude.
2) The Omnibus Election Code was enacted in 1985 while the
Local Government Code became a law in 1992. It is basic in
statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict
between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the
more recent expression of legislative will. Legis posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed
to have knowledge of the older law and intended to change it.
Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of the Local Government
Code states that: (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or
part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of this
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. In accordance
therewith, Section 40 of the LGC is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of
the OEC.
Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones, and not the other way around. When a
subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of the former
enactment, the latter is deemed repealed. The intent of the legislature
to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for local
positions from five to two years is evident. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
law. The reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years is
the manifest intent.
Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral
turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified from
running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as of March 2000.
Lingating vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 153475, November 13, 2002
Facts: During the first term of Mayor Sulong, an administrative complaint
was filed against him and several other individuals for Dishonesty,
Falsification of Public Documents, Malversation of Public Funds and
violation RA No. 3019. On February 4 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Zamboanga Del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his
removal from office. Mayor Sulong filed a motion for reconsideration
and/or notice of appeal shortly thereafter. The Sanggunian ordered the
complainant in AC No 12-91 to comment.
Pending appeal, then Vice‐Mayor Vicente Imbing took his oath and
assumed the office of Mayor of Lapuyan on March 3, 1992 pursuant to
Section 68 of the Local Gov't Code which allows for the execution
pending appeal of administrative decisions. From February 1992 to
August 2001, no comment was ever filed by the complainant in AC No 12-
91 nor has the Sanggunian resolved Sulong’s MR/Appeal.
In the May 2001 Elections, Lingating and Sulong both ran for the position
of Mayor of Lapuyan. On May 3, 2001, Lingating file a petition for
disqualification of Sulong on the ground that the latter is disqualified from
running for any elective local position having been removed from office
during his first term (1988-1991) as a result of an administrative case (AC
No 12-91) pursuant to Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code.
Respondent Sulong denied that the decision in AC No 12-91 had ever
become final and executory since up to the filing of the disqualification
case, no comment has been filed nor has the appeal been resolved. After
the parties had filed their memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution. The COMELEC, however, was unable to render judgment before
the elections of May 14, 2001, where Sulong was elected and proclaimed
Mayor of Lapuyan.
In a resolution dated August 1, 2001, the COMELEC declared respondent
Cesar B. Sulong disqualified adhering to section 40(b) of the Local
Government Code. Respondent Sulong filed an MR arguing that the
decision in AC No. 12-91 has not become final and executory; that at no
time had he been removed by virtue of the said decision, and that the
issue was moot and academic having been "overtaken by the local
elections of May 11, 1992."
Lingating filed an opposition to the MR contending that the fact that
Sulong was succeeded by Vice Mayor Imbing was proof that AC No. 12-91
had indeed become final. Lingating also prayed that he be installed as
Mayor of Lapuyuan in view of Sulong's disqualification.
The COMELEC First Division denied Lingating’s motion on the ground that
the disqualification of an elected candidate does not entitle the candidate
who obtained the second highest number of votes to occupy the office
vacated. Lingating then filed a motion for reconsideration of this order.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the first division, citing
Aguinaldo v. COMELEC that re-election renders an administrative case
moot and academic. It also ruled that respondent Sulong was not entitled
to occupy the office thus vacated.
Lingating contends that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling
in Aguinaldo vs. COMELEC. Instead, Lingating argues that the applicable
case is Reyes v. COMELEC where the court held that an elective local
executive officer, who is removed before the expiration of the term for
which he was elected, is disqualified from being a candidate for a local
elective position under Section 40(b) of the LGC. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Sumulong is disqualified to run for local election
(NO)
Held: The filing of motion for reconsideration by Sulong prevented the
decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final. There is thus
no decision finding Sulong guilty to speak of as the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan simply considered the matter as having become moot and
academic because it was overtaken by the local elections of May 11,1992.
Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente
Imbing, to the office of mayor be considered proof that the decision in AC
No. 12-91 had become final because it appears to have been made
pursuant to Sec. 68 [16] of the Local Government Code, which
makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory.
Considering the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve
respondents motion, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have
voted for respondent Sulong that after all he is disqualified, especially
since, at the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan had been rendered nearly ten years ago.
Having come to the conclusion that respondent Sulong is not disqualified
from holding the position of mayor of Lapuyan, it is unnecessary to pass
upon petitioners contention that, as the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes, he is entitled to be installed as mayor
because the votes cast in favor of respondent Sulong were void.
Aguinaldo and Reyes Cases are inapplicable. In Aguinaldo v COMELEC, the
court held that removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the
alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed
before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is
thereafter re-elected for another term. However, Aguinaldo is not
applicable as at the time the case was decided, there was no provision
similar to 40(b) of the LGC and hence, cannot be given retroactive effect.
Neither is Reyes vs. COMELEC applicable as AC No. 12-91 remains to this
day (at that time), not final. The case at bar is the very opposite of those
cases. Here, . . . the decision in the administrative case, . . . was served on
petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because
petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus
validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40(b) of the Local
Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there
was no provision similar to 40(b) which disqualifies any person from
running for any elective position on the ground that he has been removed
as a result of an administrative case. The Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the resolution, RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
dated April 4, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc, dismissing petitioners’ RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., respondents.
petition for disqualification, is AFFIRMED. [G.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002]

FACTS
FLORES VS. DRILON
Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their
certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14,
2001 elections. Private respondent was then the incumbent mayor. Private
respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full
term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he
lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again
won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.

On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on
the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for
three (3) consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992,
3. Election Cases INVOLVING Local Elective Officials where he served the full term; (2) in the election of May 1995, where he
again served the full term; and, (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000,
where he served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to
GALIDO VS. COMELEC Tagarao in the 1998 election. Petitioner contended that Talagas candidacy
as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution.

On March 9, 2001, private respondent responded that he was not elected

City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for two (2) consecutive
terms. He pointed to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because
of his defeat the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted,
and thus his mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of three years
each. Respondent added that his service from May 12, 2001 until June 30,
2001 for 13 months and eighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the
contemplation of the law and the Constitution. COMELEC, the First
Division, found private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. disqualified for the
position of city mayor on the ground that he had already served three (3)
consecutive terms, and his Certificate of Candidacy was ordered withdrawn
and/or cancelled.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that three

(3) consecutive terms means continuous service for nine (9) years and that
RIVERA VS. COMELEC
the two (2) year-service from 1998 to 2000 by Tagarao who defeated him
in the election of 1998 prevented him from having three consecutive years
of service. He added that Tagaraos tenure from 1998 to 2000 could not be
considered as a continuation of his mayorship. He further alleged that the
recall election was not a regular election, but a separate special election
specifically to remove incompetent local officials. COMELEC en banc ruled
in favor of private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr.. It reversed the First
Divisions ruling and held that 1) respondent was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms because he did not win in the May 11, 1998 elections;
2) that he was installed only as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall
elections; 3) that his victory in the recall elections was not considered a
term of office and is not included in the 3-term disqualification rule, and 4)
that he did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in
the May 11, 1998 elections is considered an interruption in the continuity
of his service as Mayor of Lucena City. After canvassing, private
respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City.

ISSUE: WON private respondent disqualified to run for mayor

4. Term of Office: The Three Term Limit Rule of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections (whether, as provided by the
Constitution, he had already served three consecutive terms in that office)
Borja vs. COMELEC
RULING: NO.The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply. This Court held that the two
conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that
the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.

Accordingly, COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for
three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was
a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his
defeat in the 1998 elections. Petitioners contention that COMELEC in
allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election violates
Article X, Section 8 of 1987 Constitution. Neither can respondent’s victory
in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution as voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not.

