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Social Cognition Project


-what are emotions, how they appear
-primary human emotions
-secondary human emotions
-theories of emotions
-what are decisions, how they appear
-emotions and decisions
-emotional impact on judgment and decision making in advertising



emotions, affect, appraisal, decisions making, advertising


Emotion research has long struggled over the role of cognitive processes in affect (Barrett,
Lewis, & Haviland-Jones, 2016; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; M. S. Clark & Fiske, 1982; V.
Hamilton, Bower, & Frijda, 1988; Mesquita, Marinetti, & Delvaux, 2012; P. Shaver, 1984;
Zajonc, 1998). The two questions that particularly concern us here – the influence of
cognition on affect and the influence of affect on cognition – presuppose of course that the
two can be usefully separated. However, the separation is not sustained, for example, by
one’s lived experience of affect and cognition as occurring in a simultaneous mix, not to
mention the neuroscientific evidence.
Breakthroughs in brain science have revealed that people are primarily emotional decision
makers. Emotions exert an incredibly powerful force on human behavior.
Definition of Emotions
"An emotion is a feeling comprising physiological and behavioral (and possibly cognitive)
reactions to internal and external events." - Sternberg, R. In Search of the Human Mind,
2nd Ed.Harcourt, Brace, 1998 p 542

"An emotion is a complex psychological event that involves a mixture of reactions: (1)
a physiological response (usually arousal), (2) an expressive reaction(distinctive facial
expression, body posture, or vocalization), and (3) some kind of subjective
experience (internal thoughts and feelings)." Nairne, J. S. Psychology: The Adaptive Mind.
2nd Ed. Wadsworth, 2000. p. 444

"Emotion tems refer to internal mental states that are primarily focused on affect (where
"affect" simply refers to the perceived goodness or badness of something). [see Clore &
Ortony (1988) in V. Hamilton et al. Cognitive Science Perspectives on Emotion and
Motivation. 367-398]

According to PAUL EKMAN - professor of psychology in the department of psychiatry at
the University of California Medical School, San Francisco-there are six primary emotions.

Other classifications:

“The brain stem, cerebral cortex and memory act in unison in the complex mental process
that tell us who we are and generate the feelings that are at the heart of being conscious,”
Antonio Damasio-Self Comes to Mind.
Damasio maintains that “humans are not either thinking machines or feeling machines but
rather feeling machines that think.” Organisms down to the level of invertebrates emotionally
and automatically respond to threats from predators or environmental dangers for their
betterment and survival.
Through evolutionary processes, the beauty of the mind has combined feelings of emotion
with the accrual of knowledge, logic and reasoning.
Damasio posited a theory called the “somatic marker.” That is, every moment of every day,
our brain stamps an emotion onto everything we experience. That emotion, or somatic
marker, helps us project into the future and decide what to do when we encounter a similar
situation again. If you go to a casino, for example, and gamble away all your money, your
brain will mark that moment with a feeling. The next time you go to a casino, the brain will
dredge up that old queasy feeling and you will likely behave more cautiously.

Over the past decades, five general theoretical approaches to understanding the dynamics
of human emotions have emerged in sociology:
-dramaturgical theories,
-symbolic interactionist theories,
-interaction ritual theories,
-power and status theories,
-and exchange theories.
Dramaturgical Theories
Dramaturgical theories emphasize that individuals make dramatic presentations and engage in
strategic actions directed by a cultural script. Although the terminology varies among
different theorists, the cultural script guiding action includes ideologies, norms and rules,
logics, vocabularies, and implicit stocks of knowledge about which feelings should be
experienced and expressed in episodes of face-toface interaction. Actors present self in
strategic ways, emitting the emotions that are dictated by emotion ideologies and rules.
When necessary, actors draw upon the cultural vocabularies and logics that define how
emotions should be expressed. Individuals are, in essence, dramatic actors on a stage playing
parts dictated by culture, and, like all theater, they are given some dramatic license in how
they play roles, as long as they do not deviate too far from the emotional script provided by
culture. When individuals do break rules of feeling and display, they experience negative
emotions, particularly embarrassment and shame (Goffman 1967, Scheff 1988), and they
become highly motivated to repair their breach of cultural prescriptions and proscriptions. To
avoid breaches, individuals employ the appropriate emotional vocabularies and syntax
(Gordon 1989, Rosenberg 1991) to convince both themselves and others that they are indeed
abiding by feeling rules and display rules (Hochschild 1979, 1983). Persons also consciously
manipulate facial expressions, forms of talk, and gestures to sustain an impression that
feeling and display rules are being met. They also use physical props such as clothing or
objects on the interpersonal stage to communicate to others that they are adhering to emotion
ideologies and norms.
Symbolic Interactionist Theories
The basic generalization of all symbolic interactionist theories is that individuals
seek to confirm their more global self-conceptions as well as their more context dependent
identities in all episodes of interaction. When self is verified by others responding to self in a
manner that is consistent with self’s own view, the person experiences positive emotions,
such as pride and satisfaction. When self is not confirmed, however, the incongruity between

