Administrative Waiver CP Final

CUNY 2010 1/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Administrative Waiver CP
*1NC*........................................................................................................................................................... 3
Waiver CP 1NC........................................................................................................................................ 4
Net Benefit: Politics.................................................................................................................................. 5
*Solvency*..........................................................................................................................6
Solvency: Aggravated Felonies................................................................................................................ 7
Solvency: Criminal Exclusion (1/2)........................................................................................................... 8
Solvency: Criminal Exclusion (2/2)........................................................................................................... 9
Solvency: Family Based Visas............................................................................................................... 10
Solvency: Generic.................................................................................................................................. 11
Solvency: H-1B Visas............................................................................................................................. 12
Solvency: H-2 Visas............................................................................................................................... 13
Solvency: Ideological Exclusion............................................................................................................. 14
Solvency: Moral Turpitude Inadmissibility..............................................................................................15
Solvency: Refugees............................................................................................................................... 16
Solvency: Terror Exclusion.................................................................................................................... 17
*ILaw Net Benefit*...........................................................................................................18
1NC ILaw Shell...................................................................................................................................... 19
ILaw Solvency Ext.................................................................................................................................. 20
ILaw Impact Ext...................................................................................................................................... 21
2NC ILaw Module: Leadership (1/2)....................................................................................................... 22
2NC ILaw Module: Leadership (2/2)....................................................................................................... 23
Waivers  ILaw K2 Global Stability....................................................................................................... 24
Waivers  ILaw K2 Humanitarian Relief............................................................................................... 25
*Impact Modules*............................................................................................................ 26
Customary ILaw Module (1/3)................................................................................................................ 27
Human Rights Cred Module................................................................................................................... 30
*A2: Aff Args*................................................................................................................. 31
AG Strength Good: Generic................................................................................................................... 32
Agencies Solve: Generic........................................................................................................................ 33
Agencies Good: Democracy.................................................................................................................. 34
Agencies Good: SOP............................................................................................................................. 35
Delegation Good: Generic (1/2)............................................................................................................. 36
Delegation Good: Generic (2/2)............................................................................................................. 37
Executive Power: Generic (1/2).............................................................................................................. 38
Executive Power: Generic (2/2).............................................................................................................. 39
Plenary Power Bad: Generic.................................................................................................................. 40
A2: Attorney General Can’t Act............................................................................................................. 41
A2: Courts Solve.................................................................................................................................... 42
A2: Waivers Fail..................................................................................................................................... 43
CUNY 2010 2/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
**Aff Answers**...............................................................................................................44
*Solvency Answers*..........................................................................................................45
No Solvency: Admissibility..................................................................................................................... 46
No Solvency: Deportability..................................................................................................................... 47
No Solvency: Familial Sponsorship........................................................................................................ 48
No Solvency: Firearm Crimes................................................................................................................ 49
No Solvency: Generic............................................................................................................................ 50
*Mech Answers*...............................................................................................................51
Congress Must Delegate....................................................................................................52
Delegation Bad: Generic........................................................................................................................ 53
Delegation Bad: SOP............................................................................................................................. 54
*Net Benefit Answers*......................................................................................................55
I-Law Fails: Non-Binding........................................................................................................................ 56
I-Law Bad: Constitutionality.................................................................................................................... 57
Customary ILaw Bad: Preemption.......................................................................................................... 58
Customary ILaw Bad: Tensions........................................................................................59
HR Cred Bad: China.............................................................................................................................. 60
HR Cred Bad: War................................................................................................................................. 61
CUNY 2010 3/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
*1NC*
CUNY 2010 4/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Waiver CP 1NC
Text: The Attorney General of the United States should grant waivers of inadmissibility to all
visa applicants who are denied admissions because of _________________.
____Waivers forgive visa applicants found to be inadmissible or deportable
Shugall & Desnoyers, ‘8 [Ilyce, Associate Attorney at Van Der Hout, Brigagliano & Nightingale, LLP in San
Francisco & Rebecca, JD Candidate Winter 2008, William Mitchell College of Law, “Immigration Law: Case Note:
Orozco v. Mukasey: When an entry may not be an “admission” and the fundamental problems with the ninth
circuit’s analysis,” William Mitchell College of Law, 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 68, lexis]
In addition to being inspected and admitted, a non-citizen applying for adjustment of status under section
245(a) must show [*86] that he or she is admissible to the United States. n107 There is a broad range of
conduct that can render someone inadmissible. One of the more common grounds is section 212(a)(6)(C)(i),
which relates to conduct involving fraud or misrepresentation. n108 Under that section, any non-citizen who
fraudulently or willfully misrepresents a material fact in obtaining or seeking to obtain a visa,
documentation, or admission to the United States is inadmissible. n109 Congress enacted section 212(a)(6)(C)
(i) in order to prevent non-citizens from obtaining entry into the country by fraudulent means and then, once this
is exposed, continuing with the immigration application process as if nothing happened. n110 Recognizing the
harsh results of lifetime inadmissibility on non-citizens and their families, however, Congress enacted a
waiver under section 212(i) for qualified individuals. n111 A waiver generally serves to temporarily or
permanently remove, or "forgive," a particular ground of inadmissibility or deportability. n112 A waiver
[*87] granted under section 212(i) essentially forgives a non-citizen's inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)
(C)(i) due to fraud or misrepresentation. n113 Previously, section 212(i) was expanded by the Immigration Act of 1990
("IMMACT90") n114 to allow a waiver for fraud or misrepresentation under former INA section 212(i)(1) for the spouse, parent, son, or
daughter of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. n115 For non-citizens lacking the requisite family relationship, IMMACT90 also
permitted a waiver in circumstances [*88] where ten years had passed since the date of the fraudulent act. n116 Yet, IIRIRA significantly
curtailed section 212(i) relief. n117 First, a 212(i) waiver was no longer available to the parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent
residents. n118 IIRIRA also removed the ten-year provision, restricting the benefits of the waiver only to those who have the stated family
relationship. n119 Further, Congress raised the threshold for granting section 212(i) waivers, requiring a showing of "extreme hardship" to
the non-citizen's qualifying family member if the waiver is not approved. n120 Additionally, under IIRIRA, judicial review of a section
212(i) waiver is barred. n121 Thus, in its present form, section 212(i) waives inadmissibility for fraud or
misrepresentation under 212(a)(6)(C)(i) only if the non-citizen can prove that his or her lawful permanent
resident or U.S. citizen spouse or parent will suffer extreme hardship if the admission to the United States
is refused. n122 Additionally, the [*89] benefit of a 212(i) waiver is discretionary, meaning that the
application may still be denied even if the non-citizen meets all of the statutory requirements. n123 If the
non-citizen is outside the United States, a 212(i) waiver is submitted to a consular officer in connection with an
immigrant visa application. n124 If the individual is inside the United States, the 212(i) waiver application is
filed with the CIS field office director or with the Immigration Judge if the person is in removal proceedings.
n125
CUNY 2010 5/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Net Benefit: Politics
___Delegation allows unpopular action to happen without political backlash
Mezhburd, 2K [Serg, Managing Editor, “The Unintelligible Standard: Rethinking the Mandate of the FTC From a
Nondelegation Perspective,” NYU Annual Survey of American Law, 57 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 361, lexis]
While agreeing that the Constitution mandates congressional lawmaking, public choice theorists add that
congressional lawmaking is also crucial to representative democracy. n66 Using the economist-styled [*374]
rational actor model, public choice theory argues that reelection serves as the major motive for all decisions
made by legislators while in office. n67 Consequently, publicly elected officials who may be held accountable
to their electorate should be promulgating the laws that affect such an electorate. Further, public choice
theorists argue, Congress may have selfish and even sinister reasons for delegating. n68 For example, a statute
setting universally desirable goals and broadly delegating the lawmaking authority to implement such goals is
politically beneficial, since it enables Congress to claim support for uncontroversial issues, such as protection
of children or the environment, while removing itself from politically unpopular but necessary costs, such as the
consequent rise in prices of consumer goods and services. n69 As nondelegation proponents are fond of saying,
delegation provides Congress with an escape route from making "hard choices." n70
___The CP avoids presidential and congressional backlash
Schoenbrod. ’93 [David, Prof of Law @ NYU Law, “Power and Responsibility; how Congress Abuses
the people through Delegation,” p. 10, googlebooks]
Congress and the president delegate for much the same reason that they continue to run budget deficits. With
deficit spending, they can claim credit for the benefits of their expenditures yet escape blame for the costs.
The public must pay ultimately of course, but through taxes levied at some future lime by some other officials. The
point is not that deficits always have bad economic consequences, but that they have the political consequence of
allowing officials to duck responsibility for costs. Likewise, delegation allows legislators to claim credit for the
benefits which a regulatory statute promises yet escape the Name for the burdens it will impose, because they
do not issue the laws Deeded to achieve those benefits. The public inevitably must suffer regulatory burdens to
realize regulatory benefits, but the laws will come from an agency that legislators can then criticize for imposing
excessive burdens on their constituents. Just as deficit spending allows legislators to appear to deliver money to
some people without taking it from others, delegation allows them to appear to deliver regulatory benefits without
imposing regulatory costs. It provides "a handy set of mirrors—so useful in Washington—by which a politician can
appear to kiss both sides of the apple."
CUNY 2010 6/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
*Solvency*
CUNY 2010 7/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Solvency: Aggravated Felonies
___Waivers solve aggravated felony exclusion and deportation
Rodriguez, ‘6 [Sara A., B.A. University of Wisconsin, 1990; M.A. University of Wisconsin, 1991; J.D. University
of Houston, 1996; LL.M. Candidate, Public International Law, University of Houston Law Center, 2006, “Exile and
the not-so-lawful Permanent Resident: Does International Law Require: A Humanitarian Waiver of Deportation for
the Non-Citizen Convictd of Certain Crimes?” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 20 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 483,
Spring]
Initially, the BIA held that the amendments eliminating the discretionary [*494] waiver would not apply
retroactively to any individual who sought section 212(c) relief before the AEDPA's effective date of April 24,
1996. n80 In a move that sparked much controversy, United States Attorney General Janet Reno vacated the
BIA's decision, concluding that the AEDPA's restrictions on relief should be applied to all pending section
212(c) waiver applications, even those triggered by criminal convictions entered prior to the April 24, 1996
enactment date. n81 By adopting a policy of making the 1996 amendments and their elimination of the
availability of section 212(c) relief retroactive, the Attorney General effectively precluded any non-citizen
ever convicted of an aggravated felony from obtaining this type of discretionary relief from a final order
of removal. n82 Eliminating permanent resident non-citizens convicted of certain crimes from eligibility
for discretionary relief undoubtedly assured that more of these aliens will be deported. The consequences
of deportation for a criminal conviction are devastating for a non-citizen with family members who elect
to remain in the United States. In that regard, non-citizens convicted of an aggravated felony are
permanently barred from returning to the United States for even so much as a visit without a pardon or a
waiver in advance from the Attorney General. n83
CUNY 2010 8/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Solvency: Criminal Exclusion (1/2)
___Waivers solve crime inadmissibility
Spring]
Controversy about the retroactive application of these legislative amendments produced widespread litigation in
the courts. n20 This article will review three novel immigration opinions, particularly Beharry v. Reno, which
attempted to remedy the harsh consequences of retroactivity by relying on international law to create a
"humanitarian" waiver of removal for long-term LPRs convicted of certain crimes whose deportation
would visit hardship on guiltless family members. n21 Although the district court's decision in Beharry was
eventually reversed on procedural grounds, n22 to some practitioners and commentators the decision appeared to
hold out a glimmer of hope for aliens facing deportation as a result of certain criminal offenses. n23 [*486] The
promise posed by Beharry and its use of international law has not born fruit, as no court has followed its
reasoning. With all due respect for the noble effort to create a humanitarian waiver of removal, this article will
demonstrate that Beharry and its attempt to exploit international law was wrongly decided in several important
respects. To facilitate this discussion, the article will briefly review the historical treatment of non-citizens
convicted of certain crimes and the modern statutory mechanism for removing those individuals from the United
States. This article will examine a series of immigration decisions that culminated with Beharry and will then
discuss the international norms identified in those cases as they relate to the removal of criminal aliens. To
explain why courts have declined to follow Beharry, this article will also discuss some of the roadblocks that
have, to date, prevented the use of these international norms to contest removal proceedings undertaken in
accordance with the comprehensive federal statutory scheme in place in the United States. In doing so, the
article hopes to clarify whether the current policy of removing criminal aliens without balancing extreme
hardship to family members comports or conflicts with international law and to examine whether
international norms are of any aid to non-citizens facing deportation by reason of their criminal activity.
___Waivers solve exclusion - drug and firearm offenses, national security and domestic violence
crimes
