Book 4

Book 4
“Blackout”
2005 Protection Seminar
Contents
• Power Plant Protection and Control Strategies for Blackout Avoidance

• Panel Discussion and Open Forum on Blackout Avoidance
6190-118th Avenue North – Largo, Florida 33773

www.beckwithelectric.com
POWER PLANT
PROTECTION AND
CONTROL STRATEGIES
FOR BLACKOUT
AVOIDANCE
Presentation

POWER PLANT PROTECTION AND
CONTROL STRATEGIES FOR
BLACKOUT AVOIDANCE
Chuck Mozina
Consultant
Beckwith Electric
Version: 9-24-04
Blackout Avoidance
BLACKOUTS
How And Why They Occur
How They Affect Generators And

Generator Protection
Blackout Avoidance
RECENT BLACKOUTS
2003 - East Coast Blackout
2003 - Italian Blackout
2002 - Swedish Blackout
1997 - PJM Disturbance
1996 - West Coast Blackout
1995 - PECO Disturbance

Blackout Avoidance
ANATOMY OF THE
EAST COAST
2003
BLACKOUT
Blackout Avoidance
Root Cause of Recent Blackouts
VOLTAGE COLLAPSE – WHY?
Today, major generation sources are remote from

load centers. This was NOT the case 25 years
ago.
This makes the power system very reliant on

transmission system to transport power to load
centers.
Blackout Avoidance
Root Cause of Recent Blackouts
VOLTAGE COLLAPSE – WHY?
Purchase power from remote sources to save

$$$.
New generation built remotely from load

centers.
Blackout Avoidance
How Voltage Collapses Occur

LIN E 1
LIN E 2
R EM O TE
LIN E 3 LO C A L LO A D
G E N E R A TIO N
C EN TE R
LIN E 4
LIN E 5
LIN E 6
As lines trip between remote generation and load

center, the reactance increases.
This increases the reactive (VAR) losses- reducing

the voltage at the load center.
The voltage phase angle between the

generators at the load center and
remote generators also increase.
Blackout Avoidance
Real Power (MW) Flow
POWER
Eg O
SYSTEM
FLOW
SYSTEM
B SYSTEM
C
POWER TRANSFER EQUATION
Pe = Eg Es Sin ( 0g- 0s )
X Es O
Where: Eg = Voltage at the Load Center

Generation
Es = Voltage at the Remote Generation
Pe = Electrical Real Power Transfer
X = Reactance Between Local and
Remote Generation
0g = Votage Angle and Local Generation
0s = Voltage Angle at Remote Generation

Blackout Avoidance
Real Power (MW) Flow Example

POWER
SYSTEM
Eg O A
FLOW - 0 MW
TRANSFER
Load = 5000 MW
GEN. =5000 MW
SYSTEM
B
SYSTEM
Load = 5000 MW
C
Gen. = 5000 MW
Load = 5000 MW
POWER TRANSFER EQUATION Gen. = 5000 MW
X Es O

Generation
Remote Generation
0g = Voltage Angle and Local Generation

Blackout Avoidance
Real Power (MW) Flow Example
POWER
SYSTEM
Eg O A
FLOW - 2000 MW
TRANSFER
Load = 5000 MW
GEN. = 7000 MW
SYSTEM
B
Load = 5000 MW SYSTEM
Gen. = 5000 MW C
Load = 5000 MW
Gen. = 3000 MW
POWER TRANSFER EQUATION
Es O

Generation
Remote Generation
0g = Voltage Angle and Local Generation

Blackout Avoidance
Real Power (Mvars) Flow
REACTIVE
POWER
Eg O
SYSTEM FLOW SMALL
A
SYSTEM
B
1. To make reactive power flow SYSTEM
you need to have a difference C
in voltage magnitude between
Eg and Es.
2. Voltage on a power system Es O

can only be varied +/- 5%
which is not enough difference
to result in a significant VARS
flow.
3. Thus VARS cannot be

transmitted over long
distances and must be
generated locally near the
load.
Blackout Avoidance
Voltage Collapse Scenario

POW ER FLOW
LINE 1
LINE 2
REMOTE
LINE 3 LOCAL LOAD
GENERATION
CENTER
LINE 4
LINE 5
LINE 6
Eg O Es O
Blackout Avoidance
How Load Responds to Low Voltage
Resistive load current decreases as voltage

goes down- Helping the system.
Motor loads are constant KVA devices and

increase their load current as voltage decreases-
hurting the system.
During “Heat Storm” conditions, most load is

motor load- making blackout more likely.
Blackout Avoidance
Sources of Reactive (Var) Support
VAr Support must be provided at the load

center.
Two major sources of VAr support:

Capacitor Banks – Double-Edge Sword.
Vars go down with the square of voltage.
Generators/ Synch. Condensers – A

dynamic source of Vars. Can adjust VAr
output during contingencies.
Blackout Avoidance
How Generators Provide Vars to the

System
The Generator AVR (Automatic Voltage Regulator)
Controls Field Current into the Rotor Which in Turn
Controls Terminal Voltage and VAr Output/Input.
Reactive Power Rotor MW
Winding G System
into System
Limited MVARS Normal Overexcited
+
MVAR Operation
Overexcited Stator
Overexcitation Winding
Limiter (OEL) Limited
+ MW
0 Real Power
into System
Under
Excitation
Limiter
Underexcited (URL)
- Underexcited
MVAR Operation
MW
G System
Reactive Power Stator End MVAR
into Generator Iron Limited
Blackout Avoidance
Generator Excitation & AVR Control

