[G.R. No. 116607.

April 10, 1996]

EMILIO TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA

VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondents.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases
where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy
available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision
of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.[18] Indeed,
relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when
the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can
be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.[19]

[18]
Somoso v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 654, 660 [1989]; Ibabao v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150
SCRA 76 [1987]; Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Lood, 110 SCRA 205 [1981].
[19]
Ibabao v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at 86; Manila Electric Co. p. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA
201 [1990].

G.R. No. 161864 April 27, 2007

SPS. ROLANDO DELA CRUZ and TERESITA DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,

vs.
SPS. FELICIANO ANDRES and ERLINDA AUSTRIA, and the DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, Respondents.

For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the
client’s cause must be shown.12 The negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is
deprived of his day in court, the result of which is that he is deprived of his property without due
process of law. Thus, where a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course,
he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the
very essence of due process.13 Here, the case underwent a full-blown trial. Both parties were
adequately heard, and all issues were ventilated before the decision was promulgated.

It should be pointed out that in petitions for relief from judgment, meritorious defenses must be
accompanied by the ground relied upon, whether it is fraud, accident, mistake, excusable
negligence, extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.14 In the instant case, there being neither excusable
nor gross negligence amounting to a denial of due process, meritorious defenses cannot alone be
considered.

While it is true that rules of procedure are not cast in stone, it is equally true that strict compliance
with the Rules is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and
expeditious dispatch of judicial business.15 Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized
by harking on the policy of liberal construction.16
12 Que v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150739, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 358, 369.

13 Saint Louis University v. Cordero, G.R. No. 144118, July 21, 2004, 434 SCRA 575, 584.

14 Id. at 586.

Heirs of the Late Cruz Barredo v. Asis, G.R. No. 153306, August 27, 2004, 437 SCRA 196, 201;
15

See Saint Louis University v. Cordero, supra.

16Mariveles Shipyard Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144134, November 11, 2003, 415 SCRA
573, 584.

As to the affidavit of merit, MAGDATO countered that "the affidavit of merit may be set forth in the
petition itself and need not be in a separate document (Consul vs. Consul, L-22713, July 26, 1966),"
if the "facts constituting petitioner's substantial cause of action or defense . . . are alleged in the
verified petition for the oath elevated the petition to the same category as a separate affidavit (Fabar,
Inc. vs. Rodelas, L-46394, Oct. 24, 1977)."

So we did in People's Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Tiongco,48 where we declared:

There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel is
notice to parties, and that such doctrine has beneficent effects upon the prompt
dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case, however, should be looked
into and adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise, in the
court's desire to make short cut of the proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or
uwittingly, dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice. It would then be easy for
one lawyer to sell one's rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot every
process of the court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under this
circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also
a notice to his clients.

In the alternative, the petition for relief from judgment may properly be considered as MAGDATO's
appeal from the order (decision) of the MCTC of 20 September 1993, or an action to annul the said
order. It is a settled rule that a final and executory judgment may be set aside in three way, viz., (1)
by a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38; (2) when the judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction, by direct action, as certiorari, or by collateral attack; and (3) when the judgment was
obtained by fraud and Rule 38 cannot be applied, by civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil
Code.52 The fraud must be extrinsic or collateral. In the instant case, the unconscionable failure of
MAGDATO's lawyer to inform MAGDATO of his receipt of the Order of 20 September 1993 and the
motion for execution and to take the appropriate action against either or both to protect MAGDATO's
rights amounted to connivance with the prevailing party for MAGDATO's defeat, which constituted
extrinsic fraud.53

53 Laxamana vs. Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 48, 56 [1978]; Asian Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.
vs. Island Steel, Inc., 118 SCRA 233, 239 [1982].