G.R. No.

192685 July 31, 2013

OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Registrar, Register of
Deeds, Pasig City, FRANCIS SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO, and GEMA O.
CHENG, Respondents.

Facts:

ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) entered into a Joint Project
Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of "The Malayan Tower." wherein the latter shall
provide the real property while former would construct and shoulder the cost of construction and
development of the condominium building. Due to financial difficulties, ASB was unable to perform its
obligations to MICO. Thus, MICO and ASB executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), allowing
MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the development and completion of The Malayan Tower. The
MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan Tower
representing their investments. On 11 March 2005, two sets of Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs)
were issued by Espenesin for 38 units and the allotted parking spaces in Malayan Tower. The first was in
the name of MICO and the second in the name of ASB.
The second set of CCTs was issued upon the instruction of Serrano an officer of MICO. Ampil, unsecured
creditor of the ASB charged Espenesin with violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019
before the Office of the Ombudsman. Ombudsman dismissed Ampil’s complaint on the ground of lack of
probable cause for the alleged commission of falsification. Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the appellate court. And as already stated, the appellate court
affirmed the Ombudsman’s resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ombudsman’s discretionary power to determine the existence of probable cause
may be assailed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

HELD:

The Supreme Court have consistently hewed to the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s
exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsman’s finding to proceed or desist in the
prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on
the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse
so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, on several occasions, the
court have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining probable cause: (a) To afford
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) When necessary for the orderly administration of
justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c) When there is a prejudicial question which is
sub judice; (d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e) Where the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance. The
fourth circumstance is present in this case. Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had altered
the CCTs and the Ombudsman’s findings thereon, the Ombudsman abruptly dismissed Ampil’s
complaint-affidavit. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the
accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. As Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin was duty bound to inquire and ascertain the
reason for Serrano’s new instruction on those specific set of CCTs and not just heed Serrano’s bidding.
He heads the Office of Register of Deeds which is constituted by law as "a public repository of records of
instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands x x x in the province or city wherein such office is
situated." He should not have so easily taken Serrano’s word that the amendment Serrano sought was to
correct simple and innocuous error. Espenesin could have then easily asked, as he is obliged to, for a
contract or an authenticated writing to ascertain which units and parking slots were really allotted for ASB
and MICO. His actions would then be based on what is documented and not merely by a lame claim of
bona fides mistake.
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent

G.R. No. 200804, January 22, 2014

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Doctrine: An essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is an
absence of an appeal nor any "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of law, one
which has been so defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy and sufficient not
merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment. (Conti v. CA)

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims
Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of P23,111.71 which
represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005. On June 10, 2011,
the MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of respondent. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
before the RTC, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in finding that petitioner
failed to establish with certainty respondent’s obligation, and in not ordering the latter to pay the full
amount sought to be collected.

On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari, finding that the
said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided
under Section 2322 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not a decision on a complaint falling under small claims cases may be questioned via
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 when the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that
decisions rendered in such case is final and unappealable.

HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under
the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus,
immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases,
similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the
aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general
rule has been enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation, wherein it was
held that:

In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always
available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the
Rules is an absence of an appeal nor any "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of
law, one which has been so defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy and
sufficient not merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x
x x complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from
the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal" concerned.
Maglalang v. PAGCOR

Doctrine: Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law

final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon
proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.

Facts:

Maglalang, herein petitioner, is a teller at the Casino Filipino which is under the PAGCOR. In one
instance, a customer named Cecilia Nakasato made a transaction with the petitioner amounting to
P50,000.00, with 45 pcs of P1,000 and 10pcs of P500.

However, during the transaction it was alleged that the petitioner committed an error in the performance
of his duty. It appeared that Nakasato was shortchanged by the petitioner. Thus, Nakasato confronted the
petitioner several times.

Due to this incident, the petitioner received a memorandum and was charged with discourtesy.
Thereafter, he received a memorandum from the Board of Directors of PAGCOR and found him guilty
with discourtesy rendering him 30-days of suspension. He then file a motion for reconsideration for
excessive penalty as the first offense is punishable only by reprimand. Likewise, he filed a motion for
production of the relevant documents, such as a copy of the investigation report against him. But, the
same was denied by the Board of Directors.

In appeal before the CA, the petitioner adduced that there was no evidence to prove the complaint
against him and that the penalty imposed against him suffers from grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Albeit this contention, the CA outrightly dismiss the petition for its failure to
exhaust the administrative remedies and held that the CSC has the jurisdiction over the case as GOCCs
are part of the Civil Service if they have an original charter.

Hence, this is now submitted before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear the case.

Held:

Yes.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on
a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
court's judicial power can be sought.

However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the
following exceptions:

(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3)
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when
there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury;
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter
is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,
and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review
is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no
administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil
Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.

Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are
still subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco,32 we held:

Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for one (1) month is final and
unappealable, it follows that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the same.
The Ombudsman was not estopped from asserting in this Court that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction
to review and reverse the decision of the Ombudsman via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. This is not to say that decisions of the Ombudsman cannot be questioned. Decisions of
administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable
are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of
discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly
misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to
reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or
reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no
jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.

In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in
view of petitioner's allegation that P AGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition
for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and
should therefore be set aside.
Title: People of the Philippines vs. Castaneda; G.R. No. 208290 ; December 11, 2013

Parties: Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondent: THE HONORABLE JUANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR., HONORABLE

CAESAR A. CASANOVA, HONORABLE CIELITO N. MINDARO-GRULLA, AS
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION, COURT OF TAX
APPEALS; and MYRNA M. GARCIA AND CUSTODIO MENDOZA VESTIDAS, JR.

Ponente: JUSTICE PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Doctrine/s: Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari
should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy
disposition of their case. While there are recognized exceptions to such strict
observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the
rules.

As to the propriety of petition for certiorari (Rule 65) when there is judgment of acquittal
(not in violation of double jeopardy rule), it must be shown that there was grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.

Facts: Private respondents Myrna M. Garcia and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. were charged
before the CTA for fraudulently declaring imported items as falsely containing cartons of
CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case when in truth they were Anti-Virus Software
Kaspersky Internet Security Premium 2012. These items are subject to customs duties in
the amount of Php 3,341,245 of which only the amount of Php100,362 was paid.

Trial ensued and when the prosecution rested its case, respondents filed a Demurrer to
Evidence claiming that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

CTA granted the demurrer and dismissed the case against private respondents ruling
that: 1) documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in
evidence; 2) the object evidence consisting of the alleged misdeclared goods were not
presented as evidence; and 3) the witnesses failed to positively identify the accused as
responsible for the misdeclaration of goods.

Said resolution was received by the BOC two (2) days after its promulgation, or on May
17, 2013. A petition for certiorari (Rule65) was filed by the prosecution on August 12,
2013.

Issue/s: (1) Whether the belated filing should be allowed by the Court

(2) Whether a judgment of acquittal in the present criminal case may correctly be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65

Held: (1) NO, Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that
certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy
disposition of their case. While there are recognized exceptions to such strict
observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the
rules.
In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was
advanced to warrant the relaxation of the Rules i.e. petitioner’s failure to monitor
incoming court processes. Notably, the records show that the petition was filed only on
August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date which fell on July 16, 2013. To
excuse this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfair to the other party, but it will also
sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure.
Suffice it to say, the reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry even a tinge of merit
that would deserve leniency.

