1.DE LIMA VS. GUERRERO Pursuant to DOJ Department Order No.
Pursuant to DOJ Department Order No. 790, the four cases were consolidated and
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
For consideration is the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and Status Quo Ante Order1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Senator Leila De Lima. In it, petitioner assails the following orders and warrant
issued by respondent judge Hon. Juanita Guerrero of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, in Criminal Case No. 17-165,
entitled "People vs. Leila De Lima, et al.:" (1) the Order dated February 23, 2017
finding probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest against petitioner De
Lima; (2) the Warrant of Arrest against De Lima also dated February 23, 2017; (3)
the Order dated February 24, 2017 committing the petitioner to the custody of the
PNP Custodial Center; and finally, (4) the supposed omission of the respondent
judge to act on petitioner's Motion to Quash, through which she questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC.2
Antecedents
The facts are undisputed. The Senate and the House of Representatives
conducted several inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at
the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of
their testimonies.3 These legislative inquiries led to the filing of the following
complaints with the Department of Justice:
a) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00313, entitled "Volunteers against Crime and
Corruption (VACC), represented by Dante Jimenez vs. Senator Leila M.
De Lima, et al.;"
b) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00315, entitled "Reynaldo Esmeralda and Ruel
Lasala vs. Senator Leila De Lima, et al.;"
c) NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00331, entitled "Jaybee Nifio Sebastian,
represented by his wife Roxanne Sebastian, vs. Senator Leila M De Lima,
et al.;" and
d) NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00336, entitled "National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) vs. Senator Leila M. De Lima, et al. "4
the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors (DOJ Panel),5 headed by Senior Assistant State
Prosecutor Peter Ong, was directed to conduct the requisite preliminary
investigation.6
The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing on December 2, 2016,7 wherein
the petitioner, through her counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Immediately
Endorse the Cases to the Office of the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the
Panel of Prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice ("Omnibus Motion"). 8 In the
main, the petitioner argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has the exclusive
authority and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints against her. Further, alleging
evident partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel, the petitioner contended that the
DOJ prosecutors should inhibit themselves and refer the complaints to the Office
of the Ombudsman.
A hearing on the Omnibus Motion was conducted on December 9, 2016,9 wherein
the complainants, YACC, Reynaldo Esmeralda (Esmeralda) and Ruel Lasala
(Lasala), filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to the Omnibus Motion. 10
On December 12, 2016, petitioner, in turn, interposed a Reply to the Joint
Comment/Opposition filed by complainants VACC, Esmeralda and Lasala. In
addition, petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Motion to First Resolve Pending
Incident and to Defer Further Proceedings. 11
During the hearing conducted on December 21, 2016, petitioner manifested that
she has decided not to submit her counter-affidavit citing the pendency of her two
motions.12 The DOJ Panel, however, ruled that it will not entertain belatedly filed
counter-affidavits, and declared all pending incidents and the cases as submitted
for resolution. Petitioner moved for but was denied reconsideration by the DOJ
Panel.13
On January 13, 2017, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Prohibition and Certiorari14assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the
complaints against her. The petitions, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 149097 and CA-
G.R. No. SP No. 149385, are currently pending with the Special 6th Division of the
appellate court.15Meanwhile, in the absence of a restraining order issued by the
Court of Appeals, the DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary
investigation16 and, in its Joint Resolution dated February 14,
2017,17 recommended the filing of Informations against petitioner De Lima.
Accordingly, on February 17, 2017, three Informations were filed against petitioner
De Lima and several co-accused before the RTC ofMuntinlupa City. One of the
Infonnations was docketed as Criminal Case No. 17-16518 and raffled off to Branch
204, presided by respondent judge. This Information charging petitioner for
violation of Section 5 in relation to Section (jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, contained the following averments:
That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Leila M. De Lima, being then the Secretary of the Department of Justice,
and accused Rafael Marcos Z. Rages, being then the Officer-in-Charge of the
Bureau of Corrections, by taking advantage of their public office, conspiring and
confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then an employee of the
Department of Justice detailed to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or
influence over inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal
drug trading, in the following manner: De Lima and Ragos, with the use of their
power, position, and authority, demand, solicit and extort money from the high
profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the senatorial bid of De Lima in
the May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not being lawfully
authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones and other electronic
devices, did then and there willfully and unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous
drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, through Ragos and Dayan, the
proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos
on 24 November 2012, Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012,
and One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos weekly "tara" each from the
high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison.19
On February 20, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash,20mainly raising the
following: the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner;
the DOJ Panel lacks authority to file the Information; the Information charges more
than one offense; the allegations and the recitals of facts do not allege the corpus
delicti of the charge; the Information is based on testimonies of witnesses who are
not qualified to be discharged as state witnesses; and the testimonies of these
witnesses are hearsay.21
On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently
assailed Order 22finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against De Lima and her co-accused. The Order stated, viz.:
After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case by the Department of
Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable cause for the issuance of
Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS
Z. RAGOS and RONNIE P ALISOC DAYAN.
WHEREFORE, let Warrants of Arrest be issued against the abovementioned
accused.
SO ORDERED.23
Accordingly, the questioned Warrant of Arrest dated February 23, 2017 ,24 which
contained no recommendation for bail, was issued against petitioner.
On February 24, 2017, the PNP Investigation and Detection Group served
the Warrant of Arrest on petitioner and the respondent judge issued the assailed
February 24, 2017 Order,25 committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP
Custodial Center.
On February 27, 2017, petitioner repaired to this court via the present petition,
praying for the following reliefs:
a. Granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Order dated 23
February 2017, the Warrant of Arrest dated the same date, and the Order dated 24
February 2017 of the Regional Trial Court - Branch 204, Muntinlupa City, in
Criminal Case No. 17-165 entitled People of the Philippines versus Leila M De
Lima, et al.;
b. Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge from
conducting further proceedings until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved
with finality;
c. Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to the proceedings; and
d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior to the
issuance of the Order and Warrant of Arrest, both dated February 23, 201 7,
thereby recalling both processes and restoring petitioner to her liberty and
freedom.26
On March 9, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the
respondents, interposed its Comment to the petition.27 The OSG argued that the
petition should be dismissed as De Lima failed to show that she has no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy. Further, the OSG posited that the petitioner did not
observe the hierarchy of courts and violated the rule against forum shopping. On
substantive grounds, the OSG asserted inter alia that the RTC has jurisdiction over
the offense charged against the petitioner, that the respondent judge observed the
constitutional and procedural rules, and so did not commit grave abuse of
discretion, in the issuance of the assailed orders and warrant.28
On petitioner's motion, the Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the
significant issues raised. The Court then heard the parties in oral arguments on
March 14, 21, and 28, 2017.29
In the meantime, the OSG filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 2017,30 claiming
that petitioner falsified the juratsappearing in the: (1) Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping page of her petition; and (2) Affidavit of Merit in support of
her prayer for injunctive relief. The OSG alleged that while
the advertedjurats appeared to be notarized by a certain Atty. Maria Cecille C.
Tresvalles-Cabalo on February 24, 2017, the guest logbook 31 in the PNP Custodial
Center Unit in Camp Crame for February 24, 2017 does not bear the name of Atty.
Tresvalles-Cabalo. Thus, so the OSG maintained, petitioner De Lima did not
actually appear and swear before the notary public on such date in Quezon City,
contrary to the allegations in the jurats. For the OSG, the petition should therefore
be dismissed outright for the falsity committed by petitioner De Lima.
In compliance with an Order of this Court, petitioner filed the Affidavit of Atty. Maria
Cecille C. Tresvalles-Cabalo dated March 20, 201732 to shed light on the
allegations of falsity in petitioner'sjurats.
The parties simultaneously filed their respective Memoranda on April 17, 2017.33
The Issues
From the pleadings and as delineated in this Court's Advisory dated March 10,
201734 and discussed by the parties during the oral arguments, the issues for
resolution by this Court are:
Procedural Issues:
A Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts considering that the petition should first be filed with the Court
of Appeals.
B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before the
trial court renders the instant petition premature.
C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule against
forum shopping given the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before
the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 17-165 and the
Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No.
149097, assailing the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.
Substantive Issues:
A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over
the violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed Information.
B. Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in finding probable
cause to issue the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner.
C. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Status Quo Ante Order in the interim until the instant petition is resolved or
until the trial court rules on the Motion to Quash.
OUR RULING
Before proceeding to a discussion on the outlined issues, We shall first confront
the issue of the alleged falsification committed by petitioner in the jurats of her
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in
support of her prayer for injunctive relief.
In her Affidavit, Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo disproves the OSG's allegation that she did
not notarize the petitioner's Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping
and Affidavit of Merit in this wise:
4. On February 24, 2017 at or around nine in the morning (9:00 AM), I went to
PNP, CIDG, Camp Crame, Quezon City to notarize the Petition as discussed the
previous night.
5. I met Senator De Lima when she was brought to the CIDG at Camp Crame and
I was informed that the Petition was already signed and ready for notarization.
6. I was then provided the Petition by her staff. I examined the signature of Senator
De Lima and confirmed that it was signed by her. I have known the signature of the
senator given our personal relationship. Nonetheless, I still requested from her
staff a photocopy of any of her government-issued valid Identification Cards (ID)
bearing her signature. A photocopy of her passport was presented to me. I
compared the signatures on the Petition and the Passport and I was able to verify
that the Petition was in fact signed by her. Afterwards, I attached the photocopy of
her Passport to the Petition which I appended to my Notarial Report/Record.
7. Since I already know that Sen. De Lima caused the preparation of the Petition
and that it was her who signed the same, I stamped and signed the same.
8. To confirm with Senator De Lima that I have already notarized the Petition, I
sought entry to the detention facility at or around three in the afternoon (3:00 PM).
xxx
xxxx
11. Since I was never cleared after hours of waiting, I was not able to talk again to
Senator De Lima to confirm the notarization of the Petition. I then decided to leave
Camp Crame.35
At first glance, it is curious that Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo who claims to have
"stamped and signed the [Verification and Certification and Affidavit of Merit]"
inside Camp Crame, presumably in De Lima's presence, still found it necessary to,
hours later, "confirm with Senator De Lima that [she had] already notarized the
Petition." Nonetheless, assuming the veracity of the allegations narrated in the
Affidavit, it is immediately clear that petitioner De Lima did not sign the Verification
and Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in front of the
notary public. This is contrary to the jurats (i.e., the certifications of the notary
public at the end of the instruments) signed by Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo that the
documents were "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me."
Such clear breach of notarial protocol is highly censurable36 as Section 6, Rule II of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires the affiant, petitioner De Lima in this
case, to sign the instrument or document in the presence of the notary, viz.:
SECTION 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
While there is jurisprudence to the effect that "an irregular notarization merely
reduces the evidentiary value of a document to that of a private document, which
requires /roof of its due execution and authenticity to be admissible as
evidence,"37 the same cannot be considered controlling in determining compliance
with the requirements of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Both
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 6538 require that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition
must be verified and accompanied by a "sworn certificate of non-forum shopping."
In this regard, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[a]
pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that
the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records." "A pleading required to be verified which x x x lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading." Meanwhile, Section 5, Rule
7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there
is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom
to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed."
"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided x x x."
In this case, when petitioner De Lima failed to sign the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary, she has likewise failed to
properly swear under oath the contents thereof, thereby rendering false and null
the jurat and invalidating the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.
The significance of a proper jurat and the effect of its invalidity was elucidated
in William Go Que Construction v. Court of Appeals,39where this Court held that:
In .this case, it is undisputed that the Verification/Certification against Forum
Shopping attached to the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 was not
accompanied with a valid affidavit/properly certified under oath. This was because
the jurat thereof was defective in that it did not indicate the pertinent details
regarding the affiants' (i.e., private respondents) competent evidence of identities.
Under Section 6, Rule II of AM. No. 02-8-13-SC 63 dated July 6, 2004, entitled the
"2004 Rules on Notarial Practice" (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice), ajurat refers
to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
xxxx
In Fernandez v. Villegas (Fernandez), the Court pronounced that noncompliance
with the verification requirement or a defect therein "does not necessarily render
the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or
act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance
with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be
served thereby." "Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who
has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been
made in good faith or are true and correct." Here, there was no substantial
compliance with the verification requirement as it cannot be ascertained that any of
the private respondents actually swore to the truth of the allegations in the petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 given the lack of competent evidence of
any of their identities. Because of this, the fact that even one of the private
respondents swore that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct of his
knowledge and belief is shrouded in doubt.
For the same reason, neither was there substantial compliance with the
certification against forum shopping requirement. In Fernandez, the Court
explained that "non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification,
is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless
there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of 'substantial compliance' or
presence of 'special circumstances or compelling reasons."' Here, the CA did not
mention - nor does there exist - any perceivable special circumstance or
compelling reason which justifies the rules' relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if
any of the private respondents certified under oath that no similar action has been
filed or is pending in another forum.
xxxx
Case law states that "[v]erification is required to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct,
and not merely speculative." On the other hand, "[t]he certification against forum
shopping is required based on the principle that a party-litigant should not be
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora." The important
purposes behind these requirements cannot be simply brushed aside absent any
sustainable explanation justifying their relaxation. In this case, proper justification
is especially called for in light of the serious allegations of forgery as to the
signatures of the remaining private respondents, i.e., Lominiqui and Andales.
Thus, by simply treating the insufficient submissions before it as compliance with
its Resolution dated August 13, 2009 requiring anew the submission of a proper
verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA patently and grossly
ignored settled procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused its discretion. All
things considered, the proper course of action was for it to dismiss the
petition.40 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping, there is no assurance that the petitioner
swore under oath that the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith
or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. It must be noted that
verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must never
be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice,41as what
apparently happened in the present case. Similarly, the absence of the notary
public when petitioner allegedly affixed her signature also negates a proper
attestation that forum shopping has not been committed by the filing of the petition.
Thus, the petition is, for all intents and purposes, an unsigned pleading that does
not deserve the cognizance of this Court.42 In Salum bides, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman,43the Court held thus:
The Court has distinguished the effects of non-compliance with the requirement of
verification and that of certification against forum shopping. A defective
verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading and thus produces no legal
effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied,
while the failure to certifv against forum shopping shall be cause for dismissal
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, and is not curable by amendment of
the initiatory pleading. (Emphasis and italicization from the original.)
Notably, petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify her failure to sign the
Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping in the presence of the
notary. There is, therefore, no justification to relax the rules and excuse the
petitioner's non-compliance therewith. This Court had reminded parties seeking the
ultimate relief of certiorari to observe the rules, since nonobservance thereof
cannot be brushed aside as a "mere technicality."44 Procedural rules are not to be
belittled or simply disregarded, for these prescribed procedures ensure an orderly
and speedy administration of justice.45 Thus, as in William Go Que
Construction, the proper course of action is to dismiss outright the present petition.
Even if We set aside this procedural infirmity, the petition just the same merits
denial on several other grounds.
PETITIONER DISREGARDED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS
Trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor by this
Court.46 It will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the
lower courts.47 The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of
courts is an important component of the orderly administration of justice and not
imposed merely for whimsical and arbitrary reasons.48 In The Diocese of Bacolod
v. Commission on Elections,49the Court explained the reason for the doctrine
thusly:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and
now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The
strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with
causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave
time for the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that
the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely
necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to
the policy.
xxxx
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this
court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an
effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the
evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to
determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or
even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform
these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches.
Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they
mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as
these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur
within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the "actual case" that
makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The
consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some
cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their
decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the
determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature.
This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court.
But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil
actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is
competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that
may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further
reiterating - in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusion of
bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a
repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these
doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role. 50 (Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule and direct resort to this
Court were allowed in some instances. These exceptions were summarized in a
case of recent vintage, Aala v. Uy, as follows:
In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the
doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed
when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of
constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the case
involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the
essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7)
when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order
complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as
an inappropriate remedy.51
Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established in the present
petition so as to convince this court to brush aside the rules on the hierarchy of
courts.
Petitioner's allegation that her case has sparked national and international interest
is obviously not covered by the exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. The
notoriety of a case, without more, is not and will not be a reason for this Court's
decisions. Neither will this Court be swayed to relax its rules on the bare fact that
the petitioner belongs to the minority party in the present administration. A primary
hallmark of an independent judiciary is its political neutrality. This Court is thus
loath to perceive and consider the issues before it through the warped prisms of
political partisanships.
That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a special
treatment of her case. The right to equal treatment before the law accorded to
every Filipino also forbids the elevation of petitioner's cause on account of her
position and status in the government.
Further, contrary to her position, the matter presented before the Court is not of
first impression. Petitioner is not the first public official accused of violating RA
9165 nor is she the first defendant to question the finding of probable cause for her
arrest. In fact, stripped of all political complexions, the controversy involves run-of-
the mill matters that could have been resolved with ease by the lower court had it
been given a chance to do so in the first place.
In like manner, petitioner's argument that the rule on the hierarchy of court should
be disregarded as her case involves pure questions of law does not obtain. One of
the grounds upon which petitioner anchors her case is that the respondent judge
erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to issue
her arrest. By itself, this ground removes the case from the ambit of cases
involving pure questions of law. It is established that the issue of whether or not
probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is
a question of fact, determinable as it is from a review of the allegations in the
Information, the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other
documents and/ or evidence appended to the Information.52 This matter, therefore,
should have first been brought before the appellate court, which is in the better
position to review and determine factual matters.
Yet, petitioner harps on the supposed judicial efficiency and economy of
abandoning the rule on the hierarchy of courts in the present case. Indeed, the
Court has considered the practical aspects of the administration of justice in
deciding to apply the exceptions rather than the rule. However, it is all the more for
these practical considerations that the Court must insist on the application of the
rule and not the exceptions in this case. As petitioner herself alleges, with the
President having declared the fight against illegal drugs and corruption as central
to his platform of government, there will be a spike of cases brought before the
courts involving drugs and public officers.53 As it now stands, there are 232,557
criminal cases involving drugs, and around 260,796 criminal cases involving other
offenses pending before the R TCs.54 This Court cannot thus allow a precedent
allowing public officers assailing the finding of probable cause for the issuance of
arrest warrants to be brought directly to this Court, bypassing the appellate court,
without any compelling reason.
THE PRESENT PETITION IS PREMATURE
The prematurity of the present petition is at once betrayed in the reliefs sought by
petitioner's Prayer, which to restate for added emphasis, provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in the interest of substantial justice and
fair play, Petitioner respectfully prays the Honorable Court that judgment be
rendered:
a. Granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Order dated 23
February 2017, the Warrant of Arrest dated the same date, and the Order dated 24
February 2017 of the Regional Trial CourtBranch 204, Muntinlupa City, in Criminal
Case No. 17-165 entitled People of the Philippines versus Leila M De Lima et al.;
b. Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge from
conducting further proceedings until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved
with finality;
c. Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to the proceedings; and
d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior to the
issuance of the Order and Warrant of Arrest, both dated February 23, 201 7,
thereby recalling both processes and restoring petitioner to her liberty and
freedom.55 (Emphasis supplied)
Under paragraph (a), petitioner asks for a writ of certiorari annulling the Order
dated February 23, 2017 finding probable cause, the warrant of arrest and the
Order dated February 24, 2017 committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP
Custodial Center. Clearly petitioner seeks the recall of said orders to effectuate her
release from detention and restore her liberty. She did not ask for the dismissal of
the subject criminal case.
More importantly, her request for the issuance of a writ of prohibition under
paragraph (b) of the prayer "until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with
finality," is an unmistakable admission that the RTC has yet to rule on her Motion
to Quash and the existence of the RTC's authority to rule on the said motion. This
admission against interest binds the petitioner; an admission against interest being
the best evidence that affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. 56 It is
based on the presumption that "no man would declare anything against himself
unless such declaration is true. "57 It can be presumed then that the declaration
corresponds with the truth, and it is her fault if it does not.58
Moreover, petitioner under paragraphs (c) and (d) prayed for a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction and a status quo ante order which easily reveal her real
motive in filing the instant petition-to restore to "petitioner her liberty and freedom."
Nowhere in the prayer did petitioner explicitly ask for the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 17-165. What is clear is she merely asked the respondent judge to rule
on her Motion to Quash before issuing the warrant of arrest.
In view of the foregoing, there is no other course of action to take than to dismiss
the petition on the ground of prematurity and allow respondent Judge to rule on the
Motion to Quash according to the desire of petitioner.
This Court, in Solid Builders Inc. v. China Banking Corp., explained why a party
should not pre-empt the action of a trial court:
Even Article 1229 of the Civil Code, which SBI and MFII invoke, works against
them. Under that provision, the equitable reduction of the penalty stipulated by the
parties in their contract will be based on a finding by the court that such penalty is
iniquitous or unconscionable. Here, the trial court has not yet made a ruling as to
whether the penalty agreed upon by CBC with SBI and MFII is unconscionable.
Such finding will be made by the trial court only after it has heard both parties and
weighed their respective evidence in light of all relevant circumstances. Hence, for
SBI and MFII to claim any right or benefit under that provision at this point is
premature.59 (Emphasis supplied)
In State of Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60the Court likewise held
that a petition for certiorari can be resorted to only after the court a quo has
already and actually rendered its decision. It held, viz.:
We note, however, that the appellate court never actually ruled on whether or not
petitioner's right had prescribed. It merely declared that it was in a position to so
rule and thereafter required the parties to submit memoranda. In making such a
declaration, did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction? It did not.
xxxx
All things considered, this petition is premature. The CA has decided nothing and
whatever petitioner's vehement objections may be (to any eventual ruling on the
issue of prescription) should be raised only after such ruling shall have actually
been promulgated.
The situation evidently does not yet call for a recourse to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.61(Italicization from the original. Emphasis supplied.)
An analogous ruling was made by this Court in Diaz v. Nora, where it ruled in this
wise:
x x x In the case of the respondent labor arbiter, he has not denied the motion for
execution filed by the petitioner. He merely did not act on the same. Neither had
petitioner urged the immediate resolution of his motion for execution by said
arbiter. In the case of the respondent NLRC, it was not even given the opportunity
to pass upon the question raised by petitioner as to whether or not it has
jurisdiction over the appeal, so the records of the case can be remanded to the
respondent labor arbiter for execution of the decision.
Obviously, petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to seek relief from
public respondents but he failed to avail himself of the same before coming to this
Court. To say the least, the petition is premature and must be struck
down.62 (Emphasis supplied.)
The dissents would deny the applicability of the foregoing on the ground that these
were not criminal cases that involved a pending motion to quash. However, it
should be obvious from the afore-quoted excerpts that the nature of the cases had
nothing to do with this Court's finding of prematurity in those cases. Instead, what
was stressed therein was that the lower courts had not yet made, nor was not
given the opportunity to make, a ruling before the parties came before this forum.
Indeed, the prematurity of the present petition cannot be over-emphasized
considering that petitioner is actually asking the Court to rule on some of the
grounds subject of her Motion to Quash. The Court, if it rules positively in favor of
petitioner regarding the grounds of the Motion to Quash, will be preempting the
respondent Judge from doing her duty to resolve the said motion and even
prejudge the case. This is clearly outside of the ambit of orderly and expeditious
rules of procedure. This, without a doubt, causes an inevitable delay in the
proceedings in the trial court, as the latter abstains from resolving the incidents
until this Court rules with finality on the instant petition.
Without such order, the present petition cannot satisfy the requirements set before
this Court can exercise its review powers. Section 5 (2)(C) of Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution explicitly requires the existence of "final judgments and orders of
lower courts" before the Court can exercise its power to "review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari" in "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any
lower court is in issue," viz.:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the palpable absence of a ruling on the Motion to Quash -- which puts the
jurisdiction of the lower court in issue -- there is no controversy for this Court to
resolve; there is simply no final judgment or order of the lower court to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm. As per the block letter provision of the
Constitution, this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction in a vacuum nor issue a
definitive ruling on mere suppositions.
Succinctly, the present petition is immediately dismissible for this Court lacks
jurisdiction to review a non-existent court action. It can only act to protect a party
from a real and actual ruling by a lower tribunal. Surely, it is not for this Court to
negate "uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all," as the lower court's feared denial of the subject
Motion to Quash.63
The established rule is that courts of justice will take cognizance only of
controversies "wherein actual and not merely hypothetical issues are
involved."64 The reason underlying the rule is "to prevent the courts through
avoidance of premature adjudication from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements, and for us to be satisfied that the case does not present a
hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed
may never transpire."65
Even granting arguendo that what is invoked is the original jurisdiction of this Court
under Section 5 (1) of Article VIII, the petition nonetheless falls short of the
Constitutional requirements and of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the absence of
a final judgment, order, or ruling on the Motion to Quash challenging the
jurisdiction of the lower court, there is no occasion for this Court to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. Without a judgment or ruling, there is nothing for this
Court to declare as having been issued without jurisdiction or in grave abuse of
discretion.
Furthermore, it is a basic requirement under Rule 65 that there be "[no] other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy found in law."66 Thus, the failure to exhaust all other
remedies, as will be later discussed, before a premature resort to this Court is fatal
to the petitioner's cause of action.
Petitioner even failed to move for the reconsideration of the February 23 and 24,
2017 Orders she is currently assailing in this Petition. As this Court held in Estrada
v. Office of the Ombudsman, "[a] motion for reconsideration allows the public
respondent an opportunity to correct its factual and legal errors x x x [it] is
mandatory before the filing of a petition for certiorari."67The reasons proffered by
petitioner fail to justify her present premature recourse.
Various policies and rules have been issued to curb the tendencies of litigants to
disregard, nay violate, the rule enunciated in Section 5 of Article VIII of the
Constitution to allow the Court to devote its time and attention to matters within its
jurisdiction and prevent the overcrowding of its docket. There is no reason to
consider the proceedings at bar as an exception.
PETITIONER VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
It is settled that forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails himself of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or
already resolved adversely by, some other court. It is considered an act of
malpractice as it trifles with the courts and abuses their processes. 68 Thus, as
elucidated in Luzon Iron Development Group Corporation v. Bridgestone Mining
and Development Corporation,69forum shopping warrants the immediate dismissal
of the suits filed:
Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple
judicial remedies in different fora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court; or for the purpose of increasing their
chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another. The
rationale against forum-shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two different courts, for to do so would constitute abuse
of court processes which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks
havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily
burdened dockets of the courts.
xxxx
What is essential in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation
caused the courts and litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on similar or related causes and/or grant the same
or substantially similar reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered upon the same issues.
xxxx
We emphasize that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum-
shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and
contradictory decisions. To avoid any confusion, this Court adheres strictly to the
rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the
dismissal of a case. The acts committed and described herein can possibly
constitute direct contempt.70
This policy echoes the last sentence of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,
which states that "[i]f the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal
with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions."
The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements
of litis pendentia, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res
judicata in the other. Forum shopping therefore exists when the following elements
are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.71
Anent the first requisite, there is an identity of parties when the parties in both
actions are the same, or there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action litigating for the
same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.72
Meanwhile, the second and third requisites obtain where the same evidence
necessary to sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a
recovery in the first, even if the forms or the nature of the two (2) actions are
different from each other. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two
(2) actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former
is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not.73
All these requisites are present in this case.
The presence of the first requisite is at once apparent. The petitioner is an accused
in the criminal case below, while the respondents in this case, all represented by
the Solicitor General, have substantial identity with the complainant in the criminal
case still pending before the trial court.
As for the second requisite, even a cursory reading of the petition and the Motion
to Quash will reveal that the arguments and the reliefs prayed for are essentially
the same. In both, petitioner advances the RTC's supposed lack of jurisdiction over
the offense, the alleged multiplicity of offenses included in the Information; the
purported lack of the corpus delicti of the charge, and, basically, the non-existence
of probable cause to indict her. And, removed of all non-essentials, she essentially
prays for the same thing in both the present petition and the Motion to Quash: the
nullification of the Information and her restoration to liberty and freedom. Thus, our
ruling in Jent v. Tullet Prebon (Philippines), Inc. 74 does not apply in the present
case as the petition at bar and the motion to quash pending before the court a
quo involve similar if not the same reliefs. What is more, while Justice Caguioa
highlights our pronouncement in Jent excepting an "appeal or special civil action
for certiorari" from the rule against the violation of forum shopping, the good justice
overlooks that the phrase had been used with respect to forum shopping
committed through successive actions by a "party, against whom an adverse
judgment or order has [already] been rendered in one forum."75 The exception with
respect to an "appeal or special civil action for certiorari" does not apply where the
forum shopping is committed by simultaneous actions where no judgment or order
has yet been rendered by either forum. To restate for emphasis, the RTC has yet
to rule on the Motion to Quash. Thus, the present petition and the motion to quash
before the R TC are simultaneous actions that do not exempt petitions
for certiorari from the rule against forum shopping.
With the presence of the first two requisites, the third one necessarily obtains in
the present case. Should we grant the petition and declare the RTC without
jurisdiction over the offense, the RTC is bound to grant De Lima's Motion to
Quash in deference to this Court's authority. In the alternative, if the trial court rules
on the Motion to Quash in the interim, the instant petition will be rendered moot
and academic.
In situations like the factual milieu of this instant petition, while nobody can restrain
a party to a case before the trial court to institute a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, still such petition must be rejected outright because
petitions that cover simultaneous actions are anathema to the orderly and
expeditious processing and adjudication of cases.
On the ground of forum shopping alone, the petition merits immediate dismissal.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION
Even discounting the petitioner's procedural lapses, this Court is still wont to deny
the instant petition on substantive grounds.
Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information in Criminal Case
No. 17-165, the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case
against her. She posits that the Information charges her not with violation of RA
9165 but with Direct Bribery-a felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan given her rank as the former Secretary of Justice with Salary
Grade 31. For the petitioner, even assuming that the crime described in the
Information is a violation of RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive
jurisdiction to try the case considering that the acts described in the Information
were intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice. Some justices of
this Court would even adopt the petitioner's view, declaring that the Information
charged against the petitioner is Direct Bribery.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the R TC has exclusive
jurisdiction to try violations of RA 9165, including the acts described in the
Information against the petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, so the respondents
contend, was specifically created as an anti-graft court. It was never conferred with
the power to try drug-related cases even those committed by public officials. In
fact, respondents point out that the history of the laws enabling and governing the
Sandiganbayan will reveal that its jurisdiction was streamlined to address specific
cases of graft and corruption, plunder, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
Before discussing the issue on jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is necessary
to clarify the crime with which the petitioner is being charged. For ease of
reference, the Information filed with the R TC is restated below:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
Versus Criminal Case No. 17-165
INFORMATION
The undersigned Prosecutors, constituted as a Panel pursuant to Department
Orders 706 and 790 dated October 14, 2016 and November 11, 2016,
respectively, accuse LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z. RAGOS and
RONNIE P ALISOC DAY AN, for violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 3 (jj),
Section 26 (b) and Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002, committed as follows:
That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Leila M. De Lima, being then the Secretary of the Department of Justice,
and accused Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos, being then the Officer-in-Charge of the
Bureau of Corrections, by taking advantage of their public office, conspiring and
confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then the employee of the
Department of Justice detailed to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or
influence over inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal
drug trading, in the following manner: De Lima and Ragos, with the use of their
power, position, and authority demand, solicit and extort money from the high
profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the Senatorial bid of De Lima in
the May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not being lawfully
authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones and other electronic
devices, did then and there willfully and unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous
drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, through Ragos and Dayan, the
proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos
on 24 November 2012, Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012,
and One Hundred Thousand (₱l00,000.00) Pesos weekly "tara" each from the high
profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison.
CONTRARY TO LAW.76