self-directed behavior and the responses of others generates negative emotions such as
distress, anxiety, anger, shame, and guilt. Individuals are seen as motivated to bring
cognitions about self into line with the responses of others and, correspondingly, to turn
negative emotions into positive emotions. In Shott’s (1979) theory, for example, the arousal
of guilt, shame, and embarrassment signals to self that deviations from norms have occurred
and that corrective behaviors must be forthcoming. Much theorizing within the symbolic
interactionist tradition examines the various strategies that individuals pursue to achieve
congruity among self, norms and cultural standards, behavior, and the responses of others.
When individuals repress negative emotions, they are more likely to make external
attributions and blame others, the situation, or morecinclusive structures for their negative
emotional arousal, thereby breaching social bonds and commitments to social situations.
Interaction Ritual Theories
The guiding generalizations from this approach include the following:
1. The more that individuals are copresent and exchange greeting rituals, the more likely they
will experience mild transient emotions, shared mood, and mutual focus of attention.
2. The more that the conditions in item 1, above, persist, the more likely that talk and bodily
gestures will fall into rhythmic synchronization, leading to a sense of collective effervescence
that increases each participant’s level of positive emotional energy.
3. The higher the level of emotional effervescence and the longer its duration, the greater will
be the sense of group solidarity among participants and the more likely they will symbolize
the emerging sense of solidarity.
4. The more an interaction ritual leads to the symbolization of solidarity and the more this
ritual is iterated over time, the more likely that symbols marking group solidarity will
circulate among group members and increase the level of particularized cultural capital in the
5. The more the conditions above are realized, the more likely that individuals in the group
will have conversations among themselves that invoke group symbols and, thereby, arouse
positive emotional energy.
6. The more that status and power differences prevail among participants in an interaction
ritual, the greater high-status and high-power individuals’ emotional energy will be compared
to that of low-status and low-power individuals and the more likely high-status and high-
power individuals will develop commitments to group symbols and, thereby, augment their
level of particularized cultural capital compared to low-status and low-power participants.

7. The more that power and status are used in abusive and exploitive ways, the more those
subject to such abuse will adopt strategies of minimizing the loss of positive emotional
energy or, alternatively, minimizing the arousal of negative emotional energy.
8. The more salient that self and identity dynamics are during an interaction ritual, the more
intense all elements of the interaction ritual will become, with confirmation of self and
identity during the course of the ritual raising the level of positive emotional energy and
failure to verify self- lowering the level of emotional energy or turning the valence of
emotions toward the negative pole.
Power and Status Theories
The basic generalization in this theory is that when individuals have power or gain power,
they experience satisfaction, confidence, and security, whereas when they lose power, they
experience anxiety, fear, and loss of confidence. Kemper and Collins incorporate the notion
of expectation states into this model, arguing that when individuals expect to gain power, but
in fact do not, they lose self-confidence and experience fear and anxiety. Conversely, when
they do not expect to gain power but actually increase their power, they experience
satisfaction and gain in self-confidence. When individuals experience gains in prestige (or the
receipt of deference), satisfaction and well-being are aroused, and they express positive
sentiments to others, thereby increasing the flow of positive emotions and bonds of solidarity
between givers and receivers of deference.
The current theories do converge on some basic generalizations:
1. The more unequal the distribution of power (authority), status (prestige), and material well-
being (money), the more likely that this distribution will generate expectations and beliefs
about the competence and abilities of those at different ranks in this distribution.
2. The more that individuals interact, the more likely that emotion expectation states will
emerge; the more congruent that these emotion expectation states are with expectations states
arising from the distribution of power and prestige, the more compelling all expectation states
will be on individuals.
3. Conversely, the less congruent that emotion expectation states are with those arising from
differences in power and prestige (and money), the greater the effect of status (power and
prestige) will be over emotion expectation states on behavior.
4. The more that expectation states associated with diffuse status characteristics become part
of generalized beliefs about the respective qualities of individuals, the greater the power of
expectation states will be on behavior and emotions.

