Country Politics: Madras 1880 to 1930

Author(s): David Washbrook

Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1973), pp. 475-531
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/311852
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ModernAsianStudies,7, 3 (I973), pp. 475-53I. Printedin GreatBritain.

Politics:Madras1880to 1930
Country
DAVID WASHBROOK

Introduction

THE period from the I880Sto the I930Swas one of major change
in the politicalorganizationof India. Indiansjoined the Britishin the
highest oEces of state; governmentgreatly increased its activity
through legislation and through the trebling of taxation; elective
institutionsand legislaturessteadilyreplacedthe discretionaryrule of
bureaucrats;a nationalistmovementof greatsize and forceappeared;
the meansof communication-throughroad,rail and press improved
beyond recognitionto bring together for the first time the diverse
peoplesof India. This was the criticalepoch in the formationof the
modernIndian state and many aspectsof it have been the subjectof
historicalstudy.Yet, paradoxically,the politicalhistoryof ruralIndia
at this time has been much neglected.While we can turn to several
workson nationalgovernmentand the Congressand to investigationsof
provincialpoliticalactivity,we findconsiderablyfeweron the organiza-
tion of local politicsand virtuallynone at all that deal with matters
outsidethe principaltowns.Until the rurallocalityhas been examined,
ourknowledgeof the politicaldevelopmentof Indiamustremainsmall,
forit takesno greatinsightto seethatmostof India'swealthandpopula-
tion were to be found in the countryside.Whetherthe successof an
Indiangovernmentbejudgedby the mid-Victorianstandardof revenue
or the mid-twentiethcenturystandardof votes,it couldbe achievedonly
throughruralcontroland support.This essayis meant as a tentative
contributionto our understandingof politicalchangein the country-
side.
Its primaryconcernis, therefore,the peasant.Althoughthe peasant
was not the only element in rural society, his position as the main
producerof wealthmakeshim centralto any discussion.To a consider-
I should like to thank Dr C. J. Baker of Queens' College, Cambridge, for his help in
putting together much of the political material in this essay; Dr Carolyn M. Elliott
of the University of California, for first interesting me in rural politics; and the other
contributors to this volume for their patience and their criticisms which helped to
make the arguments put forward here less like the wandering cart tracks which they
once were.

475
476 DAVID WASHBROOK

ableextent,the structureof powerin ruralIndiawasdeterminedby the

structureof poweramongthe peasantry.1However,the almostinfinite
varietyof conditionsin differentpartsof India threwup differenttypes
of peasantpoliticalorganization.Andtherearealmostas manydifferent
waysof attemptingan analysisof them.This essayconcentrateson two
importantaspectsof peasantlife- the waysin which agrarianproduc-
tion was organizedand the ways in which peasantswere related to
governmentalauthority.
Section I examinesa region of the Madraspresidencyorganized
for 'dry' cultivation.The area includesthe Ceded districts(Kurnool,
Bellary,Anantapurand Cuddapah)and mostof hinterlandTamilnad
(thedistrictsof Salem,Coimbatore,Madura,Trichinopoly,Tinnevelly,
and Northand SouthArcot).2It triesto showhow changesin economic
and administrativeconditionsproduceda distinctive'style'of peasant
participationin politics.SectionX analysesa regionof 'wet'cultivation
in Madras-the KistnaandGodaverideltas.It attemptsto demonstrate
how a differentset of relationships
betweenagrarianproductionand the
administrationled to a differentstyle of politics.Section3 assessesthe
influenceof these two regionalpolitieson the supra-regionalpolitical
organizations the Congressand the provinciallegislaturesf which
they were part.

Betweenthe greatfamineof I876-78 and the depressionof I929-30, the

Cededdistrictsand hinterlandTamilnadexperiencedslow but definite
economicgrowth.Certainlytherewereregularrain-failuresand short-
ages,buttheireffectin contractingthe economyseldomlastedmorethan
a year or two. The greatfamine,by contrast,had drivenbackcultiva-
tion in the Cededdistrictsto such an extent that it was twentyyears
beforethe croppedareareachedits I876 level. Betweenthe mid-I880s
and the mid-Ig20s,the acreageunder cultivationkept pace with the
growthof the population.Accordingto the censusthe populationof
1The argumentspresentedbelow are pitched at a high level of generality.Con-
sequently,I have isolated'the peasant'as the most useful generalsocial category
with which to investigateruralsociety.
2 As the 'dry'regionis categorizedby a typeof cultivation,it is not meantto include
those partsof 'dry' districtsin which 'wet' rice cultivationwas to be found. In the
districtsof hinterlandTamilnadit thus excludesabout 20 per cent of Tinnevelly,
Trichinopolyand Madurawhererice cultivationtookplace alongthe banksof rivers
and large tanks.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 477
these districtsincreasedby about 30 per cent3while the area under
ryotwaritenure the only formof tenurefor which we have informa-
tion-went up by a third.4Admittedly,some of this new land was
poor,but the areaunderirrigation-mostlyfromwellsand tanks-also
increasedby about e5 per cent.SMoreover,changesin the use of land
helped to raise the profitabilityof agriculture.Most of the land was
underdry graincrops cholum,ragi and combu whichwereof little
value. But as transportfacilitiesdeveloped,and as opportunitiesin
worldmarketsgrew,the areaundercashcrops,particularlycottonand
oilseeds,expanded.6
Togetherwith the rewardsof cashcropping,a steadyrisein the price
of grain helped to promoteprosperityin the area. Grain prices, of
course,were subjectto wild fluctuationsaccordingto both the locality
and the time of the year, but improvedcommunicationshelped to
control these fluctuationsand to stabilize prices at higher levels.7
As more was earnedfrom the land, the sharewhich the state took in
land revenuebecamesmaller.Althoughin theorythe ryotwarirevenue
system,which coveredthree-quarters of Madrasand nearlyall of the
dry districts,allowedthe governmentto raiseassessments to keep pace
with prices,in practicethis was neverpossible.Districtswere resettled
and pricesreviewedonly everythirtyyearsand even then, as we shall
see, governmentwas not the masterof its own administration.During
the periodunderstudythe governmentat Fort St Georgewas able to
raiseits assessmenton dry land froman averageof Rs I vIO per acreto
Rs I.I8, and on wet land from Rs 5.e to Rs 5.8 increasesof only
3 Calculatedfrom DharmaKumar'sestimateof populationin I886, D. Kumar,
LandandCastein SouthIndia (Cambridge,I965), p. II6 and Censusof India I92I
Madras.Folume XIII. PartII (Madras,I922), p. 4.
4 Reports ontheSettlement of theLandRevenue in theDistrictsof theMadrasPresidency for
Fasli I294 (I884-85) (Madras,I886), pp. 444; Reports on theSettlementof theLand
Revenue in theDistrictsof theMadrasPresidencyforFasli I330 (I920-2I) (Madras,I922),
pp. I 7-20. (Hereafterthis seriesof reportsis abbreviatedas LandRevenue Reports for
Fasli. . .)
s Ibid.
6 Allowingfor changesin the area coveredby the statistics,between I884-85 and
I920-2I the area undercotton grew by 40 per cent and that underground-nutby
I00 per cent. By the mid-Ig20s,these two cropsoccupiedabout I5 per cent of the
acreageof most dry districts.Agricultural Statisticsof BritishIndia.Quinquennial series
(Galcutta,I884-85 to I920-2I), Vol. I, 'AreaunderGrops'.
7 The fluctuations remainedsufficientto makeit diflicultto give an accurateidea
of the scale of the price rise. But, roughly,dry grainswere selling between50 and
70 per cent more in the years I9I0-I7 than in l8887. During the shortagesof
I9I8-20, priceswent even higher. Calculatedfrom 'Statementsshowingthe prices
of food grains'in LandRevenue Reports
for Fasli I290 (I8808I) to LandRevenueReports
for Fasli I335 (I925-26).
478 DAVID WASHBROOK

between 7 and I2 per cent.8Its increasedincomefrom land revenue

dependedon the fact that more acres were assessedand more land
becameirrigated.
Thereis muchto suggesta modestbuoyancyin the agrarianeconomy
at thistime. Governmentcensusesof cattle,ploughsand carts,however
inaccuratethey may have been, all indicatea steadygrowthin capital
investmenton the land.9Althoughthere was no such thing as a free
marketin land, the evidencesuggestsa slow growthin land prices.l°
By the time of the First World War, the Madrasgovernmentfound
itselfunderconstantpoliticalpressurefromruralareasto expandroad
and railwaycommunicationsalong potentialtrade routes.llTrade in
agrarianproducewas developing,albeit graduallyand fragmentarily.
Of course,this prosperitydid not necessarilymeanthat everybodywas
gettingricher.Indeed,many may have been gettingpoorer.A variety
of economic,social and politicalfactorsstood betweenthe cultivator
and the fruitsof his labour.Hence it is necessaryto look closelyat the
natureof agrarianorganizationto see how cropswere produced,who
producedthem and, perhapsmost importantof all, how they were
sold.
The land in thesedistrictswas markedby the smallsize of the hold-
ings and the extremepoverty of the holders.In I900, for example,
rathermore than 70 per cent of all the ryotwaripattas issuedby the
governmentwerefor the paymentof lessthan Rs I0 per annumin land
revenue.In Coimbatore,the richestdistrict,about 67 per cent of the
holdings paid less than Rs I 0; in Cuddapah,the poorest district,
77 per cent of the holdingswere so rated.l2
The amountof land representedby a Rs I0 pattawas barelyenough
to supporta familyin good years,and in many yearsthe rainsfailed.
Even amongthese minutepattas, many were meant to supportmore
than one family. In the early I890S, Sir FrederickNicholson,one of
Madras'few agrarianexperts,attemptedto give an idea of how many
so-calledlandownersheld smallholdingsof this type: 'their immense
numbersmay be judged from the fact that about 86 per cent of the

8 Galculatedfrom'Statementsof the Ryots'Holdings',LandRevenue Reports

for Fasli
I290 (I880-I88I) to LandRevenueReportsfor Fasli I335 (I925-26).
9 SeeAgriculturalStatisticsofBritishIndia.
QuinquennialSeries,I884-85 to I920-2I,
'Live-Stock'.
loSee commentson land pricesin Reports of theProvincial
Banking
Enquiry
Committee,
I92t30 (Calcutta,I 93I ) 'Madrass [RPBC],p. 79.
11For example,see the districtboardcampaignsin Ramnad,Maduraand Coim-
batoreto get a railwayto the West Coast,Hindu,I Februaryand I7 May I9I5.
12 LandRetJenue
Reportsfor Fasli I3IO (I900-OI), pp. 7I-7.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 479
Madrasryotspay lessthan Rs IO a;ndon average<Rs 4 in assessment'.l3
However,in every district-almost-in everyvillage-there were a few
largepattadarswhoseholdingsmadea mockeryof SirThomasMunro's
claims that the ryotwarisystem created a society of equal peasant
farmers.In Coimbatoreand Tinnevellythere were severalhundred,
and in the Cededdistrictsseveraldozen,men payingmorethan Rs e50
per annumon a singlepatta. In I900, the 7.5 per cent of pattasat the
top of the revenuetablepaidmorethan43 percentofthelandrevenue.l4
The growthof cashcroppingin the dry areasproduceda diversifica-
tion rather thania specialization'ofcrop patterns.Peasantsseldom
devotedthe wholeof theirholdingsto cottonor oilseedsbut continued
to sow dry grainsalongsidethe morevaluablecrops.This was because
they could not rely either upon the weather or upon prices. The
BankingInquirynoted how, in some 'dry'localities,ryotswouldgrow
as many as five differentcrops on the same land in the hope that,
shouldsomefail, the othersat leastmightsurvive.lsEqually,the prices
of cottonand groundnutwerefixedby internationalmarketconditions
whichvariedfromyear to year but whichwere barelyrelatedto local
conditions.l6When the grain harvestwas poor and priceswere high,
the peasantwho had turnedall his land over to cash cropscould find
himselfin difficulties,as his incomedid not meet the cost of his food.
Cultivators,evennearmarkets,did not usuallyput morethana quarter
of their land under a single cash crop;l7and in villagesmore remote
fromthe aucttonblock,the proportionwas less.
Thesecroppatterns,togetherwith the generalpovertyof the region,
tended to limit marketingareas. In the poorestparts of the Ceded
districtsmostryotsdid not tradeoutsidetheirvillage;l8farthersouth,
13 F. A. Nicholson,Reportregarding of introd?lcing
thepossibilities Agric?llt?lral
Banksinto
theMadrasPresidency (Madras,I 895) [RAB],Vol. I, p. 232.
14 LandReven?le for Fasli 1310 (I900OI),
Reports pp. 7I-7. The problem of the
zemindariryot,who appearsoccasionallyin the dryand moreoftenin the wet region,
is more difficult.However, on the basis of landholdingsize and rent payment,
there is evidenceof little real distinctionbetween him and the governmentryot.
Most commentatorsthoughtthat the structureof landholdingsunderzemindarswas
roughlythe sameas that undergovernmentand that, althoughzemindarirentswere
higher,they werecollectedlessregularly.S. SrinivasaRaghavaiyangar,Memorand?lm
ontheProgress of theMadrasPresidency theLasl;FortyLearsof BritishAdministration
d?lring
(Madras,I892), p. 76; RPBC,pp. 7-8.
pBC,p.I4-
16RpBC,p.Io8
Banking
17 See MadrasProvincial (Madras,I 930) [MPBC],Vol. V.
Enq?liryCommittee
'Reportsby Investigators'for examinationof sdry'villagesin Madura,Coimbatore
and Bellarydistricts.
18 F. A. Nicholson,RAB,Vol. I, p. 230.
480 DAVID WASHBROOK

men boughtand soldin shandieswhichservedsmallcirclesof villages.19

Therewaslittlescopefora fast-movinggraintradewhich,in otherparts
of India, often formedthe backboneof commerce.As most villages
grewmostof theirwants,'the food-grainneededfor local consumption
is seldom shiftedvery far'.20Of course, most of the rice eaten had
to come from outside,but in these areas,rice was a luxuryavailable
only to a few. All villageshad some wells, usuallyon the land of the
richer ryots, which providedsufficientirrigationto grow vegetables.
Cloth was often locally produced and hand-loomweaving was an
important village industry.2lHousehold utensils and agricultural
implementswere rrladeby village artisans.Most villagershad little
use for imports.22
Of course,everythingthat was grownin the village or village circle
was not consumedthere: cotton and groundnutwere exportedfrom
India and grain was neededin the towns.But the ordinarycultivator
had nothingto do with these-transactions.The government'srevenue
demand had to be met immediatelyafter the harvest, and most
peasantshad to sell as quicklyas they could to pay on time; and the
usual conventionsof credit requireddebts also to be repaid at the
harvest,forcingthe peasantto sellat once.23Further,capitalwasneeded
to transportgrainby cartto the towns,and capitalwasin shortsupply.
Most peasantsthereforedisposedof their grain immediatelyin the
villageor villageshandie.
Cottonandgroundnutcashcropsalsopresentedmarketingdifficulties.
Both were sold, ultimately,to Europeanand Indian companieswhich
were based in the major towns. These companiesusually operated
throughcommissionagents(dallals)who could combineto "dominate
the market"at the expenseof small,disorganizedsellers.24 In addition,
cotton and groundnutfetched high prices only after they had been
processed:mostryotswerein no positionto do this.They soldtheirraw
producerelativelycheaplyin the local shandieor even in the field.25
-19RPBC, p. XXg; RoyalCommission on Agriculture in India, Appendix,Vol. XIV
(London,I928), p. 269.
20 RPBC,p. t 2 I .
21 RoyalCommission onSgriculurein IndiajAppendix, Vol. XIV, p. 270.
22Exceptfor cattle; and the cattle tradewas highly decentralized,being carried
on and financedby itinerantpedlars.
23 Both these factorsapplied also to zemindariryots. RPBC,p. IO6; 'Report on
Kurnool'pp. 4-5 in LandRevenue Reports for FasliI3I2 (I902-3); MPBC,Vols. II-V,
inpassim.
24RPBC,ps I IOs
2s RoyalCommission onSgriculture
in India,Sppendix, Vol. XIV, p. 269. MPBC,Vo]s.
II-V, in hassim.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 93° 48I

The CottonCommission( I925-28) foundthat, in the areaof the Ceded

districtswhich it investigated,87 per cent of the cotton crop had
beensoldinitiallyin the villagewhereit hadbeengrown.26As the Royal
Commissionon Agriculture(I928) discovered,'the keynote of the
marketingsystem. . . is the predominantpart played by the middle-
man'.27
The middle-manwas the main beneficiaryof the marketingsystem.
In the grain trade, he could makeprofitseitherby transportingpart
of the cropto the townsor simplyby keepingsomeof it whereit was.
As mostryotshad to sell at the harvest,they gluttedthe grain market
and drove down prices.The merchantwho bought and storedmade
money as prices rose again during the next agriculturalyear.28In
cottonand groundnut,he gainedeven more.Not only couldhe greatly
enhancethe valueof the produceby processingit, but, if he operatedon
a sufficientlylarge scale, he could crackthe hegemonyof the urban
dallal.The sellerwho guaranteedthe deliveryof manytons of decorti-
cated groundnutor cotton kapaswas in a strongbargainingposition.
Indeed,it was usualfor a big ruraltraderto employhis own dallalto
negotiatedirectlywith the variouspurchasingcompanies.29 If he kept
the producehe had collectedin a warehousein the town, he could
raise a loan on it withoutdifficultyfrom urban sources,and wait for
the best offerbeforesellingit.
The middle-manplayeda key role in the economyof the dry areas,
but it is difficultto discoverwho he was. In some partsof the region
there were distinctly commercialgroups: Komatis in the north,
Devangas, Nadars, Vannigas and Tamil Muslimsin the south. In
localitieswhich had been particularlystimulatedby cash cropping,
Marwarisand Multanishad movedin. But the absenceof a thriving
graintrade,and the problemof obtainingimpersonalsecurityforloans,
tended to restricttheir activitiesto the towns.30In the countryside,
26 Indian
Central CottonCommission.General Reporl;
onEightInvestigations intotheFinance
andMarketing of Cultivators'
Cotton.I925-28 (Bombay,n.d.), p. 2I.
27 RoyalCommission onAgriculZrein India,Appendix, Vol. XIV, p. 268.
28 RPBC,p. I06; MPBC,Vol. III, pp. 658, 946; 'Reporton Kurnool',pp. 4 5 in
LandRevenue ReportsforFasli I3IS (I90F3).
29 RPBC,p. I I2, I23; RoyalCommission onAgricult?lre
in India,Appendix, Vol. XIV,
p. 268.
30 l!Tone
of the evidence,not even the individualvillage surveys,attemptsto dis-
tinguishexactlywho was involvedin ruraltrade.In mostof the dryregionthiswould
have been diEcult anywaybecauseat everyharvesturbanmerchantsor theiragents
set out fromthe townswith emptycartsand pickedup what they couldfromwhich-
evervillagestheypassedthrough.Therewas little routinein thisaspectof marketing.
However,in somelocalitiesit is clearthat thesetradinggroupshad establishedsome-
L
482 DAVID WASHBROOK