Spring]
Any drug offense, however minor, may result in serious immigration consequences. In the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 (the "1986 ADAA"), n49 Congress amended the INA by classifying all controlled
substances as drugs [*490] for purposes of excluding or deporting an alien. n50 The only waiver
potentially available for this type of crime is for a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or
less of marijuana designated for personal use. n51 Also deportable are aliens convicted of certain
firearms offenses, n52 high-speed flight from an immigration checkpoint, n53 miscellaneous crimes
related to national security n54 and crimes related to domestic violence. n55
CUNY 2010 9/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Solvency: Criminal Exclusion (2/2)
___Waivers solve criminal offenses
Rodriguez, ‘6 [Sara A., B.A. University of Wisconsin, 1990; M.A. University of Wisconsin, 1991; J.D.
University of Houston, 1996; LL.M. Candidate, Public International Law, University of Houston Law Center, 2006,
“Exile and the not-so-lawful Permanent Resident: Does International Law Require: A Humanitarian Waiver of
Deportation for the Non-Citizen Convictd of Certain Crimes?” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 20 Geo.
Immigr. L.J. 483, Spring]
Ali's story is not an isolated one. United States immigration officials removed more than 79,000 "criminal aliens" during the year 2003 alone.
n14 Many of the LPRs among this number learned the hard way that punishment imposed for criminal behavior is often followed by exile in
the form of immigration sanctions that may result in the relinquishment of home and [*485] family. n15 Legislative amendments to United
States immigration statutes have steadily eroded the availability of relief for the LPR who is subject to an order of deportation, or removal as
that proceeding is now known, n16 because of a criminal conviction. The year 1996 was particularly hard for this category of non-citizen
with the advent of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (the "AEDPA") in April, n17 and the Illegal Immigrant Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (the "IIRIRA") in September. n18 These 1996 legislative changes drastically affected aliens convicted of
aggravated felonies, as that term is defined by the immigration statutes, when Attorney General Janet Reno announced that the amendments
restricting relief from removal for these individuals would apply retroactively. n19 As a result, a conviction for an aggravated
felony offense at any time in the past not only rendered non-citizens subject to deportation, but it also
made them ineligible for relief from deportation in the form of a discretionary waiver.
CUNY 2010
10/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Solvency: Family Based Visas
___Waivers solve family based visas
Section 237(a)(1)(H) now contains the current version of the waiver and applies to a non-citizen who
"is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter" of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident and "was in
possession of an immigrant visa or equivalent document and was otherwise admissible to the United States
at the time of such admission ... ." n136 A waiver granted under section [*91] 237(a)(1)(H) waives the
non-citizen's deportability and establishes his or her lawful admission for permanent residence in the
United States. n137
CUNY 2010
11/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Solvency: Generic
___ Waivers solve
With these views in mind, the district judge found that "[s]ummary deportation of this long-term alien without
allowing him to present the reasons he should not be deported violates the ICCPR's guarantee against
arbitrary interference with one's family, and the provision that the alien shall 'be allowed to submit the
reasons against his expulsion.'" n139 It further found that application of the INA to Beharry "would violate the
principles of customary international law that the best interests of the child must be considered where
possible." n140 To ensure an interpretation in compliance with international law, the district court interpreted
another waiver provision, INA § 212(h), to afford an opportunity to present evidence that a long-term
resident's removal would constitute an "extreme hardship" to a qualifying relative, warranting discretion
on the part of the Attorney General to waive deportation. n141 In doing so, the district court ignored the
fact that section 212(h) plainly excluded from relief lawful permanent residents convicted of an aggravated
felony. n142 The district court also overlooked the fact that Beharry had not asked for any relief under this
statute.
___Waivers solve inadmissibility
Vastine, ‘7 [Michael, Director of Immigration Clinic and Clinical Instructor, St. Thomas University School of
Law, “Being Careful What You Wish For: Divisible Statutes - Identifying a Non-Deportable Solution to a Non-
Citizen's Criminal Problem,” The Campbell Law Review, 29 Campbell L. Rev. 203, Winter, lexis]
A respondent arriving at a port of entry is considered an "arriving alien" and bears the burden of proving
her admissibility. Even a returning permanent resident is considered an arriving alien if, since her initial
admission as a resident, she has been convicted of a crime that would render her inadmissible. n21
Whether detected at a port of entry or through other contact with law enforcement, the criminal alien is issued
the Notice to Appear and given a court date to answer to the charges regarding the grounds of removal
(deportability or inadmissibility). n22
CUNY 2010
12/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Solvency: H-1B Visas
___Waivers solve H1B visas
Traven, ‘6 [Michael, JD at Capital University Law School, “Restricting Innovation: How Restrictive U.S.
Visa Policies Have the Potential to Deplete our Innovative Economy,” Capital University Law Review, 34
Cap. U.L. Rev. 693, Summer, lexis]
To understand the ways in which the visa policies have changed under the post- 9/11 U.S. government, it is
important to understand the basic [*712] structure of the U.S. visa system as it pertains to the creative
class. Two basic types of visas exist: immigrant and nonimmigrant. n118 Immigrant visas are typically
reserved for foreign individuals who desire to live in the U.S. permanently. n119 Conversely, a
nonimmigrant visa is issued on the condition that the person stays in the U.S. temporarily and only for a
specified purpose. n120 The foreign individuals upon whom this Comment focuses are those seeking a
nonimmigrant visa. Certain general requirements must be met before most nonimmigrant visas are
issued. n121 First and foremost, the applicant must be able to prove that he has a permanent residence
abroad to which he intends to return after the expiration of his visa. n122 The foreign national must
have a valid passport, must be admissible or have received a waiver of inadmissibility, and in certain
cases, must prove that he will be financially stable during his visit to the U.S. n123 The foreign national
may also have the ability to obtain permanent status as a U.S. citizen if certain standards are met. n124
Many different nonimmigrant visas are available, but three categories typically affect those in the
creative class: student visas, H-1B (or skilled employee) visas, and J-1 exchange visitor visas for
visiting scholars and researchers. n125
CUNY 2010
13/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Solvency: H-2 Visas
___Waivers solve H-2 visas
Lichtenstein, ‘7 [Merav, Associate Notes Editor, Cardozo Public Law, Policy and Ethics Journal; J.D. Candidate
(June 2007), Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; B.A. Emory University (2003), “An Examination of Guest
Worker Immigration Reform Policies in the United States,” Cardozo Public Law, Policy & Ethics Journal, 5
Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 689, Spring, lexis]
The Senate Bill also included plans to expand and reform the existing H-2A agricultural guest worker
program (part of AgJOBS) n193 and create a new "Temporary Worker Visa Program" n194 by making
available [*714] 325,000 new H-2C temporary guest-worker visas a year. n195 To be eligible for the guest
worker visa, the immigrant would have to pay $ 500 plus processing fees n196 (as well as $ 100 for their spouse
and each child), submit to a medical examination and fill out an application containing information about health,
criminal and gang history, immigration history and any terrorist involvement. n197 These proposed H-2C visas
would allow the guest workers to work in the United States for three years, and then renew the visa once for a
total of six years. n198 The visa would not tie a worker to his employer, n199 but rather, would allow the worker
to move from one approved employer to another. n200 Additionally, after the worker has been employed for at
least four years, the new legislation would grant the worker or the employer the ability to file an employment-
based visa petition on behalf of the worker, qualifying the worker to apply for lawful permanent resident status.
n201 To qualify, the worker would have to obtain a U.S. Department of Labor Certification stating that there are
insufficient numbers of US workers available and qualified to fill the job, n202 and submit at least two specified
documents to establish current employment. n203 The new visa program outlined by the bill provided for a
waiver of inadmissibility for specified labor certification, document, and prior unlawful presence
violations committed for humanitarian, family unity, or public interest purposes. n204 However, it would
not allow non-immigrants entering under the H-2C visa to change their status to any other nonimmigrant
classification n205 and would terminate the H-2C admission if the worker becomes unemployed for sixty or
more consecutive days, thus requiring them to return to their foreign residence. n206 If a [*715] worker does
not depart to their foreign residence within ten days of expiration of authorized admission, they will be barred
from entering the country for ten years and from receiving any future immigration benefits, other than asylum.
n207
CUNY 2010
14/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Solvency: Ideological Exclusion
___Waiver solve ideological exclusion – the McGovern Amendment
Vandiver, ‘6 [W. Aaron, J.D., Emory University School of Law, “Checking Ideas at the Border:
Evaluating the Possible Renewal of Ideological Exclusion,” Emory Law Journal, 55 Emory L.J. 751, lexis]
During its existence, intense scholarly criticism was levied at the McCarran-Walter Act, n46 and gradually
the harsh use of ideological controls on immigration gave way as the Cold War waned. In 1979, Congress
passed the "McGovern Amendment" which altered subsection 28, the provision that barred admission of
aliens affiliated with communism. n47 The McGovern Amendment required that the Secretary of State
recommend a waiver of inadmissibility to the Attorney General for any alien denied a visa due to
subsection 28 organizational affiliation unless the Secretary certified to [*758] Congress that a waiver
would be detrimental to the security interests of the United States. n48 The McGovern amendment
effectively ended the worst abuses of subsection 28 for ideological purposes. By the period from 1971
to 1980, the number of actual subversive/anarchist exclusions fell to thirty-two. n49
CUNY 2010
15/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Solvency: Moral Turpitude Inadmissibility
___Waivers solve inadmissibility based on violations of moral turpitude
Two forms of waivers of inadmissibility exist under §212(h) of the INA. As a defense from removal, non-
residents with an immigrant visa available to them may apply for residency and waive criminal grounds
of inadmissibility including most crimes involving moral turpitude, convictions of multiple crimes,
prostitution, and a single conviction of possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana. n11 In its second
form, permanent residents of seven years may re-acquire their residency and waive the same offenses,
unless their conviction could be categorized as an aggravated felony. n12 In both forms of §212(h) the
applicant must also meet a threshold requirement of showing that [*206] denial and deportation would cause
extreme hardship to a spouse, child, or parent. n13 In each of the forms of relief, once the prima facie case and
any required standard of hardship is met, the alien must also show that she warrants a favorable exercise of
discretion. n14
CUNY 2010
16/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Solvency: Refugees
___Waivers help refugees – avoids deportation for fraud
Unlike the grounds of inadmissibility, the grounds of deportability apply to non-citizens who have already
been admitted to the United States. n126 There are several removal provisions unique to the deportability
grounds. n127 One of those provisions is section 237(a)(1)(A), which provides that a person is removable if he
or she was inadmissible at the time of entry or adjustment of status. n128 In effect, the provision is a
delayed finding of inadmissibility, and reaches all those individuals who managed to enter the United
States or adjust status in violation of a statute or regulation. n129 Thus, non-citizens inadmissible at the
time of entry for having engaged in fraud or misrepresentation within the meaning of section 212(a)(6)(C)(i)
are deportable under section 237(a)(1)(A). Like the lifetime inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i),
however, recurring hardships in the enforcement of 237(a)(1)(A) eventually led to a legislative determination
that the provision was excessively severe. n130 A major concern was the [*90] impact of the provision on
refugees who are often compelled to engage in fraud in order to escape persecution in their home
countries and seek protection in the United States. n131 As a result, legislation in 1957 and 1961 provided for
a waiver of deportability, which was initially embodied in section 241(f). n132 Following extensive amendments
in 1981, n133 section 241(f) was revised and replaced with section 241(a)(1)(H) in 1990 n134 and then renamed
under section 237 by IIRIRA in 1996. n135 Section 237(a)(1)(H) now contains the current version of the waiver
and applies to a non-citizen who "is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter" of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
resident and "was in possession of an immigrant visa or equivalent document and was otherwise admissible to
the United States at the time of such admission ... ." n136 A waiver granted under section [*91] 237(a)(1)(H)
waives the non-citizen's deportability and establishes his or her lawful admission for permanent residence
in the United States. n137
CUNY 2010
17/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Solvency: Terror Exclusion
___Waivers can solve visa denials for terror exclusion
Vandiver, ‘6 [W. Aaron, J.D., Emory University School of Law, “Checking Ideas at the Border:
Evaluating the Possible Renewal of Ideological Exclusion,” Emory Law Journal, 55 Emory L.J. 751, lexis]
A more feasible approach for avoiding unnecessary ideological exclusions would be to reinstate section 411's requirement that the
Secretary of State specifically assess an alien's dangerousness. As a further step, Congress could enact a modest waiver scheme for
nondangerous individuals modeled on the McGovern Amendment. Of course, this approach flies in the face of Congress' recent
elimination of the Secretary of State's need to determine dangerousness. No matter how unlikely the change in the current political
climate, the fact remains that some kind of waiver scheme is probably the most effective device for
preventing unnecessary and abusive ideological exclusions. As explained in Part I, Congress' first major
attempt to rein in the abusive ideological exclusions taking place under the McCarran-Walter Act was the
McGovern Amendment of 1977. n228 The McGovern Amendment turned the voluntary waiver framework
which was already in place upside down. Instead of simply allowing the Secretary of State the discretion to
issue voluntary waivers for nondangerous individuals found inadmissible, the McGovern Amendment
required the Secretary of State to recommend a waiver of ineligibility to the Attorney General for
any alien denied a visa due to subsection 28 of the McCarran-Walter Act unless the Secretary
certified to Congress that a waiver would be detrimental to the security interests of the United States.
n229 Section 411's requirement of a determination by the Secretary of State that an alien's
statements represented a threat to the U.S. war on terrorism operated in a similar, though more
modest, manner as the McGovern Amendment did. Both provisions assumed that an alien's statements
in favor of certain ideas may or may not indicate a threat to the United States. Thus, aliens were
excludable for their speech under both provisions if they represented a threat, but aliens were not excluded
simply for speech without some higher threshold showing of danger. The Secretary of State had to certify,
under both approaches, that the alien's entry was actually a threat to the United States' interests. Thus, while
the McGovern Amendment's verbal formulation [*787] established a higher standard - requiring a
"detriment" to U.S. "security interests" n230 - than section 411, the premises of the two were similar.
Congress, therefore, should at least consider reinstating section 411's requirement that the Secretary of
State determine dangerousness. Congress could also consider a waiver scheme for those who fall under
the inadmissibility provisions of the current INA, as amended by the REAL ID Act. Such a waiver
framework could be modeled on the McGovern Amendment, but would not necessarily need to set
the same high standard to protect against wanton ideological exclusions. The case of Dora Maria Tellez
provides the perfect example of how such a waiver scheme might work. Because she took part in the overthrow of the Somoza regime
in the 1970s, Professor Tellez undoubtedly participated in past terrorist activity and has been a member of a terrorist organization
under the INA's definition of those terms. She personally participated in the Sandinista takeover of the Nicaraguan parliament in
which over two thousand people were held hostage. n231 Moreover, she has endorsed and espoused her activity ever since, which
falls under the definition of endorsement of terrorism under section 411 of the PATRIOT Act and the REAL ID Act. Her behavior,
however, does not make Ms. Tellez a terrorist threat to the United States today. The civil war between Somoza and the Sandinistas,
and later between the Sandinistas and the Contras, involved a great deal of political violence on both sides. But, advocacy of Latin
American political violence that took place in the 1970s and 1980s in no sense would make Ms. Tellez a "terrorist" in the common
usage of that word today. Under the hypothetical waiver scheme described above, it is very difficult to
imagine that the Secretary of State would certify to Congress that Ms. Tellez's past revolutionary
activity in a tiny Central American country over twenty-five years ago makes her a terrorist threat to the
United States today. The Secretary of State, if faced with the choice of granting Ms. Tellez a waiver of
inadmissibility or certifying to Congress that Ms. Tellez represents a terrorist threat to the United States,
would probably choose to waive inadmissibility. In this way, a waiver scheme would prevent the
suppression of legitimate political dialogue by making the exclusion of aliens based simply upon their
ideas less likely, while still allowing the executive to deny entry to dangerous individuals in its good-faith
discretion.
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*ILaw Net Benefit*