(2) NO. While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it must be shown that there was grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.

In this case, a perusal of the challenged resolutions of the CTA does not disclose any
indication of grave abuse of discretion on its part or denial of due process. The records
are replete with indicators that the petitioner actively participated during the trial and, in
fact, presented its offer of evidence and opposed the demurrer.

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as

is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Here, the subject
resolutions of the CTA have been issued in accordance with the rules on evidence and
existing jurisprudence.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS
vs. HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN and RAMON P. NADAL,
G.R. No. 110280, October 12, 1993, En Banc, Romero, J.

Doctrine:
Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of
the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty
requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.

Facts:
Ramon Nadal, a student enrolled in the UP College of Law, was granted of “Iskolar ng Bayan
Program, the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STAFP) of the University of the
Philippines. On a home investigation conducted upon him, it showed that he had failed to declare the fact
(a) that he has and maintains a car (Toyota Corolla, Model 1977); and (b) the income of his mother
(Natividad Packing Nadal) in the U.S.A., in support of the studies of his brothers Antonio and Federico.
Noting discrepancies between Nadal's application form and the certification, the U.P. charged Nadal
before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT). The Board of Regents (BOR) found him guilty of willful
withholding of information or misrepresentation in relation to his application for STAFP benefit. The BOR
imposed on him the penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective of March 29, 1993, non-issuance of
any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed
the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance
of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the university. Nadal wrote
President Abueva a handwritten letter stating that "after learning of the latest decision" of the BOR, he
had been "intensely concentrating on (his) job so that (he) can earn enough to pay for (his) financial
obligations to the University." Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for
mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against the BOR.
Nadal complained that he was not afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting on his case on
March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of “NOT GUILTY” in his favor, the Chairman of the UP Board of
Regents, without notice to the petitioner, called another meeting the following day to deliberate on the
Chairman’s Motion for Reconsideration, which this time resulted in a decision of “GUILTY.”

The trial court granted Nadal’s action for mandamus with preliminary injunction on the basis that,
it is a basic requirement in the issuance of the preliminary injunctive writ that there must be a right to be
protected. As the issue in the case at bar is due process in the March 29 Board meeting, there is, indeed,
a right to be protected for, in administrative proceedings, a respondent's right to due process exists not
only at the early stages but also at the final stage thereof. With the circulation to the members of the
BOR, as well as to other UP personnel, of the Minutes of the March 29, 1993 meeting, even after this
case had already been filed, the Court is convinced that there now exists a threat to the petitioner
(respondent in SDT Case No, 91-026) that the decision of the BOR finally finding him guilty of willfully
withholding information material to his application for STFAP benefits, will be implemented at any time,
especially during the enrollment period, and this implementation would work injustice to the petitioner as it
would delay him in finishing his course, and, consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job. The
injury thus caused would be irreparable.

Issue:
Whether or not mandamus shall be applicable in this case?

Held:
NO. Mandamus is not applicable since UP exercise a valid academic freedom. SC reiterated the
doctrine in Arellano vs. Cui that school has an academic freedom to whom they will accept in their
institution. UP has therefore the discretion in this case that the court should respect therefore Mandamus
shall not prosper.

The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower court's finding that the implementation of
the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay
him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a
ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances clearly of his
own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the
overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a
disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning.

From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from
assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a
showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an
official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. Hence, by
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower court dared to tread upon legally forbidden grounds.
For, by virtue of the writ, the University's exercise of academic freedom was peremptorily curtailed.
Moreover, the door was flung wide open for Nadal to do exactly what the decision of the BOR prohibited
him from doing and that is, to violate the suspension order by enrolling for the first semester of 1993-
1994. It must have been with consternation that the University officials helplessly watching him complete
his academic requirements for taking the Bar.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the lower court is hereby ordered to
DISMISS the petition for mandamus.
G.R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988
ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON, by attorney-in-fact Trinidad S.
Viado, petitioners, vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN City, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, and the
NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. TOMASA BARTOLOME, in her own behalf and in behalf of
the other members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association," petitioners-intervenors.

Facts:
 Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. With funds pooled from their
retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. a piece of land measuring
about 8,756 square meters, in the latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of
this sale, Carmel's Torrens title (No. 64007) over the lot was cancelled and a new one (No. 8314)
issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of their property.
 They woke up one morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the
land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the
subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang
Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof."
 Presidential Decree No. 293 – invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which
had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots
for sale to the public (the Tuasons being among the buyers). The land bought by Carmel was part of
the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar Lands").
 Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and all those derived therefrom.
 His decree contained contradictory declarations. While acknowledging on the one hand that the lots
in the Carmel Subdivision were occupied by the buyers thereof, and in fact the latter's dwellings stood
thereon, he states on the other that the "members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.
(are) the present bona fide occupants" of all said lots. The latter averment is not only essentially
inconsistent with the former but is both a physical and legal fallacy. Well known is the rule of physics
that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. And the absurdity of the subsumed
proposition is self-evident for persons not in possession of land, who probably have not even set foot
thereon, cannot be deemed "occupants" thereof, much less "bona fide" occupants.
 Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314, of the
following: “MEMORANDUM. — Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this certificate of title is
declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the Government and
the property described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.”
 The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos
decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in
violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain but also of the
provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; and they prayed that
the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its
efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund.
 Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General – questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the
petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial
officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: WON the remedy of certiorari is proper.
Held: Yes.
 It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-
judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or
ministerial.
 Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of
prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person ... exercising
functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed
against an unlawful exercise of judicial power.
 The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a
determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties
 were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of
jurisdiction — which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. 11 He
adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent
transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots
claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of ... (the)
Association (of homeowners) stand." And applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication
that "title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members
of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines,"
and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of
the Republic ... (were) null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy.
 These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in
the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never
vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as may be established by law — the judicial acts done by him were in the
circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his
office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he
had assumed as head of the martial law regime.
 In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for prohibition if the
averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter. Considered in this wise, it will also
appear that an executive officer had acted without jurisdiction — exercised judicial power not granted
to him by the Constitution or the laws — and had furthermore performed the act in violation of the
constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be proper
and efficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the
appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determined after all not by the prayer but by the
basic averments of the parties' pleadings.
GR No. 203124, Jun 22, 2015
PROVINCE OF LEYTE v. ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FACTS:

Sometime in 2006 and 2007, the Province of Leyte issued four (4) separate franchise tax assessments
against EDC which the latter, in turn, protested separately. When the Province of Leyte effectively denied
all protests, EDC appealed such denials before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 6
(RTC). Upon motion of EDC, the RTC issued an Order dated February 4, 2008 directing the consolidation
of said appeals. Notwithstanding the pendency of the cases before the RTC, the Province of Leyte issued
another tax assessment against EDC. This prompted EDC to file a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated April 4, 2008 praying that the RTC enjoin the Province of Leyte from
assessing, or attempting to assess, collecting or attempting to collect franchise taxes from, and availing
[itself] of enforcement remedies or actions against [EDC] until [the pending cases before the RTC] shall
have been resolved with finality.

In support of its motion, EDC averred that it does not have a franchise; hence, the Province of Leyte's
assessment of franchise taxes against it is contrary to law and would result in the payment of illegally
exacted taxes if not enjoined.