tradingconnectionsfollowedcloselythoseof debt: to most cultivators,

tradeand debtweretwo sidesof the samecoin.As Nicholsonobserved:
Probablyit would, at least for an immensenumberof villagesand for the
majorityof small ryots and cultivators,be safe to say that the rural credit
of this presidencyis chiefly grain credit, all the poorer ryots habitually
and annuallyborrowingfrom the richerryotsat the sowingseason,and re-
paying advancesat the harvest.It may also be said that the ruralcreditors
of this presidencyare, for the vast bulk of the loans ryots, not men of the
Marwariclass. In Tinnevelly,South Arcot, Coimbatoreand other districts
where the short mortgageis in vogue, from 85 p.c. to 73 p.c. even of such
loans are grantedby ryots; similarfiguresare found in loans upon simple
bonds.In the CededDistricts,such as Anantapurwheremortgagesare rare,
therewill be a few simplebondsdue to men- oftenwell-to-dolandholders
outsideof the village,but the bulkis due to the richerryotswithinthe village
and nearlyeveryseerof borrowedgrain,the commonestformof loan in these
districts,is due to co-ryotsof the same village.3l
Nearlyfortyyearslater,the BankingInquiryfoundthat this analysw
still applied.32
Sincethe commercialgroupsfoundit so difficultto enter
the trading and moneylendingbusinessin the villages, the rural
economyrestedfirmlyin the handsof thosefew peasantswith a surpIus
fromtheirown lands.
The tiny elite of rich peasantsin the dry districtswere perfectly
placedto dominatethe villageeconomyand to graspa proStfromany
new opportunities.Theirrelativelylargeholdingsand substantialcrops
meantthat they did not need to sell grainas soon as it was harvested.
They were able to investin cartsand to processtheir crops.Fromthis
secure basej the large landholdercould launch himself across the
market.His surplusenabledhim to buy up cheapgrainat the harvest
and to advanceloansto his poorerbrothers.The intereston grainloans
wasextremelyhighandleftverylittlewiththedebtorwhohadto borrow
again nextyear.33It was alsousualforcreditorsto demandthe rightto
buy the debtor'scropat a fixedand low priceas a conditionof loan.34
thingof a morepermanentrelationshipwith the economy.Yet almostall the evidence
indicatesthat richryotswereheavilyinvolvedin tradeand controlledmost varying
in differentreportsbetween60 and go per cent- of the ruralcredit.Allowingfor the
fact that, here and there?non-landowningtradinggroupswere important,I have
chosento concentrateon the ryot-ruralcapitalistwho was much the most typical
oommercialagent in the regionas a whole.
31 F. A. Nicholson,RAB,Vol. I, p. 230. See also, Statement
exhibiting
theMoraland
lfiIat;erial
Progress
andCondition
of IndiaduringtheyearI9OI-02and-thenineprecedingyears.
PP I903, Vol. XLIV, p. 354.
32 RPBC P 79
33 F. A. Nicholson,RAB,Vol. I p. 232; RPBC,pp. 79, I06.
34 Ibid.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 483
The positionof the rich ryot was greatly enhancedby the lack of
alternativesourcesof creditin the area. Faced with the government's
demandfor revenue,regularrain-failureand socialpressuresto spend
lavishlyon family ceremonies,petty cultivatorshad to find patrons:
'theycouldnot beginto cultivatewithoutborrowingseed, cattle,grain
formaintenance,etc.'35Butfewof theirfellowvillagerswerelikelyto be
able to meet their needs.A Bellarywitnesstold the BankingInquiry
that ryotsneededa minimumof twentyacresof landto beginto market
their own crops.36This was presumablygood dry land which would
pay aboutRs 30 per annumin revenue.In Coimbatorethis qualifica-
tion wouldhave excludedabout93 per cent of the landholdingpopula-
tion fromtradingand lendingon theirown account.In poorerdistricts
like Cuddapahor Bellaryit wouldhave excluded97 per cent of ryots.
Not surprisingly,the most usual form of credit relationshipwas that
betweena pettycultivatorand a singlecreditorwho regularlysupplied
mostof his wants:'Undereach rich ryot therewill be a set of ordinary
ryotswho dependon him for money.Whenonce a ryot goes to a par-
ticularrich ryot for money then a conventionis establishedthat the
poorryot is the clientof the rich ryot.'37
The largelandholder'slocal dominancewas furtherassuredby his
ability to provideemployment.In the I890S, S. SrinivasaRaghavai-
yangarestimatedthat 8 dry acreswere neededto keep a family and
that 75 per cent of the cultivatorsheld less than 5 acres.3sObviously
mostryotsrequiredextraworkin orderto survive.The rich ryot,who
possessedmore land than he could cultivate,paid labourersto till it,
or leased it out on annual, unprotected,tenancies.Many nominally
independentrevenuepayerswere thus alreadytied to a patronas his
employees and tenants.39Naturally, they looked to him as their
principalsowcarand werein no positionto refusehis overturesor deny
him their crop.Borrowing,labouringand tenancywereoften different
aspectsof the samerelationship:
The Sahukarchargeshis own rates of interest as the ryot can no longer
bargainwith him: what is worsethe ryothas next to ploughthe lender'sfield
3SF. A. lsicholson,RAB,Vol. I, p. 232. 36MPBC,Vol. II, p. 298.
37 MPBC,Vol. III, p. 664. See alsoReport ontheFaminein theMadrasPresidency
during
I 896 andI 897 (Madras,I 898), Vol. I, p. 50.
38 S. Srinivasa Raghavaiyangar,Memorandum ontheProgress of theMadrasPresidency,
P 75
39 In the villagesinvestigated by the CottonCommissionin Bellarydistrict,about
35 per cent of the ryotsworkedthe land of other ryotsas well as their own. Indian
Central CottonCommission. General ReportonEightInvestigations
zntotheFtnance
andMarket-
ingof Cultivators' Cotton.I925-28, p. 50.
 DAVID WASHBROOK
484
gratisand to do any otherworkat his bidding.The youngermembersof the
family,the sonsand brothers,are sometimesengagedas the privateservants
of the Sahukarwithoutpaymentand in partialpaymenton the interestof the
amountborrowed.40
The rich peasant ran an estate which stretchedfar beyond the
boundariesof hisownlandintothatnominallyownedby hisdependents
who 'are thusin the worstcaseslittle morethan tenantsof the lender
who can prescribewhat cropsthey shallgrowand demandwhat terms
he pleases'.4l
In the Cededdistricts,the bulkof the graintradewas in the handsof
the richerReddiswho builttheirhouseson top of enormousgrainpits.42
Muchvillagetradeconsistedof borrowingfromand returningto these
pits.43Near Adoni, in Bellarydistrict,the Cotton Commissionfound
that althoughthe scaleof advanceson the cottoncropwas secondonly
to that in Sind, the amountowed directlyto urbancreditorswas only
27.3 per cent of the total.44Ryots and landlordswere responsiblefor
56 per cent of the loans-far more than in any other part of India.4s
But even if the loanswere not fromurbanmerchants,they still bound
the debtorand his crop to the lender.46In the marginallymore pros-
peroussouth, membersof the principalpeasantcastes-Gounder and
other Vellalas, Reddi migrants from Andhra, and agricultural
Maravars were responsiblefor moving much of the grain, cotton
andgroundnutcropfromthe fieldsandsmallershandiesto the markets.
They oftenkeptwarehousesin theirvillagesand in the towns,paid for
the decorticationof theirgroundnut,and hireddallalsto act as brokers
for their cotton.47From their positionsat the centresof commerce,
some of the more successfulamong them built up broad economic
connexions.In the north7the growthof mica miningwas financedby
40 MPBC,Vol. III, p. 699.
41 F. A. Nicholson,RAB,Vol. I, p. 232.
42 Appendix totheReport
of theIndianFamineCommission, t8g8, beingMinutesof Evidence,
etc.Volume II. MadrasPresidency,
p. IOI, PP, I899, Vol. XXXII; ReportontheFamine
in theMadrasPresidency dunngt8g6and s897 (Madras,I898), Vol. I, p. 48; Vol. II, p.
I39.
F. A. lficholson,RSB, Vol. I, p. 230.
43

IndianCentral
4A CottonCommittee.
GeneralReportonEightInvestigations
intotheFinance
andMarketing of Cultivators'
Cotton.Ig2s-28, p. I 4.
4SIbid.,p.I6.
46RPBC,p. IO9; RoyalCommission on Agriculture
in India.VolumeIII. Evidence
taken
in theMadrasPresidency (London,Ig27), p. 55.
47 RPBC,pp. I I2, I23, IO8; RoyalCommission onAgriculture
in India,Appendix,
Vol.
XIV, p. 233, 268; MPBC,Vol. III, pp. 3I9, 750, 946 972; IndianCentralCotton
Committee.
General Reporton EightInvestigations
intotheFinanceandMarketing of Culti-
vators'
CottonI925-28, p. 64.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 485
landowningReddis;48where British military or railway enterprises
touchedthe local economy,it was oftenwealthypeasantfamilieswho
pickedup the constructionandsupplycontracts;49 wherepettyindustry
beganto appear,bothin the townsand in the villages,it was oftenthe
investmentof local peasants in decorticationmachines,cottonpresses
and,by the I g30s,cottonmills-which supportedit ;50in districtcapitals
such as Maduraand Coimbatore,Goundersmovedbetweentradeand
banking,and playedan importantpartin urbanand regionaleconomic
development.sl
The wealthy and commerciallymobile peasantused his profitsto
extend and tighten his control in the locality. He was helped by
the peculiar nature of the money-market.In Madras, the usual
securitiesfor loans were moveablepropertiesand personalknowledge
of the borrower.Land mighthave seemedthe mostobviouscollateral;
but titlesto it werecomplicatedby the interestsof thejoint-familyand
by a revenue system in which a man seldom owned the fields he
cultivated. The petty cultivator,who had little propertysave his
miserablecrop, and who was unknownoutsidehis villagecircle,could
raise money only in his neighbourhood.The rich ryot, however,
who had cropsstoredbothin his villageand in the town, and who was
known to be credit-worthyamong urban financiers,had much less
difficultyin obtainingcredit.52Moneyborrowedin the town, whereit
was quite plentiful,could be lent out at a considerableprofit in the
village, where it was scarce.As the marketopportunitiesin the dry
areasincreased,the more importantand the more dominantthe rich
ryotsbecamein the workingof the ruraleconomy.
48 See biography of K. Audinarayana Reddi in Reforms (Franchise) B, March

I92I, 34-99, National Archives of India, New Delhi [NAI].

49 In North Arcot district, where there was a great deal of military and railway

contracting available, the leading contractors were drawn from the locally dominant

Palli caste. One of the most famous, A. Dhanakoti Mudaliar, who came from a rich

landowning family, extended his contracting empire to Madras city where he was

a member of the Corporation in the I880S. Also, see biography of M. Venkataraja-

ghaoulu Reddiar in Hindu, I9 May I9I9.

so For example, the Vellakina Gounder family, of which V. C. Vellingiri Gounder

was a member, built a cotton mill in Coimbatore district in the I930S. For examples of

Land-owning families involved in urban commerce see biographical notes on K.S.

Ramaswami Gounder in Directory of the Madras Legislature (Madras, I938), p. 23I;

on M. Vydyalinga Reddy in V. L. Sastri (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Madras Presidency

and the Adjacent States (Cocanada, I920) p. 767.

51 For examples, see biographical notes on G. Eswara Reddi, ibid., p. 75I; C. S.
Ratnasabhapati Mudaliar, ibid., p. 609; and for involvement with urban co-opera-

tive banks, P. S. Kumaraswami Raja in Directory of the Madras Legislature, p. I44;

V. K. Palamsami Gounder, ibid., p. I96; K. A. Nachiappa Gounder, ibid., p. I76.
s2 RPBC, pp 87S
486 DAVID WASHBROOK

One of the main problemsthe historianconfrontsin tryingto trace

the increasingpower of the richerpeasantsis that the sourcesupon
which he has to rely were not concernedwith this question. The
revenuestatisticsreveal somethingabout movementsin landholding
but the economicpowerof the rich peasantdid not necessarilydepend
upon formalownership.Mostland was worthno morethan the crops
and the cultivatorson it. Throughhis manipulationof creditandtrade,
the richpeasantalreadypossessedeffectivecontroloverthe land and he
could find betterwaysof spendinghis moneythan idly pursuingtitle-
deeds. Moreover,the assumptionof legal possessionbroughtwith it
great hazards.Titles to land in ryotwariMadraswere documentsof
dubiousvalue, but even to get hold of them, the money-lenderhad to
follow a course which was fraught with danger. Court cases were
expensiveand lengthy; under the UsuriousLoans Act, they could
end in disasterfor the money-lenderwho foreclosed.Judges could cut
agreedinterestratesalmostat will. Mostloanswereunsecuredby any
formaldocumentand so most money-lendersseldomwent to court.53
The actual amountof land transferredin Madraseach year by legal
possession,gift or will, was remarkablysmall.54Essentially,the rich
peasant operated his informal economic empire through personal
connexionwith his debtors:the amount of land which he formally
acquiredin no way representedhis influence.
Nonetheless,the little movementof land thatwe can trace,indicates
an increasingstratificationof landholdingas larger proprietorsac-
cumulatedmoreland and as the numberof smallryotsgrew.Between
I886-87 and Ig2s-26, the proportionof totalrevenuepaid by pattasof
morethanRs 250perannumincreasedfrom4.2 per centto 6.7 per cent
and by pattasof less than Rs IO frome4.3 per cent to 3I.2 per cent.55
53F. A. Nicholson,RAB,Vol. I, p. 230; RPBC,pp.87,I73-5, I8I-2.
54On average,about I-I i per cent of the croppedareaper annum.Unfortunately,
from I9I3-I4, the Madras Governmentceased to keep central records of the
acreagetransferredbut there is little reasonto think that the pattern of transfers
establishedin the I884-I9I4 period altered radicallybefore the depression.See
AgriculturalStatisticsof BritishIndia.QuinquennialSeries.I884-85 to I9I 2-I3, 'Land
Transfers'.
55 These figurescover both joint and single pattas.Althoughthere were admini-
strativedifferencesbetweenthe two, it would in practicehave been difficultto find
any real distinctions.Most single pattas were regardedas joint-familyproperty
although legally registeredonly in the name of one member.The growth in the
numberofjoint pattaholdersin the twentiethcenturywas due more'to the growing
desireon the part of the people to securedocumentaryevidencein supportof their
joint interestin land' than to any change in the characterof landholdingitself.
Hence I have put singleandjoint pattastogetheras unitsof possession.LandRevenue
Reportsfor Fasli I3IO (I900-OI), p. 26. Table I calculatedfrom 'Statementof the
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 487
Thisgrowthat the top andbottomendsof the pattascalewas,of course,
at the expenseof holdingsin the middle.Table I expressesthe develop-
ment in termsof the growthof revenuepaid by particularclassesof
patta.
TABLEI
Grozsthin Revenue
paid bypattas I886/87-
I925/2656

LeSSthan RS IO 72-4

IO-30 24.I
3° 5° I9. 3
50-IOO 4.7
IOO-250 75
250-500 I37-6
500-I ,000 4 I .5
MOre than RS I,000 I38.6

If anything,the land revenuefiguresminimize,ratherthan maximize,

the movementof landtowardsthe largerproprietors.They arestatistics
of pattas,not pattadars,and therewas nothingto stop one man from
holdingmore than one patta. However,pattasincludedall the land
held by a man in one revenuevillage, so that the multi-pattaholde-r
had his landsquitewidelyspread.In view of thisfact, the richryotwas
infinitelymorelikelythan the poorone to own severalpattas,and the
land revenuefigureswouldnot showthe truepositionof his accumulat-
ing wealth.
The growing economicimportanceof the rich peasant found its
reflectionin social and politicallife. The ties of debt operatedby the
wealthyryotin the villagewere,of course,politicalas well as economic:
His powerand prestigemustat any costbe securedby havinga largenumber
of village people at his disposal.Considerationof his importanceinfluence
the advanceof money ratherthan profitfrom usuriousratesof interest.57

Rent-Roll'in LandRevenue Reportsfor Fasli I296 (I886-87) and LandRevenue Reports

for Fasli I335 (I925-26).
S6 Calculatedfromibid.
S7 The quotation continues '. . . Nevertheless,the lifelong dependence of the
borrowerupon the landlordand a varietyof freeservicesto be renderedto the latter
duringagriculturalseasonsare featurescloselyassociatedwith this system.It is not
unusualthat the smalleragriculturistborrowersare obliged to sell their produceto
the apparentlyobliginglandlord'.MPBC,Vol. III, p. I034; see also ibid.,p. 770.
488 DAVID WASHBROOK