The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,

Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided
by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner
vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by
voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus,
the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
SOCRATES VS.COMELEC
G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002
FACTS
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay
officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory
Recall Assembly (PRA for brevity) to initiate the recallofVictorino Dennis M.
Socrates who assumed office as Puerto Princesa’s mayor on June 30,
2001. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn,
president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the
PRA.
PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 which declared its loss of confidence in
Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to
schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the
Recall Resolution. Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, to nullify
and deny due course to the Recall Resolution. The COMELEC gave due
course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor in the recall election. Petitioners filed a petition before the
COMELECto disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to
cancel his certificate of candidacy anchored on the ground that Hagedorn
is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been
elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive
full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.
Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from
proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to assume office to
give effect to the will of the electorate.
ISSUE: Whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall
election of Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002.
RULING: YES. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found
in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution which is also reiterated in Section
43 (b) of RA No. 7160. These constitutional and statutory provisions have
two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve
for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that
only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent
is that involuntary severance from office for any length of
time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and
after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous
service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot
seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election
refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of
the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall
election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate
reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth
term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does
not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the
reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A
recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third
term.Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking
immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the
same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is
a consecutive fourth term. The framers of the Constitution did not intend
the period of rest of an elective official who has reached his term limit to
be the full extent of the succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September
24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term
which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the
Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular
elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and
1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of
Puerto Princesa. Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the
2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he
became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002
when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.This
period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as
mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal
prohibition. Hagedorns three consecutive terms ended on June 30,
2001. Hagedorns new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30,
2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive
terms as mayor.One cannot stitch together Hagedorns previous three-
terms with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive
term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from
June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or
consecutive character of Hagedorns service as mayor.
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at
the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official
full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of
a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the
three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts
to an interruption of continuity of service.
In Hagedorns case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office,
although short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in
the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require
the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent
is that interruption for any length of time, as long as the cause is
involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local officials’ continuity of
service.
One who wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full term of his
predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the
recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an
interruption in continuity of service. A winner in the recall election
cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for
purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective officials
terms in office.
Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to
the sovereign will of the people.
SUMMARY: Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002
recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his
three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30,
2001;
2. Hagedorns continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily
interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during
which time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorns recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004
cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth
consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth
consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible
effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders.
MELANIO L. MENDOZA and MARIO E. IBARRA v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and LEONARDO B. ROMAN
[G.R. No. 149736. December 17, 2002]
After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the
petition.
FACTS
Petitioners would seek the disqualification of respondent Leonardo B.
Roman on the ground of his having transgressed the three-term limit
under Section 8, Article X, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Mr. Roman won in the
1993 recall election for governor of the Province of Bataan, assumed office
on June 28, 1994, and served the remainder of the term which ended June
30, 1995. Thereafter, he was reelected in 1995, 1998 and 2001. Thus, he
is now serving his ninth consecutive year as governor of Bataan. On 22
February 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of
candidacy for the same post in the 14th May 2001 regular elections. On 16
May 2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Bataan.
ISSUE: WON private respondent Roman exceeded the three-term limit for
elective local officials, expressed in the Constitution and the
LocalGovernment Code,should respondent’s incumbency to the post of
Governor following the recall elections be included in determining the
three-consecutive term limit fixed by law?
RULING: NO
In order that the three-consecutive term limit can apply, two conditions
must concur (1) that the elective local official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms to the same local government position, and (2)
that he has served three consecutive full terms, albeit a voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be deemed to be
an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which
he is elected. Section 8, Article X, of the Constitution is explicit that the
"term of office of elective local officials . . . shall be three years" which
phrase is forthwith followed by its mandate that "no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms," and that" (v)oluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
(is) elected." The law evidently contemplates a continuous full three-year
term before the proscription can apply. The Constitutional Commission, in
its deliberations, referred to a full nine (9) years of service for each
elective local government official in the application of the prohibition,
envisioning at the same time a continuous and uninterrupted period of
nine years by providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent
voluntarily gives up the office.
A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local
official merely serves the balance of the latter’s term of office; it is not a
full three-year term. It also goes without saying that an incumbent elective
local official against whom a recall election is initiated and who
nevertheless wins in a recall election must be viewed as being a continuing
term of office and not as a break in reckoning his three consecutive terms.
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at
the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official
full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of
a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the
three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service."
If involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbent’s
being unable to finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid
recall proceedings negates "one term" for purposes of applying the three-
term limit, it stands to reason that the balance of the term assumed by the
newly elected local official in a recall election should not also be held to be
one term in reckoning the three-term limit. In both situations, neither the
elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the elected local
official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local
official following the recall election could be considered to have served a
full three-year term set by the Constitution. Consistently, it has held that
the term of a newcomer in recall elections cannot be counted as a full term
and may not thus be included in counting the three-term limit prescribed
under the law
Respondent Roman has won the election to the post of Governor of Bataan
with a comfortable margin against his closest opponent. Where a
candidate appears to be the clear choice of the people, doubts on the
candidate’s eligibility, even only as a practical matter, must be so resolved
as to respect and carry out, not defeat, the paramount will of the
electorate. While the Constitution would attempt to prevent the
monopolization of political power, indeed a wise rule, the precept of
preserving the freedom of choice of the people on who shall rightfully hold
the reins of government for them is no less than fundamental in looking at
its overriding intent.chanrob1e
To summarize, in applying the three-term limit, the term during which
succession takes place or a recall election is held should not be counted,
either with the three consecutive terms preceding, or with the three
consecutive terms succeeding, such term. It should not be counted not
because of any interruption in the continuity of the service but because
such term is for less than three years. Hence, the unexpired portion of a
term, whether filled by succession or by election in a recall, cannot be
considered one full term. In the case at bar, since respondent Roman’s
first election in 1993 was in consequence of a recall and not a regular
election and he had not fully served three consecutive terms when he was
elected on May 14, 2001, his last election is valid.
After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the
petition.
VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted to dismiss the petition.
He contended that as revealed by the records of the Constitutional
Commission, the Constitution envisions a continuous and an uninterrupted
service for three full terms before the proscription applies. Therefore, not
being a full term, a recall term should not be counted or used as a basis
for the disqualification whether served prior (as in this case) or subsequent
(as in the Socrates case) to the nine-year, full three-term limit.
MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J. joined, voted to dismiss
the petition on the ground that, in accordance with the ruling in Borja, Jr.
v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639,
Oct. 6, 1998 (res.); Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999); and
Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002, a term during which
succession to a local elective office takes place or a recall election is held
should not be counted in determining whether an elective local official has
served more than three consecutive terms. He argued that the Constitution
does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three
consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit
interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are
not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent.
Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which
respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of
a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14,
2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two
consecutive terms (1995–1998 and 1998–2001), his election on that day
was actually only his third term for the same position.
PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to dismiss the petition. He
argued that a recall term should not be considered as one full term,
because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected
official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents.
The desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced
against the need to uphold the voters’ obvious preference who, in the
present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast. He
explained that, in Socrates, he also voted to affirm the clear choice of the
electorate, because in a democracy the people should, as much as legally
possible, be governed by leaders freely chosen by them in credible
elections. He concluded that, in election cases, when two conflicting legal
positions are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice should be tilted
in favor of the people’s overwhelming choice.
AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to dismiss, arguing that
it is clear from the constitutional provision that the disqualification applies
only if the terms are consecutive and the service is full and continuous.
Hence, service for less than a term, except only in case of voluntary
renunciation, should not count to disqualify an elective local official from
running for the same position. This case is different from Socrates, where
the full three consecutive terms had been continuously served so that
disqualification had clearly attached.
On the other hand, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., with whom DAVIDE, C.J.,
and AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ., concurred,
holds the view that the recall term served by respondent Roman,
comprising the period June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, should be
considered as one term. Since he thereafter served for two consecutive
terms from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001, his election on May 14,
2001 was actually his fourth term and contravenes Art. X, Sec. 8 of the
Constitution. For this reason, she voted to grant the petition and to declare
respondent’s election on May 14, 2001 as null and void.
CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO-MORALES, J., also dissented and voted to
grant the petition. He held that a recall term constitutes one term and that
to totally ignore a recall term in determining the three-term limit would
allow local officials to serve for more than nine consecutive years contrary
to the manifest intent of the framers of the Constitution. He contended
that respondent Roman’s election in 2001 cannot exempt him from the
three-term limit imposed by the Constitution.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS DISMISSED.
5. Tenure of Office
OSMENA V COMELEC
(TENURE OF OFFICE)
FACTS:
Petitioners argue that:
1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the
holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday
of May 1992;
2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof,
providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall
hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall
have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII
(Transitory Provision) of the Constitution;
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect,
shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the
2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution;
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for
Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the
provision of Section 9, Article IX under the title “Commission on Elections”
of the Constitution;
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned
in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the
Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much
less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second
Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution
itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the
parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate or at least minimize these
problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the self-
correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or
revision.
ISSUE: 1. WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional
HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.
1. It provides for the de-synchronization of election by mandating that
there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of “synchronization” in
the mentioned in the Constitution was used synonymously as the phrase
holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their
Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date
will synchronize future elections to once every three years.
2. R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution
shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. It is not competent for the
legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold
over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution
has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the
Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no
legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though
the successors fail to qualify within the time.
3. R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987
Constitution which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials,
except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be
held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be
elected will be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from
November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years.
4. The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution
by changing the campaign period.
Menzon vs Petilla
(SUCCESSION AND VACANCY)
Facts:
 By virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed yet in the
province of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Governmentdesignated the
Vice-Governor, Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte.
 Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also
designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor.
Menzon took his oath of office.
 The Provincial Administrator inquired from the Undersecretary of the
DILG as to the legality of the appointment of the Menzon to act as
the Vice-Governor.
 Undersecretary stated that the appointment of the Menzon as the
temporary Vice- Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor
who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor,
could concurrently assume the functions of both offices.
 As a result the Sangguniang Panlalawiganissued herein questioned
Resolution where it held invalid the appointment of the Menzon as
acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.
 Despite several letters of request, the Acting Governor and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, refused to correct the Resolution.
 Thus, Menzon filed a petition for certiorari andmandamus seeking the
nullification of the Resolution and for the payment of his salary for his
services as the acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.
Issue:WON there was a vacancy
Held: Yes
The Law on Public Officers is clear. There is no vacancy whenever
the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu
contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized
to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office.
Applying the definition of vacancy to this case, it can be readily seen that
the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-
Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. There is no
satisfactory showing that Petilla, notwithstanding his succession to
the Office of the Governor, continued to simultaneously exercise the duties
of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call
for a full-time occupant to discharge them. More so when the vacancy is
for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's automatic assumption to
the acting Governorship that resulted in the vacancy in the office of the
Vice-Governor. The fact that the Secretary of Local Government
was prompted to appoint the Menzon shows the need to fill up the position
during the period it was vacant.
Secretary of Local Government had the authority to designate
Menzon.
The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the
event of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However,
the silence of the law must not be understood to convey that a remedy in
law is wanting. The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed
a necessity for the appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. For about two
years after the governatorial elections, there had been no de
jure permanent Governor for the province of Leyte. The exigencies of
public service demanded nothing less than the immediate appointment
of an acting Vice-Governor.
By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode
of succession provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed
in case of a temporary vacancy in the same office.
DOCENA VS SANGGUNIAN PANLALAWIGAN OF EASTERN SAMAR
(Permanent Vacancies in Local Sanggunian)
Facts:
 Docena was appointed by DILG Secretary to succeeda member of the
Sanggunian Panlalawagian of Eastern Samar(SPES) who died in
office. Docena took his oath of office and assumed office as a
member of the SPES.
 On the following day,Socrates Alar was also appointed by DILG
Secretary to the position already occupied by Docena.
 2ndappointment was subsequently withdrawn to reinstate the
1stappointment, but this was later itself recalled in favor of the
2nd appointment.
 SPES passed a resolution reiterating its previous recognition of the
Socrates’s appointment.
 DILG Secretary issued another Recall order this time in favor of
Docena
 Docena filed a petition for mandamus to compel the respondents to
recognize and admit him as a lawfully appointed member of the SPES.
Issue: Which appointment is valid?
Held: Docena’s appointment. Having been issued and accepted earlier,
and having already assumed office, Docena could not thereafter be just
recalled and replaced. The appointment was permanent in nature, and for
the unexpired portion of the deceased predecessor’s term. Petitioner had
already acquired security of tenure in the position and could be removed
therefrom only for any of the causes, and conformably to the procedure,
prescribed by the LGC. These requirements could not be circumvented by
the simple process of recalling his appointment.
B. Appointive Local Officials Common to all Municipalities, Cities
and Provinces
DE RAMA vs. CA
PETITIONERS: Conrado L. De Rama
RESPONDENTS: The Court Of Appeals (Ninth Division, The
Civil Service Commission), Eladio Martinez, Divino De Jesus, Morell Ayala,
Aristeo Catalla, Daisy Porta, Flordeliza Oriasel, Graciela Glory, Felecidad
Orinday, Ma. Petra Muffet Luce, Elsa Marino, Bernardita Mendoza, Jane
Macatangay, Adelfo Glodoviza And Florino Ramos
DOCKET NO.: GR No. 131136
DATE: February 28, 2001
PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J.
TOPIC: Appointive Local Officials
FACTS:
• Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon,
petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated to the CSC,
seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees on
the ground that appointments of the said employees were midnight
appointments of the former mayorAbeja, done in violation of Article
VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
• While the matter was pending before the CSC, three of the subject
employeesfiled with the CSC a claim for payment of their salaries
which was withheld by De Rama, claiming that employees cannot be
deprived of their salaries and benefits by the unilateral act of the
newly-assumed mayor.
CSC Ruling:Denied petitioners request for the recall of the appointments
of the 14 employeesand declared that the appointments of the said
employees were issued in accordance with pertinent laws. Thus, the same
were effective immediately, and cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the
appointing authority until disapproved by the CSC. The CSC also dismissed
petitioners allegation that these were midnight appointments, pointing out
that the Constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only
those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made
to apply to local elective officials. Thus, the CSC opined, the appointing
authority can validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long
as the appointee meets the qualification standards for the position.The
CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had
already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City,
and for petitioners failure to present evidence that would warrant the
revocation or recall of the said appointments.It is well-settled that once an
appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position
in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not
merely equitable right (to the position), which is protected not only by
statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him
either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause,
and with previous notice and hearing.
De Ramaclaims that the CSC was without jurisdiction: (1) to refuse to
revoke the subject appointments; (2) to uphold the validity of said
appointments, even assuming that there was failure to present evidence
that would prove that these appointments contravened existing laws or
rules;(3) No screening process and no criteria were adopted by the
Personnel Selection Board in nominating the respondents; (4) No posting
in three (3) conspicuous public places of notice of vacancy as required by
the rules and the law; (5) Merit and fitness requirements were not
observed by the selection board and by the appointing authority as
required by the Civil Service rules; (6) Petitioner has valid grounds to recall
the appointments of respondents.
Issues: w/n appointments made by previous mayor is valid
HELD: Yes. Appointment made was not prohibited and contrary to law
(midnight appointment). The court cannot dwell on the other grounds
since it was not raised earlier. If ever there were other procedural or legal
requirements that were violated in implementing the appointments of the
private respondents, the same were not seasonably brought before the
Civil Service Commission. These cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.
The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling
the appointments of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC,
the only reason he cited to justify his action was that these were midnight
appointments that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the
Constitution. However, the said prohibition applies only to presidential
appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or
her tenure.
• It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the
appointees assumption of the position in the civil service, he
acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by
revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and
with previous notice and hearing. Moreover, it is well-settled that the
person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the
position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the
Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away by either
revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid
cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing.
• In the case at bar, there was no previous notice, much less a hearing
accorded to the latter.
• Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations
of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that an
appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or
revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in
effect until disapproved by the Commission.
• Thus, it is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially
approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven
to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and
regulations.
• Sec. 10. An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws
and rules shall take effect immediately upon its issuance by the
appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties of
the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without
awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission. The
appointment shall remain effective until disapproved by the
Commission. In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier than
he date of its issuance.
• Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the
same may be recalled on any of the following grounds:
(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the
agencys Merit Promotion Plan;
(b) Failure to pass through the agencys Selection/Promotion
Board;
(c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between
management and employees relative to promotion; or
(d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and
regulations.
• Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only
be recalled on the above-cited grounds.
DAVID vs. COMELEC
PETITIONERS:Alex L. David, As Barangay Chairman Of Barangay 77,
Zone 7, Kalookan City And As President Of The Liga Ng Mga Barangay Sa
Pilipinas
RESPONDENTS: Commission On Elections, Secretaries of DILG and DBM
DOCKET NO.:G.R. No. 127116.
PETITIONERS: Liga Ng Mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter, Represented
By Bonifacio M. Rillon
RESPONDENTS: Commission On Elections And Department Of Budget
And Management
DOCKET NO.:GR No. 128039
DATE:April 8, 1997
PONENTE:Panganiban, J.
TOPIC: Leagues of Local Barangay Units and Elective Officials
FACTS:
• David fileda petition for prohibition to prohibit the holding of the
barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997.
The Court resolved to require the respondents to comment on the
petition within a non-extendible period of fifteen days ending on
January 29, 1997.Solicitor General filed his four-page Comment
siding with petitioner and praying that the election scheduled on May
12, 1997 be held in abeyance. Respondent Commission on
Elections filed a separate Commentopposing the petition. Comelec
issued Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding
of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997.
• Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter represented by its
president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petitionto seek a judicial review
by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional:
1. Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows:
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the
sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall
begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the
second Monday of May 1994.
2. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of
the holding of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other
activities related thereto;
3. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in
Republic Act No. 8250 otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1997 intended to defray the costs and
expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections;
David: The term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years.
This is reiterated in Republic Act No. 6679, approved on November 4,
1988, which reset the barangay elections from the second Monday of
November 1988 to March 28, 1989 and provided in Sec. 1 thereof that
such five-year term shall begin on the first day of May 1989 and ending on
the thirty-first day of May 1994. Petitioners further aver that although Sec.
43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to
three years, such reduction does not apply to barangay officials because
(1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to barangays while RA 7160 is
a general law which applies to all other local government units; (2) RA
7160 does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of
barangay officials is concerned; (3) while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987
Constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at three years, the
same provision states that the term of barangay officials shall be
determined by law; and (4) thus, it follows that the constitutional intention
is to grant barangay officials any term, except three years; otherwise,
there would be no rhyme or reason for the framers of the Constitution to
except barangay officials from the three year term found in Sec. 8 (of)
Article X of the Constitution.
Comelec: Petitioners cannot claim a term of more than three years since
they were elected under the aegis of the Local Government Code of 1991
which prescribes a term of only three years.
Brief Historical Background of Barangay Elections:
As a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of
the Philippines. The word barangay is derived from the Malay balangay, a
boat which transported them (the Malays) to these shores. Quoting from
Juan de Plasencia, a Franciscan missionary in 1577, Historian Conrado
Benitez wrote that the barangay was ruled by a dato who exercised
absolute powers of government. While the Spaniards kept the barangay as
the basic structure of government, they stripped the dato or rajah of his
powers. Instead, power was centralized nationally in the governor general
and locally in the encomiendero and later, in the alcalde mayor and the
gobernadorcillo. The dato or rajah was much later renamed cabeza de
barangay, who was elected by the local citizens possessing property. The
position degenerated from a title of honor to that of a mere government
employee. Only the poor who needed a salary, no matter how low,
accepted the post.
After the Americans colonized the Philippines, the barangays became
known as barrios. For some time, the laws governing barrio governments
were found in the Revised Administrative Code of 1916 and later in the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917. Barrios were granted autonomy by
the original Barrio Charter, RA 2370, and formally recognized as quasi-
municipal corporations by the Revised Barrio Charter, RA 3590. During the
martial law regime, barrios were declared or renamed barangays -- a
reversion really to their pre-Spanish names -- by PD. No. 86 and PD No.
557. Their basic organization and functions under RA 3590, which was
expressly adopted as the Barangay Charter, were retained. However, the
titles of the officials were changed to barangay captain, barangay
councilman, barangay secretary and barangay treasurer.
Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, a Punong Barangay
(Barangay Captain) and six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay
(Barangay Councilmen), who shall constitute the presiding officer and
members of the Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Council) respectively
were first elected on May 17, 1982. They had a term of six years which
began on June 7, 1982.
The Local Government Code of 1983 also fixed the term of office of local
elective officials at six years. Under this Code, the chief officials of the
barangay were the punong barangay, six elective sangguniang barangay
members, the kabataang barangay chairman, a barangay secretary and a
barangay treasurer.
B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, reiterated that barangay officials
shall hold office for six years, and stated that their election was to be held
on the second Monday of May nineteen hundred and eighty eight and on
the same day every six years thereafter.
This election scheduled by B.P. Blg. 881 on the second Monday of May
1988 was reset to the second Monday of November 1988 and every five
years thereafter by RA 6653. Under this law, the term of office of the
barangay officials was cut to five years[25] and the punong barangay was
to be chosen from among themselves by seven kagawads, who in turn
were to be elected at large by the barangay electorate.
But the election date set by RA 6653 on the second Monday of November
1988 was again postponed and reset to March 28, 1989 by RA 6679,[27]
and the term of office of barangay officials was to begin on May 1, 1989
and to end on May 31, 1994. RA 6679 further provided that there shall be
held a regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May
1994 and on the same day every five (5) years thereafter. Their term shall
be for five years x x x. Significantly, the manner of election of the punong
barangay was changed. Sec. 5 of said law ordained that while the seven
kagawads were to be elected by the registered voters of the barangay, the
candidate who obtains the highest number of votes shall be the punong
barangay and in the event of a tie, there shall be a drawing of lots under
the supervision of the Commission on Elections.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991, RA 7160,several provisions
concerning barangay officials were introduced:
(1) The term of office was reduced to three years, as follows:
SEC. 43. Term of Office. --
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the
sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after
the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May,
1994
(2) The composition of the Sangguniang Barangay and the manner of
electing its officials were altered, inter alia, the barangay chairman was to
be elected directly by the electorate, as follows:
SEC. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. -- (a) There shall be in each barangay
a punong barangay, seven (7) sanggunian barangay members, the
sanggunian kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay
treasurer.
SEC. 390. Composition. -- The Sangguniang barangay, the legislative body
of the barangay, shall be composed of the punong barangay as presiding
officer, and the seven (7) regular sanguniang barangay members elected
at large and the sanguniang kabataan chairman as members.
SEC. 41. Manner of Election. -- (a) The x x x punong barangay shall be
elected at large x x x by the qualified voters in the barangay.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Pursuant to the foregoing mandates of the Local Autonomy Code, the
qualified barangay voters actually voted for one punong barangay and
seven (7) kagawads during the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994. In
other words, the punong barangay was elected directly and separately by
the electorate, and not by the seven (7) kagawads from among
themselves.
ISSUE 1: Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: RA
7160 or RA 6679?
HELD: RA 7160 governs. Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term
to Three Years
RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted later than RA 6679. It
is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of
different vintages, the later enactment prevails. Petitioner may be correct
in alleging that RA 6679 is a special law, but they are incorrect in stating
that RA 7160 is necessarily a general law. It is a special law insofar as it
governs the term of office of barangay officials. There being a clear
repugnance and incompatibility between the two specific provisions, they
cannot stand together. The later law, RA 7160, should thus prevail in
accordance with its repealing clause. When a subsequent law encompasses
entirely the subject matter of the former enactments, the latter is deemed
repealed.
ISSUE 2: Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years
constitutional?
HELD:Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution
Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states, the term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of
office for barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term
to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition,
thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in
accordance with the exigencies of public service.
Therefore, to the question at issue here on how long the term of barangay
officials is, the answer of the Commission was simple, clear and quick: As
may be determined by law; more precisely, as provided for in the Local
Autonomy Code. And the Local Autonomy Code, in its Sec. 43-c, limits
their term to three years.
ISSUE 3: Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that
provided under RA 7160?
HELD: Yes. Petitioners Estopped From Challenging Their Three-Year
Terms
If, as claimed by petitioners, the applicable law is RA 6679, then Petitioner
David should not have run and could not have been elected chairman of
his barangay because under RA 6679, there was to be no direct election
for the punong barangay; the kagawad candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes was to be automatically elected barangay
chairman; (2) thus, applying said law, the punong barangay should have
been Ruben Magalona, who obtained the highest number of votes among
the kagawads -- 150, which was much more than Davids 112; (3) the
electorate should have elected only seven kagawads and not one punong
barangay plus seven kagawads.
In other words, following petitioners own theory, the election of Petitioner
David as well as all the barangay chairmen of the two Liga petitioners was
illegal.
The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners theory is that barangay
officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that which they
ran for and were elected to, under the law governing their very claim to
such offices: namely, RA 7160, the Local Government Code. Petitioners
belated claim of ignorance as to what law governed their election to office
in 1994 is unacceptable because under Art. 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance
of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
2. Local Government Units cannot hire private counsels
ALINSUG vs. RTC OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
PETITIONERS:Zonsayda L. Alinsug
RESPONDENTS: Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, Presided By Hon. Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr.; Rolando P. Ponsica As
Municipal Mayor Of Escalante, Negros Occidental; Municipality Of
Escalante, Negros Occidental, And Patricio A. Alvarez As Municipal
Treasurer Of Escalante, Negros Occidental
DOCKET NO.:G.R. No. 108232.
DATE:August 23, 1993
PONENTE:Vitug, J.
TOPIC: LGU cannot hire private counsels
FACTS:
• The petitioner Alinsug, had been a regular employee of the municipal
government of Escalante, Negros Occidental, when she received a
permanent appointment as Clerk III in the office of the Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator of the same municipality.
• On 19 June 1992, Zonsayda absented herself from work allegedly to
attend to family matters. She had asked permission from the
personnel officer but not from the mayor.
• Thus, Mayor Ponsica issued Office Order No. 31, suspending
Zonsayda for one month and one day commencing for a simple
misconduct which can also be categorized as an act of
insubordination which carries with it forfeiture of benefits such as
salary and PERA and leave credits during the duration of its
effectivity.
• Forthwith, Zonsayda filed with the RTC a petitionfor "injunction with
damages and prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction" against Mayor Ponsica and the municipal treasurer.
• Mayor Ponsica and the municipal treasurer filed an answer to the
petition, through private practitioner Samuel SM Lezama, alleging
that the petitioner had not exhausted administrative remedies and
that her suspension was in accordance with law.
Petitioner: Praying that the answer be disregarded and expunged from
the record, and that the respondents be all declared in default on the
ground that since the respondents were sued in their official capacities,
"not including their private capacities," they should have been represented
by either the municipal legal officer or the provincial legal officer or
prosecutor as provided for by Sec. 481 (b) [i] and [3] of the Local
Government Code. It also cited Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 10 and Art. 177 of
the Revised Penal Code which penalizes usurpation of public authority.
Respondents: It was "unnecessary to provide such a provision because
there (exist) administrative and judicial rulings sustaining the validity of the
employment of a private counsel by municipal officials. Moreover, since the
petitioner prayed for the award of moral damages, their hiring of a private
counsel was justified.
RTC: Appointment of a legal officer was optional on the part of the
municipal government and the municipality of Escalante had not, in fact,
designated any such legal officer, petitioner's move to declare respondents
in default "for having retained a private counsel" was not thereby legally
sustainable.
ISSUES: (a) whether or not a private counsel may represent municipal
officials sued in their official capacities
(b) whether or not respondents had been in default on account of their
having filed their answer through a private counsel.
HELD: Respondents were properly represented by a private counsel,
whose legal fees shall be for their own account.
Sec. 443 (b) of the Local Government Code,the mayor may appoint a
municipal legal officer. Section 481, Article 11 of Title V of the Code which
provides for the appointment of local officials common to all municipalities,
cities and provinces, states that "the appointment of a legal officer shall be
mandatory for the provincial and city governments and optional for the
municipal government." The same section specifies the functions of the
legal officer, and one of them being that he shall:
(i)Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and
special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any
official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, that
in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality
is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another
component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be
employed to represent the adverse party;
Indeed, it appears that the law allows a private counsel to be
hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an adverse
party in a case involving the provincial government or another
municipality or city within the province.
The municipality should not be burdened with expenses of hiring a private
lawyer" and that "the interests of the municipality would be best protected
if a government lawyer handles its litigations."
But would these proscriptions include public officials? Not necessarily. It
can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official
capacity and sued in that capacity, is later held to have exceeded his
authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then been
underwritten by the people's money which ordinarily should have been his
personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him
without, however, his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of
his own choice. The Court held that in the discharge of governmental
functions, "municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its
officers, except if and when, the only to the extent that, they have acted
by authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof."
Where rigid adherence to the law on representation of local officials in
court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid
grievance and the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for
moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by
them in their private capacity, the hiring of a private counsel would be
proper.
Also, a public official (eg: OSG) who is sued in a criminal case is actually
sued in his personal capacity inasmuch as his principal, the State, can
never be the author of a wrongful act, much less commit a crime.
The key then to resolving the issue of whether a local government
official may secure the services of private counsel, in an action
filed against him in his official capacity, lies on the nature of the
action and the relief that is sought.
While the petition below was filed against respondents as public officials,
its allegations were also aimed at questioning certain acts that can well
bring the case beyond the mere confines of official functions.
MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL V. CA
FACTS:
 BACKGROUND:
o Atty. Felix E. Mendiola served as counsel for the
Municipality of Pililia in a collection suit for unpaid business
taxes, storage permit fee, mayor’s permit fee, sanitary
inspection fee, and the cost of the suit against private
respondent Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC).
o Pililla won in the trial court, and the SC affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
o The judgment became final and executory and the records
were remanded to the trial court for execution.
 In connection with the execution of said judgment, Atty. Felix E.
Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of the municipality for the
examination of defendant corporation's gross sales for the years 1976
to 1978 and 1984 to 1991 for the purpose of computing business tax.
 PPC filed a manifestation that Pililla Mayor NicomedesPatenia received
from it the sum of P11,457,907.00 as full satisfaction of the above-
mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court, as evidence by the
release and quitclaim documents executed by said mayor.
 RTC: denied the motion for examination and execution of judgment
on the ground that the judgment had already been satisfied.
 CA: dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel
in violation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the
filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla through the
proper provincial or municipal legal officer.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Felix E. Mendiola can represent the Municipality of
Pililla
HELD:
 No.
The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no
authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the
Municipality of Pililla. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides:
Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial
subdivisions in litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the
province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any
court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the
Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district
in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to
some other municipality or municipal district in the same province.
When the interests of a provincial government and of any political
 division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf
of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any
municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special
attorney may be employed by its council.
HELD:
Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a
province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory.
The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly
limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to
represent it.
The fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the
municipality's case must appear on record. In the case, there is
nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified
to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the
appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law.
The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough
to apply to situations where the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the
case cannot be sustained. The fiscal's refusal to represent the
municipality is not a legal justification. A fiscal cannot refuse to
perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without
violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a
special attorney, the municipal council should request the Secretary of
Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial
fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court.
It should also be noted that the lack of authority of Atty. Mendiola,
was even raised by the municipality itself in its comment and
opposition to said counsel's motion for execution of his lien, which
was filed by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of
said municipality.
The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise
for the first time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the
municipality is untenable. The legality of his representation can be
questioned at any stage of the proceedings.
Also, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by
Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized, said authority is deemed to have
been revoked by the municipality when the latter, through the
municipal mayor and without said counsel's participation, entered into
a compromise agreement with PPC.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED for lack of merit and the
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
RAMOS V. CA
FACTS:
 Petitioners Antonio C. Ramos, Rosalinda M. Perez, Norma C. Castillo,
and the Baliuag Market Vendors Association, Inc. filed a petition for
the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances No. 91 (1976) and
No. 7 (1990) and the contract of lease over a commercial arcade to
be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan, Preliminary
injunction, was issued by the court a quo on May 9, 1990.
o The provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney, Oliviano
D. Regalado, filed an Answer in behalf of respondent
municipality.
o At the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28, 1990,
Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos appeared, manifesting that he
was counsel for respondent municipality.
o On June 18, 1990, Provincial Attorney Oliviano D. Regalado
appeared as collaborating counsel of Atty. Romanillos. The
Provincial Fiscal did not appear. It was Atty. Romanillos
who submitted the Reply to petitioners' Opposition to
respondents' motion to dissolve injunction and a written
formal offer of evidence for respondent municipality.
 Petitioners opposed the personality of Atty. Romanillos to appear as
counsel of the respondent municipality, and motioned to disqualify
Atty. Romanillos from appearing as counsel for respondent
municipality and to declare null and void the proceedings participated
in and undertaken by Atty. Romanillos.
o Atty. Romanillos withdrew as counsel for respondent
municipality and that Atty. Regalado, as his collaborating
counsel for respondent municipality, is adopting the entire
proceedings participated in/undertaken by Atty. Romanillos.
 Respondent Judge issued the Order denied petitioners' motion to
disqualify Atty. Romanillos as counsel for respondent municipality and
to declare null and void the proceeding participated in by Atty.
Romanillos; and on the other hand, granted Atty. Regalado's motion
"to formally adopt the entire proceedings including the formal offer of
evidence”.
ISSUES:
1. Who has the legal authority to represent a municipality in law-
suits?
2. If an unauthorized lawyer represents a municipality what is the
effect of his participation in the proceedings?
3. Parenthetically, does a motion to withdraw the appearance of
the unauthorized counsel have to comply with Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court regarding notice and hearing of motions?
1. Only provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can
represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. In
the recent case of Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of
Appeals, set in clear-cut terms the answer to the question of
who may legally represent a municipality in a suit for or against
it, thus: we ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a
province or municipality in lawsuits.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and
provincial subdivisions in litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall
represent the province and any municipality or municipal district
thereof in any court, except in cases whereof (sic) original
jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the
municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to
the provincial government or to some other municipality or
municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a
provincial government and of any political division thereof are
opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any
municipality or other political subdivision of a province a special
attorney may be employed by its council.
Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3,
Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Law, only provincial
fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or
municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The
municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly
limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is
disqualified to represent it. For the aforementioned exception to
apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to
handle the municipality's case must appear on record. In the
instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that the
provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the
Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of herein
private counsel is without authority of law. The provincial fiscal's
functions as legal officer and adviser for the civil cases of a
province and corollarily, of the municipalities thereof, were
subsequently transferred to the provincial attorney.
The foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudence show that
only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal
attorney should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Only in
exceptional instances may a private attorney be hired by a
municipality to represent it in lawsuits. It may be said that Atty.
Romanillos appeared for respondent municipality inasmuch as he
was already counsel of Kristi Corporation which was sued with
respondent municipality in this same case. The fact that the
municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed to collaborate
with a private law firm does not legalize the latter's
representation of the municipality of Hagonoy. While a private
prosecutor is allowed in criminal cases, an analogous
arrangement is not allowed in civil cases wherein a municipality
is the plaintiff.
Private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own.
Neither may they do so even in collaboration with authorized
government lawyers. This is anchored on the principle that only
accountable public officers may act for and in behalf of public
entities and that public funds should not be expanded to hire
private lawyers.
2. We agree with public respondent that such adoption
produces validity. It does not appear that the adoption of
proceedings participated in or undertaken by Atty. Romanillos
when he was private counsel for the respondent municipality of
Baliuag — such as the proceedings on the motion to dissolve the
injunction, wherein petitioners had even cross-examined the
witnesses presented by Atty. Romanillos in support of said
motion and had even started to present their witnesses to
sustain their objection to the motion — would have resulted in
any substantial prejudice to petitioners' interest. To declare the
said proceedings null and void — notwithstanding the formal
adoption thereof by Atty. Regalado as Provincial Attorney of
Bulacan in court — and to require trial anew to cover the same
subject matter, to hear the same witnesses and to admit the
same evidence adduced by the same parties cannot enhance the
promotion of justice.
This Court believes that conferring legitimacy to the appearance
of Atty. Romanillos would not cause substantial prejudice on
 petitioners. Requiring new trial on the mere legal technicality o The Province paid the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm despite the fact
that the municipality was not represented by a legally authorized that it didn’t appear as counsel for the Province in the SC case
counsel would not serve the interest of justice. In sum, although o Considering the standing of both Atty. Cornago the Cortes &
a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in Reyna Law Firm, the P38.5 Million attorney’s fees is
litigations, in the interest of substantial justice however, we hold unconscionable and violative of (a) COA Circular No. 85-55-A
that a municipality may adopt the work already performed in prohibiting irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
good faith by such private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it expenditures or uses of funds; and (b) Sec. 3 (e) and (g) of the
(1) provided that no injustice it thereby heaped on the adverse Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
party and (2) provided further that no compensation in any
guise is paid therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer.
Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyers work cannot *** However, it was held that respondents could no longer be subject
bind the municipality. to disciplinary action for such administrative misconduct as it was
committed during a prior term.
3. NO, a motion to withdraw the appearance of an
unauthorized lawyer is a non-adversarial motion that
C. DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
need not comply with Section 4 Rule 15 as to notice to
the adverse party. The disqualification of Atty. Romanillos was
G.R. No. 93252 | August 5, 1991
what petitioners were really praying for when they questioned
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
his authority to appear for the municipality. The disqualification
vs.
was granted, thereby serving the relief prayed for by petitioners.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS,
such being the case, no "notice directed to the parties concerned
respondents.
and served at least 3 days before the hearing thereof" need be
given petitioners, the questioned motion not being contentious.
Besides, what petitioners were questioning as to lack of
authority was remedied by the adoption of proceedings by an
authorized counsel, Atty. Regalado.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED and