5. The more that individuals and collective actors hold power, prestige, and other resources or
gain these resources, the more likely they are to experience such positive emotions as
satisfaction, happiness, pride, well-being, and confidence and the more likely they are to give
off positive emotions to others.
6. The less that individuals and collective actors hold power, prestige, and other resources or
fail to gain these resources, the more likely they are to experience such negative emotions as
anger, anxiety, sadness, and fear; these emotions will increase in intensity when (a) actors do
not receive resources that are consistent with, and proportionate to, expectation states and
status beliefs, or (b) actors do not receive resources in proportion to their status and power.
7. The more that individuals make attributions to self for the failure to receive resources, the
more likely they are to experience emotions like sadness and, if resources were expected,
shame, embarrassment, guilt, and depression.
8. The more that individuals fail to give deference and compliance to others when they are
due, the more likely the individuals are to feel guilt and shame, and the more likely those who
are deserving of deference and compliance are to experience anger and fear.
9. The more that individuals make external attributions for their failure to receive resources
that were expected, the more likely they are to experience and express anger at those who are
perceived to be responsible for their failure.
10. The more that individuals receive resources that others perceive as their due, the greater
the latter’s resentment will be of the former and the more intense this resentment will be
when individuals receiving rewards have not met expectations.
Exchange Theories
All exchange theories view humans as motivated to receive rewards or utilities and avoid
costs and punishments. Although the vocabularies of exchange theories vary somewhat, the
basic model is that individuals incur costs (giving up resources or forgoing alternative
sources of resources) and make investments (accumulated costs) in order to receive resources
from other actors. Individuals behave in this way to receive a profit (resources received, less
costs and investments). Moreover, payoffs are assessed against normative standards of justice
and fair exchange that can be determined by such factors as comparison of one’s payoffs and
costs relative to those of others, previous payoff schedules, expectations for payoff as
dictated by norms or past exchanges, and the relative power of exchange partners.
The basic generalization in exchange theorizing on emotions is that individuals experience
positive emotions when payoffs exceed costs and investments while meeting standards of
justice. Conversely, when payoffs do not exceed costs and investments and fall below

standards of what is considered fair and just, individuals experience negative emotions. The
nature and intensity of the emotions experienced by individuals vary with a number of
conditions: the type of exchange, the types of structures in which exchanges of resources
occur, the relative power and dependence of actors on each other for resources, the
expectations for resources, the standards of justice that apply to the exchange, and the
attributions that actors make for success or failure in receiving profitable payoffs.We review
each of these conditions belowand discuss howexchange theorists develop generalizations
about the arousal of emotions.
Exchanges can be of four basic types: (a) productive when individuals must coordinate their
behaviors to receive payoffs; (b) negotiated when individuals actively bargain over time with
offers and counteroffers to establish what resources must be given up in order to receive other
resources; (c) reciprocal when one party gives resources to another with the implicit
expectation that this gift of resources will be reciprocated by the recipient at a subsequent
point in time; and (d) generalized when individuals do not directly exchange resources and
instead pass resources on to actors who, in turn, pass them along in chains of exchange that
eventually work their way back to an individual (Lawler 2001).
Despite the progress made by these theories, several issues remain unresolved: the nature of
emotions, feeling, and affect; the degree to which emotions are biologically based or socially
constructed; the gap between social psychological theories on emotions and macro-structural
theorizing; and the relatively narrow range of emotions theorized, coupled with an equally
narrow focus on the structural and cultural conditions producing these emotions.
A revolution in the science of emotion has emerged in recent decades, with the potential to
create a paradigm shift in decision theories. Many research studies reveal that emotions
constitute potent, pervasive, predictable, sometimes harmful and sometimes beneficial drivers
of decision making. Across different domains, important regularities appear in the
mechanisms through which emotions influence judgments and choices.
In psychology, decision-making is regarded as the cognitive process resulting in the
selection of a belief or a course of action among several alternative possibilities. Every
decision-making process produces a final choice, which may or may not prompt action.
Decision-making is the process of identifying and choosing alternatives based on
the values, preferences and beliefs of the decision-maker.
Decision-making can be regarded as a problem-solving activity terminated by a solution
deemed to be optimal, or at least satisfactory. It is therefore a process which can be more or
less rational or irrational and can be based on explicit or tacit knowledge and beliefs.

