Cruz v CA

 petitioners and Arnel Cruz were co-owners of a parcel of land situated in Taytay, Rizal.
 On August 22, 1977, petitioners and Arnel Cruz executed a Deed of Partial Partition,
distributing to each of them their shares
 Subsequently, the same parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement where they agreed
in writing to share equally in the proceeds of the sale of the properties although they had
been subdivided and individually titled
 Sometime in January 1983, petitioner Thelma Cruz learned that Arnel Cruz had executed a
Special Power of Attorney in favor of one Nelson Tamayo authorizing him to obtain a loan of
104k from respondent Summit, to be secured by a real estate mortgage on the subject
parcel of land.
 Since the loan remained outstanding, Summit instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings where it won. Consequently, Sheriff Sta. Ana issued a Certificate of Sale to
respondent Summit
 In the RTC, petitioners asserted that they co-owned the properties with Arnel Cruz, as
evidenced by the MoA. Hence, they argued that the mortgage was void since they did not
consent to it.
 RTC ruled in favor of petitioners; petitioners and Arnel intended to keep the properties in a
state of co-ownership
 CA reversed; the MoA does not contain any proscription against the mortgage of the
property although it provides that the parties thereto are entitled to share in the proceeds
of the sale of the properties covered by it.
WON the land is still co-owned
HELD: NO

 Co-ownership is terminated upon judicial or extra-judicial partition of the properties owned

in common. From a reading of the provisions of the Deed of Partial Partition, no other
meaning can be gathered other than that petitioners and Arnel Cruz had put an end to the
co-ownership
 There is nothing from the words of said deed which expressly or impliedly stated that
petitioners and Arnel Cruz intended to remain as co-owners with respect to the disputed
property. Further, there is absolutely nothing in the Memorandum of Agreement which
diminishes the right of Arnel Cruz to alienate or encumber the properties allotted to him in
the deed of partition.
 Petitioners sold the properties adjudicated to them and titled in their name. Being clear
manifestations of sole and exclusive dominion over the properties affected, the acts signify
total incongruence with the state of co-ownership claimed by petitioners. Thus, this Court
holds that the real estate mortgage on the disputed property is valid and does not
contravene the agreement of the parties.
Panganiban v Oamil

 Oamil filed a case against Partenio (pet father) for the execution of the “Agreement to sell”
between them. The land is Partenio’s conjugal share in a parcel of commercial land owned
by him and his first wife. The land is question is co-owned by petitioners and Patrenio
 There are two portions of the subject property in contention: one facing 21 st St and one
facing Canda St.
 For failing to appear, RTC ruled in favor of respondent. However, the RTC failed to specify
which portion should be deeded to Oamil. The decision obtained finality and Oamil was
awarded the 21st St. side of the property
 Petitioners filed a verified petition for relief from the decision of the trial court. They argued
that Partenio’s conjugal share in the property, and that of petitioners as well, are being
litigated in a judicial partition proceeding pending in the CA
 Petitioners moved for an MR. Instead of resolving it, the court deferred proceeding to await
the decision of the CA in the partition case. The CA awarded the Canda St. side to Patrenio
 The trial court substantially modified its Decision dated December 26, 1993, by awarding
specifically the 21st St. portion of the property to Partenio as his conjugal share, despite the
pronouncement in partition case which awards the Canda St. portion to him. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision thereby disregarding the decision on the partition case. The CA
ruled that petitioners have always acknowledged their father Partenio’s "acts of ownership"
over the 21st St. portion, thus signifying their consent and thereby barring them from
questioning the award.
WON petitioners can question the award of the 21st st property
HELD: YES

 During the existence of the co-ownership, no individual can claim title to any definite
portion of the community property until the partition thereof; and prior to the partition, all
that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land
or thing.
 The decision in the Special Civil Action, which is an action for judicial partition of the subject
property, determines what Partenio, and ultimately, respondent, as his successor-in-
interest, is entitled to in Civil Case No. 140-0-93.

