In the present complaint, complainants contend that respondent judge is
administratively liable for rendering judgment against them without the benefit of an arraignment
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1231. March 17, 2004.]
(formerly OCA IPI No. 97-287-MTJ)
ANTONIO GAMAS and FLORENCIO
SOBRIO, complainants, vs. JUDGE ORLANDO A. OCO, in his
capacity as presiding judge of Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok,
South Cotabato and PNP SPO4 WILLIE ADULACION in his capacity
as public prosecutor of MTC-Polomolok, South
Cotabato, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a complaint for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law filed by
complainants Antonio Gamas and Florencio Sobrio ("complainants") against Judge Orlando
A. Oco ("respondent judge"), former 1 Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok,
South Cotabato ("MTC Polomolok") and SPO4 Willie Adulacion ("respondent Adulacion"), a
"police prosecutor" in the MTC Polomolok.
The Facts
In their Complaint ("Complaint") and supporting affidavits, complainants allege that
they are the accused in a case for theft 2 which, at the time material to this case, was pending in
the sala of respondent judge. As respondent judge had issued warrants for their arrest,
complainants on 3 October 1996 went to the MTC Polomolok to post bail. Complainants allege
that respondent Adulacion enticed them to plead guilty to the charge, apply for probation, and
thus avoid imprisonment.
Respondent Adulacion, who had allegedly prepared a draft decision embodying his
suggestion, conferred with respondent judge, and handed the draft decision to
respondent judge. After reading the document, respondent judge signed it, told complainants "O,
plead guilty man kamo" ("O, you're pleading guilty"), and handed the document to a clerk.
Respondent judge told the clerk to read the contents of the decision to complainants and to
instruct them on what to do. The clerk read the contents of the document to complainants and
asked them to sign it. Complainants signed the document upon respondent Adulacion's
assurance that once the police apprehend the rest of the accused, 3 the police will revive the
case and respondent Adulacion will present complainants as "star witnesses." Complainants
later found out that what they signed was an Order 4 ("3 October 1996 Order") finding them
guilty of theft and sentencing them each to imprisonment for six (6) months and one (1) day.
Finding the proceedings highly irregular, complainants sought the assistance of a
lawyer. Upon motion of complainants' counsel, respondent judge vacated the 3 October 1996
Order, ostensibly on the ground that complainants had entered improvident guilty pleas.
Respondent judge scheduled complainants' re-arraignment on 2 February 1997.
and in violation of their right to be represented by counsel. 5
In his Answer ("Answer"), respondent judge denied complainants' allegations
regarding the alleged procedural irregularities in the issuance of the 3 October 1996 Order.
According to respondent judge, the following transpired in his sala on 3 October 1996:
2. On [the] session day [of October 3, 1996,] prosecutor Willie
Adulacion with two men who turned out to be complainants,
Antonio Gamas and Florencio Sobrio approached me. It was Adulacion
who talked. He stated that these two have long pending warrants of arrest
and they cannot afford to file P10,000.00 bail. They were charged of theft
of corn worth P4,500.00. . . . They were caught with two others who are
their relatives hauling 3 or 4 tricycle loads of corn cabs [sic]. Adulacion
said that Gamas and Sobrio asked him to propose to the judge that
Sobrio and Gamas would plead guilty, but be meted the most minimum
penalty, allowed probation and after which they be released [on] their own
recognizance because they cannot file their bailbonds.
3. Their predicament at that moment if I cannot attend to them
immediately was that Mr. Adulacion [would] have to lock them in jail
because they surrendered. Gamasand Sobrio were lucky that instant
because there was a lull in my proceedings so they were able to see me.
4. As soon as Adulacion ha[d] articulated his piece of talk, in
the hearing distance of Gamas and Sobrio because we were face to
face[,] I asked them if what Adulacion said was true and they replied yes.
5. That instant I knew that Sobrio and Gamas wanted things
done instantly so they will not be locked in jail so I ordered for the records
from my staff. I read thoroughly while the three waited across the table,
seated.
6. I gathered from my readings that [the] tricycle drivers with
their tricycles were apprehended in flagrante delicto carrying corn cabs
[sic] right in the corn field of Dole. I asked why there were released with
the tricycles inspite of this apprehension but I did not get satisfactory
answer from any of the 3. . . .
7. For me to instantly respond to their plea that they be allowed
to plead guilty, meted the minimum sentence, allowed probation and
pending probation they be released on recognizance, they will solve their
very immediate problem of being locked in jail because they had
surrendered to Adulacion and they had no ready bails. Knowing the
course of action they wanted, I begun discoursing on their rights as
accused. I told them of their right to counsel, to be given free of charge if
they cannot afford to solicit services of one, to confront the witnesses and
cross examine and because they had voluntarily articulated the desire to
plead guilty, I estimated to them the probable penalty. I also told them
that they have [a] right to apply for probation but pending action they may
be required to file bailbonds but they begged that they be allowed to
plead guilty but released pending probation proceedings.
8. After the discourse I read from them that they would like to
really plead guilty and wanted instant action so that they will not be in jail.
As called for by the situation I arraigned them. I read to them in the
dialect they understand the accusation and informed them [of] the nature
of the evidence arrayed but they pleaded guilty, always begging that they
 be sentenced with the most minimum penalty, allowed probation and
released immediately in their recognizance.
xxx xxx xxx
11. [Thus], there was arraignment and that their plea of guilt
was voluntary.
12. I wrote the decision in long hand in their very presence then
handed it to the typist who typed it; then I read silently what the typist
typed and satisfied that what I wrote was correctly typed I signed [the 3
October 1996 Order], then required my court interpreter to read the whole
decision in the language they know. I looked while the interpreter was
reading. They looked satisfied that what the interpreter was reading
corresponded with what they proposed and what we discussed. After the
reading, Gamasand Sobrio signed the decision.
13. It was I who wrote that decision, Mr. Adulacion cannot write
that.
14. So it is clear that before deciding I arraigned Gamas and
Sobrio upon their demand for instant solution to their predicament. Before
arraignment I counselled them of their rights and I even warned them the
exact penalty I will give them. There was no lawyer in attendance but the
lawyer was their problem. I heard them saying that since they were
caught carrying the corn, a lawyer would not have much use, moreover
they expressed they have no money to pay for a lawyer. I argued that I
can give them a PAO lawyer but they insisted they plead guilty so that all
will get done without jailing them that instant. 6
Respondent judge claims that complainants assailed the validity of the 3 October 1996
Order to avoid serving their sentences as they had allegedly violated the terms of their probation
by failing to report to their probation officer. Respondent judge maintains that there was no
irregularity in the issuance of the 3 October 1996 Order. Respondent judgeadds that he decided
to set aside his ruling merely out of compassion for complainants. 7
We referred this matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Polomolok, South Cotabato ("RTC Polomolok") for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Investigating Judge's Findings
On 7 December 2000, Executive Judge Eddie Roxas ("Executive Judge Roxas") of
RTC Polomolok submitted his Report ("Report"), finding respondent judge liable for simple
neglect of duty and recommending the imposition of P10,000 fine on the latter. The Report reads
in pertinent parts:
The basic issues to be resolved in this case . . . are as follows:
1. Whether or not complainants waived their right to counsel;
2. Whether or not complainants were properly arraigned; and
3. Whether or not the Order dated October 3, 1996 was
prepared by Prosecutor Adulacion.
To resolve the first issue, it is noteworthy to state that in all
criminal prosecution[s], the accused shall be entitled to be present and
defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, that
is from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment (Sec. 1(c),
Rule 115, Rules of Court). In relation to such statutory right of the
accused, the Court has been given the correlative duty to inform the
accused of his right to counsel as expressly provided under Section 6 of
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The right to be assisted by counsel is
deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio [counsel] for him if he
so desires and he is poor, or grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney of his own.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case under investigation, it is clear that the herein
complainants were not assisted by counsel when they were allegedly
arraigned by the Respondent Judge. Nowhere in the records of the case
[was it shown] that the said complainants were indeed assisted by their
own counsel of choice, or a counsel de oficio from the time they were
allegedly arraigned up to the promulgation of their sentence. . . .
[S]uch fact has been admitted by the Respondent Judge,
however, he alleged that the right to counsel had already been waived by
the complainants after they were apprised of the said right.
While it is true that the complainants were informed of their
right to have counsel, however, it is not enough that said complainants be
simply informed of their right to counsel; they should also be asked
whether they want to avail themselves of one and should be told that they
can hire a counsel of their own choice if they desire to have one, or that
one can be provided to them at their own request.
xxx xxx xxx
[I]t is . . . clear from the investigation conducted that the herein
complainants did not satisfactorily waived their right to counsel, for
although they were mechanically informed and inadequately explained of
the same, it's not a guaranty that they have voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently waived such right. One cannot waive a right if in the first place
he does not know and understand such right. In that instance, there is no
valid waiver to speak of.
xxx xxx xxx
With regard to the second issue, the undersigned
Investigating Judge cannot be persuaded that on the very basic
procedure alone, involving just the mechanical process of arraignment
outlined in Section 1 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, there was the
necessary degree of compliance by the Respondent Judge. Other
considerations reveal how flawed the supposed arraignment actually was.
For instance, there is no showing that the complainants were afforded
with counsel, nor furnished a copy of the Amended Complaint with the list
of witnesses against them in order that they may duly prepare and
comply with their responsibilities.
xxx xxx xxx
Not frequently indeed, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of
a lenient treatment, or upon a bad advice or promises of the authorities or
parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express "remorse." It is
the duty of the Judge, like the herein Respondent Judge, to see to it that
 he does not labor under these mistaken impression. Failure or omission
on the part of the Respondent Judge to exercise caution against the
demands of sheer speed in disposing of cases, whether voluntarily or
involuntarily, should not only be censured but also condemned. [A] Court
cannot, therefore, hold liberty and life forfeit, no matter how despicable
the offender when effective protection for his basic rights were denied
because of poverty or ignorance.
For failure of the Respondent Judge to strictly follow and
observe the mandatory provisions of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, it
can therefore be gainfully said that the herein complainants were not
properly arraigned last October 3, 1996.
Anent the last issue, the complainants failed to adduce
sufficient evidence that it was indeed Police Prosecutor Willie Adulacion
who prepared the Order dated 3 October 1996. The
Respondent Judge adequately proved that it was he who wrote the
subject Order duly substantiated and corroborated by the testimonies of
the other witnesses. Such proof has never been controverted by the
complainants. Thus, the complainants claim that it was Police Prosecutor
Willie Adulacion who prepared the subject Order is without merit for [utter]
lack of basis in truth and in fact. 8
On 31 January 2001, we referred the Report to the Office of the Court Administrator
("OCA") for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The OCA's Evaluation and Recommendation
In its Memorandum dated 11 May 2001, the OCA, while agreeing with the findings of
Executive Judge Roxas, finds respondent judge liable not for mere simple neglect of duty but for
gross ignorance of the law. Accordingly, the OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined
P20,000. The OCA explains: AaSTIH
[R]espondent judge showed his ignorance not only of the scope
of his authority to arraign the complainants but also of the procedure to
follow in conducting an arraignment. Moreover, respondent failed to
properly apprise complainants of their right to counsel and to provide
them with counsel de oficio particularly during the arraignment, if they do
not have a counsel by reason of their poverty. This is a fundamental
constitutional precept which respondent Judge is expected to know.
Where, as in this case, the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of
conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 9
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA well-taken.
Respondent Judge Failed to Properly Apprise
Complainants of their Right to Counsel
The Constitution mandates that "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . .
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." 10 Indeed, the accused has a right to
representation by counsel from the custodial investigation all the way up to the appellate
proceedings. 11 At the arraignment stage, Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel.
— Before arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to
counsel and ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is
allowed to defend himself in person or has employed counsel of his
choice, the court must assign a counsel de oficio to defend him.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Rule 116 means that:
[W]hen a defendant appears [at the arraignment] without [an]
attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with: 1 — It
must inform the defendant that it is his right to have [an] attorney before
being arraigned; 2 — After giving him such information the court must ask
him if he desires the aid of attorney; 3 — If he desires and is unable to
employ attorney, the court must assign [an] attorney de oficio to defend
him; and 4 – If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the
court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. 12
Compliance with these four duties is mandatory. 13 The only instance when the court
can arraign an accused without the benefit of counsel is if the accused waives such right and the
court, finding the accused capable, allows him to represent himself in person. However, to be a
valid waiver, the accused must make the waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 14 In
determining whether the accused can make a valid waiver, the court must take into account all
the relevant circumstances, including the educational attainment of the accused. In the present
case, however, respondent judge contends that complainants waived their right to counsel and
insisted on their immediate arraignment.
After reviewing the records and taking into account the circumstances obtaining in this
case, we find that respondent judge did not properly apprise complainants of their right to
counsel prior to their arraignment. Consequently, there was no basis for complainants' alleged
waiver of such right.
In his Answer, respondent judge does not deny that when he "arraigned"
complainants, no lawyer assisted the complainants. However, respondent judge asserted that
the attendance of a "lawyer was their (complainants') problem." Respondent judge stated that
before arraigning complainants, he gave a "discourse [of] their rights as accused."
Respondent judge also stated that since the police caught complainants in flagrante delicto,
complainants told him "a lawyer would not have much use." Respondent judge further stated
that complainants "expressed that they have no money to pay for a lawyer."
Respondent judge informed complainants "he can give them a PAO lawyer" if they so desired.
However, respondent judge did not appoint a PAO lawyer despite being informed by
complainants that they could not afford a lawyer.
These do not amount to compliance with Section 6 of Rule 116.
Respondent judge has the duty to insure that there is no violation of the constitutional right of the
accused to counsel. Respondent judge is grossly mistaken in saying that securing a "lawyer was
their (complainants') problem." Once the accused informs the judge that he cannot afford a
lawyer and the court has not allowed the accused to represent himself, or the accused is
incapable of representing himself, the judge has the duty to appoint a counsel de oficio to give
meaning and substance to the constitutional right of the accused to counsel.
Respondent judge knew that complainants are mere tricycle drivers.
Respondent judge could not have expected complainants to be conversant with the rules on
criminal procedure. 15 Respondent judge should not only have followed Section 6 of Rule 116 to
the letter, but should also have ascertained that complainants understood the import of the
proceedings. Respondent judge should not have proceeded with complainants' arraignment until
he had ascertained that complainants' waiver of their right to counsel was made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently and that they were capable of representing themselves. As well
observed by Executive Judge Roxas:
[Respondent judge] is not only duty-bound to tell the
complainants the right to which they are entitled, he must also explain
their effects in practical terms, and in a language the complainants fairly
understand. In other words, the right of the complainants to be informed
 of their right to have a counsel implies a correlative obligation on the part
of the Respondent Judge to explain and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Since the
right to be informed implies comprehension, the degree of explanation
required will necessarily vary, depending upon the education, intelligence
and other relevant personal circumstances of the complainants. Suffice it
to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed when the
subject is unlettered as in this particular case. Short of this, there is a
denial of the right as it cannot truly be said that the herein complainants
have been informed of their rights to counsel. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
The unfortunate but expected result of respondent judge's failure to comply strictly
with Section 6 of Rule 116 surfaced during the investigation of this case. Complainants uniformly
testified that they were unaware of the meaning and consequence of their guilty pleas. Thus,
complainant Gamas testified:
[ATTY. OCO]:
Q You did not want to plead guilty, of course?
[ANTONIO GAMAS]:
A At that time we do not know what plead guilty is. It is only now that I am
aware.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you arrived there at the office of Adulacion, what did Adulacion
tell you, if he told you anything?
A He said that since you have no cashbond, you just pleaded guilty since
you loaded stolen items.
Q So what was your reaction when Adulacion told you that?
A We were dumbfounded.
Q So you have no reaction at all when Adulacion told that you will plead
guilty because you don't have cashbond?
A Nothing, because it was only lately that I came to know the meaning of
plead guilty.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You did not understand the word "plead guilty?"
A I do not know what is plead guilty.
Q You did not ask Adulacion, "what is that all about, Sir?"
A I did not ask anymore, because he also added that he will give us
lighter sentence.
Q So because of that promise of Adulacion, you conformed with his
suggestion that you will plead guilty?
A Because he said we are supposed to be star witnesses and he will
apprehend the three others, so we pleaded guilty.
Q The fact that you pleaded guilty, you were in conformity to the
suggestion of Willie Adulacion?
A We cannot do anything at that time, we were
dumbfounded. 17 (Emphasis supplied)
Complainant Sobrio similarly testified:
[ATTY. OCO]:
Q What was the story that transpired between you and Adulacion?
[FLORENCIO SOBRIO]:
A Since we don't have any cashbond, we will plead guilty.
COURT:
xxx xxx xxx
Q So what was your answer if there was an answer?
A I said, "What is plead guilty, I don't understand that?"
Q Did Willie Adulacion explain to you what is plead guilty after you
inquired from him?
A No.
Q After you asked him, what was the answer of Adulacion when you
asked him what is that plead guilty?
A He said that we apply for probation so that he can help us.
Q He did not explain to you that by pleading guilty is admitting the charge
against you?
A No. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
These testimonies underscore the need for trial court judges to comply strictly with
Section 6 of Rule 116. That the accused, like complainants, insist on their arraignment without
representation is no reason for a judge to accede readily to their wishes. A judge has the duty to
protect the accused in their rights, even against their wishes, when it is clear, as in this case,
that they are not in a position to validly exercise or waive those rights. As we had occasion to
observe:
[E]ven the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill
in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for
this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so
desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney of his own. 19 (Emphasis supplied)
 Indeed, by subsequently vacating his 3 October 1996 Order, respondent judge tacitly
admits that complainants were in no position to represent themselves during their
arraignment, causing them to enter guilty pleas improvidently.
Respondent Judge's Arraignment of
Complainants Highly Irregular
Section 1(a), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Arraignment and plea; how made. — The accused must be
arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or
assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by
the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint
or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him,
and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution
may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information.
We have explained the rationale, requirements, and compliance of this rule in this
manner:
[S]ection 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should
be made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court [1]
furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list
of witnesses stated therein, then [2] reading the same in the language or
dialect that is known to him, and [3] asking him what his plea is to the
charge. The requirement that the reading be made in a language or
dialect that the accused understands and knows is a mandatory
requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly
followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of
implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate
regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the precise
nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an
avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal
thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the
Constitution. 20
We subscribe to Executive Judge Roxas' finding that respondent judge similarly failed
to comply with the requirements of Section 1(a) of Rule 116. Complainants deny
respondent judge's claim that he arraigned complainants by "read[ing] to them [the information]
in the dialect they understand and inform[ing] them [of] the nature of the evidence arrayed
[against them]. 21 However, there is no disputing that respondent judge failed to furnish
complainants a copy of the information with the list of the witnesses.
The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals that
a judge can take lightly. Each step constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal
litigation "where the issues are joined . . . and without which the proceedings cannot advance
further." 22 Respondent judge may have genuinely desired to spare complainants the travails of
being detained in jail, thus the rush in arraigning them, accepting their guilty pleas, imposing a
light sentence, and granting them probation. While well-intentioned, such conduct unjustifiably
short-circuited the mandatory arraignment procedure in Section 1(a) of Rule 116.
Respondent Judge's Acts and Omissions
Constitute Gross Ignorance of the Law
The rule is that when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does
not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 23 The provisions of the Constitution on the
right of the accused to counsel, and of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on the
requirements for the arraignment of an accused, are basic. Every judge should know the
fundamental substantive and procedural requirements on arraignment and right to counsel.
By holding complainants' arraignment in the manner he conducted it,
respondent judge is liable for this administrative transgression. It may very well be that
respondent judge knew the substantive and procedural rules in question. What renders him
liable is that he acted as if he did not.
On the Appropriate Imposable Penalty
Under Section 11(A), in relation to Section 8(8), of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is punishable by:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from the office without salary and other benefits
for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.
This schedule of penalties under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, which took effect on 1 October
2001, does not apply retroactively. 24 Accordingly, we sustain the OCA's recommendation
that respondent judge be required to pay a fine of P20,000, a penalty we have meted in
similar administrative cases involving gross ignorance of the law. 25
The Court has no Jurisdiction Over
Respondent Adulacion
We refrain from passing upon the complaint against respondent Adulacion, as he is
neither a member of the Bar 26 nor a judiciary employee. This Court's administrative jurisdiction
extends only to members of the bar and over all courts and their personnel. 27 However, the
dismissal is without prejudice to any action complainants may wish to file against respondent
Adulacion before the appropriate body.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Orlando A. Oco, former Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato, GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law.
Accordingly, we FINE respondent Orlando A. Oco P20,000, to be taken from his withheld
retirement benefits. The complaint against respondent Willie Adulacion is DISMISSED. aSTAcH
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., is on official leave.
||| (Gamas v. Oco, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1231 (formerly OCA IPI No. 97-287-MTJ), [March 17,
2004], 469 PHIL 633-654)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 183345. September 17, 2014.]
MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
 DECISION
BRION, J p:
Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, filed by Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao (petitioners). They seek the reversal of the Court
of Appeals' (CA) decision 2 dated February 28, 2006 and resolution 3 dated June 13, 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 86289. These CA rulings affirmed the February 26, 2004 4 and July 26,
2004 5 orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, which respectively denied the
petitioners' motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest. 6
Factual Antecedents
On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy y Awiten (Dy) filed a criminal
complaint against the petitioners and Victor Ngo (Ngo) for syndicated estafa penalized under
Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation with Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1689. 7
Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where
Ngo was the manager. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took Ngo's advice to
deposit his money in an investment house that will give a higher rate of return. Ngo then
introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao (Gracia), also known as Mina Tan Hao, who presented herself
as an officer of various reputable companies and an incorporator of State Resources
Development Corporation (State Resources), the recommended company that can give Dy his
higher investment return. 8
Relying on Ngo and Gracia's assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the
approximate amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). This initial investment earned the
promised interests, leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, to increase his investment to almost One
Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00). Dy increased his investments through several checks
he issued in the name of State Resources. 9 In return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy
representing his earnings for his investment. Gracia issued checks in the total amount of One
Hundred Fourteen Million, Two Hundred Eighty Six Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen
Centavos (P114,286,086.14). All these checks 10 were subsequently dishonored when Dy
deposited them.
Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored
checks. Ngo promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo already
resigned from Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he confronted Gracia
regarding the dishonored checks. He eventually learned that Gracia invested his money in the
construction and realty business of Gracia's husband, Danny Hao (Danny). Despite their
promises to pay, the petitioners never returned Dy's money. ScEaAD
On July 17, 2003, Dy filed a supplemental affidavit to include in the criminal complaint
Chester De Joya, Allan Roxas, Samantha Roxas, Geraldine Chiong, and Lyn Ansuas — all
incorporators and/or directors of State Resources. 11
On the basis of Dy's complaint 12 and supplemental affidavit, 13 the public prosecutor
filed an information 14 for syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-accused. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-219952 and was raffled to respondent RTC of
Manila, Branch 40.
Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the other
accused. Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion
to lift warrant of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the absence of probable cause against
them and the pendency of their petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). 15
In its February 26, 2004 order, the trial court denied the petitioners' twin
motions. 16 The petitioners moved for reconsideration but the trial court also denied this in its
July 26, 2004 order.
Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with the CA.
The CA's Ruling
The CA affirmed the denial of the petitioners' motion to defer arraignment and motion
to lift warrant of arrest.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a judge is
mandated to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. 17 The CA noted that Judge Marquez only issued the warrants of arrest after his
personal examination of the facts and circumstances of the case. Since the judge complied with
the Rules, the CA concluded that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to him. 18
In its decision, however, the CA opined that the evidence on record and the assertions
in Dy's affidavits only show probable cause for the crime of simple estafa, not syndicated estafa.
Under PD No. 1689, in order for syndicated estafa to exist, the swindling must have been
committed by five or more persons, and the fraud must be against the general public or at least
a group of persons. In his complaint-affidavit, Dy merely stated that he relied on the petitioners'
false representations and was defrauded into parting with his money, causing him
damage. 19 Since there was no evidence that State Resources was formed to defraud the public
in general or that it was used to solicit money from other persons aside from Dy, then the
offense charged should only be for simple estafa. 20
Nevertheless, the CA found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the warrants of arrest against the petitioners as there was still probable
cause to believe that the petitioners committed the crime of simple estafa. 21
The Petition
The petitioners submit that an examination of Dy's affidavits shows inconsistencies in
his cited factual circumstances. These inconsistencies, according to the petitioners, negate the
existence of probable cause against them for the crime charged.
The petitioners also contend that it was only Ngo who enticed Dy to invest his money.
As early as August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved, thus negating the
assertion that Dy advanced funds for this corporation. 22 They question the fact that it took Dy
almost five years to file his complaint despite his allegation that he lost almost
P100,000,000.00. 23
Lastly, the petitioners claim that the warrants of arrest issued against them were null
and void. Contrary to the trial court's findings, the CA noted in the body of its decision, that PD
1689 was inapplicable to their case. There was no evidence to show that State Resources was
formed to solicit funds not only from Dy but also from the general public. Since simple estafa and
syndicated estafa are two distinct offenses, then the warrants of arrest issued to petitioners were
erroneous because these warrants pertained to two different crimes. 24
The Court's Ruling
We resolve to DENY the petition.
Procedural Consideration
We note that the present petition questions the CA's decision and resolution on the
petition for certiorari the petitioners filed with that court. At the CA, the petitioners imputed grave
abuse of discretion against the trial court for the denial of their twin motions to defer arraignment
and to lift warrant of arrest.
 This situation is similar to the procedural issue we addressed in the case of Montoya
v. Transmed Manila Corporation 25 where we faced the question of how to review a Rule 45
petition before us, a CA decision made under Rule 65. We clarified in this cited case the kind of
review that this Court should undertake given the distinctions between the two remedies. In Rule
45, we consider the correctness of the decision made by an inferior court. In contrast, a Rule 65
review focuses on jurisdictional errors.
As in Montoya, we need to scrutinize the CA decision in the same context that the
petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it. Thus, we need to examine the CA
decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and not on the basis of whether the
trial court's denial of petitioners' motions was strictly legally correct. In question form, the
question to ask is: did the CA correctly determine whether the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying petitioners' motions to defer arraignment and lift warrant of
arrest? DCIEac
Probable Cause for the Issuance of
a Warrant of Arrest
Under the Constitution 26 and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, 27 a judge is
mandated to personally determine the existence of probable cause after his personal
evaluation of the prosecutor's resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime charged.
These provisions command the judge to refrain from malting a mindless acquiescence to the
prosecutor's findings and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances
presented by both parties.
Section 5 (a) of Rule 112, grants the trial court three options upon the filing of the
criminal complaint or information. He may: a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
failed to establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or c)
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt
on the existence of probable cause. 28
In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners
and their co-accused. To be valid, these warrants must have been issued after compliance with
the requirement that probable cause be personally determined by the judge. Notably at this
stage, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of
the accused. In doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing; he only needs to personally
review the prosecutor's initial determination and see if it is supported by substantial evidence. 29
The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the
existence of probable cause to support the issuance of the warrants. The petitioners, in fact, did
not present any evidence to controvert this. As the trial court ruled in its February 26, 2004
order:
The non-arrest of all the accused or their refusal to surrender
practically resulted in the suspension of arraignment exceeding the
sixty (60) days counted from the filing of co-accused De Joya's
motions, which may be considered a petition for review, and that of co-
accused Spouses Hao's own petition for review. This is not to mention
the delay in the resolution by the Department of Justice. On the other
hand, co-accused De Joya's motion to determine probable cause
and co-accused Spouses Hao's motion to lift warrant of arrest
have been rendered moot and academic with the issuance of
warrants of arrest by this presiding judge after his personal
examination of the facts and circumstances strong enough in
themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of the crime
that in fact happened. 30 [Emphasis ours]
Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. As stated by him, the warrants were only issued after
his personal evaluation or the factual circumstances that led him to believe that there was
probable cause to apprehend the petitioners for their commission of a criminal offense.
Distinction between Executive and
Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause
In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages. The first is at
the executive level, where determination is made by the prosecutor during the preliminary
investigation, before the filing of the criminal information. The second is at the judicial level,
undertaken by the judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the case at hand, the question before us relates to the judicial determination of
probable cause. In order to properly resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial court's issuance
of the warrants of arrest against the petitioners, it is necessary to scrutinize the crime of estafa,
whether committed as a simple offense or through a syndicate.
The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316 of the RPC. In these
provisions, the different modes by which estafa may be committed, as well as the corresponding
penalties for each are outlined. One of these modes is estafa by means of deceit. Article 315 (2)
(a) of the RPC defines how this particular crime is perpetrated:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits.
Under this provision, estafa has the following elements: 1) the existence of a false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; 2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; 3) the
reliance by the offended party on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, which
induced him to part with his money or property; and 4) as a result, the offended party suffered
damage. 31
As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced him to invest with
State Resources and promised him a higher rate of return. 32 Because of his good business
relationship with Ngo and relying on Gracia's attractive financial representations, Dy initially
invested the approximate amount of P10,000,000.00.
This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by Gracia to invest more so
that he eventually advanced almost P100,000,000.00 33 with State Resources. Gracia's
succeeding checks representing the earnings of his investments, however, were all dishonored
upon deposit. 34 He subsequently learned that the petitioners used his money for Danny's
construction and realty business. 35 Despite repeated demands and the petitioners' constant
assurances to pay, they never returned Dy's invested money and its supposed earnings. 36
These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafa by means of deceit.
The petitioners induced Dy to invest in State Resources promising higher returns. But unknown
to Dy, what occurred was merely a ruse to secure his money to be used in Danny's construction
and realty business. The petitioners' deceit became more blatant when they admitted in their
petition that as early as August 1995, State Resources had already been dissolved. 37 This
admission strengthens the conclusion that the petitioners misrepresented facts regarding
themselves and State Resources in order to persuade Dy to part with his money for investment
with an inexistent corporation.
These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners' deceit. "Deceit is the
false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives or is
intended to deceive another, so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury." 38
Thus, had it not been for the petitioners' false representations and promises, Dy would
not have placed his money in State Resources, to his damage. These allegations cannot but
lead us to the conclusion that probable cause existed as basis to arrest the petitioners for the
crime of estafa by means of deceit. HADTEC
We now address the issue of whether estafa in this case was committed through a
syndicate.
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, 39 there is syndicated estafa if the following
elements are present: 1) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of
the RPC was committed; 2) the estafa or swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more
persons; and 3) the fraud resulted in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers
associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. 40
The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second
elements of syndicated estafa are present; there is probable cause for violation of Article 315 (2)
(a) of the RPC against the petitioners. Moreover, in Dy's supplemental complaint-affidavit, he
alleged that the fraud perpetrated against him was committed, not only by Ngo and the
petitioners, but also by the other officers and directors of State Resources. The number of the
accused who allegedly participated in defrauding Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the
requirement for the existence of a syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently
solicited by the corporation must come from the general public. In the present case, no evidence
was presented to show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through State Resources, also sought
investments from other people. Dy had no co-complainants alleging that they were also
deceived to entrust their money to State Resources. The general public element was not
complied with. Thus, no syndicated estafa allegedly took place, only simple estafa by means of
deceit.
Despite this conclusion, we still hold that the CA did not err in affirming the trial court's
denial of the petitioners' motion to lift warrant of arrest.
A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts
and circumstances is convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was committed.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense was committed by the person sought to be arrested. 41 This must be distinguished from
the prosecutor's finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the proper criminal
information. Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the necessity
of placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. 42
In People v. Castillo and Mejia, 43 we explained the distinction between the two kinds
of probable cause determination:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and
judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made
during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly
pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion
to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those
whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law
and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has
the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case
must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a
correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to
pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand,
is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for
placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be
forced to issue the arrest warrant. 44 [Emphasis ours]
With our conclusion that probable cause existed for the crime of simple estafa and that
the petitioners have probably committed it, it follows that the issuance of the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners remains to be valid and proper. To allow them to go scot-free would
defeat rather than promote the purpose of a warrant of arrest, which is to put the accused in the
court's custody to avoid his flight from the clutches of justice. AHcCDI
Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely
different crimes. Simple estafa is a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. An offense is
necessarily included in another offense when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form a part of those constituting the latter. 45
Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed information under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court 46 is necessary; the warrants of arrest issued against
the petitioners should not be nullified since probable cause exists for simple estafa.
Suspension of Arraignment
Under Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be
suspended if there is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the
DOJ, or the Office of the President. However, such period of suspension should not exceed
sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November
21, 2003. Since this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment
should be suspended indefinitely.
We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not
an unqualified right. In Spouses Trinidad v. Ang, 47 we explained that while the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of
the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. 48
As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's delay in resolving the
petitioners' petition for review had already exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the
petitioners' arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the petitioners'
motion to suspend completely lacks any legal basis.
As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed
because of the petitioners' refusal to submit to the trial court's jurisdiction and their erroneous
invocation of the Rules in their favor. As there is probable cause for the petitioners' commission
of a crime, their arrest and arraignment should now ensue so that this case may properly
proceed to trial, where the merits of both the parties' evidence and allegations may be weighed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM
WITH MODIFICATION the February 28, 2006 decision and June 13, 2008 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86289. We hereby order that petitioners Ma. Gracia Hao
and Danny Hao be charged for simple estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended and be arraigned for this charge. The warrants of arrest issued stand.
 SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr. * and Leonen, JJ., concur.
||| (Hao v. People, G.R. No. 183345, [September 17, 2014])
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399. November 19, 2014.]
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 13-4013-RTJ]
GASPAR BANDOY, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR.,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 45, and ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 46, both at REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE,
OCCIDENTAL MINDORO, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
For review before the Court is this administrative case against respondent Judge Jose
S. Jacinto, Jr. (Judge Jacinto, Jr.) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branches 45 1 and
46, 2San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, filed by Gaspar Bandoy (Bandoy) for Grave Abuse of
Authority in relation to Criminal Case No. 2-1928, 3 entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Gaspar Bandoy, Peter Alfaro and Randolph Ignacio" and Criminal Case No. Z-1910, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Romulo De Jesus, Jr."
Complainant Bandoy alleged, in his verified complaint, 4 that he was one of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 2-1928, for Serious Illegal Detention filed by Romulo De Jesus, Jr.
(De Jesus, Jr.), which was raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC, Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro (RTC-Br. 44), with Judge Jacinto, Jr. as the Assisting Presiding Judge. Bandoy claimed
that the case was initiated by De Jesus, Jr. to get back at him for being instrumental in the filing
of an earlier criminal complaint against him for Violation of Article XXII, Section 261, paragraph
7, number 14 of the Omnibus Election Code (Ballot Switching). The said case was likewise
raffled to RTC-Br. 44.
Bandoy also averred that he was an election watcher of former Mayor Joel Panaligan
during the 2007 local elections, while De Jesus, Jr., a teacher of their municipality's public
elementary school, was one of the chairpersons of the Board of Election Inspectors; that they
were both assigned in Precinct 3-A of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro; that De Jesus, Jr. was
rumored to be closely associated with the rival mayoralty candidate, Voltaire Anthony C.
Villarosa (Voltaire), son of House representative Amelita C. Villarosa (Cong. Villarosa) and
Mayor Jose Tapales Villarosa (Mayor Villarosa) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; that in the said
local elections, De Jesus, Jr. was caught in the act of ballot switching, which was captured on
video by a member of the media, a certain Randy Bool; that by virtue of a search warrant from
the Commission of Elections (COMELEC), De Jesus, Jr. was caught in possession of some
ballots inside his backpack; and that as a result of this incident, De Jesus, Jr. was criminally
charged with the offense of ballot switching. Accordingly, on August 17, 2007, a warrant of arrest
was issued against De Jesus, Jr. 5
According to Bandoy, on August 20, 2007, De Jesus, Jr. personally appeared before
Provincial Prosecutor Levitico Salcedo to file a criminal case for Serious Illegal Detention against
him, Peter Alfaro, Randolph Ignacio, and then Election Supervisor, Atty. Judy Lorenzo (Atty.
Lorenzo). Apparently, De Jesus, Jr. did this while there was a standing warrant of arrest against
him. Worse, De Jesus, Jr. remained at-large until he was able to post bail on March 7, 2008
before then Las Piñas RTC Judge Raul B. Villanueva. 6 Because complainant Bandoy was
charged with Serious Illegal Detention, the provincial prosecutor recommended "no bail" leaving
them incarcerated for more than two years. 7
Bandoy further claims that Judge Jacinto, Jr. committed grave abuse of his authority
by displaying manifest bias and partiality in favor of De Jesus, Jr. when he granted several
postponements of De Jesus, Jr.'s arraignment, originally scheduled on April 23, 2008, 8 but was
reset for seven times until De Jesus, Jr. entered a plea of not guilty supposedly
inside Judge Jacinto, Jr.'s chambers on July 6, 2011. 9
Bandoy emphasized that many of the said resettings were mostly due to De Jesus,
Jr.'s non-appearance for failure to locate him at his given address. Despite these supposed
obvious court defiance, Judge Jacinto, Jr. remained lenient and seemingly tolerated his
continuous non-appearance in the court's subsequent scheduled hearings. Another example
of Judge Jacinto, Jr.'s supposed unreasonable bias towards Bandoy was his lack of interest to
dispose of the case of serious illegal detention despite De Jesus, Jr.'s obvious dilatory tactics
and unjustified absences when his appearance was necessary. EScIAa
Bandoy, along with his co-accused, moved for reconsideration and filed a petition for
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) to have the serious illegal detention case against
them dismissed. Meanwhile, co-accused Atty. Lorenzo filed a separate petition with the Court of
Appeals (CA) and won the case. The Court later affirmed the dismissal of the case against her.
At first, the DOJ denied their petition. Upon reconsideration, however, the DOJ, under the helm
of Justice Secretary Leila De Lima, directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Occidental
Mindoro, to cause the withdrawal of the case against Bandoy and his co-
accused. 10 Accordingly, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed its Motion to Withdraw
Information.
Judge Jacinto, Jr., in an order, 11 dated July 5, 2011, denied the motion to withdraw
information. In the end, Bandoy was only able to regain temporary freedom when JudgeJacinto,
Jr. finally resolved 12 to allow him to post a bail bond of P100,000.00 each or a total of
P300,000.00. 13 Bandoy added that Voltaire was a principal sponsor in the wedding
of Judge Jacinto, Jr.'s child.
Thereafter, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was assigned to another sala, while Judge Wilfredo De
Joya Mayor (Judge Mayor) became the assisting presiding judge of Branch 44. It was during this
time that the case for serious illegal detention was temporarily dismissed, but upon
reconsideration, Judge Mayor decided to reinstate and continue the case against Bandoy.
Meanwhile, the case of ballot switching against De Jesus, Jr. was dismissed on October 25,
2012, 14 while their bail for the serious illegal detention case was cancelled. 15
According to complainant Bandoy, the compelling force that made him initiate this
present administrative case was because Judge Jacinto, Jr. would take over Judge Mayor's
assignments on account of the latter's compulsory retirement from service on December 1,
2012, which would include their pending serious illegal detention case. He claimed
that Judge Jacinto, Jr. ordered the police and the CIDG to re-arrest him and his co-accused
even though there was no warrant of arrest against them. 16 He begged the Court not to
let Judge Jacinto, Jr. handle their case of serious illegal detention for fear that they would have
to endure another bout of extreme bias and partiality from him.
In his Comment, 17 Judge Jacinto, Jr. denied being an ally of the Villarosa clan. 18 He
also denied having a hand in the order to arrest Bandoy and his co-accused as the Chief of PNP
and the CIDG Chief, both of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, merely consulted him on how to go
about the order of cancellation of bail that Judge Mayor issued. He explained "wala po akong
alam sa Kautusan kaya binasa po sa akin ang nilalaman nito sa cellphone at pagkatapos ay
nagwika po akong parang may kulang sa Kautusan at kapag nakansela ang piyansa ay babalik
sila sa selda dahil wala na po silang piyansa (as a consequence thereof)." 19 Judge Jacinto, Jr.
even refused to issue a warrant of arrest when he was asked because he was not handling the
case anymore. 20
Bandoy, in his Reply, 21 brought to the attention of the Court that Judge Jacinto, Jr., in
order to thwart the enemies of his supposed master, Mayor Villarosa, issued warrants of arrest
against ten individuals. 22 He also divulged that the audit team from the Court was personally
assisted by Judge Jacinto, Jr. and given accommodations in "Aroma Center," one of the
properties of Mayor Villarosa. 23 Bandoy was thankful that Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not deny the
fact that the police officials wanted to arrest them even without a warrant of
arrest. 24 Bandoy showed a timeline of events supposedly depicting how De Jesus, Jr., through
the tolerance and partiality of Judge Jacinto, Jr., evaded arraignment on numerous occasions
effectively delaying the progress of the case for ballot switching and even actually conducting
the arraignment in his chambers. 25 He further reiterated his plea not to let Judge Jacinto, Jr.
preside over the affairs of Branch 44.
In his Rejoinder, 26 Judge Jacinto, Jr. stated that he was again assigned as Assisting
Presiding Judge of Branch 44. 27 He clarified that he indeed issued warrants of arrest against