As he often stood betweenstarvationand his clients, he seldomhad

difficultyin obtainingtheir allegiance:
Experienceshowsthat this unfortunateclass of ryot have not only to work
in the ryot'sfieldsfor bare subsistancebut what is worsethey have to help
in all village politicsand factiousquarrelsand in all kindsof litigation.58
Increasingwealthenabledhimto deepenand extendhisvillageempire.
He could alsospendmorelavishlyon religionand ritual.Not only did
this bring him more influenceover priest and servicegroupsin his
village, but it heightenedhis socialstatusand distinguishedhim more
clearlyfromhis fellows.
As the rich peasantbecameinvolvedin higher formsof economic
organization,he was alsodrawninto largerformsof socialand political
organization.The principalmarkettowns drew togethervillage elite
familiesfromthe surroundingcountrysideand gave them the meansto
furthertheir ambitions.Marriageconnexionsaffiectedeconomicand
political, as well as social, life. The towns became focal points for
marriagebrokerageamongwealthylandowners.59 They weremembers
of peasantsub-casteswhich sprawledacrossan area largerthan that
from which they normallytook their spouses.But when dominant
familiescame to live in the same town, they began to create much
widergeographicalconnexions.60 Thisalsoopenedthewayformarriages
between wealthy families in different sub-castes.Such growth of
literacy as there was in this region took place among the superior
peasantry.Able to read and to write, the rich peasanthad a better
chanceof takingthe opportunitiesaffiordedhim in the markettowns.
This examinationof the dry areas of Madras emphasizestwo
features.In the first place, growingmarketopportunitieshelped to
increasethe wealth of groupsalreadylanded and rich. Throughthe
extensionof ties of debt and trade,this elite was able to extendits own
economiccontroloverits neighbourhood withoutany seriouschallenge
from outside. Secondly, as rich peasantswere attractedfrom their
villagesinto marketingcentres,they could work in larger economic
andsocialstructures.By borrowingcheapmoneyin the towns,pursuing
diffierentkindsof economicopeningsin the districts,and establishing
S8 Ibid.,p. 699.
ssRoyalCommission onAgriculturein India.Appendix,
Vol. XIV, p. 233.
60 lForinteresting
discussionson the importanceof expandingmarriageties among
South Indianpeasantssee CarolynM. Elliot, 'Casteand lFactionAmongthe Domi-
nant Caste:the Reddisand Kammasof Andhra'in R. Kothari(ed.), Castein Indian
Politics(blewDelhi, I970), pp. IR9-7I. Also,J. Maner, 'The Evolutionof Political
Arenasand Units of SocialOrganizations:the Lingayatsand Vokkaligasof Princely
Mysore'(forthcoming).
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 489
distantmarriageand politicalalliances,they wereable to builda series
of socially horizontal connexions which reinforcedtheir position.
Naturally,such connexionswere deniedto their clientsin the villages.
For mostpoorerpeasants,economicconnexionswith the outsideworld
took place only throughthe rich peasantwho divertedmost of the
rewardsto himself.
There is much to suggest that the social patterns produced by
administrativedevelopmentwere similar.ProfessorsFrykenbergand
Mukherjeehave shown that the British,in their early settlements,
failedto interferedirectlyin the villagepoliticalstructureswhich they
found.6lNonethe less, the conquerorscertainlyexerciseda considerable
indirect influence over village political society. The village as an
administrative or politicalunit62-wasintimatelyrelatedto the institu-
tionsof governmentaboveit, andthe Britishgreatlychangedthe nature
of those institutions.For much of the eighteenth century, Madras
had beentornapartunderthe ruleof smallprincesor wanderingbands
of warriorswho had pressedheavilyon the villagein searchof surplus
wealth. By establishingpeace, the British removed this threat and
replacedthe manyauthoritieswhichhadruledMadraswithoneuniform
but moredistantauthority.They relaxedthe pressurewhichhad built
up on the village.63
However,the British,like the previousnative regimes,also had to
governrural Madras,and this meant that they had to connect their
administrationto the village. To effiectthis, they relied less on naked
force- such as had characterizedthe administrationof HyderAli and
Tipu Sultan-than on establishingcontactsinsidevillage societywith
collaboratorswhowoulddo theirworkforthem.In the laternineteenth
century,as the Britishadministration becamethe mostpowerfulMadras
had ever seen, the positionof these collaboratorsinevitablybecame
strengthened.Thosewho directedvillageadministrationaddedto their
local powerthroughtheirlinkswith extra-villageauthority.
The principalofficeon which the Britishbuilt their administration
61 R. E. Frykenberg andN. Mukherjee,'TheRyotwariSystemand SocialOrganiza-
tion in the MadrasPresidency'and R. E. Frykenberg,'Village Strengthin South
India' in R. E. Frykenberg(ed.), LandControl andSocialStructure in IndianHistory
(Madison,I969), pp. 2I7-26; 227-47.
62The administrativevillage, of course, was not necessarilythe same as the
economicvillageor villagecirclewe havediscussedabove. blorwereeithernecessarily
the same as the 'physical'village of habitation.Village, as used in this article, is
shorthandfor the unit of face-to-facerelationsin rural society. Later, we shall be
discussingthe actualsize and shapeof this unit.
63 See B. Stein, 'Integrationof the AgrarianSystem of South India' in R. E.
Frykenberg(ed.), LandControl andSocialStructure
in IndianHistory,pp. 207-I2.
 DAVID WASHBROOK
490
was that of the village headman.
who kept the revenue records Certainly, the kurnam (accountant)
was also, and sometimes
powerful. As he was usually the independently,
member of a literate family, the
kurnam might also have relatives
in government offices
village. But in a system in which beyond the
'all influence is sought to be
through the Village Magistrate or exercised
daily of greater influence',65the headman'64whose post 'becomes
headman was usually at the centre
village politics. Dependent on the of
Britishrecruited their headmen support of established leaders, the
from the principal peasant
castesand from families which landowning
had, or pretended to have, been
nized as headmen by previous recog-
regimes. In I802, Fort St George
firmedthem in ofiice and con-
guaranteed their hereditary rights.66
meantthat it threw away its This
best lever on the village
For three-quarters of a establishment.
century, it was folk-lore at Fort
thathereditary village officers St George
could be dismissed if they failed
formtheir duties. But in I884 J. to per-
H. Garstin, of the Board of
studiedthe practical difiiculties Revenue,
of enforcing this rule, and
thatthe only offiencefor reported
which a village officer could be
(shortof a criminal conviction) dismissed
was that of being a woman.67
Land revenue systems have
always been the most important
ofIndian government. The aspects
system favoured by the British in
Madras was ryotwari. Under this, the most of
for government took responsibility
measuring and assessing for revenue
Itspawned a vast every field in the
bureaucracy, the senior officersin which presidency.
more than post-boxes' passing huge were 'little
them quantities of paper which came to
from subordinates on to
superiors.6sThe lowest officials in the
pyramid were those appointed in the
headman who were responsiblefor village-the kurnam and the
of collections, and for issuing notices
demand and restraint of defaulters'
hasshown how the British locked property. Dr R. E. Frykenberg
themselves out of their own admirli-
strative
system by giving too much
serving
low down in it.69Although unchecked authority to those
reforms,particularlyfrom the I 870s,
checked the worst abuses at higher
levels, the independence of local
64Administration
Report
of theMadrasPolice
Police.
. .], p. 4. for theyearI885 (Madras,I 886),
[Madras
65
F. A. Nicholson,RAB,Vol. I, p.
3I2.
66
B. B. Misra, 7CheAdministrative
67J.H. Garstinto Secretary, Historyof IndiaI834-I947 (Oxford,Ig70), p. 46I.
Revenue
(Revenue)dated 24June I884, Tamil NadDepartment,3 April I884 in G.O. 787
68
For a critiqueof the weaknesses Archives[TNA].
of the
insideit, see G.O. I73 (Revenue) revenuedepartmentwrittenby senior
officials
69R.E. Frykenberg,Guntur dated 20 FebruaryI90X, TNA.
DistrictI788-I848. A Historyof LocalInfuence
Authority
in SouthIndia(Oxford,I 965). andCentral
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO T 930 49I

administrations remainedintact in MadrasPresidencyuntil at least

I900. In I885, for example, a Board of Revenue investigationin
Tanjore, generallyconsideredone of the better governed districts
uncovereda networkof intrigueandprivateconnexionwhichstretched
fromthe HuzurSheristidarto hundredsofvillageofficers.The dominant
officecliquehad useda floodin the winterof I884 as an excuseto claim
Rs 8 lakhsof remissionsfrom Fort St George;the Boardof Revenue
found Rs 4 lakhs of these to be fraudulent.The investigator,H. S.
Thomas,who had nearlythirtyyears'experienceof Madras,doubted
whetherhis findingswere the resultof peculiarconditionsin Tanjore.
He thoughtthat the samekind of hiddenorganizationsexistedevery-
where;they had been uncoveredin Tanjoreonly becausetheirprivate
demands on the revenue-had oversteppedthe bounds of common
sense.70
Such a looselyorganizedrevenueadministrationgave great power
to those who connectedthe village to the taxation system.In I902,
Lord Ampthill,the Governor?describedto his Secretaryof State the
operationsof the annualjamabundi:
Whathappensis this:All the landson whichthe cropshavefailedhave to be
inspectedby subordinateagency which, as you know, is very amenableto
briberyin this country.The consequenceis that the well-to-doryotwho can
affordto bribe the village officersor revenueinspectorsgets them to report
that his cropsarewitheredor totallylost,so as to entitlehim to remission....
Again it is by no meansinfrequentthat the remissionsneverreach the ryots
for whom they were intended as the village officersdeceive the ryots by
tellingthem that no remissionswere granted,collect the full assessmentand
pocketthe money themselves.7l
Within the limits of a known and relativelyfixed stribute'to the
superior government, the village revenue establishmentdictated
village payments.When they came to resettlethe land, the British
discoveredthat the area cultivatedoften bore no relationto what was
in the records.Wet land was listed as dry; good qualitysoil as bad;
and manyfieldswerenot listedat all.72Village officersalso controlled
the sale of revenuedefaulters'land and saw that it went to theirclients
70}I. S. Thomas,Reporton
lvanyoreRemissionsinFasli
I294 (A.D. I884-85) (Madras,
I 885) )
71 Ampthill to Hamilton, 6 August I90X, pthill Papers, Eur. MSS. 23317.
India Oice Library[IOL].
72 See, MadrasDistrictGazetteers:
W. Francis,Ehe;ffiligiris(Madras,I908), Vol. I,
p. 28I; J. F. Hall, South
Kanara(Madras,I938), Vol. IIj p. 28; F. J. Richards,Salem
(Madras,I9I8), Vol. I, PartII, pp. 35-6; W. Francis,Madura(Madras,I906), Vol. I,
pp. 203-4; Selectionsfrom
theMadrasRecords Vol.XXII (Madras,I870), p. I 8; 'Report
on Coimbatore',pp. 2-3 in LandRevenue Reports
for Fasli I280 (I877I).
492 DAVID WASHBROOK

at give-awayprices.73 As late as I929 the BankingInquirywastold that

in many placesno outsidercould acquireland withoutthe permission
of the villagerevenueestablishment.74
Police administrationalso was built onto the authoritieswithin the
the village.At no time in the nineteenthcenturywas Fort St George
able to employmorethan one centrallyappointedpolicemanto every
I,500 inhabitants.75
Keepingthe peace,such as it was, restedfirmlyin
the hands of the village headmanwho, by Sir William Robinson's
reformsof I863, acquiredgreaterformal powers than ever before.
He wasgivenmoneyto hiremorekavalgars,and usuallyhe couldkeep
all otherlaw-officersout of hisvillage.76He waswell placedto operatea
ruleof terror,whichdoubtlesshad alwaysbeen partof his prerogative.
The grimsituationin Salem,describedby its Superintendent of Police
in I896, was typicalof the area:
all the violentcrimein the districtis committedby Koravars,who act
in verymanycasesas privateKavalgars in thevillages.He considers thatin
verymanycasesthesemenarein thehandsof theVillageMagistrates, who
usethemastheirservants andin consequence protectthem,takingcarewhen
crimesoccurnot to mentionany of theirdependents in theirfirstreports,
on whichthe SessionsCourtsetssuchvalue.The VillageMagistrates, of
course,obtaina considerable shareof the proceedsof theselootingexpedi-
tions.77
Headmenused the gangsundertheirprotectionto forcethe obeisance
of subjectsin their little kingdomsand to harassand plundertheir
enemies.78 Whenthe policeand courtsoutsidethe villagetook a hand,
they provedusuallyto be the unwittingallies of the village powers.
The districtpoliceonly cameinto the villagewhenthe headmancalled
them, and his word was taken by the courts as that of authority.79
t3 Report of the Indian Famine Commission. Appendix. Volume III. Condition of the Country
nd People, PP I88I, Vol. LXXI, Part 2, p. 4I6.
74 MPBC, Vol. III, p. 679.
75 See Madras Police I878-I900. And their 'provincial' policemen were ineXective:
'Dishonesty in investigation is, we are told, prevalent everywhere....', Statement of
the Police Committee on the Administration of the District Police in the Madras Presidency
(Madras, I902), p. 50.
76 For an assessment of the workings of the reforms, see Madras Police I 885, pp. I-5.
77Madras Police I896, p. 35. For similar reports on headmen in Coimbatore,
Guddapah, Tinnevelly, Madura, Chingleput and North Arcot, see Madras Police
I 888, App. C, pp. xxi-xxii; ibid., I 895, pp. 33, I 85; ibid., I9I 2, p. I 0.
78 'But many Reddis or Village Magistrates keep gangs of retainers generally
Yerikalas who, when not committing depredations, act as bravos in paying oF old
scores against rivals'. Report on Cuddapah in Land Revenue Reports for Fasli I3I4
( I904-°5), ps 72 s
79 Madras Police I 897, p. I 2.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 493
In the early twentieth century, false reports and charges brought
by headmen against their enemies often headmenin neighbouring
villages-became so numerousthat the MadrasGovernmentbeganto
keep two registersof crime one 'false'and one 'true'.80
Headmenalso possessedsome powersas criminaland civil magis-
tratesin theirown right.Althoughthesepowerswerelittle usedin the
later nineteenth century this does not mean that the headman's
influencewas on the wane.8lHis formalpowersin criminalmatters
were extremelylimited.Fifteendays in prisonor a spell in the stocks
were hardly awesomethreatsin a society where life was so cheap.
Most people who appearedbeforethe headmandid so voluntarilyto
answerpetty chargesof social misdemeanour.His informalinfluence
was far greaterthan the limits of his judicial power suggest.In civil
matters,it was generallyrecognizedthat headmenarbitratedmany
more, and far more important, disputes than ever got into their
ledgers.82Indeed, in the Ceded districts,where the Reddi was pre-
eminent,the headmendid not botherto sendin returnsof the casesthey
tried.83In the early twentiethcentury, when governmentbegan to
insist on records,litigationin village courtsincreasedprodigiously.s4
In spite of the recommendation of the MadrasTortureCommission
(I855) that police, magisterialand revenuefunctionsshould not lie
in the same hands, the village headmanpossessedall three. Not only
was it extremelydifficultfor the Britishto intervenein his affairs,but
normaladministrative proceduresguaranteedthat,whenevertheywere
calledin, it wasto supporthisauthority.In thelaternineteenthcentury,
as the governmentbeganto do moreand more,the headman'srole in
governmentgrew larger. The administrationof the income tax,
introducedin I886, was attachedto his revenueoffice;ssthe Famine
80 For example in I9I8, the police were called out in answer to 5,290 false com-
plaints and found themselves involved in 4,I60 false prosecutions. Madras Police I9I8,
pp. I8-2I.
81 In the later nineteenth century although relatively few village headmen tried

civil cases, they nonetheless covered about two-thirds of the litigation in their com-
petence. F. A. lficholson, RAB, Vol. I, p. 3I2.
82 Ibid.
83 See Report on the Administration of Civil j'ustice in the Presidency of Madras I88I-I925
(annual series); Report on the Administration of Criminal ustice in the Presidency of Madras
I88I-I925 (annual series).
84 In I88I, village munsiEs heard 47,656 civil cases; in I9I0, they heard 96,597;
and between I9I3 and I9I8, with the help of panchayats, they heard an annual
average of I 26,959. Report on the Administration of Civil jfustice in the Presidency of Madras
in I88I (Madras, I882), p. 3I; ibid., I9I0, p. 4; ibid., I920, p. 3.
35 For comments on the arbitrary nature of assessment see Proceedings of the Board
of Revenue, No. 46 (Ordinary) dated I5 January I892, T1fA. Also Report on the
in their workthey hadto be able to read before their sanadswere

494 DAVID WASHBROOK

Codeprovidedhimwithcheapgovernmentloansandgrainto distribute,
almostwithoutsupervision,in his village;86the developmentof Takavi
loans permittedhim to hand outr withhold government-backed
creditforlong-termloans;87the DistrictBoardsAct of I884 put him on
village unionswith powersof local taxationand considerableadmini-
strative interference.88 The British elaborateda vast administrative
system which sought to govern entirely through him. In the last
decadesof the nineteenthcenturythe villageheadman,in somepartsof
Madras,was morepowerfulthan he had ever been before.
As the Madrasgovernmentbecame more concernedwith district
administration, it demandedgreaterefficiencyfromthe headmanwhose
powersit had increased.While securityand the regularpaymentof
revenuewere its main concern,the governmentdid not enquiretoo
closelyinto the aSairsof the village; but when it wantedto do more,
the headman'sindependencecould prove a problem. The revenue
resettlements,which beganin the I860S, showedhow irrelevantpolicy
madein the capitalwas to the practiceof the village.On investigation
the revenue system was found actually to prevent the centre from
meddlingtoo much in the localities.89To exercisecontrolthe British
realizedthattheywouldhaveto changethe entiresystem,and thatthey
would have to put the police on a quite differentfooting.90From the
I880S the new revenuesettlements cut downsomeof the worstabusesin
the village.Village officershad now to demonstratesome competence

recognized.Theirrightto issuenoticesof demandand restraintat will

was curbed and many of the minor posts of village watchmenand
servants,which had provided the headman with useful patronage,
were discontinued.Between the I 860S and I 906, headmen were
paid increasinglyby centrally administeredstipends. Districts and
Administration of theIncomeEaxunderActII of I886 in theMadrasPresidency for theyear
I 88&89 (Madras,I 890), p. 39.
86 Appendix totheReport of theIndianFamine Commission, I 898, beingMinutesof Evidence,
etc.Volume II. MadrasPresidency. PP, I 899, Vol. XXXII, pp. 33, I 65, I 69; Reportonthe
Faminein theMadrasPresidency duringI896 andI897 (Madras,I898), Vol. II, p. 203.
87 Takaviloanswere administered throughthe regularrevenuemachinery.
88 Village oicers were ex-officiomembersof village unions-collections of villages
broughttogetherforadministrative purposes.By I 920, therewerenearly600 of these,
with an averageannualincomeof Rs 3,ooo.G.0. I337 (Localand Municipal,Local)
dated I 3 July I 92I, T1NA.
89 See J. H. Garstin,Report on theRevisionof Revenue Establishments
in theMadras
Presidency (Madras,I883).
90 Radical police reformwas recommendedafter an inquiry ordered by Lord
Gurzon.See Statement of thePoliceCommittee ontheAdministration of theDistrictPolicein
theMadrasPresidency (Madras,I902).
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I880 TO I 930 495

taluks were reduced in size, and more supervisoryofficials were

appointed.
However,it mustbe doubtedwhetherany of thesereformsseriously
curtailedthe independenceof the village officer,at least beforethe
mid-Ig20s.For the Governmentof India cheapgovernmentand good
governmentwere synonymous.Reforms cost money, and Calcutta
would not give Madras the funds necessaryto launch an effective
attack on the village administration.gl In I883 a modestrequestfor
Rs 4.6 lakhsto improvethe revenuedepartmentwas turneddown.g2
In I896, when approachedfor money to reformthe police force, the
Governmentof India only permitted an increase in expenditure
sufficientto issue the existing policemen with badges and night-
sticks.93Faced with parsimonyon this scale, all the effiortsof Fort St
Georgewere mere tinkerings.They could not underminethe village
officerbecausethey could not affiordto replacehim.
Moreover,villageofficersthemselvesexercisedinfluencewhichwent
far beyondthe boundsof theiroffice.Exactfiguresof theirlandholding,
apart fromtheir inams,do not exist; but everybodyin Madrasknew
that they were the richestof the rich peasants.94In I92I the Govern-
ment announcedthat it wouldnot raisetheirstipendsto meetinflation
becausetheir stipendsformedonly a very small part of their income.
Fewmembersof theLegislativeCouncilbotheredto challengethis;some
carriedit furtherand arguedthat seniorvillage officersdid not need
to be paid at all.gsThe vital officesof governmentin the Iocalityhad
been settled on the principallandowningfamiliesof village Madras,
who, by inter-marriage,formed distinguishableelites within small
territories.They were preciselythe samefamilieswho were tightening
their controlover the local economies.The government'sattemptsat
reformchippedat only one of their many pillarsof authority.These
local bosses made dangerousenemies and, during the Home Rule
League-Congress agitationsof I9I6-22, when the nationaliststried to
91During our period, the Governmentof India took, under vatious headings,
between68 and 78 per cent of Madrasrevenues.
92 G.O. 369 (Revenue)dated25 MarchI885, T1fA; India Oice, PublicandJudi-
cial Department,File 25I of I888, IOL.
93 MadraspoliGe I897, p. 5.
94 Some fragmentsof evidenceon their landholdings, however,are available.For
example,accordingto a reportof I865, the village officersof Bellaryheld 650,ooo
acresof land in the district.W. Francis,Bellary(Madras,I904), Vol. I, p. I75; or
again I 68 Cuddapahvillageoicers mentionedin a resettlementoperation,admitted
to paying Rs 22,507 a year in land revenuebetweenthem. 'Reporton Cuddapah'
p. I 0 in LandRevenue Reports for Fasli I 285 ( I 875-76) .
95 C;overnmerltof India, lIome Judicial Files I-2 of I922, NAI.
496 DAVID WASHBROOK