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1NC ILaw Shell
___Waivers bring the U.S. in compliance with International law
Rodriguez, ‘6 [Sara A.; J.D. University of Houston, 1996; LL.M. Candidate, Public International Law, University
of Houston Law Center, 2006, “Exile and the not-so-lawful Permanent Resident: Does International Law Require: A
Humanitarian Waiver of Deportation for the Non-Citizen Convictd of Certain Crimes?” Georgetown Immigration
Law Journal, 20 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 483, Spring]
The lengthy published opinion in Mojica v. Reno considered as an issue of "first impression" whether two long-term LPRs with
family in the United States were "entitled to a hearing determining whether they should not be deported because of humanitarian
factors" of the sort formerly available under section 212(c). n89 After reviewing the history of immigration in United States and the
country's human rights obligations under international law, n90 the district court refused to allow a retroactive application of the
amended law to bar a "humanitarian" hearing on the petitioners' eligibility for section 212(c) relief. n91 In conducting a statutory
interpretation of the changes to section 212(c), the district court in Mojica stressed that "Congress - as the lawmaker of the
leading proponent of international human rights law - is certainly aware of the elements of current
international law that, absent an overriding national policy, it will follow." n92 Pointing in particular
to provisions found in several international instruments, which include the prohibition against
arbitrary exile or expulsion without first having the benefit of a full and fair hearing, n93 and the
prohibition against the imposition of a heavier penalty than the one [*496] applicable at the time an
alien's penal offense was committed, n94 the district court also credited at length the right of family
members who were legally within the country not to suffer unduly because of the alien's expulsion.
n95 Using these principles as a backdrop for statutory construction, the district court decided that it would be
contrary to international law to eliminate retroactively the availability of a section 212(c) waiver of
deportation. n96 After the Attorney General appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
Mojica decision on other grounds without addressing any of the international issues raised by the district court. n97
___Effective international law solves every impact
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, ’02 [Institute for Energy and Environmental Research,
and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, “Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies
and Actions Regarding Security-Related Treaties”, May, http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/execsumm.pdf]
The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a global
society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-
state actors, and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas
accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians
that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still continue. Multilateral agreements increasingly
have been a primary instrument employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges of this kind, for
several reasons. They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including
prohibited and required practices and policies. In other words, they articulate global norms, such as the protection of
human rights and the prohibitions of genocide and use of weapons of mass destruction. They establish
predictability and accountability in addressing a given issue. States are able to accumulate expertise and
confidence by participating in the structured system established by a treaty. However, influential U.S.
policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treaty-based international legal system because they fear infringement
on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms . This approach has dangerous
practical implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do
not enter into treaties expecting that they are only political commitments that can be overridden based on
U.S. interests. When a powerful and influential state like the United States is seen to treat its legal
obligations as a matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states will see this as a
justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments. When the United States wants to require
another state to live up to its treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example
and opted out of compliance.
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ILaw Solvency Ext.
___Waivers for crimes solve international law
Controversy about the retroactive application of these legislative amendments produced widespread litigation in
the courts. n20 This article will review three novel immigration opinions, particularly Beharry v. Reno, which
attempted to remedy the harsh consequences of retroactivity by relying on international law to create a
"humanitarian" waiver of removal for long-term LPRs convicted of certain crimes whose deportation
would visit hardship on guiltless family members. n21 Although the district court's decision in Beharry was
eventually reversed on procedural grounds, n22 to some practitioners and commentators the decision appeared to
hold out a glimmer of hope for aliens facing deportation as a result of certain criminal offenses. n23 [*486] The
promise posed by Beharry and its use of international law has not born fruit, as no court has followed its
reasoning. With all due respect for the noble effort to create a humanitarian waiver of removal, this article will
demonstrate that Beharry and its attempt to exploit international law was wrongly decided in several important
respects. To facilitate this discussion, the article will briefly review the historical treatment of non-citizens
convicted of certain crimes and the modern statutory mechanism for removing those individuals from the United
States. This article will examine a series of immigration decisions that culminated with Beharry and will then
discuss the international norms identified in those cases as they relate to the removal of criminal aliens. To
explain why courts have declined to follow Beharry, this article will also discuss some of the roadblocks that
have, to date, prevented the use of these international norms to contest removal proceedings undertaken in
accordance with the comprehensive federal statutory scheme in place in the United States. In doing so, the
article hopes to clarify whether the current policy of removing criminal aliens without balancing extreme
hardship to family members comports or conflicts with international law and to examine whether
international norms are of any aid to non-citizens facing deportation by reason of their criminal
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ILaw Impact Ext.
Upholding the principles, norms, and procedures of International Law is critical to avoiding
nuclear war and ecological catastrophe
Damrosch & Mullerson, ’95 [Lori, Professor of Law @ Columbia and Rein, Prof of Int’l Law @ Kings
College, Beyond Confrontation, pg 1-2]
The contemporary world has an ever-increasing need for an international legal system
that can respond to the demands of our time. Of the many reasons for this fact, we will
survey only a few of the most salient. First and foremost is the increasing interdependence
of all peoples. Even as the world is riven with many contradictions and conflicts, it is also
becoming more integrated with a greater need for orderly, predictable conduct. Events,
and especially natural and social disasters, even when they occur within a single country, have
more noticeable effects on conditions in the world at large. The Chernobyl accident, the
earthquake in Armenia, and internal political processes underway in the territories of the
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe – these and many other events occurring within
separate countries or regions have a global significance affecting the destiny of all
peoples. The intertwining of the economic life of diverse countries today is even greater than
was the interdependence of different regions within the same state only half a century ago.
Order and predictability of the behavior of actors on the international scene can be
achieved first of all with the aid of social norms, among which international law occupies
an important place. A second reason for the growth of the role of international law is
inextricably connected with the first. The threats of a thermonuclear catastrophe,
universal ecological crisis, and acute economic problems in developing countries are of
global concern and endanger the very existence of humanity. Resolution of these
problems demands coordinated efforts of all states and peoples, which would be
impossible to achieve without the aid of international norms, procedures, institutions.
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2NC ILaw Module: Leadership (1/2)
___U.S. credibility in international law is key to leadership – It stabilized US power,