 The ruling in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 – that the Canda St. portion shall go to
Partenio – became the law of the case and continues to be binding between the parties as
well as their successors-in-interest. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that
dictum can no longer be relitigated anew in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 since said issue had
been resolved and finally laid to rest in the partition case
 As a result of the trial court’s refusal to abide by the decision in the Special Civil Action, the
rights of the petitioners have been unnecessarily transgressed, thereby giving them the
right to seek relief in court in order to annul the October 23, 1997 Order of the trial court
which substantially and wrongly modified its original decision in Civil Case No. 140-0-93. It
was clear mistake for the trial court to have gone against the final and executory decision in
Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 and its original decision, which does not award a definite
portion of the disputed property to Partenio. As a result of this mistake, the petitioners are
entitled to relief
Cuizon v Remoto

 Petitioners-spouses Encarnation and Salvador Cuizon rely on a TCT in the name of

Encarnacion L. Cuizon issued in 1984 pursuant to an extra judicial sale executed in 1983 by
the heirs of Placida (original owner) with the Cuizon’s
 Respondents have in their favor a notarized Deed of Sale of Real Property dated September
19, 1968 covering the same parcel of land executed by Placida herself with the Remoto’s
 RTC ruled in favor of respondents; Since petitioner-spouses knew of the existence of the
first deed of sale, Exhibit A, this first unregistered deed of sale (Remoto deed) prevails over
the registered second deed of sale (Cuizon Deed). CA affirmed
Who has a better right to the land
HELD: Remotos

 As correctly ruled by both the trial court and the CA, the 1968 Deed of Sale executed by
Placida in favor of Angel should prevail over the 1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale
made by the heirs of Placida in favor of petitioners-spouses Cuizon.
 Records bear the fact that when Placida sold her one-fourth portion of the in 1968, the
1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale was still inexistent, and more importantly, said
portion was yet to be transferred by succession to Placidas heirs. The records also show that
after Placida sold her portion to Remoto, the latter immediately took possession of the
same. Applying the principle of priority in time, it is clear that Remoto, and consequently his
heirs, the respondents herein, have a superior right to the property.
 The Court notes, however, that the property originally co-owned by Placida, Eugenio
Tabada, Raymunda Tabada and Patrecia Tabada, covered by TCT No. RT-183, measures 16
hectares, while the 1968 Deed of Sale covers 4,300 square meters.
 The right of Placida to sell her one-fourth portion of the property is sanctioned under art
493
 The sale to Remoto affects only Placidas pro indiviso share in the property, and Angel gets
only what corresponds to Placidas share in the partition of the property owned in common.
Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void; only the rights of
the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Given the foregoing, the portion sold by Placida and bought by Angel under the 1968 Deed
of Sale should only pertain to one-fourth of Placidas share in the 16-hectare property, or
4,000 square meters.
Castro v Miat

 Spouses Moises (co-petitiioner) and Concordia Miat bought 2 parcels of land; 1 in

Paranaque and 1 in Paco. Moises wanted the Paranaque property for himself while he left
the Paco property to his 2 sons Romeo (defendant) and Alexander
 Alexander sold his share in the Paco property to Romeo for 42k and received a
downpayment of 6k but never executed a deed of assignment in Romeo’s favor because he
was apparently busy
 In 1988, Romeo learned from his godmother that she paid 30k to Moises as downpayment
for the sale by Moises of the Paco property in favor of Virgilio (petitioner)
 Romeo was brought by petitioner Virgilio Castro to the chambers of Judge Anunciacion to
discuss the Paco property. The agreement was reiterated in front of the extended Miat
family members:
 Initially, Romeo and Alexander orally divided the Paco property between themselves.
Later, however, Alexander sold his share to Romeo. Alexander was given P6,000.00 as
downpayment.
 Later, Moises ran into financial difficulties and he mortgaged for P30k the Paco property
to the parents of petitioner Virgilio Castro. He informed Romeo and Alexander that he
would be forced to sell the Paco property if they would not redeem the mortgage. He
accompanied his children to the Manila City Hall to discuss its sale with a judge and a
lawyer. Also present in the meeting were petitioner Virgilio Castro and his parents. After
the conference, he proceeded to sell the property to the petitioners-spouses Castro.
 Alexander testified that after the sale, his father got one-third (1/3) of the proceeds
while he received two-thirds (2/3). Romeo did not get a single centavo but was given
the right to till their Nueva Ecija property. From his share of the proceeds, Alexander
intended to return to Romeo the P6,000.00 given him earlier by the latter. He
considered the money to be a personal debt due Romeo, not Romeos downpayment of
his share in the Paco property.
 The RTC ruled in favor of Romeo. The CA modified the rulling to declare the sale between
Mosies and Virgillo as void ad for Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance of
the Paco property to Romeo
WON the Paco property is Conjugal
Won the verbal partition is valid
WON Castro’s are buyers in good faith
HELD