LEILA M. DE LIMA
(66 Laguna de Bay corner Subic Bay Drive,
South Bay Village, Paraiiaque City and/or
Room 502, GSIS Building, Financial Center,
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City), RAFAEL
MARCOS Z. RAGOS (c/o National Bureau of
Investigation, Taft Avenue, Manila) and
RONNIE P ALISOC DAY AN, (Barangay
Galarin, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan), Accused
x-------------------------------------x
Notably, the designation, the prefatory statements and the accusatory portions of
(NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00315 and NPS No. theXVl-
Information repeatedly provide that the petitioner is charged with "Violation of
INV-16K-00336) For: Violation of the the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Section 5, in relation to Section
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 3(jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165." From the very
2002,Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj),designation of the crime in the Information itself, it should be plain that the crime
Section 26 (b), and Section 28, Republic ActwithNo.
which the petitioner is charged is a violation of RA 9165. As this Court clarified
9165 (lllegal Drug Trading) in Quimvel v. People, 77 the designation of the offense in the Information is a
critical element required under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in
apprising the accused of the offense being charged, viz.:
The offense charged can also be elucidated by consulting the designation of the
offense as appearing in the Information. The designation of the offense is a critical
element required under Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court for it assists in
apprising the accused of the offense being charged. Its inclusion in the Information
is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him of the opportunity
to prepare his defense accordingly. Its import is underscored in this case where
the preamble states that the crime charged is of "Acts of Lasciviousness in relation
to Section 5(b) of R.A. No.7610."78(Emphasis supplied.)
Further, a reading of the provisions of RA 9165 under which the petitioner is
prosecuted would convey that De Lima is being charged as a conspirator in the
crime of Illegal Drug Trading. The pertinent provisions of RA 9165 read:
SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxxx
(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals using electronic devices such
as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios,
internet, instant messengers and chat rooms or acting as a broker in any of such
transactions whether for money or any other consideration in violation of this Act.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions.
xxxx
SECTION 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. - Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the
following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the
commission of the same as provided under this Act:
xxxx
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical;
xxxx
SECTION 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. - The
maximum penalties of the unlawful acts provided for in this Act shall be imposed,
in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, if those
found guilty of such unlawful acts are government officials and employees.
While it may be argued that some facts may be taken as constitutive of some
elements of Direct Bribery under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), these facts taken
together with the other allegations in the Information portray a much bigger picture,
Illegal Drug Trading. The latter crime, described by the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as "a global illicit trade involving the cultivation,
manufacture, distribution and sale of substances,"79necessarily involves various
component crimes, not the least of which is the bribery and corruption of
government officials. An example would be reports of recent vintage regarding
billions of pesos' worth of illegal drugs allowed to enter Philippine ports without the
scrutiny of Customs officials. Any money and bribery that may have changed
hands to allow the importation of the confiscated drugs are certainly but trivial
contributions in the furtherance of the transnational illegal drug trading - the
offense for which the persons involved should be penalized.
Read as a whole, and not picked apart with each word or phrase construed
separately, the Information against De Lima goes beyond an indictment for Direct
Bribery under Article 210 of the RPC.80 As Justice Martires articulately explained,
the averments on solicitation of money in the Information, which may be taken as
constitutive of bribery, form "part of the description on how illegal drug trading took
place at the NBP." The averments on how petitioner asked for and received money
from the NBP inmates simply complete the links of conspiracy between her,
Ragos, Dayan and the NBP inmates in willfully and unlawfully trading dangerous
drugs through the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices under
Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28, of RA 9165.
On this score, that it has not been alleged that petitioner actually participated in the
actual trafficking of dangerous drugs and had simply allowed the NBP inmates to
do so is non sequitur given that the allegation of conspiracymakes her liable for the
acts of her co-conspirators. As this Court elucidated, it is not indispensable for a
co-conspirator to take a direct part in every act of the crime. A conspirator need not
even know of all the parts which the others have to perform,81 as conspiracy is the
common design to commit a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the
execution of the crime. 82 As long as the accused, in one way or another, helped
and cooperated in the consummation of a felony, she is liable as a co-
principal.83 As the Information provides, De Lima's participation and cooperation
was instrumental in the trading of dangerous drugs by the NBP inmates. The
minute details of this participation and cooperation are matters of evidence that
need not be specified in the Information but presented and threshed out during
trial.
Yet, some justices remain adamant in their position that the Information fails to
allege the necessary elements of Illegal Drug Trading. Justice Carpio, in particular,
would cite cases supposedly enumerating the elements necessary for a valid
Information for Illegal Drug Trading. However, it should be noted that the subject of
these cases was "Illegal Sale" of dangerous drugs -- a crime separate and distinct
from "Illegal Trading" averred in the Information against De Lima. The elements of
"Illegal Sale" will necessary differ from the elements of Illegal Trading under
Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), of RA 9165. The definitions of these two
separate acts are reproduced below for easy reference:
SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxxx
(ii) Sell. - Any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor
and essential chemical whether for money or any other consideration.
(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals using electronic devices such
as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios,
internet, instant messengers and chat rooms or acting as a broker in any of such
transactions whether for money or any other consideration in violation of this Act.
It is obvious from the foregoing that the crime of illegal trading has been written in
strokes much broader than that for illegal sale. In fact, an illegal sale of drugs may
be considered as only one of the possible component acts of illegal trading which
may be committed through two modes: (1) illegal trafficking using electronic
devices; or (2) acting as a broker in any transactions involved in the illegal
trafficking of dangerous drugs.
On this score, the crime of "illegal trafficking" embraces various other offenses
punishable by RA 9165. Section 3(r) of RA 9165 provides:
(r) Illegal Trafficking. - The illegal cultivation, culture, delivery, administration,
dispensation, manufacture, sale, trading, transportation, distribution, importation,
exportation and possession of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical.
In turn, the crimes included in the definition of Illegal Trafficking of drugs are
defined as follows:
(a) Administer. - Any act of introducing any dangerous drug into the body of any
person, with or without his/her knowledge, by injection, inhalation, ingestion or
other means, or of committing any act of indispensable assistance to a person in
administering a dangerous drug to himself/herself unless administered by a duly
licensed practitioner for purposes of medication.
xxxx
(d) Chemical Diversion. - The sale, distribution, supply or transport of legitimately
imported, in-transit, manufactured or procured controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, in diluted, mixtures or in concentrated form, to any person or entity
engaged in the manufacture of any dangerous drug, and shall include packaging,
repackaging, labeling, relabeling or concealment of such transaction through fraud,
destruction of documents, fraudulent use of permits, misdeclaration, use of front
companies or mail fraud.
xxxx
(i) Cultivate or Culture. - Any act of knowingly planting, growing, raising, or
permitting the planting, growing or raising of any plant which is the source of a
dangerous drug.
xxxx
(k) Deliver. - Any act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally
or otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration.
xxxx
(m) Dispense. - Any act of giving away, selling or distributing medicine or any
dangerous drug with or without the use of prescription.
xxxx
(u) Manufacture. - The production, preparation, compounding or processing of any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, either directly
or indirectly or by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by
means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical
synthesis, and shall include any packaging or repackaging of such substances,
design or configuration of its form, or labeling or relabeling of its container; except
that such terms do not include the preparation, compounding, packaging or
labeling of a drug or other substances by a duly authorized practitioner as an
incident to his/her administration or dispensation of such drug or substance in the
course of his/her professional practice including research, teaching and chemical
analysis of dangerous drugs or such substances that are not intended for sale or
for any other purpose.
xxxx
(kk) Use. - Any act of injecting, intravenously or intramuscularly, of consuming,
either by chewing, smoking, sniffing, eating, swallowing, drinking or otherwise
introducing into the physiological system of the body, any of the dangerous drugs.
With the complexity of the operations involved in Illegal Trading of drugs, as
recognized and defined in RA 9165, it will be quite myopic and restrictive to require
the elements of Illegal Sale-a mere component act-in the prosecution for Illegal
Trading.
More so, that which qualifies the crime of Illegal Trafficking to Illegal Trading may
make it impossible to provide the details of the elements of Illegal Sale. By "using
electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, email, mobile or
landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms," the Illegal
Trading can be remotely perpetrated away from where the drugs are actually being
sold; away from the subject of the illegal sale. With the proliferation of digital
technology coupled with ride sharing and delivery services, Illegal Trading under
RA 9165 can be committed without getting one's hand on the substances or
knowing and meeting the seller or buyer. To require the elements of Illegal Sale
(the identities of the buyer, seller, the object and consideration, in Illegal Trade)
would be impractical.
The same may be said of the second mode for committing Illegal Trading, or
trading by "acting as a broker" in transactions involved in Illegal Trafficking. In this
instance, the accused may neither have physical possession of the drugs nor meet
the buyer and seller and yet violate RA 9165. As pointed out by Justice Perlas-
Bernabe, as early as 1916, jurisprudence has defined a broker as one who is
simply a middleman, negotiating contracts relative to property with which he has
no custody, viz.:
A broker is generally defined as one who is engaged, for others, on a commission,
negotiating contracts relative to property with the custody of which he has no
concern; the negotiator between other parties, never acting in his own name, but in
the name of those who employed him; he is strictly a middleman and for some
purposes the agent of both parties.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
In some cases, this Court even acknowledged persons as brokers even "where
they actually took no part in the negotiations, never saw the customer."85 For the
Court, the primary occupation of a broker is simply bringing "the buyer and the
seller together, even if no sale is eventually made. "86 Hence, in indictments for
Illegal Trading, it is illogical to require the elements of Illegal Sale of drugs, such as
the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration.87 For the
prosecution of Illegal Trading of drugs to prosper, proof that the accused "act[ed]
as a broker" or brought together the buyer and seller of illegal drugs "using
electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or
landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms" is
sufficient.
The DOJ' s designation of the charge as one for Illegal Drug Trading thus holds
sway. After all, the prosecution is vested with a wide range of discretion-including
the discretion of whether, what, and whom to charge. 88 The exercise of this
discretion depends on a smorgasboard of factors, which are best appreciated by
the prosecutors.89
As such, with the designation of the offense, the recital of facts in the Information,
there can be no other conclusion than that petitioner is being charged not with
Direct Bribery but with violation of RA 9165.
Granting without conceding that the information contains averments which
constitute the elements of Direct Bribery or that more than one offence is charged
or as ill this case, possibly bribery and violation of RA 9165, still the prosecution
has the authority to amend the information at any time before arraignment. Since
petitioner has not yet been arraigned, then the information subject of Criminal
Case No. 17-165 can still be amended pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 14. Amendment or Substitution. - A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
Now the question that irresistibly demands an answer is whether it is the
Sandiganbayan or the RTC that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal
Case No. 17-165, i.e., violation of RA 9165.
It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by
law in the manner and form prescribed by law.90 It is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action.91 Indeed, Congress has the
plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.
It follows then that Congress may also, by law, provide that a certain class of
cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such would be a
special law that is construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of
courts.92
The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated
the rules provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. A plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over
drug-related cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other.
The designation of the RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-
related cases is apparent in the following provisions where it was expressly
mentioned and recognized as the only court with the authority to hear drug-related
cases:
Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the
Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal
Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - x x x
x and hear cases involving violations of this Act. The number of courts designated in
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed,
the Court shall immediately schedule a hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture
of all the proceeds of the offense and all the assets and properties of the accused
either owned or held by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall
be found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income:
xxxx
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or
income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited, shall be
disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodia legis and no
bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.
xxxx
Section 61. Compulsory Confinement of a Drug Dependent Who Refuses to Apply
Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - x x x
A petition for the confinement of a person alleged to be dependent on dangerous
drugs to a Center may be filed by any person authorized by the Board with the
Regional Trial Court of the province or city where such person is found.
xxxx
Section 62. Compulsory Submission of a Drug Dependent Charged with an
Offense to Treatment and Rehabilitation. - If a person charged with an offense
where the imposable penalty is imprisonment of less than six (6) years and one (1)
day, and is found by the prosecutor or by the court, at any stage of the
proceedings, to be a drug dependent, the prosecutor or the court as the case may
be, shall suspend all further proceedings and transmit copies of the record of the
case to the Board.
In the event the Board determines, after medical examination, that public interest
requires that such drug dependent be committed to a center for treatment and
rehabilitation, it shall file a petition for his/her commitment with the regional trial
court of the province or city where he/she is being investigated or tried: x x x
xxxx
Section 90. Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from
among the existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try
each judicial region shall be based on the population and the number of cases
pending in their respective jurisdiction.
The DOJ shall designate special prosecutors to exclusively handle cases involving
violations of this Act.
Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to
take cognizance of drug-related cases. Thus, in Morales v. Court of Appeals,93this
Court categorically named the RTC as the court with jurisdiction over drug related-
cases, as follows:
Applying by analogy the ruling in People v. Simon, People v. De Lara, People v.
Santos, and Ordonez v. Vinarao, the imposable penalty in this case which involves
0.4587 grams of shabu should not exceed prision correccional. We say by analogy
because these cases involved marijuana, not methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu). In Section 20 of RA. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of RA No.
7659, the maximum quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride
for purposes of imposing the maximum penalties are not the same. For the latter, if
the quantity involved is 200 grams or more, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from ₱500,000 to PIO million shall be imposed.
Accordingly, if the quantity involved is below 200 grams, the imposable penalties
should be as follows:
xxxx
Clearly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in Criminal
Case No. 96-8443 would at most be only prision correccional duration is from six
(6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Does it follow then that, as the
petitioner insists, the RTC has no jurisdiction thereon in view of the amendment of
Section 32 of B.P. Big. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, which vested upon Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties? This Section 32 as thus amended now reads:
xxxx
The exception in the opening sentence is of special significance which we cannot
disregard. x xx The aforementioned exception refers not only to Section 20 of B.P.
Blg. 129 providing for the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases, but
also to other laws which specifically lodge in Regional Trial Courts exclusive
jurisdiction over specific criminal cases, e. g., (a) Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. Nos. 1289 and 4363 on written defamation or libel; (b)
Decree on Intellectual Property (P. D. No. 49, as amended), which vests upon
Courts of First Instance exclusive jurisdiction over the cases therein mentioned
regardless of the imposable penalty; and (c) more appropriately for the case at bar,
Section 39 of RA No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44, which vests on Courts of
First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Courts concurrent exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving violations
of said Act.
xxxx
That Congress indeed did not intend to repeal these special laws vesting exclusive
jurisdiction in the Regional Trial Courts over certain cases is clearly evident from
the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended by RA No. 7691. These special laws are not, therefore, covered by
the repealing clause (Section 6) of RA No. 7691.
Neither can it be successfully argued that Section 39 of RA. No. 6425, as
amended by P.D. No. 44, is no longer operative because Section 44 of B.P. Big.
129 abolished the Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Courts. While, indeed, Section 44 provides that these
courts were to be "deemed automatically abolished" upon the declaration by the
President that the reorganization provided in B.P. Blg. 129 had been completed,
this Court should not lose sight of the fact that the Regional Trial Courts merely
replaced the Courts of First Instance as clearly borne out by the last two sentences
of Section 44, to wit:
xxxx
Consequently, it is not accurate to state that the "abolition" of the Courts of First
Instance carried with it the abolition of their exclusive original jurisdiction in drug
cases vested by Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by P. D. No. 44. If that
were so, then so must it be with respect to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
and Section 57 of the Decree on Intellectual Property. On the contrary, in the
resolution of 19 June 1996 in Caro v. Court of Appeals and in the resolution of 26
February 1997 in Villalon v. Ba/dado, this Court expressly ruled that Regional Trial
Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over libel cases pursuant to Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code. In Administrative Order No. 104-96 this Court
mandates that:
xxxx
The same Administrative Order recognizes that violations of RA. No. 6425, as
amended, regardless of the quantity involved, are to be tried and decided by the
Regional Trial Courts therein designated as special courts.94 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Yet, much has been made of the terminology used in Section 90 of RA 9165. The
dissents would highlight the provision's departure from Section 39 of RA 6425 - the
erstwhile drugs law, which provides:
SECTION 39. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court. - The Circuit Criminal Court
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses
punishable under this Act.
For those in the dissent, the failure to reproduce the phrase "exclusive original
jurisdiction" is a clear indication that no court, least of all the RTC, has been vested
with such "exclusive original jurisdiction" so that even the Sandiganbayan can take
cognizance and resolve a criminal prosecution for violation of RA 9165.
As thoroughly discussed by Justice Peralta in his Concurring Opinion, such
deduction is unwarranted given the clear intent of the legislature not only to retain
the "exclusive original jurisdiction" of the RTCs over violations of the drugs law but
to segregate from among the several RTCs of each judicial region some RTCs that
will "exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." If at all, the
change introduced by the new phraseology of Section 90, RA 9165 is not the
deprivation of the RTCs' "exclusive original jurisdiction" but the further restriction of
this "exclusive original jurisdiction" to select RTCs of each judicial region. This
intent can be clearly gleaned from the interpellation on House Bill No. 4433,
entitled "An Act Instituting the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, repealing Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended:"
Initially, Rep. Dilangalen referred to the fact sheet attached to the Bill which states
that the measure will undertake a comprehensive amendment to the existing law
on dangerous drugs -- RA No. 6425, as amended. Adverting to Section 64 of the
Bill on the repealing clause, he then asked whether the Committee is in effect
amending or repealing the aforecited law. Rep. Cuenco replied that any provision
of law which is in conflict with the provisions of the Bill is repealed and/or modified
accordingly.
In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen suggested that if the Committee's intention was
only to amend RA No. 6425, then the wording used should be "to amend" and not
"to repeal" with regard to the provisions that are contrary to the provisions of the
Bill.
Adverting to Article VIII, Section 60, on Jurisdiction Over Dangerous Drugs Case,
which provides that "the Supreme Court shall designate regional trial courts to
have original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable by this Act," Rep. Dilangalen
inquired whether it is the Committee's intention that certain RTC salas will be
designated by the Supreme Court to try drug-related offenses, although all RTCs
have original jurisdiction over those offenses.
Rep. Cuenco replied in the affirmative. He pointed that at present, the Supreme
Court's assignment of drug cases to certain judges is not exclusive because the
latter can still handle cases other than drug-related cases. He added that the
Committee's intention is to assign drug-related cases to judges who will handle
exclusively these cases assigned to them.
In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen stated that, at the appropriate time, he would like to
propose the following amendment; "The Supreme Court shall designate specific
salas of the RTC to try exclusively offenses related to drugs."
Rep. Cuenca agreed therewith, adding that the Body is proposing the creation of
exclusive drug courts because at present, almost all of the judges are besieged by
a lot of drug cases some of which have been pending for almost 20
years.95 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Per the "Records of the Bilateral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing
Provisions of Senate Bill No. 1858 and House Bill No. 4433," the term
"designation" of R TCs that will exclusively handle drug-related offenses was used
to skirt the budgetary requirements that might accrue by the "creation" of exclusive
drugs courts. It was never intended to divest the R TCs of their exclusive original
jurisdiction over drug-related cases. The Records are clear:
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). x x x [W]e would like to propose
the creation of drug courts to handle exclusively drug cases; the imposition of a 60-
day deadline on courts within which to decide drug cases; and No. 3, provide
penalties on officers of the law and government prosecutors for mishandling and
delaying drugs cases.
We will address these concerns one by one.
1. The possible creation of drugs courts to handle exclusively drug cases. Any
comments?
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. BARBERS). We have no objection to this proposal, Mr.
Chairman. As a matter of fact, this is one of the areas where we come into an
agreement when we were in Japan. However, I just would like to add a paragraph
after the word "Act" in Section 86 of the Senate versions, Mr. Chairman. And this is
in connection with the designation of special courts by "The Supreme Court shall
designate special courts from among the existing Regional Trial Courts in each
judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act. The
number of court designated in each judicial region shall be based on the
population and the number of pending cases in their respective jurisdiction." That
is my proposal, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). We adopt the same proposal.
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. BARBERS). I have no problem with that, Mr. Chairman,
but I'd like to call your attention to the fact that my proposal is only
for designation because if it is for a creation that would entail another budget, Mr.
Chairman. And almost always, the Department of Budget would tell us at the
budget hearing that we lack funds, we do not have money. So that might delay the
very purpose why we want the RTC or the municipal courts to handle exclusively
the drug cases. That's why my proposal is designation not creation.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). Areglado. No problem, designation.
Approved.96
The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to
the Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade
27 or higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation
to office. The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking
government officials is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is
circumscribed by law and its limits are currently defined and prescribed by RA
10660,97 which amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606.98 As it now stands,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
xxxx
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice
to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a. of this
section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. Provided, That the Regional Trial Court
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information: (a) does not allege
any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the
government or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts
in an amount not exceeding One Million pesos (₱l,000,000.00).
The foregoing immediately betrays that the Sandiganbayan primarily sits as a
special anti-graft court pursuant to a specific injunction in the 1973
Constitution.99 Its characterization and continuation as such was expressly given a
constitutional fiat under Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
SECTION 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
provided by law.
It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the Sandiganbayan is without
jurisdiction to hear drug-related cases. Even Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended
by RA 10660, touted by the petitioner and the dissents as a catchall provision,
does not operate to strip the R TCs of its exclusive original jurisdiction over
violations of RA 9165. As pointed out by Justices Tijam and Martires, a perusal of
the drugs law will reveal that public officials were never considered excluded from
its scope. Hence, Section 27 of RA 9165 punishes government officials found to
have benefited from the trafficking of dangerous drugs, while Section 28 of the law
imposes the maximum penalty on such government officials and employees. The
adverted sections read:
SECTION 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for
Misappropriation, Misapplication or Failure to Account for the Confiscated, Seized
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laborat01y Equipment Including the Proceeds or Properties Obtained from the
Unlawful Act Committed - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(Pl0,000,000.00), in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public
office, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who misappropriates,
misapplies or fails to account for confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment including the
proceeds or properties obtained from the unlawful acts as provided for in this Act.
Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the proceeds of
the trafficking of dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, or have received any
financial or material contributions or donations from natural or juridical persons
found guilty of trafficking dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, shall be
removed from office and perpetually disqualified from holding any elective or
appointive positions in the government, its divisions, subdivisions, and
intermediaries, including government-owned or -controlled corporations.
SECTION 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. - The
maximum penalties of the unlawful acts provided for in this Act shall be imposed,
in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, if those
found guilty of such unlawful acts are government officials and employees.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, provides but the general
rule, couched in a "broad and general phraseology. "100 Exceptions abound.
Besides the jurisdiction on written defamations and libel, as illustrated
in Morales 101and People v. Benipayo, 102 the RTC is likewise given "exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for
violation of the Omnibus Election Code,"103 regardless of whether such violation
was committed by public officers occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or
higher in relation to their offices. In fact, offenses committed by members of the
Armed Forces in relation to their office, i.e., in the words of RA 7055,104"service-
connected crimes or offenses," are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan but by
court-martial.
Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by public officers is not
determined solely by the pay scale or by the fact that they were committed "in
relation to their office." In determining the forum vested with the jurisdiction to try
and decide criminal actions, the laws governing the subject matter of the criminal
prosecution must likewise be considered.
In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction
to "exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." This is an
exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general
rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of
statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law and the latter
is to be considered as an exception to the general. 105
Parenthetically, it has been advanced that RA 10660 has repealed Section 90 of
RA 9165. However, a closer look at the repealing clause of RA 10660 will show
that there is no express repeal of Section 90 of RA 9165 and well-entrenched is
the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. It is only accepted upon the clearest
proof of inconsistency so repugnant that the two laws cannot be enforced. 106 The
presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of two laws involved one is
special and the other general.107 The mentioned rule in statutory construction that
a special law prevails over a general law applies regardless of the laws' respective
dates of passage. Thus, this Court ruled:
x x x [I]t is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a
general law - regardless of their dates of passage - and the special is to be
considered as remaining an exception to the general.
So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes. If
reasonable construction is possible, the laws must be reconciled in that manner.
Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and the mere
repugnancy between two statutes should be very clear to warrant the court in
holding that the later in time repeals the other.108
To reiterate for emphasis, Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660,
is the general law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses
committed by high-ranking public officers in relation to their office; Section 90, RA
9165 is the special law excluding from the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction violations
of RA 9165 committed by such public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is
vested upon the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as drugs court,
regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to the
public officials' office.
The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original
exclusive jurisdiction to RTCs specially designated by the Supreme Court logically
follows given the technical aspect of drug-related cases. With the proliferation of
cases involving violation of RA 9165, it is easy to dismiss them as common and
untechnical. However, narcotic substances possess unique characteristics that
render them not readily identifiable.109 In fact, they must first be subjected to
scientific analysis by forensic chemists to determine their composition and
nature.110Thus, judges presiding over designated drugs courts are specially trained
by the Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJa) and given scientific instructions to
equip them with the proper tools to appreciate pharmacological evidence and give
analytical insight upon this esoteric subject. After all, the primary consideration of
RA 9165 is the fact that the substances involved are, in fact, dangerous drugs,
their plant sources, or their controlled precursors and essential chemicals. Without
a doubt, not one of the Sandiganbayan justices were provided with knowledge and
technical expertise on matters relating to prohibited substances.
Hard figures likewise support the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs
over violations of RA 9165. As previously stated, as of June 30, 2017, there are
232,557 drugs cases pending before the RTCs. On the other hand, not even a
single case filed before the Sandiganbayan from February 1979 to June 30, 2017
dealt with violations of the drugs law. Instead, true to its designation as an anti-
graft court, the bulk of the cases filed before the Sandiganbayan involve violations
of RA 3019, entitled the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and
malversation.111 With these, it would not only be unwise but reckless to allow the
tribunal uninstructed and inexperienced with the intricacies of drugs cases to hear
and decide violations of RA 9165 solely on account of the pay scale of the
accused.
Likewise of special significance is the proviso introduced by RA 10660 which, to
reiterate for emphasis, states:
Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
where the information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any
bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the same
or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One million
pesos (₱l,000,000.00).
The clear import of the new paragraph introduced by RA 10660 is to streamline the
cases handled by the Sandiganbayan by delegating to the RTCs some cases
involving high-ranking public officials. With the dissents' proposition, opening the
Sandiganbayan to the influx of drug-related cases, RA 10660 which was intended
to unclog the dockets of the Sandiganbayan would all be for naught. Hence,
sustaining the RTC's jurisdiction over drug-related cases despite the accused's
high-ranking position, as in this case, is all the more proper.
Even granting arguendo that the Court declares the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165, still it will not
automatically result in the release from detention and restore the liberty and
freedom of petitioner. The R TC has several options if it dismisses the criminal
case based on the grounds raised by petitioner in her Motion to Quash.
Under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has three (3) possible
alternative actions when confronted with a Motion to Quash:
1. Order the amendment of the Infonnation;
2. Sustain the Motion to Quash; or
3. Deny the Motion to Quash.
The first two options are available to the trial court where the motion to quash is
meritorious. Specifically, as to the first option, this court had held that should the
Information be deficient or lacking in any material allegation, the trial court can
order the amendment of the Information under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, which states:
SECTION 4. Amendment of Complaint or Information. - If the motion to quash is
based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the
amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect
despite the amendment.
The failure of the trial court to order the correction of a defect in the Information
curable by an amendment amounts to an arbitrary exercise of power. So, this
Court held in Dio v. People:
This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the opportunity to
amend is an arbitrary exercise of power. In People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth
Division): When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of
an Information, and the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the
motion to quash and order the prosecution to file an amended Information.
Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts
constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment. In such
instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the Information; rather,
it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an
amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing
the defect to be cured by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on
technical grounds, which only result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.
More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings
of this rule. As explained by this Court in People v. Andrade, the State, just like any
other litigant, is entitled to its day in court. Thus, a court's refusal to grant the
prosecution the opportunity to amend an Information, where such right is expressly
granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and again in a string of
Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's right to due process. 112
Notably, the defect involved in Dio was the Information's failure to establish the
venue - a matter of jurisdiction in criminal cases. Thus, in the case at bar where
petitioner has not yet been arraigned, the court a quo has the power to order the
amendment of the February 17, 2017 Information filed against the petitioner. This
power to order the amendment is not reposed with this Court in the exercise of
its certiorari powers.
Nevertheless, should the trial court sustain the motion by actually ordering the
quashal of the Infonnation, the prosecution is not precluded from filing another
information. An order sustaining the motion to quash the information would neither
bar another prosecution113 or require the release of the accused from custody.
Instead, under Section 5, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court can simply
order that another complaint or information be filed without discharging the
accused from custody. Section 5, Rule 117 states, thus:
Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. - If the motion to quash is
sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed
except as provided in Section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in
custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If no order is made or if
having been made, no new information is filed within the time specified in the order
or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause, the accused, if in
custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody for another charge.
Section 6, Rule 117, adverted to in the foregoing provision, prevents the re-filing of
an information on only two grounds: that the criminal action or liability has already
been extinguished, and that of double jeopardy. Neither was invoked in
petitioner's Motion to Quash filed before the court a quo.
The third option available to the trial court is the denial of the motion to quash.
Even granting, for the nonce, the petitioner's position that the trial court's issuance
of the warrant for her arrest is an implied denial of her Motion to Quash, the proper
remedy against this court action is to proceed to trial, not to file the present petition
for certiorari. This Court in Galzote v. Briones reiterated this established doctrine:
A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety of the chosen legal
remedies availed of by the petitioner in the lower courts to question the denial of
his motion to quash. In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to
quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction
is rendered and the lower court's decision of conviction is appealed, the accused
can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error committed by
the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the latter's ruling.
In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately
question the denial of his motion to quash via a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not
appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1
(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition
for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other
adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of
an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as discussed above.114 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
At this juncture, it must be stressed yet again that the trial court has been denied
the opportunity to act and rule on petitioner's motion when the latter jumped the
gun and prematurely repaired posthaste to this Court, thereby immobilizing the trial
court in its tracks. Verily, De Lima should have waited for the decision on her
motion to quash instead of prematurely filing the instant recourse.
In the light of the foregoing, the best course of action for the Court to take is to
dismiss the petition and direct the trial court to rule on the Motion to Quash and
undertake all the necessary proceedings to expedite the adjudication of the subject
criminal case.
RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN FINDING
PROBABLE CAUSE TO ORDER THE PETITIONER'S ARREST
The basis for petitioner's contention that respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the February 23, 2017 Order 115 finding probable cause to
arrest the petitioner is two-pronged: respondent judge should have first resolved
the pending Motion to Quash before ordering the petitioner's arrest; and there is no
probable cause to justify the petitioner's arrest.
Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in
contemplation of the law.116
In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve
the Motion to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of
procedure, statute, or jurisprudence to support the petitioner's claim. Rather,
Sec.5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court117 required the respondent judge to
evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence within a limited
period of only ten (10) days, viz.:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds
probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when
the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of
doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be
resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or
information.
It is not far-fetched to conclude, therefore, that had the respondent judge waited
longer and first attended to the petitioner's Motion to Quash, she would have
exposed herself to a possible administrative liability for failure to observe Sec. 5(a),
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Her exercise of discretion was sound and in
conformity with the provisions of the Rules of Court considering that a Motion to
Quash may be filed and, thus resolved by a trial court judge, at any time before the
accused petitioner enters her plea.118 What is more, it is in accord with this Court's
ruling in Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller119that "[a]s the presiding judge, it was her task,
upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused."
This Court's ruling in Miranda v. Tuliao 120does not support the petitioner's
position. Miranda does not prevent a trial court from ordering the arrest of an
accused even pending a motion to quash the infonnation. At most, it simply
explains that an accused can seek judicial relief even if he has not yet been taken
in the custody of law.
Undoubtedly, contrary to petitioner's postulation, there is no rule or basic principle
requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack
of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest. As such, respondent judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed February 23, 2017
Order even before resolving petitioner's Motion to Quash. There is certainly no
indication that respondent judge deviated from the usual procedure in finding
probable cause to issue the petitioner's arrest.
And yet, petitioner further contends that the language of the February 23, 2017
Order violated her constitutional rights and is contrary to the doctrine in Soliven v.
Makasiar. 121Petitioner maintains that respondent judge failed to personally
determine the probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest since, as
stated in the assailed Order, respondent judge based her findings on the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation and not on the report and supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor.122 This hardly deserves serious
consideration.
Personal determination of the existence of probable cause by the judge is required
before a warrant of arrest may issue. The Constitution123 and the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure124 command the judge "to refrain from making a mindless
acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings and to conduct his own examination of
the facts and circumstances presented by both parties. "125 This much is clear from
this Court's n1ling in Soliven cited by the petitioner, viz.:
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.126
It must be emphasized, however, that in determining the probable cause to issue
the warrant of arrest against the petitioner, respondent judge evaluated the
Information and "all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation
conducted in this case." The assailed February 23, 2017 Order is here restated for
easy reference and provides, thusly:
After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case by the Department of
Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable cause for the issuance of
Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA M. DE LIMA x x x. 127 (Emphasis
supplied.)
As the prosecutor's report/resolution precisely finds support from the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation, this Court cannot consider the
respondent judge to have evaded her duty or refused to perform her obligation to
satisfy herself that substantial basis exists for the petitioner's arrest. "All the
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation" encompasses a broader
category than the "supporting evidence" required to be evaluated in Soliven. It may
perhaps even be stated that respondent judge performed her duty in a manner that
far exceeds what is required of her by the rules when she reviewed all the
evidence, not just the supporting documents. At the very least, she certainly
discharged a judge's duty in finding probable cause for the issuance of a warrant,
as described in Ho v. People:
The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated in Allado v.
Diokno, where we explained again what probable cause means. Probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe
that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence,
the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, 'must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed
and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof' At this stage of the
criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence
submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally
evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause. In Webb v. De Leon we
stressed that the judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt
of the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply
personally reviews the prosecutor's initial determination finding probable cause to
see if it is supported by substantial evidence."
xxxx
x x x [T]he judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding
probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and
understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will support his own
conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused for an offense and hold him
for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have
supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally
sustain his own findings on the existence (or non-existence) of probable cause to
issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and
independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by
no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could
ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to
the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause,
but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor
to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of
arrest.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the
preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not
intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete
records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of
an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient
supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn
statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to
make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the
findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he
cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation, as
Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions,
which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we
repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in
his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the
investigating officer.128 (Emphasis supplied.)
Notably, for purposes of determining the propriety of the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of
the guilt of the accused.129 She is given wide latitude of discretion in the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. 130 A finding
of probable cause to order the accused's arrest does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.131 It is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. 132
Again, per the February 23, 2017 Order, respondent judge evaluated all the
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation and on the basis thereof
found probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against the petitioner. This is
not surprising given that the only evidence available on record are those provided
by the complainants and the petitioner, in fact, did not present any counter-affidavit
or evidence to controvert this. Thus, there is nothing to disprove the following
preliminary findings of the DOJ prosecutors relative to the allegations in the
Information filed in Criminal Case No. 17-165:
Thus, from November 2012 to March 2013, De Lima[,] Ragos and Dayan should
be indicted for violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 3Gj), Section 26(b) and
Section 28, of R.A. 9165, owing to the delivery of PS million in two (2) occasions,
on 24 November 2012 and 15 December 2012, to Dayan and De Lima. The
monies came inmate Peter Co [were] proceeds from illicit drug trade, which were
given to support the senatorial bid of De Lima.
Also in the same period, Dayan demanded from Ragos money to support the
senatorial bid of De Lima. Ragos demanded and received ₱100,000 tara from
each of the high-profile inmates in exchange for privileges, including their illicit
drug trade. Ablen collected the money for Ragos who, in turn, delivered them to
Dayan at De Lima's residence.133
The foregoing findings of the DOJ find support in the affidavits and testimonies of
several persons. For instance, in his Affidavit dated September 3, 2016, NBI agent
Jovencio P. Ablen, Jr. narrated, viz.:
21. On the morning of 24 November 2012, I received a call from Dep. Dir. Ragos
asking where I was. I told him I was at home. He replied that he will fetch me to
accompany him on a very important task.
22. Approximately an hour later, he arrived at my house. I boarded his vehicle, a
Hyundai Tucson, with plate no. RGU910. He then told me that he will deliver
something to the then Secretary of Justice, Sen. Leila De Lima. He continued and
said "Nior confidential 'to. Tayong dalawa lang ang nakakaalam nito. Dadalhin
natin yung quota kay Lola. SM 'yang nasa bag. Tingnan mo."
23. The black bag he was referring to was in front of my feet. It [was a] black
handbag. When I opened the bag, I saw bundles of One Thousand Peso
bills.1âwphi1
24. At about 10 o'clock in the morning, we arrived at the house located at Laguna
Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City.
25. Dep. Dir. Ragos parked his vehicle in front of the house. We both alighted the
vehicle but he told me to stay. He then proceeded to the house.
26. From our parked vehicle, I saw Mr. Ronnie Dayan open the gate. Dep. Dir.
Ragos then handed the black handbag containing bundles of one thousand peso
bills to Mr. Dayan.
27. At that time, I also saw the then DOJ Sec. De Lima at the main door of the
house. She was wearing plain clothes which is commonly known referred to
as "duster."
28. The house was elevated from the road and the fence was not high that is why I
was able to clearly see the person at the main door, that is, Sen. De Lima.
29. When Dep. Dir. Ragos and Mr. Dayan reached the main door, I saw Mr. Dayan
hand the black handbag to Sen. De Lima, which she received. The three of them
then entered the house.
30. After about thirty (30) minutes, Dep. Dir. Ragos went out of the house. He no
longer has the black handbag with him.
31. We then drove to the BuCor Director's Quarters in Muntinlupa City. While
cruising, Dep. Dir. Ragos told me "Nior 'wag kang maingay kahit kanino at wala
kang nakita ha," to which I replied "Sabi mo e. e di wala akong nakita."
32. On the morning of 15 December 2012, Dep. Dir. Ragos again fetched me from
my house and we proceeded to the same house located at Laguna Bay comer
Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City.
33. That time, I saw a plastic bag in front of my feet. I asked Dep. Dir.
Ragos "Quota na naman Sir?"Dep. Dir. Ragos replied "Ano pa nga ba, 'tang ina
sila lang meron. "134
Petitioner's co-accused, Rafael Ragos, recounted in his own Affidavit dated
September 26, 2016 a similar scenario:
8. One morning on the latter part of November 2012, I saw a black handbag
containing a huge sum of money on my bed inside the Director's Quarters of the
BuCor. I looked inside the black handbag and saw that it contains bundles of one
thousand peso bills.
9. I then received a call asking me to deliver the black handbag to Mr. Ronnie
Dayan. The caller said the black handbag came from Peter Co and it
contains "Limang Manoi<' which means Five Million Pesos (Php5,000,000.00) as
a "manoR' refers to One Million Pesos (Php 1,000,000.00) in the vernacular inside
the New Bilibid Prison.
10. As I personally know Mr. Dayan and knows that he stays in the house of the
then DOJ Sec. Leila M. De Lima located at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive,
South Bay Village, Paranaque City, I knew I had to deliver the black handbag to
Sen. De Lima at the said address.
11. Before proceeding to the house of Sen. De Lima at the above[-]mentioned
address, I called Mr. Ablen to accompany me in delivering the money. I told him
we were going to do an important task.
12. Mr. Ablen agreed to accompany me so I fetched him from his house and we
proceeded to the house of Sen. De Lima at the above-mentioned address.
13. While we were in the car, I told Mr. Ablen that the important task we will do is
deliver Five Million Pesos (Php5,000,000.00) "Quota" to Sen. De Lima. I also told
him that the money was in the black handbag that was on the floor of the
passenger seat (in front of him) and he could check it, to which Mr. Ablen
complied.
14. Before noon, we arrived at the house of Sen. De Lima located at Laguna Bay
corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City.
15. I parked my vehicle in front of the house. Both Mr. Ablen and I alighted from
the vehicle but I went to the gate alone carrying the black handbag containing the
Five Million Pesos (Php5,000,000.00).
16. At the gate, Mr. Ronnie Dayan greeted me and opened the gate for me. I then
handed the handbag containing the money to Mr. Dayan.
17. We then proceeded to the main door of the house where Sen. De Lima was
waiting for us. At the main door, Mr. Dayan handed the black handbag to Sen. De
Lima, who received the same. We then entered the house.
18. About thirty minutes after, I went out of the house and proceeded to my
quarters at the BuCor, Muntinlupa City.
19. One morning in the middle part of December 2012, I received a call to again
deliver the plastic bag containing money from Peter Co to Mr. Ronnie Dayan. This
time the money was packed in a plastic bag left on my bed inside my quarters at Petitioner would later confine herself to the contention that the prosecution's
the BuCor, Muntinlupa City. From the outside of the bag, I could easily perceive evidence is inadmissible, provided as they were by petitioner's co-accused who
that it contains money because the bag is translucent. are convicted felons and whose testimonies are but hearsay evidence.