link up their agitationwith protestsfrom the village elites,the British

had causefor alarm.g6
The governmenthad manyreasonsfor not launchinga full-blooded
assault on their village officers.When a governmentorder of I894
forcedvillage officersto prove their literacyand to attend classeson
their work, it contained a clause which permittedall those village
officersand their immediateheirswho registeredwithin two yearsto
avoid the penaltiesfor failure.97It was a generationbeforethe order
beganto have any impact,and then all the governmentfoundit could
do with men whofailedthe testswasto askthemto comebackthe next
year.98The attempts to enfranchiseservice inams were expensive
and still incompleteby the time they werestoppedby the Government
of India in I906. In any case, village officerstook advantageof their
possessionof the recordsto surrenderas littlelandas possible.Theirnew
stipendswereworthfarmorethanthe fieldstheylost.g9Sincethegovern-
ment could not easily dismiss them, the control-through-payment
which the Britishhad hoped to achieveremainedpurelynotional.l°°
Someof the mostglaringabusesof the revenuesystemwereended,but
the resettlementoperationsdid not preventthe village officersfrom
continuingto manipulatethe administration.More land was assessed
for revenue,but the Madrasgovernmentstill knew remarkablylittle
about who paid what. In the end, the Britishdid little more than
irritatethe headmanby clippingsomeof his perquisitesand patronage;
they neversolvedthe centralproblemsof his existenceand the nature
of his rule.
The headman'ssuccessin fending off attack was made clear by
96 In I9I6, HomeRule Leagueagitatorspickedup the causeof indentured labourers
and demanded that the Governmentrestrict emigrationto Burma and Ceylon
becauseof the appallingconditionsof servicethere.In fact, as the Britishrecognized,
this movewas intendedless to aid the labourersthan to connectwith the protestsof
landlordsin severalparts of Madraswho fearedthat emigrationwas takingaway
their cheap laboursupply.The governmentacted quicklyand imposedrestrictions
in order to preventthe developmentof a seriousthreat to order. Home Political
Deposit,March-I9I 7, 32 and 33; April I9I 7, 6I, NAI.
97 G.O. 36I (Education)dated 24 May I894, TNA.
98 See Hindu,I August I9I9.
99For example,in I870, the villageoicers of TrichinopolysurrenderedI6,304,37
acresof inam land and had to pay aboutRs I0,000 p.a. assessmenton it. In return,
the cessescollectedby governmentanddistributedto themincreasedfromRs 642 p.a.
to Rs I,72,340 in I875. 'Reporton Trichinopoly',p. I0 in LandRevenue Reportsfor
Fasli I280 (I877I); and ibid.,for Fasli I285 (I875-76), p. 68.
100'The irregularitiescommittedby these servants (which are very frequent)
cannot,however,be well punishedby suspensionor dismissalas it has beenfoundby
experiencethat such a coursecausesgreat inconvenienceto the public service. . .',
'Reporton Cuddapah',p. 2I in LandRevenue ReportsforFasliI285 (I875-76).
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 497
the failureof two particularreforms.In I9I8, thirty-fiveyearsafterit
had been firstsuggested,the Governmentof Madrasintroduceda bill
to abrogatethe hereditaryrightsof village officers.Faced with open
agitationon an unprecedentedscale, Fort St Georgeshelvedthe bill
beforeits firstreading.l°lThe secondtriumphwas over policereform.
BetweenI905 and I907, 2,000 menwererecruitedas deputy-inspectors
in the districts,to fill the gap betweenthe villageand the distantcircle
police stations.'02 Withinfive years,it had becomeapparentthat this
schemewas not working.The new deputyinspectorsdoubledthe cost
of-the police and drove down the detectionrate.l03In many regions
openwarwasdeclaredbetweenthe villageand the police.Oncevillage
headmen withdrewtheir co-operation,the problem of maintaining
order became more impossiblethan ever.l04By IgIs, the Madras
Governmenthad to compromise,and the right to appointthe deputy
inspectorswas taken from the Commissionerof Police and given to
committeesof local notables.l05Once again the village headmenhad
preservedtheirimmunityfromoutsidecontrol.
The fate of the policereformsset a patternfor the futurerelationship
between the governmentat Fort St Georgeand that in the village.
Insteadof curbingthe village administrationthe Madrasgovernment
built upon it. Local panchayatswere far more importantin Madras
Presidencythan anywhereelse in India.l06To controlthe production
and consumptionof alcohol,the governmentdecidedin I908 to enlist
the aid of local committees.l07 When-the forest conservationpolicy
causedfrictionwithlocalgroups,thegovernmentmadelocalcommittees
responsibleforcarryingit out.l08FromaboutI9I5 irrigationpanchayats
steadilytookoverthe distributionof water.l09Duringthe I920S village
courts were encouragedto take a larger share of litigation.ll°The
lol Fordiscussionofthe bill, see G.O. I958 (Revenue)dated I4 AugustI920, TNA.
Also, Governmentof India, HomeJudicalFiles I-2 of I92X, NAI.
102 Madras PoliceI9I9, AppendixD, p. x.
103 lliadrasPoliceI9I2, p. 9; ibid.,I9I5, pp. I7-I8.
104 Madras PoliceI907, pp. 5-6; ibid.,I9I2, p. 33; ibid.,I9I4, pp. 72-76.
loS Madras PoliceI9I5, p. I8.
t06RoyalCommission onAgriculture in India.Appendix, Vol. XIV, pp. 256-8.
107 ReportontheAdministration of theAbkariRezJenue in thePresidency
ofFortSt. Georgefor
theyearI9I5-I6 (Madras,I9I6), p. 4.
108 Forestpanchayatsdevelopedout of a reportby the ForestCommitteein I9I3.
The governmenthoped that they 'will go far to remove or reduce the frictionof
forestsubordinatesand the publicwhich has been such an unsatisfactory featureof
past administration'.Quotedin Hindu,I4 April I9I5.
109 RoyalCommission onAgriculture in India.Appendix, Vol. XIV, p. 256.
110Reporton theAdministration of Civil yusticein thePresidency of Madras.I920-30
(annualseries).
M
498 DAVID WASHBROOK

MadrasGovernmenthad to use village leaders in order to govern.

By usingthem the governmentmade theseleadersmorepowerful.
The main themeof this economicand administrativeanalysisof the
dry areas of Madrashas been the growthof social stratification.Of
course,Madrasruralsocietywas hierarchicallyorganizedlong before
the Britisharrived;and the Britishdid not changethe social orderof
thathierarchy.Butthe distancebetweenthe richand the poor,between
those with administrativepower and those without it, was becoming
greater.Furtherprosperitycame to individualsand to familieswho
werein a positionto controlthe villageeconomyand the local admini-
stration rather than to whole castes or communities.Communal
organizationsamong dominant peasant castes were weakened.l'l
In the countrysidepolitics were markedby factionalismratherthan
by conflictbetweencastesor classes.Peasantleaders,oftenof the same
ritualrank,foughteachotherforland, loot and pre-eminencewithina
restrictedlocality.Theirfollowers weresociallyheterogeneous
anddrawn
togetherby theirdependenceon a commonleader.
The restrictedlocalityoverwhichthe peasantbossheld swaywas not
limited to the village, althoughthere were many factionfightsinside
villages.Mostof the powersat the disposalof the peasantleadercould
be exported beyond the village boundary.Connexionsof debt, kin
and terrorcouldembraceseveralvillages.Sincethe Madrasvillagewas
usually a collection of hamlets broughttogetherfor administrative
convenience,village officersmight havejurisdictionscoveringseveral
squaremiles.Further,by wagingwar againsthis neighbours,a success-
ful village leader could influencean even larger territory.A typical
example of local politics in this area was the long-standingfeud
betweenChinnarappaReddi and ThimmaReddi in the Gooty taluk
of Anantapurdistrict.Bothmen werelargelandholdersconnectedwith
village officefamilies.They had been quarrellingfor many years,but
in I904 their rivalw brokeout into an open vendetta.Thimmawas
arrestedfor the murderof a youngReddi lawyerwho was Chinnarap-
pa's man. Thimmawas acquitted,and extendedthe fightby acquiring
land insideChinnarappa's territory.Chinnarappacounteredby hiring
P. Kesava Pillai, a lawyer and well-knownprovincial politician,
who had considerableinfluencewith the local administration. Overthe
next few yearsThimmawas arraignedbeforethe local magistracyon
variouschargesof violenceno fewerthan thirty-threetimesand several
1ll Forexample,by I 907, of all the Vellalasub-castesin Trichinopolydistrict,'only
a few of the sub-divisions,namelythe Kodiklrals,Kongasand Aru-nadus,have caste
panchayats'.F. R. Hemingway,Trichinopoly (Madras,I907), Vol. I, p. I02.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 499

of his hench-menwere imprisoned.Chinnarappaalso used Kesava

Pillai's influence to block police action-against himself. He drove
Thimma'slabourersoff hislandandattackedhisdependents.Supporters
of each man were murdered-sometimesat the rate of two or three a
month-but KesavaPillai intervenedsix timesto preventthe Madras
authoritiesfrom stationingpunitive police in the district. In better
daysThimmahad boughta pleadershipcertificatefroma local official.
This was revokedby the courtswhen Kesava Pillai accusedhim of
moneylending.Throughviolence, and by bending the law, Chinna-
rappa smashedThimma'sempire and became 'the sole monarchof
forty villages', exacting tribute from his subjectsand settling their
disputes.ll2Police reportsfromother districtsmakeit clear that there
was nothing unusualin this conflict.ll3Forty villages might seem a
sizeable realm, but it was simply a fraction of one revenue firka.
Such battles were essentiallyfought out face-to-facewith resources
gatheredfroma smallarea.They rarelyintrudedinto the higherlevels
of the administration,althoughindividualsuperiorpolice and revenue
officialsweresometimescalledin to help one or the otherof the sides.
The general developmentof administration,however, began to
createinstitutionsin which the resourcesavailableto engagein such
petty battles could be drawn from a much wider area. Just as the
economicelite found that the developmentof the economyenabled
them not only to strengthentheirlocal positionbut also to participate
in new forms of economic activity, so the administrativeelite were
pulled out of the locality and placed in a frameworkin which new
administrativer political-opportunitieswere available.The most
importantof these institutions,althoughby no means the only ones,
were the ruralboards.ll4
Althoughthe MadrasGovernmenthad been forced by Ripon in
I884 into followingthe letterof the legislationabout decentralization,
it did not begin to follow its spirit until about I909. The district
112The story emergedin the course of a trial which was fully reportedin the
Hindu,20, 22, 29 and 30June and I6July I925; see also P. KesavaPillai to S. M. V.
Osman,the Collectorof Anatapur,I July I922, and P. KesavaPillai to C. P. Rama-
swami Iyer, I4 May I925, P. Kesava Pillai Papers, Nehru MemorialMuseum,
New Delhi [1!TMM].
113 The dry districtsin generaland Coimbatore, Salem,Cuddapahand Anantapur
in particular,had much the highestmurderratesin the presidency.Superiorpolice
officialsinvariablyattributedthe prevalenceof the crime to faction. See Madras
PoliceI9I0, p. I5; ibid.,I9I8, p. I 2; ibid.,I920, p. I4.
114 As important,and subject to the same pattern of growth, were the temple
committees.See C. J. Baker,'PoliticalChangein SouthIndia (I9I9-I937)' (Fellow-
ship dissertation,Queens'College,Cambridge,I972), pp. 65-74.
soo DAVID WASHBROOK

boards,which sat on top of a pyramidof taluk boardsand village

unions, remained extensions of various government departments,
whoseofficersran them as partof theirgeneralduties.A. Subbarayalu
Reddiar,who tookoverthe Cuddaloretalukboardin I9IX, reportedto
his patronSir-P. S. SivaswamiIyer:
As mattershave stood,with the exceptionof Dispensaries,Schoolsand Taluk
Board Roads, almost the whole -ofthe outdoorwork was managedby the
Revenue divisionalagency. The Village Sanitation,the maintenanceand
opening of the village roads, the repair and constructionof the drinking
water wells and ponds, the clearanceof encroachments,the removal of
pricklypear, etc., were all in the handsof the revenuedepartment.ll5
The dispensarieswererun by the MedicalDepartment;the schoolsby
the EducationDepartment;and the taluk boardroadsby the Public
WorksDepartment.In the ruralboards,as muchas in the departments,
rivalsfor favoursjockeyedaroundthe officialand tried to divert his
authorityto theircourse.Villageunionsand talukboardswere mostly
run by the lowest offlcialswho were ex-officio membersof them.ll6
Electionsto the districtboards,whichweremadeby talukboards,were
controlledby theseofficials.ll7The politicalbankruptcyof these early
rural boardshas been perfectlydescribedby-the Tamil novelistA.
Madhaviah:
In these assemblies,I first discoveredwhat a shameful farce local self-
governmentwas. Not a few of my fellow memberswere almost illiterate,
and altogetherinnocent of the English tongue in which our deliberations
were conducted.They were wealthy and so they were elected. They came
morefor the travellingallowancethey obtainedfor attendingmeetingsthan
for the subjectsdiscussedat those meetings,unlessthey happenedto hold a
secretbrieffrom a contractorto get an extravagantbill passed.ll8
From about I 909, Fort St George began to implement Ripon's
policiesmore fully. Madrasdistrictboardshad never lackedfunds-
theywerethe richestin India, and some,by the I890S, had even begun
to constructtheir own railwaysll9-but now they became enormous
poolsof patronage.BetweenI 909 and I 9 I 9, budgetsof the ruralboards
increasedby 70 per cent to a districtaverageof I I lakhsa year, and
115A. Subbarayalu ReddiartoP. S. Sivaswami Iyer,IR AprilI9I2. P. S. Sivaswami
IyerPapers,NAI.
116 Seearticleon Tindivanum talukboardin Hindu, g AugustI897.
117 Memorandum 3I -4L,dated5 FebruaryI 9 I 5, in Confidential Proceedings of
the MadrasGovernment, I9I6, Volume23, IOL.
118A. Madhaviah, ThillaiGovindan (London,I9I6), p. I I8.
119Theearliestdlstrictboardrailwaywasthatconstructed in Tanjorein I897-98.
SeeHindu,IO and I7June I896.
 COUNTRY POLITICS * MADRAS I880 TO I 930 50I

between I9I9 and I929 they more than doubled again.l20At the
same time their administrativecompetence,which had always been
considerable,was increased.They controlleda large slice of primary
and some secondaryeducation,the right to licenseall marketsin the
district,to route and maintainall importantroads,to grant building
permission,to levy taxes and to organize religiousfestivals. More
significantly,from I909 the MadrasGovernmentbegan to withdraw
its officialsfrom these boards and to replace them with local non-
officialsin the executiveoffices.It alsoincreasedthe numberof elected
seats.l2lThe effectsof thesechangesare not difficultto guess:
Landlordswith local influencediscoveredthat, as presidentsand membersof
local boards,they could wield a large amountof influencein their locality,
and exercisegreaterpowerover their neighbours.122
It did not takelocal politicianslong to recognizeand use the potential
ofthe districtboard.In I9I7, for example,A. SubbarayaluReddiar,a
7-otalRevenue
of RuralBoards

Year Rupees

I909-I0 I 52 77, 794

I9I9-20 2 68, 49, 522
I 929-3O 5 78, o7, 952

G.O. I 702 (Local and Municipal Local) dated I 2 December I 9 I 0; G.O. I 337 (Local
and Municipal) dated I3JUly I922; G.O. I568 (Local and Municipal) dated g April
I93I, TNA.

121 Presidents
of RuralBoards

a. DistrictBoards

Nominated Nominated
Year Total Official Non-Official Elected
I9I I-I2 25 25 -
I 922-23 25 I I4 9
I 926-2 7 24 I 4 I9

b. TalukBoards
I9I I-I2 95 73 I9 3
I922-23 I25 I I3 III
I926-27 I29 - I4 I I8

Source:AnnualReportontheWorking
of LocalBoardsin
Madrasfor I9I2, I923, I927.
122 M. Venkatarangaiya, 7Che Development of Local Boards in the Madras Presidency

(Bombay, I939), pp. 66-7.

502 DAVID WASHBROOK

rich landedmagnateand lawyer,movedfromthe president'sofficeof

the Cuddaloretaluk board to the chair of the South-Arcot district
board, and rapidlybegan to build a district-widepolitical machine.
He replaced revenue departmentemployees with his men;123 he
demandedthe right to appoint all taluk board staff, somethingno
collectorhad done;l24he stood on his rightsto nominatetaluk board
membersand presidentsbeneath him;l25and he used his powersto
driveout his enemiesfromlocal boardseats.In particular,he was able
to unseathis old rivalin Cuddaloretown and talukpolitics,M. Razak
Maracair,from the districtboard, on which he had sat since I886,
and fill the vacancywith his closestally A. T. Muthukumaraswami
(Shetty,anotherrich landlordand banker.l26
It wasnot onlythat the localself-government reformscreateddistrict
arenas in which politicians could participate:the growing power
of the boardsand the fact that they were availableto enemiesmeant
that everyman of local influencehad to take part or sufferthe conse-
quences.For example,the main concernof A. K. D. DharmaRaja, a
rich landlord from Rajapalayamin Ramnad district, was to run
his privatemarket.Fromits beginningsin I900, he had protectedit
fromthe avariciousgaze of governmentby gettinghis brother,who was
a villageofficer,to forgetto notifyhis superiorsof its existence.Later,
however,its appearancewas noticedfor it was taking businessaway
from the licensedmarket.DharmaRaja then contactedhis tahsildar,
T. S. RamaswamiIyer, who agreedto look after its interestsin the
talukboardwhereit was licensedfor a nominalsum. In I920 the raja
of Ramnad became the first non-officialpresidentof the Ramnad
districtboardand promptlybeganto treatthe wholedistrictas partof
his estate.l27In particular,he triedto obtaincontrolof all the markets
in the district.DharmaRaja now foundhimselfdraggedinto a district
arenasimplyto maintainhimselflocally,and he soughtelectionto the
district board.l28Dharma Raja's history was not unique: all over
Hindu,5 FebruaryI9I 8.
23
Ibid.
24
t25 G.O. I02I (Localand Municipal,Local) dated8 AugustI9I8, TNA.
t26 Hindu,I 2 June I9I8, 9 October I920.
127 The raja became involved with various NattukottaiGhetties,whose whole
south Asian bankingempire was centred on Ramnad, in a districtdog-fightfor
controlof the principalmarkets.G.O. 783 (Localand Municipal)dated3 May I922;
G.O. 8II (Local and Municipal)dated g May I922 TNA; Hindu,3I July and I6
March I922.
128 G.O. I984 (Local and Municipal)dated 7 SeptemberI923, T1fA. Dharma
Raja was relatedto P. S. KumaraswamiRaja (seefootnote5I ) and theirfamilywas
typical of our peasant-capitalistelite. They owned Rs 20,000 worth of land, had
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 5o3
Madrasruralleaderswere forcedto take accountof the new institu-
tions.Scarcelysurprisingly, the ChinnarappaReddivs. ThimmaReddi
conflictwas now drawninto a largerarena.Both becametalukboard
membersand Chinnarappashowedwho was dominantwhen Thimma
was thrown oS the board for associatingwith known criminals-
the result,it was said, of Kesava Pillai'sinfluencein Madrascity.l29
In I920, Chinnarappawas electedto the districtboard.
The district boards placed the rural elite in a broaderpolitical
context.Rivals no longerfoughteach others'armiesonly with sticks:
they had to shift around their districts,seeking allianceswith men
whosebasescouldbe a hundredmilesfromtheirown, in orderto gain
control of districtinstitutions.The need to make wider horizontal
political connexionswithin an extendinglocality also fosteredwider
social and marriageconnexions.Althoughthe politicalconductof the
elite changed,there was very little alterationin the verticalstructure
of politics. The rural leaders, scramblingover each other to gain
districtofficeand rewards,still preservedas tight a grip as ever over
their localities.Madhaviah'scommenton the electoralimportanceof
wealthappliedthroughoutthisperiod;and the Britishfullyrecognized
the influence village officerspossessedover district and provincial
elections.l30The ruralboardfranchisewas basedon tax-payment,and
included only a small fractionof the population.l3lEven so, many
votersweredependentsof the ruralelite and theirvoteswerecastlong
beforetheyreachedany pollingbooth.Mostmendid not havethe vote,
and this servednot only to preservethe importanceof the active elite
but actuallyto enhanceit. For if any memberof this votelessmajority
wishedto obtainanythingfromthe districtinstitutions,he coulddo so
interestsin bankingand a cotton ginningfactoryand possessedvillage oEce. See
A. K. D. VenkataRaja,A BriefLifeSketch Raja(Rajapayaiyam,
of P. S. Kumaraswami
I 964) .
129 G.O. I80 (Localand Municipal,Local) dated 27 FebruaryI920. TNA.
130 Between I920 and I930, the electoratesto the LegislativeCounciland to the
talukboardswereroughlythe same.Whenconsideringactionagainstvillageofficers,
C. Todhunter,a seniorBritishofficial,thought:'the villageofficersare likelyto have
so much influenceover the electorateunder the Montagu-Ghelmsford Reforms
that it would be easy for them to securea mandate to elected membersto oppose
interference-withhereditaryright'. Note, I I / I 2/ I 9 in G.O. I 958 (Revenue)dated
I 4 August I 920, TNA.
131 lXo exact statisticsof the ruralboardelectorates exist. On the basisof informa-
tion collectedfor the I920 and I937 LegislativeCouncilreforms,it seemsprobable
that, between I920 and I930, about * per cent of the ruralpopulationcould vote
in ruralboardelectionsand, betweenI930 and I937, about I3 per cent. See Madrss
Government Evidence to theSouthborough Committee
onFranchise I9I&I9. (Calcutta,I9I9),
AppendixI; Governmentof India, Home Political,File I 29 of I937, NAI.
5o4 DAVID WASHBROOK