ten individuals in connection with a serious illegal detention case against them, but only after a
finding of probable cause by the public prosecutor handling it. Judge Jacinto, Jr. reiterated that
he merely affirmed the finding of probable cause, which justified the issuance of the warrants of
arrest as the charge was a non-bailable offense. 28 He likewise denied seeking any favor from
Mayor Villarosa to accommodate the audit team in their property, the Aroma Family Hotel. He
explained that the audit team paid him a "courtesy call" where he assured the team of his
cooperation. 29 He again restated that the police officials merely coordinated with him as was
customary because he was the Executive Judge of the municipality. 30 Judge Jacinto, Jr.
believes that Bandoy's accusations against him were designed to oust him as Presiding Judge of
Branches 45 and 46 of San Jose and even as Assisting Presiding Judge of Branch 44,
Mamburao, both in the province of Occidental Mindoro. 31
In its Report, 32 dated June 03, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) did
not give credence to Bandoy's allegation that Judge Jacinto, Jr. issued an order for his arrest
without a warrant and to the insinuation that the Court's audit team was conveniently housed in
Aroma Family Hotel of the Villarosas for failure to present proof. 33 The OCA observed,
however, that Judge Jacinto, Jr. never refuted the allegations of leniency over the several
resettings of the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. and that the arraignment was held in his
chambers. As such, the OCA equated his silence to admission. 34 Thus, the OCA
recommended that:
1. The administrative complaint against Presiding Judge Jose S. Jacinto,
Jr., Branch 45, Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, be RE-DOCKETED as regular administrative matter;
and
2.. Respondent Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr. be found GUILTY of Bias and
Partiality and Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and,
accordingly, be FINED in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. 35
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.
Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence and diligence are
prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. 36
Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. One who accepts the
exalted position of a judge owes the public and the Court the duty to maintain professional
competence at all times. 37
In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an allegation that he
arraigned De Jesus, Jr. inside his chambers. He was given the opportunity to answer, but he
chose not to delve into it. Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not squarely face the issues being
imputed against him, which was quite irregular since it was his name and his capacity as a
member of the bench, that was being challenged. As aptly observed by the OCA, "the natural
instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It is
against human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false
accusations." 38 His silence introduces doubt in the minds of the public, which is not acceptable.
Given the exacting standards required of magistrates in the application of the law and
procedure, the Court finds Judge Jacinto, Jr. administratively guilty of gross ignorance of Rule
116 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 1 (a) thereof requiring arraignment of an
accused to be made in open court, to wit:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea, how made. — (a) The
accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be
made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with
a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language
or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not
guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those
named in the complaint or information. HDTSCc
(Emphasis supplied)
The procedural steps laid down in Section 1 (a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals that
a judge can take nonchalantly. Each step constitutes an integral part of that crucial stage in
criminal litigation "where the issues are joined . . . and without which the proceedings cannot
advance further." 39
Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1 (a) of Rule 116 constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. 40 There is gross ignorance of the law when the error committed by
the judge was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious." 41 It may also be committed when
a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty or corruption. 42 Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be
excused by a claim of good faith. 43
The Court has impressed upon judges that they owe it to the public and the legal
profession to know the very law that they are supposed to apply in a given controversy. 44They
are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to maintain the desired professional
competence. 45 When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the
confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the Court the duty to be
proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence.
Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. 46
Canon 2, 47 Rule 2.01 48 and Canon 3 49 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise
emphasize that judges, as officers of the court, have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed
with evenly and fairly. Not only must they be honest and impartial, but they must also appear to
be honest and impartial in the dispensation of justice. Judges should make sure that their acts
are circumspect and do not arouse suspicion in the minds of the public. When they fail to do so,
such acts may cast doubt upon their integrity and ultimately the judiciary in general. 50 As held
in Joselito Rallos, et al. vs. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., Branch 5 RTC, Cebu City: 51
Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be
impartial but should also appear impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly
 teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and
hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered
by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and
impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as
to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal,
metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein respondent,
because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the
litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests
and the embodiments of the people's sense of justice. Thus, their official
conduct should be beyond reproach.
Here, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. was postponed
from 2007 to 2011 without appropriate action coming from the court. Judge Jacinto, Jr. should
have availed of known legal remedies to compel De Jesus, Jr. to personally appear for his
arraignment, but he did not. The appearance of leniency seemingly exhibited in favor of De
Jesus, Jr. gives an impression of bias and partiality that should be addressed and corrected.
Consequently, under Section 8 (9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,as amended
by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious
charge. Section 11 (A) of the same Rule provides that the penalty to be imposed if a
respondent Judge is found guilty of a serious charge is either a fine of more than P20,000.00 but
not more than P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Court is aware of the other pending administrative cases
against Judge Jacinto, Jr., but they cannot be fully considered in the imposition of the
penalty in this case as they are still under review and evaluation. Thus, a fine of
P40,000.00 52 is deemed appropriate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. GUILTY of
Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and of Bias and Partiality. Accordingly, he
is FINED in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
||| (Bandoy v. Jacinto, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399, [November 19, 2014])
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 163972-77. March 28, 2008.]
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, petitioner, vs. THE
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division), respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
24167-24170, 24195-24196, 1 questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea
bargaining proposal. HaDEIc
The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated
March 25, 2004, as follows:
Said accused, 2 together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon,
were charged before this Court for three counts of malversation of
public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and
P13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by
falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making it appear
that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal
hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries
thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the
charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted before this
Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a public
officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw
their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the same with a plea of "guilty",
provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt
and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the
alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed
instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of falsification
of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of
"guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a
private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the
accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a
plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable
officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the
prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead
"guilty" to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a
private individual. The prosecution explained:
"With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it
appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a
lesser offense of falsification by a private individual defined and
penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will
strengthen our cases against the principal accused, Municipal
Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind
of these criminal acts."
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the
prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer of said accused to
plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to
render accounts because: DaESIC
". . . JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the
total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the
provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In
short, the damage caused to the government has already been
restituted . . . . 3
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution, 4 dated March 25, 2004,
denied petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the
prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its
approval. 5
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution dated May 31, 2004.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his plea bargaining offer on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an
accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on a "routinary
basis," negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is only P18,860.00, which
he already restituted. 6
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only
one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than
that for the graver charge. 7
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit: EaISTD
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment,
the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment
but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said
lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment
of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered
by the trial court at the pre-trial conference, 8 viz.:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. — In all
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is
provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a
pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the
charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of
the criminal and civil aspects of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. — All agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be
reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise,
they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering
the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by
the court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution
has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is
immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made
only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses. 9 ASaTCE
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon
which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, 10 and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use
word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the
trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. 11 Trial courts are exhorted
to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not
supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the
accused. 12
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama, 13 the Court ruled that the acceptance
of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter
of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial
court, 14 viz.:
. . . In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial
court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which
their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v.
Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that
the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his
concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February
28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained
clearly and tersely the rationale or the law:
. . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only
basis on which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing
the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty
to the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less
than the evidence already in the record. The reason for this being that
Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for
a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended
as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining. 15 (Emphasis
supplied)
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already
rested its case. HcISTE
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the
trial court's exercise of its discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a
capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in
other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law. 16
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the
ground that petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would
redound to the benefit of the public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the
proposal would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against them and
send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties they are likely
to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or that the
economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh the
risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the laws
intended to curb graft and corruption in government." 17
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting
petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair
play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the
judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction —
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach
and do complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of
their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the
spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance
rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different
courts. 18
and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, 19 in order
to afford equal justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v. Estrada, 20 the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution
dated March 14, 2007, approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the
prosecution and one of the accused, Charlie "Atong" Ang. The agreement provided that the
accused undertakes to assist in the prosecution of the case and promises to return the
amount of P25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea Bargaining Agreement,
the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and
whether the agreement complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court. The Sandiganbayan noted that the accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea
of "not guilty"; and that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense;
and the lesser offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery,
is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is Plunder. 21 HATEDC
The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by
the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not be applied to the present case. Records show
that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its Memorandum dated August 16,
2002, the Office of the Special Prosecutor rationalized:
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO
RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of
P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government
of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the
government has already been restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily
surrendered in the instant cases. Moreover, the accused is also willing
to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits
consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it
appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser
offense of falsification by private individual defined and penalized
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will strengthen our cases
against the principal accused, the Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon,
who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the
movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated
as draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of
Bato, Leyte. 22
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to
Render Account by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of
Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with
which petitioner was originally charged.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of
Falsification of Public Documents through an untruthful narration of facts to be established,
the following elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth
of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a
third person. 23
On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article
172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (a) the offender
is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position; (b) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) the falsification was committed in a
public or official or commercial document. 24 AEIHaS
As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, with which petitioner was also charged, the
elements are as follows: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control of
funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the funds or property involved are
public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or
misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence permitted,
the taking by another person of such funds or property. 25 Article 217 also provides that the
failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming such public funds or property, upon
demand by a duly authorized officer, "shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use." In this regard, it has been ruled that once such
presumption is rebutted, then it is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never
deemed to have existed at all. 26
Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure to Render
Account by an Accountable Officer, the lesser offense which petitioner seeks to plead guilty
of, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender
must be an accountable officer for public funds or property; (c) the offender is required by
law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and (d) the
offender fails to render an account for a period of two months after such accounts should
be rendered. 27
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court state when an offense includes or is
included in the other, to wit:
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in
another. — An offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved,
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.
An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or
information constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be
necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form part of those constituting the latter. 28 ICDcEA
 In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are
sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification
of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by
Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his
official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato,
Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, while the
Informations contain allegations which make out a case for Malversation against petitioner,
nevertheless, absent the element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held
liable for Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure
to render account was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an
accounting within the prescribed period.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this
case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser
offenses.
Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in
that the nature of his duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or
custody of local government funds, 29 not to mention that petitioner has already restituted
the amount of P18,860.00 involved in this case. Unlike Estrada which involves a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, 30 and a whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from
the public coffers, this case tremendously pales in comparison.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will
result in a discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate to intervene in
order to equalize the imbalance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004
and May 31, 2004 are SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant
petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to
the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision. aTHCSE
SO ORDERED.
Tinga, * Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, [March 28, 2008], 573 PHIL 368-383)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 164953. February 13, 2006.]
JOHN JOSEPH LUMANLAW y BULINAO, petitioner, vs. HON.
EDUARDO B. PERALTA JR., in His Capacity as Acting Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court (Branch 13), Manila, respondent.
Ernesto L. Delfin for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARRAIGNMENT; FORMALLY
INFORMS THE ACCUSED OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM. — Arraignment is a vital
stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused are formally informed of the charges against
them. The proper conduct of the arraignment is provided in Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the provision shows that arraignment is not a mere formality,
but an integral part of due process. Particularly, it implements the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them and their right to
speedy trial.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THIRTY-DAY PERIOD WITHIN WHICH ARRAIGNMENT MUST
BE HELD FROM THE DATE THE COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE ACCUSED,
NOT MANDATORY; CASE AT BAR. — [P]etitioner argues that, by respondent's failure to act
expeditiously on his arraignment, his right to speedy trial was violated. He points out the fourteen
postponements that resulted in his intolerable detention for almost two years. Moreover, he cites
Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 (implementing Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise
known as "The Speedy Trial Act of 1998"), which provides that arraignment shall be held within
thirty days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused. The thirty-day period
invoked by petitioner was construed in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How. It was held in that
case that the period was not absolute. Certain delays were allowed by law and excluded from
the computation of the time within which trial must commence. The Court ruled that those
exclusions should "reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of 'speedy
trial' is a 'relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.'" It held further that courts
must strive to maintain a delicate balance between the demands of due process and the
strictures of speedy trial, on the one hand; and, on the other, the right of the State to prosecute
crimes and rid society of criminals.
3. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL;
VIOLATION OF; LAPSE OF ALMOST TWO YEARS FROM FILING OF INFORMATION
WITHOUT ACCUSED HAVING BEEN ARRAIGNED IS ASTONISHING; CASE AT BAR. —
Given the length and the unreasonableness of the majority of the delays, a violation of the right
of petitioner to speedy trial becomes manifest. Almost two years elapsed from the filing of the
Information against him until the filing of this Petition; incredibly, he has not been arraigned. An
arraignment takes, at most, ten minutes of the court's business and does not normally entail
legal gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to the accused the charges leveled against them,
ensuring their understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the charges. A
prudent and resolute judge can conduct an arraignment as soon as the accused are presented
before the court. In fact, by fixing a period of only thirty days from the filing of the information to
the conduct of an arraignment, RA 8493 recognizes that this fundamental right should and can
be done with minimal delay. For this reason alone, we are astonished that the court a quo could
not complete such a simple but fundamental stage in the proceedings. The protracted delay
became all the more oppressive and vexatious when viewed from the perspective that the liberty
of the accused was being curtailed for the entire duration.
4. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; COURT HAS A MANDATORY DUTY TO APPOINT
A COUNSEL DE OFICIO FOR THE ACCUSED AT THE TIME OF THEIR ARRAIGNMENT;
CASE AT BAR. — [T]he arraignment set for August 6, 2003, was postponed by the trial court
due to the absence of the counsel of petitioner. . . . We find no legal basis for the trial court's
action. The appointment of a counsel de oficio in the absence of the defendant's counsel de
parte is not prohibited, not even by the Constitution, especially when the accused themselves
request that appointment. In fact, the court has a mandatory duty to appoint a counsel de oficio
when the accused have no counsel of choice at the time of their arraignment.
5. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; COURT PERSONNEL; CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT; RULE 3.09 OF CANON 3 THEREOF; DUTY OF JUDGE TO
SUPERVISE COURT PERSONNEL TO ENSURE PROMPT AND EFFICIENT DISPATCH OF
BUSINESS; REPEATED FAILURE OF JAIL WARDENS TO BRING ACCUSED TO COURT
FOR ARRAIGNMENT, A VIOLATION OF; CASE AT BAR. — The foremost cause for the lengthy
delay in this case was the repeated failure of the jail wardens to bring the accused to court. No
less than four court settings, spanning seven months, were postponed on this ground alone. . . .
Remarkably, although respondent judge was justified in deferring the arraignment until the
accused was presented, the problem could have been easily averted by efficient court
management. . . . Rule 3.09 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires them to
"organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business . . . ." Additionally, Section 5 (d) of Rule 135 confers upon every court the power to
control the conduct of its ministerial officers and of all other persons who in any manner are
connected with a case before it.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE 3.05 OF CANON 3 THEREOF; DUTY OF JUDGE TO DISPOSE
OF COURT'S BUSINESS PROMPTLY; CASE AT BAR. — Indeed, judges are required to
dispose of the court's business expeditiously, in accordance with Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, which we quote: "A judge shall dispose of the court's business
promptly and decide cases within the required period." This Court has constantly impressed
upon judges the need to act promptly on their cases. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes
the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into
disrepute. In the light of the numerous and unreasonable delays in the arraignment of petitioner,
the sought for dismissal of the Information filed against him is in order.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; MANDAMUS; A PROPER REMEDY
FOR UNWARRANTED DELAYS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE ARRAIGNMENT OF ACCUSED;
CASE AT BAR. — It is established that a writ of mandamus may be issued to control the
exercise of discretion when, in the performance of duty, there is undue delay that can be
characterized as a grave abuse of discretion resulting in manifest injustice. In view of our finding
of unwarranted delays in the conduct of the arraignment of petitioner, he has indeed the right to
demand — through a writ of mandamus — expeditious action from all officials tasked with the
administration of justice. Thus, he may not only demand that his arraignment be held but,
ultimately, that the information against him be dismissed on the ground of the violation of his
right to speedy trial.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, C.J p:
Vexatious, oppressive, unjustified and capricious delays in the arraignment violates
the constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy case disposition, particularly when the
accused is detained. Under the circumstances of the present case, mandamus is a proper
remedy for relief from prolonged detention. This Court safeguards liberty and will therefore
always uphold the basic constitutional rights of the people, especially the weak and the
marginalized.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Mandamus 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
(1) the dismissal of the Information filed against Petitioner John Joseph Lumanlaw yBulinao; and
(2) his release from the Manila City Jail.
The Facts
Culled from the parties' pleadings are the following undisputed facts.
Petitioner Lumanlaw was apprehended by the Western Police District near San Diego
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, on the evening of November 26, 2002, for illegal possession of a
dangerous drug. He was charged in an Information 2 filed with Branch 13 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, as follows:
"That on or about November 24, 2002, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess
any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
have in his possession, custody and control one (1) heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero one one
(0.011) grams of white crystalline substance known as
SHABU containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug. 3
A Commitment Order 4 was consequently issued by Presiding Judge Luis J. Arranz
directing the detention of petitioner in the Manila City Jail and setting the latter's arraignment on
January 8, 2003. On even date, petitioner's counsel manifested 5 his intention to file a motion for
preliminary investigation. Because of the Manifestation, the arraignment was deferred to
February 21, 2003. The aforesaid Motion 6 was filed together with a Petition to Reduce Bail 7 on
January 17, 2003. CaTSEA
The resolution of these matters was overtaken by Judge Arranz's retirement from
public service. Thus, the arraignment scheduled for February 21, 2003, had to be postponed.
This Court designated herein respondent, Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., as acting presiding
judge of Branch 13, Regional Trial Court, Manila, in Administrative Order No. 27-2003 issued on
February 18, 2003. 8
On March 26, 2003, the newly designated acting presiding judge issued an
Order 9 setting the arraignment of petitioner on April 23, 2003. On the latter date, the
arraignment was reset to June 25, 2003, due to the public prosecutor's absence. 10
On June 25, 2003, petitioner's counsel received the lower court's Order
granting Lumanlaw's Petition to Reduce Bail and denying his Motion for Preliminary Investigation
for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. 11 In the same Order, the trial court set
petitioner's arraignment on August 6, 2003.
The arraignment was postponed again, this time due to the absence of petitioner's
counsel. According to him, he requested the court to proceed with the arraignment, with the
public defender assisting the accused, but that respondent judge denied the request on the
ground that petitioner was already represented by a counsel de parte. 12 The trial court
then re-scheduled the arraignment on September 24, 2003. 13
In what was beginning to be a pattern of laxity, the September 24 arraignment was
likewise postponed in view of the scheduled meeting of presiding judges with accredited
newspaper publishers and was thus reset to October 1, 2003. 14
On the latter date, respondent judge issued the following Order: 15
"In view of the draft Order dated August 6, 2003 which impeded
the Produce Order for the arraignment and pre-trial conference this
afternoon of defendant John Joseph Lumanlaw in relation to Criminal
Case No. 02-208426, the arraignment and pre-trial conference are
hereby reset on December 10, 2003 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, on
the date amenable to Atty. Ernesto Delfin, as well as the defendant."
Again, the arraignment did not occur on December 10, 2003, because petitioner had
not been brought to the court by the wardens of the Manila City Jail. According to the trial court's
Order, 16 there was no proof of service on the Manila City Jail. The arraignment was thus reset
to March 1, 2004.
Notably, a year had passed since the filing of the Information, yet Lumanlaw remained
uninformed of the charges against him, while continuing to be in detention and despair all
throughout that period of limbo. Owing to this insufferable state of affairs, petitioner's counsel
manifested his intention to file a motion to dismiss on account of the violation of his client's right
to a speedy trial. 17 Accordingly, an Urgent Motion to Dismiss 18 was filed on December 19,
2003. The Motion was heard on February 20, 2004, but was promptly denied by the trial court.
The arraignment was reset yet again to March 17, 2004. 19
The arraignment did not take place, however, because the accused was not produced
in court by the jail wardens concerned. It turned out that the trial court had not issued a "produce
order" to the Manila City Jail. Another resetting was ordered for April 16, 2004. 20
Now frustrated with the repeated postponements, petitioner filed a Second Urgent
Motion to Dismiss 21 on March 22, 2004. Relying on the provisions of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, mandating that arraignment should be held within thirty (30) days from the
date the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused, petitioner argued that the protracted delay
of his arraignment violated his constitutional right to speedy trial. 22
On April 16, 2004, the RTC could not proceed with the arraignment. What transpired
on that date is evident from its Order: 23
"Inasmuch as the Trial Prosecutor has just furnished a copy of
her Comment dated April 12, 2004 to the defense counsel, as prayed for
by Atty. Ernesto Delfin, counsel for accused John Joseph Lumanlaw in
Criminal Case No. 02-208426, he is GRANTED five (5) days from today
to submit his Reply. After which, the pending Second Urgent Motion to
Dismiss dated March 21, 2004 filed on March 22, 2004 (page 33, Record
in Criminal Case No. 02-208426) will be deemed submitted for
resolution.
"Meanwhile, without prejudice to the resolution of the pending
motion, the arraignment and pre-trial conference of John
Joseph Lumanlaw are hereby tentativelyscheduled on May 26, 2004 at
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon."
On May 26, 2004, the arraignment could not be conducted, again because of the
Manila City Jail's failure to bring petitioner to the court despite notice. 24 On the same day, his
counsel received 25 the trial court's Order 26 dated May 3, 2004, denying his Second Urgent
Motion to Dismiss. The arraignment was reset to June 16, 2004. 27
On this date, it was respondent judge's absence that caused the postponement of the
arraignment, which was reset to July 21, 2004. 28 But on that date, no hearing was conducted in
Branch 13 because of the ongoing semestral inventory of cases in respondent judge's regular
sala, Branch 17. 29
Hence, the present Petition. 30
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"Whether or not the failure of public respondent to conduct the
arraignment of the petitioner despite the delay of one (1) year, nine (9)
months and four (4) days constitute undue and unjustifiable delay in
violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial. HESIcT
"Whether or not such undue and unjustifiable delay would
warrant the dismissal of the Information filed against the petitioner.
"That should the decision by the Honorable Supreme Court be
one finding merit in this Petition, whether or not the said decision is
binding upon the newly appointed presiding judge of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 13, Manila, as successor of public respondent." 31
On the other hand, respondent asks whether the Petition for Mandamus should be
given due course. 32
On the whole, the issues may be reduced to the following: 1) whether there was a
violation of the right to speedy trial, warranting a quashal of the Information against petitioner;
and 2) whether mandamus is the proper remedy.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Right to Speedy Trial
Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused are
formally informed of the charges against them. The proper conduct of the arraignment is
provided in Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the provision
shows that arraignment is not a mere formality, but an integral part of due
process. 34Particularly, it implements the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against them and their right to speedy trial.
On this point, petitioner argues that, by respondent's failure to act expeditiously on his
arraignment, his right to speedy trial was violated. He points out the fourteen postponements
that resulted in his intolerable detention for almost two years. Moreover, he cites Section 2 of
Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 (implementing Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as
"The Speedy Trial Act of 1998"), which provides that arraignment shall be held within thirty days
from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused.
On the other hand, respondent counters that there were no capricious and oppressive
delays that would justify a dismissal of the Information. The Office of the Solicitor General points
to the participation of petitioner himself in the protracted proceedings, such as his filing of a
Motion for Preliminary Investigation and his counsel's absence from one of the scheduled
hearings. 35
Speedy Trial Construed
The thirty-day period invoked by petitioner was construed in Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. v. How. 36 It was held in that case that the period was not absolute. Certain
delays were allowed by law and excluded from the computation of the time within which trial
must commence. The Court ruled that those exclusions should "reflect the fundamentally
recognized principle that the concept of 'speedy trial' is a 'relative term and must necessarily be
a flexible concept.'" 37 It held further that courts must strive to maintain a delicate balance
between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial, on the one hand; and,
on the other, the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals. ADcEST
Indeed, judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum. They must contend with the
realities of everyday life. Thus, a sensible assessment of their conduct must consider several
factors, rather than a mere mathematical calculation of periods that have elapsed between
stages. Jurisprudence has set forth the following guidelines:
". . . . [T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right
to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied
his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that
matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant
are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the
delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered." 38
 Reasonable Postponements
It should be stressed that petitioner never acquiesced to the seemingly endless
postponements of the arraignment. He asserted his right to speedy trial twice, but was denied by
respondent in both instances. Considering that petitioner has been under detention since
December 2002, we need not belabor the prejudice, distress, and anxiety he suffered as a result
of the delayed arraignment.
We concede that the bases for some of the delays were completely sound, such as
the retirement of Judge Arranz 39 and the manifestation of petitioner that the latter would be
filing a Motion for Preliminary Investigation. 40 Those matters were manifestly not intended to
delay the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 02-208426.
The delay caused by Judge Arranz's retirement may be deemed a normal part of the
ordinary conduct of court business and was not necessarily unreasonable. The second ground
was the right of the accused accorded by Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. 41 Verily, petitioner's request for a preliminary investigation before
arraignment was well-advised, in view of the rule that failure to do so would constitute a waiver
of the right. 42 Thus, it has been held that though the conduct of a preliminary investigation may
hold back the progress of a case, such investigation is necessary so that the defendant's right
will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency. 43
Unjustified Delay
This Court reviewed the other reasons for the postponements in this case, but finds
them far from being reasonable. There were fourteen postponements in all. Going over the
causes for the delays, we see the lack of earnest effort on the part of respondent to conduct the
arraignment as soon as the court calendar would allow. Most of the postponements could have
easily been avoided if he had been more keen on respecting and upholding petitioner's
constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition.
Given the length and the unreasonableness of the majority of the delays, a violation of
the right of petitioner to speedy trial becomes manifest. Almost two years 44 elapsed from the
filing of the Information against him until the filing of this Petition; incredibly, he has not been
arraigned. An arraignment takes, at most, ten minutes of the court's business and does not
normally entail legal gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to the accused the charges leveled
against them, ensuring their understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the
charges. A prudent and resolute judge can conduct an arraignment as soon as the accused are
presented before the court.
In fact, by fixing a period of only thirty days from the filing of the information to the
conduct of an arraignment, RA 8493 recognizes that this fundamental right should and can be
done with minimal delay. For this reason alone, we are astonished that the court a quo could not
complete such a simple but fundamental stage in the proceedings. The protracted delay became
all the more oppressive and vexatious when viewed from the perspective that the liberty of the
accused was being curtailed for the entire duration. ScaAET
Postponement Due to
Absence of Counsel
It will be recalled that the arraignment set for August 6, 2003, was postponed by the
trial court due to the absence of the counsel of petitioner. 45 The latter sought to proceed with
the arraignment by requesting the assistance of the public defender as counsel de oficio, but the
request was denied on the flimsy ground that the accused already had a counsel de parte. We
find no legal basis for the trial court's action.
The appointment of a counsel de oficio in the absence of the defendant's counsel de
parte is not prohibited, 46 not even by the Constitution, 47 especially when the accused
themselves request that appointment. In fact, the court has a mandatory duty to appoint a
counsel de oficio when the accused have no counsel of choice at the time of their
arraignment. 48 People v. Serzo 49 held thus:
". . . [A]n accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing
to be represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own
choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is immutable, his
option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not
absolute. The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel
of choice against the state's and the offended party's equally
important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may
restrict the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused
insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a
member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for
a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like." 50
Like other personal rights, the right to a counsel de parte is waivable, so long as 1) the
waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to
a third person with a right recognized by law; and 2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and
intelligently made. 51
Applying these principles, it would have been more prudent for respondent judge to
have appointed a counsel de oficio for purposes of arraignment only. This course of action
became more compelling in the instant case when petitioner himself requested the
appointment. 52 To be sure, he would not have been prejudiced by that action, provided there
was a proper observance of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under
Section 8 of this rule, before proceeding with the arraignment, the court is mandated to give the
appointed counsel de oficio reasonable time to consult with the accused as to the latter's
plea. 53
Clearly, respondent judge's postponement of the arraignment on August 6, 2003, had
no substantial basis. Thus, the postponement, initially caused by the absence of petitioner's
counsel, became unreasonable and ultimately attributable to respondent's inflexibility as regards
contingencies.
Responsibility of Judges
in Minimizing Delay
The foremost cause for the lengthy delay in this case was the repeated failure of the
jail wardens to bring the accused to court. No less than four court settings, 54 spanning seven
months, were postponed on this ground alone. To be sure, this recurring circumstance was
caused, in different instances, by the failure of the court personnel to issue the produce order on
time and by the dereliction of the jail wardens. Remarkably, although respondent judge was
justified in deferring the arraignment until the accused was presented, 55 the problem could
have been easily averted by efficient court management.
In his role as administrator, respondent should have supervised his clerk of court to
ensure a timely service of the produce order on the wardens of the Manila City Jail. Judges must
keep a watchful eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court personnel under their
immediate supervision, who are primarily employed to aid in the administration of justice. Judges
who set the pace for greater efficiency, diligence and dedication, could prompt their personnel to
be more diligent and efficient in the performance of official duties. For certain, leniency in the
administrative supervision of court personnel must be avoided. 56
We stress the need to remind judges to exhibit more diligence and efficiency in the
performance of their judicial duties to avoid loss of faith and confidence in the administration of
justice. Rule 3.09 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires them to "organize and
supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business . . . ."
Additionally, Section 5(d) of Rule 135 confers upon every court the power to control the conduct
of its ministerial officers and of all other persons who in any manner are connected with a case
before it. IASEca
 Respondent did not exercise his prerogatives in administering speedy justice. Instead,
he was content with issuing reminders 57 that miserably failed to resolve the problem
expeditiously. We can only conclude from the distinct circumstances of the case that he failed to
assert actively his authority to expedite the proceedings.
Instead of being proactive and steering the course of the proceedings with deliberate
dispatch, respondent tended to be passive and reactive by allowing the pace of the proceedings
to be dictated by the listlessness of the parties, his staff, and the jail wardens. Judges should be
more deliberate in their actions and, within the bounds of law, make full use of their authority to
expedite proceedings while continuing to respect the rights of parties to ventilate their respective
causes fully.
Indeed, judges are required to dispose of the court's business expeditiously, in
accordance with Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which we quote:
"A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and
decide cases within the required period."
This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to act promptly on their
cases. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the
judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. 58
In the light of the numerous and unreasonable delays in the arraignment of petitioner,
the sought for dismissal of the Information filed against him is in order.
Second Issue:
Propriety of a Petition for Mandamus
Respondent maintains that mandamus is not the proper remedy, because he did
not neglect his duties. Considering the above findings of inordinate delay, respondent's
contention evidently has no leg to stand on.
It is established that a writ of mandamus may be issued to control the exercise of
discretion 59 when, in the performance of duty, there is undue delay that can be characterized
as a grave abuse of discretion resulting in manifest injustice. 60 In view of our finding of
unwarranted delays in the conduct of the arraignment of petitioner, he has indeed the right to
demand — through a writ of mandamus — expeditious action from all officials tasked with the
administration of justice. Thus, he may not only demand that his arraignment be held but,
ultimately, that the information against him be dismissed on the ground of the violation of
his right to speedy trial.
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right
and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right
involved is mandated by the Constitution. 61 Besides, it has long been established in this
jurisdiction that the writ of mandamus is available to the accused to compel a dismissal of the
case. 62
Respondent argues for the dismissal of the instant Petition on the ground that
petitioner did not move for a reconsideration of the trial court's Order dated May 3, 2004.
Respondent insists that a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to a mandamus petition,
because the former remedy is plain, speedy, and adequate in the ordinary course of
law. 63 Indeed, his contention expresses the general rule, but is not impervious to
exceptions. ACETID
In the face of extraordinary and compelling reasons, it has been held that the
availability of another remedy does not preclude a resort to a special civil action under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. These reasons arise when, among others, the assailed order issued with
grave abuse of discretion is null, 64 when the available remedy will not afford expeditious
relief, 65 and when a motion for reconsideration will be useless. 66
The instant case falls under these exceptional cases. To begin with, the numerous
and unreasonable postponements displayed an abusive exercise of discretion. The delays were
ordered in total disregard of the constitutional right of petitioner. In fact, the Orders denying his
motions to dismiss did not even bother to explain the reasonableness of the bases for the
postponements. The Order dated February 20, 2004, contains only this general statement:
"Pending resolution of certain incidents as chronicled by the
Court in open court, and given the Trial Prosecutor's objections thereto
lifted from the record as to why the arraignment and pre-trial conference
of the [petitioner] John Joseph Lumanlaw y Bolinao were not scheduled
forwith (sic) as expected by counsel for the defense, the Court opted
to DENY the 'Urgent Motion to Dismiss' dated December 17, 2003 in
Criminal Case No. 02-208426." 67
After enumerating all the causes for the postponements, the Second Urgent Motion to
Dismiss was denied by respondent in the Order dated May 3, 2004, in words that were just as
vague, as shown below:
"Based on the foregoing chronological backdrop, there were
causes that justified the suspension of the arraignment that shall be
excluded in computing the period for arraignment per Section 1 (g), Rule
116 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, thusly:
'Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme
Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30)
days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to
quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying
suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing
the period.'
"Accordingly, the Second Urgent Motion to Dismiss dated
March 21, 2004 from defense counsel in Criminal Case No. 02-208426
must be and is hereby DENIED. . . . ." 68
The Orders did not even discuss why the postponements were justified, or which of
them could be excluded from the computation of the prescribed period. Absent any discussion of
these matters, baseless was the court a quo's conclusion that there was no violation of
petitioner's right to speedy trial. A veritable display of capriciousness cannot be countenanced
when weighed against an immutable right protected by the Constitution.
As further aggravation, respondent did not exert any effort to expedite the arraignment
even after petitioner had filed two urgent motions to dismiss. Indeed, there was basis for the
latter's belief that filing a motion for reconsideration would have been only an exercise in
futility. 69
Respondent also contends that the instant Petition should be dismissed for
disregarding the hierarchy of courts. This Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance
of a petition filed directly with it. 70 In the interest of speedy justice, the Court deemed it best to
take cognizance of the present Petition, notwithstanding the hierarchy of courts. Remanding the
legal issues to the Court of Appeals would have only exacerbated the violation of petitioner's
rights. cAHITS
It is the policy of this Court not to deny a writ of mandamus on purely technical
matters, if a party would be deprived of substantive rights. Procedural rules should not be strictly
enforced when their enforcement would result in a miscarriage of justice. This principle holds,
especially when a petition is meritorious and the trial judge clearly violated petitioner's
constitutional right. The protection of our people's civil liberties overwhelms all rules of
procedure. These rules are mere tools for facilitating the attainment of justice. As explicitly
provided in the Rules of Court itself, they "shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding." 71
Let it be known that this Court will not shirk from the responsibility — nay, the duty —
to set aside all obstacles to the fortification of every citizen's constitutionally enshrined rights. We
will not condone or give our imprimatur to the sluggish pace of the proceedings below. The Court
has the duty to safeguard liberty; hence, it will always uphold the basic constitutional rights of
our people, especially the weak and the marginalized.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 02-208425-26 pending
before Branch 13 of the Manila Regional Trial Court is DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby ordered
RELEASED from the Manila City Jail, where he is currently detained, unless he is being held for
any other lawful cause.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., is on leave.
||| (Lumanlaw y Bulinao v. Peralta, Jr., G.R. No. 164953, [February 13, 2006], 517 PHIL 588-
608)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 188314. January 10, 2011.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. KHADDAFY
JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD
a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro,
JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu Solaiman, ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a.
Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE DOES,accused,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu
Khalil, and ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or
Zaky, accused-appellants.
DECISION
SERENO, J p:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision
convicted the three accused-appellants — namely, Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo
Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky — of the
complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, and sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion
perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death
Penalty).
Statement of Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from
its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move out of
the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed two men running
after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and let them
in.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of
the two men, because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from each
other — one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At
the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that the eyes of
one of the men were reddish. When he approached the person near the driver and asked
him whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter looked dumb struck by the
question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew
more concerned when the other man seated at the back also paid for both passengers. At
this point, Andales said he became more certain that the two were up to no good, and that
there might be a holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on
asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that the
man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of him and his
arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was tinkering with something. When
Andales would get near the man, the latter would glare at him. Andales admitted, however,
that he did not report the suspicious characters to the police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and
EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver
initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited
unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and
allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got off the bus and ran towards
Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing
the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where
the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking
traumatized. A few hours after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station
narrating the whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice,
confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group —
Abu Solaiman — announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentine's Day
"gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on
radio and warned of more bomb attacks. HETDAC
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an
exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the
Valentine's Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused
Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a
television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14
February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad,
and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening
of 14 February.
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group — namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B.
Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a.
Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other "John" and "Jane Does" — were then charged with multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were
arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476),
Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon
arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused
Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not
guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated the following:
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali
admitted knowing one another before February 14, 2005.
3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in
the RRCG bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route
fronting the MRT terminal which is in front of the Makati
Commercial Center.
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat
whom he claims taught him how to make explosive devices.
5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the
February 14 bombing incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the
bomb explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four people
dead and more or less forty persons injured.
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period
March 20-24 each gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN
news network admitting their participation in the commission of
the said crimes, subject of these cases.
8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to
these crimes, because they were guilt-stricken after seeing a
man carrying a child in the first bus that they had entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he
gave a television news interview in which he admitted that he
supplied the explosive devices which resulted in this explosion
inside the RRCG bus and which resulted in the filing of these
charges.
10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are
members of the Abu Sayyaf. 1
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused
Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas to the charge
of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled "guilty" to the heavier charge
of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel
conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of
the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested their
readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad
pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder. 2
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under
training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other
persons taught him how to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they
were to wage battles against the government in the city, and that their first mission was to
plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro
Manila. HTIEaS
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu
Sayyaf leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a
soldering gun, aluminum powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he knew would
be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that sometime in November to December 2004,
Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT — that is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions.
Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it
for their first mission. The TNT was allegedly placed in two buses sometime in December
2004, but neither one of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentine's Day bombing, Trinidad
and Baharan got another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he
received a call from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go to crowded
areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad had already been exploded in Makati.
Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali, repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next
day, Asali allegedly received a call from accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the
success of the mission. 3 According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, "Sa wakas nag
success din yung tinuro ko sayo."
Assignment of Errors
Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants' plea of
guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
the said plea.
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-
appellants for the crimes charged had been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. 4
First Assignment of Error
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not
conduct a searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty."
The transcript of stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the
Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:
Court:
Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations
that were agreed upon during the last hearing, is to address
this matter of pleas of not guilty entered for the frustrated
murder charges by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr.
Baharan, because if you will recall they entered pleas of guilty
to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier pleas of not
guilty for the frustrated multiple murder charges remain . . . [I]s
that not inconsistent considering the stipulations that were
entered into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will
recall, they admitted to have caused the bomb explosion that
led to the death of at least four people and injury of about forty
other persons and so under the circumstances, Atty Peña,
have you discussed this matter with your clients?
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Peña:
 Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I
haven't conferred with them about this with regard to the
multiple murder case.
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Peña, can you assist the
two accused because if they are interested in withdrawing their
[pleas], I want to hear it from your lips.
Atty. Peña:
Yes, your Honor.
(At this juncture, Atty. Peña confers with the two accused,
namely Trinidad and Baharan) EIAScH
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to
them the consequence of their pleas, your Honor, and that the
plea of guilt to the murder case and plea of not guilty to
the frustrated multiple murder actually are inconsistent with
their pleas.
Court:
With matters that they stipulated upon?
Atty. Peña:
Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead
guilt to the murder case, then they are now changing their
pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to the one of guilt. They are
now ready, your Honor, for re-arraignment.
xxx xxx xxx
INTERPRETER:
(Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in Filipino
in a clearer way and asked both accused what their pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the
crime charged.
COURT:
All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have
withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and changed it to the pleas
of guilty to the charge of frustrated murder. Thank you. Are
there any matters you need to address at pretrial now? If there
are none, then I will terminate pretrial and accommodate . . . 5
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial
judges . . . must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while
justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in
seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his
plea and the import of an inevitable conviction." 6 Thus, trial court judges are required to
observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of
evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,
the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
(Emphasis supplied)
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-
arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's original
plea was "not guilty," the trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why
he changed his plea to "guilty." 7 According to the Court:
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of
guilt, especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon
the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that
the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea. 8
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed
satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of
a "guilty" plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court
found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had already
signified in open court that his counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea;
that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused understood that the
penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been intimidated,
bribed, or threatened. 9
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry
remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that
the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty
plea. 10 This requirement is stringent and mandatory. 11
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-
arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against
the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty
to another charge — multiple murder — based on the same act relied upon in the multiple
frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of
guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt — one through an
extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused
during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the
foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the
"searching inquiry" in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not
warranted, as the accused's plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment under consideration. 12 EacHSA
Second Assignment of Error
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting
a searching inquiry was not complied with, "[t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is made
. . . loses much of great significance where the conviction can be based on independent
evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the offense charged." 13Thus,
in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set
aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial
court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the
accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence
proving his commission of the offense charged. 14 (Emphasis supplied.)
 In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the conductor was
merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was insufficient.
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the
evidence for the prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the stipulation of
facts, primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the
accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales positively identified accused Baharan and
Trinidad as the two men who had acted suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted
on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had scampered away
from the bus moments before the bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he
had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati
City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these
corroborating testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions (pretrial
stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television interviews, as they both
stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the perpetrators of the Valentine's Day
bombing. 15 Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the
testimony of accused-turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the transcript of
stenographic notes on the state prosecutor's direct examination of state-witness Asali
during the 26 May 2005 trial:
Q: You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what
circumstances did he train you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those
explosives, you and Trinidad?
A: Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that
Angelo Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained to make
an explosive, sir.
Q: Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that
training?
A: If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month
and two weeks.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in
training at Mr. Cararao, is there any mission that you
undertook, if any, with respect to that mission?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other
parts of Metro Manila, sir. 16
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused Baharan and
Trinidad.
Q: Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what
happened to the 2 kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took
from you sometime in November 2004?
A: That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not
explode.
Q: How did you know, Mr. witness?
A: He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as
told to you by Trinidad? cIECTH
A: On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on
that date, December 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the
reason why?
xxx xxx xxx
A: He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he
could detonate a bomb
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you
up, with respect to the taking of the explosives from you?
A: There is, sir . . . Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.
Q: What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?
A: He told me that "this is your first mission."
Q: Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are
referring to?
A: That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the
Christians.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you
know if the bomb explode?
A: I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo
Trinidad from me until after I was caught, because I was told by
the policeman that interviewed me after I was arrested that the
2 kilos were planted in a bus, which also did not explode.
Q: So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that
Angelo Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr.
witness?
xxx xxx xxx
A: If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.
Q: Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?
A: It's Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?
A: They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.
Q: Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that
explosive?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of
explosives, which were taken from you by Trinidad and
Tapay? ETDHaC
xxx xxx xxx
A: That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.
Q: Why did you know, Mr. witness?
A: Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman.
He told me not to leave the house because the explosive that
were taken by Tapay and Angelo Trinidad exploded.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?
xxx xxx xxx
A: I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the
explosive that he took exploded already, sir.
Q: How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb
exploded at Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and
Trinidad?
A: It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should
coincide with the bombing in General Santos.
xxx xxx xxx
A: He told it to me, sir . . . I cannot remember the date anymore, but I
know it was sometime in February 2005.
Q: Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the
bombing exploded in Makati, any other call?
xxx xxx xxx
A: There is, sir . . . The call came from Abu Zaky.
Q: What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?
A: He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful
mission.
xxx xxx xxx
A: He told me that "sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo."
xxx xxx xxx
Q: By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that
Abu Zaky called you up the following day, that was February
15, and congratulating you for the success of the mission. My
question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what is the relation of
that mission, wherein you were congratulated by Abu Zaky, to
the mission, which have been indoctrinated to you, while you
were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?
A: They are connected, sir.
Q: Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?
A: Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu
Sayyaf should not wage war to the forest, but also wage our
battles in the city.
Q: Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?
A: The government, sir. 17
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group was
determined to sow terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their "anger towards the
Christians." 18 It can also be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani and Abu Solaiman,
had carefully planned the Valentine's Day bombing incident, months before it happened.
Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to make bombs and explosives. While in training,
Asali and others were told that their mission was to plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and
other parts of Metro Manila. According to Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004
to confirm that Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were "about to
commence" their "first mission." 19 They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in
Metro Manila, but to no avail. The day before the Valentine's Day bombing, Trinidad got
another two kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentine's Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group announced
that they had a gift for the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third try,
their plan finally succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group declared
that there would be more bombings in the future. Asali then received a call from Rohmat,
praising the former: "Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo." 20 CaDATc
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt
against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the
provision on "principal by inducement." The instructions and training he had given Asali on
how to make bombs — coupled with their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb
different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmat's confirmation that Trinidad would be getting
TNT from Asali as part of their mission — prove the finding that Rohmat's co-inducement
was the determining cause of the commission of the crime. 21 Such "command or advice
[was] of such nature that, without it, the crime would not have materialized." 22
Further, the inducement was "so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it, the act would not have been performed." 23 In People v. Sanchez, et al., the
Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene,
evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the principal by
inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and
because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered liable for all the
resulting crimes. 24 The same finding must be applied to the case at bar.
 The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving
accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from the
"collective acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the commission of the
crime." As correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus Decision:
Asali's clear and categorical testimony, which remains
unrebutted on its major points, coupled with the judicial admissions freely
and voluntarily given by the two other accused, are sufficient to prove the
existence of a conspiracy hatched between and among the four accused,
all members of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and
mayhem in the metropolis by indiscriminately killing and injuring civilian
victims by utilizing bombs and other similar destructive explosive devices.
While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not
been expressly admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and
Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latter's participation in the
commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has been established by virtue
of the aforementioned evidence, which established the existence of the
conspiracy itself and the indispensable participation of accused Rohmat
in seeing to it that the conspirators' criminal design would be realized.
It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the
acts of the accused, which clearly manifests a concurrence of wills, a
common intent or design to commit a crime (People v. Lenantud, 352
SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused collectively and
individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and
all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals (People v. Ellado, 353
SCRA 643). 25
In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in
concluding that the defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy "when the defendants
by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other performing
another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object; and their
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating
closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments." 26
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a
conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of
the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats
the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making
the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. 27 Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court
held the following: cTCADI
. . . [W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and
judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence
against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is
admissible against the declarant's co-accused since the latter are
afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions
and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has
the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercene's admission
implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is
admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where
several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of
a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against
the latter. 28
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, Brion, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Baharan, G.R. No. 188314, [January 10, 2011], 654 PHIL 148-169)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an
incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the
Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing
harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the
accused appears at trial.1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and
annul the resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder along
with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To
Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder
in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and
June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental
Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be
found against him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its
Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on
the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then
voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law. 8 Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to
Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General
Hospital following his medical examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , 11 and his Motion to
Fix Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8,
2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because:
(a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although
he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not
reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must
further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile’s Motion
to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have
made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he
demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the
amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not
filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged
with plunder, "the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal,
not reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and
on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily surrendered.
"Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into
consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper
penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a flight
risk and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the
factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above,
it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the
evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated July
7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s
motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right.
Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two
(2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he
would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of
Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right;
that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile
comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the
Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary
surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the
crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account
that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is
charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be
conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1. Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, 19 and further binds the court to
wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional
crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate
both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s
interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.23
2. Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution,
viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court , as
follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the
time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. 25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the
moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can
claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to
bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. 26 Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter
of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to
conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
3. Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong
in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned
Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain
the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted
provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a
matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to
the Prosecution.31The indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in
Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs.
Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who
is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on
the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment,
as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the
complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the
killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended
only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably
committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has
to be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already
presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must
be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the
crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from
justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114,
Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-
parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should
primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this
purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight
of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination. 33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with
the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of
the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that
the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
3. Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70
years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered. 35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the
Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that –
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon
Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to
state that the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the
Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense
punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing
and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accused’s favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the presence
of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against
him being punishable with reclusion perpetua ,37 simply because the determination, being
primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the
trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’
responsibility in the international community arising from the national commitment under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides:
"The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate
in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in
criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the
detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar
personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. 40 With his solid reputation in both
his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him
being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the medical
examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug
therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following :
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral
artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter
monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
 (4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes
2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina,
s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes
3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on
recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose
significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to
brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead
to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary
calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk
for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could
be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure)
which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD. 43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required
special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own
instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of
that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their
testimonies ran as follows:
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the
Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the
PNP Hospital ?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you happy
or have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the
hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the condition of the
patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor.45
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown
to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling
his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already
held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the
prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law
makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the
proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ; 47
xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the
petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and
chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen similar cases, later
progressing into advance stages when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;"
taking into consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by the
People’s Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active
tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the People’s Court in sending the petitioner to the
Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was
evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act
accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said People’s Court
has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in
several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino
(case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were released on bail on the ground that they
were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health
or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the People’s Court acted with
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner on bail. 48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his
medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the
hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to
entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive
of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the
subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for
bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by
protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the
trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail
to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded
the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave
abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical
and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction. 50 The
abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of
certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the
PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon
posting of a cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate
release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other
lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 140208. March 12, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ELPIDIO PASTOR, accused-appellant.
Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Accused-appellant Elpidio Pastor was convicted of qualified rape by the Regional Trial
Court of Tagbilaran City and was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. In his brief,
appellant averred that the trial court gravely erred in not applying the guidelines for a plea of
guilty to a capital offense provided in Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Specifically, he contended that the trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the accused-appellant's
plea, pursuant to the ruling laid down in the cases of People vs. Bello and People vs. Dayot.
Allegedly, the questions propounded to the appellant were limited to his family background and
personal circumstances. Appellant prayed that the case be remanded to the court a quo for a
full-blown trial.
The Supreme Court upheld appellant's contention. According to the Court, the
questions propounded by the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of
appellant nor did the questions demonstrate that he fully understood the consequences of his
plea. Appellant was not also warned that the penalty of death is indivisible and is not affected by
either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court's statement that by pleading guilty
he "may" be sentenced to a death penalty is inadequate. It should have warned him, in a
language that cannot be misinterpreted, that should the court find that the qualifying
circumstances alleged in the information were proved during the trial, along with the elements of
the crime of rape, he would be meted the death penalty. Having found appellant's re-arraignment
to be fatally flawed, the Court ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA; PLEA
OF GUILTY TO CAPITAL OFFENSE; OBLIGATORY DUTY OF COURTS. — When a plea of
guilty to a capital offense is entered, the trial court is duty bound to: (1) conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the
consequences thereof; (2) require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) inquire from the accused if he desires
to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. The rationale behind the
rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its
severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable
and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. Moreover, the
requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining
the propriety or impropriety of the plea. aTCAcI
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED BY THE TRIAL COURT FAILED
TO SHOW THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE PLEA OF GUILT OF APPELLANT NOR DID THE
QUESTIONS DEMONSTRATE THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE CONSEQUENCES OF
HIS PLEA. — The questions propounded by the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the
plea of guilt of accused-appellant nor did the questions demonstrate that he fully understood the
consequences of his plea. First, all the questions propounded by the court were couched in
English but there is nothing in the records to show that accused-appellant had a good
comprehension, or at least, a nodding acquaintance with the English language. The records also
do not show whether the judge translated and explained his questions to accused-appellant in a
language or dialect known and understood by the latter. Accused-appellant is a simple
fisherman and his educational background is unknown.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TRIAL COURT FAILED TO EXPLAIN TO APPELLANT THE
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF RAPE. — The trial court failed to explain to accused-appellant
the elements of the crime of rape. Moreover, when the trial court asked accused-appellant if he
knew that by pleading guilty he may be sentenced to a death penalty, the latter answered "I do
not know what will be the outcome of my pleading guilty, Your Honor." Given the vagueness of
accused-appellant's answer, the trial court went no further to find out whether or not he fully
comprehended the consequences of his plea. In addition, accused-appellant was not
categorically advised that his plea of guilt would not under any circumstance affect or reduce his
sentence. The records reveal that it was the defense counsel, not accused-appellant, who was
informed and warned by the court that in cases of incestuous rape, mitigating and aggravating
circumstances do not matter. When accused-appellant attempted to prove the mitigating
circumstances of plea of guilty, voluntary surrender and drunkenness, he was under the
mistaken assumption that his liability would be reduced. He was not warned that the penalty of
death is indivisible and is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial
court's statement that by pleading guilty he "may" be sentenced to a death penalty is
inadequate. It should have warned him, in a language that cannot be misinterpreted, that should
the court find that the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information were proved during the
trial, along with the elements of the crime of rape, he would be meted the death penalty.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RE-ARRAIGNMENT OF APPELLANT IS FATALLY FLAWED.
— When accused-appellant was questioned by the court as to the act he committed, he
answered that he "was led to think bad about my daughter because my wife left me." Again, the
answer is hardly comprehensible yet, the court failed to probe deeper into the material details of
the crime. We hold that in the absence of a "searching inquiry" into the voluntariness of the plea
of guilt of accused-appellant and his full comprehension of the consequences thereof, the re-
arraignment of accused-appellant is fatally flawed.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION INDEPENDENTLY OF THE PLEA OF GUILTY. — The second
requirement prescribes that the trial court must order the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused-appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. It must be
stressed that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses
cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. The prosecution evidence must be sufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction independently of the plea of guilty. A perusal of the decision of the trial
court will reveal that the judge failed to state the factual and legal reasons on which he based
accused-appellant's conviction. The judge merely stated that the complainant "positively
declared that on May 7, 1998, her father (the accused in this case), without her consent, forcibly
obtained carnal knowledge with her, which resulted in her being pregnant." He then concluded
that the lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction, and made a
bare recital of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353. There is no
discussion of the facts of the case and the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information, in
utter disregard of the constitutional injunction that "no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." Also,
there is no evaluation of the evidence and no reason given why the court found that the
testimony of the complainant is credible. We note that the first question asked of the complainant
in her direct examination was if she could recall when she was raped by the accused-appellant.
It did not elicit the specific details as to how the rape was committed against complainant. The
prosecution simply presumed that the complainant was indeed raped on the basis of the plea of
guilty of accused-appellant. Moreover, there was practically no evidence presented to prove
force and intimidation as well as the relationship of accused-appellant with complainant. It is true
that our jurisprudence is replete with cases where the moral ascendancy of a parent over his
child has been allowed to justify a finding that there was intimidation sufficient to convict the
accused of incestuous rape. However, in the case of People vs. Alberto Chua, we held that the
mere fact that accused-appellant is her father and therefore exercises moral ascendancy over
his daughter cannot ipso facto justify this Court to conclude that the victim was
intimidated. ASICDH
6. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFIED RAPE; RELATIONSHIP OF COMPLAINANT TO
APPELLANT NOT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED; IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY
ERRONEOUS. — We have ruled that it is the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender that would qualify the rape as heinous and thus justify the
imposition of the supreme penalty. Both qualifying circumstances of age and relationship must
be alleged in the information and proved during the trial. In the case at bar, the qualifying
circumstance of relationship was not established beyond moral certainty. The rule is that
relationship, as a qualifying circumstance of rape, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, just
as the crime itself. It has been held that the bare testimony of the complainant and the admission
of accused-appellant as to their relationship is not sufficient. The birth certificate of herein
complainant which was not duly certified cannot be given probative value insofar as the
relationship of complainant with accused-appellant is concerned. Since the relationship of
complainant to accused-appellant has not been sufficiently established, it was error for the trial
court to impose the penalty of death.
7. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; IT IS THE BOUNDEN DUTY OF LAWYERS TO
PROTECT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED EVEN WHEN HE HAS
PLEADED GUILTY TO THE CRIME CHARGED; COUNSEL'S ATTITUDE FALLS SHORT OF
THE NOBLE DUTY OF A LAWYER TO DEFEND AN ACCUSED HOWEVER GUILTY HE MAY
APPEAR. — In addition, the trial court, in convicting accused-appellant, considered pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution that are inadmissible for being hearsay. The prosecution
merely asked complainant to identify the two medical certificates relating to her pregnancy
without presenting the doctors who issued the certifications to testify thereon. The defense
counsel failed to object to the documentary evidence of the prosecution and worse, even
expressed his conformity to its admission. Such lapses should not have been allowed by the trial
court considering that it was trying a case where a life was at stake. Life cannot be lost due to
the ignorance of counsel. Under the third requirement, the court must ask the accused if he
desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. In the present
case, there is nothing in the records to show that accused-appellant was informed, either by his
counsel or by the court, of his right to present evidence, if he so desires. Very glaring is the
manifest lack of enthusiasm of the defense counsel, Atty. Damalerio, for his client's cause when
he refused to cross examine the complainant, on the pretext that accused-appellant has pleaded
guilty. We reiterate that it is the bounden duty of lawyers to protect the constitutional right of an
accused even when he has pleaded guilty to the crime charged. This utter lack of concern is
further aggravated by Atty. Damalerio's lackadaisical and perfunctory discharge of his obligation
to present evidence in behalf of accused-appellant. After the prosecution rested its case, Atty.
Damalerio manifested that since the accused-appellant had already pleaded guilty, he is not
presenting any defense, and merely prayed that his client be credited with the mitigating
circumstances earlier claimed by him. To say the least, Atty. Damalerio's attitude falls short of
the noble duty of a lawyer to defend an accused however guilty he may appear to be if only to
assure that his prosecution is in accord with the procedure laid down by our law. It cannot be
over emphasized that even the guilty cannot be prosecuted by means revolting to the civilized
demands of due process.
 DECISION
PUNO, J p:
For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of the City of
Tagbilaran, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 10283, dated August 30, 1999, finding accused-
appellant Elpidio Pastor guilty of incestuous rape and sentencing him to suffer the supreme
penalty of death with its accessory penalties, to indemnify the complainant Maria Niña
R. Pastorthe sum of P75,000.00, and to pay the costs. 1
In an Information 2 dated March 12, 1999, accused-appellant was charged with the
crime of Incestuous Rape, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 7th day of May, 1998, in the Municipality
of Loon, Province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused with lewd designs, entered
the room of his own daughter, Maria Niña R. Pastor (accused being the
biological father of the victim), a 13-year old girl, and once inside did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and
intimidation, lie on top of her, insert his penis in the vagina of the said
offended victim, Maria Niña R. Pastor, and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her against her will and without her consent resulting in the
pregnancy of the victim, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Acts committed in violation of Sec. 2, Art. 266-B, par. 1, of RA
8353, amending [Article] 335 of the Revised Penal Code."
On April 8, 1999, accused-appellant was arraigned and, with the assistance of PAO
lawyer Atty. Perpetuo Magallano, entered a plea of not guilty.
During the hearing on June 23, 1999, Atty. Adriano Damalerio of PAO manifested that
after a conference with accused-appellant, the latter had decided to change his plea from Not
Guilty to Guilty. The trial court ordered that the previous plea of not guilty be set aside and that
accused-appellant be arraigned anew. Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea
of guilty to the Information which was read and translated to him in the Visayan dialect.
Thereafter, the trial court propounded clarificatory questions to accused-appellant to ascertain
whether he understood the consequences of his plea.
Accused-appellant then testified on the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty,
voluntary surrender and drunkenness which is not habitual. The prosecution admitted the plea of
guilty and voluntary surrender. Accused-appellant offered evidence to prove drunkenness. He
testified that on May 7, 1998, he drank tuba and in his drunkenness, he was led to think bad
about his daughter, herein complainant, because his wife left him. He claims that it was never
his intention to rape his daughter. 3
Subsequently, the prosecution was ordered to prove the culpability of accused-
appellant. Complainant Maria Niña testified that on May 7, 1998, at about 3 o'clock in the
morning, she was raped by her father, herein accused-appellant, in their house at Catagbacan
Sur, Loon, Bohol. Her parents were already separated at that time and her mother was living in
Manila. Complainant was impregnated 4 and gave birth on December 12, 1998. 5 On cross
examination, complainant testified that she was 13 years old at the time of the incident; 6 that
she had a premature delivery and her baby died five days after birth; that nobody forced her to
file the complaint against accused-appellant; and that she pursued the prosecution of the case
against accused-appellant knowing that he may be sentenced to death. 7
On August 30, 1999, the court a quo rendered judgment finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of incestuous rape. It nevertheless recommended
the commutation of the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua by reason of the remorseful
attitude exhibited by accused appellant. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 10283, the Court finds
accused ELPIDIO PASTOR, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Incestuous Rape, defined under Par 1 (a) of Article 266-A and
penalized under Par 5, No. (1) of Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, and hereby sentences said
accused ELPIDIO PASTOR to suffer the supreme and indivisible penalty
of DEATH, in the manner provided for by law, with the accessory
penalties of the law, to indemnify the offended party, Maria Niña
R. Pastor the sum of P75,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The Court herein was saved of its precious time in conducting
(a) full-dress trial because the accused pleaded guilty. The prosecution
even conformed to accused' (sic) claim of the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and spontaneous plea of guilt.
When the accused took the witness stand to prove the
circumstance of drunkenness, which is not habitual, which was not
conceded by the prosecution, we found him to be meditative and
remorseful, a behavior which is quite different from other death-row
convicts, who despite the onus of the evidence against them, with
insistence, persist in needlessly taxing the court on their claim of
innocence, all throughout the trial and even after the affirmance of their
conviction by our Highest Court. We believe that accused herein should
not be equated to the likes of these calloused and non-repentant
offenders.
It is therefore on the basis of the foregoing circumstances, and
in the highest interest of humane and compassionate justice, that we are
minded of the provisions of Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, and hereby, without suspending the execution of the sentence
herein, recommends unto the President of the Republic of the Philippines,
thru the Secretary of Justice, the commutation of accused' (sic) sentence
from death to reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, let copy of this decision be furnished the Secretary
of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for whatever recommendation he may
deem proper to His Excellency, the President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED."
In his appellant's brief, accused-appellant avers that the trial court gravely erred in not
applying the guidelines for a plea of guilty to a capital offense provided in Section 3, Rule 116 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, it is contended that the trial court failed to
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of the accused-appellant's plea, pursuant to the ruling laid down in the cases of People vs.
Bello 8 and People vs. Dayot. 9 Allegedly, the questions propounded to the accused-appellant
were limited to his family background and personal circumstances. Accused-appellant thus
prays that the case be remanded to the court a quo for a full-blown trial.
Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, viz:
"SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of
evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the
court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the
 prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his culpability.
The accused may present evidence in his behalf."
When a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, the trial court is duty bound to: (1)
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full
comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) inquire from the
accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires. 10 The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where
the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution
of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at
times pleaded guilty. 11 Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this
Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea. 12
Yes, your Honor, and the accused is now ready to enter a plea of Guilty,
and I would like to manifest, Your Honor, that the accused was
already arraigned and he entered the plea of Not Guilty and he
would like to change his plea of Not Guilty to Guilty, Your
Honor, and we move that the earlier plea of Not Guilty be
vacated and the accused be re-arraigned.
COURT:
Let the previous plea of Not Guilty by the accused Elpidio Pastor be set
aside and re-arraign the accused now.
COURT:

I. Call the accused, Elpidio Pastor, and arraign the accused.

Anent the first requirement, the searching inquiry must determine whether the plea of RECORD:
guilt was based on a free and informed judgment. Hence, it must focus on (1) the voluntariness
of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. 13 Although there is COURT INTERPRETER: reads the Information of Incestuous Rape and
no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have translated the same to the accused in Visayan vernacular.
held that the following guidelines should be observed:
COURT TO ACCUSED ELPIDIO PASTOR:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the
Let's ask the accused Elpidio Pastor, whether he understood the
law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
Information read and translated to him in the Visayan
preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated
vernacular.
during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been
coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from COURT INTERPRETER TO THE ACCUSED:
malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.
Q Do you understand the Information read to you?
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with,
and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. ACCUSED ELPIDIO PASTOR:
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, A Yes, Your Honor.
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of
his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty. COURT:

4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under Q Now, having understood the Information, Mr. Elpidio Pastor, what is
the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused your plea, guilty or not guilty?
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty ACCUSED ELPIDIO PASTOR:
of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions
because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper A I admit, Your Honor, that I have committed a sin.
but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment. 14 COURT:
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to Enter a plea of Guilty as expressed by accused Elpidio Pastor through
him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so his very own mouth, upon his re-arraignment today.
would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process. 15 COURT TO ELPIDIO PASTOR:
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood Q You are Elpidio Pastor?
by the latter. 16
A Yes, Your Honor.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly
guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its Q How old are you?
missing details. 17
A 35 years old, Your Honor.
In the case at bar, the records will show that the trial court miserably failed to
discharge its duty to conduct a "searching inquiry," to wit: Q You are married?

"ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO: A Yes, Your Honor.

Q What is the name of your wife? Q Your wife Josefina is living with you?

A Josefina Requello. A We got separated, Your Honor, she left for Manila and she did not
return because she had a boyfriend.
Q You and your wife were married in church?
Q Of the five (5) children, how many children were living with you at that
A Yes, Your Honor. time of the incident?
Q Do you have children? A Four (4), Your Honor.
A Yes, Your Honor, five (5) children. Q Who supported your four (4) children, Maria Niña, Joel, Rodel and
Jenelyn?
Q Tell the Court the names of your children?
A Me and my mother.
A Goldelyn the eldest.
Q Why, what is your work?
Q How old is Goldelyn now?
A Fisherman, Your Honor.
A 16 years old.
Q You have changed your plea from Not Guilty to Guilty, is this correct?
Q Where is Goldelyn now?
A Yes, Your Honor, that is true that I have committed a sin.
A She is in Mindanao, Don Carlos, Mindanao.
Q Nobody has forced you to plead guilty to this Information?
Q Your second child, what is the name?
A None, Your Honor.
A Maria Niña, Your Honor.
Q In other words, your pleading guilty is your free and voluntary act?
Q Maria Niña is the private complainant in this case?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you know that by pleading guilty you may be sentenced to a death
Q How old is Maria Niña? penalty?
A 14 years old, Your Honor. A I do not know what will be the outcome of my pleading guilty, Your
Honor.
Q Maria Niña was living with you during the incident?
Q The Court is now telling you, that by pleading guilty you may be
A Yes, Your Honor.
sentenced to a death penalty.
Q The third child, what is the name?
A Yes, Your Honor, I understand.
A Joel.
Q Despite of your knowledge, you still insist on your plea of guilt?
Q How old is Joel?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A 12 years old, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q How about the 4th child?
No further questions.
A Rodel.
ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO:
Q How old is Rodel?
Your Honor, we would like to present the accused himself to the witness
A 10 years old, Your Honor. stand to prove three (3) mitigating circumstances: First, the
plea of guilt; Second, voluntary surrender; and Third,
Q And the 5th child? drunkenness which is not habitual and at that time of the
incident, Your Honor, he was drunk.
A Jenelyn.
COURT TO COUNSELS:
Q How old is Jenelyn?
I have to inform counsels that in cases of Incestuous Rape, neither
A 8 years old. mitigating nor aggravating circumstances cannot (sic) be
availed of.
ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO: Q Now, did you purposely take tuba in order to commit crime (sic) against
your child?
Only to save him, Your Honor, for (sic) the penalty of death.
A When I drunk (sic), Your Honor, that was not my intention to do it." 18
COURT:
The questions propounded by the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the
Okay, let's hear the accused. plea of guilt of accused-appellant nor did the questions demonstrate that he fully understood the
consequences of his plea.
Call the accused to the witness stand.
First, all the questions propounded by the court were couched in English but there is
xxx xxx xxx nothing in the records to show that accused-appellant had a good comprehension, or at least, a
ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO: nodding acquaintance with the English language. The records also do not show whether the
judge translated and explained his questions to accused-appellant in a language or dialect
The purpose of the testimony of Elpidio Pastor, Your Honor, is to prove known and understood by the latter. 19 Accused-appellant is a simple fisherman and his
the three (3) mitigating circumstances: 1. Plea of guilt; 2. educational background is unknown.
Voluntary surrender; and 3. Drunkenness which is not habitual,
Your Honor. Second, the trial court failed to explain to accused-appellant the elements of the crime
of rape. Moreover, when the trial court asked accused-appellant if he knew that by pleading
FISCAL HELEN T. CABATOS: guilty he may be sentenced to a death penalty, the latter answered "I do not know what will be
the outcome of my pleading guilty, Your Honor." Given the vagueness of accused-appellant's
We admit the plea of guilt, Your Honor, and the voluntary surrender, answer, the trial court went no further to find out whether or not he fully comprehended the
Your Honor. consequences of his plea. In addition, accused-appellant was not categorically advised that his
plea of guilt would not under any circumstance affect or reduce his sentence. The records reveal
xxx xxx xxx that it was the defense counsel, not accused-appellant, who was informed and warned by the
DIRECT EXAMINATION ON ELPIDIO PASTOR BY: ATTY. ADRIANO court that in cases of incestuous rape, mitigating and aggravating circumstances do not
DAMALERIO matter. 20 When accused-appellant attempted to prove the mitigating circumstances of plea of
guilty, voluntary surrender and drunkenness, he was under the mistaken assumption that his
Q You have just admitted and in fact pleaded guilty to the crime which liability would be reduced. 21 He was not warned that the penalty of death is indivisible and is
accordingly committed (sic) on May 7, 1998, now please tell the not affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 22 The trial court's statement that
Court why did you do this kind of crime and what led you to do by pleading guilty he "may" be sentenced to a death penalty is inadequate. It should have
this crime? warned him, in a language that cannot be misinterpreted, that should the court find that the
qualifying circumstances alleged in the information were proved during the trial, along with the
A I have drunk tuba. elements of the crime of rape, he would be meted the death penalty. 23
Q And what did you feel after you drunk tuba? Third, when accused-appellant was questioned by the court as to the act he
committed, he answered that he "was led to think bad about my daughter because my wife left
A A little bit tipsy. me." Again, the answer is hardly comprehensible yet, the court failed to probe deeper into the
Q You mean you are drunk? material details of the crime.

A Yes, sir. We hold that in the absence of a "searching inquiry" into the voluntariness of the plea
of guilt of accused-appellant and his full comprehension of the consequences thereof, the re-
Q And because of that drunkenness, what did you do? arraignment of accused-appellant is fatally flawed.

A I was led to think bad about my daughter because my wife left me. II.
The second requirement prescribes that the trial court must order the prosecution to
xxx xxx xxx
prove the guilt of the accused-appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond
CROSS EXAMINATION: reasonable doubt. It must be stressed that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. The prosecution evidence must
xxx xxx xxx be sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction independently of the plea of guilty. 24
Q I said, this is not the first time that you were drunk? In the case at bar, complainant Maria Niña testified as follows:
A There are times that I got drunk but that was the only time that I "Q Ma. Niña, the accused in this case is Elpidio Pastor, how are you
committed that kind of incident. related to him?
xxx xxx xxx A My father.
COURT:
Q If your father is inside this court room today please point (sic) him?
xxx xxx xxx
A That one, ma'am.
 xxx xxx xxx A Yes, maam.
Q Were you present during the arraignment of your father, the accused in Q When did you give birth?
this case?
A December 12, 1998.
A Yes, maam.
Q And where is your baby now?
Q And you heard him pleaded (sic) guilty to the crime charge (sic)?
A She died.
A Yes maam, I heard.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Having heard your father admitted (sic) the crime charged against him,
do you still insist to pursue in prosecuting this case? Q What did you feel about the sexual assault committed by your father
against you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A I'm mad.
COURT:
Q What else did you feel?
Record that the witness is crying.
A Angry.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Is that all your feelings because of this incident?
Q Now, if you can recall, when was that that your father raped you?
A I'm also sad.
A May 7, 1998.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Where did it happen?
FISCAL HELEN T. CABATOS:
A In our house.
No further questions, Your Honor.
Q Where is your house located?
COURT:
A Catagbacan Sur, Loon, Bohol.
Cross.
Q Can you recall what time was that, that your father sexually abused
ATTY. ADRIANO DAMALERIO:
you?
No cross, Your Honor, accused had already pleaded guilty." 25
A That was 3:00 o'clock dawn.
The prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence which consists of the birth
Q By the way, where was your mother at that time when your father
certificate of complainant to prove that she was 13 years old at the time of the incident and that
sexually abused you?
accused-appellant is her father, 26 and two medical certificates, one showing that complainant
A My mother is not there. has been pregnant for 23-3/7 weeks, 27 and the other that she gave birth to a baby girl who died
five days thereafter. 28
xxx xxx xxx
As heretofore discussed, the plea of guilty of accused-appellant was made
Q What was the result of that sexual abused (sic) committed by your improvidently. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside if such plea is the
father on May 7, 1998? sole basis of the judgment. If, however, the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence
to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not
A I got ill and always vomit. merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged. 29
Q What was the caused (sic) of vomiting?
A perusal of the decision of the trial court will reveal that the judge failed to state the
A I was pregnant.
factual and legal reasons on which he based accused-appellant's conviction. The judge merely
Q Were you examined by a doctor, to prove that you were pregnant of stated that the complainant "positively declared that on May 7, 1998, her father (the accused in
that rape incident? this case), without her consent, forcibly obtained carnal knowledge with her, which resulted in
her being pregnant." He then concluded that the lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is
A Yes, maam. enough to sustain a conviction, and made a bare recital of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. 8353. There is no discussion of the facts of the case and the
xxx xxx xxx qualifying circumstances alleged in the information, in utter disregard of the constitutional
Q Now, you said that you were pregnant, eventually did you give birth of injunction that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." 30
(sic) a child?
 Also, there is no evaluation of the evidence and no reason given why the court found
that the testimony of the complainant is credible. We note that the first question asked of the
complainant in her direct examination was if she could recall when she was raped by the
accused-appellant. It did not elicit the specific details as to how the rape was committed against
complainant. The prosecution simply presumed that the complainant was indeed raped on the
basis of the plea of guilty of accused-appellant.
Moreover, there was practically no evidence presented to prove force and intimidation
as well as the relationship of accused-appellant with complainant. It is true that our jurisprudence
is replete with cases where the moral ascendancy of a parent over his child has been allowed to
justify a finding that there was intimidation sufficient to convict the accused of incestuous rape.
However, in the case of People vs. Alberto Chua, 31 we held that the mere fact that accused-
appellant is her father and therefore exercises moral ascendancy over his daughter cannot ipso
facto justify this Court to conclude that the victim was intimidated. Thus, we held:
"There must be some evidence of intimidation employed on the
victim as to indubitably show how vitiated the victim's consent was to the
violation of her womanhood. After all, rape is committed against or
without the consent of the victim. . . . The court cannot rely on
presumptions of moral ascendancy . . . [which] cannot and should not
prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. Force or
intimidation is an element of the crime of rape. There must, therefore, be
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the victim did not resist her
defloration due to the moral ascendancy of the accused."
We have ruled that it is the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender that would qualify the rape as heinous and thus justify the
imposition of the supreme penalty. 32 Both qualifying circumstances of age and relationship
must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial. In the case at bar, the qualifying
circumstance of relationship was not established beyond moral certainty. The rule is that
relationship, as a qualifying circumstance of rape, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, just
as the crime itself. It has been held that the bare testimony of the complainant and the admission
of accused-appellant as to their relationship is not sufficient. 33 The birth certificate of herein
complainant which was not duly certified cannot be given probative value insofar as the
relationship of complainant with accused-appellant is concerned. 34 Since the relationship of
complainant to accused-appellant has not been sufficiently established, it was error for the trial
court to impose the penalty of death.
In addition, the trial court, in convicting accused-appellant, considered pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution that are inadmissible for being hearsay. The prosecution
merely asked complainant to identify the two medical certificates relating to her pregnancy
without presenting the doctors who issued the certifications to testify thereon. The defense
counsel failed to object to the documentary evidence of the prosecution and worse, even
expressed his conformity to its admission. Such lapses should not have been allowed by the trial
court considering that it was trying a case where a life was at stake. Life cannot be lost due to
the ignorance of counsel.
III.
Under the third requirement, the court must ask the accused if he desires to present
evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. In the present case, there is nothing
in the records to show that accused-appellant was informed, either by his counsel or by the
court, of his right to present evidence, if he so desires.
Very glaring is the manifest lack of enthusiasm of the defense counsel, Atty.
Damalerio, for his client's cause when he refused to cross examine the complainant, on the
pretext that accused-appellant has pleaded guilty. We reiterate that it is the bounden duty of
lawyers to protect the constitutional right of an accused even when he has pleaded guilty to the
crime charged, viz.:
"It may be so that defense counsel personally found Oleby's
testimony to be believable. Nonetheless, he had the bounden duty to
scrutinize private complainant's testimony to ensure that the accused's
constitutional right to confront and examine the witnesses against him
was not rendered for naught.
It bears pointing out that in rape cases, it is often the word of
the complainant against that of the accused, the two being the only
persons present during the commission of the offense. While the lone
testimony of the victim is sufficient to convict the accused, such testimony
must be clear, positive, convincing and consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things. Complainant's testimony cannot be accepted
with precipitate credulity without denying the accused's constitutional right
to be presumed innocent. This is where cross examination becomes
essential to test the credibility of the witnesses, expose falsehoods or
half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination
testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies
in substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused and thus to give substance to the constitutional right of the
accused to confront the witnesses against him. For unless proven
otherwise to be guilty beyond all reasonable doubt, the accused is
presumed to be innocent.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his
client and protect his rights, no matter how guilty or evil he perceives
accused-appellant to be. The performance of this duty was all the more
imperative because the life of accused-appellant hangs in the balance.
His duty was no less because he was counsel de oficio." 35
This utter lack of concern is further aggravated by Atty. Damalerio's lackadaisical and
perfunctory discharge of his obligation to present evidence in behalf of accused-appellant. After
the prosecution rested its case, Atty. Damalerio manifested that since the accused-appellant had
already pleaded guilty, he is not presenting any defense, and merely prayed that his client be
credited with the mitigating circumstances earlier claimed by him. 36 To say the least, Atty.
Damalerio's attitude falls short of the noble duty of a lawyer to defend an accused however guilty
he may appear to be if only to assure that his prosecution is in accord with the procedure laid
down by our law. In cannot be over emphasized that even the guilty cannot be prosecuted by
means revolting to the civilized demands of due process.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment appealed from is SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings in accord with the guidelines set forth in
this Decision. AECIaD
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing
, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Pastor, G.R. No. 140208, [March 12, 2002], 428 PHIL 976-1001)
PEOPLE VS LUNIA
EN BANC
 [G.R. No. 128289. April 23, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GREGORIO
LIMA y SILPA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Free Legal Assistance Group for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Appellant was charged by her own daughter with two counts of rape Initially, he
pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he changed his plea and entered a plea of guilty.
The trial court in a joint decision, found the appellant guilty as charged and was imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in Crim Case No. 36,517-96 and the penalty of death in Crim.
Case No. 36,380.96.
In this appeal, appellant alleged that the trial court erred in convicting him on an
improvident plea of guilty.
The Supreme Court ruled that it is incumbent upon a trial judge to ascertain and be
totally convinced that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and its consequences fully
comprehended by the accused. In the present case, to fully determine whether such
voluntariness and comprehension attended appellant's plea of guilty, his whole testimony must
be taken into account and be read together with his statements made during the rearraignment
proceedings. As narrated earlier, after the prosecution rested its case, appellant admitted that he
sexually abused her daughter Sherilyn because of the influence of wine which made him lost his
composure; and that at the time he slept with Sherilyn in 1992, she was 10 years old. This
admission is significant since appellant furnished and explained to the trial court the missing
details of why he committed the offense charged. Certainly, his explanation is an earmark of
voluntariness of his plea of guilty and a clear comprehension of the consequences thereof.
Moreover, by invoking that his voluntary plea of guilty be taken into account as a mitigating
circumstance in reducing his penalty, he has completely demolished his argument that his plea
was improvidently made.
The assailed joint decision was affirmed with modification only as to the award of
indemnity and damages.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PLEA OF GUILTY TO CAPITAL
OFFENSE; VOLUNTARINESS AND COMPREHENSION OF THE PLEA OF GUILTY, HOW
DETERMINED; CASE AT BAR. — In the present case, to fully determine whether such
voluntariness and comprehension attended appellant's plea of guilty, his whole testimony must
be taken into account and be read together with his statements made during the rearraignment
proceedings. As narrated earlier, after the prosecution rested its case, appellant admitted that he
sexually abused her daughter Sherilyn because of the influence of wine which made him lost his
composure; and that at the time he slept with Sherilyn in 1992, she was 10 years old. This
admission is significant since appellant furnished and explained to the trial court the missing
details of why he committed the offenses charged. Certainly, his explanation is an earmark of
voluntariness of his plea of guilty and a clear comprehension of the consequences
thereof. Moreover, as noted earlier, the defense, after presenting the testimony of the accused,
earnestly prayed before the trial court that his "voluntary plea of guilty" be taken into account as
a ,mitigating circumstance in reducing his penalty. By invoking such plea of guilty, the appellant
has completely demolished his argument that his plea was improvidently made. SIDTCa
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVICTIONS BASED ON IMPROVIDENT PLEA SHALL BE SET
ASIDE WHEN SUCH PLEA IS THE SOLE BASIS OF JUDGMENT. — In any case, contrary to
appellant's assertion, he was convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of his plea of guilty,
but on the strength of the evidence adduced, by the prosecution. As held by this Court in People
vs. Lakindanum, People vs. Nismal, People vs. Petalcorin, and People vs. Tahop, convictions
based on pleas of guilty to capital offenses have been set aside because of improvidence of the
plea, but only when such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. Where, as here, the trial court
relied solely on the prosecution's sufficient and convincing evidence to convict the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt, not on his guilty plea, the same must be sustained.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — [T]he trial court found that the
prosecution's witnesses were telling the truth. We have consistently held that the findings of fact
of the trial judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses should not be disturbed on appeal
and should be given considerable weight and respect, especially on the credibility of the
witnesses, since he was in a better position to decide the question, having heard and observed
the demeanor, attitude, conduct and deportment of witnesses.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; DEATH PENALTY; WHEN IMPOSED; CASE AT BAR. —
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,
provides: "Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or
intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When
the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua. . . . The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following circumstances: l. when the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of
the victim. . . ." The prosecution has sufficiently established that in Criminal Case No. 36,517-96,
the victim was only ten years old when she was raped by her father. However, the death penalty
cannot be imposed upon the appellant because the crime was committed in 1992 when R.A.
7659 was not yet in effect. As regards Criminal Case No. 36,380-96, it was proven that the
victim was only 14 years old when she was raped by her father in 1996. Thus, the penalty of
death was correctly meted out by the trial court.
5. ID.; INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES; IMPOSED IN ENTIRETY REGARDLESS OF ANY
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME. —
The mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty cannot be appreciated in his favor
because reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties imposed in their entirety
regardless of any mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime.
6. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; AWARD OF P50,000.00 MORAL DAMAGES; CASE AT
BAR. — [W]e rectify the error committed by the trial court with respect to the award of damages
to the victim. The award of P30,000.00 as moral damages is not in line with the prevailing
jurisprudence, fixing the amount at P50,000.00 for each count of rape.
7. ID.; ID.; INDEMNITY EX-DELICTO; AWARDED IN CASE AT BAR. — [T]he amount
of P50,000.00 should be awarded to her as indemnity ex delicto in Criminal Case No. 36,517-96
since the penalty is only reclusion perpetua; while in Criminal Case No. 36,380-96 where the
penalty imposed is death, the indemnity ex delicto for the victim should be in the amount of
P75,000.00.
8. ID.; ID.; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; AWARDED WHEN AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME; CASE AT BAR, — Since
the fact of relationship between the offender and the victim is an aggravating circumstance, she
is entitled to the award of exemplary damages of P25,000.00 for each count of rape. In People
vs. Catubig, this Court clarified that an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the meaning of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code. DACIHc
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
Among the heinous crimes, none stirs up so much public outrage, repulsion and
hatred than incestuous rape. It is so odious and disgusting that the perpetrator rightfully must
feel the anger and spurn of society. Indeed, a father who stains the purity and dignity of his own
flesh and blood has reduced himself to the lowliest of lowly beasts.
Gregorio S. Lima was charged by her own daughter, Sherilyn Lima, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Davao City, with two counts of rape under the following
informations:
Criminal Case No. 36,517-96 1
"The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the
crime of rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the
instance of the complainant, Sherilyn B. Lima, who is a minor, and her
mother, Erlinda B. Lima, and witness SPO2 Ricardo M. Arcilla, whose
affidavits are hereto attached to form part of this information. The crime is
committed as follows:
"That sometime in 1992, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, by means of force and intimidation and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with her daughter, Sherilyn B. Lima, a minor who is
below fourteen (14) years of age, against her will.
"Contrary to law."
Criminal Case No. 36,380-96 2
"The undersigned, SHERILYN LIMA Y BARLIZO, after having
been duly sworn according to law, accuses her father, GREGORIO LIMA
Y SILPA of the crime of rape, under Art. 335, par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, committed as follows:
"That on or about January 20, 1996, in the City of Davao,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
mentioned accused by means of force and intimidation, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the
undersigned complainant, who is 14 years of age against her will.
"Contrary to law."
The two cases were originally raffled to the two branches of the said RTC. When
arraigned separately on the two Informations, accused pleaded "Not guilty." Thereafter, the two
cases were consolidated in Branch 17.
On November 20, 1996, counsel for the accused manifested that the latter would
change his plea of not guilty to both charges. 3 Upon rearraignment, he entered a plea of
"Guilty." Thereafter, upon order of the trial court, the prosecution presented its evidence and
rested its case.
The prosecution's evidence consisted of the testimonies of the victim, Sherilyn Lima,
her mother, Erlinda Lima, SPO2 Ricardo Arcilla, and Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma.
Sherilyn was 15 years old when she testified in court on November 20, 1996 about her
harrowing experience in the hands of her very own father. She identified her Certificate of Live
Birth 4 which indicates that she was born on August 14, 1981 in Davao City, and that her father
is Gregorio Silpa Lima, the accused. She narrated that sometime in 1992, when she was only 10
years old, her father, whom she identified in court, raped her in their house located in Sitio
Concepcion, Indangan, Buhangin, Davao City. He warned her not to inform anyone about that
incident lest he would kill all of their family members. Because of fear that he would harm them,
she did not tell her mother what he did to her. Since that incident in 1992, she had been
repeatedly ravished by the accused on occasions when her mother was out of the house. In all
those instances, she repeatedly pleaded to him to stop abusing her, but her pleas only fell on
deaf ears. 5
Sherilyn further testified that in the evening of January 20, 1996, when she was 14
years old, she was sleeping in the sala of their house together with her brothers. At that time, her
mother was attending a birthday party in her sister's place about 16 kilometers away. Sherilyn
was roused from her sleep by the accused, telling her to transfer to the master's bedroom. When
she asked why, he replied that he would do something to her. Inside the room, he instructed her
to undress and lie down. He then placed himself on top of her, kissed her private parts, and
inserted his organ into her vagina. Sherilyn felt extreme pain in her vagina while he was raping
her. But she could not resist for fear he would kill her. 6
According to Erlinda Lima, Sherilyn's mother, at around 10:00 in the evening of the
same date, she arrived home and noticed that the gate of the house was locked from inside. She
then entered the gate of her brother-in-law, which was beside their house, and proceeded to her
house. When she entered the master's bedroom, she was surprised to find Sherilyn sleeping on
the bed. She approached her daughter, removed the blanket and saw her totally naked. Erlinda
told her to dress up because they were attending her nephew's birthday party. At that moment,
the accused went out to open the gate. When he returned, Erlinda did not let him notice her
suspicion. On their way to the house of Erlinda's sister, Sherilyn cried as she confided to her
mother that the accused raped her. She also told her mother that when she was ten, or four
years earlier, she was already ravished by her father. Thereupon, Erlinda brought Sherilyn to the
police station and reported the rape incidents.
In the course of her testimony, Erlinda also identified and confirmed the Certificate of
Live Birth (Exhibit "B") of her daughter and further testified that she is legally married to accused
Gregorio Lima. 7
Meanwhile, at midnight of that same day, January 20, 1996, SPO2 Ricardo Arcilla and
several policemen, together, with Sherilyn and her mother, proceeded to the house of accused.
SPO2 Arcilla invited him to go with them to the police station, but the latter resisted. Forthwith,
Arcilla asked a fellow policeman to handcuff the accused and brought him to the police station. 8
Thereafter, Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma, Medico-legal Officer of the Davao City Health
Office, physically examined Sherilyn and found "old healed deep lacerations at 3 and 8 o'clock
positions" in her hymen. He also observed that her "hymenal orifice . . . admits a tube 3.0 in
diameter." He estimated that the lacerations could be more than four (4) months old, or possibly
more than three (3) years old. He also found spermatozoa in her vaginal canal. These findings
are reflected in the Medical Certificate he issued on January 22, 1996. 9
The accused pleaded guilty to the charges. He testified that on January 21, 1996, the
police went to his house and invited him to the police station for investigation regarding the rape
incident. He then extended his two arms to be handcuffed showing that he voluntarily
surrendered. 10 He already knew that his wife Erlinda and daughter Sherilyn would go to the
police station to have him arrested. He declared that her daughter "agreed" to what he had done
to her "because she used to get money from my wallet, (so) she cannot refuse anymore." When
asked why he raped his daughter, he answered, "Because at times that I am drunk, I lost my
composure and Sherilyn used to lay down inside my room." He also admitted having raped her
when she was 10 years old. 11
The defense rested its case with the prayer that the "voluntary plea of guilty and
voluntary surrender" be appreciated as mitigating circumstances so as to reduce the penalty to
be imposed upon the accused. 12
On November 29, 1996, the trial court rendered a Joint Judgment, 13 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
that in Crim. Case No. 36,380-96, he shall be sentenced to death and that his plea of guilty shall
not in any way affect or reduce the penalty.
The records of the proceedings during the rearraignment of appellant show how he
entered his plea of guilty, thus:
"ATTY ARIQUEZ:
For the accused. We would like to inform the Honorable Court that the
accused intend to withdraw his plea of not guilty to both
charges and instead enters a plea of guilty to both charges.
COURT:

"Accordingly, finding the evidence of the prosecution more than Does he understand the consequences of this?
sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused Gregorio Lima Y Silpa beyond
ATTY. ARIQUEZ:
reasonable doubt of the offense charged for rape under Criminal Case
No. 36, 517-96, said accused is sentenced to suffer an indivisible penalty Yes, your Honor.
of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Art. 335, par. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, together with all the accessory penalty attached therewith in COURT:
accordance with law.
Alright, re-arraign the accused.
"In Criminal Case No. 36,380-96, finding the evidence of the
prosecution, notwithstanding the plea of guilty of the accused voluntarily COURT INTERPRETER:
entered, more than sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of accused, pursuant to Republic Act 7659, Sec. 11 thereof, sub- Reading both informations to accused:
paragraph 7, accused Gregorio Lima y Silpa is sentenced to suffer the
ACCUSED:
supreme penalty of death by electrocution pursuant to sec. 24 of R.A.
7659 in the manner therein provided, subject to such other method of GUILTY.
carrying out his sentence as may be provided for by law, under existing
procedure or may be regulated through other means such as lethal COURT:
injection to be executed in the manner and procedure therein provided.
In these two informations against you, you understand the extent and
"Moreover, pursuant to Art. 100, in relation to Art. 104 of the implication of your plea of guilty?
Revised Penal Code, governing civil indemnity, accused is furthermore
ordered to indemnify complainant Sherilyn Lima. . . the amount of ACCUSED:
P30,000.00 by way of moral damages of all the ignominy and sufferings
she incurred out of accused demonic act of sexually abusing his own I know, your Honor because I committed a mistake.
daughter.
COURT:
". . ." (Italics supplied)
Were these matters explained and fully understood by you upon
In this appeal, appellant asserts, as his lone assignment of error, that "the trial court assistance by your counsel?
gravely erred in convicting (him) on an improvident plea of guilty and sentencing him to
suffer reclusion perpetua (in Criminal Case No. 36,517-96) and the supreme penalty of death (in ACCUSED:
Criminal Case No. 36,380-96)." 14 Yes, I was advised by my lawyer and I understand what he explained to
Appellant argues, in essence, that his plea in both cases was "improvident, fatally me, very clearly.
defective and void" because the trial court failed to observe the mandatory provisions of Sec. 3, COURT:
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides —
I would like to explain to you and understand, that upon your plea of
"Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of guilty on the two offenses, very serious offenses, in fact, capital
evidence — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the offenses, you may be sentenced to life or death penalty, you
court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full understand that?
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The ACCUSED:
accused may also present evidence in his behalf."
Whatever will be the judgment I will gladly accept it Your Honor.
Appellant claims that nothing on record shows that: a) he understood the two (2)
separate charges against him; and b) he was made to understand and was specifically warned COURT:
 The court is explaining to you the consequences now, did you
understand the explanation given to you by the court?
ACCUSED:
I understand your Honor.
COURT:
Do you still insist that you plead guilty in these two offenses just read to
you?
ACCUSED:
Yes, I will accept it.
COURT:
Were you forced or intimidated or unduly influenced by anybody in your
plea of guilty in these two offenses?
ACCUSED:
No one has forced me to admit the two charges, it is voluntary on my
part.
COURT:
In other words, despite the explanation of the court and your lawyer, it is
voluntary on your part that you will plead guilty to the two
offenses?
ACCUSED:
It is my voluntary plea of guilty in these two cases.
COURT:
The court is convinced on the voluntariness of plea of guilty of accused
in both cases, but considering the matter of these charges
against the accused, capital offenses, and pursuant to the
ruling of the Supreme Court, despite his plea of guilty, the
prosecution will still present its evidence against the accused,
and the accused, if the defense decides to present, the court
will receive his evidence, despite his plea of guilty." 15
Appellant's theory does not convince us.
There is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter
of a proper "searching inquiry" as required by the aforecited rule. 16 It is incumbent upon a trial
judge to ascertain and be totally convinced that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and its
consequences fully comprehended by the accused.
In the present case, to fully determine whether such voluntariness and comprehension
attended appellant's plea of guilty, his whole testimony must be taken into account and be read
together with his statements made during the rearraignment proceedings. As narrated earlier,
after the prosecution rested its case, appellant admitted that he sexually abused her daughter
Sherilyn because of the influence of wine which made him lost his composure; and that at the
time he slept with Sherilyn in 1992, she was 10 years old. 17 This admission is significant since
appellant furnished and explained to the trial court the missing details of why he committed the
offenses charged. Certainly, his explanation is an earmark of voluntariness of his plea of guilty
and a clear comprehension of the consequences thereof.
Moreover, as noted earlier, the defense, after presenting the testimony of the accused,
earnestly prayed before the trial court that his "voluntary plea of guilty" be taken into account as
a mitigating circumstance in reducing his penalty. By invoking such plea of guilty, the appellant
has completely demolished his argument that his plea was improvidently made.
In any case, contrary to appellant's assertion, he was convicted by the trial court, not
on the basis of his plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
As held by this Court in People vs. Lakindanum, 18 People vs. Nismal, 19 People vs.
Petalcorin, 20 and People vs. Tahop, 21 convictions based on pleas of guilty to capital offenses
have been set aside because of improvidence of the plea, but only when such plea is the sole
basis of the judgment. Where, as here, the trial court relied solely on the prosecution's sufficient
and convincing evidence to convict the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, not on his guilty
plea, the same must be sustained. 22 As the trial court aptly stated in its appealed decision of
November 29, 1996:
"Notwithstanding, the plea of guilty of accused and his open
confession of his understanding as to its legal import and consequences,
the court, aware of his rights and prevailing jurisprudence decided by the
Supreme Court en banc in the case of People of the Philippines vs.
Alberto Diaz (G.R. No. 119073, March 13, 1996) and the case of People
vs. Rolly Albert y Oliver (G.R. No. 114001, promulgated on December 11,
1995), required the prosecution to present its evidence against the
accused . . . ."
It bears stressing that four credible witnesses were presented by the prosecution who
were extensively cross-examined by appellant's counsel. The victim, Sherilyn, herself gave a
clear, positive and straightforward account of how she was sexually assaulted by appellant. The
three other witnesses strongly corroborated her testimony which established beyond reasonable
doubt appellant's guilt. But to be sure, the victim's testimony is sufficient to establish the crimes
charged, 23 thus:
"Q: How old are you now Sherilyn Lima?
A: 15 years old.
Q: Do you have a birth certificate to prove your age?
A: Yes, I have.
Q: I am showing to you a birth certificate, marked Exh. "A", is this the
same birth certificate?
A: Yes.
Q: And you were born on October 4, 1981, you can confirm that?
A: Yes.
Q: Your father is Gregorio Lima?
A: Yes.
Q: Is this the Gregorio Lima accused in this case?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, on January 20, 1996, where were you Sherilyn?
A: In our house.
Q: Who were your companion in your house?
A: My brother.
Q: And aside from your brother, who else?
A: My father.
Q: And where was your mother at that time?
A: She was in the house of my auntie attending a party.
Q: At that time on January 20, 1996, at that night while your mother was
not in your house attending party, where did you sleep?
A: In the sala.
Q: Of your house?
A: Yes.
Q: Who were your supposed companion in sleeping in your sala?
A: My brother.
Q: How about your father, where was he slept that night?
A: In his room.
Q: Is that the room of your father and mother?
A: Yes.
Q: While you were sleeping in the sala on Jan. 20, 1996, tell the court
Sherilyn what did your father do, if any?
A: He woke me up.
Q: Why did your father wake you up?
A: He wanted me to go to his room.
Q: What was your reaction to that, when your father asked you to go to
his room?
A: I was surprised why he wanted me to go inside his room.
Q: What did you tell your father when he told you to go to his room?
A: I asked him why he was going to bring me to his room.
Q: What was the answer of your father?
A: According to him, he wanted me to sleep in his room. He wanted to do
something to me.
Q: Did you go with your father to the room?
A: Yes.
Q: And while in the room, what did your father tell you, if any?
A: He told me to undress.
Q: What was your reaction when you were told by your father to undress?
A: I was surprised.
Q: Precisely. Aside from being surprised, what did your father tell you?
A: Just to undress myself.
Q: When you were told to undress, what happened next?
A: He had me lie down.
Q: Did you comply with his instruction?
A: Yes.
Q: When you lied down, what happened?
A: He molested me.
Q: Sherilyn, how did your father molest you?
A: He raped me.
Q: Please describe to the Hon. Court, how did your father rape you?
A: He placed himself on top of me.
Q: What happened when he was on top of you?
A: He kissed my private parts.
Q: Aside from kissing your private parts, what happened next?
A: He did something to my private parts.
Q: Please specify that something he did on your private part?
A: He inserted his organ to my private part.
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
Please make it on record, that the witness is crying.
Q: How did you know that the private part of your father was inserted in
your vagina?
A: Because I was awake when he did that to me.
Q: Aside from awake, what did you feel when his organ was inserted in
your vagina?
A: I feel great pain.
Q: More or less, how long this so-called sexual molestation made by your
father on the evening of January 20, 1996?
A: I cannot estimate, how long was that.
Q: Sherilyn while your father was doing the act on January 20, 1996, why
did you not resist?
A: Because he will kill me.
Q: Why, did he hold you?
A: He held my hands. Q: I have here a medical certificate. Is this the same medical certificate
issued to you by Dr. Ledesma?
Q: Prior to January 20, 1996, do you recall what your father has been
doing to you long before January 20, 1996? A: Yes." 24

A: He molested me. It is worthy to note that Sherilyn cried while testifying. Such actuation, undoubtedly,
demonstrates her sincerity, spontaneity and truthfulness of what she was narrating. 25
Q: That was sometime in 1992?
In a plethora of cases, we have held that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because
A: Yes. it is generally unwitnessed and very often, only the victim is left to testify for herself. Fortunately
for the victim here, her testimony is reinforced by the testimonies of two other witnesses who
Q: Why did you not report the matter to your mother? were extensively cross-examined.
A: Because if I reveal the matter, he will kill all of us. Sherilyn's mother, Erlinda Lima, testified as follows: 26
Q: How often did your father do this to you in 1992? "Q: You said you went home at 10:00 p.m. Please tell us why you went
home at 10:00 p.m.?
A: Many times.
A: Because it was the birthday of my nephew and this nephew of mine
Q: Where?
wanted that my children will also attend the birthday, so that I
A: In the house. went home to get my children.

Q: At that time, how old are you in 1992, when he started molesting you? xxx xxx xxx
Q: Where did you proceed when you entered the house?
A: 10 years old.
A: When I reached the house, I knock and the one who opened the door
Q: Why is it that it was only in 1996 that you have the courage to tell your
was my son?
mother about it?
Q: Where did you proceed?
A: I was afraid because my mother might be harmed.
A: When I entered the house, I cannot find my daughter. So I proceeded
Q: In that evening of January 20, 1996, do you recall if your mother woke
to the room of my husband to look for my daughter.
you up when she returned from your Auntie from Lanang?
Q: What did you notice, if any?
A: Yes.
A: I was surprised because I saw my daughter already sleeping beside
Q: What was your physical appearance at that time when your mother
the bed where my husband sleep, because at that time, my
woke you up?
husband went out to open the gate. I was surprised, I
A: I was sleeping. approached her and took off the blanket and she was already
naked.
Q: Aside from sleeping, were you dressed?
Q: Totally naked?
A: I was naked.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did your mother bring you?
Q: To that situation, what did you tell your daughter?
A: To the birthday party of my cousin.
A: She was sleeping, so I have to wake her up because we were invited
Q: What transportation did you take in going there? by my sister for the birthday.

A: The car of my auntie. Q: While at that moment, where was your husband?

Q: On the same evening, you reported the incident to the Buhangin A: In the house.
Police Station?
Q: When you instructed your daughter to dress up, where was your
A: Yes. husband?

Q: On January 22, 1996, do you recall if you submitted yourself for A: He was still opening the gate.
examination?
Q: Were you able to leave the house?
A: Yes.
A: Yes, sir.
 Q: What was the reaction of your husband, if any?
A: Nothing. There was no reaction because I told him that we were
attending the party of my nephew. We did not let him notice
that we have suspicion.
Q: In going to the place of your sister, what transportation did you take?
A: The vehicle of my sister.
Q: And while in the vehicle of your sister going to your sister's house in
Lanang, do you have a conversation with your daughter?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what did your daughter tell the court, that your daughter confided
also that prior to January 20, 1996, she was also abused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Upon learning of the incident on that evening, where did you bring
your daughter?
A: We proceeded to the Buhangin Police Station.
Q: What did you do in the Buhangin Police Station?
A: We reported what her father had done to her.
Q: Was your report recorded in the log book?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And do you know what action was taken by the police based on your
report?
A: They immediately arrested my husband.
Q: Do you know if your daughter was subjected to medical examination
by the City Health Office?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know that?
A: Because I was the one who brought her to Dr. Ledesma."
Also, Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma of the Davao City Health Office testified, thus: 27
"Q: As medico-legal officer of the Davao City Health Office, do you recall
having attended to the patient named Sherilyn Lima?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Sometime in 1996?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, it appears in your findings, that I call your attention to the genital
examination you conducted wherein you said among others
that there was healed, deep laceration on the private parts of
patient, what was your basis in that finding of yours?
A: When I examined the genital of the patient, particularly the hymen, I
saw old healed deep laceration at 3:00 and 8:00 o'clock
position, if it is compared to a clock, wherein the lacerations
were found at 3:00 and 8:00 o'clock positions.
Q: And what does that imply or indicate, Doctor?
A: Meaning to say that these lacerations when I saw and examined the
victim more than four months.
Q: And in your examination of the patient, have you found out what would
have caused such lacerations?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And finally you said, the patient was positive for spermatozoa, what do
you mean by that, Doctor?
A: With vaginal discharges were taken smear, there was the presence of
sperm cells.
Q: And when you said sperm cells, from male organ?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Finally, in your opinion, this old healed laceration, you found on the
private parts of patient, how long more or less were those
lacerations exist, old healed lacerations?
A: More than 4 months, when I saw patient, it could be more than one
year, more than 3 years."
The foregoing testimonies effectively corroborated Sherilyn's account.
Furthermore, the trial court found that the prosecution's witnesses were telling the
truth. We have consistently held that the findings of fact of the trial judge who tried the case and
heard the witnesses should not be disturbed on appeal and should be given considerable weight
and respect, especially on the credibility of the witnesses, since he was in a better position to
decide the question, having heard and observed the demeanor, attitude, conduct and
deportment of witnesses. 28
Based on the prosecution's evidence, and as correctly found by the trial court, the
crimes charged have been sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt. Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, provides:
"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
 xxx xxx xxx
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following circumstances:
"1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim. (Italics supplied)
xxx xxx xxx"
The prosecution has sufficiently established that in Criminal Case No. 36,517-96, the
victim was only ten years old when she was raped by her father. However, the death penalty
cannot be imposed upon the appellant because the crime was committed in 1992 when R.A.
7659 was not yet in effect. 29 As regards Criminal Case No. 36,380-96, it was proven that the
victim was only 14 years old when she was raped by her father in 1996. Thus, the penalty of
death was correctly meted out by the trial court.
The mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty cannot be appreciated in his favor
because reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties imposed in their entirety
regardless of any mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime. 30
Finally, we rectify the error committed by the trial court with respect to the award of
damages to the victim. The award of P30,000.00 as moral damages is not in line with the
prevailing jurisprudence, 31 fixing the amount at P50,000.00 for each count of rape. In addition,
the amount of P50,000.00 should be awarded to her as indemnity ex delicto in Criminal Case
No. 36,517-96 since the penalty is only reclusion perpetua; while in Criminal Case No. 36,380-
96 where the penalty imposed is death, the indemnity ex delicto for the victim should be in the
amount of P75,000.00. 32 Since the fact of relationship between the offender and the victim is
an aggravating circumstance, she is entitled to the award of exemplary damages of P25,000.00
for each count of rape. 33 In People vs. Catubig, 34 this Court clarified that an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Joint Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 36,517-96 and
36,380-96 is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION in the sense that appellant Gregorio S. Lima is
ordered to PAY the victim, Sherilyn Lima, P50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto in Criminal Case
No. 36,517-96, and P75,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 36,380-96; and, in each case, P50,000.00
as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against the appellant.
Relative to Criminal Case No. 36,380-96 wherein we affirm the imposition of death
penalty upon the appellant, three (3) members of the Court, although maintaining their
adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray that R.A. 7659, insofar
as it prescribes the penalty of death, is unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling of the
majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be accordingly imposed.
In consonance with Sec. 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the record of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for the possible exercise of his pardoning power. TcCSIa
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, De
Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez and Corona, JJ., concur.
Melo, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., are on official leave.
||| (People v. Lima y Silpa, G.R. No. 128289, [April 23, 2002], 431 PHIL 195-217)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 164258. August 22, 2012.]
ESTRELLA TAGLAY, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MARIVIC
TRABAJO DARAY and LOVERIE PALACAY, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos
City, Branch 18, dated March 9, 2004 and June 7, 2004, in Criminal Case No. FC-71-02. The
March 9, 2004 Order denied herein petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, while the June 7, 2004 Order
denied her Motion for Reconsideration.
The instant petition arose from a Criminal Complaint 2 for Qualified Trespass to
Dwelling filed by private respondent against herein petitioner with the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Sta. Maria-Malita-Don Marcelino, Davao del Sur on June 19, 2001.
Finding probable cause to indict petitioner, the Public Prosecutor assigned to handle
the case filed an Information 3 against her on November 19, 2001. The Information reads as
follows:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses ESTRELLA TAGLAY of
the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling as defined and penalized
under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as
follows:
That on June 2, 2001 at about 2:30 o'clock in the
afternoon at Tibangao, Malita, Davao del Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforesaid
accused, a private person and without any justifiable reason
and by means of violence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter into the dwelling of Loverie
Palacay without her consent and against her will and once
inside maltreated, boxed and choked her, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
Upon arraignment on June 7, 2002, petitioner pleaded not guilty. 5 Pre-trial
conference was set on August 13, 2002. EICScD
However, on August 15, 2002, the MCTC issued an Order, 6 to wit:
It appearing that private complainant Loverie Palacay was a
minor on June 2, 2001, the date of the incident, since she was born on
August 7, 1983, per Certification dated August 15, 2002 issued by
Municipal Registrar Josephine A. Marquez, this case, upon manifestation
of Prosecutor Perfecto P. Ordaneza and pursuant to Republic Act No.
 8369 and Circular 11-99, is hereby transferred to Branch 20, Regional
Trial Court, Digos City, for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, the case was transferred to the RTC of Digos City where petitioner was
brought to trial.
Witnesses were then presented by the prosecution. Prior to the presentation of the
final witness for the prosecution, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner contended that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case,
because the MCTC erroneously transferred the case to the RTC instead of dismissing it.
Petitioner also argued that the RTC's lack of jurisdiction was further aggravated when she was
not arraigned before the RTC.
On March 9, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order 7 ruling that it acquired
jurisdiction over the case when it received the records of the case as a consequence of the
transfer effected by the MCTC; that the transfer of the case from the MCTC is authorized
under Administrative Matter No. 99-1-13-SC and Circular No. 11-99; that there is no doubt that
the offended party is a minor and, thus, the case falls within the original jurisdiction of Family
Courts pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369. The RTC also held that even granting that
there was defect or irregularity in the procedure because petitioner was not arraigned before the
RTC, such defect was fully cured when petitioner's counsel entered into trial without objecting
that his client had not yet been arraigned. Furthermore, the RTC noted that petitioner's counsel
has cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution. Consequently, the RTC denied
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC via
its Order 8 dated June 7, 2004.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
Petitioner raises two main grounds.
First, petitioner contends that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
because Circular No. 11-99, which authorizes the transfer of Family Courts cases filed with first-
level courts to the RTCs, is applicable only to cases which were filed prior to the effectivity of the
said Circular on March 1, 1999. Petitioner argues that all Family Courts cases filed with first-level
courts after the effectivity of the said Circular can no longer be transferred to the RTC; instead
they should be dismissed. Considering that the Information in the instant case was filed with the
MCTC on November 19, 2001, petitioner avers that the MCTC should have dismissed the case
instead of ordering its transfer to the RTC.
Second, petitioner insists that she should have been arraigned anew before the RTC
and that her arraignment before the MCTC does not count because the proceedings conducted
therein were void.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that, generally, a direct recourse to this Court in
a petition for certiorari is highly improper for it violates the established policy of strict observance
of the judicial hierarchy of courts. 9 While this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs
and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained
freedom of choice as to which court the application for the writ will be directed. 10 There is after
all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals and should also
serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. 11 This Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. 12 A direct invocation of
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs is allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. 13
However, it is also settled that this Court has full discretionary power to take
cognizance of a petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance
of the issues raised, so warrant. 14 Under the present circumstances, the Court will take
cognizance of this case as an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts, considering that
the Information against petitioner was filed way back in November 2001. 15 Any further delay in
the resolution of the instant petition will be prejudicial to petitioner. Moreover, the principle may
be relaxed when pure questions of law are raised as in this case. 16
Now, on the merits of the petition. HCEcAa
It is significant to point out, at this juncture, the well-entrenched doctrine that the
jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject matter of an action is conferred by law. 17Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. 18 The pertinent law in the instant case is R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the Family
Courts Act of 1997, which took effect on November 23, 1997. 19 Section 5 (a) of R.A.
8369 clearly provides that Family Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases
where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9)
years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission
of the offense. In the present case, there is no dispute that at the time of the commission of the
alleged offense on June 2, 2001, private respondent, who is also the private complainant, was a
minor. Hence, the case falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts.
Anent the first issue raised, the Court agrees that the Resolution of this Court
in Administrative Matter No. 99-1-13-SC and Circular No. 11-99, issued pursuant thereto, is
applicable only to Family Courts cases which were filed with first-level courts prior to the
effectivity of the said Resolution on March 1, 1999. 20 This is evident in the language used by
the Court in the third "Whereas" clause of the subject Resolution wherein it was stated that
"pending the constitution and organization of the Family Courts and the designation of branches
of the Regional Trial Courts as Family Courts in accordance with Section 17 (Transitory
Provisions) of R.A. 8369, there is a need to provide guidelines in the hearing and determination
of criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of Family Courts which have heretofore been filed
with first-level courts." The operative word, as correctly cited by petitioner, is "heretofore" which
means "before this" or "up to this time." 21 Moreover, Section 1 of the same Resolution directs
all first-level courts, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the subject Resolution, to take
an inventory of all criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Family Courts which were
filed with them (first-level courts), to prepare an appropriate inventory and to submit the same to
the Court Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator. Logic dictates that only
those cases which were filed prior to the issuance of the Resolution shall be included in the
inventory and, therefore, shall be subject to transfer by first-level courts to the appropriate RTCs.
The necessary implication then is that all cases filed with first-level courts after the effectivity of
the Resolution on March 1, 1999 should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In the present case,
the Information was filed against petitioner on November 19, 2001. Thus, the MCTC is already
bereft of any authority to transfer the case to the RTC as the same no longer falls under the
coverage of Circular No. 11-99. What the MCTC should have done was to dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction.
More importantly, what justifies the dismissal of the case is that the Information filed
with the MCTC cannot be used as a basis for the valid indictment of petitioner before the RTC
acting as a Family Court, because there was no allegation therein of private complainant's
minority. To proceed to trial before the RTC on the basis of the Information filed with the MCTC
would be an exercise in futility as there is an infirmity in the Information constituting a
jurisdictional defect which cannot be cured. There is no point in proceeding under a defective
Information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction. 22 The Information filed with the
MCTC must thus first be amended and thereafter filed with the RTC. Pending the filing of such
Information, the RTC has not yet acquired jurisdiction because while a court may have
jurisdiction over the subject matter, it does not acquire jurisdiction over the case itself until its
jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of a valid Information. 23
The Court also agrees with petitioner in her contention in the second issue raised that
she should have been arraigned by the RTC.
It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However, the MCTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case. It is settled that the proceedings before a
court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void. 24 Considering that
the MCTC has no jurisdiction, all the proceedings conducted therein, including petitioner's
arraignment, are null and void. Thus, the need for petitioner's arraignment on the basis of a valid
Information filed with the RTC. ADcEST
It is also true that petitioner's counsel participated in the proceedings held before the
RTC without objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned. However, it is wrong for the
RTC to rely on the case of People v. Cabale, 25 because the accused therein was in fact
arraigned, although the same was made only after the case was submitted for decision. In the
similar cases of People v. Atienza and Closa 26 and People v. Pangilinan, 27 the accused in the
said cases were also belatedly arraigned. The Court, in these three cases, held that the active
participation of the counsels of the accused, as well as their opportunity to cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses during trial without objecting on the ground that their clients had not yet
been arraigned, had the effect of curing the defect in the belated arraignment. Moreover, the
accused in these cases did not object when they were belatedly arraigned. The same, however,
cannot be said in the instant case. There is no arraignment at all before the RTC. On the other
hand, the arraignment conducted by the MCTC is null and void. Thus, there is nothing to be
cured. Petitioner's counsel also timely raised before the RTC the fact that her client, herein
petitioner, was not arraigned.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of
an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 28The
purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of
his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of
why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him. 29 As an indispensable
requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside
peremptorily. 30 Otherwise, absence of arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings
before the trial court. 31
As a final note, it may not be amiss to stress that at all stages of the proceedings
leading to his trial and conviction, the accused must be charged and tried according to the
procedure prescribed by law and marked by observance of the rights given to him by
the Constitution. 32 In the same way that the reading of the Information to the accused during
arraignment is not a useless formality, so is the validity of the information being read not an idle
ceremony. 33
Criminal due process requires that the accused must be proceeded against under the
orderly processes of law. 34 In all criminal cases, the judge should follow the step-by-step
procedure required by the Rules. 35 The reason for this is to assure that the State makes no
mistake in taking the life or liberty except that of the guilty. 36
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Digos City, Branch 18, dated March 9, 2004 and June 7, 2004,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered dismissing the Information in Criminal
Case No. FC-71-02, without prejudice to refiling the same in the proper court.
SO ORDERED. AIHECa
Velasco, Jr., Abad, Mendoza and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
||| (Taglay v. Daray, G.R. No. 164258, [August 22, 2012], 693 PHIL 45-58)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 172707. October 1, 2013.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN
y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG
DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL,
MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL, NORA EVAD y MULOK, THIAN
PERPENIAN y RAFON a.k.a LARINA PERPENIAN and JOHN
DOES, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision 1 dated 28 June 2005 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863, which affirmed with modification the
Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated 16 October 1998,
finding accused-appellants Halil Gambao y Esmail, Eddie Karim y Uso, Edwin Dukilman y
Suboh, Tony Abao y Sula, Raul Udal y Kagui, Teng Mandao y Haron, Theng Dilangalen y
Nanding, Jaman Macalinbol y Katol, Monette Ronas y Ampil, Nora Evad y Mulok and Thian
Perpenian y Rafon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom as defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7659.
The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were charged under the
criminal information 3 which reads:
Criminal Case No. 98-0928
For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659
That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 o'clock in the evening
at No. 118 FB Harrison Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named-accused conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did
then and there by force and intimidation, and the use of high powered
firearms, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and
deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty against her will for the purpose of
extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a
condition for her release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P400,000.00) TO THE DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE OF Lucia L.
Chan in the said amount and such other amounts as may be awarded to
her under the provisions of the Civil Code. DaECST
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case: 4
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish
deliveries, which were shipped by her suppliers from the provinces. Sometime in the afternoon
of 11 August 1998, two persons, one of whom was identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen),
went to Chan's residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport
alleged to have been mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to
locate said passport, the two left. The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another
companion identified as Tony Abao (Abao), returned looking for Chan but were told that she was
out. When the two returned in the afternoon, Chan informed them that the fish delivery had yet to
arrive. Chan offered instead to accompany them to the airport to retrieve the box of fish allegedly
containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao declined and told Chan that they would be back
later that evening. 5
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned to
Chan's residence that evening. Chan's houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by the
stairs. 6 Thereat, the unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chan's son, Levy
Chan (Levy), and the house companions. 7 As the unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her
son Levy tried to stop the man by grabbing his mother's feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen pointed his
gun at Levy's head forcing the latter to release his grip on Chan's feet. 8 Levy thereafter
proceeded to the Pasay Police Headquarters to report the incident. 9
Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van. 10 After travelling for about two
hours, the group stopped at a certain house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman)
warned Chan not to shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth. Chan was ordered to go with
two women, 11 later identified in court by Chan as appellants Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora
Evad (Evad). 12 Chan was brought inside a house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded
by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol). 13Ronas and Evad threatened
Chan that she would be killed unless she paid 20 Million Pesos. 14 CDAEHS
On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the
"Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped and the group
alighted. Chan was brought to a room on the second floor of the house. Inside the room were
three persons whom Chan identified in court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and
Halil Gambao (Gambao). 15 Another woman, later identified as Thian Perpenian (Perpenian),
arrived. 16 At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, a man who was later identified as Teng Mandao
(Mandao), entered the room with a handgun and asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa
pulis?" 17 Another man, whom Chan identified in court as Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao
out of the room. Karim informed Chan that he was sent by their boss to ask her how much
money she has. 18 Chan was instructed to talk to her son through a cell phone and she gave
instructions to her son to get the P75,000.00 she kept in her cabinet. 19 The group then talked to
Chan's son and negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his mother's release. It was
agreed upon that Levy was to deliver P400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia
Avenue. 20
Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao (Inspector
Mancao), who were assigned at the Pasay City area to conduct the investigation regarding the
kidnapping, were informed that the abductors called and demanded for ransom in exchange for
Chan's release. 21 During their surveillance the following day, Inspectors Ouano and Mancao
observed a Red Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the victim's residence. The
inspectors observed that the occupants of the taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of the
house. The inspectors and their team tailed the taxicab until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it
entered the Elizabeth Resort and stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the
team saw in the cottage was the victim, they sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to conduct a rescue operation. 22
On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received information
that the abductors acceded to a P400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking"
Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon learning of the information, the team
immediately and strategically positioned themselves around the vicinity of the restaurant. At
about 2:00 am, a light blue "Tamaraw FX" van with 4 people on board arrived. The four took the
ransom money and headed towards the South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance team
successfully intercepted the van and arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as Karim,
Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The team was also able to recover the P400,000.00
ransom. 23 SDEHIa
At about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, the police team assaulted
Cottage No. 1, resulting in the safe rescue of Chan and the apprehension of seven of her
abductors, later identified in court as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad
and Ronas. 24
During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son testified, Karim
manifested his desire to change his earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The presiding judge
then explained the consequences of a change of plea, stating: "It would mean the moment you
withdraw your previous pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after
receiving evidence, as in fact it has received the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will
[outrightly] sentence you to the penalty provided by law after the prosecution shall have finished
the presentation of its evidence. Now that I have explained to you the consequences of your
entering a plea of guilty, are you still desirous of entering a plea of 'guilty'?" Eddie Karim
answered, "Yes." 25 On hearing this clarification, the other appellants likewise manifested,
through their counsel who had earlier conferred with them and explained to each of them the
consequences of a change of plea, their desire to change the pleas they entered. The trial court
separately asked each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they understood the consequence of changing their pleas. All of
them answered in the affirmative. 26Similarly, Dukilman manifested his desire to change his plea
and assured the trial court that he understood the consequences of such change of
plea. 27 Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty, 28 the
trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence, which it did.
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim,
Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of
Kidnapping for Ransom. Hence, they appealed to the CA.
In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modifications the
decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-
appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN
DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI,
TENG MANDAO y HARON, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD
y MULOK guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom
defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them the supreme
penalty of death is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that each of them
is ordered to pay jointly and severally the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of moral damages. CAaEDH
It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y
RAFON was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime,
she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 29
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-
SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of
the records.
In a Resolution 30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs. The issues raised by the accused-appellants in their respective briefs,
supplemental briefs and manifestations will be discussed collectively.
Insufficiency of Evidence
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this Court believe that the
witness, Chan, was not able to positively identify them because of her failing eyesight due to old
age.
 This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial court and the CA found further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or
Chan's testimony credible and straightforward. During her testimony, she positively identified the impropriety of the plea. 40
accused-appellants. If she had not met them before, she could not have positively identified
them in open court. In fact, the participation of these accused-appellants was further established Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was
through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses. based on a free and informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the
plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. This Court finds no cogent
Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of credibility of witnesses reason for deviating from the guidelines provided by jurisprudence 41 and thus, adopts the
is primarily for the trial court to determine. For this reason, its observations and conclusions are same:
accorded great respect on appeal. They are conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted
with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial
influence has not been considered. 31 In People v. Tañedo, 32 this Court had occasion to judge must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have held that the following
reiterate the ruling that findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses guidelines should be observed:
command great respect since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they
testified in court. 33 It can be observed that the briefs submitted by the accused-appellants are 1. Ascertain from the accused himself
replete with generalities and wanting in relevant particulars. It is for this reason that we are
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the
giving full credence to the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witness
law;
Chan. CTaSEI
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent
Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her conviction is insufficient. We also
counsel during the custodial and preliminary
find her argument bereft of merit.
investigations; and
The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as one of the
(c) under what conditions he was detained and
seven people apprehended when they conducted the rescue operation at around 5:00 o'clock in
interrogated during the investigations. This is
the morning of 14 August 1998, 34 and the positive identification of Perpenian by Chan
intended to rule out the possibility that the accused
constituted adequate evidence working against her defense of denial.
has been coerced or placed under a state of
Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-appellants proffered was duress either by actual threats of physical harm
denial. It is established jurisprudence that denial cannot prevail over the witnesses' positive coming from malevolent quarters or simply
identification of the accused-appellants, more so where the defense did not present convincing because of the judge's intimidating
evidence that it was physically impossible for them to have been present at the crime scene at robes. SECAHa
the time of the commission of the crime. 35
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether
The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the relevant testimonies he had conferred with, and completely explained to,
of witnesses and the absence of evidence other than mere denial proffered by the defense lead the accused the meaning and consequences of a
this Court to give due weight to the findings of the lower courts. plea of guilty.