20. Just like before, I fetched Mr. Ablen from his house before proceeding to the
house of Sen. De Lima located at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay
Village, Paranaque City, where I know I could find Mr. Dayan.
21. In the car, Mr. Ablen asked me if we are going to deliver "quota." I answered
yes.
22. We arrived at the house of Sen. De Lima at the above[-]mentioned address at
noontime. I again parked in front of the house.
23. I carried the plastic bag containing money to the house. At the gate, I was
greeted by Mr. Ronnie Dayan. At that point, I handed the bag to Mr. Dayan. He
received the bag and we proceeded inside the house.135
Nowhere in Ramos v. Sandiganbayan 137 - the case relied upon by petitioner - did
this Court rule that testimonies given by a co-accused are of no value. The Court
simply held that said testimonies should be received with great caution, but not
that they would not be considered. The testimony of Ramos' co-accused was, in
fact, admitted in the cited case. Furthermore, this Court explicitly ruled in Estrada
v. Office of the Ombudsman138that hearsay evidence is admissible during
preliminary investigation. The Court held thusly:
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there
is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in
determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties.139 (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, the admissibility of evidence,140 their evidentiary weight, probative value,

The source of the monies delivered to petitioner De Lima was expressly bared by
and the credibility of the witness are matters that are best left to be resolved in a
several felons incarcerated inside the NBP. Among them is Peter Co, who testified
full-blown trial,141 not during a preliminary investigation where the technical rules of
in the following manner:
evidence are not applied142 nor at the stage of the determination of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Thus, the better alternative is to proceed to
6. Noong huling bahagi ng 2012, sinabi sa akin ni Hans Tanna nanghihingi ng the conduct of trial on the merits for the petitioner and the prosecution to present
kontribusyon sa mgaChinese sa Maximum Security Compound ng NBP si their respective evidence in support of their allegations.
dating DOJ Sec. De Lima para sa kanyang planong pagtakbo sa senado sa 2013
Elections. Dalawang beses akong nagbigay ng tig-P5 Million para tugunan ang
hiling ni Sen. De Lima, na dating DOJ Secretary; With the foregoing disquisitions, the provisional reliefs prayed for, as a
consequence, have to be rejected.
7. Binigay ko ang mga halagang ito kay Hans Tan para maibigay kay Sen. Leila
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for
De Lima na datingDOJ Secretary. Sa parehong pagkakataon, sinabihan na lang
ako ni Hans Tan na naibigay na ang pera kay Ronnie Dayan na siyang lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to
tumatanggap ng pera para kay dating DOJ Sec. De Lima Sinabi rin niHans proceed with dispatch with Criminal Case N6.17-165.
Tanna ang nagdeliver ng pera ay si dating OIC ng BuCor na si Rafael Ragos.
SO ORDERED.
8. Sa kabuuan, nakapagbigay ang mga Chinese sa loob ng Maximum ng PIO
Million sa mga huling bahagi ng taong 2012 kay dating DOJ Sec. De Lima para sa
kanyang planong pagtakbo sa senado sa2013 Elections. Ang mga perang ito ay
mula sa pinagbentahan ng illegal na droga.136