only by approachingsomebody who was capable of influencing

decisionsinsidethem. In otherwords,he had to becomea client.
Rural boardand districtpoliticswere the preserveof small groups
feelinglittle direct pressurefrom below. The dependentsof the rural
elite were unable to come togetherto constitutea separateforce, or
evenmuchof an organizedinterest.The effectsof thiscan bejudgedby
the absenceof organizedprotestsagainstgovernmentpolicyand by the
failureof attemptsto introducepopular issues into districtpolitics.
Fromits creationin I878, the forestdepartmentsoughtto controlthe
use made of jungles and lands unfit for cultivation.This meant that,
in areaslike the Cededdistricts,Coimbatoreand Salem,it restricted
accessto land fromwhichryotstraditionallyobtainedgrazingfor their
cattle, crude fertilisers,fire-woodand variousfood stuffs. Relations
between the forest departmentand the ryots under its jurisdiction
were alwaysstrained.AlthoughLegislativeCouncillorsfrom the dry
districts such as P. Kesava Pillail3? continuallypressed Fort St
George to reformforest administration,and although all Congress
conferencesin the areatriedto enlistlocal supportby raisingthe forest
issue, there was no organizedresponse.The local rural elite dealt
with the forestdepartmenton the ground.By bribery,threatsand the
occasionalmurder,powerfulryots came to satisfactoryarrangements
with forestsubordinates.l33 They gainedaccessto the forestswhile the
poorercultivators,who lacked'influence',were kept out. From I9I5,
the developmentof forestpanchayatsput the elite even more firmly
in control.Since the leadershad little to gain by raisingthe masses,
it provedimpossibleto get a forestagitationmoving.l34
Attemptsto get a widerpoliticalresponseby usingthe propaganda
of caste were also doomed. From the I9IOS to the early I930S they
seldomunbalancedthe existingstructureof politics.Indeed, in many
ways they re-inforcedthe power of membersof the rural elite, since
caste movementswere often only the public manifestations of existing
connexionsof kin.'TheReddi in
scare' Anantapur in I 926, for example,
was reallythe attemptof a ChinnarappaReddi-led faction to get rid
of P. KesavaPillaiand to replacehim with a Reddilawyer.l35 Equally,
the activitiesof the Goundersaround Coimbatorein I92I stemmed
132 Whileon the LegislativeGouncil,P. KesavaPillaiwas popularlyknownas 'the
HonourableMemberfor ForestsandJails'.
133 See Report of theForestCommittee, (Madras,I9I3), 2 vols.
134 Appendix totheReportof theIndianFamine Commission,
I898, ofEvidence,
beingMinutes
etc.TFolumeII. MadrasPresidency, p. RI4, PP, I899, Vol. XXXII.
135 p. KesavaPillai to Dr Subbarayon, 5 DecemberI926, P. KesavaPillai Papers,
NMM.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 5o5
fromV. C. VellingiriGounder'seffortsto imposesomedisciplineon the
membersof his castein his 'territory'.l36 Such movementswere never
intendedto broadenthe context of politicalactionor even to providea
permanentseriesof alliancesbetweenmen of importance.Both Reddi
and Goundermovementsrapidlydissolvedas their leadersbegan to
fight each other and to returnto profitablecross-communal alliances.
The caste platformwhich cut acrossthese ties quicklycollapsed.In
SouthArcotin the early I920S, for example,severalyoung Padayachi
lawyersand literatitriedto createa communalconstituencyfor them-
selvesin the Padayachi-dominated taluks.They did not win the support
of any patron who mattered,and, in the I926 LegislativeCouncil
election,their two candidateswere severelybeaten.However,another
Padayachi,who had no contact with them and who stood on 'the
Brahmin'SwarajyaPartyticket,with the backingof severalnotables-
whetherPadayachior not-was returnedtriumphantly.l37
The decentralizationof governmentestablishedthe rural elite in
districtinstitutionsbut it alsostartedto drawthemtowardsthe centres
of provincialgovernment.The British,but much more the native
politicianswho increasinglysharedthe responsibilities of government
with them at the provincial capital, made sure that considerable
powersof patronagein the ruralboardsremainedwith the local self-
governmentdepartmentcontrolledfromMadras.Until I926, virtually
all districtboard presidents,and, until I930, a large numberof the
seatson the boards,werefilledby nominationfromthe capital.In the
Montagu-Chelmsford Councils, the Justice Party Ministry, in the
wordsof its ChiefWhip,'Livedon patronage.'l38 From I92I, the chief
ministerwas always the ministerfor local self-government,and he
kept his ministrysolvent by trading his nominationson the boards
for supportin the MadrasCouncil.l39This gave all districtpoliticians
a close interestin the affairsof the LegislativeCouncil and, until
I937, most memberswere also membersof ruralboards.
In the dry areas,the steady involvementof a powerfulrural elite
in district and provincialpolitics began to have importantconse-
quenceson the socialcompositionof the politicalworld.Whilecontacts
136 The movementdevelopedfromincidentswhich had led to the murderof some
Goundersin a toddyshop brawl.Its most concreteformwas the driveby Vellingiri
Gounderand his henchmento close down all the toddy-shopsin their area. See
C. J. Baker,'PoliticalGhangein South India',pp. 353-4.
137 Ibid.,pp. 24I-2; Hindu,25 lfovember I926.
38 R. V. KrishnaAyyar,In theLegislature of EhoseDays(Madras,I956), p. 45.
139 Indian Statutory Commission.
I930. takenat Madras,Vol. I, sth meeting,
OralEvidence
p. I9.
 140 Hindu, and 24 September and I and 7 October I9I3.

506 DAVID WASHBROOK

with governmentabovehad remainedpersonaland fragmentary,most

importantrural politicianshad found it convenientto work through
intermediaries.They lackedthe education,the socialbackgroundand
the familyconnexionswhich would bring them into close touch with
the top bureaucrats.Membersof the Western-educated classeswere,of
course,only too willing to performthe functionof go-between,which
took them out of the debatingchamberand gave them an income,
social importanceand attachmentto a more real political system.
The relationshipof Kesava Pillai to ChinnarappaReddi was similar
to that of many provincialpoliticiansto their backersbeforeI920. In
Salem and Coimbatoredistricts,for example, the Tamil Brahmin
lawyerB. V. NarasimhaIyer, a LegislativeCouncillorbetween I9I2
and I92I, wascloseto manyoftheprincipalfamiliesamongtheGounder
gentry.In I9I3, he touredthe Coimbatorecountrysideorganizingan
agitationon their behalfagainstthe Coimbatoredistrictboardwhich,
under the control of a Coimbatoretown clique, was swelling its
treasuryby raisingrural taxes.140Equally, in Nellore, the Brahmin
lawyer,A. S. KrishnaRao, sat on the LegislativeCouncilcontinuously
from I9I0 to I926 as the representative
of the interestsof variousReddi
leaders.Indeed,so importantwerehis local supportersthat theJustice
Party had to swallowits communalpride and twice re-nominatethis
Brahminto the presidencyof the Nelloredistrictboard.14lIn the Ceded
districts,A. KaleswaraRao notedthat 'theReddiSirdars'controlledthe
electionsto LegislativeCouncilin I920 but they did not bother to
returnmanyReddis.142
However,the developmentof the boardsmeant that the ruralelite
could no longer leave its affairsto agents. The price of securitywas
constantvigilance, and agents anxious to become principalsmight
turn the new powerin the boardsagainsttheirbackers.Districtboard
politicsalso broughtmembersof the ruralelite into close contactwith
senior governmentofficialsand gave them greater opportunitiesof
influencing important decisions. These trends provided a further
stimulusto education.Before I920, the LegislativeCounciland pro-
vincial politicshad been the domain,almostexclusively,of Western-
educatedlawyers.The era of the Montagu-Chelmsford Councilssaw
the ruralelite move in. At the very first elections,a few of the more

141 rhe Cultof Incompetence,

beingan impartial
enqui?y
intotherecord
of theFirstMadras
Ministry(Madras,I923), pp. 37-9.
142 A. KaleswaraRao, Na jtivitaKatha-J%avya
AndWramu (Rlijayawada,I959), p. 333
(Telugu).
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 5o7
substantialruralmagnateshad been returned.Amongthose members
representingCoimbatorewas V. C. Vellingiri Gounder, who paid
land revenueof Rs 2,000 in villagesin Coimbatoretalukand had bank-
ing interestsin the districtcapital. He was, of course, a prominent
districtand taluk boardmember.NorthArcot electedA. Thangavelu
Naicker,a memberof the wealthiestryotwarilandlordfamilyin the
district.BesideA. S. KrishnaRao of Nellore, sat K. Audinarayana
Reddi, whoseincomewas said to be Rs 40,000 a year from land and
from mica mining.l43All three of these men's families had made
alliancesby marriagewith other leading familiesin their district.l44
Duringthe I920S and I930S prominentpeasantfamiliesincreasingly
tooka handin provincialpolitics.In Kurnool,Cuddapahand Ananta-
pur, for example,which were deep in the territorydominatedby rich
Reddis,only two of the six Councilmemberselectedin I920 actually
were Reddis;l45by I930, all six seats were filled by their men.l46
In SouthArcotin I920, onlyA. SubbarayaluReddiar,of the threemen
elected, might have been said to belong to the dominant peasant
elite, and he, rather ahead of his brethren,was a Western-educated
lawyer;by I930, all threeSouthArcotmemberscamefromthe elite.l47
Similardevelopmentsmay be seen in North Arcot, Trichinopolyand
Salem. The I937 election, on the franchiseextended by the I935
Governmentof India Act, carriedthe processfurther.In SouthArcot
fourof the five seatswent to ruralmagnates;in Coimbatoresix of the
seven; in Anantapurtwo of three;in Cuddapahtwo of two; in South
Arcotfourof five; in Chittoorthreeof four.l48
As the rural elite was drawn closer to the centresof government,
the professionalmiddle-man,who had no importancesavethe expertise
with which he representedthe interestsof others, was progressively
eliminated.In Nellore,for example,no Brahminlawyer emergedto

143 Biographiesof MadrasLegislativeCouncillorsin Reforms(Franchise)B, March

I92I, 34-99, NAI.
144 V. C. VellingiriGounderpossessedmarriageconnexionswith severalof the
pattagar families the religious leaders of the Gounder community. Besides
religiousstatus,the familieswere amongthe richestin the Coimbatore-Salemarea.
A. ThangaveluNaickerwas relatedto the largestlandowningPalli familiesin the
Arcotregionand was the nephewof A. DhanakotiMudaliar,the Arcotand Madras
city contractor.K. AudinarayanaReddiwas creditedwith connexionto many of the
principalReddisof lNellore.
45 Resultsin Reforms(Franchise) B, March I92I, 34-99, 1!TAI.
146 Resultsin Hindu,I0 to 2I SeptemberI930.
147 These were K. M. Dorasami,R. K. VenugopalReddi and K. Ramachandra
Padayachi.
148 For briefbiographiessee Directory (Madras,I938).
of theMadrasLegislature
508 DAVID WASHBROOK

takeoverfromA. S. KrishnaRao.149In Salem,afterNarasimhaIyer's

retirementfrompolitics,the leadershipof district-levelaffairspassedto
a Europeanzemindar,a Devanga merchantand various Gounder
landlords.150
In I926, ChinnarappaReddi switchedhis supportfrom
P. KesavaPillaito a Reddilawyerand KesavaPillailosthis Legislative
Councilseat.15lThe developmentof politicalinstitutionsin the coun-
trysideallowedthe ruraleliteto standon its own.Throughan apparent-
ly endlessseriesof factionalalliancesand confrontations, ruralleaders
establishedtheir own districtempireswhich gave them seats on the
LegislativeCouncil.Securein theirhome-basesfromdisturbancesand
threatsfrombelow,and capableof dealingdirectlywith each otherin
ruralinstitutions,they were the heirsof the economicand administra-
tive developmentsof the late nineteenthand earlytwentiethcenturies.

II

The Kistna and Godaverideltas were very differentareasfrom the

dryregionwe have been examining.Whereasmajorpilgrimagecentres
in the dry districtswerefew and dispersed-notablyTirupati,Madura,
Kalahasti, Srirangam both the Kistna and Godaveri rivers were
consideredsacredto Hindusand attractedlarge numbersof pilgrims.
In the deltasirrigationworkswere centuriesold and had long made
it possibleto cultivate rice commercially.This may have been one
reasonwhy the dominantpeasant castes, particularlythe Kammas,
had broadermarriagepatternsthan in the dry region.152 The wealth
generatedby wet cultivationcould also be seen in the many small
templeswhichdottedthe countryside.Since medievaltimesthe deltas
had been the centreof Teluguculture.Brahminswere morenumerous
here than in the dry regions:5 per cent of the populationcomparedto
about 2 per cent in mostof the dry districts.153Long beforethe British
arrived,the inhabitantsof the deltaswere more mobileand wealthier
149Reddilandowners consistentlytookone districtLegislativeCouncilseat and the
familyof the Venkatagirizemindarsthe other.
lsoNotablyT. Foulkesof the Salemzemindari,S. EllappaChettyand P. Subara-
yon, who ownedthe smallKumaramangalam estate.
151 p. KesavaPillai to Dr Subbarayon5 DecemberI926, P. KesavaPillai Papers,
NMM.
If 2 In I89I, about 40 per cent of the 850ooo people returningthemselvesas
Kammasdid not specifya sub-casteand another35 per cent claimedone particular
sub-caste that found predominantlyin the Kistna area. Censusof India. I 89I .
Madras(Madras,I8g3) Vol. XIII, Part I pp. 237-38.
153Census of India.I88I. Madras(Madras,I883) Vol. II, p. I40.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 5o9

than theirneighboursin the dryzones.SinceBritishruledid not shape

societyanew but rathertended to developits existingcharacteristics,
the differentbasesof economicand socialorganizationin the dry and
wet districtsof Madrasmeantthat the two areasdivergedfurtherunder
the samerule.
Betweenthe I840S and I860S Britishengineersunder Sir Arthur
C:ottonrestoredand greatly extended the irrigationworks on the
Godaveriand Kistnarivers.New channelsbuilt to carrythe waterin-
land broughtaboutone and a halfmillionacresof landunderirrigation
for the first time.154The 'flush'irrigationproducedby the scheme,
whichled to the inundationof the fields,was perfectfor the cultivation
of rice and, by the later nineteenthcentury,the Andhradeltasfed the
upper classes in much of the Presidency.A contemporaryobserver
saw
that the whole countrylooks like a single rice field, the grovesaroundthe
villages,the road avenuesand the white sails of the boatsgliding along the
main canalsbreakingthe uniformsea of waving green crop.l55
Statisticaleccentricities,zemindaries,and the peculiarityof early
settlementsin the deltasmakeit difficultto determinethe changesin
landholdingoccasionedby the extensionof irrigation.By I900, how-
ever, it seems clear that the distributionof wealth from land in the
deltas was significantlydifferentfrom the patternestablishedin the
dry regions.In Godaveridistrict,for example,barely4 per cent of the
ryotwariwet landwasheld in pattaspayinglessthanRs I0 per annum.
The bulkof wet land about62 percent washeldin the middlerange
of pattaspayingbetweenRs 30 and Rs 250.156 Holdingswerestillsmall
in extent mostcultivatorsheld less than eighteenacres but the land
was more productive.Eighteenacresin the dry districtspaid between
Rs 4 andRs 30 a yearin revenue;eighteenacresin thewet areaspaidon
averageRs I00 a year.By convertingdry, or at best mixed,cultivating
villages,into part of a huge complexof wet cultivation,the British
irrigationworkshad, within a few decades, created a large class of
prosperouspeasantfarmers.
Sincethe deltasspecializedin riceto the exclusionof almostall other
crops,they developedtheir own distinctivetradingpatterns.Most of
154 A. V. Raman Rao, Economic Development of AndEra Pradesh (I766I957) (Bombay,
I958), pp. 86-go.
155 Quoted in 0. H. K. Spate, India and Pakistan. A General and Regional Geography
(London, I 954), p. 690.
15C These figures calculated from 'Statement of the Rent-Roll' in Land Revenue
Reports for Fasli I3IO (I900-OI).
5IO DAVID WASHBROOK

the local crop had to be exported,and everythingelse had to be im-

portedin return.157 Thisgreatlyexpandedtradewasfurtherfacilitated
by excellentinternalcommunicationsby track, rail and water. The
rail-headsarld ports grew quickly in responseto the rising volume
of trade passingthroughthem.158Marketingoperationscentredon a
few townswhich servedwide areas,includingtheir neighbouringdry
taluks.In contrastto Coimbatoreand Salem which in I929 had I34
and I I2 licensedmarketsrespectively,the whole of Gunturhad only
SiX. 159
The thrivingcommerceof the area meant that urban merchants
were active in developingrural trade. Komati merchantsexpanded
their family-basedgrain and moneylendingnetworksdeep into the
countrysideas they handledever largerquantitiesof goods. Marwaris
and Multanisflockedto the deltas.Rice was in such high demandin
the restof the presidencyand elsewhere,and riceland so valuable,that
they buried their scruplesand risked their capital in rural money-
lendingand graindealing.160
The delta ryot,himself,tookfull advantageof thesedevelopments.16l
His positionas medium-sizedlandowner,with irrigationto free him
fromthe vagariesof the weather,meantthat he was seldompressedby
the governmentrevenue demand into selling his crop cheaply at
harvesttime. He may have been in debt probablyrupeefor rupeehe
was morein debt than the averagedry cultivator but the characterof
indebtednessin the deltaswasverydiffierent fromthatin the dryregion.
The opening up of commerceprovidedthe delta ryot with a multi-
plicityof sourcesof credit:the agentsof urbanmerchants,innumerable
ryots in his own village and even town banks supplied his needs.
From I904, Co-operativeCredit Societies grew rapidly and with
conspicuoussuccess.162 Securityfor loans was not a seriousproblem.