reduces backlash against unilateralism and increases overall credibility
Krisch, ’03 [Nico. Senior Fellow @ the Center for International Studies @ NYU Law. Unilateralism and US
Foreign Policy – edited by Malone and Khong. Pp. 62-63]
However, when international instruments reflect U.S. policy preferences vis-à-vis other states – as they often
do (eg., in the area of arms control) – careful analysis is needed on whether unilateral action can render similar
results or whatever even the short-term interests of the United States demand adherence to the treaty. Even the United States itself
recognizes the value of legal regulation of international relations, as the description of its attempts to create and enforce law by unilateral
means has shown. It is not ready to renounce law as an instrument, because law stabilizes expectations and reduces the
costs of later negotiation and of the enforcement of certain policies. Thus, the question is whether it is in the U.S.
interest to accept the more egalitarian process of international law instead of using unilateral, hierarchal legal instruments. Although it is
impossible to enter into a comprehensive discussion of the general value of international law in this chapter, I shall outline at least some
arguments in favor of such an acceptance. First, a stronger use of international law could help stabilize the current
predominant positions of the United States. If the United States now concludes that treaties with other
states that reflect its superior negotiating power (even if not to the degree the United States would wish), U.S.
preferences can shape international relations in a longer perspective, as change in international law is
slower and more difficult than political change. It is worthwhile noting that past great powers similarly influenced the
international legal order to such a degree that it is possible to divide the history of international law into epochs dominated by these powers
– epochs that have left many traces in contemporary law. Second, even if the U.S. power continues to increase and this
argument therefore appears to be less appealing, the United States can gain from stronger reliance on
international law because the law can help legitimize its current exercise of power. Unilateralism in
international politics is always regarded suspiciously by other states, and it is quite probable that
perceptions of “imperialism” or “bully hegemony” will lead to stronger reactions by other states in the
long run. Already now, some states show greater unity. Although it remains to be seen whether in the Case of Russia and China this
greater unity is only symbolic, other instances, such as the strong stance of the like-minded states in the ICC,
indicate a more substantive regrouping in the face of U.S. predominance. Similarly, the accelerated
integration of the EU can be regarded as caused in part by the desire to counterbalance the United
States. IF the United States were able to channel its power into the more egalitarian process of
international law, it could gain much more legitimacy for its exercise of power and significantly reduce
the short and long term costs of its policies. This has been recognized in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the
United States in September 2001, and the U.S. president not only sought to build an international ad hoc coalition but also taken steps to
bolster the international legal regime against terrorism, in particular by transmitting conventions against terrorism to the Senate in order to
proceed with ratification. Multilateralism is certainly valued more highly by U.S. administration since the attacks, but
reluctance still prevails in many areas, as enduring U.S. opposition to the ICC and to the additional protocol to the BWC
shows. Third, it is highly questionable whether the United States will in fact be able to pursue its strategy of
subjecting international law in the future. In the past, it might have been possible to exert significant influence on the content
of international agreements and then not subscribe to them. Repeating this in the future is likely to be more difficult – as the United States
discovered in the case of the ICC statute after a certain point. As one observer to the ICC negotiations notes: Increasingly, the other
delegations felt that it would be better to stop giving in to the Untied States; they believed that the United States would never be satisfied
with the concessions it got and ultimately would never sign the treaty for completely unrelated domestic political reasons. Similarly, the
use of reservations in order to secure a privileged position has become increasingly difficult as other states become wary of this strategy
and seek to foreclose the possibility of reservations to new treaties entirely, as in the ICC statute and the Ottawa Convention. And
discontent with U.S. behavior might backfire in unexpected circumstances – as with the loss of the seat
in the Commission for Human Rights, or the suit brought and vigorously defended by Germany in the LaGrand case. In
general, these effects are likely to undermine the U.S. capacity for leadership which to a large degree is
based on reputation, credibility, and persuasiveness – not only on brute power. Moreover, as the United
States discovered in its failure to achieve desired goals in the climate change and the landmine negotiations, leadership
can be barred by too great a difference in opinion between the leader and those to be led. Compromise may thus be necessary to maintain
the momentum to lead. The United States may be forced to choose between engagement, leadership, and
control, on the one hand, and free-riding, isolation, and a loss of influence on the other.
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2NC ILaw Module: Leadership (2/2)
___ Soft power necessary to prevent disease, terrorism, and WMD
Nye, 2004, Professor of Government, Harvard,

Joseph, US MILITARY PRIMACY IS FACT - SO, NOW, WORK ON 'SOFT POWER' OF
PERSUASION, April 29,
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2004/nye_soft_power_csm_042904.htm
Soft power co-opts people rather than coerces them. It rests on the ability to set the agenda or shape the
preferences of others. It is a mistake to discount soft power as just a question of image, public relations,
and ephemeral popularity. It is a form of power - a means of pursuing national interests. When America
discounts the importance of its attractiveness to other countries, it pays a price. When US policies lose their
legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of others, attitudes of distrust tend to fester and further reduce its
leverage. The manner with which the US went into Iraq undercut American soft power. That did not
prevent the success of the four-week military campaign, but it made others less willing to help in the
reconstruction of Iraq and made the American occupation more costly in the hard-power resources of
blood and treasure. Because of its leading edge in the information revolution and its past investment in
military power, the US probably will remain the world's single most powerful country well into the 21st
century. But not all the important types of power come from the barrel of a gun. Hard power is relevant to
getting desired outcomes, but transnational issues such as climate change, infectious diseases, international
crime, and terrorism cannot be resolved by military force alone. Soft power is particularly important in
dealing with these issues, where military power alone simply cannot produce success, and can even be
counterproductive. America's success in coping with the new transnational threats of terrorism and weapons
of mass destruction will depend on a deeper understanding of the role of soft power and developing a better
balance of hard and soft power in foreign policy.
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Waivers  ILaw K2 Global Stability
___Waivers uphold international law – denial hurts global stability
Characterizing deportation as punishment, the district court decided that Beharry's deportation implicated
the ex post facto principle of "nulla poena sine lege," meaning literally that there can be no punishment
without pre-existing law. n129 Turning to several international instruments, the district court pointed to the
Supremacy Clause, which provides that "'all treaties made' by the United States, along with federal law and the
Constitution, are the 'supreme law of the land.'" n130 After a discussion about the force and effect of non-ratified
treaties, the district court considered several human rights instruments, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, "as aids in
statutory construction" of the United States immigration statutes. n131 Paying special attention to Beharry's
impending separation from several close family members, including his mother, who was an LPR, and his six-
year old daughter, who was a United States Citizen, the district court also placed particular emphasis on
provisions found in the Convention on the Rights of [*501] the Child. n132 The district court appeared to
recognize that there were limitations on the use of the above-referenced international agreements. It noted,
however, that, "[l]ike admiralty, immigration law is founded on international law." n133 As with the law of
admiralty, the district court reasoned that "United States courts are 'bound by the law of nations, which is
part of the law of the land.'" n134 Perceiving a direct clash between the domestic immigration scheme at issue
and international law, the district court in Beharry decided to "harmonize" those portions of the INA amended in
1996 with international law. n135 Before doing so, the court paused to articulate several reasons to justify its
decision under the duty to comply with international norms: The nation's credibility would be weakened by non-
compliance with treaty obligations or with international norms. The United States seeks to impose
international law norms -- including, notably, those on terrorism -- upon other nations. It would seem
strange, then, if the government would seek to avoid enforcement of such norms within its own borders.
n136 The district court commented that the United States courts have a role in ensuring compliance with
international law and furthering the nation's goals by avoiding a construction that violates norms
recognized by the world community: The United States cannot expect to reap the benefits of
internationally recognized human rights -- in the form of greater worldwide stability and respect for
people -- without being willing to adhere to them itself. As a moral leader of the world, the United States has
obligated itself not to disregard rights uniformly recognized by other nations. Thus, United States courts act
appropriately when they construe statutory programs in accordance with international law; they avoid a
construction which, "if given its literal application, would threaten the interests of the United States by placing
the Nation in violation of international standards or embarrassing the political branches in their conduct of
foreign relations." n137
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Waivers  ILaw K2 Humanitarian Relief
___Waivers use international law to create outlets for humanitarian relief
The harsh consequences of the 1996 amendments and their retroactive effect spawned an immediate reaction
from the judiciary. Shortly after the full effect of the AEDPA and IIRIRA were felt, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York issued Mojica v. Reno, n84 which became one of the first opinions to
reject the retroactive application of the 1996 amendments that eliminated eligibility for relief from deportation
under section 212(c) for aggravated felons. n85 Not long thereafter, the same district court reached a similar
result in Maria v. McElroy. n86 The United States Supreme Court addressed the elimination of section 212(c) in
2001, in INS v. [*495] St. Cyr, n87 and agreed that changes in the law could not apply retroactively to non-
citizens who had entered a guilty plea before the 1996 amendments went into effect. After St. Cyr was
decided, the same district judge that decided Mojica and Maria took another swipe at the elimination of
discretionary relief under section 212(c) in Beharry v. Reno. n88 In Beharry, the district court took exception
to the complete elimination of eligibility for a waiver of removal under section 212(c) for non-citizens
convicted of an aggravated felony in an immigration system deemed inhospitable not only to the alien
facing deportation but also to family members affected by the alien's removal. What is particularly
notable about the decisions in Mojica, Maria, and Beharry is the district court's innovative use of
international law to create an opportunity for relief. These decisions are summarized below to demonstrate
how the district court used international law in Beharry to create an opportunity for a humanitarian
waiver of removal for aggravated felons based on family hardship.
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*Impact Modules*
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Customary ILaw Module (1/3)
___Denying waivers violates the ICCPR and hurts customary international law
Spring]
In Maria, the district court undertook a statutory construction of the bar preventing aggravated felons from
eligibility for relief in an effort to avoid "offending due process principles," n103 and found that the statutory language [*497]
did not support a retroactive application of the 1996 amendments. n104 Although the district court found no need to decide whether a
hearing on an alien's eligibility for relief "would be independently required as a matter of constitutional or international law," n105 it
stated in strongly worded dicta that "[t]he retroactive deprivation of Mr. Maria's statutory right to humanitarian
relief" in the form of a hearing to determine eligibility for a waiver under section 212(c), "would arguably be
contrary to both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ('ICCPR') and customary international
human rights law." n106 In support of the notion that a waiver was required for humanitarian reasons, the
district court pointed to the United States' position as a leader in the promotion of human rights and made
the following assumption when considering whether Congress had intended to comply with international law when it eliminated
aggravated felons from eligibility for a waiver under section 212(c): "Congress can be assumed, in the absence of a
statement to the contrary, to be legislating in conformity with international law and to be cognizant of this
country's global leadership position and the need for it to set an example with respect to human rights
obligations." n107 Noting that the ICCPR "applies to all people within the territory of the United States,"
the district court pointed to several rights embodied in that treaty, including the "right of family members
to live together," n108 and the requirement that an alien "be allowed to submit the reasons against his
expulsion" in the absence of compelling national security interests. n109 The district court concluded that, by deporting a non-
citizen such as Mr. Maria without providing a hearing to consider the "consequences of deportation for
remaining family members," a retroactive application of the AEDPA "threatens precisely the type of arbitrary
family break-up that the ICCPR guards against." n110 In Maria, the district court also considered the
application of customary international law, noting that "[a] nation's sovereign power to exclude and expel
aliens is limited by international human rights law's recognition of the rights of individuals ." n111 In the
district court's view, "[e]very nation now must take the rights of foreigners into account when determining whether [*498] they
should be excluded or expelled from its territory." n112 After reviewing several treaties and conventions, the district court
concluded that "the rights to be free from arbitrary interference with family life and arbitrary expulsion
are part of customary international law." n113 Thus, it found that a retroactive application of the AEDPA to Maria
"would not only be contrary to this nation's obligations under the ICCPR, . . ., it would be a violation of
customary international human rights law, to which the United States is bound as a member of the
community of nations - violations that Congress, it can be assumed, would want to avoid . . . ." n114 Crediting
these findings, the district court found that Congress could not lawfully refuse Maria a "humanitarian
hearing" on his eligibility for relief from removal under section 212(c) by applying AEDPA retroactively. n115
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___Broader incorporation of international law solves biodiversity loss
Glennon, ’90, professor of law at the University of California, Davis