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Human performance has been the subject of active research from several perspectives:
 Psychological: examining individual decisions in the context of a set of needs,
preferences and values the individual has or seeks.
 Cognitive: the decision-making process regarded as a continuous process integrated in
the interaction with the environment.
 Normative: the analysis of individual decisions concerned with the logic of decision-
making, or communicative rationality, and the invariant choice it leads to.
Hence, in order to have anything like a complete theory of human rationality, we have to
understand what role emotion plays in it. Herbert Simon (1983, p. 29)
The philosopher de Sousa, claims that when dealing with the issue of making decisions one
can benefit significantly by accepting the hypothesis that emotions are active participants in
decision making, as they make sure that only a small percentage of all possible alternatives
and facts become relevant in the process. Antonio Damasio has come to similar conclusions,
but from the perspective of neuroscience and psychology.
Barnes and Thagard (in press) argue that emotions and inferences are both necessary when
we empathize with other people. Social psychologists have explored the function of emotions
in social perception and judgment (Forgas, 1991).
According to Wayne-Riggs [13] we’d never be able to make a practical decsion about what to
do if we if we didn’t have certain emotions attached to the possible outcomes. This theory is a
breakthrough in social science and neuroscience because scientists and philosophers always
have thought if you wanted to think clearly, you would have to leave out your emotions.
Recent work of Johnson & Tversky (1983); Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans (1992)
analyse risk preferences and decisions in risky situations. This idea is compatible with work
of Isen & Simmonds (1978) ; Mischel (1973); Mischel, Ebbesen & Zeiss (1976) in the social
psychology literature suggesting that people who are feeling happy become motivated to
maintain their positive states and thus may have more to lose controls in the same situation.
Anxious or sad individuals are posited to process information less systematically in judgment
and decision making. Negative affective states may alter the process through which people
make decisions. On the contrary, in the research study of Damasio (1994), a totally emotional
decision is very fast in comparison to a rational decision. This is reactive (and largely
subconscious) and can be useful when faced with immediate danger, or in decisions of
minimal significance.

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Lots of research studies analyzed in the last fourty years the impact of emotions in
judgement and decisions making, and collectively, they elucidate one overarching
conclusion: emotions powerfully, predictably, and pervasively influence decision making,
with and emerging of eight major themes.
Emotional impact on judgment and decision making- eight major themes
Theme 1. Integral Emotions Influence Decision Making
It is useful, when surveying the field, to identify distinct types of emotion.We start with
emotions arising from the judgment or choice at hand (i.e., integral emotion), a type of
emotion that strongly and routinely shapes decision making (Damasio 1994, Greene & Haidt
2002). For example, a person who feels anxious about the potential outcome of a risky choice
may choose a safer option rather than a potentially more lucrative option.Aperson who feels
grateful to a school s/he attended may decide to donate a large sum of money to that school
even though it limits the decision maker’s own spending. Such effects of integral emotions
operate at conscious and nonconscious levels.
Integral emotion as beneficial guide. Although a negative view of emotion’s role in reason
has dominated much of Western thought (for discussion, see Keltner & Lerner 2010), a few
philosophers pioneered the idea that integral emotion could be a beneficial guide. David
Hume (1978 [1738], p. 415), for example, argued that the dominant predisposition toward
viewing emotion as secondary to reason is entirely backward: “Reason is, and ought only to
be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey

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them.” Following this view, anger, for example, provides the motivation to respond to
injustice (Solomon 1993), and anticipation of regret provides a reason to avoid excessive
risk-taking (Loomes & Sugden 1982).
Integral emotion as bias. Despite arising from the judgment or decision at hand, integral
emotions can also bias decision making. For example, one may feel afraid to fly and decide to
drive instead, even though base rates for death by driving are much higher than are base rates
for death by flying the equivalent mileage (Gigerenzer 2004). Integral emotions can be
remarkably influential even in the presence of cognitive information that would suggest
alternative courses of action (for review, see Loewenstein 1996). Once integral emotions
attach themselves to decision targets, they become difficult to detach (Rozin et al. 1986).
Prior reviews have described myriad ways in which integral emotion inputs to decision
making, especially perceptually vivid ones, can override otherwise rational courses of action
(Loewenstein et al. 2001).
Theme 2. Incidental Emotions Influence Decision Making
Researchers have found that incidental emotions pervasively carry over from one situation to
the next, affecting decisions that should, from a normative perspective, be unrelated to that
emotion (for selective reviews, Han et al. 2007, Keltner & Lerner 2010, Lerner & Keltner
2000, Lerner& Tiedens 2006, Loewenstein & Lerner 2003, Pham 2007, Vohs et al. 2007,
Yates 2007), a process known as the carryover of incidental emotion (Bodenhausen 1993,
Loewenstein & Lerner 2003).
For example, incidental anger triggered in one situation automatically elicits a motive to
blame individuals in other situations even though the targets of such anger have nothing to do
with the source of the anger (Quigley & Tedeschi 1996). Moreover, carryover of incidental
emotions typically occurs without awareness.
Incidental emotion as bias. Psychological models have begun to elucidate the mechanisms
through which the carryover effect occurs as well as the moderators that amplify or attenuate
the effect. Early studies of carryover either implicitly or explicitly took a valence-based
approach, dividing emotions into positive and negative categories and positing that emotions
of the same valence would have similar effects. For example, such models hypothesized that
people in good moods would make optimistic judgments, and people in bad moods would
make pessimistic judgments (for reviews, see Han et al. 2007, Keltner & Lerner 2010,
Loewenstein & Lerner 2003).
Moderating factors. The field is starting to identify moderating factors for carryover of
incidental emotion. One auspicious line of work is Forgas’s (1995) affect infusion model,

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which elaborates on the circumstances under which affect—integral and/or incidental—
influences social judgment.
The model predicts that the degree of affect infusion into judgments varies along a processing
continuum, such that affect is most likely to influence judgment in complex and unanticipated
situations. Another promising line of research on moderating factors revolves around the
hypothesis (e.g., Yip & Cote 2013) that individuals with high emotional intelligence can
correctly identify which events caused their emotions and, therefore, can screen out the
potential impact of incidental emotion.
Theme 3. Emotional Valence Is Only One of Several Dimensions That Shape
Emotions’ Influence on Decision Making
Most literature on emotion and JDM (Judgement&Decision Making) has implicitly or
explicitly taken a valence-based approach (e.g., Finucane et al. 2000, Schwarz & Clore
1983), revealing powerful and provocative effects for that dimension of emotion. But valence
cannot account for all influences of affect on judgment and choice. Though parsimonious,
hypotheses relying only on the valence dimension explain less variance across JDM
outcomes than would be ideal because they do not take into account evidence that emotions
of the same valence differ in essential ways. For example, emotions of the same valence, such
as anger and sadness, are associated with different antecedent appraisals (Smith & Ellsworth
1985); depths of processing (Bodenhausen et al. 1994b); brain hemispheric activation
(Harmon-Jones & Sigelman 2001); facial expressions (Ekman 2007); autonomic responses
(Levenson et al. 1990); and central nervous system activity (Phelps et al. 2014). At least as
far back as 1998, an Annual Review of Psychology article on JDM noted the insufficiency of
valence and arousal in predicting JDM outcomes: “Even a two-dimensional model seems
inadequate for describing emotional experiences. Anger, sadness, and disgust are all forms of
negative affect, and arousal does not capture all of the differences among them . . . . A more
detailed approach is required to understand relationships between emotions and decisions”
(Mellers et al. 1998, p. 454). To increase the predictive power and precision of JDM models
of emotion, Lerner & Keltner (2000, 2001) proposed examining multidimensional discrete
emotions with their appraisal tendency framework (ATF). The ATF systematically links the
appraisal processes associated with specific emotions to different judgment and choice
outcomes. Unlike valence-based models, the ATF predicts that emotions of the same valence
(such as fear and anger) can exert opposing influences on choices and judgments, whereas
emotions of the opposite valence (such as anger and happiness) can exert similar influences.
The ATF rests on three broad assumptions: (a) that a discrete set of cognitive dimensions