157 Royal Commission on Agriculture in India. Appendix, Vol. XIV, p. 270.

158 A. V. Raman Rao, Economic Development of AndEra Pradesh (I76SI957), pp. 25I-
54. The market towns of the delta area were among the fastest growing in the presi-
dency. See Census of India. I92I. (Madras, I922), Vol. XIII, Part 2, pp. 8-I2. Census
of India. I93I (Madras, I933), Vol. XIV, Part 2, pp. IOI6. lf9 RPBC, p. I I9.
160 RPBC, pp. 2I9-20; MPBC, Vol. III, pp. 740-3, I I46.
161 Rich delta ryots were, of course, as much involved in credit and trade in their
own right as wealthy ryots in the dry districts. MPBC, Vol. III, p. 743.
162 In the Godaveri delta villages investigated by the Banking Commission, co-
operative credit loans accounted for about one-third of all admitted loans. This was
far higher than the average of dry district villages investigated. MPBC, Vol. V, pp.
86-255. Commercial expansion in the I920S stimulated the development of several
joint-stock banks, such as the Andhra Bank, and land banks, such as that started by
the raja of Pithapuram.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 5I I

The value of his crop guaranteedhim a large and regular annual

turnoverso that he was unlikelyto becomebondedby the accumula-
tion of debt to any one creditor.Most delta ryotstook a hand in the
market.Manycartedor sailedtheirown produceto the townsand sold
it directlyto the exportmerchants.l63As it was easierto exporthusked
and boiled paddy, rice mills shot -upin many of the largervillages-
oftenbuiltwith the capitalof local ryots.Thesemills,of course,bought
locally,but they had to buy on differenttermsfromthosewho bought
grainin the Cededdistricts.They had to competein a relativelyopen
marketwith many otherbuyersand they could not hope for annually
glutted marketsor a successionof bad seasonsto drive peasantsinto
dependenceon them. If their rateswere not close to those offeredin
the maintowns,theirmillswouldgrindto a halt. The Royal Commis-
sionon Agriculturesummarisedthe contrastbetweenthe delta and the
dry areasthus:
It is the cultivator'schronicshortageof money that has allowed the inter-
mediaryin the dry areasto achievethe prominentpositionhe now occupies.
Wherethe cultivatorsare tolerablywell-oS, as in the Kistna and Godaveri
deltas,his positionis not by any meansso strong.There,the ryot,once he has
paid his land revenue (kist)keepsa steady eye on the pricesprevailingfor
rice importedfrom Burma,and is in no haste to come to terms with the
agent or buyer if the terms do not suit him. The ultimate marketfor his
produce(Madrascity and the inland districtsof Coimbatoreand Salem) is
close at hand; he sellshis huskedrice to local mill-ownerswho hull it before
passingit on and who are at least as much concernedto keep their mills
workingas they are to beat down prices.l64
Rice grownfor the marketintegratedthe economyof the deltas area
and broughttheirpeasantpopulationsinto closemarketrelationswith
the towns.
Sincetherewasso muchmorecontactbetweentownandcountryside,
the effectsof theirinteractionwentfurtherin the deltasthanin the dry
zone. The marriagelinksbetweenvariousKammasub-castesbeganto
leap the boundariesof sub-castesthemselves.l65 Prosperousdelta ryots
beganto imitateurbanwaysin theirvillages.Bricksreplacedmud, and
tiles thatchin respectablehouses;l66traditionalstatusdeferenceswere
abandoned;l67 peasantsbecameincreasinglyinvolvedin the religious
l63RpBC, p. I06.
164 onAgriculture
RoyalCommission Vol. XIV, pp. 268-9.
znIndia.ASpendix,
16S See CarolynM. Elliot, 'Caste and Faction among the Dominant Gaste: the
Reddisand Kammasof Andhra?in R. Kothari(ed.), Castein IndianPolitics,pp. I29-
7I .
66 A. V. RamanRao, Economic
Development Pradesh(I76SI957),
of Andhra p. I92.
167 MPBC,Vol. III, p. 744.
5I2 DAVID WASHBROOK

and culturalrevivalismof the towns; the more adventurousvillage

familiessent theirsonsto the towns,and by sub-lettingtheir holdings,
they sometimesmovedtherethemselves.l6s
Significantdevelopmentsalsotookplacein litigationand education.
From the I 880S, 'litigation [was] developing with extraordinary
rapidity'in the superiorcourtson the deltas.l69Of course,a simple
risein litigationdoesnot tell us much.Wherevertherewerezemindaris
there was bound to be litigation.The courtsof Ramnad and North
Malabarwere filled with cases, althoughboth areas were extremely
primitive.The zemindarsof Kistna and Godvarialso kept the courts
busy,andtheirdeltadistrictsstoodnearthe top of the litigationleague.l70
But some of the rise was becausethe new courtswere attractiveto
peasants.The Collectorof Gunturcomplainedthat his courts were
clogged with extraordinarilyintricate village factional disputes.l7l
Throughoutour period,the slowestcourtsin completingcasesin the
whole provincewere those on the delta. In I890, for example, the
averagetime betweenfilingand obtainingjudgmentin a suitbeforethe
Ellore districtmunsiffwas 549 days; while his neighbourat Rajah-
mundry took 435 days.l72Both of these were twice the presidency
average.The main rivalsof Ellore and Rajahmundryfor the title of
most arduouspostingin the Madrasjudicialservicewere the courtsat
Guntur, Bezwada and Masulipatam.It was not that these courts
handledsignificantlymore cases than othersin zemindariareas, but
that the cases themselveswere not the block filings of a zemindar,
which could be sortedout by a singlejudgment.A great many cases
were individuallitigationsand were contestedeveryinch of the way.
The last decadesof the nineteenthcenturyalso saw a risein literacy
in the delta districts.In general, the Northern Circarswere more
backwardin educationthan were the southerndistrictsof the Presi-
dency, having neither the great cities of Madras, Trichinopolyor
LandRevenue
168 Reports
for Fasli I3I5 (I905-06), p. 72.
The commentparticularlyreferredto the districtmunsiis' courtsat Bezwada
169
and Masulipatam.Report ontheAdministration ofCiviljtusticein thePresidency
of Madrasin
I 890 (Madras,I 89I ), p. I 4.
170 In I890, for example,the zemindarof Telaprole,in Kistna, alone filed 2382
cases.Ibid.,p. I5. Kistna,Godaveriand, after I9O5, Gunturwere usuallyin the top
half dozendistrictsin the presidencyfor the numberof casesfiled in ratio to popula-
tion. See Reports ontheAdministration of Civiljtusticein thePresidency of Madras(annual
series).
171 Statistics
ofCriminal
CourtsintheMadrasP:residencyfor theyearI9I5 (Madras,I9I6),
p. 2.
172 Report
ontheAdministration
of Civiljtusticein thePresidency
of Madrasin theyearI900
(Madras,I 9O I ), p. 5.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 5I3

Madura,nor the great concentrationof religioustraditionsin a few

ancienttempletowns. However,between I89I and I93I, the literacy
rate in Kistna and Godaveridistrictsrose fasterthan anywhereelse.
Muchof thisdevelopmentwasin the vernacularsandtookplaceamong
the main peasant castes-the Kammas and Kapus.l73It was not
confinedto the towns.In I908, for example,the C:ollector of Godaveri
was horriSedto discover'seditious'vernacular newspapers circulating
in many delta villages.Their readerswere not only Brahmins-whom
he consideredto be beyondthe pale -butalso peasantlandholders.l74
By I929 the BankingInquiryfound a male literacyrate of between
I5 and go per cent in the villages of Ramachandrapuram taluk in
Godaveridistrict.This village rate compareswith a I93I averageof
only 2 I per centfor the wholePresidency,includingthe towns,Madras
city (52 per cent), and the advanceddistrictsof Tanjoreand Malabar
(morethan 30 per cent).l75
Religiousand cultural revivalismin the later nineteenthcentury
showsthe extent to which the delta countrysidehad been integrated
with the towns.One of the mostfamousvernaculardramaticsocietiesn
the RajahmundryHindu Theatrical Company, Enanced by local
landholders,performedin all the leadingAndhratowns,and it toured
the larger villages.l76Religious agitation moved from peasants to
townsmen.Duringthe muhurramof I884, for example,a small army
gatheredin Gudur,a villagenearMasulipatamn and marchedthrough
the countrysidepickingup support.'The movementwas not headedby
any chiefand was madefromvillageto villagewith a flag bearingthe
imprintof an idol Anjamar'.It convergedon Masulipatamand caus'ed
a riotoutsidethe mainmosque.l77 In the dry areas,thissortof religious
violencewasvirtuallyunknownin the countryside,althoughtherewere
occasionaloutbreaksamongweaving-communities in the towns.
In the deltasthe trafflcbetweentownand countrymovedbothways.
Vernacularnewspapers,whichdealt mostlywith religiousand cultural
mattersnwere publishedin the towns but read over a wide area.l7s
173 Censusof India.I93I (Madras,I933), Vol. XIAI,Part I, p. 283, ibid.,Part 2,
pp. 2767.
174 M. Alenkatarangaiya, EheFreedomStruggleinAndWra (Hyderabad,
(AndEra)
Pradesh
x968),Alol.II, pp. 266-76.
75 MPBC,Vol. 51,pp. 86-255; Census of India.I93I, Vol. XIV, Part 2, p. 283.
of theMadrasPresidency
176 V. L. Sastri (ed.), Encyclo,baedis andtheAdjacent States
(Cocanada,I 920) p. 50I.
77 Madras PoliceI88+, p. 7.
178The delta towns easily led the Madrasmofussilin the size and scope of their
vernacularjournalisticactivity.By I925, for example,Rajahmundryhad at least
5 daily or weeklyvernacularnewspaperswith a combinedcirculationestimated.at
N
5I4 D AV I D WA S H B R O O K

Anotherconnexionwasprovidedby urbangroupssuchas the Komatis,

whohad manyagentsin the villages.Not onlydid theybeginto exercisc
a tightercontroloverruraltradethroughChambersof Commerceand
joint-stockcompanies,l79 but they also spent money on templesdedi-
catedto theircastesaint,KanyakiParameswami, whichservedas focal
pointsfor the community.Komatisin the villagescame back to the
townsfor religiousfestivalsand to lay claim to a shareof communal
funds.i80Their strong connexionscan be seen in the cow-protection
movement,in which many of the principalfamiliesin the delta towns
and villageswereinvolved.l8l
Mostof the problemsof governmentfacedby the Britishin the delta
districtssprangfromthe failureof their administrativesystemto take
account of the social changespromotedby economic development.
In the first decadesof the nineteenthcentury,when the differences
betweenthis area and the dry region had been less remarkable,the
delta ryotwaritractshad been settledon a uniformplan. Partsof the
deltashad originallybeen settledunderzemindars,but many of these
had collapsed by I 850. From the I 870s the Madras government
deliberatelyattemptedto makethe wet districtsconformmore to the
generalryotwaripattern.Zemindarivillage officersbecametied more
closely to the tahsildarand the police superintendentthan to their
landlord,and they were paid froma government-administered cess.l82
4,700; Masulipatammaintainedat least 5 with a circulationof 8,ooo; and Ellore at
least 3 with a circulationof about 2,000. Governmentof India, Home Political,File
26I of I926, NAI.
179 See, for example,the reporton the foundationof the GunturCotton,Paperand
Jute Mills Company,which involvedthe Lingamalee,Pydah and Majeti families,
in Hindu,I3 SeptemberI904. A GunturChamberof Commerce,consistingalmost
entirelyof Komatis,was foundedin about I9I I to regulatedistrictcommerce.See
Hindu,29 January I 9 I 3.
1soFor a descriptionof the expansionof Komati religiousand communalactivity
see the petitionsof KomatisfromvariousAndhratownsagainstthe HinduReligious
EndowmentsAct of I926 in G.O. 3666 (Local and Municipal)dated 8 September
I928. StateArchives,Hyderabad.From I907, a Komaticaste conferencedeveloped
fromGuntur.
181 Reportof the Directorof CriminalIntelligence,g April I9I0, Home PoliticalB,
June I9I0, I7-25, NAI; also G.O. 2I6 (Local and Municipal,Municipal)dated
3 FebruaryI9I4, TNA.
182 These developments, which were the resultof administrativeactivity,received
legislativeratificationunder the ZemindariVillage Officers'ServicesActs of I894
and I895. For discussionsof the ways in which governmenthad underminedthe
zemindars'authorityin their estatessee G.O. 35I (Revenue)dated 3 March I925;
G.O. 875 (Revenue)dated I2June I925, T1NA.The presenceof zemindars,of course,
influencedthe socialand politicallife of the localitiesin whichtheylived. Zemindars
both drewand spenta largeincome,which gave them many dependents.However,
our main concernis the peasantryand therewas as little differencein administrative
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 5I5

In the laternineteenthcentury,Britishadministrative practicefollowed

preciselythe same coursein the deltasas elsewhere.Village establish-
ments were given greater powers: they managed the income tax,
police,government-backed creditschemes,and villageunions.Yet the
whole edificeof governmentwas being built on shiftingfoundations.
For an administrativesystembasedon the village to workwell, the
village itselfmust be an importantand coherentsocial unit. By I900,
in the deltas,this was no longerthe case. So many ruralpeople were
involvedin educational,marketingand legal adventuresin the district
towns that their society would be better characterizedas an urban
hinterlandthan as one of a collectionof separatevillages.Further,the
great mobilityof the labouringpopulationunderminedthe autonomy
of the village community.In the dry region, most villageshad more
labourthan was necessaryfor their own needs, but in the deltas rice
cultivationdemandedtwice in the year many morehandsthan were
locally available.At transplantationand harvest, thousandsof day
labourersfrom the upland taluks and Ganjam and Vizagapatam
districtspouredinto the delta and settledfor a few weeksin campson
the outskirtsof the villages.Theywereusuallypaidin cashandreturned
home as soon as their work was done.l83Their bi-annualinflux des-
troyedthe cohesionof the delta village.
The Madrasgovernment'smodel of village governmentdepended
on the existenceof villageleaderswho could rule. In the delta villages
such leaderswere hard to find. (:ertainly,there were some ryotswho
weremuch richerthan others,and manyof them werevillageofficers.
But they did not controlthe tradeand moneylendingof theirlocalities
to the same extent as the village Reddis of the Ceded districtsand
Gounderheadmenof (:oimbatoreand Salem. Town courtsundercut
theirpowersof arbitrationin local disputes.Theircontroloverrevenue
paymentswas restrictedby the ease with which othersin the village
couldcall in urbanlawyersand officers.They couldnot overawetheir
highly mobile subjectswho could alwayssummonthe outsideworld
into battleagainstthem. In the deltavillagestherewas no entrenched,
dominant,and unassailablepeasantelite.
Fromthe laternineteenthcentury,socialand politicalcontrolin the
deltaswas breakingdown, and in the twentiethcenturyit often col-
lapsed.The village police could not maintainorder.There was more
crimein the Kistua and Godaveridistrictsthan anywhereelse in the
organizationas in economicorganizationbetweenryotwariand zemindaripeasants.
Indeed,many zemindarivillageofficersjoined the rent-strikeagainstgovernmentin
I92I-22. on Agriculturein India, Vol. ITIvp. 3I6.
183RoyalCommission
5I6 DAVID WASHBROOK

Presidency.But this crimewas not the organizedmurderand looting

thrownup by the factionalismof the dry districts,but petty theft and
housebreaking whichwere the productof socialinstability.l84Eventhe
revenue administration the centre of the entire British system-
threatenedto come to a standstill.Faced with large numbersof rich
and independentpeasantsin his village, the village officerhad to rely
moreon consensusthan forceto collecthis revenue.Of coursehe had
Leviathanbehindhim, but the districtcourtswerefar fromthe village
and expropriationtook time. If the Britishhad had to use force to
collect the land revenue,then their governmentin India would have
beenimpossible.In the dryregion,the authorityof the villageestablish-
ment guaranteedthe smoothrunningof jamabundi.The decisionto
pay was taken and enforcedby the elite. The delta village establish-
ment, however,had to be more circumspector it wouldface vigorous
opposition. During the civil disobediencemovement, many delta
peasantsrefusedto pay, and, in manyplaces,the flowof revenuedried
up. The villageofficerswerenot behindthis: in manyvillages'the rich
ryots'simplyorderedthem to stay collections.When the government
tried to punishthe establishmentsof defaultingvillages,it found that
many village officershad been swept away on a tide they could not
contrOl.l85
In the dry region, Fort St George's effiortsto control its village
agentshad succeededmerelyin irritatingthem. In the deltasthey had
more seriousconsequences.Here the leadershipof the village official
was alreadyunderpressurefromthe peoplebelowand the interference
of governmentfrom above weakenedit further.In the dry regions,
government'sinroadson the power and patronageof its overmighty
servantsonly clippeda fractionof the authorityof the Reddi and the
Gounder;but in the deltas they knockedaway the few remaining
propson whichthe villageofficerleant. By the earlytwentiethcentury,
many officersfelt that therewas little point in continuingto wear the
hollowcrownsof authority.Many men with long traditionsof govern-
ment service, finding more attractive opportunitiesopen to them
elsewhere,resignedor sold their posts. The Brahminfamily of A.
KaleswaraRao, for example, auctionedits kurnamshipin a village
near Bezwadaand moved permanentlyinto the town.l86At a lower
184 See MadrasPolicefor I87>I925. G.O. 639 (Public)dated 5 June I93I, TNA.
185 G.O. 938 (Public) dated II SeptemberI93I; G.O. 939 (Public) dated II
SeptemberI93I; G.O. 980 (Public)dated 2I SeptemberI93I; G.O. I075 (Public)
dated 20 OctoberI93I, TNA.
186A. KaleswaraRao, Na jtivitaKatha-Navya Andhramu(Vijayawada,I959), p. I9,
(Telugu).
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 5 I 7
level, the Collectorof Kistna noticed many petty village servants
quittingto workas labourersin the rice fields,wherethey could earn
moremoney.187 In the dry areas,by contrast,men were still willingto
pay Rs s,ooo forjust such petty officeswhich carriedstipendsof only
Rs 4 per month.l88Those who clung to officevigorouslyopposedall
the government'schanges.Between I 907 and I 9 I 4 Curzon'sdeputy
policeinspectorsweremostseriouslyobstructedin the delta districts.l89
By the time of the First World War, even the revenue department
founditselfin trouble.The Collectorof Kistnareportedin I9I4
My taluk officersinformme that they find constantrecurringdifficultiesin
getting their ordinaryrevenlledutiesdone by the village servants.Resigna-
tions are very common, temporaryabsencefrom duty of regularmonthly
occurrenceand wholesalestrikesare by no meansunusual.190
Paradoxicallyperhaps,the very linkagesbetweentown and village,
which had contributedso much to the decay of village government,
providedirate officialswith a powerfulmeansof makingtheir griev-
ances known to government.When they learnt that government
intended to end their hereditaryrights, village officers organized
associationafter association;they held regulartaluk and Erkacon-
ferencesand publishednewspapersto publicizetheir cause.19lHome
Rule Leaguersand Congressmen fromthe townsplayeda largepartin
these organizations,seeing a chance of winning a following.As the
power of village officerswaned, their protest grew more violent.
Finallyit spilledoverinto Gandhi'snon-cooperationmovementwith an
officer-ledrent strikein severalpartsof Guntur,Kistnaand Godaveri
districts.192 The government fairly easily broke the move-
PoliceI9I3,
187Madras Appendix,p. 9.
188See commentsof rajaof Ramnadin Government of Irldia,HomeJudicial Files
I-2 of I922, NAI.
MadrasPoliceI9I3, Appendix,
189G.O. I675 (Judicial)datedI8 AugustI9I3, T1!TA;
p. g; ibid.,I9I4 AppendixD, p. 72; ibid.,I9I9, AppendixE, p. 68.
lsoMadrasPoliceI9I3, Appendix,p. 9. See also reportof a LegislativeCouncil
debateon villageofficerresignationsin Hindu,3 FebruaryI9I5.
191ForreportsorlvariousvillageofficerassociationmeetingsseeHindu,I 2 November
I920; and AndArapatrika, 4 February I9I9 and 7 September I920; DesabAimani,
8 January I9I9; Gramapulana, I0 SeptemberI92 I, in ReportsontheJativePressin the
MadrasPresidency, IOL.
192The most famousof the strikeswas in Pedanannipadfirkaof Gunturdistrict,
which was not, strictlyspeaking,in the deltas.However,most of the originaldrive
for a strikehad come from delta villages. As early as August I920, for example,
villageofficersin NortherndeltaicGunturhad beguntheirown strike.AndArapatrika,
7 SeptemberI920 in Reports ontheJativePressin theMadrasPresidency, IOL. And in
DecemberI 92 I, the AndhraDesaVillageOfficers'Associationhad calledforresigna-
tionsat Rajahmundryand had obtainedthemfromabouthalf the officersin thiswet
5I8 DAVID WASHBROOK