All these, at least preliminarily, outline a case for illegal drug trading committed in
conspiracy by the petitioner and her co-accused. Thus, the Court cannot sustain
the allegation that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed Order for petitioner's arrest.
2. NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. HON. PRESIDING
JUDGE OF RTC-NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 52, BACOLOD CITY, and
ANICETO MANOJO CAMPOS,
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Whats sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the
Resolutions[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2007 and 16 August 2007,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02651 outrightly dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari filed by petitioner Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. (NOPA)
against private respondent Aniceto Manojo Campos (Campos).
On 17 March 1999, Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with
Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10773, against NOPA before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City. According to
Complaint, Campos and NOPA entered into two separate contracts denominated as
Molasses Sales Agreement.Campos allegedly paid the consideration of the Molasses Sales
Agreement in full, but was only able to receive a partial delivery of the molasses because
of a disagreement as to the quality of the products being delivered.
On 17 August 2005, more than six years after NOPA filed its Answer, NOPA
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file the correct
filing fee. According to NOPA, Campos deliberately concealed in his Complaint the exact
amount of actual damages by opting to estimate the value of the unwithdrawn molasses in
order to escape the payment of the proper docket fees.
On 30 June 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to
Dismiss. NOPA received this Order on 17 July 2006.
On 1 August 2006, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 June
2006 Order. On 5 January 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying NOPAs Motion for
Reconsideration.
On 2 April 2007, NOPA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals assailing the Orders of the RTC dated 30 June 2006 and 5 January 2007.
On 23 May 2007, the Court of Appeals issued the first assailed Resolution
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:
1. Failure of the Petitioner to state in its Verification that the
allegations in the petition are based on authentic records, in violation of
Section 4, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by
A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC (May 1, 2000), which provides:
x x x - A pleading is verified by an affidavit
that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which
the contains a verification based on information and belief,
or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.
2. Failure of the petitioner to append to the petition relevant
pleadings and documents, which would aid in the resolution of the instant
petition, in violation of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, such as:
a. Ex-parte Motion to Set the Case for Pre-Trial dated July
27, 1999;
b. Notice of Pre-Trial;
c. Motion for Leave to File Third Party Complaint;
d. Orders dated July 31, 2000, March 20 2001, November 17,
2004, and May 17, 2005, respectively;
e. Motion to Suspend the Proceedings dated August 10,
2003;
f. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute; and
g. Motion for Reconsideration to the Order dated May 12,
2005.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provides:
 When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
3. Failure of petitioners counsel to indicate in the petition his
current IBP Official Receipt Number, in violation of Bar Matter No.
1132 and/or A.M. No. 287, which reads as follows:
The Court resolved, upon recommendation of
the Office of the Bar Confidant, to GRANT the request
of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippinesand the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos
Norte to require all lawyers to indicate their Roll of
Attorneys Number in all papers or pleadings submitted
to the various judicial or quasi-judicial bodies in
addition to the requirement of indicating the current
Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) and the IBP Official
Receipt or Lifetime Member Number.[2]
On 22 June 2007, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above
Resolution, attaching thereto an Amended Petition for Certiorari in compliance with the
requirements of the Court of Appeals deemed to have been violated by NOPA. The Court
of Appeals denied the said Motion in the second assailed Resolution dated 16 August 2007.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari, where NOPA raises the following
issue and arguments:
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL
REQUIREMENTS WHEN PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE IN
ITS VERIFICATION THAT THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN ARE
TRUE AND CORRECT OF HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OR
BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND FAILURE TO ATTACH
THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS ON ITS PLEADINGS AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 1, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.[3]
ARGUMENTS
1. The requirement that a pleading be verified is merely formal
and not jurisdictional. The court may give due course to an unverified
pleading where the material facts alleged are a matter of record and the
questions raised are mainly of law such as in a petition for certiorari. [4]
2. Petitioner had attached to its Petition for Certiorari clearly
legible and duplicate original or a certified true copy of the judgment or
final order or resolution of the court a quo and the requisite number of
plain copies thereof and such material portions of the record as would
support the petition.[5]
3. Substantial compliance of the rules, which was further
supplied by the petitioners subsequent full compliance demonstrates its
good faith to abide by the procedural requirements. [6]
4. The resolution of the important jurisdictional issue raised by
the petitioner before the PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA would justify a
relaxation of the rules.[7]
The original Verification in the original Petition for Certiorari filed by NOPA
states as follows:
1. That I am the President and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. (NOPA), the
petitioner in this case, a domestic corporation duly organized under
Philippine Laws, with principal place of business at Central Bais, Bais
 City, Philippines; that I am duly authorized by the Board of NOPA
(Secretarys Certificate attached as Annex A) to cause the preparation of
the foregoing petition; and that I hereby affirm and confirm that all the
allegations contained herein are true and correct to my own knowledge
and belief;[8]
NOPA claims that this Court has in several cases allowed pleadings with a
Verification that contains the allegation to the best of my knowledge and the allegation are
true and correct, without the words of his own knowledge, citing Decano v.
Edu,[9] and Quimpo v. De la Victoria.[10] NOPA claims that the allegations in these cases
constitute substantial compliance with the Rules of Court, and should likewise apply to the
case at bar.
NOPA is mistaken. NOPA cited cases promulgated before 1 May 2000, when
Section 4 of Rule 7 was amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10. Before the amendment, said
Section 4 stated:
SEC. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically required
by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied
by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
knowledge and belief.
As amended, said Section 4 now states:
SEC. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically required
by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied
by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
Clearly, the amendment was introduced in order to make the verification
requirement stricter, such that the party cannot now merely state under oath that
he believes the statements made in the pleading. He cannot even merely state under oath
that he has knowledge that such statements are true and correct. His knowledge must be
specifically alleged under oath to be either personal knowledge or at least based on
authentic records.
Unlike, however, the requirement for a Certification against Forum Shopping in
Section 5, wherein failure to comply with the requirements is not curable by amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading,[11] Section 4 of Rule 7, as amended, states that
the effect of the failure to properly verify a pleading is that the pleading shall be treated as
unsigned:
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on information and belief, or upon knowledge,
information and belief, or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated
as an unsigned pleading.
Unsigned pleadings are discussed in the immediately preceding section of Rule 7:
SEC. 3. Signature and address. x x x.
xxxx
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the
court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it
shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended
for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a
pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent
matter therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a change of his
address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (5a)
A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the partys
knowledge and belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to
allow the deficiency to be remedied. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in the
exercise of this discretion, refused to allow the deficiency in the Verification to be
remedied, by denying NOPAs Motion for Reconsideration with attached Amended Petition
for Certiorari.
 May an appellate court reverse the exercise of discretion by a lower court? The
old case of Lino Luna v. Arcenas[12] states that it can, but only in exceptional cases when
there is grave abuse of this discretion or adverse effect on the substantial rights of a litigant:
Discretionary power is generally exercised by trial judges in
furtherance of the convenience of the courts and the litigants, the
expedition of business, and in the decision of interlocutory matters on
conflicting facts where one tribunal could not easily prescribe to another
the appropriate rule of procedure.
The general rule, therefore, and indeed one of the fundamental
principles of appellate procedure is that decisions of a trial court which
"lie in discretion" will not be reviewed on appeal, whether the case
be civil or criminal at law or in equity.
We have seen that where such rulings have to do with minor
matters, not affecting the substantial rights of the parties, the prohibition
of review in appellate proceedings is made absolute by the express terms
of the statute; but it would be a monstrous travesty on justice to
declare that where the exercise of discretionary power by an inferior
court affects adversely the substantial legal rights of a litigant, it is
not subject to review on appeal in any case wherein a clear and
affirmative showing is made of an abuse of discretion, or of a total
lack of its exercise, or of conduct amounting to an abuse of
discretion, such as its improper exercise under a misapprehension of the
law applicable to the facts upon which the ruling is based.
In its very nature, the discretionary control conferred upon the
trial judge over the proceedings had before him implies the absence of
any hard-and-fast rule by which it is to be exercised, and in accordance
with which it may be reviewed. But the discretion conferred upon the
courts is not a willful, arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled
discretion. It is a sound, judicial discretion which should always be
exercised with due regard to the rights of the parties and the
demands of equity and justice. As was said in the case of The Styria vs.
Morgan (186 U. S., 1, 9): "The establishment of a clearly defined rule of
action would be the end of discretion, and yet discretion should not be a
word for arbitrary will or inconsiderate action." So in the case of
Goodwin vs. Prime (92 Me., 355), it was said that "discretion implies that
in the absence of positive law or fixed rule the judge is to decide by his
view of expediency or by the demands of equity and justice."
There being no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide the judge in
the court below in such cases, there is no "positive law or fixed rule" to
guide a court of appeal in reviewing his action in the premises, and such
courts will not therefore attempt to control the exercise of discretion by
the court below unless it plainly appears that there was "inconsiderate
action" or the exercise of mere "arbitrary will," or in other words that his
action in the premises amounted to "an abuse of discretion." But the right
of an appellate court to review judicial acts which lie in the discretion of
inferior courts may properly be invoked upon a showing of a strong and
clear case of abuse of power to the prejudice of the appellant, or that the
ruling objected to rested on an erroneous principle of law not vested in
discretion.[13]
The case at bar demonstrates a situation in which there is no effect on the
substantial rights of a litigant. NOPAs Petition for Certiorari is seeking the reversal of the
Orders of the RTC denying NOPAs Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to pay the
proper docket fees. The alleged deficiency in the payment of docket fees by Campos, if
there is any, would not inure to the benefit of NOPA.
There is therefore no substantive right that will be prejudiced by the Court of
Appeals exercise of discretion in the case at bar. While the payment of docket fees is
jurisdictional, it is nevertheless unmistakably also a technicality. Ironically, in seeking the
leniency of this Court on the basis of substantial justice, NOPA is ultimately praying for a
Writ of Certiorari enjoining the action for breach of contract from being decided on the
merits. Whats sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. A party cannot expect its
opponent to comply with the technical rules of procedure while, at the same time, hoping
for the relaxation of the technicalities in its favor.
There was therefore no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals warranting this Courts reversal of the exercise of discretion by the
former. However, even if we decide to brush aside the lapses in technicalities on the part of
NOPA in its Petition for Certiorari, we nevertheless find that such Petition would still fail.
NOPA seeks in its Petition for Certiorari for the application of this Courts ruling
in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[14] wherein we ruled that the
court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.
An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended
pleading.
In denying[15] NOPAs Motion to Dismiss, the RTC cited Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,[16] wherein we modified our ruling in Manchester and decreed that
where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The aforesaid ruling was made
on the justification that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. (SIOL) demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees required. NOPA claims that Sun is not applicable to the case at bar,
since Campos deliberately concealed his claim for damages in the prayer.
In United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont Bank) v. Ros,[17] we discussed
how Manchester was not applicable to said case in view of the lack of deliberate intent to
defraud manifested in the latter:
This Court wonders how the petitioner could possibly arrive at the
conclusion that the private respondent was moved by fraudulent intent in
omitting the amount of damages claimed in its Second Amended
Complaint, thus placing itself on the same footing as the complainant
in Manchester, when it is clear that the factual milieu of the instant case
is far from that of Manchester.
First, the complainant in Manchester paid the docket fee
only in the amount of P410.00, notwithstanding its claim for damages
in the amount of P78,750,000.00, while in the present case, the
private respondent paid P42,000.00 as docket fees upon filing of the
original complaint.
Second, complainant's counsel in Manchester claimed, in the
body of the complaint, damages in the amount of P78,750.00 but omitted
the same in its prayer in order to evade the payment of docket fees. Such
fraud-defining circumstance is absent in the instant petition.
Finally, when the court took cognizance of the issue of non-
payment of docket fees in Manchester, the complainant therein filed
an amended complaint, this time omitting all mention of the amount
of damages being claimed in the body of the complaint; and when
directed by the court to specify the amount of damages in such
amended complaint, it reduced the same from P78,750,000.00
to P10,000,000.00, obviously to avoid payment of the required docket
fee. Again, this patent fraudulent scheme is wanting in the case at bar.
This Court is not inclined to adopt the petitioner's piecemeal
construction of our rulings in Manchester and Sun Insurance. Its attempt
to strip the said landmark cases of one or two lines and use them to
bolster its arguments and clothe its position with jurisprudential blessing
must be struck down by this Court.
All told, the rule is clear and simple. In case where the party
does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of
docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by
paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal
doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance and not the strict regulations
set in Manchester will apply.
In the case at bar, Campos filed an amount of P54,898.50 as docket fee, based on
the amounts of P10,000,000.00 representing the value of unwithdrawn
molasses, P100,00.00 as storage fee, P200,00.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P500,000.00 as attorneys fees. The total amount considered in
computing the docket fee was P10,900,000.00. NOPA alleges that Campos deliberately
omitted a claim for unrealized profit of P100,000.00 and an excess amount of storage fee in
the amount of P502,875.98 in its prayer and, hence, the amount that should have been
considered in the payment of docket fees is P11,502,875.98. The amount allegedly
deliberately omitted was therefore only P602,875.98 out of P11,502,875.98, or merely
5.2% of said alleged total. Camposs pleadings furthermore evince his willingness to abide
by the rules by paying the additional docket fees when required by the Court.
Since the circumstances of this case clearly show that there was no deliberate
intent to defraud the Court in the payment of docket fees, the case of Sun should be
applied, and the Motion to Dismiss by NOPA should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May
2007 and 16 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02651, outrightly dismissing
the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc.
against private respondent Aniceto Manojo Campos, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

3. UNITED PARAGON MINING G.R. No. 150959
CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the Decision[2] dated July 24, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
as reiterated in its Resolution[3] of November 7, 2001, dismissing the petition for
certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
thereat filed by the herein petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 44450, entitled United
Paragon Mining Corporation, represented by Feliciano M. Daniel v. Atty. Murly P.
Mendez, in his capacity as Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, Region V, and Cesario
F. Ermita.
The facts:
Prior to the instant controversy, private respondent Cesario F. Ermita (Cesario, for
brevity) was a regular employee working as a foreman of petitioner United
Paragon Mining Corporation (UPMC, hereafter).
On January 18, 1996, Cesario received a termination letter bearing date January
16, 1996 and signed by UPMCs Personnel Superintendent, Feliciano M. Daniel,
informing Cesario that his employment as foreman is terminated effective thirty
days after his receipt of the letter. As stated in the letter, the termination was on
account of Cesarios violation of company rules against infliction of bodily injuries
on a co-employee, it being alleged therein that Cesario inflicted bodily injuries on
a co-employee, a certain Jerry Romero, as well as for unlawfully possessing a
deadly weapon, a bolo, again in violation of company rules.
As a result of the termination, the matter was brought to the grievance
machinery as mandated under the Collective Bargaining Agreement existing at
that time between UPMC and the United Paragon Supervisors Union. Having
failed to reach a settlement thereat, the parties agreed to submit the dispute to
voluntary arbitration. Accordingly, the complaint for illegal dismissal was referred
to Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Murly P. Mendez of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board, Regional Branch No. V, LegaspiCity, whereat the same was
docketed as VA Case No. RB5-657-04-002-96.
On February 28, 1997, Voluntary Arbitrator Mendez rendered a
decision[4] in Cesarios favor, stating that although the procedural requirements in
the termination of an employee had been complied with, the termination of
Cesario was unjustified because it was arrived at through gross misapprehension
of facts. Explains the Voluntary Arbitrator:
An analysis of the tenor of the termination letter would seem to indicate that
Ceasario Ermita was separated from service simply because his explanation was
not acceptable to the company.Stated more bluntly, Ermita was terminated not
because there was a definite finding of fact relative to his supposed culpability,
but because his answer did not find favor with management.
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence on record partakes of the uncorroborated statement of Jerry
Romero claiming that he was assaulted by [Cesario]. This claim has been disputed
and is denied by [Cesario] in the statement executed by him on January 2, 1996 as
well as in his written explanation (Annex 6, Respondent's Position Paper).
On this point, it can be argued that since this is a case of one's word against
another, the best that could be said of management's evidence is that it has
achieved a level at an equi-poise with that of the Constitution. The spirit of
prevailing jurisprudence as well as a liberal interpretation of the new
Constitutional provision on labor, would mandate that where a doubt exists, the
same should be resolved in favor of labor. The position of [Cesario] appears to
have been strengthened by the document jointly signed by [him] and Jerry
Romero, the supposed victim of the assault charged.
This amicable settlement would serve to negate the charge of physical injury
against [Cesario] as a basis for termination, it appearing that even [his] supposed
victim, Jerry Romero, who has been made to appear as a complainant in the
proceedings which resulted in the termination letter, has admitted in this
amicable settlement (Annex A, Complainant's Position Paper) that "hindi naming
sinasadya yon at itong ginawa naming sulat na ito ay siya ang magpapatunay na
ayos kaming dalawa at walang problema sa isa't isa."

This admission, that comes no less from the supposed accuser of [Cesario], clearly
establishes the fact that whatever may have happened between them on New
Year's eve was something that neither of them willfully and voluntarily did. Since
it has been established that the supposed scuffle between [Cesario] and Romero
was "hindi sinasadya," then it would necessarily follow that there could not have
been a willful and voluntary assault by [Cesario] upon Romero. This situation is
further rendered more puzzling by the fact that the suspected assailant was
himself the bearer of the tell-tale marks of injury.
xxx xxx xxx
It has been established to the satisfaction of this Arbitrator that the bolo seen
that night was used to chop wood to be burnt in the bonfire. This statement by
people who happened to be unbiased and disinterested remains uncontested and
undisputed.
Further, the preponderance of evidence shows that it was not [Cesario] who used
said bolo, but his son.
xxx xxx xxx
On these points, it is the finding of this Arbitrator, and it is so ruled, that Ceasario
Ermita was unjustifiably terminated.[5] (Words in brackets supplied).
On the basis of the above, the Voluntary Arbitrator, in his aforementioned
decision of February 28, 1997, ordered Cesarios reinstatement, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby issued ordering respondent United Paragon
Mining Corporation to immediately reinstate Ceasario F. Ermita to his former
position prior to the termination without loss of seniority nor interruption of
service, and to pay said Ceasario F. Ermita his back wages, including such other
fringe benefits as he would have been entitled to, from the date of his
termination effective February 17, 1996 up to the time of actual
reinstatement. Attorney's fees are hereby granted equivalent to 10 per cent of
such monetary award as the complainant is entitled to.
For lack of merit, all other claims for damages are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
In time, UPMC moved for a reconsideration of the decision insofar as it ordered
Cesarios reinstatement which UPMC sought to avert by offering separation pay
instead. UPMC cites the following against the decreed reinstatement: 1) Cesarios
position has already been filled up; and 2) reinstatement is no longer appropriate
in view of the supposed strained relations between Cesario and UPMC.
In his Order[6] of April 22, 1997, the Voluntary Arbitrator denied the desired
reconsideration stressing that UPMCs management misapprehended the facts
when it caused Cesarios termination, which cannot support the claim of the
existence of strained relations between him and the corporation.
Unsatisfied, UPMC, thru its Personnel Superintendent Feliciano M. Daniel,
elevated the case to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Injunction, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44450,
asserting that the Voluntary Arbitrator committed grave abuse of discretion,
erroneous interpretation of the law and denial of substantial justice.
In the herein assailed Decision[7] dated July 24, 2001, the CA, without going into
the merits of the petition, dismissed the same on the following grounds:
1) The petition for certiorari was not the proper remedy in order to seek review
or nullify decisions or final orders issued by the Labor Arbiter;
2) The verification in the petition is ineffective and insufficient because it was
merely signed by the company's Personnel Superintendent without alleging or
showing that he is authorized for the said purpose and that the verification was
based on knowledge and information;
3) The petitioner's ground of grave abuse of discretion, erroneous interpretation
of the law and denial of justice are actually dwelling on the appreciation of facts,
which cannot be entertained in a petition for certiorari.
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its
Resolution of November 7, 2001,[8] petitioner UPMC is now with this Court via the
present recourse, submitting for our consideration the following questions:
I against it and its Personnel Superintendent, Feliciano M. Daniel. It is argued that
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION
AFTER FINDING THAT THE PROPER REMEDY SHOULD HAVE BEEN A PETITION FOR
REVIEW ON CERTIORARI AND NOT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION AFTER FINDING THAT THE VERIFICATION PORTION OF
THE PETITION WAS INEFFECTIVE AND INSUFFICIENT IN THE ABSENCE OF
ALLEGATION OR SHOWING THAT FELICIANO DANIEL, AS PERSONNEL
SUPERINTENDENT WAS DULY AUTHORIZED TO FILE THE PETITION;
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION AFTER FINDING THAT THE PETITION LACKS MERIT
BECAUSE IT DWELLED ON THE APPRECIATION OF FACTS WHICH IS NOT PROPER IN
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
The recourse must have to be DENIED, no reversible error having been
committed by the CA in its challenged decision.
We start with the basic concept that a corporation, like petitioner UPMC, has no
power except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those
that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said
powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and
agents. It has thus been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be
sued in any court is lodged with its board of directors that exercises its corporate
powers. In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents,
can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by the
corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.[9]
It is petitioners posture that there is no necessity for a board resolution
authorizing its Personnel Superintendent to file in its behalf the certiorari petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 44450 because said petition arose out of the labor dispute filed
in Cesarios complaint for illegal dismissal, Daniel was made a co-respondent of
the corporation. Upon this premise, UPMC argues that Daniel has all the right to
answer the complaint and to appeal an unfavorable judgment therein, which he
actually did, in his capacity as the corporations Personnel Superintendent and as
its representative. Plodding on, petitioner contends that were the CA to insist that
Daniel could not represent the corporation, it follows that the proceedings before
the Voluntary Arbitrator could only be binding as against Daniel because the
company then could not have been duly represented in said proceedings.
Throughout the proceedings before the Voluntary Arbitrator, that is, from the
filing of the position papers up to the filing of the motion for reconsideration,
UPMC was duly represented by its counsel, Atty. Archimedes O. Yanto. True it is
that Cesarios complaint for illegal dismissal was filed against the corporation and
Daniel. It appears obvious to us, however, that Daniel was merely a nominal party
in that proceedings, as in fact he was impleaded thereat in his capacity as UPMCs
Personnel Superintendent who signed the termination letter. For sure, Cesarios
complaint contains no allegation whatsoever for specific claim or charge against
Daniel in whatever capacity. As it is, Daniel was not in anyway affected by the
outcome of the illegal dismissal case because only the corporation was made
liable therein to Cesario. Being not a real party-in-interest, Daniel has no right to
file the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 44450 in behalf of the corporation without any
authority from its board of directors. It is basic in law that a corporation has a
legal personality entirely separate and distinct from that of its officers and the
latter cannot act for and on its behalf without being so authorized by its
governing board.
In Premium Marble Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[10] we made it clear that in
the absence of an authority from the board of directors, no person, not even the
officers of the corporation, can validly bind the latter:
We agree with the finding of public respondent Court of Appeals, that in the
absence of any board resolution from its board of directors the [sic] authority to
act for and in behalf of the corporation, the present action must necessary
fail. The power of the corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with
the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. Thus, the issue of
authority and the invalidity of plaintiff-appellants subscription which is still
pending, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the
sound judgment of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Given the reality that the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 44450 was filed by Daniel in
behalf of and in representation of petitioner UPMC without an enabling
resolution of the latters board of directors, that petition was fatally defective,
inclusive of the verification and the certification of non-forum shopping executed
by Daniel himself.
True, ample jurisprudence exists to the effect that subsequent and substantial
compliance of a petitioner may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure in
the interest of justice.[11] But to merit the Court's liberal consideration, petitioner
must show reasonable cause justifying non-compliance with the rules and must
convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the
administration of justice.[12] Here, petitioner has not adequately explained its
failure to have the certification against forum shopping signed by its duly
authorized officer. Instead, it merely persisted in its thesis that it was not
necessary to show proof that its Personnel Superintendent was duly authorized to
file that petition and to sign the verification thereof and the certification
against forumshopping despite the absence of the necessary board authorization,
thereby repeating in the process its basic submission that CA-G.R. SP No. 44450 is
merely a continuation of the proceedings before the Voluntary Arbitrator and
that its Personnel Superintendent was impleaded as one of the
respondents in Cesarios complaint for illegal dismissal.