The RTC held that the main action would not be disposed of even though, in the meantime, the Province
of Leyte would be enjoined from collecting franchise taxes from EDC. The RTC further noted that in case
EDC is ultimately held liable for said taxes, the injunction bond would initially and substantially answer for
the Province of Leyte's claim. On the other hand, if EDC is compelled to pay such taxes pending
resolution of the cases before the RTC and is subsequently adjudged not liable to pay the same, there is
no assurance that it could recover its operational losses. Aggrieved, the Province of Leyte elevated the
matter before the CA by way of a petition for certiorari.

The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that, inter alia, "there was no proper proof of service of the
petition to the adverse party. Certainly, registry receipts can hardly be considered sufficient proper proof
of receipt by the addressee of registered mail." The Province of Leyte moved for reconsideration, which
was, however, denied in a Resolution[19] dated August 3, 2012; hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the Province of Leyte's certiorari petition before it due to
its failure to provide proof of service of the same on EDC.

Held:

No. The instant case was elevated to the CA via a petition for certiorari which is, by nature, an original
and independent action, and therefore, not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition
of the judgment or order complained of. Being an original action, there is a need for the CA to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case before it can resolve the same on the merits.
Naturally, the CA acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner -which is the Province of Leyte in
this case - upon the filing of the certiorari petition.

In petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent upon: (a) the service of the order or resolution indicating the CA's initial action on the petition
to the respondent; or (b) the voluntary submission of the respondent to the CA's jurisdiction. In the case at
bar, records reveal that the CA served its Resolution dated November 4, 2009 indicating its initial action
on the Province of Leyte's certiorari petition before it, i.e., directing EDC to file a comment to the petition,
among others. In fact, the EDC complied with such directive by filing its comment dated December 14,
2009 to such petition. Hence, the CA had already acquired jurisdiction over both parties to the instant
case.

The Court's pronouncement in Barra v. Civil Service Commission is instructive on this matter: Courts
should not be unduly strict in cases involving procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. Since litigation is not a game of technicalities, every litigant should be afforded
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and even
the Rules of Court expressly mandates that "it shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
GIL G. CAWAD, MARIO BENEDICT P. GALON, DOMINGO E. LUSAYA, JEAN V. APOLINARES, MA.
LUISA S. OREZCA, JULIO R. GARCIA, NESTOR M. INTIA, RUBEN C. CALIWATAN, ADOLFO Q.
ROSALES, MA. LUISA NAVARRO, and the PHILIPPINE PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM); ENRIQUE T. ONA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH); and
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, in his capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
Respondents.

G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015

PERALTA, J.:

Doctrine: The issue in this case is not whether the Joint Resolution No. 4 can become law and,
consequently, authorize the issuance of the regulation in question, but whether the circular can be struck
down as invalid for being tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Regardless, therefore, of the validity or
invalidity of Joint Resolution No. 4, the DBMDOH Joint Circular assailed herein cannot be said to have
been arbitrarily or capriciously issued for being consistent with prior issuances duly promulgated pursuant
to valid and binding law.

It must be recalled that administrative regulations, such as the DBM-DOH Joint Circular herein, enacted
by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law they are entrusted to enforce are entitled to
great respect. They partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written
in the statute itself. As such, administrative regulations have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of legality. Unless and until they are overcome by sufficient evidence showing that they
exceeded the bounds of the law, their validity and legality must be upheld.

FACTS: On March 26, 1992, RA 7305, aka The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers was signed into
law. On September 3, 2012, the respondents DBM and CSC issued DBM-CSC Joint Circular No. 1,
Series of 2012, to prescribe rules on the grant of Step Increments. The joint circular provided that “an
official or employee authorized to be granted longevity pay under an existing law is not eligible for the
grant of Step Increment due to length of service.” Then on November 29, 2012, DBM and DOH issued
DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1 Series of 2012, which provided for the definition of hazard pay and that it
may only be granted to public health workers (PHWs) if the nature of their duties and responsibilities
actually expose them to danger. It also stated that the longevity pay should be granted only when the
following criteria are met:

a. The PHW holds a position in the agency plantilla of regular positions; and
b. He/She has rendered at least satisfactory performance and has not been found guilty of any
administrative or criminal case within all rating periods covered by the 5-year period.

In short, the joint circulars diminished and limited the benefits granted by the Magna Carta to PHWs.

According to Section 35 of RA 7305, the rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the act
should take effect only after thirty days after publication in a newspaper of general circulation. The DBM-
DOH joint circular was made effective on January 1, 2013, just three days after it was published in a
newspaper of general circulation on December 29, 2012.

ISSUE: Was the joint circular valid despite it not meeting the publication requirement of RA 7305?

HELD: Yes, The joint circular did not modify, amend, or supplant the revised IRR. It gave no real
consequences to what the law itself has already prescribed. As an exception to the rule on publication,
interpretative regulations which “need nothing further than their bare issuance for they give no real
consequence more than what the law itself already prescribed” need not be published. These kinds of
regulations do not need to be published to be effective since they do not add anything to the law and do
not affect substantial rights of any person.
Vivas v. Monetary Board

Doctrine: Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.

Facts:

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a status quo ante order or writ of
preliminary injunction ordering the respondents to desist from closing EuroCredit Community Bank,
Incorporated (ECBI) and from pursuing the receivership thereof. The petition likewise prays that the
management and operation of ECBI be restored to its Board of Directors (BOD) and its officers.

Petitioner Vivas and his principals acquired the controlling interest in Rural Bank Faire, a bank whose
corporate life has already expired. BSP authorized extending the banks’ corporate life and was later
renamed to EuroCredit Community Bank (ECBI).

The examiners from the BSP made an audit to EuroCredit that resulted to the resdiscounting line of the
bank.

Through a series of examinations conducted by the BSP, the findings bore that ECBI was illiquid,
insolvent, and was performing transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound banking practices.
Vivas then appealed the decision of the Montary Board but the Monetary Board issued a Prompt
Corrective Action (PCA) due to negative capital and other unsound and unsafe activities.

Vivas still filed a motion for reconsideration before the Monetary Board alleging that its prior resolution
has failed to observe due process. The Monetary Board moved for the general examination of the books
but postponements were made by Vivas. The Monetary Board then issued a resolution enjoining the bank
to cease and desist for transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound that might dissipate the
assets of the bank.

Consequently ECBI was placed under receivership and placed Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
as the Receiver. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a status quo ante
order or writ of preliminary injunction ordering the respondents to desist from closing EuroCredit
Community Bank, Incorporated (ECBI) and from pursuing the receivership thereof.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition of prohibition made by Vivas is applicable.

Held: No.

To begin with, Vivas availed of the wrong remedy. The MB issued Resolution No. 276, dated March 4,
2010, in the exercise of its power under R.A. No. 7653. Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB
placing a bank under conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may not be restrained or set aside
except on a petition for certiorari. Pertinent portions of R.A. 7653 read:

Section 30.

x x x x.

The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final
and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on
the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed by the stockholders of
record representing the majority of the capital stock within ten (10) days from receipt by the board of
directors of the institution of the order directing receivership, liquidation or conservatorship.
Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the
circumstances obtaining. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court
prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which
they have not been vested by law, and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred.
Its office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over matters
not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance.

Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the
defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the
proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not
intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.

Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of
closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had already been issued
by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by the PDIC were already
accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate.