the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SALALIMA V. GUINGONA

FACTS:
 National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a case against the Province of
Albay questioning the validity of the auction sale, which theProvince
conducted because of NPC’s failure to pay real property taxes
assessed.
 The AlbaySangguniangPanlalawigan, through a resolution, authorized
respondent Governor to engagethe services of a Manila-based law
G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991
firm (Cortes & Reyna Law Firm) to handle the case against NPC.
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,
o Later, the Province also engaged the services of Atty.
vs.
Cornago. This is despite the availability of theProvincial
HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Legal Officer, Atty. Ricafort, who already filed the Province’s
Department of Local Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his
comment on the NPC petition.
capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local
o A retainer agreement was entered into which provided that
Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA JR., respondents.
Atty. Cornago and the law firm shall receiveP50,000 as
acceptance fee and 18% of the value of the property
subject matter of the case which is P214 Million.
o The province had already paid P7,380,410.31 as attorney’s
fees when the COA disallowed furtherdisbursements for
lack of the requisite prior written conformity and
acquiescence of the Sol Gen and thewritten concurrence of
the COA as required by COA Circular No. 86-255.
 An administrative complaint was then filed against Gov. Salalima, Vice
Gov. Azaña, and other AlbaySangguniangPanlalawigan Members
relative to the questioned retainer contract and the disbursementof
public funds in payment thereof.