 Conjugal. Since Moises and Concordia were married before the effectivity of the Family
Code, the provisions of the New Civil Code apply. The records show that the Paco property
 was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly
conjugal property.
 VALID. We hold that the oral partition between Romeo and Alexander is not covered by the
Statute of Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons. Firstly, Alexander accepted the six
thousand (P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo as downpayment for the purchase of his share
in the Paco property. Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat and Pedro Miranda,
who testified regarding the sale of Alexanders share to Romeo, were intensely questioned
by petitioners counsel.
o In Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals
 [N]o law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to
be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a
partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the
protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others.
 Not Buyers in good faith. Virgilio testified that together with Romeo, Alexander and Moses
Miat, they went to Judge Anunciacion of Manila in order to find out if Romeo has a right
over the property. Romeo told Virgilio in that meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco
property by virtue of an oral partition and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he knew
Romeo was in possession of the title and Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the
property.
Go-Bangayan v bangayan

 Petitioner Sally Go-Bangayan is the paramour of respondent Benjamion Bangayan. They

executed a purported marriage contract but was not registered since Sally knew of
respondent’s married status.
 Their cohabitation produced 2 children and they acquired the ff 7 properties:

 property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
 (2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin,
married to Sally;
 (3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783
registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
 (4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual.
 Their relationship ended in 1994. She filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of
public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
She claimed 37 properties as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin.
 Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground that his marriage to
Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin
also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally, for his
appointment as administrator of the properties, and for the declaration of Bernice and
Bentley as illegitimate children.
 RTC ruled in favor of respondent. On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally
could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal
properties with Benjamin because they were not married; that the 37 properties were given
as advance inheritance by Benjamin’s parents; and that the 37 properties were in the name
of Benjamin and his brothers. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos.
61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal
partnership of Benjamin and Azucena (actual wife)
 The CA partly granted Sally’s appeal. As to the 7 properties
o TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 belong exclusively to Benjamin
o TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 belong exclusively
to Sally
o TCT No. 61722 to be co-owned by Ben and Sally in common; Ben’s share shall
accrue to the conjugal partnership he has with Azucena; Sally’s share accrues to
her

WON the CA erred in modifying the RTC ruling regarding the property relations of Sally and Ben

HELD: CA ruled aptly

 the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code
  Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.

 Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and
Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of
Benjamin with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally with the descriptive title "married to
Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in
the name of Sally as a single individual.
 We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-
ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be
no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.
Lacbayan v Samoy

 Petitioner Betty Lacbayan is respondent Bayani Samoy’s paramour.

 During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more
incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. Five parcels of land
were also acquired during the said period
 TCT No. 303224 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty Lacbayan
 TCT No. 23301 and registered in the name of Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty
Lacbayan
 TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty
Lacbayan Samoy
 TCT No. 335193 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty L.
Samoy.
 TCT No. 90232 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty L.
Samoy.
 They parted ways in 1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and
terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. When this did not
fall through, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition
 Petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together as husband and wife in 1979
without the benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring real
properties amounting to P15M. Respondent, in his Answer, denied petitioners claim of
cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without
any contribution from petitioner.
 RTC dismissed the complaint; gave considerable weight to petitioners own admission that
the properties were acquired not from her own personal funds. CA affirmed
 Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on
the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent
maintains otherwise.

WON the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an

action for partition

WON respondents assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission against
interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership
between him and petitioner

HELD:

 YES. in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia

o The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination
of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not
otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the
parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is
 not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or
partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a
co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting
of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in
order.