The Petition Should Have Been Filed in the CA

Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed with the CA. Section 4 of
Rule 65 reads:

Section 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial
of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or
of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. [

That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and reiterated in the case of Bank of
Commerce v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas.

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it simply ignored the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not
grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of
his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or important reason which would allow a direct
resort to this Court. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure
questions of law. In the case at bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas is questioning the
findings of the investigating team.
Title: Corales vs. Republic; G.R. No. 186613; August 27, 2013

Parties: Petitioner: ROSENDO R. CORALES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL

MAYOR OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, AND DR. RODOLFO R. ANGELES, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR OF NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA

Respondent: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AS REPRESENTED BY PROVINCIAL STATE AUDITOR OF
LAGUNA MAXIMO L. ANDAL

Ponente: JUSTICE JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Doctrine/s: Prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to
desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be
resorted to when there is “no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.”

The action for prohibition is premature since there are still many administrative remedies
available to petitioners.

Facts: Petitioner Corales was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for three
(3) consecutive terms. In his first term as local chief executive, petitioner Corales
appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to the position of Municipal Administrator, whose
appointment was approved by the Sangguniang Bayan. However, the subsequent
renewal of appointment of Dr. Angeles were disapproved by the Sangguniang Bayan on
the ground of nepotism, unfitness and unsatisfactory performance. Even so, petitioner Dr.
Angeles continued to discharge the functions and duties of a Municipal Administrator.

Maximo Andal, Provincial State Auditor of Laguna, issued an Audit Observation

Memorandum (AOM), which finds that subsequent appointment of Dr. Angeles was
without legal basis and recommends that a Notice of Disallowance be issued for the
payment of salary expenses of Dr. Angeles by Petitioner Corales.

Corales was required to comment or reply, however, he instead filed a Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal and members of the Sangguniang Bayan
before the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna.

OSG Filed a Motion to Dismiss Petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
grounded on lack of cause of action, prematurity and non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

RTC denied Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Andal was merely a nominal party.
Hence, Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

CA granted Petition for Certiorari, dismissing the Petition for Prohibition with the trial
court. Corales and Angeles filed Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

Issue/s: Whether the Petition for Prohibition filed by Petitioners is proper

Held: NO. Prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to
desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be
resorted to when there is “no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.”

As previously stated, petitioners’ action for prohibition was premature. The audit
investigative process was still in its initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance
issued. And, even granting that the AOM issued to petitioner Corales is already
equivalent to an order, decision or resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already
tantamount to a directive for petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner
Dr. Angeles, still, the action for prohibition is premature since there are still many
administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest the said AOM.

From the final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the
Commission proper. It is the decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can
be appealed to this Court. Clearly, petitioners have all the remedies available to them at
the administrative level but they failed to exhaust the same and instead, immediately
sought judicial intervention.

Moreover, courts have accorded respect for the specialized ability of other agencies of
government to deal with the issues within their respective specializations prior to any
court intervention. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone
of our judicial system. The action for prohibition is premature since there are still many
administrative remedies available to petitioners.
ROLANDO TAN, ELENA TAN and LAMBERTO TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 164966, June 8, 2007, Third Division, Ynares-Santiago, J

Doctrine:
Writ of Prohibition is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, and when the proceedings are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Facts:
Spouses Go and others started a business with James King. King will lend them cash to be lent
to other people and in return Tan and others will issue checks inclusive of interest to King. The initial
checks were honoured by the bank. The following month, spouses Go together with their (wife Tan-Go)
parents borrowed money to renovate their movie houses. On June 2002, when several checks were
about to fall due, (husband) Go allegedly attacked King and told him that all the checks that he issued
would be dishonored and for this reason he had to injure, kidnap and kill him. Thereafter, all checks were
dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds. King filed complaint for violation of BP 22 and estafa. All the
accused, except (husband) Go, submitted their counter-affidavits. Assistant Prosecutor Montero found
probable cause and filed information against all accused. They posted bail before warrant of arrest could
be issued and pleaded “not guilty” during arraignment. Accused filed a Petition for Prohibition and
Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the CA. They
sought to restrain the trial court from proceeding with the subject criminal cases against them and prayed
that the same be dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing petition for prohibition.
Held:
NO. Petition is without merit. Basic is the rule that the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary
remedy to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and
orderly administration of justice. It is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and when the proceedings are done without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner must allege in his petition and establish
facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. A remedy is plain, speedy and
adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of
the tribunal or inferior court. Further, the writ will not lie to correct errors of judgment but only errors of
jurisdiction. As long as the tribunal acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise
of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment which are correctible by a
timely appeal. In determining whether a tribunal acted in grave abuse of discretion, mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. There must be grave abuse of discretion as where the tribunal exercised its
power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent or gross as would amount to an evasion, or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in
contemplation of law.
The arguments raised in their petition for prohibition ineluctably shows that petitioners are
principally questioning the factual and legal bases of the finding of probable cause against them. This is
but a veiled attempt to litigate issues which should have been timely appealed to the Secretary of Justice
via a petition for review. However, petitioners, through their own fault, failed to avail themselves of this
remedy. Court ruled that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition is not a substitute for a lost
appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing
petitioners petition for prohibition, and the Resolution dated July 14, 2004 denying reconsideration
thereof, are AFFIRMED.
G.R. Nos. 174813-15 March 17, 2009
NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIÑO REPRESENTING
JAYCEE CORSIÑO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING ARTHUR
VILLARUEL, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Hall of Justice, Quezon City, Branch 86, Respondent.

Facts:
 Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness
were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsiño, Arthur Villaruel and two others before
Regional Trial Court, acting as a Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay.
 Private complainants AAA1 and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been filed against petitioners
and their co-accused.
 Petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They
claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.
 OCP – affirming the Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused. The Resolution was
signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and approved by City Prosecutor Claro A.
Arellano.
 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the
Case as an appeal, reversed the Resolution holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the
same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.
 Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations.
 Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present Petition
for Mandamus.
Issue: Can the SC compel respondent Judge Bay to dismiss the case through a writ of mandamus by
virtue of the resolution of the office of the city prosecutor finding no probable cause against the accused
and subsequently filing a motion to withdraw information?
Held:
 Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
 As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion
by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to
any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not
that of the court.
 Here, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the City
Prosecutor’s Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to
curb Judge Bay’s exercise of judicial discretion.
 There is indeed an exception that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a
writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when
refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. In other
words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by
mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny
such Motion.
 In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had
already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If
petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order
denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file
a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.
 In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but against the
trial court, seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the City
Prosecutor’s Office. The prosecution has already filed a case against petitioners.
 Santos v. Orda, Jr. – once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in court, any disposition or
dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdiction, competence,
and discretion of the trial court.
 Here, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The former was, therefore, deemed to
have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new
relevant and material evidence and determine whether the information it had filed should stand.
 In sum, petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant their Motion to
Withdraw Informations is improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on matters
involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is never available to direct the exercise of judgment
or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise
of either. The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an Information on the ground of
lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is
required to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfied by
the respondent judge in the case at bar.
 Finally, if only to appease petitioners who came to this Court seeking a review of the finding of
probable cause by the trial court, we nevertheless carefully reviewed the records of the case. After
going through the same, we find that we are in agreement with the trial court that there is indeed
probable cause against the petitioners sufficient to hold them for trial.
G.R. No. 161735, September 25, 2007
EX-C1C JIMMY B. SANCHEZ and EX-C2C SALVADOR A.
METEORO
vs.
ROBERTO T. LASTIMOSO, in his capacity as
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE

FACTS:

Petitioners were former constable in the Philippine Constabulary (PC) that were discharged from the
service due to administrative cases filed against them for allegedly losing his firearm while Meteoro was
discharged for being absent without leave.. On appeal, they were both cleared of all charges and
thereafter applied for reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon even up to the integration
of the PC into the PNP. On the account of the integration, NAPOLCOM issued two resolutions, to wit: (1)
Resolution No. 98-037 - considering as absorbed into the police force, among others, those who had
been discharged by virtue of pending administrative or criminal cases but who were later acquitted or had
their cases dismissed, and who subsequently filed petitions for reinstatement that were not acted upon by
the PNP; and (2) Resolution No. 98-105 - affirming and confirming the absorption into the PNP 126 ex-PC
constables including therein the petitioners. As no absorption order had yet been issued by the Chief of
the PNP, the constables in the list requested the assistance of the Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG). DILG Secretary sent a memorandum to the Chief of the PNP. As petition
for absorption is yet to be acted upon, petitioners filed a petition for mandamus with RTC against the PNP
Chief. During the pendency of the said petition, NAPOLCOM issued Resolution No. 99-061 on April 19,
1999 recalling the earlier Resolution No. 98-105.

RTC rendered its Decision in the mandamus case declaring as void ab initio NAPOLCOM Resolution No.
99-061 and ruling in favor of the petitioners, the Director-General of the Philippine National Police was
directed to immediately issue absorption orders to the petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling
of the trial court and ruled that a writ of mandamus could not be issued because petitioners had not
established with distinct clarity their right to be absorbed into the PNP.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action for mandamus to compel the respondent to
absorb the petitioners in the Philippine National Police.

HELD:

No. In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is essential that, on the one hand,
petitioner has a clear legal right to the claim that is sought and that, on the other hand, respondent
has an imperative duty to perform that which is demanded of him. Mandamus will not issue to
enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial
doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire
and to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to
implement that which is already established. Unless the right to relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will
not issue. We no longer speak of the reinstatement of the petitioners to the service because the
Philippine Constabulary no longer exists, but of their employment in the PNP which is, as we held in
Gloria v. De Guzman, technically an issuance of a new appointment.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.
TUMBOKON, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.

G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007

CORONA, J.:

Doctrine: Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is
questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to
command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the
writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief
sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.

FACTS: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 which became effective on
December 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease
and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, implementation of the ordinance was repeatedly postpone. Thus, petitioners filed this original
action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies. Petitioners
contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local
Government Code (RA 7160), to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay.

ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus may be issued in order to compel the enforcement of an ordinance.

HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel
the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have
a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and
imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.

When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the
people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and
they need not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct
interest in the enforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners
to institute this proceeding.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has
not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.21 He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the
transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the
law and are bound to obey it.
Funa v. Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO)

Doctrine: Mootness is not a ground to dismiss a petition for mandamus.

Facts:

This is a petition for mandamus to compel: (1) the COA to audit and examine the funds of MECO and (2)
to submit MECO to such audit and examination.

the UN Resolution under the One-China Policy, the PROC was recognized as the legitimate government
of China and that it is the government that can only exercise a legitimate diplomatic relations. But,
considering the people-to-people interaction with Taiwan, the Philippines created Manila Economic and
Cultural Office.

MECO then was created under Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 as a non-stock, non-profit corporation. But
momentarily, the said office functioned as the office for relations to Taiwan for the following: Trade,
economic cooperation, investment, cultural, scientific and educational exchanges.

Funa sent a letter to the COA requesting for a copy of the latest financial and audit report of the MECO
believing that the same is under the operational supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry. It
was then found out the three clusters of COA assigned to government corporate sector was not able to
audit MECO.

Funa filed a petition for Mandamus against COA alleging the failure of the latter to perform its mandate
under the constitution to audit bona fide GOCC or government instrumentality. MECO is a GOCC without
an original charter thus the funds partake the nature of public funds.

On its claim, MECO interposed that the mandamus as a petition was prematurely filed. As the cause of
action of Mandamus presupposes that there was a refusal by the tribunal, board, or officer to perform its
duty. Likewise, it claimed that it is not a GOCC thus it only shows that its funds are private in character.

Meanwhile, COA has exalted that the petition being sought should be dismissed on the ground of
mootness. As the Commissioner Pulido-Tan already directed an audit team to make the auditing of
accounts under the “verification fees” of overseas employment documents.

Hence, this submission before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not MECO is a governmental entity.

Whether or not the petition for mandamus should be dismissed on the ground of being moot and
academic.

Ruling:

We decline to dismiss the mandamus petition on the ground of mootness.

A case is deemed moot and academic when, by reason of the occurrence of a supervening event, it
ceases to present any justiciable controversy. Since they lack an actual controversy otherwise cognizable
by courts, moot cases are, as a rule, dismissible.
The rule that requires dismissal of moot cases, however, is not absolute. It is subject to exceptions.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, this Court comprehensively captured these exceptions scattered
throughout our jurisprudence:
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

In this case, We find that the issuance by the COA of Office Order No. 2011-698 indeed qualifies as a
supervening event that effectively renders moot and academic the main prayer of the
instant mandamus petition. A writ of mandamus to compel the COA to audit the accounts of the MECO
would certainly be a mere superfluity, when the former had already obliged itself to do the same.
Be that as it may, this Court refrains from dismissing outright the petition. We believe that
the mandamus petition was able to craft substantial issues presupposing the commission of a grave
violation of the Constitution and involving paramount public interest, which need to be resolved
nonetheless:
First. The petition makes a serious allegation that the COA had been remiss in its constitutional or legal
duty to audit and examine the accounts of an otherwise auditable entity in the MECO.
Second. There is paramount public interest in the resolution of the issue concerning the failure of the
COA to audit the accounts of the MECO. The propriety or impropriety of such a refusal is determinative of
whether the COA was able to faithfully fulfill its constitutional role as the guardian of the public treasury, in
which any citizen has an interest.
Third. There is also paramount public interest in the resolution of the issue regarding the legal status of
the MECO; a novelty insofar as our jurisprudence is concerned. We find that the status of the MECO
whether it may be considered as a government agency or not has a direct bearing on the country's
commitment to the One China policy of the PROC.
An allegation as serious as a violation of a constitutional or legal duty, coupled with the pressing public
interest in the resolution of all related issues, prompts this Court to pursue a definitive ruling thereon, if
not for the proper guidance of the government or agency concerned, then for the formulation of
controlling principles for the education of the bench, bar and the public in general. For this
purpose, the Court invokes its symbolic function.
If the foregoing reasons are not enough to convince, We still add another:
Assuming that the allegations of neglect on the part of the COA were true, Office Order No. 2011-
698 does not offer the strongest certainty that they would not be replicated in the future. In the first
place, Office Order No. 2011-698 did not state any legal justification as to why, after decades of not
auditing the accounts of the MECO, the COA suddenly decided to do so. Neither does it state any
determination regarding the true status of the MECO. The justifications provided by the COA, in fact, only
appears in the memorandum it submitted to this Court for purposes of this case.
Thus, the inclusion of the MECO in Office Order No. 2011-698 appears to be entirely dependent upon the
judgment of the incumbent chairperson of the COA; susceptible of being undone, with or without reason,
by her or even her successor. Hence, the case now before this Court is dangerously capable of being
repeated yet evading review.
Verily, this Court should not dismiss the mandamus petition on the ground of mootness.
Title: Cudia vs. Superintendent of PMA; G.R. No. 211362 ; February 24, 2015

Parties: Petitioner: FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military
Academy, represented by his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own
behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING

Respondent: TH E SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY

(PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC MEMBERS,
and the CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB)

Ponente: JUSTICE DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Doctrine/s: For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty.