[Michael, Board of Editors @ American Journal of Intl Law, Jan., 84 A.J.I.L. 1]
It is now possible to conclude that customary international law requires states to take appropriate steps to
protect endangered species. Customary norms are created by state practice "followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation." 250 Like highly codified humanitarian law norms that have come to bind even
states that are not parties to the instruments promulgating them, 251 wildlife protection norms also have
become binding on nonparties as customary law. Closely related to this process of norm creation by
practice is that of norm creation by convention: customary norms are created by international
agreements "when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact
widely accepted." 252 Several such [*31] agreements are directed at wildlife protection, 253 and CITES
is one of them. It is intended for adherence by states generally 254 and is accepted by the 103 states that have
become parties. In addition, some nonparties comply with certain CITES documentary requirements so as to
trade with parties. 255 CITES is not "rejected by a significant number of states"; 256 only the United Arab
Emirates has withdrawn from the agreement. In such circumstances, the International Court of Justice has
observed, international agreements constitute state practice and represent law for nonparties. 257
Moreover, customary norms are created by "the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations." 258 Because CITES requires domestic implementation by parties to it, 259 and because the overall
level of compliance seems quite high, 260 the general principles embodied in states' domestic endangered
species laws may be relied upon as another source of customary law. 261 Even apart from the CITES
requirements, states that lack laws protecting endangered species seem now to be the clear exception rather
than the rule. 262 That there exists opinio juris as to the binding character of this obligation 263 is
suggested by the firm support given endangered species [*32] protection by the UN General Assembly
and various international conferences. 264
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___Extinction
Diner, ’94 [Diner, David N. B.S. Recipient. Ohio State University. J.D. Recipient. College of Law. Ohio State
University. LL.M. The Judge Advocate General’s School. United States Army. Judge Advocate’s General’s Corps.
United States Army. “The Army and the Endangered Species Act: Who’s Endangering Whom?” Military Law
Review. 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161. Winter, lexis]
No species has ever dominated its fellow species as man has. In most cases, people have assumed the God-like power of life and death --
extinction or survival -- over the plants and animals of the world. For most of history, mankind pursued this domination with a
singleminded determination to master the world, tame the wilderness, and exploit nature for the maximum benefit of the human race. n67
In past mass extinction episodes, as many as ninety percent of the existing species perished, and yet the world moved forward, and new
species replaced the old. So why should the world be concerned now? The prime reason is the world's survival. Like all animal life,
humans live off of other species. At some point, the number of species could decline to the point at which
the ecosystem fails, and then humans also would become extinct. No one knows how many [*171] species the world
needs to support human life, and to find out -- by allowing certain species to become extinct -- would not be sound policy. In addition to
food, species offer many direct and indirect benefits to mankind. n68 2. Ecological Value. -- Ecological value is the value that species have
in maintaining the environment. Pest, n69 erosion, and flood control are prime benefits certain species provide to man. Plants and animals
also provide additional ecological services -- pollution control, n70 oxygen production, sewage treatment, and biodegradation. n71 3.
Scientific and Utilitarian Value. -- Scientific value is the use of species for research into the physical processes of the world. n72 Without
plants and animals, a large portion of basic scientific research would be impossible. Utilitarian value is the direct utility humans draw from
plants and animals. n73 Only a fraction of the [*172] earth's species have been examined, and mankind may someday desperately need the
species that it is exterminating today. To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew n74 could save
mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to man in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be
critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a closely interconnected
ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on it. n75 Moreover, as the number of
species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. n76 4.
Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. n77
As the current mass extinction has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This
trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the number
of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. Biologically diverse ecosystems are
characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems
inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more
successfully it can resist a stress. . . .[l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands,
such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere
breaks down as a whole." n79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified
many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading
Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild
examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction,
with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human
extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the
rivets from an aircraft's wings, [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.
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Human Rights Cred Module
___Waivers uphold the UDHR and ICCPR
Article 12 of the UDHR broadly declares that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with
his . . . family. . . ." n213 Article 12 further specifically envisions "the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks." n214 Prominent among the protections afforded by the ICCPR is its
recognition in Article 23(1) that "the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State." Consistent with Article 12 of the UDHR, Article 17 of the
ICCPR contains the same broad guarantee of the right to be free from "arbitrary or unlawful
interference" family and the right to protection from such interference. Although some regional
conventions include rights designed to protect private family life from unwarranted interference, n215 at least
one does not. n216
___Human Right Credibility solves extinction
Copelan, ’99, NYT Law Professor

[Rhonda, “The Indivisible Framework of International Human Rights: A Source of Social Justice
in the U.S,” New York University Law Review, p. 71-2]
The indivisible human rights framework survived the Cold War despite U.S. machinations to truncate it in
the international arena. The framework is there to shatter the myth of the superiority. Indeed, in the face of
systemic inequality and crushing poverty, violence by official and private actors, globalization of the market
economy, and military and environmental depredation, the human rights framework is gaining new
force and new dimensions. It is being broadened today by the movements of people in different parts of
the world, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere and significantly of women, who understand the protection
of human rights as a matter of individual and collective human survival and betterment. Also emerging is
a notion of third-generation rights, encompassing collective rights that cannot be solved on a state-by-state
basis and that call for new mechanisms of accountability, particularly affecting Northern countries. The
emerging rights include human-centered sustainable development, environmental protection, peace, and
security. Given the poverty and inequality in the United States as well as our role in the world, it is
imperative that we bring the human rights framework to bear on both domestic and foreign policy.
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*A2: Aff Args*

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AG Strength Good: Generic
___A strong attorney general is good for the country
Robinson, ‘9 [Nick, visiting fellow at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, “It's the AG's job to enforce
the law, so it's a conflict of interest to have him appointed by the president,” CSMonitor, January 30,
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/0130/p09s01-coop.html]
It is the attorney general's responsibility to ensure that the laws of the country are enforced,
including against the country's highest office holders. Yet, in our current system the attorney general's
loyalty is torn between the laws he or she swears to uphold and the president. Attorney Generals John
Ashcroft and Alberto Gonzales were widely seen by critics as too beholden to President Bush and his
far-reaching vision of executive power to effectively police the president or his administration. Such
conflicts of interest are not new. Eric Holder's nomination for attorney general is currently stalled because
he supposedly showed too little independence as deputy attorney general when recommending pardons
favored by President Clinton. The answer to this problem lies not in decrying the politicization of the
attorney general's office by presidents, but instead in making the attorney general independent and
politically accountable through nationwide election.
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Agencies Solve: Generic
___Agencies solve best - they have the necessary enforcement and power to implement the
plan
Parelle, ’02 [Richard, Prof of Poly Sci @ U Miss, of St Louis, The Supreme
Court in American Politics, p. 119, GoogleBooks
The argument that the courts lack capacity means that there are other political actors better suited to make the
difficult policy decisions. The bureaucratic agencies are populated by experts and specialists who are trained
in the substantive issue areas in which they operate. The congressional committees that make policy rec -
ommendations 10 the entire House and Senate ate composed of specialists who have spent years on that
committee learning the nuances of the issues they face. " Members of Congress have access to an extensive
trained staff to help them with their policymaking responsibilities. (Davidson and Oleszek 1997). This is a sharp
contrast with most federal judges.!* If bureaucrats and members of Congress are better equipped than judges to
make decisions, they are also aided by the procedures that govern their behavior. Members of Congress and experts
in the agencies have broad access to information that judges lack. Congress holds hearings that allow a wide
range of interested parties and relevant agencies to participate and present their views. Once a piece of
legislation is passed, the agency has to develop rules and promulgate regulations to enforce it. During that period,
there is provision tor public comment, allowing the agency to get a range of views to assist them. The agencies
and Congress have access to the feedback mechanisms necessary to keep the system moving (Kingdon 3995,
27-34). If there are problems with the law or the execution of it, groups will approach Congress or the
bureaucratic agency to have corrections made^ 1 \ *\
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Agencies Good: Democracy
Congressional delegation to the agencies key to democracy
Stack, ‘6, Associate Professor of Law at Benjamin N. Cardozo. School of Law