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differentiates emotional experience (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith 1988, Lazarus 1991, Ortony et
al. 1988, Scherer 1999, Smith & Ellsworth 1985); (b) that emotions serve a coordination role,
automatically triggering a set of concomitant responses (physiological, behavioral,
experiential, and communication) that enable the individual to address problems or
opportunities quickly (e.g., Frijda 1988, Levenson 1994, Oatley & Jenkins 1992); and (c) that
emotions have motivational properties that depend on both an emotion’s intensity and its
qualitative character.
The appraisal-tendency hypothesis. According to the ATF, appraisal tendencies are goal
directed processes through which emotions exert effects on judgments and decisions until the
emotion-eliciting problem is resolved (Lerner & Keltner 2000, 2001). The ATF predicts that
an emotion, once activated, can trigger a cognitive predisposition to assess future events in
line with the central appraisal dimensions that triggered the emotion.
Theme 4. Emotions Shape Decisions via the Content of Thought
Based on evidence that discrete emotions are associated with different patterns of cognitive
appraisal (for review, see Keltner & Lerner 2010) and that such appraisal dimensions involve
themes that have been central to JDM research, a natural opportunity for linking discrete
emotions to JDM outcomes arises. Consider two illustrations of how emotions shape the
content of thought via appraisal tendencies, drawn from Lerner & Keltner (2000). Table 1
compares two pairs of emotions from the same valence that are highly differentiated in their
central appraisal themes on a judgment related to those appraisal themes. Each of these four
emotions can be characterized in terms of the six emotion appraisal dimensions originally
identified by Smith & Ellsworth (1985): certainty, pleasantness, attentional activity,
anticipated effort, control, and others’ responsibility.

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Theme 5. Emotions Shape Decisions via the Depth of Thought
In addition to influencing the content of thought, emotions also influence the depth of
information processing related to decision making. One interesting school of thought
(Schwarz 1990, Schwarz & Bless 1991) proposes that, if emotions serve in an adaptive role
by signaling when a situation demands additional attention, then negative mood should signal
threat and thus increase vigilant, systematic processing, and positive mood should signal a
safe environment and lead to more heuristic processing. Indeed, numerous studies have
shown that people in positive (negative) affective states were more (less) influenced by
heuristic cues, such as the expertise, attractiveness, or likeability of the source, and by the
length rather than the quality of the message; they also relied more on stereotypes (Bless et
al. 1996, Bodenhausen et al. 1994a).
Note that systematic processing is not necessarily more desirable than automatic processing.
Theme 6. Emotions Shape Decisions via Goal Activation
Many theorists have proposed that emotions serve an adaptive coordination role, triggering a
set of responses (physiological, behavioral, experiential, and communication) that enable
individuals to address encountered problems or opportunities quickly (for review, see Keltner
et al. 2014). For example, in their investigation of action tendencies, Frijda and colleagues
(1989) found that anger was associated with the desire to change the situation andmove