On the basis of academic freedom, the powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant
awards, and commission officers in the military service are discretionary acts on the part
of the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief.

For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and
there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought
to be mandated.

Facts: First Class Cadet Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA. He was
supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy
Saber as the top Navy Cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an ensign of the
Philippine Navy.

However, Prof. Berong of ENG412 issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cudia
because he was late for 2 minutes. Cudia, in his Explanation of Report reasoned out that
he came directly from another class and they were dismissed a bit late by their instructor.
Dr. Costales, professor of said other class, responded that she never dismissed the class
late, and that she followed the protocol to dismiss class 10-15 minutes earlier than
scheduled.

For this, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) in violation of the Honor Code
for lying. Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report. The HC
constituted a team to conduct the preliminary investigation on the violation, it
recommended the case be formalized. Cudia pleaded not guilty. The ultimate result was
a guilty verdict. The HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group
conducted a formal review and checking of findings.

Special orders were issued placing Cudia on indefinite leave of absence and pending
approval of separation from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The matter was referred
to Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld the decision. Cudia wrote a
letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the findings of the CRAB.

Six days prior to the graduation ceremonies of the PMA, petitioners Renato P. Cudia,
acting for himself and in behalf of his son, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia, filed this
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with application for extremely urgent
temporary restraining order (TRO).

Issue/s: Whether or not the petition for mandamus is proper

Held: NO. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus
may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer,
or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled.

For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An
act is ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or
the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must
have no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by law.

This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide how or
when to perform the duty. Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet Cudia in the
list of graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 and to allow him to take part in the
commencement exercises, the same was rendered moot and academic when the
graduation ceremonies pushed through without including Cadet Cudia in the roll of
graduates.

With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia’s rights and
entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma, awards, and
commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign, the same cannot be granted in a petition
for mandamus on the basis of academic freedom.

Suffice it to say at this point that these matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by
the right of academic freedom; therefore, beyond the province of the Court to decide.

The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant awards, and commission officers in the
military service are discretionary acts on the part of the President as the AFP
Commander-in-Chief. For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the
thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to
perform the act sought to be mandated.
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN,
COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015, En Banc, Reyes, J.

Doctrine:
The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is
discretionary, not ministerial.

Facts:
Ferdinand Villanuev was appointed as the Presiding Judge of MTC in Compostela Valley. After 1
year of office as MTC judge, he applied for the vacant position of RTC Judge in Tagum City. December
18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the Villanueva that he was not
included in the list of candidates for the said stations since he did not possess the 5 year prescribed for
being an RTC judge. Villanueva has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the
list.

Villanueva filed a petition for certiorari to prevent the JBC from performing its function of selection
and mandamus to include his name in the short list.

Issue:
Whether or not Villanueva has a cause of action to file a petition for certiorari and mandamus in
this case.

Held:

No. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and
the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a
tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to
set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions.

In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the
JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of
judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative.

The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by Villanueva in assailing JBC's policy. The writ
of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of
conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would have the JBC do in his favor. The
function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is discretionary, not
ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees for
judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the
judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates for a
judicial vacancy.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court, however, DIRECTS
that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the publication requirement of (1) the assailed policy
requiring five years of experience as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to the
Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special guidelines that the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be
implementing.
 G.R. No. 131977 February 4, 1999
PEDRO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO OLORES, respondents.

Facts:
 Petitioner prays for the execution of the decision of the trial court granting his petition for quo
warranto which ordered his reinstatement as Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation
Service, and the payment of his back salaries and benefits.
 Petitioner Pedro Mendoza was appointed Customs Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, the position of Customs Service Chief was reclassified by the
Civil Service as "Director III". Petitioner's position was thus categorized as "Director III, CIIS" and he
discharged the function and duties of said office.
 Petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X, Cagayan de
Oro City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS.
Despite petitioner's new assignment as Acting District Collector, however, he continued to receive the
salary and benefits of the position of Director III.
 Petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his
termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas' appointment as Director III by
President Fidel V. Ramos.
 Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the RTC.
 RTC – granted the petition. The court found that petitioner was illegally terminated from office without
due process of law and in violation of his security of tenure, and that as he was deemed not to have
vacated his office, the appointment of respondent Allas to the same office was void ab initio. The
court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at the same time
directed the reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of full back salaries and
other benefits appurtenant thereto.
 While the case was pending CA, respondent Allas was promoted to the position of Deputy
Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this promotion,
Petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered moot and academic.
 CA – dismissed the motion.
 The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly.
 Petitioner – filed a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision, which was denied on the ground that
the contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent
Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo warranto petition.
 Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the CA questioning the order of
the trial court.
Issue: WON CA grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be issued, considering that
respondent Olores who was not a party to the case now occupies the subject position.
Held: CA did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision.
 The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
 Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation to show by what
right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according to the
Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority
from the state.
 A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of
a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he
has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. The action may be commenced for the Government by
the Solicitor General or the fiscal against individuals who usurp a public office, against a public officer
whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office, and against an association which acts
as a corporation without being legally incorporated. The action may also be instituted by an individual
in his own name who claims to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another.
 Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted
position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. If the court
finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the
 office. If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of usurping,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered pursuant to
Sec. 10
 The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in the discretion of
the court and on the relief sought.
 The decision of the trial court had long become final and executory, and petitioner prays for its
execution. He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite respondent Olores' appointment.
Petitioner's removal was illegal and he was deemed never to have vacated his office when
respondent Allas was appointed to the same. Respondent Allas' appointment was null and void and
this nullity allegedly extends to respondent Olores, his successor-in-interest.
 A judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule,
however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the
respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source.
This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such,
but always against the person — to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to
perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.
 In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas.
What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the
contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores.
Title: Calleja vs Panday (483 SCRA 680, February 28, 2006)

Parties: Petitioners: MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA, JOAQUIN M. CALLEJA, JR., JADELSON

PETER P. CALLEJA, MA. JESSICA T. FLORES, MERCIE C. TIPONES and PERFECTO
NIXON C. TABORA

Respondent: JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY, AUGUSTO R. PANDAY and MA. THELNA P.

MALLARI

Ponente: Justice Austria- Martinez

Doctrine/s: While actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation,
which were formerly cognizable by the SEC under PD 902-A, have been transferred to
the courts of general jurisdiction, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who
usurp an office in a private corporation.