[Kevin M. “The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws Name,” Columbia Law Review,
106 Colum. L. Rev. 263, March, lexis]
Part V addresses how these statutory conclusions in turn influence Congress's choice of delegate and defends the
appeal of these constructions. Whenever Congress grants authority, it faces a choice: Should it grant authority
to the agency alone, to the President, to the agency subject to the President's control, or to some other
institutional arrangement? That question of institutional design requires an understanding of the legal
implications of Congress's choice of delegate. The narrower statutory constructions this Article defends bolster
both democratic and rule-of-law values. These constructions emphasize that the scope of the President's
statutory authority (as well as of judicial deference) is in Congress's control by way of its choice of delegate. 19
The implication that a delegation to an executive branch official creates a duty under the law, not to the
President, enforces a check, internal to the executive branch, on the President's power. Structural advantages
of the President over Congress - such as the capacity to act unilaterally and poor congressional incentives to monitor
expansions of presidential power - provide grounds to embrace such constraints on executive power.
___Democracy solves nuclear war and extinction
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, ’95 [“Promoting Democracy in the 1990’s,”
http://www.carnegie.org/sub/pubs/deadly/dia95_01.html]
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and
decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The
flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made
common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones.
Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global
ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are
associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality,
accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience
of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not
go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their
leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less
likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build
weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open,
and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They
are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest
the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal
obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely
because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law,
democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can
be built.
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Agencies Good: SOP
___Agencies uphold separation of powers
Bryner, ’87 [Gary, Ph. D in Govt, Poli Sci @ BYU, “Bureaucratic Discretion: Law and Policy in Federal
Regulatory Agencies,” p.5-6]
Bureaucratic discretion is also defended as a practical response to the inability of traditionally separated
governmental powers to deal effectively with the policy challenges confronting them. James Landis defended the
broad grants of discretionary authority to administrative agencies not as "simply an extension of executive
power" but a "full audit of authority necessary for |them| in order to plan, to promote, and to police," thus
representing "an assemblage of rights normally exercisable by government as a whole." "The administrative
process." he argued, is an "answer to the inadequacy of the judicial and the legislative processes.'"*
Discretion is especially important in regulatory agencies, as it permits administrative officials to be flexible
and adaptable in tailoring their efforts to specific situations. Laws cannot be written to anticipate and address all
of the possible situations within an agency's jurisdiction. They must permit a consideration of economic, regional,
cultural, personal and other differences among those who fall within (he agency's regulatory reach. Discretion per-
mits the regulators to tailor their efforts to particular circumstances and concerns, produce regulatory actions that arc
reasonable and fair, and effectively accomplish policy objectives.” Discretion Is a fundamental clement of
modem administrative theory and is consistent with important norms of pluralism and democracy. It is also
consistent with political incentives and serves as an attractive way for legislators to delegate responsibility for
difficult decisions to bureaucrats. Credit can be claimed for legislative action, blame can be deflected when specific
efforts clash with politically powerful interests, and constituents can be cultivated by intervening in unpopular
agency actions.
___SOP violations carry the same risk as nuclear war
Martin H. Redish, Law Professor, Northwestern University and Elizabeth J. Cisar, Clerk Chief Judge
William Bauer, U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Duke Law Journal, 1991, lexis.
In summary, no defender of separation of powers can prove with certitude that, but for the existence of
separation of powers, tyranny would be the inevitable outcome. But the question is whether we wish to take
that risk, given the obvious severity of the harm that might result. Given both the relatively limited cost
imposed by use of separation of powers and the great severity of the harms sought to be avoided, one
should not demand a great showing of the likelihood that the feared harm would result. For just as in
the case of the threat of nuclear war, no one wants to be forced into the position of saying, “I told you
so.”
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Delegation Good: Generic (1/2)
___Executive delegation good for enacting immigration policy
Cox & Rodriguez, ‘9 [Adam B, Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School,. & Cristina M.,
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, “The President and Immigration Law,” The Yale Law
Journal, 119 Yale L.J. 458, December, lexis]
If we cannot count on the courts to participate in leveling down, we ought to think seriously about leveling
executive discretion up by delegating the President more control over our immigrant admissions system. Such
an idea has recently emerged in the policy debate. A 2006 task force made up of former government officials and
immigration policy experts has recommended establishing a Standing Commission, similar to the Federal Reserve,
to allocate [*539] labor visas, n260 and two major labor unions recently have come out in favor of delegation, as
well. n261 Moreover, such formal delegation already exists in one limited area: the refugee allocation system
established by the Refugee Act of 1980. n262 To be sure, this delegation may itself have been motivated by the
desire to limit executive discretion. The Refugee Act of 1980 created a formal system that demanded the President
consult with his Cabinet and members of Congress in the allocation of refugee slots, which had the effect of
curtailing the then-existing executive discretion to admit as many refugees as desired through the use of the parole
power. Still, Congress chose to formally delegate considerable ex ante screening power to the President rather
than to set the refugee quota itself. Perhaps Congress concluded that presidential control, made transparent
and consultative, remained necessary to address with flexibility the worldwide refugee situation, which could
change dramatically from year to year depending on human-initiated and natural disasters and shifting foreign policy
concerns. Delegating to the President more general ex ante screening power would capture this very flexibility
for the immigration system as a whole. Leveling up would simply involve expanding the logic of the refugee regime to the other
domains of immigration. In a sense, doing so would bring to immigration policy a practice of delegation commonplace in other regulatory arenas.
Throughout the administrative state, Congress has delegated ex ante standard setting authority to administrative and independent agencies, taking
advantage of the greater ease with which agencies can collect and synthesize information presented by experts, interest groups, and the public
alike, to produce regulatory policies or standards that reflect facts on the ground and changed circumstances. n263 The failure to delegate
similar authority in the immigration context has contributed to the pathological features of immigration
policy laid out above. [*540] We recognize, of course, that lawmakers and the public regard immigration law as different from other regulatory
arenas in fundamental ways. Perhaps leaving immigrant admissions policy in the control of Congress helps maintain the illusion of democratic
control over membership decisions - the process of self-definition of the polity that the people's institution of the legislature must manage. n264
On this theory, admissions standards can be analogized to marginal tax rates, or to the elements of a crime - rules that our intuitions tell us should
be kept in the hands of the most deliberative and popularly accountable body, the legislature. As we have emphasized throughout, however , the
idea that Congress remains in control of immigrant screening more generally is illusory. Congress has, as a
de facto matter, given the Executive wide authority to decide these basic membership questions. The ex post
screening system obscures the extent to which Congress does not actually control membership decisions.
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Delegation Good: Generic (2/2)
___Congress should delegate admissibility standards to agencies
A second and more radical step would permit the Executive to change the rules regarding the types of immigrants
admitted. Congress could delegate to the immigration agencies the power to determine which family
relationships, employment statuses, or other qualities, such as language ability, should be taken into account
in determining eligibility for admissions. n269 Again, this power exists implicitly as part of the refugee allocation
system; the President has the power in that system to select the countries from which refugees should be chosen, and
the country of origin historically has been used as a proxy for immigrant types. But this step would represent a
larger departure from the [*543] status quo, as it would transparently give the Executive the power to make
first-order judgments about the types of people who should be admitted. n270 Regardless of whether Congress
were to decide to limit delegation to number setting or include the definition of substantive criteria for admissions,
in this preliminary discussion of power reallocation, we seek primarily to emphasize the value of vertical
integration. An agency that has front-end screening authority and ex post enforcement authority will be better
equipped to manage the regulatory problems it faces.
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Executive Power: Generic (1/2)
___The executive has the power to control admissibility and deportability
We contend that there has been a relatively secular trend toward the enlargement of the President's power
over core immigration policy through ever-expanding congressional delegation of what amounts to screening
authority. We have moved from a world of plausible independent executive [*511] authority to admit and
remove to a world of pervasive delegation and subsequent executive screening. To be clear, we do not mean
that Congress has formally delegated to the President the power to set the legal criteria governing the
admission and deportation of noncitizens. To the contrary - as we noted at the outset of this Part, one of the
signal features of immigration law is that Congress has largely retained a monopoly over these formal legal
criteria. n182 In general, Congress specifies in great detail the criteria for admission and removal, particularly when
it comes to the major categories of family and labor migration that make up the bulk of admissions. In this sense,
immigration law resembles tax law, where Congress retains control over marginal rates, or criminal law, where
Congress defines the elements of a crime, rather than other regulatory arenas in which Congress has delegated
broad authority to the executive branch to set standards. n183 We claim, instead, that the President's inability
to set formal admissions and removal criteria has not precluded him from playing a major role in shaping
screening policy. The modern structure of immigration law that gives the President little standard-setting
authority as a formal matter actually has given rise to a system of de facto delegation of power that serves as
the functional equivalent to standard-setting authority. This de facto delegation is driven by legal rules that
make a huge fraction of resident noncitizens deportable at the option of the Executive. This significant
population of formally deportable people gives the President vast discretion to shape immigration policy by
deciding how (and over which types of immigrants) to exercise the option to deport.
___Exec delegation good/solves
Almost all separation-of-powers jurisprudence and scholarship in immigration law focuses on judicial review - an understandable tendency given
how the die was cast in the Chinese Exclusion Cases. But this extraordinary attention to the relationship between the judiciary and the political
branches has obscured an even more important separation-of-powers question - how power is allocated between the two political branches . The
Court's jurisprudence on this question provides few answers, and conventional wisdom assumes that
Congress retains responsibility for making the decisions at the heart of immigration law: how many and
which types of noncitizens should be allowed to enter and reside in the United States. But as the historical
practice we unearth reveals, the Executive has exercised considerable screening authority through three basic
sources of power: inherent authority, formal delegation, and de facto delegation. Though the first two forms
of authority have been significant historically, and the formal delegation model remains important, it is the de
facto delegation model that principally drives the relationship between Congress and the President today.
This form of delegation, however, is asymmetric, in that it gives the President power to screen immigrants at
the back end of the system [*547] when the question is whom to deport, but not at the front end, when the question is whom to admit.
Because this asymmetry has pathological consequences in certain circumstances, its existence should occasion reevaluation of the relationship
between the political branches in immigration law. We suggest that greater formal delegation of ex ante screening authority
to
the President offers one way to reintegrate control over the two central policymaking instruments in
immigration law. But even if less drastic institutional design strategies might be preferable, the separation-of-
powers inquiry in immigration law must be broadened to consider the political branches as they relate to one
another.
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Executive Power: Generic (2/2)
___Executive has control over immigration
Congress's increasing exertion of control over the formal legal criteria governing admissions and deportation
has not by any means meant that the President's role in setting core immigration policy has disappeared, and
we aim in this Part to illuminate that role. The President's veto power certainly has given him some leverage
over the shape of immigration law. Perhaps the most well known exercise of this power unfolded at the turn of the twentieth century,
when Congress sought over a thirty-year period to impose a literacy requirement on arriving immigrants. Multiple presidents vetoed these efforts,
n83 until Congress finally overrode President Wilson's second veto in 1917. n84 In this Part, however, we put to the side the President's formal
role in the legislative process, largely because the veto power enables the President only to block rather than to initiate the setting of admissions
and removal standards. Instead, we explore the other paths through which the Executive has wielded affirmative authority over
admissions and removals, even as Congress has developed an extremely detailed immigration code covering the
substantive criteria for admitting and deporting immigrants. We identify three models of executive power, which
map onto those identified by the courts in Part I: (1) [*485] inherent executive authority; (2) formal delegated
authority; and (3) de facto delegated authority. Though the inherent authority and formal delegation models
have historically supported expansive regulation by the Executive historically and continue to play a role in
defining the interbranch relationship, the model of de facto delegation is the most salient and least understood
in today's context. On the subject of inherent authority, we consider the negotiation and maintenance of the Bracero guest
worker program in the post-World War II period as an illustration. As we show, as late as the mid-twentieth century, it was still thinkable for the
Executive to claim the constitutional authority to decide for himself whom to admit to the country - standard setting ordinarily thought to be the
province of Congress. On the subject of delegated authority, we focus first on the model of express congressional delegation to the executive
branch. To manage the Haitian and Cuban refugee crises of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s , the Executive relied heavily on powers
formally delegated to it by Congress, even as lawyers for the administrations invoked the presidents' inherent
authority. These episodes illuminate how the Executive has been able to wield delegated authority ostensibly
limited to emergency or exceptional contexts to expand its power over core immigration policy.
___The executive has discretion over deportability
[*516] During the last two decades, the expansion of deportation provisions targeting postentry conduct has
accelerated dramatically - due mostly to the way modern immigration law treats criminal behavior classified
as an "aggravated felony." n205 Congress in 1988 made deportable any noncitizen with a conviction for an
"aggravated felony" - a term that the INA initially defined to cover serious drug trafficking offenses. n206 Since
then Congress has expanded the definition repeatedly. n207 Today the definition encompasses a broad swath of
criminal conduct, including minor convictions - even some misdemeanors - that make the statutory label something
of a misnomer and the statute's scope breathtaking. n208 The principal consequence of this dramatic expansion
has been to further enlarge the number of immigrants technically subject to removal, and thus the size of the
immigrant population over which the Executive exercises its discretion. n209 Moreover, the expansion has
altered the types of immigrants subject to deportation by making many long-term permanent residents
deportable - often for very minor crimes. This gives the Executive policymaking power with respect to an
ever-increasing cohort of immigrants.
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Plenary Power Bad: Generic
___Plenary power bad – violates general executive power
Many more recent cases, such as Kleindienst v. Mandel n54 and Fiallo v. Bell, n55 have reiterated this language,
n56 which could be read as simply limiting judicial review and recognizing political branch primacy generally. n57
But the reference to "Congress" rather the political branches as a unit could also be read as recognizing
congressional primacy. For an even more striking example in which the Court appeared to conceptualize
immigration authority as a typical congressional power governed by standard conceptions of the separation of
powers, consider INS v. Chadha: It is also argued that these cases present a nonjusticiable political question, because
Chadha is merely challenging Congress's authority under the Naturalization Clause, and the Necessary and Proper
Clause. It is argued that Congress's Art. I power "To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," combined with
the Necessary and Proper Clause, grants it unreviewable authority over the regulation of aliens. The plenary
authority of Congress over aliens under Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, is not open to question, but what is challenged here is
whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power. As we made clear in
Buckley v. Valeo: "Congress has plenary authority in all cases in which it has substantive legislative
jurisdiction, so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction."
n58 [*478] This passage not only suggests that the immigration power is a function of Congress's authority to
set rules for naturalization, but also suggests that the power to regulate immigration may be subject to
constraint, just like any other Article I power. On this account, the immigration power is plenary in the same
way that the commerce power is plenary under Justice Marshall's formulation in McCulloch v. Maryland, not in a
way that suggests complete freedom from constitutional restraint, or inherent executive authority to regulate.
Moreover, although Chadha explicitly addresses the institutional structure of national lawmaking in the immigration
arena - it is perhaps the only modern Supreme Court case directly concerned with that structure - the Chadha Court
did not devote any of its opinion to the question whether the policymaking structure might be different in
immigration law than in other regulatory arenas. Despite these developments bringing immigration law into line
with standard understandings of separation of powers, traces of inherent executive authority with respect to
immigration still appear in doctrine from the latter part of the century - though the Court never again came
close to making as bold a statement in support of inherent authority as its undefined elaboration in Knauff. In
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, n59 for example, the Court struck down a regulation promulgated by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) barring noncitizens, including lawful permanent residents, from employment in the civil service.
The Court suggested that the regulations' validity turned on whether the CSC "has direct responsibility for fostering
or protecting" the overriding national interest claimed by the government in the case. n60 The Court concluded that
the CSC did not have that expertise or status - a conclusion that then-Justice Rehnquist argued, in dissent, ran
counter to the standard operating procedure of the administrative state. n61
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A2: Attorney General Can’t Act
___The Attorney General has the power to grant waivers
US Code, No date given