Improvident Plea 3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused,
such as his age, socio-economic status, and
As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, educational background, which may serve as a
the penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death. A review of the records 36 shows that on 7 trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
October 1998, the accused-appellants withdrew their plea of "not guilty" and were re-arraigned. informed plea of guilty.
They subsequently entered pleas of "guilty" to the crime of kidnapping for ransom, a capital
offense. This Court, in People v. Oden, 37 laid down the duties of the trial court when the 4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The trial court is mandated: nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty
that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently,
(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient
comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt, treatment or upon bad advice or because of
promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter
(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It
precise degree of his culpability, and is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused
does not labor under these mistaken impressions
(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in
because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the
his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. 38 HAICcD
admission of authorship of the crime proper but also
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that
possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of increase punishment.
such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is
the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt
charged and fully explain to him the elements of the
before the court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the
crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of
meaning, significance and consequence of his plea. 39 Moreover, the requirement of taking
the court to do so would constitute a violation of his
 fundamental right to be informed of the precise
nature of the accusation against him and a denial of
his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language
known and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be
required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime
or furnish its missing details. cDTaSH
It is evident from the records 42 that the aforesaid rules have not been fully complied
with. The questions propounded by the trial court judge failed to ensure that accused-appellants
fully understood the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is readily apparent from the
records 43 that Karim had the mistaken assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the
imposable penalty and that both the judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that such plea
of guilt will not mitigate the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of theRevised Penal Code. Karim was
not warned by the trial court judge that in cases where the penalty is single and indivisible, like
death, the penalty is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial
court judge's seemingly annoyed statement that a conditional plea is not allowed, as provided
below, is inadequate:
Atty. Ferrer:
Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something before the trial.
For accused Eddie Karim we manifest and petition this court
that he be allowed to be re-arraigned Your Honor please,
considering that he will plead guilty as charged but the
imposable penalty is lowered, Your Honor.
Court:
You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the law says.
You plead guilty, no condition attached. Conditional plea is not
allowed.
Atty. Ferrer:
Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is already repenting.
Court:
Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there should
be no condition attached. We cannot make that condition and
dictate to the court the penalty. 44
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenian's, were improvidently made, this
Court will still not set aside the condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court judge's
shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on accused-appellants' culpability. EaCSHI
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and
the cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the
trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did in
this case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the
guilty plea but on evidence proving the commission of the offense charged. 45 The manner by
which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the
conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the
accused. 46
Contrary to accused-appellants' assertions, they were convicted by the trial court, not
on the basis of their plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the trial court. 47 The prosecution was able to
prove the guilt of the accused-appellants and their degrees of culpability beyond reasonable
doubt.
Degree of Culpability
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs that
conspiracy, insofar as they were concerned, was not convincingly established. Dukilman hinges
his argument on the fact that he was not one of those arrested during the rescue operation
based on the testimony of Inspector Ouano. 48 On the other hand, Ronas and Evad base their
argument on the fact that they had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom
money.
We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at the
cottage during the rescue operation, the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently
established that he was one of the four people apprehended when the police intercepted the
"Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols Tollgate. 49 Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector Ouano
sufficiently established that Ronas and Evad were two of those who were arrested during the
rescue operation. 50 This Court has held before that to be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not
even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy. 51 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals. 52 Moreover, Chan positively identified the accused-appellants and
placed all of them at the crime scenes. DcHSEa
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It has been a long
standing opinion of this Court that proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as
the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the
commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense. 53 The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common
purpose of the accused-appellants and how they were all united in its execution from beginning
to end. There were testimonies proving that (1) before the incident, two of the accused-
appellants kept coming back to the victim's house; (2) during the kidnapping, accused-appellants
changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the accused appellants were those present when
the ransom money was recovered and when the rescue operation was conducted.
Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao,
Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was established beyond reasonable doubt based on
the proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
In Perpenian's Supplemental Brief, 54 she directs this Court's attention to the
manifestation made by the prosecution regarding their disinterest in prosecuting, insofar as she
was concerned. 55 However, pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Judge
Mogul, 56 once the information is filed, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or
conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion of
the courts; more so in this case, where no Motion to Dismiss was filed by the prosecution.
The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave inconsistent answers and lied
several times under oath during the trial. 57 Perpenian lied about substantial details such as her
real name, age, address and the fact that she saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked
why she lied several times, Perpenian claimed she was scared to be included or identified with
the other accused-appellants. The lying and the fear of being identified with people whom she
knew had done wrong are indicative of discernment. She knew, therefore, that there was an
ongoing crime being committed at the resort while she was there. It is apparent that she was
fully aware of the consequences of the unlawful act. IESDCH
 As reflected in the records, 58 the prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient
evidence to hold her responsible as a principal. Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution
had was the testimony 59 of Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998 Perpenian entered the
room where the victim was detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding stories
unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-
principal, but rather only as an accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence 60 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18
of the Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely,
(1) that there be community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the
execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in
the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the
acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal liability.
Assuming arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was
inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she saw
Chan being guarded in the room. A rational person would have suspected something was wrong
and would have reported such incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet;
and to add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held before that being
present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed will make a person
responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed. 61 It should be noted that the accused-
appellant's presence and company were not indispensable and essential to the perpetration of
the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only liable as an accomplice. 62 Moreover, this Court is
guided by the ruling in People v. Clemente, et al., 63 where it was stressed that in case of doubt,
the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a
principal. TESDcA
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
considering the evidence presented by the prosecution, linking accused-appellants' participation
in the crime, no doubt can be entertained as to their guilt. The CA convicted the accused-
appellants of kidnapping for ransom and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death,
applying the provisions of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this Court finds
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals to the crime of kidnapping for
ransom. However, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, 64 we modify the penalty imposed by the trial
court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of Perpenian. Pursuant to
the passing of R.A. No. 9344, 65 a determination of whether she acted with or without
discernment is necessary. Considering that Perpenian acted with discernment when she was 17
years old at the time of the commission of the offense, her minority should be appreciated not as
an exempting circumstance, but as a privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344, 66 the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict
with the law shall still be applied even if he/she is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from the
aforesaid provision, because under Article 40 of R.A. No. 9344, 67 the suspension of sentence
can be availed of only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-
one (21) years. This leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce judgement. Perpenian is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Since this Court has ruled that death as utilized in Article 71 of theRevised Penal Code shall no
longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, 68 the
penalty imposed by law on accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping for
ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one degree lower than what the principals would
bear (Reclusion Perpetua). 69 Applying Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable
penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law for
accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the
penalty lower than that prescribed by law (Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty, which is one degree lower than the
maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range of Prision Correccional; and the
maximum penalty shall be within the minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent any aggravating
circumstance and there being one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court imposes the
indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum,
to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. DScTaC
As regards Perpenian's possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other training
facility in accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in People v. Jacinto 70that
the age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment is not
material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender
age. This Court, however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that
Perpenian's actual served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for her offense. For
such reason, she may be immediately released from detention.
We note that in the Order 71 dated 9 October 1998, the trial court admitted the
documentary evidence offered by the counsel for the defense proving that the real name of
Thian Perpenian is Larina Perpenian.
In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this case, he is relieved of all
personal and pecuniary penalties attendant to the crime, his death 72 having occurred before
rendition of final judgement. 73
There is prevailing jurisprudence, 74 on civil liabilities arising from the commission of
kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code. The persons convicted were held liable for P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity and damages, where,
as in this case, the penalty for the crime committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed
because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346: 75
1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have
suffered and thus needs no proof; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public
good. HDIATS
These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages where death is the
penalty warranted by the facts but is not imposable under present law.
The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros 76 is instructive on the
apportionment of civil liabilities among all the accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil
liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime
according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation.
Hence, each principal accused-appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of
indemnity and damages than Perpenian who was adjudged as only an accomplice.
Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation, all of them shall
be liable for the total amount of P300,000.00 divided among the principals who shall be liable for
P288,000.00 (or P32,000.00 each) and Perpenian who shall be liable for P12,000.00. This is
broken down into P10,666.67 civil indemnity, P10,666.67 moral damages and P10,666.67
exemplary damages for each principal; and P4,000.00 civil indemnity, P4,000.00 moral damages
and P4,000.00 exemplary damages for the lone accomplice.
 WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00863 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants
HALIL GAMBAOy ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO
y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y
KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole. Accused-appellant THIAN
PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellants are ordered to indemnify
the victim in the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages apportioned in the following manner: the principals to the
crime shall jointly and severally pay the victim the total amount of P288,000.00 while the
accomplice shall pay the victim P12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code on
several and subsidiary liability.
The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to immediately release THIAN
PERPENIAN A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN due to her having fully served the penalty imposed
on her, unless her further detention is warranted for any other lawful causes.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director
of the Correctional Institute for Women by personal service. The Director of the Correctional
Institute for Women shall submit to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the
decision, the action he has taken thereon.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo de-Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad,
Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., took no part.
Bersamin and Mendoza, JJ., are on official leave.
Villarama, Jr., J., is on sick leave.
||| (People v. Gambao y Esmail, G.R. No. 172707, [October 1, 2013], 718 PHIL 507-533)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 174056. February 27, 2007.]
[Formerly G.R. No. 138257]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
ROGELIO GUMIMBA y MORADANTE alias ROWING and RONTE
ABABO (acquitted), appellants.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
For review before the Court is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 26
April 2006, affirming with modification the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Ozamiz
City, Branch 15, 3 dated 10 March 1999, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape with homicide.
In an Information 4 dated 17 April 1997, appellant Rogelio Gumimba y Morandante
alias Rowing and co-accused Ronie Abapo (Abapo) were charged before the RTC, with the
crime of rape with homicide of an eight (8)-year old child, thus:
That on or about April 8, 1997, in Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, to wit: by then and there pinning down one
[AAA], 5 a minor, 8 years of age, and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her and as a result thereof she suffered 6-12 o'clock
lacerated wounds of [sic] the vagina as well as fatal stab wounds on the
different parts of her body and which were the direct cause of her death
thereafter.
CONTRARY to Article 335 in relation with Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code.
On 16 May 1997, appellant and Abapo both entered a plea of not guilty on
arraignment. 6 Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial with the prosecution first presenting two
witnesses: (1) Emelio Magallano, President of Purok I, Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz City; and (2)
Sofronio Arañas, a Civilian Volunteer Officer (CVO) of the same barangay.
Magallano and Arañas testified that at around 9 o'clock in the evening of 10 April
1997, appellant went to Magallano's home and confessed to him that he alone and by himself
raped and killed his (appellant's) niece, AAA, in Purok Pantaon, Ozamiz City. Subsequently,
Magallano accompanied appellant to the residence of Arañas where he reiterated his
confession. That same night, Magallano, Arañas, appellant and family members of the witnesses
proceeded to the home of Barangay Captain Santiago Acapulco, Jr. who conducted an
investigation. Appellant repeated his narration and confessed to the barangay captain that he
had raped and killed the victim, and that he was alone when he committed the crime. As a result
thereof, Acapulco, Jr., in the company of the others, brought appellant to the Ozamiz City Hall
and turned him over to the police authorities. 7
However, appellant manifested though counsel (before the court) at the following
hearing on 22 May 1997 that he would like to change his earlier plea of not guilty to a plea of
guilty. 8 The RTC ordered appellant's re-arraignment and the latter accordingly entered a plea of
guilty. 9 The court conducted an inquiry to ascertain the voluntariness of appellant's plea and his
full comprehension of the consequences thereof. Prosecution was likewise charged to establish
the guilt and degree of culpability of appellant. 10
In accordance with the court's directive, the prosecution continued with the
presentation of its evidence in chief. It presented Dr. Pedrita Rosauro, the physician who
conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim, and who testified that the victim was raped
before she was killed. The examination by Dr. Rosauro revealed that AAA sustained four (4)
stab wounds in front, two (2) stab wounds in her back and one (1) lacerated wound each on her
neck and on her middle upper extremity. Furthermore, she found 6 and 12 o'clock laceration
wounds on the external genital organ of the victim. 11
Before resting its case, the prosecution presented appellant as witness against his co-
accused Abapo. Appellant testified that he and Abapo raped and killed the victim. He likewise
explained that he had previously confessed to Magallano, Arañas and Acapulco that he alone
committed the crime in the hope that the parents of the victim, who were relatives of his, might
take pity on him. 12
 In his defense, Abapo testified that at the time the crime was allegedly committed, he
was with his mother and three (3) siblings at the Labo River, about two (2) kilometers away from
Barangay Pantaon, washing their clothes. 13 In support thereof, Abapo presented his mother
Virgencita Abapo, Elisa Carreon and Raymundo Orot, all of whom corroborated his alibi. 14 The
defense also presented witness Arañas who reiterated his earlier testimony that appellant
confessed to him that he alone was responsible for the raping and killing of the victim. 15 Finally,
Eugenio Bucog, a teacher at Capucao Elementary School, was presented to demonstrate
Abapo's good character when he was his student. 16
On 10 March 1999, the RTC promulgated its Decision. On the basis of appellant's plea
of guilty, the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged. Appellant
was sentenced to suffer the death penalty and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amounts of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the life of the victim, P30,000.00 as moral damages,
and costs. 17 On the other hand, the trial court acquitted Abapo on the ground that his guilt was
not established beyond reasonable doubt. Except for the lone testimony of appellant, the RTC
held that no other evidence was adduced to prove the participation of Abapo. Moreover, the
court a quo found that appellant's testimony implicating Abapo was not worthy of credence
coming as it did from a polluted source. 18
With the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on
automatic review. Pursuant to this Court's decision in People v. Mateo, 19 the case was
transferred to the Court of Appeals.
On 26 April 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision 20 affirming the appellant's
conviction, but with modification as to damages awarded to the heirs of the victim. The
dispositive portion of the said Decision states:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated March 10, 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozami[s] City, is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of civil
indemnity ex delicto is hereby increased from P50,000.00 to
P100,000.00, including the award of moral damages from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00. Conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court
in People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo, We refrain from entering
judgment, and the Division Clerk of Court is hereby directed to elevate
the entire records of the case to the Honorable Supreme Court for its final
disposition.
SO ORDERED." 21
On 3 October 2006, the Court issued an order requiring the parties to simultaneously
submit supplemental briefs within thirty (30) days from notice should they so desire. 22On 21
November and 24 November 2006, appellant and appellee filed similar manifestations that they
are adopting the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals. 23
Thus, appellant raises the following errors in this petition for review:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF HIS IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY
AND HIS ALLEGED SEPARATE CONFESSIONS TO ONE EM[I]LIO
MAGALLANO, AND ONE SOFRONIO ARAÑAS, THE LATTER BEING
HEARSAY AND WITHOUT PROBATIVE VALUE WHATSOEVER.
II
THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE LATTER'S
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OWNING UP ONLY TO THE CRIME OF SIMPLE
RAPE. 24
The ultimate issue is whether appellant's guilt was established by evidence beyond
reasonable doubt.
It must be conceded at the outset that the trial court failed in its duty to conduct the
prescribed "searching inquiry" into the voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilty and full
comprehension thereof. Consequently, appellant's plea of guilty was made improvidently and it
is rendered inefficacious. 25 Nevertheless, the Court must rule against appellant as the evidence
on record is ample to sustain the judgment of conviction independent from his plea of guilty.
The crime of rape with homicide is punishable with death under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, which provides:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
The crime of rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
xxx xxx xxx
The Information, to which appellant pleaded guilty, alleged that homicide was
committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape of AAA. This, if proven, would warrant the
penalty of death at that time. 26 Accordingly, a plea of guilty to such charges calls into play the
provisions of Section 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus —
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.
— When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to
prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may
present evidence in his behalf.
Based on this rule, when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, there are three
(3) conditions that the trial court must observe to obviate an improvident plea of guilty by the
accused: (1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
by the accused of the consequences of his plea; (2) it must require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) it
must ask the accused whether he desires to present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do
so if he so desires. 27
 There is no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," or An examination of the records of the proceedings will illustrate the court's treatment of
as to the number and character of questions he may ask the accused, or as to the earnestness appellant's change of plea, viz:
with which he may conduct it, since each case must be measured according to its individual
merit. 28 However, the logic behind the rule is that courts must proceed with caution where the Atty. Cagaanan:
imposable penalty is death for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable
and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. 29 An Considering the voluntary plea of guilty of the accused[,] we pray that the
improvident plea of guilty on the part of the accused when capital crimes are involved should be mitigating circumstance to prove his plea of guilty be
avoided since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty appreciated in favor of the accused. We likewise pray that
without having fully comprehended the meaning and import and consequences of his another mitigating [circumstance] of voluntary surrender be
plea. 30 Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate appreciated in his favor.
review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea. 31
Pros. Edmilao:
In the instant case, when the accused entered a plea of guilty at his re-arraignment, it
Considering the gravity of the crime, may we ask your Honor that we will
is evident that the RTC did not strictly observe the requirements under Section 3, Rule 116
present evidence inorder [sic] that it will give also justice to the
above. A mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is
victim.
insufficient. 32 Such procedure falls short of the exacting guidelines in the conduct of a
"searching inquiry," as follows: Court:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought Present evidence to prove gravity of the crime.
into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a
competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; Pros. Edmilao:
and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during
the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the Our first witness is the ABC president.
accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or Court:
simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.
What matter will Santiago Acapulco testify?
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether
Court:
he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the
meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. Was there cruelty done by the accused in picking [sic] the life of the
minor girl?
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the
accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational xxx xxx xxx
background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to
give a free and informed plea of guilty. Pros. Edmilao:

(4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or May we ask that we will present her [sic] in the next hearing.
nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve
such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope Court:
of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
The court will call the accused to the witness stand.
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express
remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not xxx xxx xxx
labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries
with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of (The witness after having administered an oath, took the witness stand
the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment. and declared that he is:

(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is ROGELIO GUMIMBA
charged and to fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the
basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a 20 years old
violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of
Single
the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
Occupation-duck raising
(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a language
known and understood by the latter. Resident of Capucao, Ozamiz City)
(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in xxx xxx xxx
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate
the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details. 33 Court:
The court will allow the prosecutor or the defense to profound [sic] Objection. . .
question [sic] on the matter and the accused understand [sic]
and fully comprehend [sic] the consequence of his plea of Court:
guilty.
Sustained.
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
Pros. Edmilao:
Q When you said you raped her, you mean you inserted your penis inside
Q Mr. Rogelio Gumimba[,] are you the same accused in this case in Crim. the vagina of [AAA]?
Case No. RTC 2074?
A No, Your Honor.
A Yes, sir.
Q When you said you raped her, what do you mean?
Q Now the victim in this case is [AAA], a minor, 8 years of age[.] Since
you have admitted this in what particular place wherein [sic] A I was drank [sic] at that time.
you raped and slew [AAA]?
Q And you said you tied [AAA], what did you use in tying her?
A Purok Pantaon, Ozamiz City.
A Banana skin.
Q How far is that place wherein you slew and raped [AAA] from her
house? Q How did you tie [AAA]?

A Very near, sir. A I tied both her hands.

Q Can you estimate how many meters? Q The hands of [AAA], you placed at the back?

A One meter, sir. A In front of her.

Q Was it committed inside or outside the house? Q After tying her [,] what did you do to her?

A Outside. A After that I went home.

Q In what particular place of the house[:] in front, at the side or at the Q You did not stab [AAA]?
back?
A I stabbed her, Your Honor.
A At the back of the house of the victim.
Q What weapon did you use in stabbing her?
Q Will you please tell the court, how did you do it, will you please narrate.
A A long bolo.
A I raped her by tying her hand, then I killed her.
Q You mean you were bringing [a] long bolo at that time?
Q Before you raped and killed [AAA], where did you get her?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A I saw her roaming around.
Q After stabbing her, what did you do to her?
Q In committing the crime, were you alone?
A No more, Your Honor.
Atty. Anonat:
Q How many times did you stab [AAA]?
Objection. . .
A I could not count how many stab wounds I inflicted to [sic] her.
Court:
Q But you will agree that you have stabbed her many times?
Sustained.
A I could no longer count how many stab wounds, Your Honor.
Pros. Edmilao:
Q When you were arraigned, you pleaded guilty, do you understand
You stated that you pushed her and even tied her hand and raped her the consequence of your pleading guilty?
and stabbed her, were you the one alone [sic]?
A I do not know Your Honor [,] the consequence.
Atty. Anonat:
Q You pleaded guilty to the offense of rape with homicide, did you
understand?
 A Yes, Your Honor, I understand. rape with homicide. Apart from his testimony upon changing his plea to a plea of guilty, appellant
gave a subsequent testimony when he was presented by the prosecution as a witness against
Q That by your pleading guilty to the offense you will be sentenced his co-accused. This second testimony which constitutes another judicial confession, replete
to die? with details and made consciously as it was, cured the deficiencies which made his earlier plea
of guilty improvident. The latter testimony left no room for doubt as to the voluntariness and
A Yes, I am aware. comprehension on appellant's part of his change of plea, as well as completed his narration of
Q Your act of pleading guilty to the offense charged is your how he raped and killed the victim. The pertinent portions of the second testimony follow, thus:
voluntary will? Pros. Jose A. Edmilao:
A Yes, I admitted that crime, but we were two. Q While you were gathering firewoods [sic] and Ronie Abapo was
pasturing carabao, do you recall of any untoward incident that
Q You mean to say there were two of you who raped [AAA]?
happened? CAIHTE
A Yes, your Honor.
A We raped and killed.
Q Before raping her, was [AAA] wearing clothes?
Q Whom did you rape and kill?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A [AAA].
Q Was [AAA] wearing [a] panty before you raped her?
Q And when you said [AAA], who was then your companion, because you
A Yes, Your Honor. said we?

Q Did you remove her panty before raping her?

A No, You Honor, I did not. A Ronie Abapo.

Q How did you rape [AAA]? xxx xxx xxx

Q While she [AAA] was there gathering oranges, you mean to say you
A I have sexed [sic] with her.
were close to the place [AAA] was?
Q What do you mean by I "remedio" her, you mean you have inserted
A I, together with Ronie Abapo go [sic] near to the place [AAA] was.
your penis into the vagina of [AAA]?
Q When you were already near at [sic] the place where [AAA] was
A No, Your Honor, my penis did not penetrate into the vagina of [AAA].
climbing, was she still up there at the orange tree?
Q Why your penis did [sic] not able to penetrate into the vagina of [AAA]?
A She already came down.
A The vagina of [AAA] is very small.
Q When she came down, what followed next then?
Q Can you tell this Court how tall was [AAA]?
A We held her hands.
A (The witness demonstrated that from the floor about 3 feet high was the
Q Who held her hands?
height of [AAA])
A The two of us.
Q If you are standing and [AAA] is also standing side by side with you, up
to what part of your body is the height of [AAA]? Q You mean one hand was held by you and the other hand was held by
Ronie Abapo?
A Up to my waist line.
Atty. Anonat:
Atty. Cagaanan:
Objection, leading.
Q When you pleaded guilty [,] was it in your own free will?
Pros. Edmilao:
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that you were holding the hands of [AAA], how did you do it?
Q Were you not forced or coerced by anybody with this crime?
A We held her hands and tied it [sic] with banana skin.
A No, sir. 34
Q Who tied the hands of [AAA]?
The inefficacious plea of guilty notwithstanding, the totality of the evidence for the
prosecution undeniably establishes appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of A Both of us.
Q After tying the hands of [AAA][,] with banana stalk where did you place Q Why?
her?
A It did not penetrate, because I was afraid.
A We brought her to the [sic] grassy place.
Q But your penis erected [sic]?
Q What happened then after [AAA] was brought to the [sic] grassy place?
A No, Your Honor.
A We killed her.
Q You said that Ronie was the first to have sexual intercourse, was he
Q Before you killed her, what did you do to her? able to insert his penis into the vagina of [AAA]?

A We raped her. A No, sir, because he was watching, if there was person [sic] around.

Q Who raped her first? Q Were you able to see the penis of Ronie inserted into the vagina of
[AAA]?
A It was Ronie Abapo, then followed by me.
A I have [sic] not seen.
Q How did you rape her?
xxx xxx xxx
A We undress[sed] her.
Q You said that you and Ronie Abapo raped [AAA], what do you mean or
Q What was she wearing at that time? what do you understand by the word rape?

A She wore a dress. A We undressed her.

Q What about Ronie Abapo? Q Why did you undress her?

A He did not undress. A We undressed her, because we want [sic] to do something to her.

Q How did you let your penis out? Q What is that something that you want [sic] top do to [AAA]?

A I removed my t-shirt. A We raped her.

Q How about your pants? Q When you said we raped her, you mean, you inserted your penis inside
the vagina of [AAA]?
A I also removed my pants.
A No, sir.
Q What was then the reaction of [AAA], when you first tied her hand?
Q But you tried to insert your penis inside the vagina?
A She did not cry, because we covered her mouth.
A Yes, sir.
Q Who covered her mouth? You or Ronie?
Q And your penis touched the vagina of [AAA]?
A Ronie.
A Yes, sir.
Q What [sic] you said that it was Ronie Abapo, what did you do then
when he was on [sic] the act of raping her? Q Only your penis was not able to enter the vagina because [AAA] is [sic]
still a small girl?
A I was just near to [sic] them.
A Yes, sir.
Q The after Ronie Abapo, what did you do then?
Q After trying to insert your penis after Ronie Abapo, what did you do to
A He told me that you will be the next [sic]. [AAA]?
Q So when he told you that you will be the next [sic], what did you do A I walked away, but he called me.
next?
Q Who called you?
A I also raped her.
A Ronie Abapo.
Q Again, when you said you raped her, you inserted your penis into the
vagina of [AAA]? Q Why did he call you?

A It did not enter [sic]. A He asked me, what to do with [AAA]. It might be that she will tell us to
somebody [sic], we will kill her.
Q What did you do? Q How about you, did you made [sic] the following stab to [AAA]?

A I did not answer. A I was hesitant to stab, but eventually I stabbed her.

Q And what was your answer? Q How many times?

A Because he keep [sic] on persuading me. A Only one.

Q How did he persuade you? Q What part of her body was she hit?

A He persuaded me because we might be caught. A At the stomach.

Q And what did he tell you to do? Q Do you mean to say that you also got the bolo from the hands of Ronie
Abapo and also stabbed [AAA]?
A That we will kill [AAA].
A Yes, sir.
Q How did he tell you that?
Q Why was [AAA] not killed, when Ronie Abapo made stabbed [sic] on
A Rowing[,] we will kill her. her?
Q And what was your reply? A He [sic] was already dead.
A I refused. Q Why did you stab her, when she was already dead?
Q When you refused, what did he do then? A I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still alive.
A He keep [sic] on persuading me. xxx xxx xxx
Q And what did eventually came [sic] to your mind? Q Do you know where is [sic] the bolo used in stabbing [AAA]?

A Evil came to my mind, so we killed her. A No, sir.

Q How did you kill her? Q After killing [AAA], where did you place the bolo?

A We stabbed her. A In our place.

Q What weapon you used [sic] when you killed her? Q It [sic] it there in your home?

A A long bolo. A Already taken.

Q Whose [sic] the owner of that long bolo? Q Who got?

A Mine, but Ronie Abapo used it. A The barangay captain.

Q Who was the first one to use it? Q Now, did you tell to [sic] anybody regarding the raping and killing of
[AAA] aside from here in Court?
A Ronie Abapo.
A I have already told.
Q But the bolo was in your hands, how did [sic] he be able to use it?
Q Who was the person whom you talked about [sic]?
A I put it on the ground and he got it.
A My neighbor.
Q You said that he made the first struck [sic]. Where was [AAA] first hit?
Q Whose [sic] the name of that neighbor?
A In the stomach.
A Emilio Magallano.
Q How many times did Ronie Abapo strike her with the use of that bolo?
Q After Emilio Magallano[,] to whom did you report?
A I cannot remember anymore.
A Sofronio Aranas.
Q Aside from the stomach, where were the other pants [sic] of [AAA] also
hit? Q Who else?

A At the left side. A Rico Magallano.

 Q Who else?
A The wife of Panyong.
Q In the reporting [sic] this matter[,] were you together with Ronie Abapo
telling these persons that you raped [AAA]?
A I was alone.
Q And did you tell her that you were two in killing and raping with Ronie
Abapo?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A According to Emilio that the mother of the victim might be [sic] pity
enough to me, because I am related to them.
Q When you reported to these persons you have mentioned, did you also
tell them that you were together with Ronie Abapo in killing and
raping?
A No, sir. 35
While the trial court found appellant's second testimony insofar as it implicated his co-
accused to be unworthy of credence, there is absolutely nothing on record which militates
against its use as basis for establishing appellant's guilt. In fact, in his Brief, appellant submits
that he must be convicted of simple rape alone and not rape with homicide. Thus, he admits in
writing, albeit implicitly, that he raped the victim.
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the
sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict
the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the
guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged. 36 Thus, as we have ruled in People v. Derilo: 37
While it may be argued that appellant entered an improvident
plea of guilty when re-arraigned, we find no need, however, to remand
the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence. As a rule,
this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital
offenses because of improvidence thereof and when such plea is the sole
basis of the condemnatory judgment. However, where the trial court
receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused has
erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made
(improvidently or not) loses legal significance, for the simple reason that
the conviction is based on evidence proving the commission by the
accused of the offense charged.
Thus, even without considering the plea of guilty of appellant,
he may still be convicted if there is adequate evidence on record on
which to predicate his conviction. . . . .
Here, the prosecution was able to establish, through the separate testimonies of
appellant, that at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 8 April 1997, appellant was gathering
firewood not far from the house of the victim AAA in Barangay Pantaon, Ozamiz City. He met co-
accused Ronie Abapo who was then pasturing his carabao also within the vicinity of the victim's
home. They spotted the victim picking oranges with her three (3)-year old brother at the back of
their house and together approached her from behind, tied her hands with banana skin and
dragged her to a grassy place. 38 Abapo raped the victim first. 39 Thereafter, appellant followed
suit. 40 Once they had finished with their dastardly acts, they stabbed and killed the victim with a
long bolo which belonged to appellant. 41
Through the testimony of the physician who conducted the autopsy on AAA's body, it
was established that the victim had 6 and 12 o'clock lacerations on her external genital organ.
Thus, it is clear that the rape was consummated.
Appellant challenges the testimonies of the witnesses Magallano and Arañas on what
appellant had confessed to or told them for being hearsay. The challenge fails. The testimonies,
it should be conceded, cannot serve as a proof of extrajudicial confession for an extrajudicial
confession has to be in writing, among others, to be admissible in evidence. 42 That is why the
testimonies are of use in the case as corroborative evidence only. Such utility, however, cannot
be defeated by the hearsay rule. The testimonies covered are independently relevant statements
which are not barred by the hearsay rule.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such
statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule
does not apply. The statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or
be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. 43
Moreover, where, as in the case at bar, there is no evidence to show any dubious
reason or improper motive for a prosecution witness to bear false testimony against the accused
or falsely implicate him in a crime, his or her testimony should be given full faith and credit. 44
Next, we address appellant's contention that he can only be convicted of simple rape,
as this is the only crime to which he has owned up. Arguing that the victim may have already
been dead after his co-accused had allegedly hacked her first, appellant theorizes that he, at
most, would be guilty of an impossible crime.
Appellant is clutching at straws. It is extremely doubtful that appellant could have
known positively that the victim was already dead when he struck her. The proposition not only
completely contradicts his judicial confession, it is also speculative as to cause of death. In light
of the particular circumstances of the event, appellant's mere conjecture that AAA had already
expired by the time he hacked her cannot be sufficient to support his assertion of an impossible
crime. An examination of the testimony is again called for, thus:
Pros. Edmilao:
Q You said that he (Abapo) made the first strike, where was [AAA] first
hit?
A In the stomach.
Q How many times did Ronie Abapo strike her with the use of that bolo?
A I cannot remember anymore.
Q Aside from the stomach, where were the other pants [sic] of [AAA] also
hit?
A At the left side.
Q How about you, did you made [sic] the following stab to [AAA]?
A I was hesitant to stab, but eventually I stabbed her.
Q How many times?
A Only one.
 Q What part of her body was she hit?
A At the stomach.
Q Do you mean to say that you also got the bolo from the hands of Ronie
Abapo and also stabbed AAA?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why was [AAA] not killed, when Ronie Abapo made stabbed [sic] on
her?
A He [sic] was already dead.
Q Why did you stab her, when she was already dead?
A I just stabbed her, because I thought that she was still alive. 45
Thus, the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and the Court of Appeals should
be sustained. However, with the passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the penalty of death can no longer be imposed.
Accordingly, the penalty imposed upon appellant is reduced from death to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. 46
With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the award in light of prevailing
jurisprudence. Accordingly, appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of AAA in the amount of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate
damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. 47
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 00193 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the heirs of the victim, AAA, in the amounts of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate
damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs. DcAaSI
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Chico-Nazario, Garcia and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., are on leave.
Azcuna, J., is on official leave.
Nachura, J., took no part.
||| (People v. Gumimba y Moradante, G.R. No. 174056 [Formerly G.R. No. 138257], [February
27, 2007], 545 PHIL 627-655)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 172868. March 14, 2008.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
ROBERTO AGUILAR, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
On petition for review is the Court of Appeals' decision 1 of August 31, 2005
which affirmed with modification that of Branch 69 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
convicting appellant, Roberto Aguilar, of Qualified Rape. 2
The inculpatory portion of the information, docketed as Criminal Case No.
125621-H charging appellant with Qualified Rape of his daughter, reads:
That on or about the 4th day of May, 2003 in Taguig, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, taking advantage of his moral authority and ascendancy
and by means of force and intimidation did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA] 3 against her
will and consent, the said crime having been attended by the qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority, the said accused being the
father of the said victim, a 15-year old minor at the time of the
commission of the crime, and that the said rape was committed in full
view of the sister of the victim, thereby raising the crime to a [sic]
QUALIFIED RAPE, which is aggravated by the circumstances
of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength,
nighttime and dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4 (Underscoring supplied)
The following facts were not disputed by appellant.
The private complainant, AAA, daughter of appellant and his wife BBB, was born
on January 22, 1989, 5 and was thus 14 years old on May 4, 2003, the date the offense is
alleged to have been committed.
At the time of the commission of the offense, AAA's mother BBB was working in
Pakistan, leaving the custody and care of their three children to her husband-appellant.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of May 4, 2003, while AAA was sleeping with
her younger sister CCC at their house in Purok 6, Tuktukan, Taguig, Metro Manila, she was
roused from her sleep as she felt someone undressing her. She quickly recognized her
father, herein appellant, who was removing her short pants and later also removed his. He
soon lay atop her, inserted his penis in her vagina, and proceeded to perform a push and
pull motion.
The noise produced by the push and pull motion of appellant awakened CCC
who, overtaken by fear, feigned to be asleep albeit she made sure she witnessed the
incident.
Later that day, the siblings' aunt DDD, sister of their mother BBB, visited their
home. CCC at once reported to DDD what she had witnessed earlier. AAA confirmed the
report. After consulting her husband about the incident, DDD, together with AAA proceeded
to the Taguig Police Station and filed a complaint against appellant.
On examination of AAA at the Philippine National Police Laboratory by Medico-
legal Officer Paul Ed C. Ortiz, the following findings, quoted verbatim, were noted:
Hymen: With pressure if shallow healed lacerations at 2, 3, 6 & 9 o'clock
and a deep healed laceration at 11 o'clock position.
xxx xxx xxx
 CONCLUSION: Subject is non-virgin state physically. There are no
external signs of application of any form of trauma. 6
On his scheduled date of arraignment on June 23, 2003, appellant's counsel de
oficio informed the trial court that appellant intended to plead guilty to the charge. To afford
appellant time to reflect on his intended plan and its consequences, however, the trial court
postponed the arraignment to July 6, 2003, and later to July 21, 2003.
On arraignment on July 21, 2003, appellant pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial
court thereupon conducted a searching inquiry to determine the voluntariness of appellant's
plea and his full comprehension of the consequences thereof. On being convinced that
appellant indeed voluntarily admitted his guilt and fully understood its consequences, the
trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence "to prove the guilt of [appellant] and
[the] exact degree of culpability."
The prosecution thus presented as witnesses AAA, CCC, and DDD.
After the prosecution rested its case, when asked by the trial court "What can you
say, are you going to testify", appellant answered in the negative. 7
By decision of October 10, 2003, the trial court convicted appellant and imposed
the death penalty on him, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Roberto Aguilar guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Qualified Rape, this court hereby sentences accused to suffer
the Death penalty and to pay offended party [AAA] P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED. 8
The case was thereupon elevated for automatic review to this Court, appellant
faulting the trial court on the sole ground that in convicting him, it failed to comply with
Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When
the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present
evidence in his behalf.
Following People v. Mateo, 9 the Court transferred the case to the Court of
Appeals for intermediate review.
By Decision of August 31, 2005, the Court of Appeals, finding the evidence for
the prosecution to have proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant, affirmed the
decision of the trial court with modification by increasing the award of civil indemnity,
disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the October 10, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial court,
Branch 69, Pasig City, in Criminal Case No. 125621-H, is hereby
MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Roberto Aguilar guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Qualified Rape, this court hereby sentences accused to suffer
the Death Penalty and to pay offended party [AAA] P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED. 10 (Emphasis supplied)
The case is back before this Court.
The parties were, by Resolution of July 11, 2006, required by the Court to submit
Supplemental Briefs if they so desired. 11 Both parties manifested that they no longer
intended to submit the same. 12
The above-quoted provision of Sec. 3 of Rule 116 provides the procedure to be
observed when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense in order to safeguard his
rights.
The Court has in several cases prescribed the following guidelines on the
manner in which a searching inquiry should proceed:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the
custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under
what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused
has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual
threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply
because of the judge's intimidating robes.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had
conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning
and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as
his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed
plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or nature of
the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a
lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express
remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not
labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries
with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of
the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and
to fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his
indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his
fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
against him and a denial of his right to due process.
(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known
and understood by the latter.
(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading
guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy
or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details. 13
The trial court attempted to observe these guidelines as reflected in the following
excerpt of the proceedings taken on July 21, 2003:
COURT:
Make it of record that accused admitted complete responsibility to
Criminal Case No. 125621 duly assisted by counsel for
 qualified rape. Question: Alam mo ba na sa pag-amin mo sa A- Opo.
kasong qualified rape bibigyan ka ng parusang lethal injection
or life sentence depende sa testimony ng complainant, COURT:
nalalaman mo ba ito?
Kasal ka ba sa iyong asawa?
ACCUSED:
A- Opo.
Opo.
COURT:
COURT:
Kailan?
Bakit mo naman inamin itong kaso laban sa iyo?
ACCUSED:
ACCUSED:
May 19.
Dahil ginawa ko po kase talaga at naaawa ako sa asawa ko na
nagpapakagastos pa sa kaso at saka umaabsent pa eskwela COURT:
ang anak ko sa pagpunta punta dito.
Alam mo ba kung ilang taon si [AAA]?
COURT:
ACCUSED:
Ito ba ay napagisipan mong mabuti bago ka umamin?
Fifteen po sa January 22.
ACCUSED:
COURT:
Opo, mula pa noong July 7. Noon ko unang sinabi na aamin ako.
Pinagsisisihan mo ba ang ginawa mo sa anak mo?
COURT:
ACCUSED:
Ilang taon ka na ngayon?
Opo.
ACCUSED:
COURT:

Bibistahan ko pa rin ito at saka kita bibigyan ng kaukulang parusa

Forty five po. matapos kong marining [sic] ang testimony ng iyong anak at ng
kanyang testigo.
COURT:
ACCUSED:
Anong natapos mo?
Opo. 14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
ACCUSED:
From the above-quoted transcript of the proceedings, the Court finds that the trial
First year high school po. court failed to fully observe the above-enumerated guidelines.

COURT: Nevertheless, as did the appellate court, the Court finds that appellant's
conviction must be sustained, not on the basis of his plea of guilt which he affirmed on the
Ano ang trabaho mo bago nangyari ang insidenteng ito? witness stand but on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution showing the
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of appellant which, by choice, he failed to rebut.
ACCUSED:
Consider the following testimony of AAA:
Isa po akong smoked-fish vendor.
Prosecutor Deza —
COURT:
xxx xxx xxx
Ano ang religion mo?
Q- When did this alleged molestation of the accused to you
ACCUSED: happened? [sic]

Roman Catholic po. A- May 4, 2003 Sir.

COURT: Q- And where did it occur?

How about your daughter? A- In our residence in Purok 6, Tuktukan, Taguig, Metro Manila Sir.
Q- What time did it occur? Make it of record that the witness was crying while narrating her story.

A- Two o'clock in the morning Sir. Prosecutor Deza —

Q- Will you please inform the Honorable Court how did the alleged
rape started? [sic]
A- I was sleeping at around seven o'clock in the evening when I was
awakened because somebody was undressing me.
Q- Can you remember how long did this "niyuyugyug ka niya" last?
A- Three (3) minutes po.
Q- Did you feel his organ to [sic] your organ?

Q- And who were your companion [sic] or rather persons, if any, sleeping A- Yes Sir.
with you on that night of May 4, 2003?
Q- And how did you feel?
A- My sister was sleeping beside me.
A- It was painful Sir.
Q- Who else if any?
Q- Did you ever attempt to prevent him from doing so?
A- Only the two of us were sleeping while the others were sleeping
outside Sir. A- I pushed him but he was strong Sir.

Q- How about your father? Where was he supposed to sleep then? Q- Aside from his acts did he say anything while he was doing such
molestation to you?
A- Outside of the room Sir.
A- He told me not to make any noise because somebody might hear us,
Q- So what time if you can remember were you awakened when "tapos minura pa niya ako."
somebody was undressing you?
Q- Were you afraid with [sic] your father?
A- About two o'clock.
A- Yes Sir.
Q- And when you were awakened because you were being
undressed do [sic] you recognize who was undressing Q- At that time that [sic], when your father bad mouth or "minura ka" was
you? that enough to make you afraid?

A- Yes Sir. A- Yes Sir and he was threatening me Sir.

Q- And who was he? Court (to the witness) —

A- Roberto Aguilar Sir. Q- How did he threaten you?

Q- When you open [sic] your eyes and you saw A- He said that he will kill me Your Honor. He told me that if I will shout or
Roberto Aguilar undressing you was he undressed or dressed? do something against him he will kill me.

A- He was dressed when he removed my short pants and then he also Prosecutor Deza —
undressed himself.
Q- Did he have the influence or the means to kill you at that time?
xxx xxx xxx
A- Yes Sir because he has a knife with him and he can stab me anytime.
Q- So what happen [sic] after he undressed himself and you were
Q- Did you see the knife?
also undressed?
A- Yes Sir.
A- He put himself on top of me and he inserted his organ part [sic] to
my private part. Court (to the witness) —
Q- You said he inserted his organ to yours. Did you see it? Q- When did you see the knife?
A- Yes Sir. A- When I was last used he pointed the knife at me Your Honor.
Q- What was he actually doing when he was on top of you? Prosecutor Deza —
A- "Niyuyugyug po niya ako, kinakabayo po niya ako." Q- When you said your last used when was that last used? [sic] Were you
referring to this one May 4?
Court —
A- Yes Sir. 15 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 Undoubtedly, AAA's testimony, which was corroborated by her sister CCC,
proves beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had carnal knowledge of his minor daughter
AAA.
It bears reiterating at this juncture that in the earlier-quoted transcript of his
testimony during the searching inquiry conducted by the trial court after he pleaded guilty to
the charge, appellant, when asked why he made such plea, answered, "Dahil ginawa ko po
kase talaga", and that after the prosecution rested its case, appellant opted not to present
evidence in his defense.
With the passage, however, on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346, "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines", the penalty of death cannot
be imposed. Accordingly, the penalty imposed upon appellant is reduced to reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole. 16
WHEREFORE, the challenged August 31, 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals
is MODIFIED in that appellant, Roberto Aguilar, is sentenced to suffer, reclusion
perpetua,without eligibility for parole. In all other respects, the appellate court's decision is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Reyes and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Nachura, J., took no part. Signed pleading as Solicitor General.
||| (People v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 172868, [March 14, 2008], 572 PHIL 431-444)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137554. October 1, 2003.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOHN MAMARION, Leny
Leysa (Acquitted), JULIET HARISCO, Bebot dela Rosa alias "Bebot
Villarosa" (Acquitted), Benjie Bernaje (At-large); Sergio Mendoza
alias "Bambi", alias "SM", alias "Friday" (Acquitted), Ronald
Porquez (At-large), ROLANDO V. MACLANG, CHARLITO
DOMINGO, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
This is an automatic review of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod
City (Branch 50) in Criminal Case No. 96-17590 finding appellants John Mamarion y Hisugan,
Charlito Domingo y Gorospe, Rolando Maclang y Ventura and Juliet Harisco y Carrera guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, sentencing each of
them to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to indemnify solidarily the heirs of the late Roberta
Cokin in the amount of P50,000.00.
An Information for Kidnapping For Ransom was initially filed on March 11, 1996
against appellant Mamarion together with Amado Gale, Jr. (Gale for brevity), Roger Biona and a
John Doe 2 based on a Resolution dated March 4, 1996 issued by the Acting City Prosecutor
and Assistant City Prosecutor of Bacolod City finding probable cause against them and
dismissing the charges against Ronaldo Porquez and appellants Maclang and Harisco for
insufficiency of evidence. 3
On May 9, 1996, the Information was amended to include appellant Domingo as co-
accused. 4
Thereafter, a Second Amended Information was filed against appellants Mamarion,
Domingo, Harisco and Maclang together with Gale, Biona, Leny Leysa, Bebot Dela Rosa @
Bebot Villarosa, Benie Bernaje, Sergio Mendoza @ SM @ Bambi @ Friday, Ronald Porquez,
John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and Edward Doe as accused. 5 The Information reads:
That on or about July 16, 1995 or and sometime prior thereto,
in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused John Mamarion, Amado,
Gale, Charlito Domingo, Roger Biona, Juliet Harisco, Leny Leysa, Bebot
Dela Rosa @ Bebot Villarosa, Benie Bernaje, Sergio Mendoza @) SM @
Bambi @ Friday, Ronald Porquez, Rolando V. Maclang, together with
John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and Edward Doe whose true names,
identities and whereabouts are still unknown, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another with the use of firearms of different
calibers by means of violence against and intimidation of person, did
then, and there, kidnap ROBERTA COKIN, detain and deprive her of her
liberty for the period of more than three (3) days for the purpose of
extorting money in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) from
her sister, Teresita Cokin, for her (Roberta's) release and that after the
pay-off was intercepted and accused John Mamarion was arrested: as a
consequence thereof, victim Roberta Cokin was inflicted multiple physical
injuries on different parts of her body which caused her death, to the
damage and prejudice of her heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
Only accused Gale and appellants Mamarion and Domingo were arraigned on
January 27, 1997. The other accused remained at-large. Gale and appellant Domingo pleaded
"not guilty" while a plea of "not guilty" was entered by the trial court for appellant Mamarion as he
refused to enter any plea. 7 Trial proceeded only with respect to Gale, appellants Mamarion and
Domingo.
On March 23, 1997, accused Leysa was arrested in Tondo, Manila. Upon his
arraignment on April 30, 1997, he pleaded "not guilty." 8 Trial then ensued with respect to him.
Meanwhile, accused Gale filed a motion, with the approval of the public prosecutor,
seeking that he be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense, i.e., from Kidnapping for Ransom
to Slight Illegal Detention. 9 Acting on said motion, the trial court conferred with the victim's
sister, Teresita Cokin, and the latter agreed. 10 There being no evidence presented as yet
against Gale 11 and on the condition that he will testify for the prosecution, the trial court found
no impediment to grant the motion. Gale was re-arraigned and entered a plea of guilty to Slight
Illegal Detention. Accordingly, the trial court rendered a Decision dated May 13, 1997,
sentencing Amado Gale as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Amado
Gale, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Slight Illegal
Detention defined and penalized under Art. 268 of the Revised Penal
Code, and taking into consideration the mitigating circumstances of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong and voluntary surrender, without
any aggravating circumstance, the penalty that should be imposed on the
 accused is prision mayor in its maximum period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as
minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor as maximum. 12
On July 7, 1997, accused Villarosa was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty," 13 and trial
proceeded with regard to him.
Accused Biona was killed some time in October 1997 during an encounter with the
military in Metro Manila. 14
Accused Mendoza was arrested on October 6, 1997, 15 and on October 27, 1997, he
was arraigned, to which he pleaded "not guilty." 16 The last to be arrested were appellants
Maclang and Harisco who were brought to court for arraignment on November 7, 1997 and both
pleaded "not guilty." 17 Joint trial was held with regard to these three accused. 18
Based on the evidence presented before it, the trial court made the following findings
of facts surrounding the kidnapping for ransom and death of Roberta Cokin:
. . . Roberta Cokin, nicknamed Obing, is a rich Filipino-Chinese
businesswoman with business interests in Bacolod City and in the
province and City of Iloilo. These varied business interest include a
grocery store, commercial buildings, real estate and agricultural
landholdings. Roberta or "Obing" as she is fondly called, lives together
with her only surviving sister, Teresita Cokin, in their house at Mercedes
St., in Bacolod City. Both Roberta and Teresita are spinsters.
xxx xxx xxx
At about 11:45 in the evening of July 15, 1995, Roberta passed
by her cockfarm situated in front of the Bacolod City National High School
along Libertad Street (now Henares Street) in Bacolod City. She came
from the Tangub cockpit where she attended a cockfight and she was
alone driving by herself a Toyota Hi-Lux pick-up.
Roberta never made it home. A group of armed men came and
took away Roberta and her pick-up. On the following morning, Teresita
Cokin, Roberta's younger sister, saw the abandoned Hi-Lux pick-up in
front of the San Sebastian Cathedral. Later, Teresita received a
telephone call from one identifying himself as Bravo, informing her that
Roberta was kidnapped and would be released only after a One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) ransom is paid.
Andres Sumpay, the nephew of Roberta Cokin, was at the
Cokin grocery early in the morning of July 15, 1995. He was minding the
store when he noticed a man pacing the sidewalk in front of the store.
The man later identified as the accused John Mamarion, handed over to
Andres a plastic bag containing some papers. When this bag was later
opened by Teresita Cokin, it contained the driver's license of Roberta.
Inserted in the jacket cover of the driver's license of Roberta (Exh. I), is
the ransom note (Exh J), a piece of yellow pad paper on which appears,
in Roberta's own handwriting, the following:
Teresita, please give the bearer One Million
(P1,000,000.00) for I am kidnap by them. Don't tell the police or
any law enforcer for my security reason." (Sgd) Obing. "Please
produce immediately. Same"
Teresita had in mind to follow Obing's instruction and keep the
police out of the incident but without her knowledge, her nephew, Andres
Sumpay, with the help of a family friend a retired policeman Graciano
Reyes, reported the kidnapping to the NBI. Teresita was at first furious
when the NBI started to investigate but as she could do nothing more,
she accepted and welcomed the NBI's intervention.
The NBI sought the assistance of the Bacolod Anti-Syndicated
Crime Unit (BASCU) a unit of the Bacolod City Police specifically
organized for the purpose of going after syndicated crimes and big-time
criminals. The NBI set up shop in the house of Cokin and monitored the
calls made by the kidnappers.
When Bravo made follow-up calls for the payment of the
ransom money, Teresita, following the instructions of the NBI, demanded
that she be allowed to talk with her sister. Teresita heard the voice of
Roberta over the telephone but their conversation was very brief. All that
Roberta said was for her sister to be obedient to the wishes of her
kidnappers. Bravo thereafter told Teresita that the ransom money is
raised to Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00). The NBI monitoring the call
failed to trace its origin as the call was made with the use of a cellular
telephone.
Bravo's last call was made in the afternoon of July 20, 1995.
Teresita had already raised the amount of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) in cash and Bravo wants the money to be delivered at
the Holiday Restaurant in the place which is known as the Shopping
Center. The person who is carrying the money should wear a red cap and
the money should be given to one who will identify himself as Bravo. The
pay-off time was at 5:30 p.m.
The NBI and the BASCU laid out a plan to apprehend the
kidnappers and recover the ransom money during the pay-off. An NBI
agent, Ed Rasco, together with a Bacolod City policeman, concealed
themselves inside the KC-20 pick-up car driven by Mario Mahusay when
the latter left to deliver the ransom money. Other BASCU personnel
posted themselves at strategic places around Holiday Restaurant.
Mario Mahusay was very conspicuous with his red cap inside
the Holiday Restaurant at about 5:30 p.m. that day, July 20, 1995. When
the restaurant's telephone rung, Mario was told that someone would like
to talk with him. It was Bravo on the other end of the line and he
instructed Mario to take a taxi and proceed to the Tops Bowling Lanes
which is about a little less than a kilometer away.
Fortuitously, a taxi was on hand when Mario stepped out of the
restaurant. Mario boarded the taxi and it immediately sped away.
The NBI and the BASCU men were caught unprepared by the
sudden turn of events. Their communication system heated up with
frenzied calls and instructions. Jumping on their vehicles, they sped
northward following the route taken by the taxi.
The taxi, with Mario Mahusay on board, stopped in front of
Tops Bowling Lanes and Mario alighted. He went inside the building and
waited. He did not wait long as in a few moments, a man came and
identified himself as Bravo. Mario delivered the bags containing the Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the man who took them. The man gave
Mario P50.00 and they both left the premises of Tops.
The BASCU team, on board their service vehicle, found no
trace of the taxi. They proceeded to the Ceres bus terminal at the
 Shopping Center and looked over the buses and the passengers hoping
to find suspicious looking characters. Not finding any, they again boarded
their service vehicle and moved towards the direction of the Queen of
Peace Church (Hua Ming Church). The church is just near the Top's
Bowling Alley.
Before the BASCU team could reach the vicinity of the church,
they chanced upon a man with a bag walking hurriedly. When accosted,
the man fired at the BASCU team. After a brief firefight and the explosion
of a grenade, the man was subdued. The bags containing the ransom
money were recovered. The BASCU team also took from the man a .357
caliber homemade revolver with ammunitions and a holster (Exhs. A, B,
C and D). The man was later identified as John Mamarion.
xxx xxx xxx
The firearm recovered from Mamarion (Exh. A) was marked by
Office Tubongbanua with the initial "JM" and it was indorsed to the NBI
together with the live ammunitions (Exh. B), the spent shells (Exh. C) and
the holster (Exh. D). The bags containing the ransom money was also
turned over to the NBI.
xxx xxx xxx
The remains of Obing Cokin was discovered in a shallow grave
in a secluded area of a sugarcane plantation in the town of Anilao, Iloilo
on August 7, 1995. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Teresita Cokin positively identified the corpse to be that of her
elder sister, Obing. There is absolutely no doubt in this identification as
Teresita is intimately familiar with the features of her sister, including her
dentures. Moreover, she knew the blouse of Obing which has a red and
white fish design and a long sleeve. Accordingly, Teresita executed an
affidavit of identification allowing Dr. Ricardo H. Jaboneta, Medico-Legal
Officer of the NBI to autopsy the remains of Roberta Cokin.
xxx xxx xxx
Roberta died of "Traumatic shock, secondary to multiple
physical injuries". The autopsy was conducted on August 8, 1995. Dr.
Jaboneta opines that Roberta died not earlier than August 1, 1995 and
not later then August 5, 1995. 19
The trial court relied principally on the testimony of Gale together with the
corroborating testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, namely: Andres Sumpay, Teresita
Cokin and Mario Mahusay as to appellant Mamarion, establishing the participation of appellants
in the commission of the crime of Kidnapping with Ransom, as follows:
(1) June 18, 1995 — accused Ronaldo Porquez (at-large) together with
appellants John Mamarion and Charlito Domingo, John's
brother, Felipe "Oloy" Mamarion 20 and Gale, held a meeting
at the Ocean City Restaurant in Iloilo City wherein Porquez
introduced the plan of kidnapping Roberta Cokin for the ransom
of one million pesos to be participated in by the group as
follows — Porquez will finance the operation in Iloilo City, Gale
will identify the victim and monitor her activities and the
brothers Mamarionand Domingo were the ones who will abduct
the victim; 21
(2) June 19 to 22, 1995 — the group, consisting of the
brothers Mamarion, Domingo and Gale, went around Iloilo and
Bacolod City looking for a safehouse but was not successful;
while they were in Bacolod City, the group used the Mitsubishi
Lancer driven by Gale and owned by his cousin, Atty.
Tranquilino Gale; 22
(3) June 22, 1995 — Gale met appellant Maclang for the first time
in appellant Harisco's duplex in Capitol Heights, Bacolod City;
in the afternoon of the same day, Bale,
Oloy Mamarion, appellants Mamarion and Domingo proceeded
to Harisco's store in Gatuslao-Gonzaga street, where appellant
Harisco gave money to appellant Mamarion; they then went to
Bata, Taculing and Mansilingan, looking for a safehouse;
finding none, Gale brought them back to the duplex in Capitol
Heights and appellant Maclang paid him P500.00 for his
services; 23
(4) June 23, 1995 — Gale brought the group to Banago wharf and he was
instructed by appellant Mamarion to come back for them in the
morning of July 3, 1995; 24
(5) July 3, 1995 — Accused Biona, came into the picture; he arrived from
Manila and was in camouflage uniform and armed; 25
(6) July 6, 1995 — a meeting was again held at the Ocean City
Restaurant; Porquez informed Gale, the brothers Mamarion,
Domingo, and Biona that the kidnapping will take place in
Bacolod City and that appellants Maclang and Harisco will
provide the funds in Bacolod City; 26
(7) July 10, 1995 — at 5:30 in the morning, the group had a breakfast
meeting in Harisco's duplex, and appellants Maclang and
Harisco gave "instructions" to the group; Maclang informed the
group that Roberta Cokin will be abducted at the Tangub
cockpit on July 15, 1995 while Harisco said that it will
be appellant Mamarion who will get Roberta as they trust him,
and she will finance the operation; Harisco then borrowed the
Lancer from Gale for 4 days, paid Gale P2,000.00 as rent, and
told Gale that his services will not be needed in the interim;
appellant Mamarion told Gale to be back on July 14, 1995; 27
(8) July 15, 1995 —
3:00 p.m. — Appellants Mamarion and Domingo, alias "Jack", Biona,
two unidentified persons and Gale met in the public plaza, as
agreed upon; Gale was instructed by Mamarion to drive to
Tangub cockpit; on the way there, Domingo and
Oloy Mamarion alighted at Goldenfield; upon reaching the
cockpit, appellant Mamarion and Biona went down and Gale
was instructed by appellant Mamarion to come back at 8:00
p.m.; 28
8:00 p.m. — Gale fetched appellant Mamarion and Biona, and they
proceeded to Goldenfield where Gale saw
Oloy Mamarion and appellant Domingo having drinks at an
open-space store; 29
11:00 p.m. — Gale heard appellant Mamarion receive a message on his
handset from a female voice, after which they left Goldenfield;
 while in traffic, they saw the white Hi-Lux pick-up of Roberta
Cokin which they tailed; when they reached Cokin's cock farm
in front of the Bacolod City High School, they saw her
unloading several boxes and appellant Mamarion told Gale to
park 20-25 meters away; appellants Mamarion and
Domingo then got off the car and proceeded towards Cokin's
pick-up while Biona told Gale to move away; they parked in
Libertad Street and stayed there for 20 minutes; when Biona
received a message in his handset, he told Gale to leave
Libertad Street and when they passed by the cockfarm, Cokin's
pick-up was no longer there; they proceeded to a newly-
cemented portion between Homesite and Bata Subdivision,
and saw Cokin's pick-up there; appellant Mamarion was
holding Cokin's right hand while appellant Domingo was
holding her left; she was struggling to free herself; upon seeing
this, Gale cried as he took pity on Cokin; Gale was told to
transfer to the victim's pick-up and together with
Oloy Mamarion, they parked the pick-up in front of the Bacolod
Cathedral; they alighted and went to the State Theater;
meanwhile, appellants Mamarion and Domingo together with
Biona, who were in the Lancer previously driven by Gale,
proceeded towards Homesite; after an
hour, appellant Mamarion arrived at the State Theater on board
the Lancer, and Oloy Mamarion and Gale boarded the car; they
went to a small house situated on a vacant lot in Homesite;
appellant Mamarion left; 30
(9) July 16, 1995 —
6:00 a.m. — Appellant Mamarion came back, and with Gale and
Oloy Mamarion, they went to Harisco's duplex; Gale remained
in the car; appellant Mamarion came back and they picked
up appellant Domingo; the three drove to the Cokin building in
Lopez Jaena-Libertad Street, and parked along the street; Gale
stayed behind in the car while appellants Mamarion and
Domingo alighted; Domingo was holding a piece of yellow
paper; shortly thereafter, the two came back and Domingo
mentioned that the person who received the note was mestizo-
looking; they proceeded to the public plaza and Gale saw
appellant Mamarion talking in a public phone booth at Gonzaga
street; 31
— at around 6:00 a.m., Andres Sumpay noticed a man wearing a cap,
pacing back and forth in front of the Cokin Grocery; the man
handed to him a plastic bag containing some papers which he
later found out to be the driver's license of the victim; he gave
the bag to Cokin's house helper, and told her to give it to
Teresita Cokin; Andres Sumpay later identified the man
as appellant Mamarion; 32
— Teresita Cokin, after attending the 5:00 a.m. mass at the San
Sebastian Cathedral, saw Roberta's pick-up in front of the
church; when she got home she received a phone call from a
certain Bravo who asked her if she got the ransom note with
the victim's driver's license; she asked Andres Sumpay about it,
and he told her that he gave it to Amparing, who placed it on
the table; she then got the drivers license and ransom note; 33
— after appellant Mamarion used the public phone, he went back to the
car and told Gale that he talked to Teresita who got angry
because there was blood in the pick-up; they went to Tops
Bowling Lanes on 6th Street and appellant Mamarion alighted
and went inside; when appellant Mamarion went back to the
car, he told Gale that Teresita was still angry; they returned to
the vacant lot and waited until evening; Gale
told appellant Mamarion that the Lancer's papers are ready and
he has to leave on the 18th to bring it to Manila; he referred
Benjie Bernaje as the one who will substitute him in driving
them around; 34
(10) July 17, 1995 — Gale and appellant Mamarion went to see Bernaje,
who agreed to substitute for Gale; on the way to Banago wharf,
they stopped by Tops Bowling Lanes where
appellant Mamarion made another phone call to Teresita,
asking if the money is ready; in Banago,
appellant Mamarion gave the Lancer's key to Gale, and told
Gale that he is going to Iloilo; 35
(11) July 19, 1995 —
— Gale, together with the Lancer, arrived in Manila in the afternoon, and
proceeded to Atty. Tranquilino Gale's house in Alabang; 36
— Teresita Cokin received another phone call from Bravo; she was able
to talk to Roberta who told her to obey her captor's wishes;
Bravo told her that they are raising the ransom amount to 2
million pesos; 37
(12) July 20, 1995 — Mario Mahusay, the Cokin's driver, handed the
ransom money to a man wearing a red cap who identified
himself as Bravo, at the Tops Bowling Lanes; Mahusay later
pointed to appellant Mamarion as the man who posed as
Bravo; members of the Bacolod Anti-Syndicated Crime Unit
(BASCU) team who were monitoring the pay-off apprehended
appellant Mamarion in front of the Hua Ming Church after a
brief gun fight; 38
The trial court found appellants Mamarion, Domingo, Maclang and Harisco guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping with Ransom in its Decision dated October
7, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: cSEaDA
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court Finds the accused
JOHN MAMARION y HISUGAN and CHARLITO DOMINGO y
GOROSPE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as PRINCIPAL BY
DIRECT PARTICIPATION and the accused ROLANDO MACLANG y
VENTURA and JULIET HARISCO y CARRERA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as PRINCIPALS BY INDUCEMENT and all of them as
CO-CONSPIRATORS of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM
defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended. They are all sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH. By way of civil liability, they are all ordered to pay solidarily the
heirs of the late Roberta Cokin the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as indemnification for her death.
The accused JOSE VILLAROSA, LENY LEYSA and SERGIO
MENDOZA are all acquitted as their guilt have not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Their immediate release is ordered unless they are
detained for some other cause. 39
 Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ARBITRARILY
amended. ACCEPTING HOOK, LINE AND SINKER THE EXPLANATION OF
AMADO GALE THAT HE DID NOT IDENTIFY ACCUSED JULIET
In their respective briefs, appellants raise the following assignments of errors, to wit: HARISCO (AND CO-ACCUSED ROLANDO MACLANG) BECAUSE HE
WAS AFRAID FOR HIS LIFE AND THAT OF HIS FAMILY.
For appellant John Mamarion:
E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE TESTIMONY TO THE TESTIMONIES OF JOE JOVEN AND JOI SIMPAS, BJMP
OF AMADO GALE, JR. AGAINST ACCUSED SECURITY ESCORTS OF AMADO GALE DURING THE AUGUST 8,
JOHN MAMARION. 1996 REINVESTIGATION, WHO TESTIFIED THAT, DURING
AFORESAID HEARING IN ILOILO CITY, AMADO GALE ACTED
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED
NORMALLY AND DID NOT APPEAR TO BE NERVOUS OR
JOHN MAMARION GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE
APPREHENSIVE AND FURTHERMORE, THAT AMADO GALE DID
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM
NOT GO TO THE COMFORT ROOM AS HE ALLEGED WHERE HE
AND FOR THE DEATH OF ROBERTA COKIN. 40
WAS HANDED A WRITTEN DEATH THREAT.
For appellant Charlito Domingo:
F. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 1N CONVICTING ACCUSED
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE JULIET HARISCO DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES. ESTABLISH MOTIVE ON HER PART FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE
CRIME CHARGED.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCREDITING THE TESTIMONIES
AND EVIDENCE FOR APPELLANT CHARLITO DOMINGO, II
PARTICULARLY HIS DEFENSE OF ALIBI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING JULIET HARISCO
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING APPELLANT BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHARLITO DOMINGO ON REASONABLE DOUBT. 41 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HER FAVOR.