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against another person or obstacle by fighting, harming, or conquering it. As one would
expect, readiness to fight manifests not only experientially but also physiologically. For
example, anger is associated with neural activation characteristics of approach motivation
(Harmon-Jones & Sigelman 2001) and sometimes with changes in peripheral physiology that
might prepare one to fight, such as increasing blood flow to the hands (Ekman & Davidson
1994). Such emotion-specific action tendencies map onto appraisal themes. For example,
given that anxiety is characterized by the appraisal theme of facing uncertain existential
threats (Lazarus 1991), it accompanies the action tendency to reduce uncertainty
(Raghunathan & Pham 1999). Sadness, by contrast, is characterized by the appraisal theme of
experiencing irrevocable loss (Lazarus 1991) and thus accompanies the action tendency to
change one’s circumstances, perhaps by seeking rewards (Lerner et al. 2004).
Theme 7. Emotions Influence Interpersonal Decision Making
Emotions are inherently social (for review, see Keltner & Lerner 2010), and a full
explanation of their adaptive utility requires an understanding of their reciprocal influence on
interaction partners. As an example of how complex such influences can be, people derive
happiness merely from opportunities to help and give to others with no expectation of
concrete gains (Dunn et al. 2008). Indeed, prosociality is sometimes used instrumentally to
manage one’s mood, relieving sadness or distress (Schaller & Cialdini 1988).
Theme 8. Unwanted Effects of Emotion on Decision Making Can Be Reduced
Under Certain Circumstances
Numerous strategies have been examined for minimizing the effects of emotions on decision
making in situations where such effects are seen as deleterious. These strategies broadly take
one of two forms: (a) minimizing the magnitude of the emotional response (e.g., through time
delay, reappraisal, or induction of a counteracting emotional state), or (b) insulating the
judgment or decision process from the emotion (e.g., by crowding out emotion, increasing
awareness of misattribution, or modifying the choice architecture).
Emotions help optimally navigate social decisions. Many scholars have conceptualized
emotions as communication systems that help people navigate and coordinate social
interactions by providing information about others’motives and dispositions, ultimately
allowing for the creation and maintenance of healthy and productive social relationships
(Keltner et al. 2014, Morris & Keltner 2000). In the case of psychopathology (e.g.,
narcissism), emotions impede healthy and productive social relationships (Kring 2008).
Frank (1988) argues that the communicative function of emotions has played a crucial role in

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helping people solve important commitment problems raised by mixed motives. That is,
whether we decide to pursue cooperative or competitive strategies with others depends on our
beliefs about their intentions (cf. Singer & Fehr 2005), information that is often inferred from
their emotions (Fessler 2007).This approach has been particularly evident in the study of
mixed-motive situations (e.g., negotiation and bargaining; cf.Van Kleef et al. 2010). For
example, communicating gratitude triggers others’ generosity (Rind & Bordia 1995) and
ultimately helps an individual build social and economic capital (DeSteno 2009).


Do emotions in advertising drive decisions?

It is widely accepted that human emotions play a significant role in driving our decisions,
from the type of content we watch to the products and services we buy (LeDoux 2002;
Damasio 1994). Physiological changes in our heart rate, posture, facial expression and voice
convey emotion responses to the world around us. These responses are encoded in the System
1 brain circuit, the automatic and largely emotional processing system of the brain. When
making decisions, our past and current emotion experiences bias our decision-making

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subconsciously, making emotions an important influencer on our decisions (Loewenstein and
Lerner 2003).
In his book, Emotionomics, Dan Hill proposes us a model –The Emotionomic Matrix that
companies can use in broadening their strategic business planning, more specifically branded
correlated. Creating these matrices as, for instance, a platform for an advertising campaign or
for introducing a new initiative to employees will enable companies to anticipate the feelings
and needs most likely to create engagement and buy-in.
What exactly the Emotionomics Matrix is. While the four core motivations are central to it,
The matrix would be woefully incomplete if it didn’t take into account emotions; it shows us
how it might be possible to assign a place within the matrix for each of Ekman’s core
emotions, based on which motivations are the most likely to invoke them. While these are not
rigid assignments, the objective is to give readers some sense of how the core motivations
and the core emotions may be related.

How do emotions and motivations pair up most naturally?

• Defend and fear form a likely combination, given concerns about survival.
• Acquire and anger fit together because anger often involves seeking control.
• Learn and surprise make sense together because of the discovery process.
• Bond fits together with both happiness and sadness as we either celebrate being
with those we care about or are sad about missing them.
• Disgust can involve rejecting an idea (learn), person (bond) or object (acquire).
Facial coding technology provides an objective measure of emotion that is
unobtrusive, cost-effective and scalable. The universality of facial expressions, the

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ubiquity of webcams and recent developments in computer vision make automatic facial
coding an objective, passive and scalable measure of emotion. Moreover, unlike selfreport,
facial coding enables the remote measurement of subtle and nuanced expressions of emotion
on a moment-by-moment basis.