ISSUE: WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in entering

into the retainer agreement with Atty. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna
Law Firm and in making payments pursuant to said agreement

HELD:
G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991
 Yes.
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,
In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay, respondents
vs.
exceeded their authority and violated a provision of the LGC and a THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his
Supreme Court doctrine. Moreover, the entire transaction was attended by capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government,
irregularities. respondent

Ratio:
 Sec. 481 LGC: requires the appointment of a legal officer to
represent the LGU in all civil actions and specal proceedings
wherein the LGU or any official thereof, in his official capacity
is a party
o EXCEPTION: In actions or proceedings where a component city
or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government
or to another component city or municipality, a special legal
officer may be employed to represent the adverse party
 Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok: LGUs cannot be
represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial
Fiscal who can rightfully represent them
 Attendant Irregularities:
o No prior written approval of the Sol Gen and COA before the
disbursements were made
o The resolution passed by the Sanggunian only authorized the
Governor to sign a retainer contract with the Cortes & Reyna
Law Firm and yet he also signed with Atty. Cornago, a different
entity
FACTS: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints
were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of
office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension
orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against
him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon
appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by
the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not
authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove
local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local
autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present
Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the
President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left
the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the
power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces
disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
“supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to
the power of control given to him over executive officials of our
government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and
supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. “In administration law supervision means overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably
inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in
his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in
suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped
by imposing a 600 day suspension
G.R. No. 100874 February 13, 1992
GOVERNOR BENJAMIN I. ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs.
NELSON B. MELGAR and HON. JUDGE MARCIANO T. VIROLA,
respondents.
FACTS:
A letter-complaint with the Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro (herein
petitioner Governor Benjamin I. Espiritu) accusing Mayor Melgar of grave
misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority, and culpable violation of the
Constitution and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of public service,
and requested that the mayor be under preventive suspension pending the
investigation of the charges. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental
Mindoro required Mayor Melgar to answer the complaint, and after
evaluating the complaint, as well as the answer of the Mayor, the
Sanggunian passed a resolution, recommending to the Provincial Governor
that the respondent Mayor be preventively suspended for forty-five (45)
days pending investigation. Thus, Governor Espiritu put Melgar under
preventive suspension.Mayor Melgar received the Order of Suspension. He
forthwith filed a "Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction with
prayer for Restraining Order" in the Regional Trial Court of Oriental
Mindoro alleging that "the order of suspension was an arrogant, despotic
and arbitrary abuse of power" by the Governor, RTC Judge Virola issued a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from
implementing the Order of suspension against Mayor Melgar. Governor
Espiritu filed a motion to dismiss and/or for reconsideration which Judge
Virola. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Petitioner avers,
as Provincial Governor, is empowered by Section 63 of the Local
Government Code to place an elective municipal official under preventive
suspension pending decision of an administrative case against the elective
municipal official:
ISSUE: Whether or not the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is
authorized by law to preventively suspend municipal mayor Naujan at
anytime
HELD: YES. Clearly, the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is
authorized by law to preventively suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan
at anytime after the issues had been joined and any of the following
grounds were shown to exist:
1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of;
2. When the evidence of culpability is strong;
3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or
4. When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence.
Since respondent mayor believed that his preventive suspension was
unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought relief first from
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, not from the courts. The
regional trial court had no jurisdiction the case and gravely abused its
discretion in refusing to dismiss the case.There may exist honest
differences of opinion with regard to the seriousness of the charges, or as
to whether they warrant disciplinary action. However, as a general rule,
the office or body that is invested with the power of removal or suspension
should be the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. So,
unless a flagrant abuse of the exercise of that power is shown, public
policy and a becoming regard for the principle of separation of powers
demand that the action of said officer or body should be left
undisturbed.However, in this particular case, since the 60-day preventive
suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the Temporary Restraining
Order which we issued on August 6, 1991, and therefore has already been
served, he is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges against him.
RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of the Department of Local
Government, and MELVIN VARGAS, as Acting Governor of
Cagayan, respondents.
G.R. No. 94115 August 21, 1992
FACTS: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of
Cagayan. After December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, respondent
Secretary of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, to petitioner
requiring him to show cause why should not be suspended or remove from
office for disloyalty to the Republic, within forty-eight (48) hours from
receipt thereof.
On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the
Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by
VeronicoAgatep, Manuel Mamba and OrlinoAgatep, respectively the mayors
of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against
petitioner for acts the latter committed during the coup. Petitioner was
required to file a verified answer to the complaint.
In reply to respondent Secretary's letter requiring him to explain
why should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty. In his
letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively
participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic
to the cause of the rebel soldiers.
Respondent Secretary suspended petitioner from office for sixty
(60) days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation
into the charges against him.Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered
the questioned decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering
his removal from office.
While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the
May 11, 1992 elections.The Commission on Elections upon several
petitions made the resolution ordering petitioner’s disqualification. Pending
the outcome of the disqualification case, thereby allowing the canvassing
of the votes and returns in Cagayan to proceed. However, the Commission
was ordered not to proclaim a winner until this Court has decided the
case.Petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections.
ISSUES: WON the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove
local government officials as alter ego of the President, and as embodied in
B.P. Blg. 337 has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and which is now
vested in the courts
WON Petitioner is disqualified on the ground that he
had been removed from office by resolution of respondent Secretary
RULING:
1. No. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local
government officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory
grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by
Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the
President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices and the power of general supervision over local governments,
and by the doctrine that the acts of the department head are
presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by
him. The statutory grant found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional
roots, having been enacted by the then BatasanPambansa pursuant to
Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, Section 2.
2. No. Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term
are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially
true were the Constitution provides that the penalty in proceeding for
removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and
disqualification from holding office for a term for which the officer was
elected or appointed. The underlying theory is that each term is separate
from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefor.
The Court should ever remove a public officer for acts done prior
to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the
people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a
man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason
of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
 REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B.
TAN, Respondents
G.R. No. 207264 | October 22, 2013
She is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the
HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon such qualifications and to set
aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having denied Petitioner her right to
due process and for unconstitutionally adding a qualification not otherwise
required by the constitution.
FACTS: Petitioner Reyes filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent
Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of
petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended
petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material
misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency,
date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an
American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion
to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution
cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen
of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but denied byCOMELEC
en banc.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013
elections.
On June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality
declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and
executory.
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.
ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a
duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for
the position of member of the House of Representative
WON the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to
run for office
RULING:
1. Yes. Petitioner, is in error when she posits that at present it is the
HRET which has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a
Member of the House of Representatives.COMELEC retains
jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution,
jurisdiction of HRET begins only after the candidate is considered as a
Member of House of Representatives. For one to be considered as a
member, there must be a concurrence of these requisites: 1. Valid
proclamation 2. Proper oath and 3. Assumption of office. Unavailable
to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House at
present. As she has not yet assumed office yet. And proper oath was
not validly complied as must made 1. Before the speaker of HoR and
in open session. Here although she made the oath before Speaker
Belmonte, there was no indication that it was made during plenary or
in open session and thus, it remains unclear whether the required
oath of office was indeed complied.
2. No. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and
become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have
accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation
of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that
petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office
as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of
allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency,
the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen
who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile
of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show
that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through
positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from
the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this case, there is no
showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced
her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as
Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January
18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year
residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as
she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the
said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA.
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of
the petition is affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.
HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for
the Visayas, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, Presiding Judge, Branch XXVIII,
Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, Mandaue City Mayor
ALFREDO M. OUANO, Mandaue City Vice-Mayor PATERNO CAÑETE
and Mandaue City SangguniangPanlungsod Member RAFAEL
MAYOL, respondents.
G.R. No. 108072 | December 12, 1995
FACTS:The controversy stemmed from the filing of criminal and
administrative complaints, on 22 July 1992, against herein respondents
Mayor Ouano, Vice-Mayor Cañete and SangguniangPanlungsod Member
Rafael Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City
Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede with the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. The respondents were charged
with having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
as amended, Articles 170 (falsification of legislative documents) and 171
(falsification by public officers) of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No.
6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers).
Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension,
respondent officials, on 05 August 1992, prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of
jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against
them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the
power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local
officials, as well as to affect their preventive suspension, had now been
vested with the Office of the President.
A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order, was filed by respondent
officials with the RTC Mandaue City. Acting favorably on the pleas of
petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued, on even date, a restraining
order directed at petitioner, enjoining him. Subsequently injunction was
issued. MR by petitioner was denied by RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman under Republic Act ("R.A.") No.
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, has been divested
of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective
officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
WON 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section
24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive
suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even
now maintain its application
RULING:
1. No. There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate
that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent
provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter
in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us
to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that
repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that courts must
generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be
absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before
the inference of implied repeal may be drawn.The authority to conduct
administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over
elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister
of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman
upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and
24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what
already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the
Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the
President.
2. No. The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify
the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No.
6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against
the officer or employee should involve dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges should
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay
in office would prejudice the case filed against him. The Ombudsman can
impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether
elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand,
in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension
prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local
official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that
(a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is
strong, (c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in
office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
[G.R. No. 125955. June 19, 1997]
WILMER GREGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
HUMBERTO BASCO, respondents.
Facts: On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as
Deputy Sheriff by no less than this Court upon a finding of serious
misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena
Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the
Second District of the City of Manila during the January 18, 1988, local
elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office.
After his term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized
national elections. Again, he succeeded in his bid and he was elected as
one of the six (6) City Councilors. However, his victory this time did not
remain unchallenged. In the midst of his successful re-election, he found
himself besieged by lawsuits of his opponents in the polls who wanted to
dislodge him from his position. All these challenges were, however,
dismissed, thus, paving the way for Basco’s continued stay in office.
Despite the odds previously encountered, Basco remained undaunted and
ran again for councilor in the May 8, 1995, local elections seeking a third
and final term. Once again, he beat the odds by emerging sixth in a battle
for six councilor seats. As in the past, however, his right to office was
again contested. On May 13, 1995, petitioner Grego, claiming to be a
registered voter of Precinct No. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed with
the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Bascos
disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and for the
declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of
Manilas Second District.
The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case on May 14, 1995, where it
ordered the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda.
Before the parties could comply with this directive, however, the Manila
City BOC proclaimed Basco on May 17, 1995, as a duly elected councilor
for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates
who vied for the seats.
In view of such proclamation, petitioner lost no time in filing an Urgent
Motion seeking to annul what he considered to be an illegal and hasty
proclamation made on May 17, 1995, by the Manila City BOC. He
reiterated Bascos disqualification and prayed anew that candidate
Romualdo S. Maranan be declared the winner.
On June 5, 1995, Basco filed his Motion to Dismiss Serving As Answer
pursuant to the reservation he made earlier, summarizing his contentions
and praying as follows:
Respondent thus now submits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief for
the following reasons:
1. The respondent cannot be disqualified on the ground of Section 40
paragraph b of the Local Government Code because the Tordesillas
decision is barred by laches, prescription, res judicata, lis pendens, bar by
prior judgment, law of the case and stare decisis;
2. Section 4[0] par. B of the Local Government Code may not be validly
applied to persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so
would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation
which impairs vested rights. It is also a class legislation and
unconstitutional on the account.
After the parties respective memoranda had been filed, the COMELECs
First Division resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification on October
6, 1995, ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by the Supreme
Court on respondent Basco on October 31, 1981 was wiped away and
condoned by the electorate which elected him and that on account of
Bascos proclamation on May 17, 1965, as the sixth duly elected councilor
of the Second District of Manila, the petition would no longer be viable.[6]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of said resolution was later denied
by the COMELEC en banc in its assailed resolution promulgated on July 31,
1996.[7] Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any
elective position since he had been removed from office as a result of an
administrative case pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code (the Code), which took
effect on January 1, 1992.[8]
Petitioner wants the Court to likewise resolve the following issues, namely:
Issue: Whether or not Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies
retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January
1, 1992;
Ruling: NO. Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code under which
petitioner anchors Bascos alleged disqualification to run as City Councilor
states:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
x x x x x x x x x.
In this regard, petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only
on January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given retroactive
effect and applied to Bascos dismissal from office which took place in
1981. It is stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not
mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of the candidate in
order for disqualification thereunder to attach. We do not, however,
subscribe to petitioners view. Our refusal to give retroactive application to
the provision of Section 40 (b) is already a settled issue and there exist no
compelling reasons for us to depart therefrom.
That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a
candidates removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense
should not deter us from the applying the law prospectively. The basic
tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and not
retroactively provides the qualification sought by petitioner. A statute,
despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to
overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage. Lex
prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.[14]
In sum, we see the dismissal of the petition for disqualification as not
having been attended by grave abuse of discretion. There is then no more
legal impediment for private respondents continuance in office as City
Councilor for the Second District of Manila.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed resolution of respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is SPA 95-212 dated July 31, 1996 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 131255. May 20, 1998]
HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
RUBEN D. TORRES, the DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR & LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
Facts: On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office
of the President a letter-complaint dated September 13, 1997 charging
petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Private
respondents alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they were
at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan when petitioner belligerently barged into the
Hall; petitioner angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered
threatening words at them; close behind petitioner were several men with
long and short firearms who encircled the area. Private respondents claim
that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending
legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva
Ecija obtain a loan of P150 million from the Philippine National Bank; that
private respondents opposed the loan because the province of Nueva Ecija
had an unliquidated obligation of more than P70 million incurred without
prior authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; that the provincial
budget officer and treasurer had earlier disclosed that the province could
not afford to contract another obligation. Private respondents prayed for
the suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the
provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the proposed loan
in light of the financial condition of the province.
The President acted on the complaint by writing on its margin
the following:
1. Noted. There appears no justification for the use of force, intimidation
or armed followers in the situation of 12 Sep at the Session Hall. 2. Take
appropriate preemptive and investigative actions. 3. BREAK NOT the
PEACE.
He thus instructed the then Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments (SILG) Robert Barbers to "[t]ake appropriate preemptive and
investigative actions," but to "[b]reak not the peace." The letter-complaint
together with the President's marginal notes were sent to Secretary Robert
Z. Barbers on September 20, 1996. Acting upon the instructions of the
President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case against
him[4] and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its
annexes. In the same notice, Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to
submit [his] verified/sworn answer thereto, not a motion to dismiss,
together with such documentary evidence that [he] has in support thereof,
within fifteen (15) days from receipt."[5] Petitioner was again ordered to file
his answer to the letter-complaint within fifteen days from receipt. In a
letter dated December 9, 1996, petitioner moved for another extension of
thirty (30) days to file his answer. On January 7, 1997, petitioner
requested for another extension of thirty (30) days to file his answer as he
was still on the process of choosing a lawyer. Three months later, on April
22, 1997, Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, then Acting Secretary of the
DILG, issued an order declaring petitioner in default and to have waived
his right to present evidence. Private respondents were ordered to present
their evidence ex-parte.
On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President,
placing petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pending
investigation of the charges against him.[17]
On January 8, 1998, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President,
adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He
imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6)
months without pay
Issues: 1. WON the doctrine of qualified political agency is applicable to
this case.
2. WON DILG erred in recommending that Respondent be placed
under preventive suspension.
3. WON the Resolution adopted on January 8, 1998 is proper.
Ruling: 1. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against
elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority
and the Investigating Authority. This is explicit from A.O. No. 23.
Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of
the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive
Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the
Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the
exclusive Investigating Authority.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against
elective local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over
local governments under Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. The
power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to
see that the subordinate officers perform their duties."[48] If the
subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.[49] The President's power of general supervision means no more
than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that
subordinate officers act within the law.[50] Supervision is not incompatible