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1001, Section 212.
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/ineligibilities/ineligibilities_1364.html]
Aliens who are ineligible for a visa under one of the classes enumerated above may be eligible for a
waiver of ineligibility under one of the following provisions of the Act. 212(d)(1) The Attorney
General shall determine whether a ground for exclusion exists with respect to a nonimmigrant
described in section 101(a)(15)(S). The Attorney General, in the Attorney General's discretion, may
waive the application of subsection (a) (other than paragraph (3)(E)) in the case of a nonimmigrant
described in section 101(a)(15)(S), if the Attorney General considers it to be in the national interest to
do so. Nothing in this section shall be regarded as prohibiting the Immigration Service from instituting
removal proceedings against an alien admitted as a nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)(S) for conduct
committed after the alien's admission into the United States, or for conduct or a condition that was not
disclosed to the Attorney General prior to the alien's admission as a nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)
(S).
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A2: Courts Solve
___Court action bad for waiver processing
Hethmon, ‘6 [Michael M., General Counsel for the Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI), “Symposium on
Immigration Appeals and Judicial Review: Tsunami watch on the Coast of Bohemia n1: The BIA Streamlining
Reforms and Judicial Review of Expulsion Orders,” Catholic University Law Review, 55 Cath. U.L. Rev. 999,
Summer, lexis]
Critics of the BIA reforms characterize this tension as inherent in due process requirements. n446 The prevailing
view of the immigrant interests and the judiciary seems to be that expulsion cases are not amenable to traditional
criteria. n447 FAIR disagrees. n448 "[W]hen the record can reasonably be read in more than one way, [the rule
from the Ventura line of cases is that] the court should not substitute its preference for what it considers the more
reasonable view of the evidence." n449 The striking reported differences between the circuits in the rate of
reversing BIA decisions, both before and after implementation of streamlining reforms, can credibly be
explained by the personal opinions and worldviews of the judges who have been left by Congress to reduce
these penumbras and emanations to predictions as to future events in foreign lands. n450 The judges in
the activist circuits, if they felt it were necessary, could exercise a much greater level of restraint and even
skepticism, by utilizing, for example, the substantial evidence test, in order to reduce their caseloads to
levels comparable to those of the less sympathetic circuits. n451
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A2: Waivers Fail
___The CP prevents prosecutorial discretion
Hethmon, ‘6 [Michael M., General Counsel for the Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI), “Symposium on
Immigration Appeals and Judicial Review: Tsunami watch on the Coast of Bohemia n1: The BIA Streamlining
Reforms and Judicial Review of Expulsion Orders,” Catholic University Law Review, 55 Cath. U.L. Rev. 999,
Summer, lexis]
Entitlement to relief is almost always the determinative issue in both administrative and judicial appeals.
The three major types of relief from expulsion are persecution-based relief, cancellation of removal and
related relief, and waivers of inadmissibility or excludability. n391 Some types of relief are mandatory if
eligibility standards are met, but most forms of relief require the government to determine whether the alien
merits a favorable exercise of discretion. n392 Whatever doctrine INA [*1043] section 242(a)(2)(B) may
embody, the immigration interests, the immigration bar, and the DHS administrators will continue to take
advantage of the expanded doctrine of prosecutorial discretion. Both the BIA and the Article III courts fully
understand that prosecutorial discretion currently plays a very large role, even if it is difficult to measure.
n393 Aliens must generally concede deportability as a condition to requesting relief. n394 Although the formal
burden of proof remains on the alien applicant to establish that he or she meets the elements of eligibility
for relief from expulsion, n395 in practice there is a strong and pervasive bias among the regulatory and
stakeholder institutions to give the applicant what Professor Martin called "the benefit of the doubt." n396
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**Aff Answers**
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*Solvency Answers*
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No Solvency: Admissibility
___Waiving standards for admissibility doesn’t solve – other requirements will prevent
admission
Two forms of waivers of inadmissibility exist under §212(h) of the INA. As a defense from removal, non-
residents with an immigrant visa available to them may apply for residency and waive criminal grounds of
inadmissibility including most crimes involving moral turpitude, convictions of multiple crimes, prostitution, and
a single conviction of possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana. n11 In its second form, permanent
residents of seven years may re-acquire their residency and waive the same offenses, unless their conviction
could be categorized as an aggravated felony. n12 In both forms of §212(h) the applicant must also meet a
threshold requirement of showing that [*206] denial and deportation would cause extreme hardship to a
spouse, child, or parent. n13 In each of the forms of relief, once the prima facie case and any required
standard of hardship is met, the alien must also show that she warrants a favorable exercise of discretion.
n14
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No Solvency: Deportability
___Waivers don’t solve deportability – aliens must be in the U.S. at least 7 years
If available, a waiver granted under section 212(h) could have potentially overcome the grounds under which the
respondent was found deportable. n207 However, the waiver is unavailable to someone who has "previously
been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence" unless the person
has lived in the United States for seven years before the start of deportation or removal proceedings . n208 The
respondent in Ayala-Arevalo was admitted as a permanent resident in July 1991, and his deportation proceedings began about five
years later, on May 20, 1996. n209 Thus, if the Board found that he was indeed "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" within
the meaning of section 212(h), he would not have the necessary seven years of residence and would thus be ineligible for a waiver.
n210
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No Solvency: Familial Sponsorship
___Waivers don’t solve – must have familial sponsorship [LGBT]
[*129] Because of this major change in analysis, many non-citizens will potentially face a situation similar to
that in 1952 by having to undertake a trip abroad to secure their immigrant visas. n370 The consequences of
departing the United States, however, are much greater today than they were in 1952. Of those individuals who
may need to travel abroad, countless will now require unlawful presence waivers under INA section 212(a)(9)
(B)(v) for having been in the United States without legal status for a period of over 180 days. n371 For those
who require such a waiver, the disadvantages are much more than the cost of traveling abroad. First, not all non-
citizens are eligible for an unlawful presence waiver. n372 In order to be eligible for a waiver, one must
have the necessary qualifying relative relationship, including a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident
parent or spouse. n373 Similar to the waiver under INA section 212(i), U.S. citizens and lawful permanent
resident children of the non-citizen do not count as qualifying relatives. n374 [*130] Furthermore, the
mere existence of qualifying relatives is insufficient to meet the requirements of the unlawful presence
waiver. The non-citizen must prove that the relative would suffer "extreme hardship" if the non-citizen
were unable to return to the United States. n375 The Board has interpreted the "extreme hardship" requirement
and has found that such hardship must go beyond that which a family member would normally suffer if he or she
were removed from the United States. n376 Specifically, the Board has determined that the "extreme
hardship" inquiry with respect to a waiver of inadmissibility is essentially the same as that to be made
when reviewing an application for suspension of deportation under former INA section 244. n377 The Board
has set forth various factors to be considered in making an extreme hardship determination. These factors are:
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No Solvency: Firearm Crimes
___Waivers can’t solve firearm offenses
The weapons violation also led the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to allege that Pichardo
was also deportable under former §241(a)(2)(C) of the INA as an alien convicted of a firearms offense. n36
This allegation was more problematic for him since it was not waivable under former INA §212(c). n37 As
discussed above, the INA §212(c) waiver is only available if the ground of deportability has [*210] a
corresponding ground of inadmissibility. n38 The "certain firearms offenses" language of former
INA §241(a)(2)(C) is unique and has no similar counterpart in the inadmissibility grounds at INA
§212. n39 By comparison, controlled substances offenses have parallel sections in both pertinent sections
of the INA. n40 Thus, Pichardo could only apply for INA §212(c) relief if he could successfully argue that
his crime was not a firearms offense.
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50/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
No Solvency: Generic
___No solvency for ILaw – no explicit provisions on non-citizen deportation
Spring]
None of these treaty provisions expressly mention or limit in any way the authority of a nation to
deport or remove a non-citizen for any reason. Likewise, none of these treaties expressly prohibit an
alien's removal where doing so would adversely affect his family relationships. Treaty provisions
such as those found in the CRC, as well as in Articles 17 and 23 of the ICCPR, provide evidence that
family rights, in general, are fundamentally important. However, these provisions do not establish an
absolute right to be free from interference. By its plain terms, Article 17 of the ICCPR prohibits only
"arbitrary or unlawful" interference with family life. Thus, the above-referenced international agreements
support, at most, a general right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with family life. n221
CUNY 2010
51/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
*Mech Answers*
CUNY 2010
52/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Congress Must Delegate
Congress must delegate authority
The four dissenters, by contrast, rejected the idea that an acceptance requirement would abridge executive judgment,
emphasizing that Congress already had interfered with executive judgment by adopting an elaborate removal
scheme. In so concluding, the dissenters emphasized that it is "to Congress that the Constitution gives authority
over aliens." n70 In other words, Congress may delegate discretion to the Executive, but it is not appropriate
to use a conception of freestanding executive authority over foreign affairs to limit in any way Congress's
definition of the scope of executive authority.
CUNY 2010
53/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Delegation Bad: Generic
Delegation bad
Third, delegating ex ante screening authority to the President could introduce new obstacles associated with
the administrative state. If agency inaction is a pervasive problem across the administrative state, for
example, then it might be difficult to secure a change in executive policy simply through delegation, absent an
external push of some kind. n273 The courts present the most likely candidate to exert external pressure. If, for
example, courts were to apply robust conceptions of due process to the Executive's enforcement policies,
thereby substantially raising the costs of enforcement raids, detention pending removal, and other aspects of
the current asymmetric regime, an Executive under pressure to address illegal immigration would be more
likely to utilize his delegated authority to address the problem on the front end. n274 This dynamic was clearly
apparent in the 1970s, when the lower courts during the Haitian refugee crises applied due process norms to force
the Executive to change its policies with respect to the removal of unauthorized immigrants. The Reagan
Administration, of course, ran an end-run around the courts by adopting an interdiction policy subject to even fewer
due process and oversight constraints than the policy it replaced. But today's dilemma of unauthorized
immigration would not obviously lend itself to this kind of extraterritorial solution, because by definition the
problem involves persons in the territory of the United States. In addition to these challenges, we recognize
that delegating formal screening authority to the President presents legitimacy concerns. As we [*545]
explain above, much of this concern is misguided, given that the President already exercises screening authority
through de facto delegation. Moreover, if a concern for accountability drives the worry over delegation, the history
laid out in Part II highlights the error of making simple-minded statements about superior congressional
accountability in the immigration arena. The Executive's unitary cast might well mean that its decision-making
processes are less deliberative than Congress's (though notice and comment procedures can recreate some public
deliberation). Part II also provides some suggestive evidence that the President has been more open to higher levels
of immigration, as the Bracero experiment and the saga of the literacy test vetoes underscore. n275 But this evidence
cannot tell us in the abstract whether the President or Congress is more likely to be responsive to voters. To be sure,
the President is likely to be responsive to a different set of voters. According to a standard trope, the President lacks
the regional bias of Congress and is therefore more likely to approximate the views of the median voter, or to
overcome obstacles erected by regional minorities in the Senate. n276 Whereas the intensity of regional preferences
can allow a minority coalition to block reform in Congress, the President through the administrative process is
arguably better positioned to effectively balance competing interests, such as the interests of employers, labor, and
immigrants themselves. Of course, whether we can conclude that the President is more accountable to the
people than Congress depends on to whom accountability should run - a question beyond the scope of this
Article. For our purposes, we simply underscore that Congress [*546] does not have a monopoly on the virtue of
accountability. n277 Most importantly, we are writing in a context in which Congress does not appear capable of or
willing to act to address the pathologies we have outlined.
CUNY 2010
54/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Delegation Bad: SOP
___Delegation hurts separation of powers
Zellmer, 2K [Sandra B., Associate Professor, University of Toledo College of Law, “The Devil, the
Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal,” Arizona State
Law Journal, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 941, Fall, lexis]
The primary criticism of congressional delegations of power to administrative agencies is that such
delegations erode the separation of powers among the branches. Agency officials are not elected by the public
and are generally viewed as less accountable than the legislative branch, yet they frequently wield policy-setting
and rule-making authority. n49 Prior to the [*954] enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, n50
unelected agency officials made important decisions largely free from public scrutiny and judicial review,
giving rise to separation of powers and due process concerns. n51
___SOP violations carry the same risk as nuclear war
Martin H. Redish, Law Professor, Northwestern University and Elizabeth J. Cisar, Clerk Chief Judge
William Bauer, U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Duke Law Journal, 1991, lexis.
In summary, no defender of separation of powers can prove with certitude that, but for the existence of
separation of powers, tyranny would be the inevitable outcome. But the question is whether we wish to take
that risk, given the obvious severity of the harm that might result. Given both the relatively limited cost
imposed by use of separation of powers and the great severity of the harms sought to be avoided, one
should not demand a great showing of the likelihood that the feared harm would result. For just as in
the case of the threat of nuclear war, no one wants to be forced into the position of saying, “I told you
so.”
CUNY 2010
55/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
*Net Benefit Answers*