With the view we take of this case, we deem it unnecessary to address petitioners
other grievances.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed CA decision and
resolution are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
4. COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE
GUEVARRA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review[1] of the 21 June 2000 Decision[2] and 14
December 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43129. The
Court of Appeals set aside the 11 November 1996 decision[3] of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 81,[4] affirming the 15 December 1995 decision [5] of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31.[6]
The Antecedents
In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo (Pajuyo) paid P400 to a certain
Pedro Perez for the rights over a 250-square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon
City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of light materials on the lot. Pajuyo
and his family lived in the house from 1979 to 7 December 1985.
On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra
(Guevarra) executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house,
allowed Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain
the cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would
voluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyos demand.
In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and
demanded that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra refused.
Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 31 (MTC).
In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid title or right of
possession over the lot where the house stands because the lot is within the 150
hectares set aside by Proclamation No. 137 for socialized housing. Guevarra
pointed out that from December 1985 to September 1994, Pajuyo did not show up
or communicate with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has valid
title to the lot.
On 15 December 1995, the MTC rendered its decision in favor of Pajuyo. The
dispositive portion of the MTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and
against defendant, ordering the latter to:
A) vacate the house and lot occupied by the defendant or any other
person or persons claiming any right under him;
B) pay unto plaintiff the sum of THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00)
monthly as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises
starting from the last demand;
C) pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees;
and
D) pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Aggrieved, Guevarra appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 81 (RTC).
On 11 November 1996, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, being in accord with the law and evidence presented, and the same is
hereby affirmed en toto.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Guevarra received the RTC decision on 29 November 1996. Guevarra had
only until 14 December 1996 to file his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Instead of
filing his appeal with the Court of Appeals, Guevarra filed with the Supreme Court
a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal by Certiorari Based on Rule 42
(motion for extension). Guevarra theorized that his appeal raised pure questions of
law. The Receiving Clerk of the Supreme Court received the motion for extension
on 13 December 1996 or one day before the right to appeal expired.
On 3 January 1997, Guevarra filed his petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
On 8 January 1997, the First Division of the Supreme Court issued a
Resolution[9] referring the motion for extension to the Court of Appeals which has
concurrent jurisdiction over the case. The case presented no special and important
matter for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of at the first instance.
On 28 January 1997, the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution[10] granting the motion for extension conditioned on the timeliness of the
filing of the motion.
On 27 February 1997, the Court of Appeals ordered Pajuyo to comment on
Guevaras petition for review. On 11 April 1997, Pajuyo filed his Comment.
On 21 June 2000, the Court of Appeals issued its decision reversing the RTC
decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the court a quo in Civil Case
No. Q-96-26943 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and it is hereby declared that the
ejectment case filed against defendant-appellant is without factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Pajuyo filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. Pajuyo pointed out
that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed outright Guevarras petition for
review because it was filed out of time. Moreover, it was Guevarras counsel and
not Guevarra who signed the certification against forum-shopping.
On 14 December 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying
Pajuyos motion for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The Ruling of the MTC
The MTC ruled that the subject of the agreement between Pajuyo and
Guevarra is the house and not the lot. Pajuyo is the owner of the house, and he
allowed Guevarra to use the house only by tolerance. Thus, Guevarras refusal to
vacate the house on Pajuyos demand made Guevarras continued possession of
the house illegal.
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC upheld the Kasunduan, which established the landlord and tenant
relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra. The terms of the Kasunduan bound
Guevarra to return possession of the house on demand.
The RTC rejected Guevarras claim of a better right under Proclamation No.
137, the Revised National Government Center Housing Project Code of Policies
and other pertinent laws. In an ejectment suit, the RTC has no power to decide
Guevarras rights under these laws. The RTC declared that in an ejectment case,
the only issue for resolution is material or physical possession, not ownership.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals declared that Pajuyo and Guevarra are squatters.
Pajuyo and Guevarra illegally occupied the contested lot which the government
owned.
Perez, the person from whom Pajuyo acquired his rights, was also a
squatter. Perez had no right or title over the lot because it is public land. The
assignment of rights between Perez and Pajuyo, and the Kasunduan between
Pajuyo and Guevarra, did not have any legal effect. Pajuyo and Guevarra are
in pari delicto or in equal fault. The court will leave them where they are.
The Court of Appeals reversed the MTC and RTC rulings, which held that
the Kasunduan between Pajuyo and Guevarra created a legal tie akin to that of a
landlord and tenant relationship. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Kasunduan is
not a lease contract but a commodatum because the agreement is not for a price
certain.
Since Pajuyo admitted that he resurfaced only in 1994 to claim the property,
the appellate court held that Guevarra has a better right over the property under
Proclamation No. 137.President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued
Proclamation No. 137 on 7 September 1987. At that time, Guevarra was in
physical possession of the property. Under Article VI of the Code of Policies
Beneficiary Selection and Disposition of Homelots and Structures in the National
Housing Project (the Code), the actual occupant or caretaker of the lot shall have
first priority as beneficiary of the project. The Court of Appeals concluded that
Guevarra is first in the hierarchy of priority.
In denying Pajuyos motion for reconsideration, the appellate court debunked
Pajuyos claim that Guevarra filed his motion for extension beyond the period to
appeal.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that Guevarras motion for extension filed
before the Supreme Court was stamped 13 December 1996 at 4:09 PM by the
Supreme Courts Receiving Clerk. The Court of Appeals concluded that the motion
for extension bore a date, contrary to Pajuyos claim that the motion for extension
was undated. Guevarra filed the motion for extension on time on 13 December
1996 since he filed the motion one day before the expiration of the reglementary
period on 14 December 1996. Thus, the motion for extension properly complied
with the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals in its 28 January 1997
Resolution. The Court of Appeals explained that the thirty-day extension to file the
petition for review was deemed granted because of such compliance.
The Court of Appeals rejected Pajuyos argument that the appellate court
should have dismissed the petition for review because it was Guevarras counsel
and not Guevarra who signed the certification against forum-shopping. The Court
of Appeals pointed out that Pajuyo did not raise this issue in his Comment. The
Court of Appeals held that Pajuyo could not now seek the dismissal of the case
after he had extensively argued on the merits of the case. This technicality, the
appellate court opined, was clearly an afterthought.
The Issues
Pajuyo raises the following issues for resolution:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR ABUSED ITS AUTHORITY AND
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION:
1) in GRANTING, instead of denying, Private Respondents
Motion for an Extension of thirty days to file petition for
review at the time when there was no more period to
extend as the decision of the Regional Trial Court had
already become final and executory.
2) in giving due course, instead of dismissing, private
respondents Petition for Review even though the
certification against forum-shopping was signed only by
counsel instead of by petitioner himself.
3) in ruling that the Kasunduan voluntarily entered into by the
parties was in fact a commodatum, instead of a Contract of
Lease as found by the Metropolitan Trial Court and in
holding that the ejectment case filed against defendant-
appellant is without legal and factual basis.
4) in reversing and setting aside the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-96-26943 and in holding that
the parties are in pari delicto being both squatters,
therefore, illegal occupants of the contested parcel of land.
5) in deciding the unlawful detainer case based on the so-
called Code of Policies of the National Government Center
Housing Project instead of deciding the same under the
Kasunduan voluntarily executed by the parties, the terms
and conditions of which are the laws between
themselves.[13]
The Ruling of the Court
The procedural issues Pajuyo is raising are baseless. However, we find merit
in the substantive issues Pajuyo is submitting for resolution.
Procedural Issues
Pajuyo insists that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed outright
Guevarras petition for review because the RTC decision had already become final
and executory when the appellate court acted on Guevarras motion for extension
to file the petition. Pajuyo points out that Guevarra had only one day before the
expiry of his period to appeal the RTC decision.Instead of filing the petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, Guevarra filed with this Court an undated motion
for extension of 30 days to file a petition for review. This Court merely referred the
motion to the Court of Appeals. Pajuyo believes that the filing of the motion for
extension with this Court did not toll the running of the period to perfect the
appeal. Hence, when the Court of Appeals received the motion, the period to
appeal had already expired.
We are not persuaded.
Decisions of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their appellate
jurisdiction are appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for review in cases
involving questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. [14] Decisions of the
regional trial courts involving pure questions of law are appealable directly to this
Court by petition for review.[15] These modes of appeal are now embodied in
Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Guevarra believed that his appeal of the RTC decision involved only
questions of law. Guevarra thus filed his motion for extension to file petition for
review before this Court on 14 December 1996. On 3 January 1997, Guevarra
then filed his petition for review with this Court. A perusal of Guevarras petition for
review gives the impression that the issues he raised were pure questions of law.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference is on what the law is on a
certain state of facts.[16] There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference is
on the truth or falsity of the facts alleged.[17]
In his petition for review before this Court, Guevarra no longer disputed the
facts. Guevarras petition for review raised these questions: (1) Do ejectment cases
pertain only to possession of a structure, and not the lot on which the structure
stands? (2) Does a suit by a squatter against a fellow squatter constitute a valid
case for ejectment? (3) Should a Presidential Proclamation governing the lot on
which a squatters structure stands be considered in an ejectment suit filed by the
owner of the structure?
These questions call for the evaluation of the rights of the parties under the
law on ejectment and the Presidential Proclamation. At first glance, the questions
Guevarra raised appeared purely legal. However, some factual questions still have
to be resolved because they have a bearing on the legal questions raised in the
petition for review. These factual matters refer to the metes and bounds of the
disputed property and the application of Guevarra as beneficiary of Proclamation
No. 137.
The Court of Appeals has the power to grant an extension of time to file a
petition for review. In Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the
Intermediate Appellate Court,[18] we declared that the Court of Appeals could
grant extension of time in appeals by petition for review. In Liboro v. Court of
Appeals,[19] we clarified that the prohibition against granting an extension of time
applies only in a case where ordinary appeal is perfected by a mere notice of
appeal. The prohibition does not apply in a petition for review where the pleading
needs verification. A petition for review, unlike an ordinary appeal, requires
preparation and research to present a persuasive position.[20] The drafting of the
petition for review entails more time and effort than filing a notice of
appeal.[21] Hence, the Court of Appeals may allow an extension of time to file a
petition for review.
In the more recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals,[22] we held that Liboros clarification of Lacsamana is consistent with the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-
91. They all allow an extension of time for filing petitions for review with the Court
of Appeals. The extension, however, should be limited to only fifteen days save in
exceptionally meritorious cases where the Court of Appeals may grant a longer
period.
A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. Finality of
judgment becomes a fact on the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no
appeal is perfected.[23] The RTC decision could not have gained finality because
the Court of Appeals granted the 30-day extension to Guevarra.
The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
approved Guevarras motion for extension. The Court of Appeals gave due course
to the motion for extension because it complied with the condition set by the
appellate court in its resolution dated 28 January 1997. The resolution stated that
the Court of Appeals would only give due course to the motion for extension if filed
on time. The motion for extension met this condition.
The material dates to consider in determining the timeliness of the filing of the
motion for extension are (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or
resolution subject of the petition, and (2) the date of filing of the motion for
extension.[24] It is the date of the filing of the motion or pleading, and not the date of
execution, that determines the timeliness of the filing of that motion or
pleading. Thus, even if the motion for extension bears no date, the date of filing
stamped on it is the reckoning point for determining the timeliness of its filing.
Guevarra had until 14 December 1996 to file an appeal from the RTC
decision. Guevarra filed his motion for extension before this Court on 13 December
1996, the date stamped by this Courts Receiving Clerk on the motion for
extension. Clearly, Guevarra filed the motion for extension exactly one day before
the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal.
Assuming that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed Guevarras appeal
on technical grounds, Pajuyo did not ask the appellate court to deny the motion for
extension and dismiss the petition for review at the earliest opportunity. Instead,
Pajuyo vigorously discussed the merits of the case. It was only when the Court of
Appeals ruled in Guevarras favor that Pajuyo raised the procedural issues against
Guevarras petition for review.
A party who, after voluntarily submitting a dispute for resolution, receives an
adverse decision on the merits, is estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the
court.[25] Estoppel sets in not because the judgment of the court is a valid and
conclusive adjudication, but because the practice of attacking the courts
jurisdiction after voluntarily submitting to it is against public policy.[26]
In his Comment before the Court of Appeals, Pajuyo also failed to discuss
Guevarras failure to sign the certification against forum shopping. Instead, Pajuyo
harped on Guevarras counsel signing the verification, claiming that the counsels
verification is insufficient since it is based only on mere information.
A partys failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different
from the partys failure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-
forum shopping must be signed by the party, and not by counsel.[27] The
certification of counsel renders the petition defective.[28]
On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal
and not a jurisdictional requisite.[29] It is intended simply to secure an assurance
that what are alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of
the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
faith.[30] The party need not sign the verification. A partys representative, lawyer or
any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may
sign the verification.[31]
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the issue on the certificate against
forum shopping was merely an afterthought. Pajuyo did not call the Court of
Appeals attention to this defect at the early stage of the proceedings. Pajuyo
raised this procedural issue too late in the proceedings.
Absence of Title over the Disputed Property will not Divest the Courts of
Jurisdiction to Resolve the Issue of Possession
Settled is the rule that the defendants claim of ownership of the disputed
property will not divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction over the ejectment
case.[32] Even if the pleadings raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass on
such issue to determine only the question of possession, especially if the
ownership is inseparably linked with the possession. [33] The adjudication on the
issue of ownership is only provisional and will not bar an action between the same
parties involving title to the land.[34] This doctrine is a necessary consequence of
the nature of the two summary actions of ejectment, forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, where the only issue for adjudication is the physical or material
possession over the real property.[35]
In this case, what Guevarra raised before the courts was that he and Pajuyo
are not the owners of the contested property and that they are mere squatters. Will
the defense that the parties to the ejectment case are not the owners of the
disputed lot allow the courts to renounce their jurisdiction over the case? The Court
of Appeals believed so and held that it would just leave the parties where they are
since they are in pari delicto.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals.
Ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not at issue in an
action for recovery of possession. The parties cannot present evidence to prove
ownership or right to legal possession except to prove the nature of the possession
when necessary to resolve the issue of physical possession. [36] The same is true
when the defendant asserts the absence of title over the property. The absence of
title over the contested lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the
parties in an ejectment case.
The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is -
who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the
possession de facto and not to the possession de jure.[37] It does not even matter if
a partys title to the property is questionable,[38] or when both parties intruded into
public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the
proper government agency.[39] Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a
strong hand, violence or terror.[40] Neither is the unlawful withholding of property
allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself.[41] Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully
ejects him.[42] To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment
suit is the right to physical possession.
In Pitargue v. Sorilla,[43] the government owned the land in dispute. The
government did not authorize either the plaintiff or the defendant in the case of
forcible entry case to occupy the land. The plaintiff had prior possession and had
already introduced improvements on the public land. The plaintiff had a pending
application for the land with the Bureau of Lands when the defendant ousted him
from possession. The plaintiff filed the action of forcible entry against the
defendant. The government was not a party in the case of forcible entry.
The defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the courts to settle the issue of
possession because while the application of the plaintiff was still pending, title
remained with the government, and the Bureau of Public Lands had jurisdiction
over the case. We disagreed with the defendant. We ruled that courts have
jurisdiction to entertain ejectment suits even before the resolution of the
application. The plaintiff, by priority of his application and of his entry, acquired
prior physical possession over the public land applied for as against other private
claimants. That prior physical possession enjoys legal protection against other
private claimants because only a court can take away such physical possession in
an ejectment case.
While the Court did not brand the plaintiff and the defendant in Pitargue[44] as
squatters, strictly speaking, their entry into the disputed land was illegal. Both the
plaintiff and defendant entered the public land without the owners permission. Title
to the land remained with the government because it had not awarded to anyone
ownership of the contested public land. Both the plaintiff and the defendant were in
effect squatting on government property. Yet, we upheld the courts jurisdiction to
resolve the issue of possession even if the plaintiff and the defendant in the
ejectment case did not have any title over the contested land.
Courts must not abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of physical
possession because of the public need to preserve the basic policy behind the
summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The underlying philosophy
behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and
to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to
obtain what he claims is his.[45] The party deprived of possession must not take the
law into his own hands.[46] Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the
authorities can settle speedily actions to recover possession because of the
overriding need to quell social disturbances.[47]
We further explained in Pitargue the greater interest that is at stake in actions
for recovery of possession. We made the following pronouncements in Pitargue:
The question that is before this Court is: Are courts without jurisdiction to take cognizance
of possessory actions involving these public lands before final award is made by the Lands
Department, and before title is given any of the conflicting claimants? It is one of utmost
importance, as there are public lands everywhere and there are thousands of settlers,
especially in newly opened regions. It also involves a matter of policy, as it requires the
determination of the respective authorities and functions of two coordinate branches of the
Government in connection with public land conflicts.
Our problem is made simple by the fact that under the Civil Code, either in the old, which
was in force in this country before the American occupation, or in the new, we have a
possessory action, the aim and purpose of which is the recovery of the physical possession
of real property, irrespective of the question as to who has the title thereto. Under the
Spanish Civil Code we had the accion interdictal, a summary proceeding which could be
brought within one year from dispossession (Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs.
Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291); and as early as October 1, 1901, upon the enactment of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission) we implanted the
common law action of forcible entry (section 80 of Act No. 190), the object of which has
been stated by this Court to be to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder
which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such
withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who,
believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to gain
possession rather than to some appropriate action in the court to assert their claims.
(Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) So before the enactment of
the first Public Land Act (Act No. 926) the action of forcible entry was already available in
the courts of the country. So the question to be resolved is, Did the Legislature intend,
when it vested the power and authority to alienate and dispose of the public lands in the
Lands Department, to exclude the courts from entertaining the possessory action of forcible
entry between rival claimants or occupants of any land before award thereof to any of the
parties? Did Congress intend that the lands applied for, or all public lands for that matter,
be removed from the jurisdiction of the judicial Branch of the Government, so that any
troubles arising therefrom, or any breaches of the peace or disorders caused by rival
claimants, could be inquired into only by the Lands Department to the exclusion of the
courts? The answer to this question seems to us evident. The Lands Department does not
have the means to police public lands; neither does it have the means to prevent disorders
arising therefrom, or contain breaches of the peace among settlers; or to pass promptly
upon conflicts of possession. Then its power is clearly limited to disposition and
alienation, and while it may decide conflicts of possession in order to make proper
award, the settlement of conflicts of possession which is recognized in the court herein
has another ultimate purpose, i.e., the protection of actual possessors and occupants with
a view to the prevention of breaches of the peace. The power to dispose and alienate
could not have been intended to include the power to prevent or settle disorders or
breaches of the peace among rival settlers or claimants prior to the final award. As to
this, therefore, the corresponding branches of the Government must continue to exercise
power and jurisdiction within the limits of their respective functions. The vesting of the
Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose, and alienate public lands,
therefore, must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the Government of
the exercise of the respective functions or powers thereon, such as the authority to stop
disorders and quell breaches of the peace by the police, the authority on the part of the
courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions arising therefrom not involving,
directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition.
Our attention has been called to a principle enunciated in American courts to the effect that
courts have no jurisdiction to determine the rights of claimants to public lands, and that
until the disposition of the land has passed from the control of the Federal Government, the
courts will not interfere with the administration of matters concerning the same. (50 C. J.
1093-1094.) We have no quarrel with this principle. The determination of the respective
rights of rival claimants to public lands is different from the determination of who has the
actual physical possession or occupation with a view to protecting the same and preventing
disorder and breaches of the peace. A judgment of the court ordering restitution of the
possession of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by
another through the use of force or in any other illegal manner, can never be prejudicial
interference with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the other hand, if courts
were deprived of jurisdiction of cases involving conflicts of possession, that threat of
judicial action against breaches of the peace committed on public lands would be
eliminated, and a state of lawlessness would probably be produced between applicants,
occupants or squatters, where force or might, not right or justice, would rule.
It must be borne in mind that the action that would be used to solve conflicts of possession
between rivals or conflicting applicants or claimants would be no other than that of forcible
entry. This action, both in England and the United States and in our jurisdiction, is a
summary and expeditious remedy whereby one in peaceful and quiet possession may
recover the possession of which he has been deprived by a stronger hand, by violence or
terror; its ultimate object being to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder. (Supia
and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) The basis of the remedy is mere
possession as a fact, of physical possession, not a legal possession. (Mediran vs.
Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752.) The title or right to possession is never in issue in an action of
forcible entry; as a matter of fact, evidence thereof is expressly banned, except to prove the
nature of the possession. (Second 4, Rule 72, Rules of Court.) With this nature of the action
in mind, by no stretch of the imagination can conclusion be arrived at that the use of the
remedy in the courts of justice would constitute an interference with the alienation,
disposition, and control of public lands. To limit ourselves to the case at bar can it be
pretended at all that its result would in any way interfere with the manner of the alienation
or disposition of the land contested? On the contrary, it would facilitate adjudication, for
the question of priority of possession having been decided in a final manner by the courts,
said question need no longer waste the time of the land officers making the adjudication or
award. (Emphasis ours)
The Principle of Pari Delicto is not Applicable to Ejectment Cases
The Court of Appeals erroneously applied the principle of pari delicto to this
case.
Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code[48] embody the principle of pari
delicto. We explained the principle of pari delicto in these words:
The rule of pari delicto is expressed in the maxims ex dolo malo non eritur actio and in
pari delicto potior est conditio defedentis. The law will not aid either party to an illegal
agreement. It leaves the parties where it finds them.[49]
The application of the pari delicto principle is not absolute, as there are
exceptions to its application. One of these exceptions is where the application of
the pari delicto rule would violate well-established public policy.[50]
In Drilon v. Gaurana,[51] we reiterated the basic policy behind the summary
actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. We held that:
It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that,
regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this
remedy of restitution the object of the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and
criminal disorder which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the
reasonable hope such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those
persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to force to
gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their claims.
This is the philosophy at the foundation of all these actions of forcible entry and detainer
which are designed to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law
alone to obtain what he claims is his.[52]
Clearly, the application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of ejectment
between squatters is fraught with danger. To shut out relief to squatters on the
ground of pari delicto would openly invite mayhem and lawlessness. A squatter
would oust another squatter from possession of the lot that the latter had illegally
occupied, emboldened by the knowledge that the courts would leave them where
they are. Nothing would then stand in the way of the ousted squatter from re-
claiming his prior possession at all cost.
Petty warfare over possession of properties is precisely what ejectment cases
or actions for recovery of possession seek to prevent.[53] Even the owner who has
title over the disputed property cannot take the law into his own hands to regain
possession of his property. The owner must go to court.
Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if the parties to the
ejectment suit are squatters. The determination of priority and superiority of
possession is a serious and urgent matter that cannot be left to the squatters to
decide. To do so would make squatters receive better treatment under the
law. The law restrains property owners from taking the law into their own
hands. However, the principle of pari delicto as applied by the Court of Appeals
would give squatters free rein to dispossess fellow squatters or violently retake
possession of properties usurped from them. Courts should not leave squatters to
their own devices in cases involving recovery of possession.
Possession is the only Issue for Resolution in an Ejectment Case
The case for review before the Court of Appeals was a simple case of
ejectment. The Court of Appeals refused to rule on the issue of physical
possession. Nevertheless, the appellate court held that the pivotal issue in this
case is who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has the priority right as beneficiary of
the contested land under Proclamation No. 137.[54] According to the Court of
Appeals, Guevarra enjoys preferential right under Proclamation No. 137 because
Article VI of the Code declares that the actual occupant or caretaker is the one
qualified to apply for socialized housing.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals has no factual and legal basis.
First. Guevarra did not present evidence to show that the contested lot is part
of a relocation site under Proclamation No. 137. Proclamation No. 137 laid down
the metes and bounds of the land that it declared open for disposition to bona
fide residents.
The records do not show that the contested lot is within the land specified by
Proclamation No. 137. Guevarra had the burden to prove that the disputed lot is
within the coverage of Proclamation No. 137. He failed to do so.
Second. The Court of Appeals should not have given credence to Guevarras
unsubstantiated claim that he is the beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137. Guevarra
merely alleged that in the survey the project administrator conducted, he and not
Pajuyo appeared as the actual occupant of the lot.
There is no proof that Guevarra actually availed of the benefits of
Proclamation No. 137. Pajuyo allowed Guevarra to occupy the disputed property in
1985. President Aquino signed Proclamation No. 137 into law on 11 March
1986. Pajuyo made his earliest demand for Guevarra to vacate the property in
September 1994.
During the time that Guevarra temporarily held the property up to the time that
Proclamation No. 137 allegedly segregated the disputed lot, Guevarra never
applied as beneficiary of Proclamation No. 137. Even when Guevarra already
knew that Pajuyo was reclaiming possession of the property, Guevarra did not take
any step to comply with the requirements of Proclamation No. 137.
Third. Even assuming that the disputed lot is within the coverage of
Proclamation No. 137 and Guevarra has a pending application over the lot, courts
should still assume jurisdiction and resolve the issue of possession. However, the
jurisdiction of the courts would be limited to the issue of physical possession only.
In Pitargue,[55] we ruled that courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions
involving public land to determine the issue of physical possession. The
determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public land is, however,
distinct from the determination of who has the actual physical possession or who
has a better right of physical possession.[56] The administrative disposition and
alienation of public lands should be threshed out in the proper government
agency.[57]
The Court of Appeals determination of Pajuyo and Guevarras rights under
Proclamation No. 137 was premature. Pajuyo and Guevarra were at most merely
potential beneficiaries of the law. Courts should not preempt the decision of the
administrative agency mandated by law to determine the qualifications of
applicants for the acquisition of public lands. Instead, courts should expeditiously
resolve the issue of physical possession in ejectment cases to prevent disorder
and breaches of peace.[58]
Pajuyo is Entitled to Physical Possession of the Disputed Property
Guevarra does not dispute Pajuyos prior possession of the lot and ownership
of the house built on it. Guevarra expressly admitted the existence and due
execution of the Kasunduan.The Kasunduan reads:
Ako, si COL[I]TO PAJUYO, may-ari ng bahay at lote sa Bo. Payatas, Quezon City, ay
nagbibigay pahintulot kay G. Eddie Guevarra, na pansamantalang manirahan sa nasabing
bahay at lote ng walang bayad.Kaugnay nito, kailangang panatilihin nila ang kalinisan at
kaayusan ng bahay at lote.
Sa sandaling kailangan na namin ang bahay at lote, silay kusang aalis ng walang reklamo.
Based on the Kasunduan, Pajuyo permitted Guevarra to reside in the house
and lot free of rent, but Guevarra was under obligation to maintain the premises in
good condition. Guevarra promised to vacate the premises on Pajuyos demand
but Guevarra broke his promise and refused to heed Pajuyos demand to vacate.
These facts make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves
the withholding by a person from another of the possession of real property to
which the latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of the formers right to
hold possession under a contract, express or implied.[59]
Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his property by tolerance
without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will
lie.[60] The defendants refusal to comply with the demand makes his continued
possession of the property unlawful.[61] The status of the defendant in such a case
is similar to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose
occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner.[62]
This principle should apply with greater force in cases where a contract
embodies the permission or tolerance to use the
property. The Kasunduan expressly articulated Pajuyos forbearance. Pajuyo did
not require Guevarra to pay any rent but only to maintain the house and lot in good
condition. Guevarra expressly vowed in the Kasunduan that he would vacate the
property on demand. Guevarras refusal to comply with Pajuyos demand to vacate
made Guevarras continued possession of the property unlawful.
We do not subscribe to the Court of Appeals theory that the Kasunduan is
one of commodatum.
In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to another
something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time
and return it.[63] An essential feature of commodatum is that it is gratuitous. Another
feature of commodatum is that the use of the thing belonging to another is for a
certain period.[64] Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned
until after expiration of the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for
which the commodatum is constituted.[65] If the bailor should have urgent need of
the thing, he may demand its return for temporary use.[66] If the use of the thing is
merely tolerated by the bailor, he can demand the return of the thing at will, in
which case the contractual relation is called a precarium.[67] Under the Civil
Code, precarium is a kind of commodatum.[68]
The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo to
Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While the Kasunduan did not require
Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in good condition.
The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a contract different from
a commodatum. The effects of the Kasunduan are also different from that of
a commodatum. Case law on ejectment has treated relationship based on
tolerance as one that is akin to a landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal
of permission would result in the termination of the lease. [69] The tenants
withholding of the property would then be unlawful. This is settled jurisprudence.
Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one
of commodatum, Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to turn over
possession of the property to Pajuyo, the bailor. The obligation to deliver or to
return the thing received attaches to contracts for safekeeping, or contracts of
commission, administration and commodatum.[70] These contracts certainly involve
the obligation to deliver or return the thing received.[71]
Guevarra turned his back on the Kasunduan on the sole ground that like him,
Pajuyo is also a squatter. Squatters, Guevarra pointed out, cannot enter into a
contract involving the land they illegally occupy. Guevarra insists that the contract
is void.
Guevarra should know that there must be honor even between
squatters. Guevarra freely entered into the Kasunduan. Guevarra cannot now
impugn the Kasunduan after he had benefited from it. The Kasunduan binds
Guevarra.
The Kasunduan is not void for purposes of determining who between Pajuyo
and Guevarra has a right to physical possession of the contested
property. The Kasunduan is the undeniable evidence of Guevarras recognition of
Pajuyos better right of physical possession. Guevarra is clearly a possessor in bad
faith. The absence of a contract would not yield a different result, as there would
still be an implied promise to vacate.
Guevarra contends that there is a pernicious evil that is sought to be avoided,
and that is allowing an absentee squatter who (sic) makes (sic) a profit out of his
illegal act.[72] Guevarra bases his argument on the preferential right given to the
actual occupant or caretaker under Proclamation No. 137 on socialized housing.
We are not convinced.
Pajuyo did not profit from his arrangement with Guevarra because Guevarra
stayed in the property without paying any rent. There is also no proof that Pajuyo is
a professional squatter who rents out usurped properties to other
squatters. Moreover, it is for the proper government agency to decide who
between Pajuyo and Guevarra qualifies for socialized housing. The only issue that
we are addressing is physical possession.
Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment.[73] This
is one of the distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer.[74] In forcible
entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Thus, he must allege and
prove prior possession.[75] But in unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to possess
under any contract, express or implied. In such a case, prior physical possession is
not required.[76]
Pajuyos withdrawal of his permission to Guevarra terminated
the Kasunduan. Guevarras transient right to possess the property ended as
well. Moreover, it was Pajuyo who was in actual possession of the property
because Guevarra had to seek Pajuyos permission to temporarily hold the
property and Guevarra had to follow the conditions set by Pajuyo in
theKasunduan. Control over the property still rested with Pajuyo and this is
evidence of actual possession.
Pajuyos absence did not affect his actual possession of the disputed property.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet
on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession. [77] One
may acquire possession not only by physical occupation, but also by the fact that a
thing is subject to the action of ones will.[78]Actual or physical occupation is not
always necessary.[79]
Ruling on Possession Does not Bind Title to the Land in Dispute
We are aware of our pronouncement in cases where we declared that
squatters and intruders who clandestinely enter into titled government property
cannot, by such act, acquire any legal right to said property. [80] We made this
declaration because the person who had title or who had the right to legal
possession over the disputed property was a party in the ejectment suit and that
party instituted the case against squatters or usurpers.
In this case, the owner of the land, which is the government, is not a party to
the ejectment case. This case is between squatters. Had the government
participated in this case, the courts could have evicted the contending squatters,
Pajuyo and Guevarra.
Since the party that has title or a better right over the property is not
impleaded in this case, we cannot evict on our own the parties. Such a ruling
would discourage squatters from seeking the aid of the courts in settling the issue
of physical possession. Stripping both the plaintiff and the defendant of possession
just because they are squatters would have the same dangerous implications as
the application of the principle of pari delicto. Squatters would then rather settle the
issue of physical possession among themselves than seek relief from the courts if
the plaintiff and defendant in the ejectment case would both stand to lose
possession of the disputed property. This would subvert the policy underlying
actions for recovery of possession.
 Since Pajuyo has in his favor priority in time in holding the property, he is
entitled to remain on the property until a person who has title or a better right
lawfully ejects him. Guevarra is certainly not that person. The ruling in this case,
however, does not preclude Pajuyo and Guevarra from introducing evidence and
presenting arguments before the proper administrative agency to establish any
right to which they may be entitled under the law.[81]
In no way should our ruling in this case be interpreted to condone squatting.
The ruling on the issue of physical possession does not affect title to the property
nor constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits on the issue of
ownership.[82] The owner can still go to court to recover lawfully the property from
the person who holds the property without legal title. Our ruling here does not
diminish the power of government agencies, including local governments, to
condemn, abate, remove or demolish illegal or unauthorized structures in
accordance with existing laws.