with discipline.[51] And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order
an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion
the good of the public service so requires.[52]
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the
Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government
officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the
DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the
Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner
Joson's claim.
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints
is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political
agency. This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President.
Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency.[58] As
head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate
some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by
the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he acts personally.[59] The members of Cabinet may act for and in
behalf of the President in certain matters because the President cannot be
expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the
time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter
ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by
law to exercise authority.[60]
2. In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did
not err in recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive
suspension during the investigation. Preventive suspension may be
imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are
joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity
of the offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who
continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
The failure of respondent to file his answer despite several opportunities
given him is construed as a waiver of his right to present evidence in his
behalf (Sec. 4, Rule 4 of Administrative Order No. 23). The requisite of
joinder of issues is squarely met with respondent's waiver of right to
submit his answer.
Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for the imposition
of preventive suspension had been complied with. Petitioner's failure to file
his answer despite several opportunities given him was construed as a
waiver of his right to file answer and present evidence; and as a result of
this waiver, the issues were deemed to have been joined. The Executive
Secretary also found that the evidence of petitioner Joson's guilt was
strong and that his continuance in office during the pendency of the case
could influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity
of the evidence against him.
3. We now come to the validity of the January 8, 1998 Resolution of the
Executive Secretary finding petitioner guilty as charged and imposing on
him the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months from office
without pay.
The denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is
erroneous. Petitioner's right to a formal investigation is spelled out in the
following in A.O. 23.
The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him
procedural due process. Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the
preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the
parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This
provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to
determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted. The records
show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. As respondent,
he is accorded several rights under the law, to wit:
"Sec. 65. Rights of Respondent. -- The respondent shall be accorded full
opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to require the
attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in
his favor through compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces
tecum."
An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of
an accused.[68] These rights are essentially part of procedural due
process.[69] The local elective official has the (1) right to appear and defend
himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory
attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence. These
rights are reiterated in the Rules Implementing the Local Government
Code[70] and in A.O. No. 23.[71] Well to note, petitioner formally claimed his
right to a formal investigation after his Answer Ad Cautelam has been
admitted by Undersecretary Sanchez.
Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the
complaint against him was decided on the basis of position papers. There
is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases
against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position
papers.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of January 8, 1998 of the public
respondent Executive Secretary is declared null and void and is set
aside. No Cost.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. MTJ-98-1147. July 2, 1998]
JESUS S. CONDUCTO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ILUMINADO C.
MONZON, respondent.
Facts: On 30 August 1993, complainant filed a complaint with the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Pablo City against one Benjamin
Maghirang, the barangay chairman of Barangay III-E of San Pablo City, for
abuse of authority, serious irregularity and violation of law in that, among
other things, said respondent Maghirang appointed his sister-in-law, Mrs.
Florian Maghirang, to the position of barangay secretary on 17 May 1989
in violation of Section 394 of the Local Government Code. At the same
time, complainant filed a complaint for violation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code with the Office of the City Prosecutor against
Maghirang, which was, however, dismissed[2] on 30 September 1993 on
the ground that Maghirangs sister-in-law was appointed before the
effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991.
On 20 December 1993, complainant moved that the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon reconsider[5] the order of 29 November 1993, in
light of Opinion No. 246, s. 1993 of Director Montesa.
Acting on the motion, Francisco Samala, Graft Investigation Officer II of
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, issued an order[6] on 8
February 1994 granting the motion for reconsideration and recommending
the filing of an information for unlawful appointment (Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code) against Maghirang. The recommendation was duly
approved by Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
In his Order of 30 June 1995,[9] respondent judge denied the motion for
suspension on the ground that: [T]he alleged offense of UNLAWFUL
APPOINTMENT under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code was
committed on May 17, 1989, during [Maghirangs] terms of office from
1989 to 1994 and said accused was again re-elected as Barangay
Chairman during the last Barangay Election of May 9, 1994, hence,
offenses committed during previous term is not a cause for removal; an
order of suspension from office relating to a given term may not be the
basis of contempt with respect to ones (sic) assumption of the same office
under a new term. When the people have elected a man to office, it must
be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct (sic), if he had
been guilty if any.
The prosecution moved for reconsideration[10] of the order, alleging that
the court had confused removal as a penalty in administrative cases and
the temporary removal from office (or suspension) as a means of
preventing the public official, while the criminal case against him is
pending, from exerting undue influence, intimidate (sic) witnesses which
may affect the outcome of the case; the former is a penalty or sanction
whereas the latter is a mere procedural remedy.
In his order of 3 August 1995,[12] respondent denied the motion for
reconsideration.
On 15 October 1996, complainant filed his sworn letter-complaint with the
Office of the Court Administrator. The Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) recommends that this Court hold respondent liable for ignorance of
the law and that he be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. In
support thereof, the OCA makes the following findings and conclusions:
Judge Monzons contention denying complainants Motion for Suspension
because offenses committed during the previous term (is) not a cause for
removal during the present term is untenable. In the case of Rodolfo E.
Aguinaldo vs. Hon. Luis Santos and Melvin Vargas, 212 SCRA 768, the
Court held that the rule is that a public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous
misconduct committed during a prior term, to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no
application to criminal cases x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise, it was specifically declared in the case of Ingco vs. Sanchez, G.R.
No. L-23220, 18 December 1967, 21 SCRA 1292, that The ruling,
therefore, that when the people have elected a man to office it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character and
that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been
guilty of any refers only to an action for removal from office and does not
apply to a criminal case. (Underscoring ours)
Clearly, even if the alleged unlawful appointment was committed during
Maghirangs first term as barangay chairman and the Motion for his
suspension was only filed in 1995 during his second term, his re-election is
not a bar to his suspension as the suspension sought for is in connection
with a criminal case. Respondent’s denial of complainants Motion for
Reconsideration left the complainant with no other judicial remedy. Since a
case for Unlawful Appointment is covered by Summary Procedure,
complainant is prohibited from filing a petition for certiorari, mandamus or
prohibition involving an interlocutory order issued by the court.
Issue: WON the recommendation of OCA finding that the Respondent
judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law is proper.
Ruling: Yes. The findings and conclusions of the Office of the Court
Administrator are in order. However, the penalty
recommended, i.e., reprimand, is too light, in view of the fact that despite
his claim that he has been continuously keeping abreast of legal and
jurisprudential development [sic] in law ever since he passed the Bar
Examinations in 1995, respondent, wittingly or otherwise, failed to recall
that as early as 18 December 1967 in Ingco v. Sanchez,[17] this Court
explicitly ruled that the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the
administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his
previous term of office.
In Aguinaldo v. Santos,[22] this Court stated:
Clearly then, the rule is that a public official cannot be removed from
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application
to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have
committed during the failed coup.
Thus far, no ruling to the contrary has even rippled the doctrine
enunciated in the above-mentioned cases. If respondent has truly been
continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development [sic]
in the law, it was impossible for him to have missed or misread these
cases.
Needless to state, respondent was, in this instance, wanting in the desired
level of mastery of a revered doctrine on a simple issue.
Finally, the last sentence of Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
directs a judge to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of
the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of
arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.
That having been said, we cannot but conclude that the recommended
penalty of reprimand is not commensurate with the misdeed committed. A
fine of P5,000.00, with a warning that a commission of similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely is, at the very least, appropriate,
considering respondent is due for compulsory retirement on 29 November
2000 and that this is his first offense.
WHEREFORE, for incompetence as a result of ignorance of a settled
doctrine interpreting a law, or deliberate disregard of such doctrine in
violation of Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, respondent Judge
Iluminado C. Monzon is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that the commission of similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
RAMIR R. PABLICO, petitioner, vs. ALEJANDRO A.
VILLAPANDO, respondent.
FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan against then Mayor Alejandro Villapando of San
Vicente, Palawan for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the
Constitution for entering into a consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape,
a defeated mayoralty candidate. Complainants argue that this amounted to
appointment to a government position within the prohibited one-year
period under Article IX-B, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
In his answer, Villapando invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the
Department of Justice dated August 21, 1992, stating that the
appointment of a defeated candidate within one year from the election as
a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or
position as prohibited by the Constitution.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found respondent guilty and imposed on
him the penalty of dismissal from service. The Office of the President
affirmed the decision. Vice-mayor Pablico took his oath as municipal mayor
in place of Villapando.
The Court of Appeals declared the decisions of the SP and OP void, and
ordered Pablico to vacate the office.
ISSUE: WON local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President
validly impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local
officials?
HELD: Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. – An elective local official may
be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following
grounds:
x x x x x x
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated above by order of the proper court.
It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the
penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may
be decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et
al., we held that “[t]he Office of the President is without any power to
remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the
proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the
aforequoted Section 60.”
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code, however, adds that – “(b) An elective local official
may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a)
of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government
Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority
whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.” The
disciplining authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.
As held in Salalima, this grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power
to remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the
Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or
regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the
Local Government Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash,
with the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create
a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. (Pablico vs. Villapando,
G.R. No. 147870. July 31, 2002)
1. Recall
FELIPE EVARDONE v. COMELEC
FACTS:
These two (2) consolidated petitions have their origin
in en banc Resolution No. 90-0557 issued by the respondent Commission
on Elections which approved the recommendation of the Election Registrar
of Sulat, Eastern Samar to hold and conduct the signing of the petition for
recall of the incumbent Mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, on 14 July 1990.
Felipe Evardone is the mayor of the Municipality of Sulat,
Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position during the 1988 local
elections. On 14 February 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victorino E. Aclan
and Noel A. Nival filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office
of the Local Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat.
On 10 July 1990, Evardone filed before this Court a petition for prohibition
with urgent prayer for immediate issuance of restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction. On 12 July 1990, this Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order (TRO), effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from the Court, ordering the respondents to cease and
desist from holding the signing of the petition for recall.
On the same day (12 July 1990), the notice of TRO was received by the
Central Office of the respondent COMELEC. But it was only on 15 July
1990 that the field agent of the respondent COMELEC received the
telegraphic notice of the TRO - a day after the completion of the signing
process sought to be temporarily stopped by the TRO.
In an en banc resolution (No. 90-0660) dated 26 July 1990, the
respondent COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern
Samar for being violative of the order (the TRO) of this Court in G.R. No.
94010. Apelado, et al., filed a motion for reconsideration and on 29
August 1990, the respondent COMELEC denied said motion holding that:
"x x x. The critical date to consider is the service or notice of the
Restraining Order on 12 July 1990 upon the principal i.e. the Commission
on Election, and not upon its agent in the field."[1]
Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC by virtue of its
powers under the Constitution and Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local
Government Code) is the main issue. The resolution embodies the general
rules and regulations on the recall of elective provincial, city and municipal
officials.
Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by
Congress. Said Section 3 provides:
"Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide
for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units."
Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local
government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected
government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for
COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case
at bar is premature.
The respondent COMELEC, in its Comment (G.R. No. 94010), avers that:
"The constitutional provision does not refer only to a local government
code which is in futurum but also in esse. It merely sets forth the
guidelines which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the
present Local Government Code. Pending the enactment of the
amendatory law, the existing Local Government Code remains operative.
ISSUE: WON the Resolution by Comelec is valid. Yes
WON Recall can still be done at this time. No
HELD: We find the contention of the respondent COMELEC meritorious.
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all
existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain
operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160
providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the
President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as
provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government
Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the
present case.
"MR. NOLLEDO. Besides, pending the enactment of a new Local
Government Code under the report of the Committee on Amendments and
Transitory Provisions, the former Local Government Code, which is Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 shall continue to be effective until repealed by the
Congress of the Philippines."
Chapter 3 (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism
for recall of local elective officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes the
respondent COMELEC to conduct and supervise the process of and election
on recall and in the exercise of such powers, promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations.
We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent
COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the respondent
COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recall and set the
date for the signing of said petition.
The next issue for resolution is whether or not the TRO issued by this
Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held
pursuant to Resolution No. 2272.
In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of
Recall filed by Apelado, et al. on or about 21 February 1990 as evidenced
by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following up and
determining the outcome of such notice.
The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality
of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of
the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by Election Registrar
Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern
Samar or about 34% signed the petition for recall. As held in Paredes vs.
Executive Secretary[7] there is no turning back the clock.
"The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or
appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based on the
theory that the electorate must maintain a direct and elastic
control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the
idea that a public office is 'burdened' with public' interests and
that the representatives of the people holding public offices are
simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers and
specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in
their respective offices."[8]
Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost
confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.[9] "Loss of
confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a
person's ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the
same electorate."[10] The constituents have made a judgment and their will
to recall the incumbent mayor (Evardone) has already been ascertained
and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held
last 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P.
Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal effect.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the
limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, which states:
"SEC. 55. Who May Be Recalled; Ground for Recall; When Recall
May not be Held. - x x x
(2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of
the official's assumption of office or one year immediately
preceding a regular local election."
The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election
prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII,
Sec. 5 - on the second Monday of May, 1992.[11] Thus, to hold an election
on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election
will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg. 337).
ACCORDINGLY, both petitions are DISMISSED for having become moot
and academic. SO ORDERED.
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MORONG, BATAAN, respondents.
FACTS
In May 11, 1992, Enrique Garcia (petitioner) was elected governor of
Bataan. In the early evening of July 1, some mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the Sangguinang Bayan of the 12 municipalities of Bataan met
at the NPC Compound and the following day, they proceeded to constitute
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRAC) to initiate the recall
election of PETITIONER. They chose Mayor De los Reyes (Mariveles) as
Presiding Officer and Mayor Payumo (Dinalupihan) as Secretary of the
assembly. Vice-Mayor Roque (Limay) moved that a resolution be passed
for therecall of PETITIONER on the ground of “loss of confidence”, which
was “unanimously seconded”. In July 7, PETITIONER filed with COMELEC a
petition to deny due course to Resolution No. 1 alleging failure of PRAC to
comply with the"substantive and procedural requirements" laid down in
Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (LGC).
COMELEC dismiss the petition, schedule recall elections on October 11.
PETITIONER filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of
preliminary injunction to annul COMELEC Resolution (arguments):
a. Sec. 70, LGC unconstitutional because:
(1) the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not
to initiate recall proceedings,
(2) it violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the
political minority to equal protection of law.
b. the proceedings followed by the PRAC in passing Resolution No. 1
suffered from numerous defects, the most fatal of which was thedeliberate
failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-five (65) members of the
assembly.
SC ordered respondents to file Comments, set petition for hearing. After
hearing, granted petition on the narrow ground that thesending of
selective notices to members of the PRAC violated the due process
protection of the Constitution and fatally flawed theenactment of
Resolution No. 1 (and not ruling on alleged constitutional infirmity of
Sec.70).
In accord with the SC Resolution, Mayor De los Reyes AGAIN sent NOTICE
OF SESSION to the members of the PRAC to convene andonce more, PRAC
passed a resolution calling for the recall of PETITIONER. Petitioner filed a
supplemental Petition Petition and Reiteration of Extremely Urgent Motion
presiding for a resolution of theircontention that section 70 of R.A. 7160 is
unconstitutional:
a. the right to recall does not extend merely to the prerogative of the
electorate to reconfirm or withdraw their confidence on theofficial sought
to be recalled at a special election. Such prerogative necessarily includes
the sole and exclusive right to decide onwhether to initiate a recall
proceedings or not
b. in passing Resolution No. 1, the Bataan Preparatory Recall Assembly did
not only initiate the process of recall but had de factorecalled petitioner
Garcia from office, a power reserved to the people alonec.
EPC argument: the local officials constituting the majority party can
constitute itself into a PRA and initiate the recall of a dulyelected provincial
official belonging to the minority party thus rendering ineffectual his
election by popular mandate
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate
recall proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected
local public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection
of the law.
HELD: 1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely
suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on
whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide
for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for
Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure through a system
of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly
given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its
discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall,
whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using
its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an
alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former
mode of initiation by direct action of the people. The legislative records
reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of
initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to
diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the
people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.
2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and
sangguniang members of the municipalities and component cities are
made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level.
Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is
given to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory
recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the elected officials in
the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater probability
is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the
Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official
is loss of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are in the
PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as representatives
of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be
premised on mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our
Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition
parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system.
Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against
local officials belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the
recall process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by
extraneous influences. We held that notice to all the members of the recall
assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The
law also requires a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly
members to convene in session and in a public place. Needless to state,
compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be
no valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by the
COMELEC.
PARAS V. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of
Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election
in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the
registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the
petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the
recall election on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered
voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by
law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of
petitioner's opposition.
To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC
a petition for injunction, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining
order. Thereafter, the trial court lifted the restraining order and dismissed
the petition. The COMELEC then, for the 3rd time, re-scheduled the recall
election; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction.
Petitioner insists that the scheduled recall election is now barred as the SK
election is a regular local election, hence no recall can be had for barely 4
months separate the SK election from the recall election.
ISSUE: Whether the SK election is to be construed as a regular local
election in a recall proceeding.