For appellant Juliet Harisco: III

I THE CONVICTION OF JULIET HARISCO IS A GROSS INJUSTICE

THAT REQUIRES IMMEDIATE VINDICATION AND RECTIFICATION BY
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING JULIET HARISCO OF THE EARLY RESOLUTION OF HER APPEAL.
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM AND SENTENCING HER TO DEATH
WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. IV

A.1 PARTICIPATION AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING NEW TRIAL. 42
CONSPIRACY ON THE PART OF JULIET HARISCO ARE NOT
For appellant Rolando Maclang:
ESTABLISHED.
I
A.2 AMADO GALE IS A POLLUTED AND INCREDIBLE
WITNESS, WHOSE TESTIMONY IS NOT CORROBORATED BY ANY THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING PRINCIPAL ACCUSED
OTHER EVIDENCE. AMADO GALE TO CHANGE HIS PLEA OF NOT GUILTY TO A LESSER
OFFENSE OF SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION IN CONSIDERATION OF
A.3 THE TESTIMONY OF AMADO GALE, A CONFESS (sic)
HIS UNDERTAKING TO TESTIFY AS ONE OF THE PROSECUTION
CO-CONSPIRATOR IS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN THE ABSENCE OF
WITNESSES.
INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY.
II
B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS
SINCERE, CREDIBLE AND TRUTHFUL THE TESTIMONY OF AMADO THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED,
GALE, AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE PLANNING AND ACTUAL ROLANDO V. MACLANG BASED ON THE UNCORROBORATED
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM OF HER FORMER EMPLOYER, TESTIMONY OF PRINCIPAL ACCUSED TURNED PROSECUTION
ROBERTA COKIN, DESPITE THE MANY INCONSISTENCIES ON WITNESS, AMADO GALE, WHOSE PREVIOUS TESTIMONY IN THE
MATERIAL POINTS. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION STAGE WAS TOTALLY REJECTED
BY THE TWO (2) SETS OF INVESTIGATORS, AND WAS NOT MADE
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED
THE BASIS OF INDICTING THE ACCUSED.
JULIET HARISCO ON THE BASIS OF THE SOLE AND
UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF AMADO GALE DESPITE THE III
FACT THAT THE LATTER FAILED ON TWO (2) OCCASIONS TO
IDENTIFY HER PERSON.
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF
PRINCIPAL ACCUSED TURNED PROSECUTION WITNESS AMADO
GALE IS ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT. 43
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supports the convictions handed down by
the trial court. However, it recommends that the award of civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00 should be shouldered by each of the appellants, following the award made by the
Court in People vs. Yambot, G.R. No. 120350, October 13, 2000. 44
The Court will first determine whether or not the trial court erred in allowing Gale to
plead to a lesser offense in consideration of testifying as a prosecution witness.
Appellants assail Gale's plea to a lesser offense arguing that it should have been
made during the plea bargaining stage of the trial and that it should not be subject to the
condition that he will testify against appellants. In the Brief for the State, the OSG maintains that
Gale was validly discharged as a state witness. Under the circumstances, it is not correct to
state that Gale was discharged as a state witness under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court. Gale was allowed to change his plea pursuant to the then prevailing Section 2, Rule 116
of the Rules of Court, 45 which provided:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with
the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the
trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not
it is necessarily included in the crime charges, or is cognizable by a court
of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint
or information is necessary.
A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction
of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy.
Records show that during the May 13, 1997 hearing, the Chief State Prosecutor
manifested that he has approved Gale's motion to be allowed to plead to a lesser offense, i.e.
Slight Illegal Detention. 46 Private complainant Teresita Cokin, upon query of the trial court,
consented to Gale's offer of plea to a lesser offense Slight Illegal Detention. 47
It is immaterial that said plea was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was
made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses. In People vs. Villarama,
Jr., 48 a 1992 case, the trial court allowed the accused therein to change his plea even after the
prosecution had rested its case, applying the herein above-quoted Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court. The Court elucidated, thus:
Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition
of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of
a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the
graver charge. Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial
stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the
accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter. Thus, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof, provides:
xxx xxx xxx
However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser
offense under the aforequoted rule is not demandable by the accused as
a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court.
In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to
plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested
its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and
the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion
may be properly exercised. Thus, in People vs. Kayanan, we held that the
rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged. 49 (Emphasis supplied)
Gale's testimony was crucial to the prosecution as there was no other direct evidence
linking appellants to the commission of the crime. Hence, the trial court did not err in allowing
Gale to plead guilty to a lesser offense.
The Court will now determine: (1) whether or not the trial court erred in giving full faith
and credit to the testimony of Gale; and (2) whether or not the participation and conspiracy of the
four appellants in the commission of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom had been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
On the first issue:
As a general rule, the testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient for the conviction
of the accused unless other evidence supports such testimony. 50 There is, however, an
exception to said rule. In People vs. Sala, 51 the Court said:
It is true that the testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient
for the conviction of the accused unless such testimony is supported by
other evidence. Such testimony comes from a polluted source and,
therefore, must be received with caution. As an exception, however, the
testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered
sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and it contains details which
could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. 52 (Emphasis
supplied)
In upholding the credibility of Gale, the trial court stated in its decision, thus:
The testimony of Amado Gale on how the conspiracy to kidnap
Roberta Cokin was hatched and implemented resounds with all the
earmarks of sincerity and truth. His testimony is sox (sic) rich with details
of persons, time, places and things and portrays with vivid imagery the
action and the happenings as he saw them. This is the kind of testimony
that carries the hallmarks of honesty and truth.
Testimonies which are unequivocal, forthright and
replete with details are seals of self-authentication in their
credibility.
Moreover, Amado Gale is only a driver whose educational
attainment is only Grade II. It will require a good measure of ingenuity to
invent a story of kidnapping, abundant with all the gory details, an
ingenuity which Amado certainly do (sic) not possess. 53 . . .
Appellants take exception to such finding arguing that the prosecutors had previously
rejected Gale's testimony during the second re-investigation and his testimony is incredible and
full of inconsistencies. The Court is not convinced.
The trial court's assessment of Gale as a credible witness and the credibility of his
testimony is binding upon the Court. This is so because the trial court had the opportunity to
observe and examine the witness' conduct and demeanor on the witness stand, having
personally heard and observed him, and thus, it is in a better position to decide the question of
his credibility. 54
 A perusal of the transcripts of Gale's testimony confirms the trial court's assessment.
Notably, Gale testified twice. The first time was against appellants Mamarion and Domingo as
well as accused Villarosa and Leysa. The second instance was against appellants Maclang and
Harisco, and, accused Mendoza. All throughout his testimony, his narration of the events, from
the moment he was first taken in by the group on June 18, 1995 up to the time he was fetched
by his wife and the authorities in Laguna on September 25, 1995, Gale was consistent in his
account. Even during the rigorous cross-examination conducted by appellants' counsel, Gale
was steadfast in his account of the commission of the crime and the participation of all
appellants.
The fact that the trial court found the testimony of another prosecution witness
Ruperto Legarda, Jr. to be replete with inconsistencies and incongruities pertaining to significant
and important details and "suffers from serious improbabilities" does not lessen the credibility of
Gale.
The testimony of Gale, sans that of Legarda, Jr., is sufficient to convict appellants.
Truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. 55The
testimony of a single witness if positive and credible is sufficient to support a conviction, as
convictions rest not on the number of witnesses, but on the credibility of the testimony of even
one witness who is able to convince the court of the guilt of the accused beyond a shadow of
doubt. 56
Appellants Maclang and Harisco insist that Gale's testimony is incredible and replete
with inconsistencies. They maintain that Gale was inconsistent when: (1) he testified on July 7,
1997 that he saw Maclang for the first time in the morning of June 22, 1995 at the duplex seated
at the balcony; while during his December 17, 1997 testimony, he said that when he
fetched Mamarion's group on June 22, 1995 at the duplex, he saw Maclang seated on the chair
facing the table, and that he already knew Maclang because the latter used to attend occasions
hosted by Porquez for whom Gale used to work; 57 (2) he did not state in his July 7, 1997
testimony when and where the kidnapping will take place as discussed during their July 10, 1995
meeting; while in his December 17, 1997 testimony, he specified that Maclang said on July 10,
1995 that Roberta Cokin will be kidnapped on July 15, 1995 at the Tangub cockpit; 58 and (3)
during the August 8, 1996 re-investigation, he said that Mamarion and Roger Biona informed
him that the duplex house was owned by appellant Harisco, while when further examined, he
said that he found out that the duplex was owned by Harisco only after his affidavit was
taken. 59
These alleged inconsistencies, if they can be considered as such, are negligible and
merely refer to minor details that do not bear relevance on the material and significant fact that
appellants were part of the group which concocted and carried out the kidnapping of Roberta
Cokin.
Moreover, while it is true that, Gale did not state during his July 7, 1997 testimony that
the details of the kidnapping were discussed during the group's July 10, 1995 breakfast meeting
at the duplex house, it is because the prosecution did not ask him particularly as to what took
place during such breakfast conference. What was asked of him during that portion of his direct
examination merely pertained to his companions at that time, thus:
Q Now, on July 10, 1995 in the morning, where were you?
WITNESS:
A On July 10, I went to the Duplex house to fetch John Mamarion alias
"Oloy" and Roger Biona. And that was the time I recognized
Juliet Harisco.
ATTY. BANZON:
Q Now, in that breakfast conference with Major Maclang and Juliet
Harisco on July 10, 1995, who were the other persons present
in the morning of July 10, 1995?
A I saw some people. Some people are matured and some are young. I
don't know their names but I can recognize them by face if I
saw again.
Q How about John Mamarion, Felipe "Oloy" Mamarion, alias "Jack" and
Roger Biona, were they also in that conference?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir, they were present while Major Maclang and Juliet Harisco
instructed them while they were eating their breakfast.
Q Now, Mr. Gale, after that breakfast conference on July 10, 1995, do
you know where did you proceed?
WITNESS:
A After the breakfast conference, Juliet Harisco told me that she will
borrow or rent the car for four (4) days. She will pay the car
Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos, a day, because they are going
to North Negros for a very confidential transaction and I am not
needed. 60
Obviously, Gale could not have testified as to the details of their breakfast meeting
because proper questions on direct examination were not propounded by the prosecution. The
above-quoted testimony cannot be considered an inconsistency but rather it is the result of an
omission on the part of the prosecutor who conducted the direct examination. It must be
emphasized that a response to a question is not to be isolated in relation to other queries and
answers thereto. 61 The rule is that testimonies must be taken in their entirety. 62
Thus, during the cross-examination of Gale by counsel for Mamarion on July 24, 1997,
the Court finds that Gale elucidated on the participation of appellant Maclang, viz.:
ATTY. ROMERO:
Q You testified here that while in Bacolod City, there was an occasion
that you ate breakfast at the duplex house at Capitol Heights,
wherein Rolando Maclang, during that breakfast suggested that
the kidnapping of Roberta Cokin will be in Bacolod City?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. ROMERO:
Q And during that meeting, what Major Maclang had only told you group
that the kidnapping will be in Bacolod City, and that is all?
COURT:
Only "said". Maclang said.
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. ROMERO:
Q And that was all that Maclang said in that meeting?
 A There were many other things. A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx Q After fetching them in the morning of July 9, 1995, where did you and
your group proceed?
ATTY. ROMERO:
WITNESS:
Q Now, in Iloilo City, what was told to you by Ronal Porquez was that,
"We will kidnap a certain businesswoman in Bacolod City". And A We went around the city to look for a safehouse. We proceeded to
while in Bacolod, it was Rolando Maclang who finally decided Goldenfield, Mansiligan, Airport, and Tangub, until they decided
that the kidnapping will be held in Bacolod City. That is your to go back to the duplex . . .
testimony here in court, is that correct?
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
A We went back to the duplex house at Capitol Heights.
WITNESS: John Mamarion instructed me again to fetch them early in the
morning the following day.
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, on July 10, 1995 in the morning, as instructed by John Mamarion,
xxx xxx xxx were you able to fetch them?
COURT:
A In the morning I went back to the duplex house and when I arrived
Q Porquez in that meeting in Iloilo never mentioned Rolando Maclang there, Juliet Harisco and Rolando Maclang were there as well
and to be the person who will meet you here in Bacolod City? as the group. We took our breakfast there and had a meeting.
Is that correct or not?
Q Now, in that breakfast meeting where you also attended and
A Yes, he has mentioned that. participated on July 10, 1995, who are present?

ATTY. ROMERO: A Major Maclang, Juliet Harisco, John Mamarion, Roger Biona, Charlito
Domingo, Oloy Mamarion and myself, and some young
Q What was the statement about Rolando Maclang made by Roland persons whom I do not know, but I could identify them if ever I
Porquez? could see them.

WITNESS: ATTY. BANZON:

A That here in Bacolod, everything will be taken cared of by Major Q Now, what transpired in the breakfast meeting that you said you
Maclang. 63 attended on the morning of July 10, 1995 with Major Maclang
and Juliet Harisco among others?
This is further reinforced when Gale testified about the participation of appellants Maclang
and Harisco on December 17, 1997, to wit: A Major Maclang told us that Roberta Cokin will be kidnapped at the
cockpit of Tangub.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What else has transpired in that breakfast meeting?
Q Now, after arriving at Bacolod City on July 8, 1995, where did you and
your group proceed? A In the course of our meeting, Juliet Harisco stated further that
John Mamarion will be the one to get Roberta Cokin because
A We proceed directly to the duplex house at Capitol Heights, where
they trust John Mamarion, and she will be the one to finance.
Rolando Maclang and Juliet Harisco live.
She told me that only the group will go, and that I will not go
xxx xxx xxx with them. So, I told them that if ever they will use the car, they
have to pay me in advance the amount of P500.00 pesos per
ATTY. BANZON: day because they will use the car for four (4) days.
Q So what happened, when you arrived at the duplex house from San Q What else happened in that breakfast meeting?
Carlos on July 8, 1995?
A Juliet Harisco stated further that they will go to Central Market, and that
A John Mamarion, Carlito Domingo, Roger Biona, and I will follow them.
Oloy Mamarion alighted, and then I proceeded to Mansilingan.
They instructed me again to come back the following day, that Q When you said they will leave for the Central Market, and your group
is already July 9, 1995. will follow them, who were those are you referring to?

Q Now, as instructed by them, were you able to fetch them in the morning WITNESS:
of July 9, 1995 at the duplex house?
 A John Mamarion, Charlito Domingo, Roger Biona and myself. It was
Juliet Harisco who instructed us to follow them because we will
get the money and the group, composed of John Mamarion,
Charlito Domingo, Roger Biona, Oloy Mamarion and myself will
get the money in the amount of P2,000.00 pesos from her.
Q Were you able to receive that P2,000.00 pesos from Juliet Harisco on
July 10, 1995?
A Yes, sir. After I received the P2,000.00 pesos, they proceeded north,
but they dropped me at the corner of Pepsi/Bata because
John Mamarion told me that I could not go with them as their
travel is confidential. He instructed me that I have to wait again
in that same place where they dropped me on July 14, 1995
when they will return the vehicle.
COURT:
Q This P2,000.00 pesos represents the advance rental of the vehicle?
WITNESS:
A Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. BANZON:
Q Now, let's go back to that breakfast meeting on July 10, 1995. You said
earlier in your direct testimony that Major Maclang told you and
the group that Roberta Cokin would be kidnapped in the . . . at
the Tangub cockpit. My question is, was there a date
mentioned as to when the kidnap should be effected or made?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir. Because he knew that Roberta Cokin would be joining the
derby.
Q What date?
A July 15, 1995. But he stated further that whatever happens, he will not
be pointed to as a participant in the kidnapping. 64 (Emphasis
supplied)
Furthermore, while it is true that the names of Maclang and Harisco do not appear in
the affidavits previously executed by Gale and that the latter failed to identify them during the re-
investigation of the case, still, they were specifically pointed out and unequivocally identified by
Gale during the trial as those who were with the group when the plan to kidnap the victim was
hatched. Such testimony prevails over the affidavits which Gale previously executed. It is settled
that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in
court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are
inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes
inaccurate. 65
Moreover, delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not
necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, especially where the delay is explained. 66 Gale
was able to satisfactorily explain why he did not name or identify Maclang and Harisco in his
affidavits and during the re-investigation of the case. On cross-examination by counsel for
appellant Maclang, Gale staunchly declared: "I purposely did not make mention of Major
Maclang because the person who was taking my affidavit was a policeman and I am afraid
because Major Maclang was also a policeman, I was afraid because even Oloy Mamarion, our
companion was even killed." 67 Gale further explained that he was afraid because Major
Maclang and Juliet Harisco have warned him not to implicate them. 68 Upon further questioning,
Gale stated that he was not afraid anymore "because when my family had already left, I trusted
myself to the Lord and I said to myself that I will tell the truth." 69 Thus, the omission of the
names of appellants Maclang and Harisco by Gale in his affidavits does not demolish his
credibility when he subsequently implicated them on the witness stand.
Witnesses are usually reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or are
unwilling to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations due to a variety of valid
reasons. 70 Fear of the criminal is one such reason. 71 On that account, Gale's fear was not
without basis. In his testimony Gale revealed that on July 23, 1995, after arriving from Manila,
several armed men went to his house in Old Escalante at around 11:00 p.m., and looked for him,
but he hid. 72 Meanwhile, his wife who likewise came from Manila on the same day, dropped by
Benjie Bernaje's house, and there, Bernaje's' maid handed her a note coming from
John Mamarion which contained two bullet slugs and read: "(T)his two (2) slugs let Amado eat
this dispense slug." 73 Gale also received a death threat on May 8, 1996 during the re-
investigation of the case at the City Prosecutor's office while he was in the comfort room and
someone sidled up to him and handed him a note warning him not to name Maclang or else he
will not return to Bacolod alive. 74
Gale's escorts, JO1 Leo Joven and JO1 Jose Gerard Simpas, testified that they did
not see Gale leave Prosecutor Baldago's office at the Iloilo City Hall of Justice during the re-
investigation on May 8, 1996, nor did they notice any unusual behavior on his part at the time he
allegedly received the death threat. 75 This, however, should not be taken as proof that he did
not actually receive those death threats. As the trial court aptly elucidated:
. . . they certainly based their perception on the outward
appearance and actuations of Amado. They certainly were not in the
position to observe the anxiety on Amado's mind and fear that digs deep
in Amado's heart. The Court observed Amado to be a quiet and pensive
person. By keeping to himself and remaining quiet, Amado acted
normally. Without claiming expertise on the field of human behavior, the
Court is nevertheless convinced that Amado is the type who would
remain outwardly quiet although an inner turmoil gnaws inveterately
inside his guts.
JO1 Joven declared that Amado did not leave the re-
investigation room to go to the comfort room. The matter of Amado going
to the comfort room during the re-investigation is so insignificant and
trivial that could not possibly leave a mark in Mr. Joven's memory. In any
event, JO1 Joven left Amado Gale and the other detainee he was
guarding (Charlito Domingo) when he bought coke and siopao on the
ground floor of the building. JO1 Simpas also left the detainees when he
purchased coffee for Amado who requested for the change of the coke to
coffee. 76
There being no showing that Gale has any ill motive to testify against appellants, the
presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony was untainted with bias, and thus
entitled to full faith and credit. 77
In sum, the trial court did not commit any error when it gave probative weight and
credence to Gale's testimony.
On the second issue:
The prosecution evidence clearly shows that appellants were conspirators in the
perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom of Roberta Cokin. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. 78 Appellants Mamarion's and Domingo's acts of monitoring the victim's activities,
coordinating the abduction, handing the ransom note, collecting the ransom, and detaining
Roberta Cokin; and the concerted acts of appellants Maclang and Harisco in giving instructions
and providing funds for their operations, prove that they acted in concert in committing the crime.
Appellants' individual participation, viewed in its totality, point to a joint purpose and criminal
design. Thus, they are all equally liable given that in a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
all. 79
Appellant Mamarion questions the failure of the prosecution to present the money
allegedly paid as ransom. On this score, it must be pointed out that the corpus delicti in the
crime of kidnapping for ransom does not pertain to the ransom money itself. It is the fact of the
commission of the crime which may be proved by the testimony of the witnesses who saw it. To
prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the prosecution to be able to show that (1) a certain
fact has been proven, and (2) a particular person is criminally responsible for the act. 80
From the evidence brought before the trial court, the name and participation of
appellant Mamarion in the planning and execution of the crime of Kidnapping with Ransom
consistently and persistently crop up. However, for reasons known only to himself, he chose to
remain silent. In open court, his counsel manifested that he was waiving his right to present
evidence in his defense. Mamarion confirmed said manifestation, thus:
COURT:
Q Your lawyer declared in Court that you are not adducing any evidence
by way of your defense. Did your lawyer give you that
information?
JOHN MAMARION
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q Do you confirm that information of your lawyer?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Did your lawyer explain to you the consequences of your not
presenting evidence?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, the Court will explain to you that if you do not present any
evidence for your own behalf the case will be decided solely on
the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution against
you. Do you understand that?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you still insist that you will not present any evidence?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And you confirm to the Court that you were not enticed or persuaded
by your lawyer, but this is your own voluntary decision that you
will not be presenting evidence? Of course, upon conferring
with your lawyer?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q I think you are aware that this is a heinous crime that you are charged
with in this court?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Are you aware of the penalty that may be imposed if you are found
guilty of the offense?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What do you know?
A Death penalty.
Q And inspite of that, are you still insisting that you will not testify here, or
you will not present any other witness to testify on your behalf?
A Yes, Your Honor. 81
His silence works against him as it goes against the principle that the first impulse of an
innocent man when accused of wrongdoing is to express his innocence at the first
opportune time. 82
Appellant Domingo's defense is alibi. He claims that he was on duty from June 15 to
July 25, 1995 as Apprentice Specialist at the 2nd Air Division of the Philippine Air Force based in
Mactan although he went on leave of absence from June 23 to June 26, 1995. The trial court
refused to give any weight to the Morning Reports presented by Domingo showing that he was
on duty on the dates Gale stated as these documents do not appear to be tamper-proof, 83 and
that they do not accurately reflect absences of Air Force personnel out on a pass. 84 Aside from
this, prosecution witness Brgy. Capt. Marlon Villa testified that he saw Domingo whom he knows
as "Jack", together with Roger Biona at the Odiongan barrio fiesta on June 29, 1995, 85 and
again, on the first week of July 1995 also in Brgy. Odiongan although they didn't talk to each
other, 86 while Gale positively identified Domingo as the alias "Jack" who was part of their
group. 87 Given these testimonies, the trial court was correct in disregarding Domingo's alibi as
jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the
negative testimonies of the defense. 88
The defense of appellant Harisco is denial and alibi. The Court will first deal on her
alibi. Her defense of denial will be taken up together with that of appellant Maclang.
It is axiomatic that alibi is inherently weak and unavailing, 89 and should be
established with clear and convincing evidence in order to be acceptable. 90 The burden is upon
the accused to present credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility to be at the scene of
the crime; otherwise, an alibi may not prevail over the positive testimony and clear identification
of the accused by prosecution witnesses. 91
Harisco claims that at 5:15 in the morning of July 10, 1995, she was already in the
airport refuting Gale's testimony that they had a breakfast meeting on said date at 5:30 in the
morning.
The trial court was not persuaded with her alibi. In disregarding Harisco's alibi, the trial
court found that her PAL plane ticket shows that the flight for Cebu on July 10, 1995 was
scheduled to leave at 8:40 in the morning, and Harisco and her companion can be at the airport
minutes before the flight such that her presence during the breakfast meeting at 5:30 in the
morning cannot be foreclosed. Harisco, however, points out that the trial court was mistaken
when it stated that the flight was at 8:40 in the morning, because the time reflected on the ticket
refers to her connecting flight from Cebu to Zamboanga on the same date, not from Bacolod City
to Cebu.
On this score, the best evidence that would prove Harisco's flight details on July 10,
1995 would be the plane ticket itself. 92 A review of Harisco's plane ticket indeed discloses that
the 8:40 flight indicated therein pertains to the connecting flight from Cebu to
Zamboanga. 93 However, there is nothing on record that will buttress Harisco's denial that she
was present at the breakfast meeting as she had an early morning flight for Cebu. It must be
pointed out that it devolves upon Harisco to prove the truth of her allegations, or denials, for that
matter. Her plane ticket does not state the specific time of her flight from Bacolod to Cebu as
said flight was booked with an open date. 94 Harisco's witness, May Luzuriaga, testified that the
flight from Bacolod to Cebu was at 6:10 in the morning. 95 But further review of the evidence on
record shows that the flight was in fact at 6:50 in the morning. Particularly, in the passenger
manifest brought and presented by Bacolod Branch PAL Manager Job Lamela, it was
specifically written that the time of Flight No. 371 on July 10, 1995 was at 0650H, or in layman's
term, 6:50 in the morning, 96 thus debunking Harisco's claim. Absent proof therefore, Harisco's
claim is reduced to an unsupported allegation that bears little persuasive effect, definitely
insufficient to prevail over Gale's positive identification. 97
And even assuming that Harisco's flight was at 6:10 in the morning, it does not follow
that it was physically impossible for her to negotiate the distance between her house and the
airport. From 5:30 in the morning up to boarding time, Harisco had ample time to be at the
meeting and subsequently board the plane bound for Cebu.
The trial court took judicial notice that Harisco can be at the airport even minutes
before the flight with her ticket and baggage already checked-in earlier in her behalf. 98
Physical impossibility takes into consideration not only the geographical distance
between the scene of the crime, in the present case, the scene of the planning of the crime and
the place where appellant maintains she was at, but more importantly, the accessibility between
these two points — how this distance translates to number of hours of travel. 99Geographical
distances may be taken judicial notice of, but this alone will not suffice for purposes of proving
an alibi. 100
The burden is on Harisco to demonstrate that it was physically impossible for her to
have been in her duplex in Capitol Heights where Gale testified that she had breakfast meeting
with and gave instructions to members of the group in carrying out the kidnapping with ransom
of Roberta Cokin. 101 Harisco, failed to discharge such burden. The Court does not find any
evidence that shows that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the fact that appellant
Harisco can be at the airport in a few minutes time thus making it possible for her to be in the
breakfast meeting before going to the airport for the 6:10 a.m. flight, if indeed the flight of
appellant Harisco from Bacolod City to Cebu was actually 6:10 in the morning of July 10, 1995.
In the light of Gale's positive testimony that Harisco participated in the planning of the
kidnapping and was present at the breakfast meeting on July 10, 1995, her defense of alibi must
fail, especially when there is no showing that Gale had any improper motive to testify falsely
against her 102 or that it was physically impossible for her to be at the duplex during the
meeting.
Appellant Maclang denies any involvement, claiming that his indictment was politically
motivated and that at the time the alleged conspiracy was brewing, he was already assigned in
the Regional Special Office in Camp Delgado, Iloilo City, 103 and later at the Iloilo Police
Provincial Command in Sta. Barbara, Iloilo. 104 Maclang's denials are futile. As a defense,
denials are insipid and weak, being easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. 105 Mere denial of
involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over positive testimony. 106Also, as in the case
of Harisco and Domingo, Maclang failed to prove the impossibility of his presence when the
crime was being planned or that Gale was ill-motivated in identifying him as one of those who
spearheaded the crime.
The participation of both appellants Harisco and Maclang is spelled-out very clearly by
the trial court, based on the evidence adduced before it, as follows:
. . . The facts and circumstances which indubitably show the
participation of Major Maclang and Juliet Harisco in the conspiracy may
be succinctly summed up, thus:
1. Major Maclang is the benefactor of the accused
John Mamarion whom he took in as an asset in the Task Force
Iron Eagle of which he was the Operations Officer.
John Mamarion also worked for Juliet Harisco in the latter's
barter trade business. Both Maclang and Harisco exercised
moral ascendancy and influence over Mamarion;
2. Maj. Maclang is a friend of the accused Ronaldo
Porquez. Porquez' participation in the conspiracy as instigator
was duly established. If the kidnapping is to be segmented,
Major Maclang and Juliet Harisco handles the Bacolod City
segment while Porquez is in-charge of the Iloilo side. Porquez
expressly made known to Mamarionand the kidnap group that
in Bacolod City, Maj. Maclang and Juliet Harisco will answer for
their expenses;
3. Maclang and Harisco have an illicit affair and both
stay at the duplex house at Homesite. John Mamarion and the
kidnap group stay at the duplex house in the course of the
preparations for the kidnapping;
4. The fact that the kidnap group did not return to the
duplex house after snatching Roberta reinforces the evidence
of the duo's participation. This is too obvious to be further
explained;
5. Maclang and Harisco actually delivered moneys to
John Mamarion which were spent during the preparations for
the kidnapping;
6. It was Maj. Maclang who ordered the kidnapping
to be held on July 15, 1995 at the Tangub cockpit. Juliet
Harisco pointed to John Mamarion reiterating his assigned role
as the one who will actually snatch Roberta Cokin. This
incident took place during the breakfast meeting at the duplex
house in the morning of July 10, 1995. It was during that time
when Major Maclang gave out a warning that whatever
happens, his name should not be mentioned in connection with
the kidnapping;
7. After the filing of the charges against them, both
Maclang and Harisco took flight and evaded arrest. They were
arrested in the same house at Taytay, Rizal on October 25,
1997. As testified by Lt. Col. Rolando Lopez, both Maclang and
Harisco occupy adjacent rooms at the upper portion of the
building.
The evidence clearly show that both Maj. Maclang and Juliet
Harisco were aware of the filing of the present case against them and
they both evaded arrest. Maclang's feeble explanation for his flight was
that he was trying to recover the folder in the possession of Roger Biona
as the documents therein contained would unravel the mystery of the
Cokin kidnapping. This claim is too shallow and too nebulous as to be
given any serious consideration. Harisco's explanation is that she could
not accept being charged for a crime she did not commit. This
explanation wilts and fades in illuminating brightness of clear and positive
evidence pointing to her participation in the kidnap-slay as a principal by
inducement. 107
Both appellants Maclang and Harisco argue that: (1) it is inconceivable that they
should be involved in a crime involving such a measly mount considering that Harisco is
engaged in a successful business and owns several properties, 108 and that Maclang is a be-
medalled military officer; 109 (2) Harisco has no motive for committing the crime; 110 (3) the
bungled crime cannot be the handiwork of an experienced military man like Maclang; 111 (4) it is
illogical that Maclang will allow Harisco to give instructions to the group when he is supposedly
to be the one to do it. 112
These arguments, which are vain attempts on appellants' part to discredit Gale, are
plain surmises and conjectures that pale in the light of Gale's positive identification and
unwavering testimony. That Harisco is well-off is irrelevant. As the Court has declared
in People vs. Deang possession of wealth does not make one a saint and poverty alone does
not make one a criminal. 113 Thus, lack of motive on the part of Harisco is a moot point in the
face of the positive identification and testimony of Gale on Harisco's participation. Proof of ill
motive to commit the crime then becomes irrelevant. 114 Likewise, Maclang's so-called
achievements do not necessarily connote that he is innocent of the crime charged or that he is
incapable of committing it. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his
previous, or even present, good moral character and exemplary conduct. 115
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. No.
7659 kidnapping for ransom is penalized as follows:
Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive
him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than
five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill
him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female
or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that appellants conspired
to commit, and in fact, committed the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, as charged in the
Information. In addition, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that as a
consequence of the detention of the victim, she sustained physical injuries which resulted in her
death. Applying Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the appellants are criminally
liable for the death of the victim. There being no evidence that any modifying circumstances
attended the killing of the victim, the appellants are guilty only of the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide. 116
Kidnapping for ransom is punishable by death. Under the last paragraph of Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code, if the victim of the kidnapping dies as a result of her detention, the
penalty is also death. However, since the appellants committed only one felony namely, the
special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide, the appellant should be
sentenced to only one death penalty. 117
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling
of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in
the case at bar.
As regards the civil liability of appellants resulting from the death of Roberta
Cokin, Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code is explicit: "(N)otwithstanding the provisions of the
next preceding article, the principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective
class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily
liable for those of the other persons liable." Hence, the trial court did not err in declaring that
appellants' liability for the civil indemnity, as principals, is solidary 118 or joint and several.
The trial court did not err in awarding P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of
Roberta Cokin.
In addition, the trial court is correct in not awarding actual damages to the heirs of
Roberta Cokin. While Teresita Cokin testified that she incurred and defrayed the expenses of
transferring the remains of the victim from the funeral parlor in Anilao to Somo Funeral Home in
Iloilo, no receipt or any document was presented in support thereof.
However, the Court has ruled in recent cases that when no sufficient proof of actual
damages is offered, the heirs of the victim may be awarded temperate damages in the amount
of P25,000.00. 119
The trial court is likewise correct in not awarding moral damages. When Teresita
Cokin testified that she emotionally suffered as a result of the death of Roberta Cokin, 120 the
defense timely objected to its introduction 121 on the ground that the prosecution inadvertently
failed to offer Teresita's testimony for the purpose of proving moral damages, 122 in which case,
the trial court did not err in disallowing said evidence.
Hence, actual and moral damages may not be awarded for lack of legal basis.
In view of the presence of two circumstances, namely, the ransom demand and the
death of the victim, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 should be awarded to the
heirs of Roberta Cokin, conformably with the ruling of this Court in People vs. Deang, 123 to wit:
The law also allows exemplary damages in criminal cases as
part of the civil liability of the malefactors when the crime is attended by
one or more aggravating circumstances. As discussed above, this
requisite had already been met. Exemplary damages are, however,
imposed "not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious
actions." In the case at bar, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 are awarded to the private complainants, by way of example
or correction, in addition to the damages herein awarded.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City (Branch 50) in Criminal Case No. 96-17590, convicting appellants
John Mamarion y Hisugan, Charlito Domingo y Gorospe, Rolando Maclang y Ventura and Juliet
Harisco y Carrera of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of DEATH and ordering them to pay jointly and severally, to the heirs of Roberta Cokin the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity with MODIFICATION that they
are further ordered to pay an additional amounts of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00)
as temperate damages and One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as exemplary
damages.
Upon finality of this decision, pursuant to Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659,
amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, let the records of this case be immediately
forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power. IAEcCT
 SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcunaand Tinga, JJ ., concur.

||| (People v. Mamarion, G.R. No. 137554, [October 1, 2003], 459 PHIL 51-100)