Attorneys Fees and Rentals

The MTC and RTC failed to justify the award of P3,000 attorneys fees to
Pajuyo. Attorneys fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances
enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.[83] Thus, the award of attorneys fees
is the exception rather than the rule.[84] Attorneys fees are not awarded every time
a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed
on the right to litigate.[85] We therefore delete the attorneys fees awarded to
Pajuyo.
We sustain the P300 monthly rentals the MTC and RTC assessed against
Guevarra. Guevarra did not dispute this factual finding of the two courts. We find
the amount reasonable compensation to Pajuyo. The P300 monthly rental is
counted from the last demand to vacate, which was on 16 February 1995.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision dated 21 June 2000
and Resolution dated 14 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 43129 are SET ASIDE.The Decision dated 11 November 1996 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 in Civil Case No. Q-96-26943, affirming the
Decision dated 15 December 1995 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 31 in Civil Case No. 12432, is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION. The
award of attorneys fees is deleted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.
5. VICAR INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION, INC., and CARMELITA V.
LIM, Petitioners,
vs.
FEB LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION (now BPI LEASING
CORPORATION), Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Once more, the Court stresses that procedural rules must be used to promote, not
obstruct, substantial justice. The failure to attach the Resolution authorizing herein
individual petitioner to represent herein corporate petitioner is, under the
circumstances, excusable. The immediate correction of the defect should have
been deemed sufficient compliance with the rules.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to reverse and set aside two Resolutions 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated October 23, 20023 and February 7, 2003,4 in CA-GR SP No. 73117.
The earlier Resolution reads:
"The instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of proper
verification and certification against forum shopping as the same was executed by
Carmelita V. Lim, one of the petitioners, without showing any authority from
petitioner corporation to sign for and on its behalf."5
The second assailed Resolution denied petitioners’ "Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached Secretary’s Certificate."
The Facts
This controversy originated from a Complaint6 for unjust enrichment and damages,
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati by herein petitioner, Vicar International
Construction, Inc. (Vicar), against Respondent FEB Leasing and Finance
Corporation (now BPI Leasing Corporation) and the Far East Bank and Trust
Company. In turn, FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation filed a Complaint 7 against
Vicar, Carmelita Chaneco Lim and one John Doe, for a sum of money, damages
and replevin.
These Complaints stemmed from loans obtained from FEB by Vicar, a corporation
engaged in the construction business, for the purchase of certain heavy
equipment. In obtaining the loans, Deeds of Absolute Sale with a "lease-back"
provision were executed by the parties. In those Deeds, Vicar appears to have
sold to FEB the equipment purchased with the loan proceeds and, at the same
time, leased them back.8 For the total loan of ₱30,315,494, Vicar claims to have
paid FEB an aggregate amount of ₱19,042,908 in monthly amortizations.
Nevertheless, FEB maintains that Vicar still had an outstanding balance of about
₱22,000,000, despite the extrajudicial foreclosure of sixty-three (63) subdivision
lots. These lots, comprising an aggregate area of 20,300 square meters in
Calamba, Laguna, were used by the corporation as additional collateral. As a
consequence, the auction sale produced ₱17,000,000 which, Vicar claims, should
have been applied to its loans.
In the course of the second (replevin) case, the trial court issued several Orders
pertaining to the possession/custody of eight (8) units of the subject equipment. In
an Order dated August 2, 2002, the regional trial court (RTC) quashed the property
counterbond filed by Vicar and denied the latter’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint,
which was grounded on forum shopping. In an Order dated September 30, 2002,
the RTC denied the corporation’s Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Voluntary Inhibition of the trial judge.
On October 3, 2002, Vicar filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, to stop the implementation of the Writ of Replevin issued against the
subject equipment.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Petition was, however, instantly dismissed by the CA in its herein assailed
Resolution dated October 23, 2002, because the Verification and the Certification
against forum shopping had been executed by Petitioner Carmelita V. Lim without
any showing that she had the authority to sign for and on behalf of petitioner-
corporation.
On November 23, 2003, the day after receiving its copy of the Resolution, Vicar
filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached
Secretary’s Certificate." Nevertheless, the CA denied the Omnibus Motion in this
wise:
"The belated filing by the petitioners of the Certification of their Corporate
Secretary, to the effect that petitioner Carmelita Lim has been duly authorized by
petitioner corporation to file the subject petition for certiorari, did not cure the
defect of said petition. Absent any compelling reason for petitioners’ failure to
comply at the first instance with the required certification, we cannot, therefore,
accept their subsequent compliance."9
Hence, this Petition.10
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"A.
Whether compelling reasons exist which warrant the liberal construction of the
Petition for Certiorari.
"B.
Whether petitioners’ subsequent submission of the secretary’s certificate is a
sufficient compliance with the requirement of the law.
"C.
Whether the policy of the law is to afford a party the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his case."11
In short, the principal issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in summarily
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.
The Court’s Ruling
The present Petition for Review is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Summary Dismissal
Petitioners assert that Carmelita V. Lim was duly authorized to execute, for and on
behalf of Vicar, the Verification and Certification against forum shopping. Attached
to the Petition and signed by Petitioner Lim was the Verification/Certification, in
which was explicitly stated the authorization and affirmation, as follows:
"x x x. I am likewise duly authorized to execute this Verification/Certification in
behalf of petitioner Vicar International Construction, Inc. x x x."
This statement was supported by Vicar’s board of directors, who unanimously
approved a Resolution dated October 2, 2002, which reads thus:
"NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the
Corporation be authorized to file a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals for the purpose of annulling or setting aside the Orders dated 2 August
2002 and 30 September 2002 rendered by Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati in connection with Civil Case No. 02-357 entitled ‘FEB Leasing &
Finance Corporation, Plaintiff vs. Vicar International Construction, Inc. et al.,
Defendants.’
"RESOLVED further, that the President/General Manager Carmelita V. Lim is
hereby authorized to execute and sign any and all documents necessary for filing
of the Petition for Certiorari, including the verification and certification against
forum shopping.’"12
Petitioners candidly admit that they inadvertently failed to attach the above
Resolution to their CA Petition. In preparing the Petition, their counsel supposedly
worked overnight without sleep. She wanted to file it immediately to avoid the trial
court’s quashal of their counterbond and, thus, the immediate seizure of their
equipment -- their only means of livelihood.
Their counsel allegedly believed in good faith that the secretary’s Certificate was
attached to the Petition. When they received a copy of the October 23, 2002 CA
Resolution on November 11, 2002, they lost no time in filing the following day their
"Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached
Secretary’s Certificate."
Petitioners submit that the foregoing circumstances constitute compelling reasons
to justify setting aside the procedural defect, pursuant to Ramos v. Court of
Appeals.13
Further, citing Yap v. Baldado,14 they contend that their posthaste submission of
the secretary’s Certificate, albeit after the filing of their Petition, constitutes
substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. Finally, they aver that
pursuant to the policy of the law to afford parties the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of their case, the CA should have given due course to their Petition.
On the other hand, Respondent FEB asserts that the CA’s dismissal of the Petition
-- arising from petitioners’ failure to attach a duly executed verification and
certification against forum shopping -- is well within the appellate court’s authority,
pursuant to Sections 3 and 5 of Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.15 Respondent also claims that petitioners’ present action before this
Court seeks to correct a perceived erroneous application by the CA of a procedural
rule that is not correctible by certiorari.
Finally, respondent alleges that the instant Petition, being based on the ground of
excusable negligence, is actually a motion for new trial. As such, the Petition must
allegedly fail, because petitioners did not execute and attach an affidavit of merits.
The issue before us is not novel; neither are the factual circumstances that gave
rise to it.
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,16 the petitioner had not attached any
proof that its resident manager was authorized to sign the Verification and the non-
forum shopping Certification, as a consequence of which the Petition was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Subsequent to the dismissal, however, the
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, to which was already attached a
Certificate issued by its board secretary who stated that, prior to the filing of the
Petition, the resident manager had been authorized by the board of directors to file
the Petition.
Citing several cases17 excusing noncompliance with the requirement of a certificate
of non-forum shopping, the Court held that "with more reason should x x x the
instant petition [be allowed,] since petitioner herein did submit a certification on
non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to
do so." The Court further said that the subsequent submission of the Secretary’s
Certificate, attesting that the signatory to the certification was authorized to file the
action on behalf of petitioner, mitigated the oversight.
Similarly, in General Milling Corporation v. NLRC,18 the Court of Appeals dismissed
the Petition, which was not accompanied by any board resolution or certification by
the corporate secretary showing that the person who had signed the Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping was duly authorized to represent the petitioner-
corporation in the case. In the Motion for Reconsideration, however, the petitioner
attached a board Resolution stating that the signatory of the Certification had been
duly authorized to do so.
Under those circumstances, the Court held that "there was at least substantial
compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed
procedural requirements," except that the petition "was not accompanied by a
board resolution or a secretary’s certificate that the person who signed it was duly
authorized by petitioner to represent it in the case."19
Also, in BA Savings Bank v. Sia,20 the Court of Appeals denied due course to a
Petition for certiorari filed by BA Savings Bank. The CA’s action was grounded on
the fact that the Certification on anti-forum shopping incorporated in the Petition
had been signed merely by the bank’s counsel, not by a duly authorized
representative, as required under Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91.
Subsequently filed by the petitioner was a Motion for Reconsideration, to which
was attached a Certificate issued by the corporate secretary. The Certificate
showed that the Resolution promulgated by the board of directors had authorized
the lawyers of petitioner "to represent it in any action or proceeding before any
court, tribunal or agency; and to sign, execute and deliver the certificate of non-
forum shopping," among others. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion on the ground that Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 "requires
that it is the petitioner, not the counsel, who must certify under oath to all of the
facts and undertakings required therein."
The Court again reversed the appellate court and ruled thus:
"Circular 28-91 was prescribed by the Supreme Court to prohibit and penalize the
evils of forum shopping. We see no circumvention of this rationale if the certificate
was signed by the corporation’s specifically authorized counsel, who had personal
knowledge of the matters required in the Circular. In Bernardo v. NLRC,21 we
explained that a literal interpretation of the Circular should be avoided if doing so
would subvert its very rationale. Said the Court:
‘x x x. Indeed, while the requirement as to certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and
thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-
shopping.’"22
Guided by the above pronouncements, the Court deems it proper and justifiable to
grant the present Petition. Clearly, petitioners did not deliberately ignore SC
Circular 28-91. In fact, a "Verification/Certification," stating the information required
under the Circular, was attached to the Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA. In
that Verification/Certification signed by Petitioner Lim, she attested as follows:
"1. x x x I am likewise duly authorized to execute this Verification/Certification in
behalf of petitioner Vicar International Construction, Inc.
"2. In my personal capacity and as a duly authorized representative of Vicar
International Construction, Inc., I caused the preparation of the foregoing Petition
for Certiorari."
xxxxxxxxx
Petitioners merely missed attaching to their Petition a concrete proof of Lim’s
authority from Vicar to execute the said Verification/Certification on its behalf. The
latter, however, lost no time in submitting its corporate secretary’s Certificate
attesting to the fact that, indeed, Petitioner Vicar’s board of directors had
unanimously approved a Resolution on October 2, 2002, authorizing its president
and general manager, Carmelita V. Lim, to file the Petition and "to execute and
sign x x x the verification and certification against forum shopping."

The Certificate was submitted to the CA on the day right after it had denied the
Petition. Such swiftness of action indicates that the Resolution -- authorizing
Petitioner Lim to file the Petition and execute the Verification and the Certification
against forum shopping on behalf of Petitioner Vicar -- did exist at the time the
Petition was filed. Such fact also lends credence to the assertion of petitioners that
it was only due to inadvertence and oversight that they failed to attach the
Secretary’s Certificate to their Petition for Certiorari.

In closing, the Court stresses once more that technical rules of procedure should
be used to promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift unclogging of court
dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more
urgent ideal.23 Rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate, not obstruct,
the attainment of justice.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the appealed Resolutions