A court not designated as Special Commercial Court is not vested with jurisdiction over
cases previously cognizable by the SEC and does not have the requisite authority or
power to order the transfer of cases erroneously filed with it to another branch of the
Regional Trial Court—the only action that it could take on the matter is to dismiss the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Facts: Jose Panday filed a petition with RTC of San Jose for quo warranto against Lutgarda
Calleja, Joaquin Calleja and other petitioners in this case. Panday alleged that from 1985
up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had been members of the board of
directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005,
petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and stockholders of said corporation,
forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged
to respondents

RTC of San Jose ordered the case to be transferred to RTC of Naga since the action for
quo warranto should be brought in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over
the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides. RTC of
Naga REFUSED stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo
warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction.

RTC of San Jose ordered to remand the case to RTC of Naga since it is a specially
designated court authorized to hear and decide intra-corporate controversies.

Petitioners immediately elevated the case to the Supreme Court via Rule 45

Issue/s: WON a branch of the regional trial court which has no jurisdiction to try and decide a
case has no authority to remand the same to another co-equal court in order to cure the
defects on venue and jurisdiction.

WON Quo Warranto is not the proper action to be filed in this case given the mentioned
facts

Held: 1. NO. the filing of the petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur,
which had no jurisdiction over those kinds of actions, was clearly erroneous.

A court not designated as Special Commercial Court is not vested with jurisdiction over
cases previously cognizable by the SEC and does not have the requisite authority or
power to order the transfer of cases erroneously filed with it to another branch of the
Regional Trial Court—the only action that it could take on the matter is to dismiss the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Yes. Quo Warranto is not proper. that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private
corporation.

The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No.
8799 applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court
since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office
and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.
Title: Lokin, Jr. vs Comelec

Parties: Petitioner: LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee CIBAC

Respondent: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES

Ponente: Justice Bersamin

Doctrine/s: An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a
contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of
electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained
the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by
a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the
preceding elections.

A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State,
or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat
the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place.
Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where
the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if
the respondent may be unseated.

Certiorari, not an election protest or quo warranto, is the proper recourse to review a
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolution approving the withdrawal the
nomination of its original nominees and substituting them with others, even if the
substitute nominees have already been proclaimed and have taken their oath of office

Facts: CIBAC is a registered Party List. Originally, these are the following nominees: (1)
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C.
Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. However prior to elections,
CIBAC through Villanueva submitted an amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus
included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje. Subsequently, Villanueva as
President of CIBAC wrote to COMELEC reaffirm the substitution of the nominees.
However, CIBAC’s counsel filed a motion to the Comelec for the proclamation of Lokin.
This was opposed by Villanueva. Comelec set the case for hearing.

After the elections, CIBAC was entitled to three seats in the House of Representatives.
Secretary General of CIBAC asked the secretary of HOR to allow Lokin to be sworn in by
te Speaker. The request was denied because of the Comelec Case. COMELEC finally
decided to approve the substitution of Lokin, averring that Villanueva had the powers to
make the substitution under the charter of CIBAC.

Lokin filed 2 separate actions before the Supreme Court. One is for Mandamus, to
compel the Comelec to proclaim him the winner. Another is certiorari, assailing the order
of Comelec recognizing the substitution.

Comelec for its part avers that the Lokin is forum shopping and that the proper remedy is
an electoral protest or a special action for quo warranto before the HRET.

Issue/s: WON an election protest or special action for quo warranto before the HRET is
proper.

Held: No. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization
seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the
defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the
legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list
organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list
organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does
not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the
Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.

LOKIN IS THE RIGHTFUL NOMINEE. The Comelec erred in allowing Villanueva to

unilaterally substitute the nominees of the party-list.
Title: Aratea vs COMELEC

Parties: Petitioner: Efren Racel Aratea

Respondent: Commission on Elections, and Estela D. Antipolo

Ponente: Justice Carpio

Doctrine/s: In a quo warranto petition, the grounds to oust an elected official from his office are
ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This is provided under
Section 253 of the OEC and governed by the Rules of Court as to procedures. While quo
warranto and cancellation share the same ineligibility grounds, they differ as to the time
these grounds are cited. A cancellation case is brought before the elections, while a quo
warranto is filed after and may still be filed even if a CoC cancellation case was not filed
before elections.

Unavoidably, a “candidate” whose CoC has been cancelled or denied due course cannot
be substituted for lack of a CoC, to all intents and purposes. Similarly, a successful quo
warranto suit results in the ouster of an already elected official from office;
substitution, for obvious reasons, can no longer apply.

Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy before the election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a petition for quo
warranto after the election. Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should not confuse a
petition for disqualification using grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. It would seem,
therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the time of the discovery of the
misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of
the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is
made. During this so-called “gap” the would-be petitioner (who would seek the
disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the
proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the
misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him.
Respondent Commission sees this “gap” in what it calls a procedural gap which,
according to it, is unnecessary and should be remedied.

Facts: Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio Zambales. Rodolfo files a petition
under Sec. 78 of OEC to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to Lonzanida’s
COC on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served as mayor of San
Antonio for 4 consecutive Terms. Comelec cancelled Lonzanida’s COC based on the 3
term limit rule and that he was guilty of the crime of falsification. Lonzanida garnered
majority votes and his vice mayor, Aratea won vice mayor.

Antipolo, the 2nd placer intervened and claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor
since Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when Comelec cancelled his certificate of
candidacy. Aratea asserted that Antipolo could not be proclaimed as the winning
candidate since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during the election day and
Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the office of
the mayor. As duly elected vice mayor, Aratea asserted that he must be the one to
succeed.

Issue/s: WON Aratea is now mayor by virtue of the position of mayor being vacant.

Held: NO. Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a
candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only
qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of
Mayor.

The Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto
proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or
qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78"
petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after
proclamation of the winning candidate.
G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013
EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO vs. EMERSON S. CARLOS

FACTS:

In July 2009, Petitioner was appointed by PGMA as assistant general manager for operations
(AGMO) of the MMDA. In July 2010, Exec. Sec. Ochoa issued OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 stating
that: “All non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying Career Executive Service (CES)
positions in all agencies of the executive branch shall remain in office and continue to perform their duties
and discharge their responsibility until October 31, 2010 or until their resignations have been accepted
and/or until their respective replacements have been appointed or designated, whichever comes first,
unless they are reappointed in the meantime.” Pursuant to the said Circular petitioner was terminated.

When Petitioner sought a clarification from the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) as to the proper
classification of the position of AGMO, CESB Executive Director stated that the position of AGMO had not
yet been classified and petitioner was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2.
Demanding payment of his salary and reinstatement in the monthly payroll, petitioner sent a letter to
MMD Administration Service. For his failure to obtain an action or a response from MMDA, he elevated
his demand to the Office of the President. Meanwhile a new AGMO for MMDA was appointed. Hence,
Petitioner filed instant Petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto seeking to oust respondent from
the position of AGMO. In his comment, respondent posits that the AGMO position belongs to the CES;
thus, in order to have security of tenure, petitioner, must be a Career Executive Service official (CESO).
Respondent maintains that the function of an AGM is executive and managerial in nature.

ISSUE: Whether or not petition for quo warranto may be availed of to question an alleged illegal
termination wherein the petitioner’s right over the position sought to be reinstated is disputed.