ment,193but the campaignshowed,by the desperationof the village

officials,how meaninglessthe village had becomeas the basic unit on
whichthe administration was supposedto rest.
The patternof publicpoliticsshownin the non-cooperation campaign
wasnothingnew in the area.The easeof communication,the existence
of obviouscentresfor organization,and, aboveall, the largenumberof
wealthypeople in the countryside,made it possibleto develop, and,
for the government, impossible to prevent, widespread popular
participationin politicalmovements.Whereaswe sawthatthe challenge
of the forest departmentin the dry areas producedlittle organized
protest,the challengeof the Public WorksDepartmentin the deltas
was met with widespreadpopular resistance.The Public Works
Departmentcontrolledthe flow of piped water to many Selds, and
PWD men were said to be totally corruptand to extort money by
threateningto witholdwatersupplies.Of course,delta ryotspaid the
bribesand, on N. G. Ranga'stestimony,exchangedthreatforthreat,194
but no small all-powerfulelite existed with a vested interestin the
system.Anti-PWDprotestbecame a popularpastime. Urban-based
stumporatorsneverwantedan audiencewhentheyslangedthe PWD.195
At everyLegislativeCouncilelectionfrom I892n prospectivecandidates
had to make village pilgrimagesto demonstratetheir hatred of the
PWD.196 The earliestdistrict conferencesin Madras were those of
Kistna (I892) and Godaveri(I895). They drew a large supportfrom
peasantsand were often held in large villages.197During the First
WorldWar, anti-PWDagitationspreadthroughthe deltaseven faster
than the village officers'campaign.Dozensof small taluk conferences
were held, newspapers such as N. G. Ranga's Ryotpatrikawere
taluk. The Andhra Congress,which was wary of associatingitself with such an
obviouslydangerousmovement,held back from the village officers'eampaignfor
sixteenmonths.Finally,in JanuaryI922, it was foreedto join in orderto keepup its
politicalcredibility.It organizedthe strikein Pedanandipad,whichwas immediately
adjacentto Gunturtown,the AndhraPCCheadquarters, with the help of P. Virawa
Choudhari,a Kammawith closevillageofficerconnexionsin Pedanandipadas wel]
as politicalties with Gunturtown. The PedanandipadaSair was probablythe least
spontaneousalthoughthe mostcelebratedof all the strikes.See M. Venkatarangaiya,
TheFreedom Struggle
in Andhra Pradesh(AndAra), Vol. III, pp. 43, 244, 250-308; also
K. Venkatappayya, SviyaCaritra (Vijayawada,I952), Vol. I, pp. 226-30I (Telugu).
193 'Collector'sReportaboutthe Situationin Guntur-s', in M. Venkatarangaiya,
TheFreedom Struggle
in AndAra Pradesh(Andhra), Vol. III, p. 305.
94 N. G. Ranga,FightForFreedom (New Delhi, I968), pp. 8-9.
195 See, for example,the meetingof ryotsat Ellorein I894, addressed by S. Bhima-
sankaraRao, Rajahmundrymuncipalchairman.Hindu,I2 OctoberI894.
96 Hindu,4 OctoberI 894.
97 Hindu,I 7 April and 5, 6, I I, I2. I5 June I896.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I S8O TO I 930 5I9

founded, and permanentorganizationswere set up.198The political

cultureof the delta districtswas markedlydiSerentto that anywhere
else in Madras.
The Britishdevelopedtheir rural administration-throughdistrict
and talukboardsand villageunions-in preciselythe sameway in the
delta districtsas elsewhere.And therecan be little doubt that here, as
elsewhere,these institutionsattaineda paramountsignificancein the
determinationof local political positions, and contributedto t.he
linking of districtto provincialpolitical arenas. Clearly, there were
likely to be considerabledifferences,betweenthe deltas and the dry
districts,in the ways in which rural boardspoliticsoperated.In the
deltas, the franchiseextendedto a largerproportionof a population
which itself was more independentand possessedmany more oppor-
tunitiesfor establishingotherkindsof politicalassociations.Of course,
thereweremenin the deltaswho had greatwealth,andwho held many
of the strandsof personalpowerwhich went into the makingof rural
magnates;and it wouldbe impossibleto denythat factionwas the most
usual political structurein the area. Yet the battlefieldon which
factionsmet wasof greatersize and the armiesinvolvedverynumerous.
NQ politiciancould affordsimply to sit on his personaldependency
networkand make secret treatieswith allies. He had to use public
techniquesand to raiseissuesand causesin orderto focuson him the
attentionof the considerable'floating',or at least not directly tied,
vote. In I920, for example, M. VenkataratnamNaidu, a long-term
opponentof the Godaveridistrictboardpresident,D. SeshagiriRao,
attemptedto split the board and undercutthe president'smajority
by introducingthe non-Brahminissue into its deliberations.199 No
dry area districtboardpaid the slightestattentionto such mattersof
publicconscience.At aboutthe sametime, P. C. N. EthirajuluNaidu,
the Gunturdistrictboardpresident,foundthat his enemieswereraising
a publicoutcryagainsthimon the groundthat he was 'a foreigner'--he
came from the neighbouringdistrictof Nellore.200 During periodsof
nationalistagitation,manydistrictboardpoliticiansfoundit expedient
to identify with the Congressmovement, and several rural boards
passed funds to Congress-inspirednational education colleges.
198For the :Ryots'CentralAssociation,Guntur,see Hindu,I7 SeptemberI9I8;
taluk conferencesat :Razoleand Amalapuram,Hindtl,27 DecemberI9I8; Bezwada
Ryots' ConferenceHindu,I7 FebruaryI9I9. 199Hindfu, 7 May I920.
200 G.O. 776 (Local and Municipal,Local) dated 2I June I9I9> TNA; also K.
Kotilingamto P. S. SivaswamiIyer, n.d. but probablyin the springof I9I9, P. S.
SivaswamiIyer Papers,NAI
201 G.O. 2 I I (Localand Municipal,Local)dated I 5 FebruaryI 9 I 9, TNA. In I 92 I,
520 DARtID WASHBROOK

Indeed, some cruciallyimportantrural district politicians,such as

DanduNarayanaRajuand MagantiSitayya,bothof whomcamefrom
very rich west Godaverifamilies,openlyidentifiedwith the nationalist
movement,and soughtto capitalizeon theirassociationat ruralboard
and LegislativeCouncil electionsthroughoutthe Ig20s.202It is not
surprisingthat in I920 the only LegislativeCouncil candidateswho
thoughtit necessaryto issuemanifestosand to campaignfrom public
platforms,were thosewho stoodin the delta districts.203
The vigourof ruralboardpoliticscan be seen in the very different
historyof emotive 'caste'politics in the region. The 'Kammascare'
which beset Gunturin the mid-Ig20s,unlikethe Reddi scareof I926
and the earlyGounderagitation,wassomethingof a publicmovement.
0f course,it did not appearspontaneouslyand it waspartof a factional
strugglebetweenelite politicians.But, throughthe use of the pressand
publicplatform,it managedto recruitpreviouslyuncommittedsupport
to a casteflag and it achievedgreatlocal significance.In north-eastern
Guntur,a richgroupof Kammafamilies,findingitselflockedout of the
districtboardby a cross-communal clique (whichincludedsomeKam-
mas) based on Guntur town, mobilized behind it membersof its
'dominantcaste'. The group won over severalindependentlyconsti-
tuted Kamma taluk board factions in other parts of the district.
A venomouspublicitycampaign,whichspawnedassociationsandnews-
papers,attendedits effiorts,
in partsuccessful,to win LegislativeCouncil
seats. Finally, it contrivedto upset the prevailingpattern of district
alliancesand to seize the districtboardpresidency.204 For six or seven
years, the movementdemonstratedthe unusualpower of emotional
appealsin delta districtpolitics.And when it brokeup shortlyafter
the district board presidencyhad been won-its membersdid not
desertthe public platformand shut themselvesaway in sealedrooms,

the Gunturtalukboardprotestedat the arrestof non-co-operators. G.O. 873 (Public)

dated I 8 NovemberI 92 I, TNA.
202 C. J. Baker,'PoliticalChangein South India I9I9-I937f, pp. 2 I4-36.
203 This producedanalysesof the programmes put forwardby the variousparties
and candidates.See P. GovindarowNaidu, 7Che LegislativeCouncil
Elections.(Rajah-
mundry,I920).
204 The groupof familieswasbasedaroundNidabroluin Bapatlatalukand was led
by P. V. KrishniahChoudhary,his relativeN. G. Ranga, andJ. Kuppuswamiwho
was one of the richestryotwarilandlordsin the district,payingoverRs 8,ooo a year
in land revenue.They linked up with Kamma-basedfactionsin the Gunturand
Tenali taluk boards and overthrewP. C. N. EthirajuluNaidu's district board
presidencyin I929. P. V. KrishniahChoudharyand J. Kuppuswamialso became
LegislativeCouncillors.See C.J. Baker,'PoliticalChangein SouthIndia I9I9-I937'>
pp. I96-2I3.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 93° 52I

as the Reddi and Gounderelites had done. Rather, they split up to

follownew and potentiallymoreprofitablelines of agitationalpolitics.
The north easternGunturfamilies,for example, became prominent
in the anti-zemindaricampaign.205 Although this requiredthem to
reshuffletheiralliancesin typicalelite fashion(theynowhad to appeal
to peasants other than Kammas to work against zemindarswho
includedKammas),they still had to appealfor supportto 'the mass'
of delta districtvoters.206 In spite of their great influence,their politi-
cal ascendancywas neversure.
Yet if delta districtboardpoliticianshad to start haresin orderto
attractpublicity,they also had to chasethe haresstartedby othersin
order to keep it. Caste, religious,class and culturalmovementsand
protestsagainst the administrationwere capable of developing an
existencequite separatefrom the formalinstitutionsof local politics.
The men who organizedthemcouldgain popularsupporteventhough
they held no majoroffice. The loss of a districtboard seat was not
politicaldeathin the deltasas it wasso oftenin the dry region.Indeed,
in the delta districtsthe leadersof these independentmovementsoften
influencedaffairsin the formalinstitutionsin which they did not sit.
For example,the Bezwadalawyer,A. KaleswaraRao, was involvedin
the Andhra movement,the National Educationmovement,various
vernacularand religiousassociationsand countlessotherundertakings.
Between I9I6 and I922, he was active in ryot and village officer
protest.He was a successfullawyer,his familyhad importantvillage
connexionsandhe workedforthe Komatisof Bezwadatown.In I 922 he
led a campaignwhich put his Komatibackersinto powerin the Bez-
wada municipality.207 At the same time, he acted as brokerbetween
the many factionsin Kistna districtpolitics.In I926, he successfully
challengedthe powerfulzemindarof Mirzapuramat the Legislative
205 This wasparticularly1X.G. Ranga'sagitation.See his 7Che Modern IndianPeasant
(Madras, I936); Economic Conditionsof the gemindari Ryots(Madras, I933); Revolu-
tionary Peasants(lNewDelhi, I949). It is of interestthat, until about I930, he and his
politicalgroupin Guntur,had lookedto the favourof the zemindar-based Justice
Partyin provincialpolitics.
206 This was more of a breakthan it may sound.The Kammamovementhad hit
particularly-hard at the Telaga caste, of which P. C. N. EthirajuluNaidu was a
member.lfow the Kammaleadershad to try to win the allegianceof Telagaswho
were an importantgroupin the agriculturalcommunity.
207 A. KaleswaraRao, SNa jtivitaKatha-;Navya Andhramu (Vijayawada,I959), pp.
29I-360 (Telugu);G.0. 9I9 (Localand Municipal,Municipal)dated24 May Ig2I;
G.0. 945 (Localand Municipal,Municipal)dated 30 May Ig2I; G.0. I67 (Local
and Municipal,Municipal)dated24JanuaryIg22;G.0.2322 (Localand Municipal,
Municipal)dated27 NovemberIg22, StateArchives,Hyderabad;Hindu,gJune and
5 DecemberIg22.
522 DAVID WASHBROOK

Council elections, and later, in company with the peasant leader,

M. Pallamraju,he helpedto breakthe zemindar'sinfluenceby dividing
the Kistna districtboard.208 His local authoritynever dependedon
office-holding,for apart from two short terms as Bezwadamunicipal
chairman,he neverheld any local positions.
Similarly,Konda Venkatappayya? a Brahrninlawyerfrom Guntur
town, had a considerablerural following.Like KaleswaraRao, his
urban-backingcame from rich Komatis.With severalother Brahmin
lawyers,he foundedschoolsand organizedreligiousfestivalson their
behalf. In I9I7 he-and the municipal chairman,N. Hanumantha
Rao,209 bothof whomwere deeplyinvolvedin the Home Rule League,
helped to fomenta riot betweenthe Komatisand the local Muslims.
When the police came out oiltOthe streets,the two of them led 'the
Hindu party'againstthem and won great reputations.They filledthe
Home Rule coffiersfrom the flood of donationswhich follosved.2l0
Equally,Venkatappayyahadcontactswithseveralof the richerKamma
familiesin the environsof Gunturtown.2llAlthoughVenkatappayya's
hopesof ruralboarddominanceweredestroyedby the favoursheaped
by governmenton his major rival (the tobacco-merchantP. C. N.
EthirajuluNaidu, who was presidentof the taluk and districtboards
and chairmanof the municipality),Venkatappayya'srural influence
showedup in the non-cooperation campaign:the Kamnlaheadmenof
Pedanandipad+rerelinkedto Gunturtown and Venkatappayya,while
Britishinvestigatorsnoted the presenceof private armies of village
Komatiswho were 'centrallydirected'to preventdefectionsfrom the
rent-strike.2l2
The politicalelites of the delta districtswere diXerentlycomposed
fromthoseof the dry region.The peasanttake-overof districtlevelsor
politicswas not as completeas it was in the dry zone. Certainly,from
208 A. KaleswaraRao, Naivita Katha-Navya AndAramu,
pp. 434-60.
209 . HanumanthaRao alsoplayeda largepartin the organizationof the Komati-
supportedcow protectionmovement.G.O. 2I6 (Localand Municipal,Municipal)
dated 3 BebruaryI9I4, TNA.
210 See letters of E. A. Davis, Collectorof Guntur, and S. V. Narasirnhachari,
Deputy Magistrateof Guntur,in G.O. 246I (Home,Judicial) dated 26 lfovember
I 9 I 7, T1!{A.The politicalimplicationsof the Komati-Brahmin publicistpatronage
relationshipbecame clear in the I890S when Gunturmunicipalitywas allowed to
have a majorityof electedmembersand to elect its chairmen.In I892, the Komati
caucusTaxpayers'Association,led by the BrahminlawyerV. Bhavarnacharlu, won
all the elected seats and put its representativesinto municipaloffice, G.O. I298
(Localand Municipal,Municipal)dated 5 August I892, TNA.
211 Particularly, P. VirayyaChoudhari.M. Venkatarangaiya,7Che Freedom
Struggle
in Andhra Pradesh(AndAra), Vol. III, pp. 43, 244.
212 Ibid.,pp. 264-70, 288-9.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 523
the I9IOS, increasingnumbersof peasantswere beconlingliterateand
capable of conductingthemselvesin the larger district institutions.
Indeed, there were many more of them than in the dry region. But
political successdid not hinge simply on the possessionof small but
securevote banksand on bargainingin the districtboards.The needs
of publicityand organizationguaranteedthat there would still be a
place, alongside peasant leaders, for the professionalmiddle-man,
the purepoliticianwhohadonlyorganizational expertise.In someways,
as the politicalpopulationof the deltasexpandedin the I930S, and as
morevotersenteredthe game,the middle-manbecamemoreimportant
than ever. His abilityto battenon any publicissuekept him in touch
with the sourcesof powerin the deltas,and providedhim with a viable
political platform.A. KaleswaraRao, who, we have seen, was no
simple urban politician, did not suffer the fate of a llesava Pillai.
He was electedto the LegislativeCouncilfromKistnain I926, and to
the LegislativeAssemblyfromBezwada-Masulipatam in I937. Konda
Venkatappayyawas the only man to be elected to the Legislative
Assemblyin Madrasin I937 who had also sat in a Morley-Minto
Council.

III

Two quite distinctpatternsof districtpoliticshave emergedfronlour

discussion.In the dry areas,econonzicand administrative developmetlt
combinedto produce an extremelypowerfulrural elite which kept
localitiestight underit and monopolizedaccessto governnzentinstitu-
tions.Therewas little roomfor directpopularparticipationin politics,
and the government'sdistrictboardscame to fornlthe major,and, for
all practicalpurposes,the only, arenaof districtpolitics.By contrast,
economicdevelopmentin the wet region produceda wealthierand
moreulobilepeasantrysvhoseinterestsandinfluencedid not stopin the
locality. Many people were engaged immediatelyin far-reaching
economic,social and politicaltransactions.Districtpoliticsdeveloped
as much as a resultof movements'frombelow'as of the government's
impositionof districtinstitutions'from above'. This meant that not
only were districtboardpoliticsnecessarilyconductedwith reference
to a greater splay of public opinion but also political institutions
emergedwhich were rivals of the boards,and which influencedthe
characterof districtpolitics.213
213 Of coursen
therewere a numberof otherelementsin the compositionof district
politicswhichwe havehadto neglect.Richurbanmerchantsorzemindars,particularly
524 DAVID WASHBROOK

Politicaldevelopment,however,did llOtstop at the districtlevel.