CUNY 2010
56/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
I-Law Fails: Non-Binding
___International law is not binding and has no precedential value
Groves, ‘9 [Steven, Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division
of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, “Questions
for Judge Sotomayor on the Use of Foreign and International Law,” WebMemo #2525, July 6,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/07/Questions-for-Judge-Sotomayor-on-the-Use-of-Foreign-and-
International-Law]
Sotomayor's statements may be fairly read to mean that it is improper for a judge to use foreign law as controlling
precedent, but merely considering foreign law in reaching a judicial decision is appropriate. This is, however, a
distinction without a difference. Of course foreign and international law has no binding, precedential value in
U.S. courts. Even the current justices of the Supreme Court who have cited to foreign law and "world
opinion" take pains to make that point clear in their written opinions.[5]
CUNY 2010
57/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
I-Law Bad: Constitutionality
___Relying on international law violates the Constitution and hurts freedom of speech
Groves, ‘9 [Steven, Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division
of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, “Questions
for Judge Sotomayor on the Use of Foreign and International Law,” WebMemo #2525, July 6,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/07/Questions-for-Judge-Sotomayor-on-the-Use-of-Foreign-and-
International-Law ]
Yet to "consider" foreign law while analyzing the provisions of the U.S. Constitution is to "use" foreign law. It
defies logic to say that, in reaching a judicial decision, a judge may review and "consider" the opinions of foreign
tribunals without ultimately "using" those opinions. In other words, even if Sotomayor suggests that she does not
advocate "using" foreign law as binding or controlling authority, her own statements concede that she endorses its
"use" as persuasive authority. This "use" is dangerous, because American law is unique--the constitutional
protection of free speech, for example, is far more robust than in most other nations--and so relying on
persuasive foreign authority could serve to undermine these key, and uniquely American, constitutional
protections.
CUNY 2010
58/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Customary ILaw Bad: Preemption
___Customary international law justifies preemptive military strikes
Arend, ‘3 [Anthony Clark, a professor in the Department of Government and the School of Foreign Service, an
adjunct professor of law, and a director of the Institute for International Law and Politics at Georgetown University,
“International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force,” The Center for Strategic and International Studies
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Washington Quarterly, Spring, lexis]
Customary international law is different. Unlike treaties, customary international law is not created by what
states put down in writing but, rather, by what states do in practice. In order for there to be a rule of customary
international law, there must be an authoritative state practice. In order words, states must engage in a particular
activity and believe that such activity is required by law. Diplomatic immunity, for example, began as a rule of
customary international law before it was ultimately codified in a treaty. Centuries ago, states began the practice of
granting diplomats immunity from local jurisdiction for a variety of pragmatic reasons: they did not wish to cut off a
channel of communication; they feared that, if they arrested diplomats of a foreign state, the foreign state would do
the same to their diplomats; and so on. As time passed, more and more states began to grant immunity until virtually
all states in the international system were giving diplomats immunity. Gradually, these states that had originally
begun granting immunity for largely practical reasons came to believe that granting such immunity was required by
law. At that point, there was a rule of customary international law—when there was both a near-universal practice
and a belief that the practice was required by law. Under the regime of customary international law that
developed long before the UN Charter was adopted, it was generally accepted that preemptive force was
permissible in self-defense. There was, in other words, an accepted doctrine of anticipatory self-defense. The
classic case that articulated this doctrine is the oft-cited Caroline incident.
CUNY 2010
59/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
Customary ILaw Bad: Tensions
___Customary international law increases international tensions
University of Houston, 1996; LL.M. Candidate, Public International Law, University of Houston Law
Center, 2006, “Exile and the not-so-lawful Permanent Resident: Does International Law Require: A
Humanitarian Waiver of Deportation for the Non-Citizen Convictd of Certain Crimes?” Georgetown
Immigration Law Journal, 20 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 483, Spring]
An additional reason that courts are reticent to use customary international law to interpret
domestic statutes is its constantly evolving, "chameleon[like]" quality. n359 One circuit court of
appeals has reasoned that "[i]f courts were to interpret statutes according to their view of what best fits
the changing nuances of customary international law, they would frequently make decisions that run
up against the foreign policy of the other two branches of our government," thwarting rather than
encouraging peaceful relations between nations. n360 Thus, the uncertainty of customary
international law and the extent of its domestic role, if any, has lead courts to [*536] conclude that
"no enactment of Congress can be challenged on the ground that it violates customary international
law." n361
CUNY 2010
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Hi FI Waiver CP
HR Cred Bad: China
U.S. human rights promotion kills Chinese relations
QPih, ’05 [Zhou, PhD Candidate @ Johns Hopkins U, "Conflicts Over Human Rights Between
China and the US,” Human Rights Quarterly 27.1, p. I 1 1]
While the US takes pride in pursuing human rights abroad and strives for self-identity in its foreign policy, many
Chinese think that US human rights policy essentially uses the issue of human rights as an excuse for the
United States to intervene in other countries' domestic affairs and to advance its own strategic goals. In
China, US human rights policy is generally called "human rights diplomacy." implying that US
promotion of human rights in China has an instrumental motivation, intended to consolidate US power
globally. "The human rights issue was taken by the US as a diplomatic tool to realize its national interests," just
as the "Ping-Pong diplomacy"26 was used by the Chinese leadership to deal with its relations with the United
States in the early 1970s.27 In recent Chinese publications, US human rights policy is condemned, for
instance, as "a tool for conducting 'peaceful evolution' in socialist countries . . . to attain its long-range
strategic goal: to impose on socialist countries its own values, ideology, political standards, and
development model, aimed at changing the nature of the Chinese socialist system."28
U.S.-China relations key to preventing extinction
Zhou, ’04, Chinese ambassador to the US

[Wenzhong, “Vigorously Pushing Forward the Constructive and Cooperative Relationship Between China and the
United States,” February 7, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/bmdyzs/xwlb/t64286.htm]
Terrorism, cross-boundary crime, proliferation of advanced weapons, and spread of deadly diseases
pose a common threat to mankind.China and the US have extensive shared stake and common
responsibility for meeting these challenges, maintaining world peace and security and addressing
other major issues bearing on human survival and development. China is ready to keep up its
coordination and cooperation in these areas with the US and the rest of the international community.
CUNY 2010
61/26
Hi FI Waiver CP
HR Cred Bad: War
Human rights cred increases civilian death and magnifies war
Ford, ‘6 [Christian Eric, a research associate at UC Berkeley's Institute of International Studies, New Era Foreign
Policy Center, and a former U.S. Navy S.E.A.L., “Conflict in Lebanon / When international law makes a bad
situation worse,” August 3, http://articles.sfgate.com/2006-08-03/opinion/17308978_1_war-crimes-civilians-
international-humanitarian-law ]
Human-rights attorneys often invoke international humanitarian law when an armed conflict breaks out.
Presumably, they want to minimize the suffering of innocent people by putting warring parties on notice that
they will be accountable for their conduct. The added deterrent effect, however, from putting charges of war
crimes on the table too hastily when such charges are based solely on reports of civilian casualties, can
engender long-term consequences that outweigh any short-term sparing of innocent life. No amount of smart
bombs or infantry training can eliminate the risk to civilians. Suggesting prematurely that the killing of innocent
civilians is unjustified -- before the circumstances surrounding targeting decisions are known -- can convert a lawful
military operation into a politically unsustainable one. Worse, a premature charge of war crimes can set up a
counterproductive incentive that undercuts one of the main purposes of war crimes jurisprudence, namely,
the minimization of death and destruction during war. This is especially true when a democratic state is
fighting a militarily weaker adversary, such as a guerrilla or terrorist organization. A democratic state is
more vulnerable to the political and legitimacy costs that result when the lawfulness of its tactics during a war
are questioned. Well organized terrorist and guerrilla groups know this. They are also quite familiar with
international humanitarian law. And they recognize that the cost of violating these laws will be felt
asymmetrically. Consequently, these groups employ tactics such as using civilians as shields.

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CUNY 2010 1/26

____Waivers forgive visa applicants found to be inadmissible or deportable

___Delegation allows unpopular action to happen without political backlash

___The CP avoids presidential and congressional backlash

___Waivers solve aggravated felony exclusion and deportation

___Waivers solve crime inadmissibility

___Waivers solve criminal offenses

___Waivers solve family based visas

___ Waivers solve

___Waivers solve inadmissibility

___Waivers solve H-2 visas

___Waiver solve ideological exclusion – the McGovern Amendment

___Waivers solve inadmissibility based on violations of moral turpitude

___Waivers help refugees – avoids deportation for fraud

*ILaw Net Benefit*

___Waivers bring the U.S. in compliance with International law

___Effective international law solves every impact

___Waivers for crimes solve international law

___U.S. credibility in international law is key to leadership – It stabilized US power,

___ Soft power necessary to prevent disease, terrorism, and WMD

Nye, 2004, Professor of Government, Harvard,

___Waivers uphold international law – denial hurts global stability

___Waivers use international law to create outlets for humanitarian relief

___Broader incorporation of international law solves biodiversity loss

Glennon, ’90, professor of law at the University of California, Davis

___Waivers uphold the UDHR and ICCPR

___Human Right Credibility solves extinction

Copelan, ’99, NYT Law Professor

*A2: Aff Args*

___A strong attorney general is good for the country

Congressional delegation to the agencies key to democracy

Stack, ‘6, Associate Professor of Law at Benjamin N. Cardozo. School of Law

___Democracy solves nuclear war and extinction

___Agencies uphold separation of powers

___SOP violations carry the same risk as nuclear war

___Executive delegation good for enacting immigration policy

___Congress should delegate admissibility standards to agencies

___The executive has the power to control admissibility and deportability

___Exec delegation good/solves

___Executive has control over immigration

___The executive has discretion over deportability

___Plenary power bad – violates general executive power

___The Attorney General has the power to grant waivers

US Code, No date given

___Court action bad for waiver processing

___The CP prevents prosecutorial discretion

___Waivers don’t solve – must have familial sponsorship [LGBT]

___Waivers can’t solve firearm offenses

___No solvency for ILaw – no explicit provisions on non-citizen deportation

Congress Must Delegate

Congress must delegate authority

___Delegation hurts separation of powers

___SOP violations carry the same risk as nuclear war

*Net Benefit Answers*

___Customary international law justifies preemptive military strikes

Customary ILaw Bad: Tensions

___Customary international law increases international tensions

U.S. human rights promotion kills Chinese relations

U.S.-China relations key to preventing extinction

Zhou, ’04, Chinese ambassador to the US

Anda mungkin juga menyukai

ILaw Net Benefit

A2: Aff Args

Net Benefit Answers