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Toward a general model of affective influences on decision making: The Affect Integrated
Model of Decision-making (AIMD)

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Major conclusions from the past 35 years of research on emotion and decision making
(1) Emotions constitute powerful and predictable drivers of decision making. Across
different types of decisions, important regularities appear in the underlying mechanisms
through which emotions influence judgment and choice. Thus, emotion effects are neither
random nor epiphenomenal.
(2) Emotion effects on JDM can take the form of integral or incidental influences, with
incidental emotions often producing influences that are unwanted and non-conscious.
(3) Theories that generate predictions for specific emotions appear to provide more
comprehensive accounts of JDM outcomes than do theories that generate predictions for
positive versus negative moods.
(4) Although emotions may influence decisions through multiple mechanisms, considerable
evidence reveals that effects occur via changes in (a) content of thought, (b) depth of thought,
and (c) content of implicit goals—three mechanisms summarized within the Appraisal-
Tendency Framework.
(5) Whether a specific emotion ultimately improves or degrades a specific judgment or
decision depends on interactions among the cognitive and motivational mechanisms triggered
by each emotion (as identified in conclusion 4) and the default mechanisms that drive any
given judgment or decision.
6) Emotions are not necessarily a form of heuristic “System 1” thought. Emotions are initially
elicited rapidly and can trigger swift action, consistent with “System 1.” But once activated,
some emotions (e.g., sadness) can trigger systematic “System 2” thought. Emotions and
Decision Making, p. 35 Distinguishing between the cognitive consequences of an emotion-
elicitation phase and an emotion-persistence phase may be useful in linking to JDM theories.
(7) When emotional influences are unwanted, it is difficult to reduce their effects through
effort alone. A few strategies have been suggested, some aimed at reducing the intensity of
emotion, some at reducing the use of emotion as an input to decisions, and some at
counteracting an emotion-based bias with a bias in the opposite direction. We suggest that
less effortful strategies, particularly choice architecture, provide the most promising avenues
(8) The field of emotion and decision making is growing at an accelerating rate but is far
from mature. Most sub-areas contain few competing theories, while other areas remain
relatively unexplored with existing studies raising as many questions as they answer. The

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research pathways ahead therefore contain many fundamental questions about human
behavior, all ripe for study.
(9) Despite the nascent state of research on emotion and decision making, the field has
accumulated enough evidence to move toward a general model of affective influences on
decision making. Here we proposed the Affect Integrated Model of Decision-making
(AIMD), building on existing models and nesting rational choice models. The authors hope it
provides auseful framework for organizing research in the future.

A final touch of emotions in advertising:

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Social Cognition , From Brains to Culture, Susan T. Fiske& Shelley E. Taylor, SAGE
Publications Ltd, Third edition published 2017
 Emotionomics, Leveraging emotions for business success, Dan Hill, Kogan Page
 Self Comes to Mind, Antonio Damasio, Pantheon Books, a division of Random
House, 2010
 Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, Antonio Damasio, AVON
BOOKS, 1994
 Emotions revealed- Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and
Emotional Life , Paul Ekman, Times Books, First Edition 2003
 (The 9th International Conference on Cognitive Science Effects of emotional state on
decision making time Mary Jane Duque*, Caroline Turla, Lucille Evangelista
Batangas State University, Rizal Avenue, Batangas City, 4200. Philippines)
 Sociological Theories Of Human Emotions, Jonathan H. Turner and Jan E. Stets,
Department of Sociology, University of California, Riverside, California 92521;
Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2006. 32:25–52 doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.32.061604.123130
Copyright_c 2006 by Annual Reviews All rights reserved First published online as a
Review in Advance on March 23, 2006
 Emotion and Decision Making, Jennifer S. Lerner,1 Ye Li,2 Piercarlo Valdesolo,3
and Karim S. Kassam4, 1Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts 02138; email:, 2School of Business
Administration, University of California, Riverside, California 92521; email: 3Department of Psychology, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont,
California 91711; email: 4Department of Social and Decision
Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213; email: Rev. Psychol. 2015. 66:799–823 First published
online as a Review in Advance on September 22, 2014

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