RULING: The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local
official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b)
construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when
such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is,
during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing with the
petitioner’s interpretation of the phrase regular election to include the SK
election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local
Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by
initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election
which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996
were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local
election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can
be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government
Code.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the
limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next
regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7)
months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot
and academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on
January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby
made permanent.
MALONZO V. COMELEC
FACTS: The Court is called upon to strike down Resolution 96-026, dated
November 18, 1996, of the respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) calling for an Election for the Recall of the Petitioner Reynaldo
O. Malonzo, the incumbent Mayor of Caloocan City.
Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor in the elections held on May 8, 1995,
winning over former Mayor MacarioAsistio, Jr. Barely one year into his
term, petitioner's office as Mayor was put to serious question when on July
7, 1996, 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members
and SangguniangKabataan chairmen, constituting a majority of the
members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, met,
and upon deliberation and election, voted for the approval of Preparatory
Recall Assembly Resolution No. 01-96, expressing loss of confidence in
Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against
him. Together with relevant documents, PRA Resolution No. 01-96 was
filed with the COMELEC for appropriate action. In response, Mayor Malonzo
filed a Petition with the respondent Commission alleging, principally, that
the recall process was deficient in form and substance, and therefore,
illegally initiated. The COMELEC found the petition devoid of merit and
declared the recall proceedings to be in order. Petitioner insists that the
initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the
Liga ng mga Barangays.
ISSUE: Whether or not the the LIGA ng mga Barangay is authorized to
initiate the recall and convene the Preparatory Recall Assembly.
RULING: The barangays are represented in the Liga by the barangay
captains as provided under Section 492 of the Local Government Code. It
also provides that the Kagawad may represent the barangay in the
absence of the barangay chairman."7 The Liga ng mga Barangay is
undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just
so happens that the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga
are the very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of
whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for
the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the record, in
accordance with the existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays and
Sangguniang Barangay members convened and voted as members of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of Caloocan, and not as members
of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall proceedings, therefore, cannot be
denied merit on this ground.
CLAUDIO V. COMELEC
FACTS: Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner in G.R. No. 140560, was the duly
elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed
office on July 1, 1998.
Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several
barangays in Pasay City gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a
petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. On May 19,
1999, at the residence of barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr. in Barangay 11,
Zone 4, Pasay City, several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee
for the purpose of convening the PRA. On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members
of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and
sangguniangkabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-
1999, entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O.
CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. As
scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by
an affidavit of service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor.
Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner, alleging procedural and
substantive defects in the petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER, under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160)
A. The word "recall" in paragraph (b) covers a process which includes the
convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall
resolution.
B. The term "regular local election" in the last clause of paragraph (b)
includes the election period for that regular election or simply the date of
such election.
RULING:
(1) Recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory
recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the
registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the
filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of
such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and
the holding of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in
paragraph (b) of §74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of
which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect
his replacement.
First, §74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled
"Limitations on Recall." On the other hand, §69 provides that "the power
of recall . . . shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local
government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the
power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall
proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in
§74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other
words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election,
excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall
with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of
the voters for a petition for recall.
The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall
election is to be found in the purpose of the limitation itself. There are two
limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall
shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of
the official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place within one
year immediately preceding a regular local election. Hence, in this case, as
long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary
proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first
year in office of a local official.
(2)The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place
within . . . one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election."
Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period,
which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, 10 it could have
expressly said so.
Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during
which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election
may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective
local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period
is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of
May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15
days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as
including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months.
Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the
right of recall which is designed to make local government units "more
responsive and accountable."
2. Discipline Over Local Appointive Officials
MENDEZ V. CSC
Facts: Then Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City Vicente N. Coloyan
filed an administrative complaint against the Froilan A. Mendez (petitioner),
a legal research assistant in the Quezon City Office of the City Attorney, for
Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty, allegedly for having torn off a portion of
a Transfer Certificate of Title from the registry book of Quezon City and for
having pocketed it.
After three months of investigation, then Quezon City Mayor Adelina
Rodriguez dismissed the said complaint against the petitioner for
insufficiency of evidence. Coloyan appealed to the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) which rendered judgment reversing the Mayor’s
decision. Mendez was thus found guilty as charged and dismissed from the
service.
Said decision was affirmed by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on
appeal.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, assailing the reversal of
the city mayor's decision by the MSPB and the CSC on the ground that
Coloyan is not an aggrieved party or "party adversely affected by the
decision" allowed by law to file an appeal. Moreover, the petitioner claimed
that his exoneration by the city mayor is unappealable pursuant to Section
37, paragraph (b) of P.D. 807.
The CSC, however, denied said motion for reconsideration ruling that there
is nothing in the said law which precludes an appeal from the decision of
the disciplining authorities to determine, among others, whether the
decision rendered is supported by the facts on record and the law.
Issue: WON Coloyan is allowed by law to file an appeal.
Ruling: No. It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provision of law.
A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The Philippine Civil
Service Law" shows that said law does not contemplate a review of
decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.
Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:
“The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than
thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in
rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. ... (Emphasis
supplied)”
Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D
805 which contemplates:
“Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected
by the decision ... “
The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the
government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the
purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension,
demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In
the instant case, Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an
aggrieved party because he is not the respondent in the administrative
case below.
Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city mayor,
as head of the city government, is empowered to enforce judgment with
finality on lesser penalties like suspension from work for one month and
forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month against erring employees.
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in
a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against
him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in
this case, there is no occasion for appeal.
MACALINGAG AND CARLOS V. CHANG
Facts: Petitioner Lorinda M. Carlos (Carlos for short, Executive Director,
Bureau of Local Government ) signed a formal administrative charge
approved by petitioner Victor C. Macalincag (Macalincag for short,
Undersecretary of Finance, then acting Secretary ) for dishonesty, neglect
of duty and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service, committed
as follows:
1. That during the 45-day election ban period, before the 1988 local
elections, you disbursed an amount to the Head of Department, in
violation of the Omnibus Election Code;
2. That you (Roberto E. Chang, Respondent) disbursed an amount,
allegedly as financial assistance extended by the municipality to around
400 bereaved families;
3. That you disbursed an amount to cover expenses for merienda of
municipal employees;
4. That in violation of PD 477 and PD 1445, you incurred cash overdrafts in
the General Infrastructure and Trust Funds;
5. That you transferred an amount from the Treasurer/Cashier's safe to
the Realty Tax Division's safe, thus subjecting said municipal funds to
possible loss; and
6. That you continually failed to remit to the Bureau of Treasury the
national collection.
On the same date, petitioner Macalincag issued an Order of Preventive
Suspension against Chang.
The day after, petitioner Macalincag sent a letter to the Governor of Metro
Manila Commission recommending that an Officer-in-Charge be
immediately designated from the ranks of qualified Municipal Treasurers
and Assistant Municipal Treasurers in Metro Manila. By virtue of the said
letter, the Officer-in-Charge, MMC Finance Office furnished respondent
Chang, by ordinary mail, with a copy of the Order of Preventive
Suspension.
Chang filed a petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati against petitioners
Macalincag and Carlos, invoking Section 8 of the recently issued Executive
Order No. 392 entitled "Constituting the Metropolitan Manila Authority,
providing for its powers and functions and for other purposes."
Chang argued that the said Executive Order vested in the President of the
Republic of the Philippines the power to appoint municipal treasurers in
Metro Manila. As the power to suspend and remove a municipal official is
an incident of the power to appoint, he maintained that it is the President
who may suspend or remove him. Thus, Chang claimed that that the
implementation of the questioned suspension order was overtaken by the
issuance the said Executive Order and that the power to discipline is
vested solely on the person who has the power to appoint.
Chang also claimed that a government officer is not suspended until
someone has assumed the post and the officer subject of the suspension
order has ceased performing his official function.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the Order of Preventive
Suspension became effective upon receipt thereof by respondent Chang
and not upon the designation of an officer-in-charge to replace him; that
the Order of Preventive Suspension became effective before the issuance
of Executive Order No. 392 and, therefore, can no longer be enjoined by
reason of the alleged transfer of the power to suspend from the Secretary
of Finance to the President of the Republic of the Philippines and that the
power to suspend and remove municipal officials is not an incident of the
power to appoint.
Issue: WON the Secretary of Finance has jurisdiction to issue an Order of
Preventive Suspension against the acting municipal treasurer of Makati,
Metro Manila.
Ruling: Yes. 1) Order of Preventive Suspension became effective
upon receipt thereof by respondent Chang.
In the questioned decision of the lower court, it was pointed out that in
order that a preventive suspension will be implemented, there are two
steps involved, viz: 1) service of a copy of said order on the respondent
and 2) designation of his replacement. The trial court ruled that until an
acting municipal treasurer is appointed to replace the respondent, the
order of preventive suspension dated October 6, 1989 is incomplete and
cannot be said to have taken effect.
This ruling of the trial court is untenable.
Preventive Suspension is governed by Sec. 41 of P.D. 807 or the Civil
Service Law which provides:
“Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. — The proper disciplining authority may
preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect
in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the
respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from
service (Emphasis supplied)”
It will be noted that under the aforesaid law, designation of the
replacement is not a requirement to give effect to the preventive
suspension.
On the contrary, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, provides in Section 156, Article 5, Chapter 3, Title II
thereof for the automatic assumption of the assistant municipal treasurer
or next in rank officer in case of suspension of the municipal treasurer, to
wit:
“Sec. 156. TEMPORARY DISABILITY. — In the event of inability of the
treasurer to discharge the duties of his office on account of a trip on
official business, absence on leave, sickness, suspension, or other
temporary disability, the assistant municipal treasurer or, in his absence,
the treasury official next in rank in the municipality shall discharge the
duties of the office subject to existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)”
Specifically, it is provided under Section 233(2)of BP 337, that:
Until otherwise provided by law, nothing in this code shall be understood
to amend or repeal the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 824 and BP 20,
and all presidential decrees and issuances relevant to Metropolitan Manila
and the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII.
Accordingly, there appears to be no question that: the Order of Preventive
Suspension of respondent Chang became effective upon his receipt
thereof, which is presumed when he filed a complaint in the trial court
preventing the implementation of such Order of Suspension. Otherwise
stated, the designation of the OFFICER-IN-CHARGE to replace respondent
Chang is immaterial to the effectivity of the latter's suspension. A contrary
view would render nugatory the very purpose of preventive suspension.
2) Implementation of the questioned suspension order was not
overtaken by the issuance the said Executive Order.
Chang argued that by virtue of Executive Order No. 392, it is the President
who may suspend or remove him.
Relative thereto, Sec. 8 of Executive Order No. 392, however, provides:
Sec. 8. All city and municipal treasurers, municipal assessors and their
assistants as well as other officials whose appointment is currently vested
upon the Metropolitan Manila Commission shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Council, subject
to the Civil Service law, rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied).
Earlier, prior to Executive Order No. 392, the power to appoint the
aforesaid public officials was vested in the Provincial Treasurers and
Assessors of the Municipalities concerned, under P.D. No. 477 and later
transferred to the Commissioner of Finance under P.D. No. 921, but under
both decrees, the power of appointment was made subject to Civil Service
Laws and the approval of the Secretary of Finance.
Verily, the intention of the aforesaid legislations to follow the Civil Service
Laws, Rules and Regulations is unmistakable.
Correspondingly, the power to discipline is specifically vested under Sec.
37 of P.D. No. 807 in heads of departments, agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces and chartered cities who have original
jurisdiction to investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary
action. Stated differently, they are the proper disciplining authority referred
to in Sec. 41 of the same law.
The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is unquestionably under the
Department of Finance as provided for in Sec. 3, P.D. No. 477. Hence, the
Secretary of Finance is the proper disciplining authority to issue the
preventive suspension order. More specifically acting Secretary of Finance,
Macalincag, acted within his jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid order.
By and large, even assuming that the power to appoint, includes the
power to discipline as argued by Chang, acting Secretary Macalincag as
Secretary of Finance is an alter ego of the President and therefore, it is
within his authority, as an alter ego, to preventively suspend respondent
Chang.
GARCIA V. PAJARO AND CITY OF DAGUPAN
Facts: Evidence for the petitioner tends to show that petitioner
SEBASTIAN GARCIA, 61, married, employee at the City Treasurers Office,
Dagupan City and resident of Lucao, Dagupan City, has been employee
thereat since 1974 as Revenue Collector.
He was ordered suspended by City Treasurer Juanito Pajaro from 1990 to
1992 and directed the withholding of his salary because of the Formal
Charge filed against him. He resumed work in 1992 as Local Treasury
Officer III. When he was suspended, his position was Local Treasury
Officer and Revenue Officer.
From 1990 up to 1992, he had been reporting for work because he did not
honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer acted as the
complainant, investigator and judge and there was no complaint against
him from the Office of the City Mayor. He did not believe in the Order; he
did not submit himself for investigation.
He was not paid his salary because of the suspension order which caused
his sleepless nights, his two (2) children stopped schooling, he has to beg
from his relatives. He has a wife with four (4) children in college, one in
Commerce, another taking up Dentistry. During the 1990 earthquake,
there was calamity loan granted to employees but he could not avail of it
because the City Treasurer would not approve the loan. He is asking
P1,000,000.00 for his mental anguish and sufferings. From July to October,
1987 the City Treasurer refused to give him his COLA, differential, cash
gift, salary and mid-year bonus up to the present.
Issue: WON the city treasurer of Dagupan can discipline petitioner.
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner claims that the officer empowered to institute
disciplinary proceedings against him is the city mayor of Dagupan -- not
the city treasurer.He further asserts that under Section 78 of the Local
Government Code of 1983, the city treasurer does not have the power to
discipline him.
We are not persuaded.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that under the old and the present
Local Government Codes, appointive officers and employees of local
government units are covered by the Civil Service Law; and such rules,
regulations and other issuances duly promulgated pursuant thereto, unless
otherwise specified. Moreover, the investigation and the adjudication of
administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees,
as well as their suspension and removal, shall be in accordance with the
Civil Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws.
The Administrative Code of 1987,-- specifically Book V on the civil service -
- is the primary law governing appointive officials and employees in the
government. This Code enumerates the grounds for disciplining them.
They may be removed or dismissed summarily (1) [w]hen the charge is
serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) [w]hen the respondent is a
recidivist x x x; and (3) [w]hen the respondent is notoriously undesirable.
Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; due
process in the administrative context cannot be fully equated with that in
the strict judicial sense.
The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to heads of departments, agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On the other hand, the power to
commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or
employee is granted by Section 34 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a department,
the head of office of equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit,
the chief of an agency, the regional director or a person with a sworn
written complaint.
Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu propio, disciplinary
proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee. Local
Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85, which was issued by the
Ministry of Finance on March 27, 1985, authorized the minister (now
secretary) of finance, the regional director, and head of a local treasury or
an assessment office to start administrative disciplinary action against
officers or employees subordinate to them.
In the case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority
referred to in Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987. The term
agency refers to any of the various units of the government including a
department, a bureau, an office, an instrumentality, a government-owned
or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the head of the Office of the
Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue collector, was an officer
under him. Thus, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who
could investigate petitioner and issue a preventive suspension order
against him.
Petitioners contention that it is only the city mayor who may discipline him
is not persuasive. Section 455 (b-1-x) of the 1991 Local Government Code
states that the city mayor may cause to be instituted administrative or
judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the city. This rule is
not incongruent with the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code, which
authorizes the heads of agencies to discipline subordinate employees.
Likewise, the old Local Government Code does not vest in city mayors the
sole power to discipline and to institute criminal or administrative actions
against any officers or employees under their jurisdiction. In fact, there is
no provision under the present Local Government Code expressly
rescinding the authority of the Department of Finance to exercise
disciplinary authority over its employees.By the same token, there is
nothing that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint against
petitioner.
4. Practice of Profession
JAVELLA V. DILG
Facts:
Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City,
Negros Occidental. City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed
Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of
Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38
dated June 10, 1980 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58
and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of
authority.
Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of
the City Council or SanggunianPanglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by
profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without
securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department
of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38
in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same
department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero
and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C.
Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with
Damages" putting him in public ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as
counsel in several criminal and civil cases in the city, without prior
authority of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 80-38
On September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to
continue his practice of law. And on the same date, Sec. Santos replied in
affirmative provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with his official functions.
Javellana then filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against
him on the ground mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and
90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and
exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. However the said
Motion to Dismiss was denied by DILG.
Consequently, Javellana filed this petition for certiorari praying that DLG
Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the new
Local Government Code (RA 7160) be declared unconstitutional and null
void.
Issues:
1. Should Atty. Javellana be held administratively liable.
2. WON DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90
of the new Local Government Code (RA 7160) are unconstitutional.
Held:
1. Yes.
As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions
and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations
entrusted to their jurisdiction. With respect to the present case, we find no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG
Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss the administrative charge against him.
In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating
or incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed
with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is
a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and
Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against
the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner
Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer
Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government.
By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to
prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner
violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of
RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private
practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests
adverse to the government.
2. No.
As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions
and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations
entrusted to their jurisdiction (Santiago vs. Deputy Executive Secretary,
192 SCRA 199, citing Cuerdo vs. COA, 166 SCRA 657). With respect to the
present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent, Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in
issuing the questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss the administrative charge against him.
In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating
or incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed
with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is
a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and
Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against
the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner
Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer
Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government.
By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to
prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner
violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of
RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private
practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests
adverse to the government.
5. Local Boards
OSEA V. MALAYA
Facts:
Dr. Osea averred that she was appointed as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, by then Secretary
Ricardo T. Gloria of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, upon
the endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur.
Despite the recommendation of Secretary Gloria, President Fidel V. Ramos
appointed Dr. Malaya to the position of Schools Division Superintendent
of Camarines Sur. The appointment was made without prior consultation
with the Provincial School Board, in violation of Section 99 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. Hence, Dr. Osea filed a protest before CSC and
prayed prayed that Dr. Malaya’s appointment be recalled and set aside for
being null and void.
CSC – dismissed Dr. Osea’s protest. The Civil Service Commission found
that on September 13, 1996, President Ramos appointed Dr. Malaya, who
was then Officer-in-Charge Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City,
as Schools Division Superintendent without any specific division. Thus, Dr.
Malaya performed the functions of Schools Division Superintendent
in Iriga City. Subsequently, on November 3, 1997, Secretary Gloria
designated Dr. Malaya as Schools Division Superintendent
of Camarines Sur, and Dr. Osea as Schools Division Superintendent
of Iriga City.
In dismissing petitioners protest, the Civil Service Commission held that
Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 contemplates a situation
where the Department of Education, Culture and Sports issues the
appointments, whereas Dr Malaya’s appointment was made by no less
than the President, in the exercise of his appointing power. Moreover, the
designation of Dr. Malaya as Schools Division Superintendent
of Camarines Sur and of Dr. Osea as Schools Division Superintendent
of Iriga City were in the nature of reassignments, in which case
consultation with the local school board was unnecessary.
CA – affirmed CSC
Issue:
WON Dr. Malaya’s appointment is null and void.
Held:
No.
Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies to appointments
made by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. This is because
at the time of the enactment of the Local Government Code, schools
division superintendents were appointed by the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports to specific division or location. In 1994, the Career
Executive Service Board issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of
1994, placing the positions of schools division superintendent and assistant
schools division superintendent within the career executive
service.Consequently, the power to appoint persons to career executive
service positions was transferred from the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports to the President. The appointment may not be specific
as to location. The prerogative to designate the appointees to their
particular stations was vested in the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports Secretary, pursuant to the exigencies of the service, as provided in
Department of Education, Culture and Sports Order No. 75, Series of 1996.
In the case at bar, the appointment issued by President Ramos in favor of
respondent to the Schools Division Superintendent position on September
3, 1996 did not specify her station. It was Secretary Gloria who, in a
Memorandum dated November 3, 1997, assigned and designated
respondent to the Division of Camarines Sur, and petitioner to the Division
of Iriga City.
We agree with the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals that,
under the circumstances, the designation of respondent as Schools
Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case of
appointment. Her designation partook of the nature of a reassignment
from Iriga City, where she previously exercised her functions as Officer-in-
Charge-Schools Division Superintendent, to Camarines Sur. Clearly,
therefore, the requirement in Section 99 of the Local Government Code of
1991 of prior consultation with the local school board, does not apply. It
only refers to appointments made by the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports. Such is the plain meaning of the said law.
The plain meaning rule or verba legis in statutory construction is thus
applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.
Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment
may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of
an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in
security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at
pleasure because of the nature of his office.
On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee
from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency
which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not
require the issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a designation
connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an incumbent
official.
Petitioner asserts a vested right to the position of Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines Sur, citing her endorsement by the Provincial
School Board. Her qualification to the office, however, lacks one essential
ingredient, i.e., her appointment thereto. While she was recommended by
Secretary Gloria to President Ramos for appointment to the position of
Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, the recommendation
was not acted upon by the President. Petitioners designation as Officer-in-
Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, was expressly made
subject to further advice from the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports. Thus, her designation was temporary. In fact, there was a need to
recommend her to the President for appointment in a permanent
capacity. Inasmuch as she occupied her position only temporarily,
petitioner can be transferred or reassigned to other positions without
violating her right to security of tenure. Indeed, petitioner has no vested
right to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.
Municipal Contracts
A. Corporate Powers
FELICIANO V. COA
Facts:
A Special Audit Team from COA Regional Office No. VIII audited the
accounts of Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD). Subsequently,
LMWD received a letter from COA dated 19 July 1999 requesting payment
of auditing fees. As General Manager of LMWD, petitioner sent a reply
dated 12 October 1999 informing COAs Regional Director that the water
district could not pay the auditing fees. Petitioner cited as basis for his
action Sections 6 and 20 of Presidential Decree 198 (PD 198) as well as
Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758 (RA 6758). The Regional Director
referred petitioners reply to the COA Chairman on 18 October 1999.
On 19 October 1999, petitioner wrote COA through the Regional Director
asking for refund of all auditing fees LMWD previously paid to COA.
On 16 March 2000, petitioner received COA Chairman Celso D. Gangans
Resolution dated 3 January 2000 denying his requests. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration on 31 March 2000, which COA denied on 30
January 2001.
On 13 March 2001, petitioner filed this instant petition. Attached to the
petition were resolutions of the Visayas Association of Water Districts
(VAWD) and the Philippine Association of Water Districts (PAWD)
supporting the petition.
COA - denied petitioners request for COA to stop charging auditing fees as
well as petitioners request for COA to refund all auditing fees already paid
Issues:
1. Whether a Local Water District (LWD) created under PD 198, as
amended, is a government-owned or controlled corporation
subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA
2. Whether Section 20 of PD 198, as amended, prohibits COAs
certified public accountants from auditing local water districts;
and
3. Whether Section 18 of RA 6758 prohibits the COA from charging
government-owned and controlled corporations auditing fees.
Held:
1. Yes.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Petitioner theorizes that what PD 198 created was the Local Waters
Utilities Administration (LWUA) and not the LWDs. Petitioner claims that
LWDs are created pursuant to and not created directly by PD 198. Thus,
petitioner concludes that PD 198 is not an original charter that would place
LWDs within the audit jurisdiction of COA as defined in Section 2(1), Article
IX-D of the Constitution. Petitioner elaborates that PD 198 does not create
LWDs since it does not expressly direct the creation of such entities, but
only provides for their formation on an optional or voluntary basis.
Petitioner adds that the operative act that creates an LWD is the approval
of the Sanggunian Resolution as specified in PD 198.
COURT RULING:
The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to
private corporations created under a general law. The second refers to
government-owned or controlled corporations created by special charters.
In accordance with Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution, Congress
cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special
charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations
may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must
necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations
created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under
existing laws, that general law is the Corporation Code, except that the
Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or
controlled corporations through special charters. Since private corporations
cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create
corporations with special charters only if such corporations are
government-owned or controlled.
Obviously, LWDs are not private corporations because they are not created
under the Corporation Code. LWDs are not registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
From the foregoing pronouncement, it is clear that what has been
excluded from the coverage of the CSC are those corporations created
pursuant to the Corporation Code. Significantly, petitioners are not
created under the said code, but on the contrary, they were
created pursuant to a special law and are governed primarily by
its provision
LWDs exist by virtue of PD 198, which constitutes their special
charter. Since under the Constitution only government-owned or controlled
corporations may have special charters, LWDs can validly exist only if they
are government-owned or controlled. To claim that LWDs are private
corporations with a special charter is to admit that their existence is
constitutionally infirm.
Sections 6 and 25 of PD 198 provide:
Section 6. Formation of District. This Act is the source of
authorization and power to form and maintain a district. For
purposes of this Act, a district shall be considered as a quasi-
public corporation performing public service and supplying public
wants. As such, a district shall exercise the powers, rights and
privileges given to private corporations under existing laws, in
addition to the powers granted in, and subject to such restrictions
imposed, under this Act.
(a) The name of the local water district, which shall include the name of
the city, municipality, or province, or region thereof, served by said
system, followed by the words Water District.
(b) A description of the boundary of the district. In the case of a city or
municipality, such boundary may include all lands within the city or
municipality. A district may include one or more municipalities, cities or
provinces, or portions thereof.
(c) A statement completely transferring any and all waterworks and/or
sewerage facilities managed, operated by or under the control of such city,
municipality or province to such district upon the filing of resolution
forming the district.
(d) A statement identifying the purpose for which the district is formed,
which shall include those purposes outlined in Section 5 above.
(e) The names of the initial directors of the district with the date of
expiration of term of office for each.
(f) A statement that the district may only be dissolved on the grounds
and under the conditions set forth in Section 44 of this Title.
(g) A statement acknowledging the powers, rights and obligations as set
forth in Section 36 of this Title.
Nothing in the resolution of formation shall state or infer that the local
legislative body has the power to dissolve, alter or affect the district
beyond that specifically provided for in this Act.
If two or more cities, municipalities or provinces, or any combination
thereof, desire to form a single district, a similar resolution shall be
adopted in each city, municipality and province.
x xx
Sec. 25. Authorization. The district may exercise all the powers
which are expressly granted by this Title or which are necessarily
implied from or incidental to the powers and purposes herein
stated. For the purpose of carrying out the objectives of this Act, a district
is hereby granted the power of eminent domain, the exercise thereof shall,
however, be subject to review by the Administration. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, LWDs exist as corporations only by virtue of PD 198,
which expressly confers on LWDs corporate powers. Section 6 of PD
198 provides that LWDs shall exercise the powers, rights and privileges
given to private corporations under existing laws.Without PD 198, LWDs
would have no corporate powers. Thus, PD 198 constitutes the special
enabling charter of LWDs. The ineluctable conclusion is that LWDs are
government-owned and controlled corporations with a special charter.
Furthermore, The Local Government Code does not vest in the
Sangguniang Bayan the power to create corporations. What the Local
Government Code empowers the Sangguniang Bayan to do is to provide
for the establishment of a waterworks system subject to existing laws. The
Sangguniang Bayan may establish a waterworks system only in accordance
with the provisions of PD 198. The Sangguniang Bayan has no power to
create a corporate entity that will operate its waterworks system. However,
the Sangguniang Bayan may avail of existing enabling laws, like PD 198, to
form and incorporate a water district.
If LWDs are neither GOCCs with original charters nor GOCCs without
original charters, then they would fall under the term agencies or
instrumentalities of the government and thus still subject to COAs audit
jurisdiction. However, the stark and undeniable fact is that the government
owns LWDs. Section 45[27] of PD 198 recognizes government ownership of
LWDs when Section 45 states that the board of directors may dissolve an
LWD only on the condition that another public entity has acquired the
assets of the district and has assumed all obligations and liabilities
attached thereto. The implication is clear that an LWD is a public and not a
private entity.
In virtue of the forgoing, LWD being a GOCC with an original charter, COA
have the power and authority to audit GOCC with an original charter.
2. No. Section 20 of PD 198 declared unconstitutional.
Section 20 of PD 198 provides:
Sec. 20. System of Business Administration. The Board shall, as soon as
practicable, prescribe and define by resolution a system of business
administration and accounting for the district, which shall be patterned
upon and conform to the standards established by the
Administration. Auditing shall be performed by a certified public
accountant not in the government service. The Administration may,
however, conduct annual audits of the fiscal operations of the district to be
performed by an auditor retained by the Administration. Expenses incurred
in connection therewith shall be borne equally by the water district
concerned and the Administration. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 20 of PD 198 cannot prevail over the Constitution. No
amount of clever legislation can exclude GOCCs like LWDs from COAs audit
jurisdiction. Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution outlaws any scheme
or devise to escape COAs audit jurisdiction, thus:
Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or
its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds,
from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
In addition, the framers of the Constitution added Section 3, Article IX-D of
the Constitution precisely to annul provisions of Presidential Decrees, like
that of Section 20 of PD 198, that exempt GOCCs from COA audit.
Thus, SC ruled that the second sentence of Section 20 of PD 198 is
unconstitutional since it violates Sections 2(1) and 3, Article IX-D of the
Constitution.
3. No.
Section 18 of RA 6758 states:
Sec. 18. Additional Compensation of Commission on Audit Personnel and of
other Agencies. In order to preserve the independence and integrity of the
Commission on Audit (COA), its officials and employees are prohibited from
receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments
from any government entity, local government unit, government-owned or
controlled corporations, and government financial institutions, except
those compensation paid directly by COA out of its appropriations
and contributions.
The Supreme Court ruled that Petitioner’s contention has no basis. Section
18 of RA 6758 prohibits COA personnel from receiving any kind of
compensation from any government entity except compensation paid
directly by COA out of its appropriations and
contributions. Thus, RA 6758 itself recognizes an exception to the
statutory ban on COA personnel receiving compensation from GOCCs.
Municipal Liability
A. Liability on Contracts
1. Ultra Vires Act
SAN DIEGO vs MUNICIPALITY OF NAUJAN
FACTS: Following a public bidding conducted by the municipality of
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro for the lease of its municipal waters, Resolution
46, series of 1947 was passed by the municipal council thereof awarding
the concession of the Butas River and the Naujan Lake to the highest
bidder Bartolome San Diego. Consequently, a contract was entered into
between the said San Diego and the municipality, stipulating that for a
period of five (5) years the former was to be the lessee of "the exclusive
privilege of erecting fish corrals along the Butas River beginning from its
junction with the San Agustin River up to the Naujan Lake itself."
Subsequently, the lessee requested for the reduction of their annual rental
which was granted by the Municipality by virtue of Resolution 59. Likewise,
the lessee requested for a five-year extension of the original lease period,
which the Municipality also granted by virtue of Resolution 222. Therafter,
the municipal council of Naujan, this time composed of a new set of
members, adopted Resolution 3, series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222,
series of 1951. On the same date, the new council also passed Resolution
11, revoking Resolution 229 of the old council which confirmed the
extension of the lease period. The lessee requested for reconsideration and
recall of Resolution 3, on the ground, among others, that it violated the
contract executed between him and the municipality. The request,
however, was not granted.
The lessee instituted this proceedings in the court below seeking to have
Resolution 3, series of 1952, of the municipal council of Naujan, declared
null and void, for being unconstitutional, and praying for an order enjoining
the defendant municipality from conducting a public bidding for the leasing
of the Naujan fisheries to any person. The defendant asserted the validity
of Resolution 3, series of 1951, alleging by the way of special defense that
the resolution authorizing the original lease contract, reducing the lease
rentals and renewing the lease are null and void for not having been
passed in accordance with law.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment upholding the validity of the
lease contract, as well at is extension, and declaring Resolution 3, series of
1952, null and void. The municipality of Naujan has taken this appeal.
ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 3, series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222,
series of 1951, of the municipal council of Naujan is valid
HELD: Yes. The law (Sec. 2323 of the Revised Administrative Code)
requires that when the exclusive privilege of fishery or the right to conduct
a fish-breeding ground is granted to a private party, the same shall be let
to the highest bidder in the same manner as is being done in exploiting a
ferry, a market or a slaughterhouse belonging to the municipality. The
requirement of competitive bidding is for the purpose of inviting
competition and to guard against favoritism, fraud and corruption in the
letting of fishery privileges.
Hence, there is no doubt that the original lease contract in this case was
awarded to the highest bidder, but the reduction of the rental and the
extension of the term of the lease appear to have been granted without
previous public bidding. Thus, it is the opinion of the Court that the said
agreement executed and entered into without previous public bidding, is
null and void, and cannot adversely affect the rights of third parties and of
the public in general. As observed by the Court, when a formality observed
before the original contract was awarded, with more reason should the
rule requiring such public bidding be strickly applied in the instant case
where no such authority to alter or amend the terms of the contract was
reserved.
Furthermore, it has been ruled that statutes requiring public bidding apply
to amendments of any contract already executed in compliance with the
law where such amendments alter the original contract in some vital and
essential particular. Inasmuch as the period in a lease is a vital and
essential particular to the contract, we believe that the extension of the
lease period in this case, which was granted without the essential requisite
of public bidding, is not in accordance with law. And it follows the
Resolution 222, series of 1951, and the contract authorized thereby,
extending the original five-year lease to another five years are null and
void as contrary to law and public policy.
Also, the lower court, in holding that the defendant-appellant municipality
has been estopped from assailing the validity of the contract into which it
entered on December 23, 1951, seems to have overlooked the general rule
that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as against a municipal
corporation to validate a contract which it has no power to make or which
it is authorized to make only under prescribed conditions, within prescribed
limitations, or in a prescribed mode or manner, although the corporation
has accepted the benefits thereof and the other party has fully performed
his part of the agreement, or has expended large sums in preparation for
performance. As pointed out above, "public biddings are held for the best
protection of the public and to give the public the best possible advantages
by means of open competition between the bidders." Thus, contracts
requiring public bidding affect public interest, and to change them without
complying with that requirement would indeed be against public policy.
Hence, the Resolution passed and adopted by the Municipality of Naujan
extending the period of the contract and reducing the rental was declared
as null and void.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALOLOS vs RIVERA
FACTS: The municipality of Malolos, Bulacan, called for bids for the supply
of road construction materials to repair the road of the municipality. Herein
petitioners Rivera bid was the lowest. Subsequently, the acting municipal
treasurer informed the petitioner that the contract had been awarded to
him and requested him to call at his office for the execution of the
contract, which was likewise signed by the Mayor. The contract stipulates
that the petitioner was to furnish and deliver to the municipality of Malolos
2,700 cubic meters of crushed adobe stone (cascajo) and 1,400 cubic
meters of gravel. In compliance with the contract, the petitioner delivered
crushed adobe stone and gravel to the municipality at the places
designated by the municipal mayor. Thereafter, petitioner requested for
the payment of his deliveries but the municipality failed to pay him.
Thus, petitioner filed a complaint against the municipality of Malolos in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan to collect the sum of money. However,
the court dismissed the case. Hence, petitioner sought the intervention of
the Presidential Complaints and Committee, which forwarded the
petitioner's claim on the ground that as there was no sum of money
appropriated to meet the obligation incurred before the execution of the
contract, as required by section 607 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the said contract is void, as provided in section 608 of the same Code; and
that even if there was such sum appropriated to meet such obligation, the
alleged deliveries of crushed adobe stone and gravel could no longer be
verified by the Provincial Auditor of Bulacan or his representative. The
petitioner contends that the respondent should not be allowed to invoke
legal technicalities to delay or refuse payment after its municipal council
has acknowledged the indebtedness, because the respondent municipality
had received an annual allotment or a certain percentage of the amount
collected under the provisions of Act No. 3992, known as the Motor Vehicle
Law, out of which it could pay said indebtedness, and that there is no
issue as to the validity of the contract entered into and by and between
the petitioner and the respondent, nor is there any question as to delivery
by the petitioner and receipt by the respondent of the road construction
materials.
ISSUE: WON the Contract between Rivera and the Municipality was valid,
hence, petitioners Rivera are entitled to the sum of money to be paid by
the Municipality.
HELD: No. The Court held that if If the law requires that before a contract
involving the expenditure of P2,000 or more may be entered into or
authorized, the municipal treasurer must certify to the officer entering into
such contracts that funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose
and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract-is available
for expenditure on account thereof; and that purported contract entered
into contrary to the requirements just stated is wholly void, the petitioner's
claim that there is no longer any question as to the validity of the contract
entered into by and between the petitioner and the municipal mayor of
Malolos is not correct.
The Court further held that the Auditor General was correct in denying the
petitioner's claim. Section 73, Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the Motor
Vehicle Law, as amended by section 2, Republic Act No. 314, invoked by
the petitioner, merely allocates 10 per cent of the money collected under
its provisions to the road and bridge funds of the different municipalities in
proportion to population as shown in the latest available census, for the
repair, maintenance and construction of municipal roads. This alone is not
sufficient appropriation and authority to disburse part of the 10 per cent
collected under the Motor Vehicle Law for the purpose of paying the claim
of the petitioner.
present action against defendant-appellee in his personal capacity
pursuant to the said provision.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, stating that inasmuch as in the
previous case the contract entered into between appellant and the
Municipality of Malolos had been declared null and void by this Court, "it
cannot produce any legal effect for which thereafter no recovery can be
made."
ISSUE: WON the trial court was correct in dismissing the case reasoning
that the Contract between Rivera and Maclang produced no legal effects
since it has been declared as null and void by the Court.
HELD: No, the dismissal is erroneous. The Court’s ruling in the previous
case is that the contract was null and void visa-vis the Municipality of
Malolos, by reason of non-compliance with the requirement of section 607
of the Revised Administrative Code, which states that "except in the case
of a contract for supplies to be carried in stock, no contract involving the
expenditure by any province, municipality, chartered city, or municipal
district of two thousand pesos or more shall be entered into or authorized
until the treasurer of the political division concerned shall have certified to
the officer entering into such contract that funds have been duly
appropriated for such purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the
proposed contract is available for expenditure on account thereof."
It should be noted that the present action is against defendant-appellee in
his personal capacity on the strength of section 608 of the same code,
which provides as follows:
SEC. 608. Void contract — Liability of officer. — A purported contract
entered into contrary to the requirements of the next preceding section
hereof shall be wholly void, and the officer assuming to make such
contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for
any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been
wholly between private parties.
The position of defendant-appellee, as the officer who signed the contract
with appellant in violation of section 607, comes squarely under the
provision just quoted. His liability is personal, as it the transaction had
been entered into by him as a private party. We take it that the intention
of the law in this respect is to ensure that public officers entering into
transactions with private individuals calling for the expenditure of public
funds observe a high degree of caution so that the government may not
be the victim of ill-advised or improvident action by those assuming to
represent it.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and defendant-appellee is
ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum P19,235.00, with legal interest
from the date the complaint was filed, and costs.
B. Liability on Torts (Quasi-delict)
PALAFOX ET. AL. VS. PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE

Moneys collected under the provisions of this Act shall be deposited in a

special trust account in the National Treasury to constitute the Highway
Special Fund, which shall be apportioned and expended in accordance with
the provisions of the Philippine Highway Act of nineteen hundred and fifty-
three. MENDOZA VS. DE LEON

Section 608 of the Revised Administrative Code affords the petitioner a

remedy. But they cannot claim from the funds of the Municipality.

FERNANDO ET. A. VS. CA AND THE CITY OF DAVAO

RIVERA vs MACLANG
(connected to sa Malolos vs Rivera)

FACTS: The municipality of Malolos called for bids for furnishing and
delivering materials to be used in the maintenance and repair of barrio
roads. Appellant won in the bidding and was asked by the Municipal
Treasurer to come to his office for execution of the corresponding contract.
The contract was signed by appellant and by defendant-appellee Carlo P. TUZON AND MAPAGU VS. CA AND JUARADO
Maclang in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Malolos. Pursuant thereto
appellant subsequently delivered to the municipality gravel and adobe
stones. Therafter, the municipal council of Malolos passed a resolution
approving the contract, but in spite of repeated demands by appellant the
price of the materials was not paid. Hence, appellant sought the
intervention of the Presidential Complaint and Action Commission, which
referred the matter to the General Auditing Office. That office turned down
the claim for payment, whereupon appellant filed in this Court a petition
TORIO VS. FONTANILLA
for review. Court sustained the action of the General Auditing Office and
held that the contract in question was void as far as the municipal
government of Malolos was concerned on the ground that no money had
been appropriated to meet the obligation prior to the execution of the
contract, as required by section 607, Revised Administrative Code.
However, in the same decision this Court indicated that section 608 of the
same Code afforded appellant a remedy. Consequently, he filed the