HELD:

NO. No. In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office
allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of
the supposed usurper is immaterial. In this case, AGMO position was held to be within the coverage of
the CES. An AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character; exercises management over
people, resource, and/or policy; and assumes functions like planning, organizing, directing, coordinating,
controlling, and overseeing the activities of MMDA. The position requires the application of managerial or
supervisory skills necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities involving functional guidance,
leadership, and supervision. For the foregoing reasons, the position of AGMO is within the coverage of
the CES. Petitioner undisputedly lacked CES eligibility. Thus, he did not hold the position of AGMO in a
permanent capacity or acquire security of tenure in that position. Otherwise stated, his appointment was
temporary and "co-terminus with the appointing authority."
LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN1 B. BARUA-
YAP AND REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 211140

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Doctrine: Mandamus to compel Proclamation HRET Jurisdiction

FACTS: Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May 13, 2013
elections in accordance with final and executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections.

On the 2013 Election, COMELEC has cancelled Reyes’ Certificate of Candidacy, acting upon the petition
of Tan a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, for alleged
misrepresentations in her CoC running as Representative of Lone District of Marinduque. While the
motion for reconsideration field by Reyes was pending, the election was held and Reyes was proclaimed
as winner by the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Velasco filed an Election Protest in the HRET.
COMELEC issued a Certificate of Finality on its cancellation of Reyes’s CoC. Despite it, Speaker
Belmonte administered the oath of office to Reyes. Reyes challenged COMELEC’s action and the
Supreme Court upheld that there was no grave abuse of discretion by COMELEC. Tan filed for an
immediate execution of COMELEC’s previous resolution and to declare Velasco as winner. COMELEC
declared the proclamation of Reyes as null and void. Velasco filed a petition for the Court to issue a writ
of mandamus to compel Speaker Belmonte to proclaim him as winner, despite notice given to him by
COMELEC.

ISSUE: Is Reyes considered a Member of the House of Representative?

NO. she not yet considered a Member of the House of Representatives. This Court explained that to be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (i) a valid proclamation, (ii) a proper oath, and (iii) assumption of office. A valid
proclamation is the first essential element before a candidate can be considered a Member of the House
of Representatives over which the Tribunal could assume jurisdiction. Such element is obviously absent
in the present cases as Regina Reyes' proclamation was nullified by the COMELEC, which nullification
was upheld by the Supreme Court. There was no basis for the proclamation of Reyes. Without the
proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office,
there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.
ISSUE: Does HRET have the jurisdiction over Reyes?
NO. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. Reyes is not bona fide member of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid
proclamation. When she took her oath of office before respondent Speaker Belmonte in open session,
she had NO valid COC NOR a valid proclamation. In view of the foregoing, SHE HAS ABSOLUTELY NO
LEGAL BASIS to serve as a Member of the House of Representatives, and therefore, she HAS NO
LEGAL PERSONALITY to be recognized as a party-respondent at a proceeding before the HRET.

ISSUE: Will the Petition for Mandamus prosper?

Yes. Speaker Belmonte has no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to
register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. A petition for
Mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear
and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. It is beyond cavil that there is in existence final and
executory resolutions of this Court affirming the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC
cancelling Reyes' Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a final and executory resolution of the
COMELEC declaring null and void the proclamation of her, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning
candidate for the position of Representative. The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to
consider the facts as settled and beyond dispute - Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate.
City of Manila v. Serrano

Doctrine: Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is
determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of
just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance
of not more than three commissioners.

Facts:

The City of Manila Council enacted an ordinance that authorizes the expropriation of several properties in
Tondo. The first owner of the subject property was Feliza De Guia until her death which transferred the
property to her heirs. One of her heirs, Alberto De Guia acquired the property and transmitted the same
property to his heirs by reason of his death. Thereafter, the said heirs sold the property to a certain Lee
Kuan Hui and finally transferred Demetria De Guia.

On the fateful year of 1997, the City of Manila commenced the expropriation of certain lots which the
respondents herein are the lawful heirs of Demetria De Guia. The respondents contend that they are the
lawful occupants of the subject property for over 40 years. But, this does not stall the award of writ of
possession of the petitioner as it had already deposited the required amount set by the RTC.

On its petition for certiorari before the CA, the respondents alleged that the subject property is exempted
from expropriation by virtue of Republic Act No. 7279 stating that an owner of a residential land may only
be deprived of a property in excess of 300 square meters. In its decision, the court a quo ruled that the
subject lands are not exempted from expropriation but the City of Manila shall also likewise comply with
the other strictures of the said law. Hence, the CA issued a writ of injunction against the City of Manila.

Hence, this is now submitted before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the writ of possession should be issued in favor of the City of Manila

Held: Yes

Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these
requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. In this case, these
requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ
of possession.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements laid down in 9-
10 of R.A. No. 7279 and reiterated in the Filstream ruling. This is error. The ruling in Filstream was
necessitated because an order of condemnation had already been issued by the trial court in that case.
Thus, the judgment in that case had already become final. In this case, the trial court has not gone
beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not
petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in R.A. No. 7279. It is, therefore, premature at
this stage of the proceedings to find that petitioner resorted to expropriation without first trying the other
modes of acquisition enumerated in 10 of the law.

R.A. No. 7279 in pertinent parts provide:

SEC. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land.--- Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the
following order:

(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;

(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;

(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and
Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;

(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired;
and

(f) Privately-owned lands.

Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the
priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. the local government units shall give budgetary priority
to on-site development of government lands.

SEC. 10. Modes for Land Acquisition.--- The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall
include, amount others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land
banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and
expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted: Provided, further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of
land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That
abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding
analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.

The determination of this question must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly
the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated. Expropriation proceedings
consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be
for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the
taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three
commissioners.
G.R. No. 193936, December 11, 2013
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. YCLA SUGAR
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FACTS:

YCLA is the registered owner of three parcels of land situated in Puerto Galera. In order to complete its
69 KV Calapan–Mamburao Island Grid Project in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, NPC had to construct
transmission lines that would traverse several private properties, including the said parcels of land owned
by YCLA. Accordingly, on December 2, 1997, NPC filed a Complaint for expropriation with the RTC
against YCLA and several other individuals.

On May 2, 2001, the Board of Commissioners submitted its Report, which fixed the amount of just
compensation of the subject properties at P500.00 per sqm. YCLA objected to the amount recommended
by the Board of Commissioners. On September 15, 2003, after conducting an ocular inspection requested
by YCLA, the Board of Commissioners submitted its second Report, which fixed the just compensation of
the subject properties at P1,000.00 per sqm. RTC rendered a Decision and adopted the report and
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners. NPC appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, alleging
that the amount of P1,000.00 per sqm recommended by the Board of Commissioners as the reasonable
amount of just compensation, which was adopted by the RTC, is too excessive considering that the
subject properties were barren and undeveloped agricultural lands at the time it instituted the action for
expropriation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Board of Commissioners tasked to determine the just compensation may
revised its previous determination according to the fair market value of the subject property determine
through an ocular inspection conducted five years after the taking.

HELD:

No. It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking,
which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution
of the action precedes entry into the property, the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of
the time of the filing of the complaint. In this case, in arriving at the amount of just compensation, both the
RTC and the CA relied heavily on the Board of Commissioners’ Report dated September 15, 2003, which,
in turn, was arrived at after conducting an ocular inspection of the subject properties on August 27, 2003.
However, the Board of Commissioners’ recommendation as to the amount of just compensation was
based on the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003. What escaped the attention of the
lower courts is that the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003 cannot be used to
determine the amount of just compensation considering that the Complaint for expropriation was filed by
NPC on December 2, 1997.