are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals, which is directed to continue the proceedings in CA-GR SP No. 73117
with deliberate speed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
6. EDEN BALLATAN and SPS. BETTY MARTINEZ and CHONG CHY
LING, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GONZALO GO, WINSTON
GO, LI CHING YAO, ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE and
JOSE N. QUEDDING, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 25, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32472 entitled "Eden Ballatan, et. al., plaintiffs-
appellees v. Gonzalo Go and Winston Go, appellants and third-party plaintiffs-appellants v.
Li Ching Yao, et.al., third-party defendants."[1]
The instant case arose from a dispute over forty-two (42) square meters of residential
land belonging to petitioners. The parties herein are owners of adjacent lots located at
Block No. 3, Poinsettia Street, Araneta University Village, Malabon, Metro Manila. Lot
No. 24, 414 square meters in area, is registered in the name of petitioners Eden Ballatan
and spouses Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling.[2] Lots Nos. 25 and 26, with an area of
415 and 313 square meters respectively, are registered in the name of respondent Gonzalo
Go, Sr.[3] On Lot No. 25, respondent Winston Go, son of Gonzalo Go, Sr., constructed his
house. Adjacent to Lot No. 26 is Lot No. 27, 417 square meters in area, and is registered in
the name of respondent Li Ching Yao.[4]
In 1985, petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No. 24. During the
construction, she noticed that the concrete fence and side pathway of the adjoining house of
respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her
property.[5] Her building contractor informed her that the area of her lot was actually less
than that described in the title. Forthwith, Ballatan informed respondent Go of this
discrepancy and his encroachment on her property. Respondent Go, however, claimed that
his house, including its fence and pathway, were built within the parameters of his father's
lot; and that this lot was surveyed by Engineer Jose Quedding, the authorized surveyor of
the Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA), the owner-developer of the subdivision project.
Petitioner Ballatan called the attention of the AIA to the discrepancy of the land area
in her title and the actual land area received from them. The AIA authorized another survey
of the land by Engineer Jose N. Quedding.
In a report dated February 28, 1985, Engineer Quedding found that the lot area of
petitioner Ballatan was less by a few meters and that of respondent Li Ching Yao, which
was three lots away, increased by two (2) meters. Engineer Quedding declared that he
made a verification survey of Lots Nos. 25 and 26 of respondents Go in 1983 and allegedly
found the boundaries to have been in their proper position.He, however, could not explain
the reduction in Ballatan's area since he was not present at the time respondents Go
constructed their boundary walls.[6]
On June 2, 1985, Engineer Quedding made a third relocation survey upon request of
the parties. He found that Lot No. 24 lost approximately 25 square meters on its eastern
boundary, that Lot No. 25, although found to have encroached on Lot No. 24, did not lose
nor gain any area; that Lot No. 26 lost some three (3) square meters which, however, were
gained by Lot No. 27 on its western boundary. [7] In short, Lots Nos. 25, 26 and 27 moved
westward to the eastern boundary of Lot No. 24.
On the basis of this survey, on June 10, 1985, petitioner Ballatan made a written
demand on respondents Go to remove and dismantle their improvements on Lot No.
24. Respondents Go refused. The parties, including Li Ching Yao, however, met several
times to reach an agreement on the matter.
Failing to agree amicably, petitioner Ballatan brought the issue before the
barangay. Respondents Go did not appear. Thus, on April 1, 1986, petitioner Ballatan
instituted against respondents Go Civil Case No. 772-MN for recovery of possession
before the Regional Trial Court, Malabon, Branch 169. The Go's filed their "Answer with
Third-Party Complaint" impleading as third-party defendants respondents Li Ching Yao,
the AIA and Engineer Quedding.
On August 23, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of petitioners. It ordered the Go's
to vacate the subject portion of Lot No. 24, demolish their improvements and pay petitioner
Ballatan actual damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. It dismissed the third-
party complaint against: (1) AIA after finding that the lots sold to the parties were in
accordance with the technical description and verification plan covered by their respective
titles; (2) Jose N. Quedding, there being no privity of relation between him and respondents
Go and his erroneous survey having been made at the instance of AIA, not the parties; and
(3) Li Ching Yao for failure to prove that he committed any wrong in the subject
encroachment.[8] The court made the following disposition:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, ordering the latter:
1. To demolish and remove all improvements existing and encroaching on plaintiff's lot;
2. To clear, vacate and deliver possession of the encroached area to the plaintiffs;
3. To pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the following:
a) P7,800.00 for the expenses paid to the surveyors;
b) P5,000.00 for plaintiffs' transportation;
4. To pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the
current market value of the subject matter in litigation at the time of execution; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
The third-party complaint filed by third-party plaintiff Gonzalo Go and Winston Go against
third-party defendants Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Jose N. Quedding and Li Ching
Yao is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."
Respondents Go appealed. On March 25, 1996, the Court of Appeals modified the
decision of the trial court. It affirmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint against the
AIA but reinstated the complaint against Li Ching Yao and Jose Quedding. Instead of
ordering respondents Go to demolish their improvements on the subject land, the appellate
court ordered them to pay petitioner Ballatan, and respondent Li Ching Yao to pay
respondents Go, a reasonable amount for that portion of the lot which they encroached, the
value to be fixed at the time of taking. It also ordered Jose Quedding to pay respondents Go
attorney's fees of P5,000.00 for his erroneous survey. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
insofar as the dismissal of the third-party complaint against Araneta Institute of Agriculture
is concerned but modified in all other aspects as follows:
1) Defendants-appellants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellees the reasonable
value of the forty-two (42) square meters of their lot at the time of its taking;
2) Third-party defendant Li Ching Yao is hereby ordered to pay defendants-appellants the
reasonable value of the thirty-seven (37) square meters of the latter's lot at the time of its
taking; and
3) Third-party defendant Jose N. Quedding is hereby ordered to pay to defendants-
appellants the amount of P5,000.00. as attorney's fees.
LET THE RECORD of the case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Malabon for
further proceedings and reception of evidence for the determination of the reasonable value
of Lots Nos. 24 and 26.
SO ORDERED."[9]
Hence, this petition. Petitioners allege that:
"RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
WHEN:
1. IT APPLIED EQUITY OR EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE INSTANT CASE IN
UTTER DISREGARD AND IN VIOLATION OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF EXISTING
LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE VESTING BASIC PROPERTY RIGHTS TO HEREIN
PETITIONERS. RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO POWER TO APPLY/USE EQUITY
IN THE PRESENCE OF EXISTING LAWS TO THE CONTRARY.
2. UNDER THE GUISE OF APPLYING EQUITY BUT IN EFFECT A VERY
APPARENT PARTIALITY AND FAVOR TO RESPONDENTS GO, IT ORDERED
PAYMENT OF THE ENCROACHED AREA AT THE VALUE AT THE TIME OF ITS
TAKING AND NOT THE VALUE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT, THEREBY
ENRICHING THE GO'S BUT DEPRIVING PETITIONERS OF THE FRUITS OR
INCREASE IN VALUE OF THEIR PROPERTY TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED
UNDER THE LAW AS THE REGISTERED OWNERS WITH TORRENS TITLE IN
THEIR NAMES.
3. WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT DUE TO NON-
PAYMENT OF ANY FILING OR DOCKET FEE.
4. WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS THE RECOVERY OF THE NECESSARY
EXPENSES IN PROTECTING THEIR RIGHTS IN THIS CASE." [10]
Petitioners question the admission by respondent Court of Appeals of the third-party
complaint by respondents Go against the AIA, Jose Quedding and Li Ching Yao.
Petitioners claim that the third-party complaint should not have been considered by the
Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction due to third-party plaintiffs' failure to pay the
docket and filing fees before the trial court.
The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the complaint of petitioners
against respondents Go. The complaint filed was for accion publiciana, i.e., the recovery of
possession of real property which is a real action. The rule in this jurisdiction is that when
an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the
requisite docket and filing fees.[11] In real actions, the docket and filing fees are based on
the value of the property and the amount of damages claimed, if any. [12] If the complaint is
filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the court acquires jurisdiction upon full
payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring
prescription.[13] Where the fees prescribed for the real action have been paid but the fees of
certain related damages are not, the court, although having jurisdiction over the real action,
may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for
damages.[14] Accordingly, the court may expunge those claims for damages, or allow, on
motion, a reasonable time for amendment of the complaint so as to allege the precise
amount of damages and accept payment of the requisite legal fees.[15] If there are
unspecified claims, the determination of which may arise after the filing of the complaint
or similar pleading, the additional filing fee thereon shall constitute a lien on the judgment
award.[16] The same rule also applies to third-party claims and other similar pleadings.[17]
 In the case at bar, the third-party complaint filed by respondents Go was incorporated
in their answer to the complaint. The third-party complaint sought the same remedy as the
principal complaint but added a prayer for attorney's fees and costs without specifying their
amounts, thus:
"ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
1. That summons be issued against Third-Party Defendants Araneta Institute of
Agriculture, Jose N. Quedding and Li Ching Yao;
2. That after hearing, they be sentenced to indemnify the Third-Party Plaintiffs for
whatever is adjudged against the latter in favor of the Plaintiffs;
3. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered to pay attorney's fees as may be proved during
trial;
4. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered to pay the costs.
Other just and equitable reliefs are also prayed for."[18]
The Answer with Third-Party Complaint was admitted by the trial court without the
requisite payment of filing fees, particularly on the Go's prayer for damages.[19] The trial
court did not award the Go's any damages. It dismissed the third-party complaint. The
Court of Appeals, however, granted the third-party complaint in part by ordering third-
party defendant Jose N. Quedding to pay the Go's the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Contrary to petitioners' claim, the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages
despite the Go's failure to specify the amount prayed for and pay the corresponding
additional filing fees thereon. The claim for attorney's fees refers to damages
arising after the filing of the complaint against the Go's. The additional filing fee on this
claim is deemed to constitute a lien on the judgment award.[20]
The Court of Appeals found that the subject portion is actually forty-two (42) square
meters in area, not forty-five (45), as initially found by the trial court; that this forty-two
(42) square meter portion is on the entire eastern side of Lot No. 24 belonging to
petitioners; that on this said portion is found the concrete fence and pathway that extends
from respondent Winston Go's house on adjacent Lot No. 25; that inclusive of the subject
portion, respondents Go did not gain nor lose any portion of Lots Nos. 25 and 26; that
instead, Lot No. 27, on which respondent Li Ching Yao built his house, encroached on the
land of respondents Go, gaining in the process thirty-seven (37) square meters of the latter's
land.[21]
We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the third-party complaint
against AIA. The claim that the discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIA's fault was not
proved. The appellate court, however, found that it was the erroneous survey by Engineer
Quedding that triggered these discrepancies. And it was this survey that respondent
Winston Go relied upon in constructing his house on his father's land. He built his house in
the belief that it was entirely within the parameters of his father's land. In short,
respondents Go had no knowledge that they encroached on petitioners' lot. They are
deemed builders in good faith[22] until the time petitioner Ballatan informed them of their
encroachment on her property.[23]
Respondent Li Ching Yao built his house on his lot before any of the other parties
did.[24] He constructed his house in 1982, respondents Go in 1983, and petitioners in
1985.[25] There is no evidence, much less, any allegation that respondent Li Ching Yao was
aware that when he built his house he knew that a portion thereof encroached on
respondents Go's adjoining land. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges
bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. [26]
All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their rights must, therefore,
be determined in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the Civil Code on property.
Article 448 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, [27] or to oblige the one who
built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed the proper
rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable
rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof."
The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, planting or sowing, after
payment to the builder, planter or sower of the necessary and useful expenses, and in the
proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure. The owner of the land may also
oblige the builder, planter or sower to purchase and pay the price of the land. If the owner
chooses to sell his land, the builder, planter or sower must purchase the land, otherwise the
owner may remove the improvements thereon. The builder, planter or sower, however, is
not obliged to purchase the land if its value is considerably more than the building, planting
or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or sower must pay rent to the owner of the
land. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix
the terms thereof. The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or selling
the land on which the improvement stands to the builder, planter or sower, is given to the
owner of the land.[28]
Article 448 has been applied to improvements or portions of improvements built by
mistaken belief on land belonging to the adjoining owner.[29] The facts of the instant case
are similar to those inCabral v. Ibanez,[30] to wit:
"[P]laintiffs Geronima Zabala and her husband Justino Bernardo, constructed their house in
the belief that it was entirely within the area of their own land without knowing at that time
that part of their house was occupying a 14-square meter portion of the adjoining lot
belonging to the defendants, and that the defendants Bernardo M. Cabral and Mamerta M.
Cabral were likewise unaware of the fact that a portion of plaintiff's house was extending
and occupying a portion of their lot with an area of 14 square meters. The parties came to
know of the fact that part of the plaintiff's house was occupying part of defendant's land
when the construction of plaintiff's house was about to be finished, after a relocation of the
monuments of the two properties had been made by the U.S. Army through the Bureau of
Lands, according to their 'Stipulation of Facts,' dated August 17, 1951.
On the basis of these facts, we held that:
"The Court, therefore, concludes that the plaintiffs are builders in good faith and the
relative rights of the defendant Mamerta Cabral as owner of the land and of the plaintiffs as
owners of the building is governed by Article 361 of the Civil Code (Co Tao v. Joaquin
Chan Chico, 46 Off. Gaz.5514). Article 361 of the old Civil Code has been reproduced
with an additional provision in Article 448 of the new Civil Code, approved June 18,
1949."[31]
Similarly, in Grana and Torralba v. Court of Appeals,[32] we held that:
"Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question, petitioners,
however, were found by the Court of Appeals to have constructed a portion of their house
thereon in good faith. Under Article 361 of the old Civil Code (Article 448 of the new), the
owner of the land on which anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the building, after payment to the builder of necessary or useful
expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure, or to oblige
the builder to pay the price of the land. Respondents, as owners of the land, have
therefore the choice of either appropriating the portion of petitioners' house which is
on their land upon payment of the proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to
petitioners that part of their land on which stands the improvement. It may here be
pointed out that it would be impractical for respondents to choose to exercise the first
alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the house standing on their land, for in that event
the whole building might be rendered useless. The more workable solution, it would
seem, is for respondents to sell to petitioners that part of their land on which was
constructed a portion of the latter's house. If petitioners are unwilling or unable to
buy, then they must vacate the land and must pay rentals until they do so. Of course,
respondents cannot oblige petitioners to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the aforementioned portion of the house. If such be the case, then
petitioners must pay reasonable rent. The parties must come to an agreement as to
the conditions of the lease, and should they fail to do so, then the court shall fix the
same."[33]
In light of these rulings, petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may choose to purchase
the improvement made by respondents Go on their land, or sell to respondents Go the
subject portion. If buying the improvement is impractical as it may render the Go's house
useless, then petitioners may sell to respondents Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which
their improvement stands. If the Go's are unwilling or unable to buy the lot, then they must
vacate the land and, until they vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners,
however, cannot compel respondents Go to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than the portion of their house constructed thereon. If the value of the land is much more
than the Go's improvement, then respondents Go must pay reasonable rent. If they do not
agree on the terms of the lease, then they may go to court to fix the same.
In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents Go the subject portion of their
lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment. The
Court of Appeals erred in fixing the price at the time of taking, which is the time the
improvements were built on the land. The time of taking is determinative of just
compensation in expropriation proceedings. The instant case is not for expropriation. It is
not a taking by the state of private property for a public purpose upon payment of just
compensation. This is a case of an owner who has been paying real estate taxes on his land
but has been deprived of the use of a portion of this land for years. It is but fair and just to
fix compensation at the time of payment.[34]
Article 448 and the same conditions abovestated also apply to respondents Go as
owners and possessors of their land and respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the
improvement that encroached on thirty-seven (37) square meters of respondents Go's land.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is modified as
follows:
(1) Petitioners are ordered to exercise within thirty (30) days from finality of this
decision their option to either buy the portion of respondents Go's improvement on their
Lot No. 24, or sell to said respondents the portion of their land on which the improvement
stands. If petitioners elect to sell the land or buy the improvement, the purchase price must
be at the prevailing market price at the time of payment. If buying the improvement will
render respondents Go's house useless, then petitioners should sell the encroached portion
of their land to respondents Go. If petitioners choose to sell the land but respondents Go are
unwilling or unable to buy, then the latter must vacate the subject portion and pay
reasonable rent from the time petitioners made their choice up to the time they actually
vacate the premises. But if the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the
improvement, then respondents Go may elect to lease the land, in which case the parties
shall agree upon the terms of the lease.Should they fail to agree on said terms, the court of
origin is directed to fix the terms of the lease.
From the moment petitioners shall have exercised their option, respondents Go shall
pay reasonable monthly rent up to the time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or
until the court fixes such terms.
 (2) Respondents Go are likewise directed to exercise their rights as owners of Lots
Nos. 25 and 26, vis-a-vis respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that
encroached on thirty seven (37) square meters of respondents Go's land in accordance with
paragraph one abovementioned.
(3) The Decision of the Court of Appeals ordering Engineer Quedding, as third-party
defendant, to pay attorney's fees of P5,000.00 to respondents Go is affirmed. The additional
filing fee on the damages constitutes a lien on this award.
(4) The Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the third-party complaint against
Araneta Institute of Agriculture is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
7. Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE, petitioners, vs. Spouses
HELEN BOYON and ROMEO BOYON, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In general, substituted service can be availed of only after a clear showing
that personal service of summons was not legally possible. Also, service by
publication is applicable in actions in rem and quasi in rem, but not in personal
suits such as the present one which is for specific performance.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the February 26, 2001 Decision [2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 60888. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision is
worded as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of what prescinds, the assailed resolution and orders issued by
the public respondent are perforce ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. This pronouncement is
nonetheless rendered without prejudice to the refiling of the same case by the private
respondents with the court a quo.[3]
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are narrated by the CA in this wise:
On July 2, 1998, [petitioners] Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for specific
performance against [respondents] Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate
the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The action was
lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa which is presided by herein public
respondent Judge N.C. Perello. On July 21, 1998, respondent judge, through the acting
Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, issued summons to
the [respondents]. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the
process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the
[respondents] failed. On December 9, 1998, [petitioners] filed before the trial court an Ex-
parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. On December 28,
1998, public respondent issued an Order granting the Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court
to Effect Summons by Publication. On July 30, 1999, the respondent judge, sans a written
motion, issued an Order declaring herein [respondents] in default for failure to file their
respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, [petitioners] were
allowed to submit their evidence ex-parte. Ultimately, on December 7, 1999, respondent
judge issued the assailed resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
x x x Therefore, Spouses Helen and Romeo Boyon are directed to execute the necessary
document with the effect of withdrawing the Affidavit of Loss they filed and annotated
with the Register of Deeds of Makati City so that title to the parcel of land subject of the
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Plaintiffs be transferred in their names. Thereafter the
Register of Deeds of Makati City or Muntinlupa Citymay cancel Transfer of Certificate of
Title No. 149635 of the Defendants and issue another to Plaintiff under the deed of sale,
clean and free of any reported encumbrance.
Defendants are also directed to pay Plaintiffs actual expenses in the amount of P20,000 and
attorneys fees of P20,000 including costs of this suit.
xxxxxxxxx
On January 5, 2000, [respondent] Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the United States
of America, was surprised to learn from her sister Elizabeth Boyon, of the resolution issued
by the respondent court.On January 18, 2000, [respondents] filed an Ad Cautelam motion
questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a
quo. On March 17, 2000, the public respondent issued an Order denying the said motion on
the basis of the defaulted [respondents] supposed loss of standing in court. On March 29,
2000, the [respondents] once again raised the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court via a
motion for reconsideration. On June 22, 2000, however, an Order was issued by the public
respondent denying the said motion. The [petitioners] moved for the execution of
the controvertedjudgment which the respondent judge ultimately granted. [4]
Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA a Petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the jurisdiction of the
regional trial court (RTC).
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned
Resolution and Orders. According to the appellate court, the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over respondents because of the invalid service of summons upon
them. First, the sheriff failed to comply with the requirements of substituted service
of summons, because he did not specify in the Return of Summons the prior
efforts he had made to locate them and the impossibility of promptly serving the
summons upon them by personal service. Second, the subsequent summons by
publication was equally infirm, because the Complaint was a suit for specific
performance and therefore an action in personam. Consequently, the Resolution
and the Orders were null and void, since the RTC had never acquired jurisdiction
over respondents.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our
consideration:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the assailed Resolution
dated December 7, 1999 was already final and executory
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the Petition for Certiorari
of private respondents despite the pendency of an appeal earlier filed
C. The Honorable Court erred in not holding that the Petition for Certiorari was time barred
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the proceedings in the lower court
are null and void due to invalid and defective service of summons and the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondents. [6]
In sum, the main issue revolves around the validity of the service of summons
on respondents.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Service of Summons
Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling that the service of summons on
respondents was invalid. They submit that although the case filed before the trial
court was denominated as an action for specific performance, it was actually an
action quasi in rem, because it involved a piece of real property located in the
Philippines. They further argue that in actions quasi in rem involving ownership of
a parcel of land, it is sufficient that the trial court acquire jurisdiction over
the res. Thus, the summons by publication, which they effected subsequent to the
substituted service of summons, was allegedly sufficient.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the proceedings in the trial
court were null and void because of the invalid and defective service of
summons. According to them, the Return of Summons issued by the process
server of the RTC failed to state that he had exerted earnest efforts to effect the
service of summons. He allegedly tried to serve it personally on them on July 22,
1998 at No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang. He, however, resorted to
substituted service on that same day, supposedly because he could not find
respondents in the above address. They further allege that the person to whom he
gave the summons was not even a resident of that address.
Respondents contend that when summons is served by substituted service,
the return must show that it was impossible to serve the summons personally, and
that efforts had been exerted toward that end. They add that noncompliance with
the rule on substituted service renders invalid all proceedings relative thereto.
As to the summons by publication subsequently effected by petitioners,
respondents argue that the case filed before the trial court was an action for
specific performance and, therefore, an action in personam. As such, the
summons by publication was insufficient to enable the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of respondents.
Respondents conclude that even granting that the service of summons by
publication was permissible under the circumstances, it would still be defective and
invalid because of the failure of petitioners to observe the requirements of law, like
an Affidavit attesting that the latter deposited in the post office a copy of the
summons and of the order of publication, paid the postage, and sent the
documents by registered mail to the formers last known address.
We agree with respondents. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where the action
is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done
by personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6
and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be
served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and
sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service of
summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made
promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service
of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a
reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c)
state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of
business, of the defendant.[7] It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving
these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officers return. The
failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of
substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.[8]
Defective Personal
Service of Summons
In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously
resorted to substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine
effort to locate respondents. A review of the records[9] reveals that the only effort
he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22,
1998, to try to serve the summons personally on respondents. While the Return of
Summons states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because
Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not
mention exactly what efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find
respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process
server obtained the information on their whereabouts. The pertinent portion of the
Return of Summons is reproduced as follows:
That efforts to serve the said Summons personally upon defendants Sps. Helen and
Romeo Boyon were made but the same were ineffectual and unavailing for the reason that
defendant Helen Boyon is somewhere in the United States of America and defendant
Romeo Boyon is in Bicol thus substituted service was made in accordance with Section 7,
Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court.[10]
The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no
positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve
the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the
alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was
verified from a person who had knowledge thereof.Certainly, without specifying the
details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the
summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for
purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.
The necessity of stating in the process servers Return or Proof of Service the
material facts and circumstances sustaining the validity of substituted service was
explained by this Court in Hamilton v. Levy,[11] from which we quote:
x x x The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be
stated in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in
lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is
in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and
hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here,
no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the
requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective.[12]
Moreover, the requirements of substituted service of summons and the effect
of noncompliance with the subsequent proceedings therefor were discussed
in Madrigal v. Court of Appeals[13] as follows:
In a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service
justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why
efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances
attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers
Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It bears stressing that since
service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be
duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on
jurisdictional grounds.[14]
Summons by
Publication Improper
It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by
publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an
action against the thing itself instead of against the defendants person; in the
latter, an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is to subject that
individuals interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it. [15]
In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for
specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally
involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue,
since they did not assert any interest or right over it. Moreover, this Court has
consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action
in personam.[16]
Having failed to serve the summons on respondents properly, the RTC did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process demands
that all the proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be deemed null and
void.[17]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
8. TOYOTA CUBAO, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and DANILO A. GUEVARRA, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner Toyota Cubao, Inc., undertook repairs on the car owned by private
respondent Danilo Guevarra. The repair cost of P76,800.47 was paid by means of
BPI Check No. 17819, dated 12 March 1991, drawn by Guevarra in favor of
Toyota. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored, i.e., "Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds (`DAIF')." Petitioner thereupon requested that Guevarra
should make good the check. When Guevarra failed to heed the demand,
petitioner filed a civil case for collection of the unpaid account.
On 07 January 1993, the trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his
address in 29 Burgos Street, Calamba, Laguna. On 02 February 1993, Process
Server Antonio Rimas of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, submitted
to the trial court a return on the service; it read in full:
Respectfully returned to the Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 92, Quezon City, the herein attached original summon in the above
entitled case with the information that it was duly served to the defendant DANILO A.
GUEVARRA, thru her sister-in-law, GLORIA CABALLES, by leaving a copy of the
summons and complaint but refused to sign.
Serve[d] Feb. 2, 1993.[1]
On 23 February 1993, petitioner, claiming that Guevarra had failed to file an
ANSWER within the reglementary period, moved to declare Guevarra in default. A
copy of the motion was furnished Guevarra, through registered mail with return
card, at 29 Burgos Street, Calamba, Laguna.
On 05 March 1993, the scheduled date of hearing on the aforesaid motion,
the trial court held in abeyance any action pending submission to the court of proof
of service to Guevarra.
On 16 March 1993, petitioner filed the registry return card indicating receipt of
the motion.
On 19 March 1993, the trial court granted petitioner's Motion To Declare
Defendant In Default and allowed an ex-parte presentation of petitioner's evidence.
On 19 May 1993, petitioner presented its evidence ex-parte. Petitioner rested,
following its formal offer of documentary exhibits, and submitted the case for
resolution by the court.
On 06 January 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner;
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds for the plaintiff and against the
defendant and hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P76,800.47 with legal interest
from March 3, 1993 and until the amount is fully paid;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees;
3. With cost of suit against the defendant.[2]
On 08 March 1994, a writ of execution was issued to implement the
decision. On 26 July 1995, the Deputy Sheriff, implementing the writ, levied on
Guevarras Toyota Corolla bearing plate No. PRW-329. The notice of levy was
served on Guevarra personally but he refused to sign the receipt thereof,
expressed surprise over it, and stated that he was not aware of any case instituted
against him.
On 28 July 1995, the Sheriff issued a notice of auction sale of the levied
vehicle that was to take place on 07 August 1995 at ten o'clock in the morning.
On 07 August 1995, the vehicle was sold at public auction to Christopher Alex
Sillano, the highest bidder, for P150,000.00. Whereupon, the corresponding
certificate of sale was issued in his favor.
Guevarra turned over, on demand, the subject vehicle to the authorities;
forthwith, however, he asked, in a certiorari petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 38048)
before the Court of Appeals, for the nullification of the ex-parte judgment of 06
January 1994. Guevarra claimed that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
his person because of a defective service of summons on him. The appellate
court, finding merit in the petition, annulled and set aside the default judgment, the
writ of execution, the levy upon execution and the sale at public auction of the
vehicle.It held, in its now assailed decision of 28 June 1996, that the substituted
service of summons effected on private respondent was not valid and that,
consequently, the proceedings had before the trial court were nugatory and without
legal effect.
In its appeal to this Court, petitioner Toyota argues that the appellate court
has gravely erred in ignoring the rule, enunciated in Mapa vs. Court of
Appeals,[3] that the absence in the sheriffs return of a statement about the
impossibility of personal service cannot be conclusive proof that the substituted
service resorted to is invalid. Petitioner points out that Mapa has cautioned against
jumping outright to the conclusion that a substituted service becomes
inconsequential merely because the process server may have failed to state with
specificity the reason for resorting to substituted service. Petitioner asserts that the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court have been met
and that the evidence for such compliance is the affidavit of the process server on
the substituted service annexed to its reply filed before the appellate court.
The Court sustains the Court of Appeals.
Section 7, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court requires that summons must be
served personally by "handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person or, if he
refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." If, however, this mode of service
cannot be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service may be resorted
to under Section 8 of the same Rule. A law prescribing the manner in which the
service of summons should be effected is jurisdictional in character and its proper
observance is what dictates the court's ability to take cognizance of the litigation
before it. Compliance therewith must appear affirmatively in the return. It must so
be as substitute service is a mode that departs or deviates from the standard
rule. Substitute service must be used only in the way prescribed, and under
circumstances authorized, by law.[4]
In Mapa vs. Court of Appeals,[5] we did say that -
x x x the absence in the sheriffs return of a statement about the impossibility of personal
service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Proof of prior attempts at
personal service may be submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident
assailing the validity of the substituted service. While the sheriffs return carries with it the
presumption, albeit disputable, of regularity in the sense that inter alia, the entries therein
are deemed correct, it does not necessarily follow that an act done in relation to the official
duty for which the return is made was not done simply because it is not disclosed
therein."[6]
The Court, however, has elucidated that evidence must in such a case be duly
presented that would prove proper compliance with the rules on substituted
service. Hence -
"x x x. Unfortunately in these instant cases, the private respondent failed to present
evidence during the hearings of the petitioners separate motions to dismiss and set aside
judgment to prove that substituted service of summons was indeed effected in strict
compliance with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. During such hearings, the
private respondent could also have presented evidence to show that the petitioner did in
fact receive from Susan O. dela Torre the summonses, together with copies of the
complaints, in both cases. If indeed the petitioner received the same, the requirement of due
process would have been complied with.[7]
And, in Keister vs. Navarro,[8] the Court said:
"Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court may acquire
jurisdiction over his person. In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without
such service are null and void.[Salmon, et al. v. Tan Cueco, 36 Phil. 556; Echevarria v.
Parsons Hardware Co., 51 Phil. 980; Reyes v. Paz, et al., 60 Phil. 440; Pantaleon v.
Asuncion, 105 Phil. 761; Government v. Botor, 69 Phil. 130; Caneda v. Court of Appeals,
116 Phil. 283; Trimica, Inc. v. Polaris Marketing Corporation, 60 SCRA 321, 325.] This
process is solely for the benefit of the defendant. [Mosaic Templars of America v. Saines,
Civ. App. 265, SW 721.] Its purpose is not only to give the court jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made
against him. [72 C.J.S. 989; Mohr v. Manvierre, 101 U.S. 417, 25 L. ed. 1052.]
"The summons must be served to the defendant in person. [Section 7, Rule 14, Revised
Rules of Court.] It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a
reasonable time that a substituted service may be made. [Section 8, Ibid.] Impossibility of
prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant
personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof
of service. [I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 444.] This is necessary
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held
that this method of service is `in derogation of the common law; it is a method
extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute.' [72 C.J.S. 1053.] Thus, under the controlling
decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly,
faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is
considered ineffective. [Ibid., pp. 1053-1054.]
"Indeed, the constitutional requirement of due process requires that the service be such as
may be reasonably expected to give the desired notice to the party of the claim against
him. [Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186; Dy Reyes v. Ortega, 16 SCRA 903.]"[9]
It is not here disputed that substituted service of summons has been resorted
to by the process server but that, unfortunately, the server's return did not state the
facts or the needed particulars that could justify the substituted service. The
constitutional requirement of due process, this Court has held in Boticano vs. Chu,
Jr.,[10] exacts that the service (of summons) be such as may reasonably be
expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules
accomplishes that end, "the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional
notions of fair play are satisfied; due process is served. [11] Although Moran, on the
Rules of Court, has said that Irregularities of this kind (substituted service) (might)
be cured by proof that the copies (have) actually been delivered to the defendant,"
in the case at bar, however, private respondent appears to have been notified of
the case for the first time only at the time the levy on execution of judgment was
effected by the sheriff.
The fact of the matter was that Guevarra evidently had been unaware of the
proceedings before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-
14306. Upon learning of the adverse decision, but already too late in the day for
him to get relief from that court, he filed, instead, a certiorari petition before the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court neither abused its discretion nor was in error
when it refused to consider the affidavit of the process server (declaring the
concomitant facts required to be incorporated in the return) which was presented
to it for the first time only as an annex to its Reply filed with the tribunal. For the
appellate court to have accepted the affidavit favorably on its face value, without
hearing, would have again been a denial to the defendant (herein private
respondent) of his right to due process.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED
9. ELISEO BOTICANO, petitioner, vs MANUEL CHU, JR., respondent.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
following: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals * promulgated on March 31,
1981 in CA-G.R. No. 65287-R entitled: "Eliseo Boticano, plaintiff-appellee v. Jaime
Sigua, defendant and Manuel Chu, Jr., defendant-appellant" which holds that the
defendant-appellant was not properly served with summons and (b) the resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said decision.
The findings of fact of the trial court are as follows:
Petitioner Eliseo Boticano is the registered owner of a Bedford truck with plate No.
QC-870, T-Pilipinas '77 which he was using in hauling logs for a certain fee. At
11:00 o'clock in the evening of September 3, 1971, while loaded with logs, it was
properly parked by its driver Maximo Dalangin at the shoulder of the national
highway in Barrio Labi, Bongabon, Nueva Ecija when it was hit and bumped at the
rear portion by a Bedford truck bearing plate No. QK-516, T-Pilipinas '77 owned by
private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. and driven by Jaime Sigua, the former's co-
defendant in this case. Manuel Chu, Jr. acknowledged ownership thereof and
agreed with petitioner to shoulder the expenses of the repair of the damaged truck
of the latter. (Decision, Civil Case No. 6754, Rollo, pp. 36-37).
When Manuel Chu, Jr. failed to comply with aforesaid agreement as well as to pay
damages representing lost income despite petitioner's demands, the latter (plaintiff
in the lower court), filed a complaint on November 24, 1977 at the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VII at Cabanatuan City, against private
respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. (truck owner) and Jaime Sigua (his driver) both as
defendants in Civil Case No. 6754 "Eliseo Boticano v. Manuel Chu, Jr. and Jaime
Sigua" for damages. (Record on Appeal, Rollo, pp. 45-47).
Summons was issued on December 12, 1977 but was returned unserved for
defendant Jaime Sigua because he was no longer connected with San Pedro Saw
Mill, Guagua, Pampanga, while another copy of the summons for Manuel Chu, Jr.
was returned duly served on him thru his wife Veronica Chu at his dwelling house.
On February 15, 1978 petitioner moved to dismiss the case against Jaime Sigua
and to declare Manuel Chu, Jr. in default for failure to file responsive pleadings
within the reglementary period. The motion was granted by the lower court in an
Order dated September 4, 1978, allowing petitioner to adduce his evidence ex
parte on October 17, 1978. (Petition, Rollo, pp. 8-9).
From the evidence adduced by the plaintiff (petitioner herein) the trial court found
that private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. is responsible for the fault and negligence
of his driver Sigua under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, whose negligence and lack
of due care was the immediate and proximate cause of the damage to petitioner's
truck and ruled in favor of plaintiff-petitioner.
The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, Eliseo Boticano, and against herein defendant, Manuel
Chu, Jr. ordering the latter as follows:
(a) To pay the plaintiff the sum of P6,970.00 representing actual
damages;
(b) To pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,700.00 representing
unrealized income for the non-use of the plaintiff's damaged truck
for the period of eleven (11) months;
(c) To pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees; and
(d) To pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
Cabanatuan City, November 28, 1978. (Ibid,, pp. 13-14).
On March 19, 1979 private respondent Manuel Chu, Jr. filed with the trial court a
"Notice of Appeal" and an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to file Record on
Appeal which was granted by the trial court on the same date.
On March 26, 1979, Atty. Hermenegildo D. Ocampo, counsel of record of private
respondent, filed a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel" while the new counsel Atty.
Wilfredo G. Laxamana entered his appearance on April 18, 1979 and filed his
record on appeal on the same date.
On May 4, 1979 petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and
for execution which was set for hearing on May 14, 1979 wherein private
respondent's counsel personally appeared and opposed petitioner's motion while
on the latter date petitioner filed his reply to opposition, after which on May 16,
1979 the trial court issued an order denying aforesaid motion, while on May 22,
1979, the trial court issued another order approving private respondent's Record
on Appeal. (Rollo, pp. 9-10).
After the case was brought to the Court of Appeals and the parties had filed their
respective briefs, said Appellate Court issued its decision on March 31, 1981, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS the appealed
judgment is hereby set aside, for being null and void. This case is
directed to be remanded to the court of origin; that appellant be
properly served with summons and a copy of the complaint; and
that the necessary and appropriate proceedings or action be taken
thereafter, as the circumstances and the case win warrant.
With costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
Judgment is set aside. (Rollo, p. 33)
On April 20, 1981, petitioner filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a Motion
for Reconsideration and on June 3, 1981 a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. On August 28, 1981 respondent Court of Appeals issued an
order denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. (Rollo, pp. 9-11).
Hence, this petition, with the following assigned errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MISTAKE IN
HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT MANUEL CHU JR. WAS NOT
PROPERLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
SUMMONS WAS SERVED TO HIM THROUGH HIS WIFE;
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MISTAKE IN
HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT
HIMSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT DESPITE HIS
VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE, THRU COUNSEL ON A FIXED DATE OF
HEARING AND BY FILING WITH THE LOWER COURT A NOTICE OF APPEAL,
APPEAL BOND, MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RECORD ON
APPEAL, MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE, NOTICE OF
APPEARANCE, AND OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AND
FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF EXECUTION;
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS WAIVED ANY QUESTION ON THE TRIAL
COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER HIS PERSON BY HIS DELIBERATE FAILURE
AND REFUSAL TO SEEK RELIEF FROM THE TRIAL COURT.
4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SETTING
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 6754, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF CABANATUAN ClTY, BRANCH VII AND IN DIRECTING THAT
THE CASE BE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF ORIGIN SO THAT APPELLANT
CAN BE PROPERLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS. (Petition, Rollo, pp. 12-23)
In compliance with the resolution of the Second Division of this Court of October
12, 1981 (Rollo, p. 79-A) private respondent filed his comment on November 13,
1981 (Rollo, pp. 84-87). Petition er then filed a reply thereto in compliance with the
resolution of December 7, 1981 (Rollo, p. 39) after which the petition was given
due course in the resolution of February 8, 1982 and the parties were required to
file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 43). Petitioner filed his memorandum on
March 19, 1982 (Rollo, pp. 45-59) while private respondent filed his memorandum
on April 15, 1982 (Rollo, pp. 60-64). Thereafter, in the resolution of April 30, 1982,
the case was submitted for decision. (Rollo, p. 65).
There is no dispute as to the facts of this case, as shown by the admission of
private respondent to the extent of making an agreement with petitioner to
shoulder the expenses of the repair of the damaged truck of the latter and the
findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's evidence fully supports the
findings of facts of the trial court as well as its judgment under appeal.
Neither does private respondent deny receipt of the summons in question. The
bone of contention appears to be in the manner of service of said summons on the
wife of private respondent at their dwelling instead of on private respondent himself
personally.
Petitioner contends in favor of validity of such service while private respondent
maintains the opposite view which was sustained by respondent Court of Appeals
to the effect that the Sheriff resorted to substituted service under Section 8, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court, without first complying with the mode of personal service
required under Section 7 of the same Rule.
Thus, the principal issue which arises in this case which involves an inquiry into
procedural due process, is whether or not the question of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant can be raised for the first time on appeal.
The question has been answered in the negative by the Supreme Court in a long
line of decisions. In fact, one of the circumstances considered by the Court as
indicative of waiver by the defendant-appellant of any alleged defect of jurisdiction
over his person arising from defective or even want of process, is his failure to
raise the question of jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance and at the first
opportunity. It has been held that upon general principles, defects in jurisdiction
arising from irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings, defective
process or even absence of process may be waived by a failure to make
seasonable objections. (Castro v. Cebu Portland Cement Co., 71 Phil. 481 [1941]
citing Machan v. De la Trinidad, 3 Phil. 684; Vergara v. Laciapag 28 Phil. 439; U.S.
v. Inductivo, 40 Phil. 84; Soriano v. Ramirez, 44 Phil. 519). More recently, in
reiteration of the same principle, the Court ruled in Dalman v. City Court of Dipolog
City, Branch II, that as to the dismissal of the criminal case, the question of
jurisdiction which was never raised in said case before the trial court cannot be
done at this stage and level (134 SCRA 244 [1985]).
Coming to the case at bar, it has been pointed out that during the stages of the
proceedings in the court below, defendant-appellant could have questioned the
jurisdiction of the lower court but he did not.
It can of course be argued that the failure to question the lower court's jurisdiction
cannot be accounted against Chu for his having been declared in default gave him
no chance to participate in the court deliberations and therefore no chance to raise
the jurisdictional issue, but then, he could have done so, in the subsequent
pleadings he filed. Besides, even assuming that such failure cannot be taken
against him, the fact is he had VOLUNTARILY submitted himself to the court's
jurisdiction.
On the contrary, private respondent voluntarily appeared thru counsel in the trial
court. He filed a Notice of Appeal, Appeal Bond, Motion for Extension of Time to
File Record on Appeal, Record on Appeal, Motion for Withdrawal of Appearance,
Notice of Appearance and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and
for Issuance of a Writ of Execution. Not only did he submit pleadings and motions,
but he likewise appeared in person, thru counsel in the hearing held on May 14,
1979 at 8:30 a.m. and orally argued in open court on the pending incident. (Rollo,
pp. 53-54).
Under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service. Thus, under this principle,
it has been consistently held by the Supreme Court that the defect of summons is
cured by the voluntary appearance of the defendant. (Infante v. Toledo and
Lanting, 44 Phil. 834 [1918]; Aguilos v. Sepulvede, 53 SCRA 274 [1973]; J.M.
Tuazon & Co. v. Estabillo, 62 SCRA 1; Castro v. Cebu Portland Cement
Co., supra).
The Court of Appeals is however of the view that from all the actions and steps
taken by the appellant no presumption can arise that he voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the Court. In fact according to said Court, all of these
actions taken by the appellant are geared and mustered towards contesting the
court's jurisdiction over his person, or of attacking the validity of the judgment on
jurisdictional grounds. (Decision, CA, G.R. No. 65287-R; Rollo, p. 31).
It will be noted however, that the Notice of Appeal (Rollo, p. 38) unmistakably
indicates the reason for the appeal, which reads:
2. That, the herein defendant is not contented with the aforesaid
Decision for it is contrary to the evidence and the law and the
award of damages is so excessively unsupported by any evidence
to warrant the same; hence, he is appealing said Decision to the
Hon. Court of Appeals, Manila, both on questions of facts and law.
As clearly shown in the foregoing, the above-stated conclusion of the Court of
Appeals has evidently no basis.
Of equal importance is the question: if the defendant in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) has been declared in default, may he appeal the default judgment that may
subsequently be rendered even if he has not asked the RTC to set aside the
declaration of default? The answer is in the affirmative. However a distinction must
be made as to the effects of such appeal.
(a) If an appeal is made without first asking the RTC to set aside
the declaration of default, and the appellate court sets aside on
said declaration, all he can get is a review of the RTC's default
judgment without the opportunity of having the higher court
consider defense evidence (for the simple reason that no evidence
was even adduced by him in the RTC) (See Rule 41, sec. 2, par.
3, Rules of Court).
(b) If upon the other hand, the defendant first asks the RTC to set
aside the declaration of default (See Rule 18, secs. 2 and 3, Rules
of Court), and he is able to prevail, the declaration win be set
aside, and he will now have the opportunity to present his
evidence in the RTC. Thus, even if he finally loses in the RTC's
subsequent decision, his defense can be considered, when appeal
is made to the appellate tribunal. Of course, even if the default
declaration is not set aside despite his motion for the setting aside,
he will be entitled to all notices in the court proceedings, and can
file any pleading he may wish to file, including the notice of appeal.
(See Rule 13, sec. 9, Rules of Court).
Incidentally, the afore-mentioned rules apply to default declarations in the appeal the default judgment but in the appeal only the evidence of the petitioner
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial may be considered, respondent not having adduced any defense evidence; We
Courts, for under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the said inferior courts will follow agree with the findings of fact by the trial court, the same being unrebutted.
the rules in the RTC. Note however that in summary proceedings, there can be no
default declarations. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the then Court of First Instance
In the case at bar, there is no question that summons was timely issued and (now Regional Trial Court)of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City in Civil Case No. 6754
received by private respondent. In fact, he never denied actual receipt of such "Eliseo Boticano v. Manuel Chu, Jr. and Jaime Sigua" is hereby REINSTATED. No
summons but confined himself to the argument that the Sheriff should prove that costs.
personal service was first made before resorting to substituted service,
SO ORDERED.
This brings to the fore the question of procedural due process. In Montalban v.
Maximo (22 SCRA 1077 [1968]) the Court ruled that "The constitutional
requirement of due process exacts that the service be such as may be reasonably
expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules
reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement of justice is answered; the
traditional notions of fair play are satisfied; due process is served."