The same factorsof administrativedecentralization,the creation of
largerpoliticalinstitutionsand the transferof power from Britishto
Indianhandsalso workedto produceprovincialand nationalpolitics.
Under the Montagu-ChelmsfordreformsLegislativeCouncilswere
expandedin size, and Indianministerswith considerablelocal powers
were made responsibleto the Legislature.In Madras, this period
witnessedthe beginningsof 'party'government.Further,of course,the
nationalistmovementdevelopedin parallel to the constitution,and
rapidlycameto formits ownpoliticalsystemwhichcompetedwith that
of the government.Yet, in manyways,theselargerpoliticalorganiza-
tionswerebuilton top of firmdistrictstructureswhichwereindepend-
ent and could continueto exist without them. In Madras,between
I920 and the mid-Ig30s,the variouslabelsof provincialand national
politicsreallyadheredto groupsfactionallydeterminedin the district
ratherthan to groupsconsciouslyorganizedalongpartylinesfromthe
capital. As Dr C. J. Bakerhas shown, the leadershipof provincial
partiesexistedquite distinctlyfrom any districtfollowingsthey might
pOSsesS.2l4
Districtinstitutionswerethe largestpoliticalorganizationsin Madras
whichdirectlyadministeredtheirown patronageand power.Underthe
Montagu-Chelmsfordconstitution,the ministries in image of the
British possessedonly a supervisoryrole over the districtsand were
forcedto administerindirectlythroughchannelsopenedforthemin the
districts.This meant that the ministrywas dependenton the support
of powersconstitutedby politicalprocesseswithin the districtand it
coulddo little of its own volition.In the ruralboards,for example,the
ministrieswere faced with a majorityof memberselected locally.
Certainly,they could nominatepresidentsand a few membersbut
they had no influenceover the way most membersof districtboards
claimedtheir seats. The most that ministerscould do was to support
the dominantfactionwhich emergedfrom districtboardbargaining.
If they set up a presidentwho was unacceptableto the ulajority,
he simplycouldnot work.The rajaof Panagal,the chiefministerfrom
I92I to I926, had to back down on severaloccasionsfrom confronta-
tionswith districtboardpowers.215 Indeed,in orderto workthe district
cleverlawyers,particularlyinsensitivegovermentofficials,or evensmallsocialgroups
whichhad becomedisproportionately wealthyby meansoutsidethe mainlinesof the
agrarianeconomy,could distortsome of the behaviouralpatternswe have tried to
establish.
214 See C. J. Baker,'PoliticalChangein South India I9I9-I937'.
215 In I92I, for example, Panagal tried to reward the loyal Justice Party man
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I880 TO I 930 525

boardsat all he had to destroythe raison d'dtre of his so-calledparty.

He led a nominallyanti-Brahminparty, yet, when it was necessary,
he supportedpowerfuldistrictBrahrninpoliticiansand neglectedmany
of the faithfulof the I9I 7-eo non-Brahminagitation.216
The Montagu-Chelmsford Councilsturned the ministriesinto th(
lackeysratherthan the mastersof districtfactions.The JusticeParty's
sveaknessirl its relationswith the districtboardswas reflectedin the
compositionof the LegislativeCouncil. If the ministriescould not
directthe affairsof the districtboards,they certainlycouldnot control
the electorate. In fact, the Montagu-Chelmsfordelectorateswere
constitutedin such a way that no 'party'or centralorganizationcould
operatein them. The constituencieshad severalnlembers,but each
voterhadonlyone vote. Unlesstherewasan elaboratecaucusorganiza-
tion to distributevotes, two membersof the same partywho stood in
the same constituencyhad to take votes away frorneach other. The
Justice Party never attemptedto build such a caucus. It stayed in
power by buying support from district politicianswhose ulethods
suited the electorates.It was entirelya conciliarparty dependentfor
its majorityon the jobs, districtboardplaces, nominationsto temple
committees,and othergifts,whichit distributedto anyonewho would
vote for it. Its ultimatefailurein I937 camefromthe disappearanceof
most of its gifts and their replacementwith a whip. From the later
I920S, furtheruleasuresof decentralization meant more electionsand
fewer notninationsin district politics. Much of the Justice Party's
patronagewas thereforeliquidated.The ministry,still needing the
supportof districtpoliticians,beganto use threatsinsteadof rewards.
In I930 the rajaof Bobbili,the new chiefulinister,beganto supersede
awkwardlocalbodies.The policywentawry,forwhileearlierministries
hadmanagedto win the favourof dominantdistrictfactions,Bobbili,on
nearlyeveryoccasion,contrivedto maddenthem. In I937 when they
revoltedagainsthim, the Justice Party was beaten out of existence.
P. L. RamaswamiNaickerwith a seat on the Salemdistrictboard.The boardpresi-
dent, the EuropeanzemindarT. Foulkes,however,wouldnot have him and insisted
on the nominationof a Brahminclient of his own. Panagalwas forcedto give way.
During the course of an angry exchange of letters with Panagal, Foulkesneatly
summarizedthe weaknessof the Councilministry:'On generalprinciplesif Govern-
mentis goingto nominatememberswithoutreferenceto responsiblelocal opinion,it
is merelya matterof time when Governmentis going to land itsel-fin difficulties'.
G.O. IS95 (Localand Municipal)dated sJuly I9RI, TNA.
216 Such as T. Desikachari,NyampalleSubba Rao, A. S. KrishnaRao, T. M.
Narasimhacharlu beingan impartial
and P. Siva Rao. EheCultof Incompetence, enquiry
intotherecordof theFirstMadrasMinistry,pp. 37-8. Thoseneglectedformedthemselves
into the 'Anti-Ministerial'Justice Party.
 o

52i ) DAVID WASHBROOK

Even Bobbili lost his seat in his home district-to a professional

CongressworkercalledV. V. Giri.217
The historyof theJusticePartyshowshow far the districtremained
the mostvital level of politicalorganization.Yet the JusticePartywas
not the only organizationattemptingto wirlsupportfromthe districts.
Althoughthe Congresswas formallyopposedto constitutionalpolitics
formuchof the periodbetweenI 920 and I 937,it alsoneededto showits
districtfollowing,if it wereto have any credibilityin politics.Its ability
to competewith the JusticePartyfor districtaffectionsdependedvery
much on the natureof districtpoliticsand) as might be expected,its
successdifferedconsiderablybetweenour 'wet'and 'dry'regions.These
differencescame to be expressednot only in the size of the different
Congressorganizationsbut also in their characterand in what they
were tryingto do.
In the dry districts,the formalinstitutionsof politicshad achieved
sucha massiveimportancethat no partycouldsucceedwithoutpaying
heed to their connexionswith the LegislativeCouncil.The Congress
offeredno way of influencingpoliticaleventsin the districtinstitutions.
Lackinga base for popularpoliticsit offeredno alternativesystemof
politics.Non-cooperationmade little impact on the rural elite of this
region, save for sporadicISghtingover the forests here and there.
In so faras it won anysupportat all)thiscamefromthe townsandfrom
a fewisolatedruralgroupswhichhad beenat oddswiththe administra-
tion for manyyears.218 If the Congresswereto finda rolehere,it would
have to be as a constitutionalparty, involved,somehow,in obtaining
LegislativeCouncil rewardsfor its followers.During the I920S, the
tensionsbetweenGandhianagitationand constitutionalco-operation
wreckedthe TamilNad ProvincialCongress,whichrepresentedmostof
the dry region,and led to the developmentwithin it of two separate
partieswith opposingideologies.The ISrst,led for most of the time by
C. Rajagopalachari and supportedby an extraordinaryassortmerltof
politicalmalcontents,clung desperatelyto the Gandhianideal. There
was neverany questionthat it could succeedin constitutionalpolitics
in the I920S; it had no influencein districtaffairs,no securedlocalities
underit, and little hope of winningany election.The other Congress,
led by S. SrinivasaIyengar,A. RangaswamiIyengarand S. Satya-
217 C.J. Baker,'PoliticalChangein South India I9I9-I937, pp. 45I-4.
218 Theone exceptionto this would be the area aroundCoimbatorewhere non-
cooperationanti-drinkpropagandafitted in with V. C. VellingiriGounder'scaste
movement.Yet VellingiriGounder'sintrinsiclack of interestin the widerpurposes
of the Congresscampaignwas clear in his refusalto resignthe LegislativeCouncil
seat he had won in I920.
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 527

murthi, all of whom had powerfulcontacts in the Secretariat,the

High Courtand the universityin Madrascity, had expresseda deep
revulsionfrom Gandhianpolitics in I920> and sought to bring the
Congressbackto reality.2l9In I926, in the formof the SwarajyaParty,
they defeatedthe JusticeParty ministryat the polls. Their victory,Sof
course,was not becausethey had a programmewhich could mould a
newpublicconsciousness; as Dr R. A. Gordonhasseen,they achievedit
largely by allying with men in the districts,many of whom had sat
or stoodfor electionin the LegislativeCouncilwhen the Congresswas
noncooperating.220 The SwarajyaPartyconsistedin the mainof district
bosseswho had been unable to reach satisfactoryarrangementswith
the Justice Party and were looking for an alternativegovernment.
Althoughin the end SrinivasaIyengar did not accept office, it was
by no meansclear at any time beforethe electionthat he would not
and he only refusedto do so afterextremepressurewas put on him by
the all-Indialeadershipofthe SwarajyaParty.22lTornby bitterfighting
betweenthe two schoolsof thought,betweennon-cooperation and civil
disobedience,the Tamil Nad PCC had a small and very irregular
following.Apartfrom the I926 election,it took no significantpart in
the politicsof the presidency.
By comparison,the AndhraPCC, which was run from the delta
districts,was a permanentand powerfulpolitical institutionat the
district level. While a moderatesuch as Sir P. S. SivaswamiIyer
could mock the supportersof Tamil extremistsas Ctherabble in the
towns'222 nobodycould treat the followersof T. Prakasam,A. Kales-
waraRao or KondaVenkatappawain sucha cavalierfashion.Although
they operatedfromthe towns,theirconnexionswith Komatinetworks,
with vernacularnewspapersread in the countryside,with religious
revivalismand with local grievancesenabledthemto build a largeand
influentialruralfollowing.As earlyas I894, the RajahmundryHindu
TheatricalCompany,of which T. Prakasamwas a member,had used
plays to convey the Congressmessageto rural Godaveri.223 In the
Hindu,
219 23 and 24June and I6 August tg20.
220 Of the 47 Swarajysts elected,20 had sat in the I9Q3Council,and + othershad
stoodfor electionin I 923 but had been defeated.Only 7 of the 47 had been members
of the originalSwarajyaParty formedby Congresspoliticiansin Ig23-X4.R. A.
Gordon,'Aspectsin the historyof the IndianNationalCongress,with specialrefer-
ence to the SwarajyaParty,IgIg-Ig27' (D. Phil thesis,OxfordUniversity,Ig70), pp.
292-4.
221 C. J. Baker,sPoliticalChangein South India IgIg-Ig37', pp. 4064.
222 p. S. SivaswamiIyer to G. A Natesan, I3 August I920. P. S. SivaswamiIyer
Papers,NAI.
223 Hindun I OctoberI894
 WASHBROOK
DAVID
528
of I906-08, the AndhraExtremists
confrontation officialssmelt
Extremist-Moderate widely. In Godaveri,British editorof the
their propaganda
spread
many villages, while in Kistnathe influential meetings
in
Csedition'
to his rural fame by combiningpolitical Madras,
added
Kistnapatrika groups in
matches.224 Of all the Extremist permanentinstitu-
wrestling
with were alone in founding
inthe Andhradeltas
those School at Masulipatamwhichtaught 9 I7
establisheda National
They
tions. the vernacular. BetweenI 9 I I and I of
subjectsentirelyin
practical strong but incoherent currentsits
channelled the and finallywon
leadership
this the Andhramovement
into of the
revivalism
vernacular committee. Above all, the leaders the
provincialCongress to turn the chronicirritationagainst
own
Congresswere able they
Andhra advantage. At one time or another
to their own and I922
agitation.Between and village
I9I6
administration anti-PWD
in
allbeen involved
had on considerable- support,fromryots
were
they able to count
movement.
alike,in the nationalist AndhraCongressremainedthe focal
oScers the the
During the diEcult I920S, This propped up its importancein
of manypopularprotests.
point by the developmentof
the rural boards.
situation
political
created
own organization and muchof its member- in
its
thesametime it kept
At each other to use its organizations their
Local politiciansfought paraded
ship.
At rural board elections,candidates boardaffairs,as we
squabbles.
their influence district
It could whose greatest
Congressaffiliations.225
experiences of A. KaleswaraRao, it wras
seen from the
have the Congress. In the delta districts, the
was his high place in the way
asset This was shown in
to be a Congressman. of the all-India
important
was prepared to obey the orders those orders
Andhra Congress
at all times, no matterhow asinine Rao,
Congress leadership
local standpoint. For example,Kaleswara
appearfrom a undertook
non-cooperatedin
I 920;
might
Prakasam and Venkatappayya acceptedthe Swarajya
between I922 and
I926;
to
'constructive work'
in Kaleswara Rao'scase,won election
Party'smandatein I926 and, civildisobedience in I 930.Although
and offered Vol. II,
theLegislativeCouncil; Strugglein AndAra Pradesh(AndAra),
EheFreedom
224 M. Venkatarangaiya, board elections
pp. I 77-3 I I
. for example, municipaland taluk I, 4 September
arean HinduI0 MayI92
225 In the RajahmundrybetweenI92 I and I923.
on party tickets of the (::ongressbecameso strongthat
werefought The local position it. HindfuI I September
I4, I9, 20 April were conductedwithin Gangarajuand Dandu
I923.
I922,
local institutions
fightsfor powerin strugglefor power between Motheymid-Ig20sand I937, was
In Ellore, the betweenthe (::hangein
I924.
Raju, which dominatedlocal afEairs lines. C. J. Baker,'Political
l!{arayan on Justice Party-Congress
foughtat the polls p. 224.
South Ine;lia,
I9I9-I937,
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 930 529

thereweremajorfactionfightsfor controlof the Andhrap,226 they

did not, as in Tamil Nad, lead to a split over the very purposeof the
Congress,or to the exit for long of the losingfaction.Formanypolitici-
ans, membershipof the Congresswas too importantto be thrownaway
simply becausethey disapprovedof the courseCongresswas taking.
From the end of civil disobedience,the Congresspartiesof Andhra
and Tamil Nad moved closer together as it became clear that the
Congressitself was to take office. The I934 LegislativeAssembly
electionsand, above all, the I935-36 districtboard electionswhich
put the keyto LegislativeCouncilsuccessinto the handsof the Congress,
pointedthe way to I937. Yet the Congresspartieswhichwon in the dry
and wet regionswere of differentcharacters,indicatingthe differing
historiesof the Congressand the diffieringnatureof districtpoliticsin
the two areas.In the dry districts,the majorityof Congressmenelected
to the I937 legislaturehad comeoverto the Congressonly sincethe end
of civil disobedienceand the collapseof the Justice Party'spolitical
machine.Their interestin Congressawakenedonly when it promised
to providethem with a governmentin Madrascity which would help
them. Most of them were ruralboardpoliticians,still workingwithin
the frameworkof the government'sinstitutions.Of the 50 Congressmen
returnedfrom this region, only I 3 had been suflicientlyactive in
civil disobedienceto have gone to prison.227 But amongCongressmem-
bersfromthe deltadistricts,thereweremanymoreold partystalwarts.
Although they were also rural board politicians,many of the new
membersof the Councilcould also show membershipof the Congress
going back withouta breakto I920. Of the I5 Congressmenelected,
no fewerthan g had beento prisonin civil disobedienceand two others
were well-knownsupportersof the movement.228 Even as the C:ongress
stoodproclaimingvictoryfor a nationalideal, the ambiguitiesof trying
to constructprovincialpoliticson a base of district-levelinstitutions
stoodout clearly.

Conclusion

Althoughthe areaof ourinquiryhasbeenconEnedto twofragmentsof a

singleIndianprovince,it is hopedthat our findingssuggestapproaches
to many of the moregeneralproblemsof ruralhistoryin our period.
226 BetweenI920 and I937, KaleswaraRao, Venkatappawaand Pattabhisittara-
mawa (whowasthoroughlyunsuccessful) spenta greatdealof timefeudingwith each
otherfor Congresspre-eminenee.
227 I:)irectory
oftheMadrasLegislature
(Madras,I938). 228 Ibid.

o
53o DAVID WASHBRO-OK

Clearly,a basicquestiorlwhichemergesfromour discussion-is the way

in which Britishadministrativeinstitutions'fitted'the political hier-
archy which developedfrom agrarianeconomicrelations.Controlof
the economicresourcesof the countrysideput one formof powerinto
the handsof certainmen, and, in variousareas,the provincialgovern-
mentsof BritishIndia triedto use or to destroythe basesof this power.
Recent researchon the United Provinces,for example,suggeststhat,
beneath many of the estates of taluqdarsand zemindars,economic
conditionswerefairlysimilarto thosewe haveseenin our dryregion.229
Politicaland economiccontrolin the village, and a monopolyof the
connexionsbetweenthevillageandhigheradministrative organizations,
restedfirmlyin the handsof a small and resilientvillage elite. Yet the
administrativedevelopmentof the United Provinceswas very different
from that in dry Madras.Rural boardsnever achievedanythinglike
the same significance,and the village elite was never encouragedto
participatein the broaderstructuresof government.Rather,the British
built on the shakyfoundationsprovidedby zemindarsand taluqdars
who packedthe districtand provincial-levelinstitutionsof government.
The incongruitybetweenlines of actual ruralpower and of accessto
the political institutionsof the Britishmight be seen to account, at
least in part, for the social tensionswhich producedkisandisruptions
and the extinctionof the landlordsin the I937 election.
Another feature of our analysis which has possible implications
elsewhereis the characterof politicalsocietyin ruralareaspossessing
large numbersof wealthy,mobileand market-oriented peasants.The
problems of finding any political system capable of maintaining
stability were virtually insurmountable:controls supplied by the
economysimplycouldnot hold down enoughpeople,while the easeof
communication preventedthe acceptanceof any singlesystemof formal
politicalinstitution3.In the Andhradeltas, men who lost out in the
districtboardsor in the divisionof spoilsby the administrationwere
ableto manufacturetheirown rivalpoliticalsystemsbasedon agitation,
protestand publicity.In lookingfor pointsof comparisonwith other
partsof India, we mightnoticethat Midnaporein Bengaland Bardoli
in Gujerat,whose rent-strikesposed similarproblemsto government
duringthe daysof high Gandhianpolitics,werealsoareasin whichthe
moderatelyrich peasant,with a large numberof directconnexionsto
the market,abounded.
229 See P. J. Musgrave,'Landlords and Lordsof the Land:estatemanagementand
social controlin Uttar PradeshI860-I920' in ModernAsianStudies,Vol. 6, Part 3,
July I972, pp. 257-75v
 COUNTRY POLITICS: MADRAS I 880 TO I 93° 53I

An essay of this nature must necessarilyexclude a great many

particularities
whichinfluencedthe natureof specificevents.Its purpose
has been to try to paint some backgroundagainstwhich the actionin
the foregroundbecomesmorereadilycomprehensible. Out of the many
possiblefactorswhich affectedthe growthof ruralpoliticalsocietyin
the period, it has selectedthe two which seem to indicate the most
obviouslines of comparisonwith organizationin other parts of rural
India. All peasantshad to earn a living and all wereinvolvedin some
kind of administrativestructure.This essayhas tried to put these two
typesof activityinto a singlecontext.