The second phase commences when it appears that the parties are unable to agree
upon the partition directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the
parties by the [c]ourt…

 Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More
importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does
not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.
 NO. To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be
categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the
admitters interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.
 A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the
document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of
which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among
themselves the subject properties.
 Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement
after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have
any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.

Wherefore…Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole owner of the disputed
properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against him.
Cabrera v Ysaac

 Respondent Henry Ysaac is a co-owner of a parcel of land located in Naga city

 Henry Ysaac leased out portions of the property to several lessees. Petitioner Juan Cabrera,
one of the lessees, leased a 95-square-meter portion of the land beginning in 1986
 Respondent offered to sell the leased property but petitioner refused because the land was
too small
 To address Juan Cabrera’s concerns, Henry Ysaac expanded his offer to include the two
adjoining lands that Henry Ysaac was then leasing to the Borbe family and the Espiritu
family. However, Henry Ysaac warned Juan Cabrera that the sale for those two parcels could
only proceed if the two families agree to it. Petitioner agreed to the sale and paid 1.5k in
advance and another 6.1k for reimbursement to the Espiritu family.
 In 1992, petitioner tried to pay the remaining balance but respondent was in the US. The
only person in Henry Ysaac’s residence was his wife who refused petitioner’s payment
 In 1993, the parties agreed to reduce the area of the subject land from 439 sqm to 321sqm.
According to petitioner, respondent agreed to shoulder the resurvey expenses for which
Petitioner advance an additional 3k
 In 1994, Ysaac’s counsel wrote a letter to Cabrera’s counsel that respondent was rescinding
the sale because of Cabrera’s non-payment of the balance of the purchase price. Also.
Cabrera’s initial payment of 1.5k and 6,.1k will be applied as overdue rent payment. Ysaac
also denied shouldering the costs of the resurvey.
 When Cabrera went to Ysaac’s house, the latter told Cabrera that he could no longer sell
the property because the new administrator is his brother, Franklin Ysaac
 Due to Juan Cabrera’s inability to enforce the contract of sale between him and Henry
Ysaac, he decided to file a civil case for specific performance. The RTC ruled in favor of
Ysaac. It ruled that there was a perfected contract between Cabrera and Ysaac however,
that contract of sale between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac was duly rescinded when the
former failed to pay the balance of the purchase price in the period agreed upon.
 The CA amended the RTC ruling. It ruled that there was no recission of the contract
between the parties and that specific performance is not an available relief to plaintiff
because of the supervening sale of the property to the City of Naga, an innocent purchaser
and for value. It also ordered the return of Cabrera’s total initial payment of 10.6k

WON there was a valid contract of sale between the parties

HELD: NONE

 If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner cannot sell a definite portion of the
land without consent from his or her co-owners. He or she could only sell the undivided
interest of the co-owned property. Hence, prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of
common property requires the consent of all co-owners because it operates to partition the
land with respect to the co-owner selling his or her share. The co-owner or seller is already
 marking which portion should redound to his or her autonomous ownership upon future
partition.
 The object of the sales contract between petitioner and respondent was a definite portion
of a co-owned parcel of land. At the time of the alleged sale between petitioner and
respondent, the entire property was still held in common. The rules allow respondent to sell
his undivided interest in the coownership. However, this was not the object of the sale
between him and petitioner. The object of the sale was a definite portion.
 Respondent had no right to define a 95-square-meter parcel of land, a 439-square-meter
parcel of land, or a 321-square-meter parcel of land for purposes of selling to petitioner.
The determination of those metes and bounds are not binding to the co-ownership and,
hence, cannot be subject to sale, unless consented to by all the co-owners.
 At best, the agreement between petitioner and respondent is a contract to sell, not a
contract of sale. A co-owner could enter into a contract to sell a definite portion of the
property. However, such contract is still subject to the suspensive condition of the partition
of the property, and that the other co-owners agree that the part subject of the contract to
sell vests in favor of the co-owner’s buyer. Hence, the co-owners’ consent is an important
factor for the sale to ripen.