Indeed, such construction is but fair, and in accord with substantial justice. The
burden on a plaintiff is not to be enlarged with a restrictive construction desired by
the defendant. (Ibid., p. 1078).

Finally in a last ditch effort, private respondent insists that there was no valid
service of summons because private respondent is a partner and general manager
in San Pedro Sawmill. Consequently the wife of private respondent to whom
summons and complaint were allegedly served not being partnership, cannot
receive the same under Section 13 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

It has however been settled that actions must be brought by the real parties in
interest and against the persons who are bound by the judgment obtained therein.
(Salmon and Pacific Commercial Company v. Tan Cueco, 36 Phil. 557-558
[1917]).

The title of the case both in the trial court, in the Court of Appeals and in this Court
shows that the partnership is not a party. On the contrary, as previously stated
private respondent himself assumed the responsibility of the accident and is now
estopped to disclaim the liabilities pertaining thereto.

From what has been discussed the following conclusions are hereby made:
jurisdiction was properly acquired by the trial court over the person of respondent
thru both service of summons and voluntary appearance in court; he was therefore
properly declared in default for not having filed any answer; despite respondent's
failure to file a motion to set aside the declaration of default, he has the right to
O.B. JOVENIR CONSTRUCTION VS. MACAMIR REALTY AND
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In denying the present petition, the Court affirms the right of a plaintiff to cause
the dismissal of the complaint at any time before service of the answer without
need of affirmative action on the part of the trial court. It must be qualified
though that the incidents for adjudication occurred a few months before the
effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[1] which now requires that upon
the filing of such notice, the court issue an order confirming the
dismissal.[2] The precedental value of this decision is thus qualified to instances
occurring prior to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On 3 February 1997,[3] a complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, with private respondents Macamir Realty and Development Corp.
(Macamir Realty) and spouses Rosauro and Gloria Miranda as plaintiffs, and
petitioners O.B. Jovenir Construction and Development Corp.
(JovenirConstruction), Oscar B. Jovenir, and Gregorio Liongson being among the
defendants. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-256, sought the
annulment of certain agreements between private respondents and petitioners,
as well as damages.[4] It was alleged that Jovenir Construction was contracted to
complete the construction of private respondents condominium project. Private
respondents subsequently sought the termination of their agreements with
petitioners after it was discovered that Jovenir Construction had misrepresented
itself as a legitimate
contractor.[5] Respondents likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. A hearing on the prayer appears to have been conducted
on 6 February 1997.[6]
It was also alleged in the complaint that Gloria Miranda was the principal
stockholder and President of Macamir Realty while her husband Rosauro was the
owner of the real properties on which the condominium project was being
constructed.[7]
Almost immediately, two of the impleaded defendants filed their respective
motions to dismiss. Defendant Salud Madeja filed her motion on 6 February 1997,
while Cesar Mangrobang, Sr. and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. followed suit with their
motion dated 13 February 1997. Madeja pertinently alleged that while the
spouses Miranda had initiated the complaint on behalf of Macamir Realty, the real
party-in-interest, they failed to attach any Board Resolution authorizing them to
file suit on behalf of the corporation. Oddly enough, Madeja was a member of the
Board of Directors of Macamir Realty, and she averred as a fact that said Board of
Directors had not authorized the spouses Miranda to initiate the complaint
against Jovenir Realty.[8]
On 13 February 1997, or 10 days after the filing of the complaint, private
respondents filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint, alleging that during the initial
hearing on the prayer for preliminary injunction on 6 February 1997, counsel for
plaintiffs discovered a supposed technical defect in
the complaint x x x that x x x may be a ground for the dismissal of this case.[9] Thus,
private respondents prayed that the plaintiffs be allowed to withdraw the
complaint without prejudice.
Petitioners filed an opposition to the Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 18
February 1997, wherein they adopted Madejas arguments as to the lack of
authority on the part of the spouses Miranda to sue on behalf
of Macamir Realty. However, just one day earlier, or on 17 February 1997, private
respondents filed another complaint against the same defendants save for Madeja,
and seeking the same reliefs as the first complaint. This time, a Board Resolution
dated 10 February 1997 authorizing the spouses Miranda to file the Complaint on
behalf of Macamir Realty was attached to the complaint. This second complaint was
also filed with the Makati RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. 97-379. The
Verification and Certification [of] Non-Forum Shopping in the second complaint
was accomplished by Rosauro Miranda, who averred as follows:
3. That other than Civil Case No. 97-256 filed on February 3, 1997 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City which was withdrawn on February 13, 1997, I
further certify that we have not commenced any other action or proceedings
involving the same issue in the Supreme Court, or Court of Appeals or any other
tribunal or agency; x x x[10]

On 24 February 1997, 11 days after the filing of the Motion to Withdraw
Complaint and seven days after the filing of the second Complaint,
the Makati RTC, Branch 149, acting in Civil Case No. 97-256, granted the Motion to
Withdraw Complaint. The RTC noted in its Order[11] that an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiffs even without Order of the Court by filing a notice of
dismissal at anytime before the service of the answer under Rule 17, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court, and accordingly considered the complaint withdrawn without
prejudice.[12]
The battle then shifted to Civil Case No. 97-379, which had been raffled to Branch
136 of the Makati RTC. On 4 March 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the
second complaint on the ground of forum-shopping. They pointed out that at the
time of the filing of the second complaint on 17 February 1997, the first complaint
was still pending. The Makati RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss in an
Order[13] dated 23 May 1997, observing that at the time the Motion to Withdraw
Complaint was filed, none of the defendants had filed any answer or any
responsive pleading. Thus, it was then within respondents right to cause the
dismissal of the complaint without having to await action of the court
on their motion.[14] This Order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
Special Sixth Division in its Decision[15] dated 23 June 1998 after
petitioners had assailed the RTCs order via a special civil action for certiorari filed
with the appellate court.[16] Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners now argue that under Section 1 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure in effect at the time of these antecedents, the plaintiff may obtain the
dismissal of his own complaint before a responsive pleading has been filed
through the filing of a notice of dismissal. However, respondents in this case did
not file a notice of dismissal, but instead lodged a Motion to Withdraw Complaint,
a motion which requires affirmative action from the court before the complaint
may be deemed dismissed. Since the Makati RTC had granted the motion only
on 24 February 1997, the first complaint had not yet been withdrawn as of 17
February 1997, when the second complaint was filed. It is thus posited that the
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the second complaint was false,
in that it averred that the first complaint was withdrawn on February 13,
1997 when in fact the motion to withdraw complaint was granted only 11 days
after. In sum, respondents had violated the procedural rules against forum-
shopping, which at that time were incorporated in Administrative Circular No. 04-
94 of the Supreme Court.
We find no error on the part of the lower courts since the denial of the motion to
dismiss is wholly in accord with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure stated:
Dismissal by the plaintiff An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without
order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the
answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the
notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a
competent court an action based on or including the same claim. A class suit shall
not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court.[17]
Indubitably, the provision ordained the dismissal of the complaint by the plaintiff
as a matter of right at any time before service of the answer.[18] The plaintiff was
accorded the right to dismiss the complaint without the necessity of alleging in
the notice of dismissal any ground nor of making any reservation.[19]
In Go v. Cruz,[20] the Court, through Chief Justice Narvasa, has recognized that
where the dismissal of an action rests exclusively on the will of a plaintiff or
claimant, to prevent which the defending party and even the court itself is
powerless, requiring in fact no action whatever on the part of the court except
the acceptance and recording of the causative document.[21] The facts in that case
are well worth considering. Therein, the notice of dismissal was filed by the
plaintiff on 12 November 1981. Respondent filed his answer three days earlier, or
on 9 November, but plaintiff was served a copy of the answer by registered mail
only on 16 November.Notwithstanding the fact that the answer was filed with the
trial court three days prior to the filing of the notice of dismissal, the Court still
affirmed the dismissal sought by the plaintiff. The Court declared that the right of
the plaintiff to cause the dismissal of the complaint by mere notice is lost not by
the filing of the answer with the trial court, but upon the actual service to the
plaintiff of the answer.[22]
The Court further ruled that [plaintiffs] notice ipso facto brought about the
dismissal of the action then pending in the Manila Court, without need of any
order or other action by the Presiding Judge. The dismissal was effected without
regard to whatever reasons or motives [plaintiff] might have had for bringing it
about, and was, as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, without prejudice, the
contrary not being otherwise stated in the notice and it being the first time the
action was being so dismissed.[23]
It is quite clear that under Section 1, Rule 17 of the old Rules, the dismissal
contemplated therein could be accomplished by the plaintiff through mere notice
of dismissal, and not through motion subject to approval by the Court. Dismissal
is ipso facto upon notice, and without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the
notice. It is due to these considerations that the petition should be denied.
Evidently, respondents had the right to dismiss their complaint by mere notice
on 13 February 1997, since as of even date, petitioners had not yet served their
answer on respondents. The Motion to Withdraw Complaint makes clear
respondents desire to withdraw the complaint without prejudice. That
respondents resorted to a motion to effect what they could have instead by mere
notice may be indicative of a certain degree of ignorance of procedural rules on
the part of respondents counsel.Yet such error, if it could be called as such,
should hardly be of fatal consequence. Petitioners posit that the remedy of filing
a notice of dismissal is not exclusive, respondents having the option of securing
the courts approval to the dismissal.[24] On the contrary, the trial court has no
discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff under
Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs. Even if the
motion cites the most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court has no
choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt
for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of ground.
We are in accord with the Court of Appeals when it pronounced:
While [the Motion to Withdraw Complaint] is styled as a motion and contains a
prayer, these are innocuous errors and superfluities that do not detract from its
being a notice of dismissal made under said Section 1 of Rule 17 and which ipso
facto dismissed the case. It is a hornbook rule that it is not the caption of a
pleading but the allegations thereat that determines its nature.[[25]] The court
order of dismissal is a mere surplusage under the circumstances and emphasized
by the court a quo itself when it granted the motion [x x x]considering that an
action may be dismissed by the plaintiffs even without Order of the Court[x x x][26]
Thus, the complaint could be properly considered as having been dismissed or
withdrawn as of 13 February 1997. Accordingly, when respondents filed their new
complaint relating to the same cause of action on 17 February 1997, the old
complaint was no longer pending. The certification against forum-shopping
attached to the new complaint correctly asseverated that the old complaint was
withdrawn on February 13, 1997.[27]
Petitioners are unable to propose any convincing legal argument or any
jurisprudence that would sway the Court to their point of view. At the same time,
our present ruling must be distinguished from Ortigas & Company Limited
Partnership v. Velasco,[28] wherein it was advanced that theoretically every final
disposition of an action does not attain finality until after fifteen (15)
days therefrom, x x x the plaintiff may move to withdraw and set aside his notice
of dismissal and revive his action, before that period lapses.[29] That statement
was made in the context of ruling that a plaintiff may move for the revival of the
complaint dismissed on his instance under Section 1 of Rule 17 only within 15
days upon notice; otherwise the remedy of the plaintiff would be to file a new
complaint. This observation in Ortigas does not detract from the fact that under
Section 1, Rule 17 of the previous Rules, the complaint is deemed ipso
facto dismissed on the day of the filing of the notice. This again is because
dismissal at the instance of the plaintiff under Section 1, Rule 17 is a matter of
right, and under the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure, effective without need of any
affirmative action on the part of the trial court.
As noted at the onset, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now requires that upon
the filing of such notice, the court issue an order confirming the dismissal.[30] The
new requirement is intended to qualify the right of a party to dismiss the action
before the adverse party files an answer or asks for summary judgment.[31] Still,
there is no cause to apply the 1997 Rules retroactively to this case. A plaintiffs
right to cause the dismissal of his complaint under the old rules was unqualified.
Procedural rules may not be given retroactive effect if vested rights would be
disturbed,[32] or if their
application would not be feasible or would work injustice.[33] Since
respondents possessed an unqualified right to cause the dismissal of their
complaint without need of confirmation by the trial court, as
enunciated in the 1964 Rules, they did not err in asserting that their first
complaint was withdrawn on the day of the filing of their motion to withdraw,
and the lower courts were correct in agreeing with respondents on this point.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.