Generator Step-up
Transformer
Generator
Field CT VT
Gen.
Excitation
AVR
Transformer
Static
Exciter
Blackout Avoidance
AVR Limiters Response During Low Voltage
DEPENDS ON THE MANUFACTURER:
Some Limiters Change as the Square of the

Voltage – 90% Voltage Results in 81% of Setting
Some Proportional to Voltage – 90% Voltage

result in 90% Setting
Some Do Not Change with Voltage at all

Blackout Avoidance
Generator Instability During Major System

Disturbances
Three Types of Instability:
Steady State
Transient
Dynamic
Blackout Avoidance
Steady State Instability

POWER FLOW
LINE 1
LINE 2
REMOTE
POWER TRANSFER EQUATION GENERATION
LINE 3 LOCAL LOAD
CENTER
LINE 4
LINE 5
X
LINE 6
Eg Og Es Os
Pm ax = Eg Es
Max.
M ax. X
Power All Lines in Service
Transfer
Line 1
Tripped
Pe
Line 2
Tripped
0 90 o 180 00
0g - 0s
Blackout Avoidance
Steady State Instability

Generator GSU System
Reactance
Per Unit
MVAR
G
XS
Xd XT
V
V2 __ 1____ + 1
V2 ___1___ 1 2 XT + XS Xd
2 X T + XS Xd
Per Unit MW X
XT + XS
a) MW - MVAR PER UNIT PLOT
Xd - XT + XS R
2
Xd + XT + XS
2
Xd
b) R-X DIAGRAM PLOT

Blackout Avoidance
Transient Instability
Pmax = Eg Es
Max. X
Transfer Breakers 1 and 2
Tripped
A2
P M = Pe
A1
0C
0 90o 1800
0g - 0s
Blackout Avoidance
Typical Out-of-Step Impedance LOCI

Blackout Avoidance
Dynamic Instability
Occurs when fast acting AVR control amplifies

rather than damps small MW oscillations.
Occurs when generators are remote from load
Solution is AVR Power System Stabilizers

(PSS) – Low Freq. Filter
Required by WECC in the Western USA for

generators larger than 30 MVA
Blackout Avoidance
Key Generator Protection Functions

Effected by Major System Disturbances
Loss of Field (40)
Overexcitation (24)
Overexcitation (24) System Backup (21 & 51V)
Under Frequency (81)
Out of Step Protection (78)

Blackout Avoidance
Generator Protection Effected by Major

System Disturbances
Loss of Field (40) – Must be Coordinated with

AVR Control, Steady State Stability Limit and
Secure Under Low Voltage.
Overexcitation (24) - Coordinated with AVR
Control.
System Backup (21 & 51V) – Secure on Stable
Power Swings and System Low Voltage. Must
be Coordinated with Transmission
Protection.
Blackout Avoidance
Generator Protection Effected by Major

System Disturbances
Under Frequency (81) – Coordinated with

System Load Shedding.
Out of Step Protection (78) – Set to trip the

Generator if it Losses Synchronism.
Blackout Avoidance
Loss of Field (40) – Must be Coordinated with

AVR Control, Steady State Stability Limit and
Secure Under Low Voltage.
+X
- Xd’ Heavy Load Light Load

2
-R +R
1.0 pu Impedance Locus

Zone 1 During Loss of Field
Xd
Steady State
Zone 2 Stability Limit
Generator
Capability
Under Excitation
Limiter (UEL)
-X
Blackout Avoidance
Transformation From Mw-Mvar to R-X Plot

Blackout Avoidance
Overexcitation (24)-Coordinated with AVR Control

Reactive Power Rotor MW
Winding G System
into System
Limited MVARS Normal Overexcited
+
MVAR Operation
Overexcited Stator
Overexcitation Winding
Limiter (OEL) Limited
+ MW
0 Real Power
into System
Under
Excitation
Limiter
Underexcited (URL)
- Underexcited
MVAR Operation
MW
G System
Steady State
Reactive Power Stator End MVAR
Stability Limit
into Generator Iron Limited
Blackout Avoidance
Overexcitation Gen./Trans. Capability
Generator (IEEE/ANSI C-50.12 &13)

1.05pu V/Hz on Gen. Base
Transformers (IEEE/ANSI C-57.12 )

1.05pu V/Hz loaded at output
1.10pu V/Hz unloaded
Blackout Avoidance
Overexcitation Operating Limits
Figure #4C
Blackout Avoidance
Typical V/Hz 24 Relay Settings
Dual Set-point Definite Time

1.18pu V/Hz – 2-6 Sec. Delay
1.10 pu V/Hz – 45-60 Sec. Delay
Inverse Time Curve

1.10pu V/Hz Pickup with Curve
Selection to Match Gen./Trans
V/Hz Capability Curve
Blackout Avoidance
System Backup (21& 51V) – Secure on Stable

Power Swings and System Low Voltage. Must be
Coordinated with Transmission Protection.
JX
Z2 Reach 120% of Longest Line but

Z2 Must be Less than 80 to 90%
of Capability Curve
Generator
Capability
Curve
Max.
Torque
Angle
Z1
Z2 Reach at 50 to 67% of
Generator Capability Curve
RPFA
R
Blackout Avoidance
Security Enhancements for Generator

Distance Backup Protection
Z3 out of step blocking

JX Z3

Z2 Must be Less than 80 to 90%
of Capability Curve
Generator
Capability
Curve
Max.
Torque
Angle Z2 Reach at 50 to 67% of
Z1
Load Encroachment
Blocking
RPFA
R
Blackout Avoidance
Generator Voltage Overcurrent (51V)

Backup
Voltage Controlled Overcurrent Relays
- Voltage control set below emergency system
operating voltage.
- Current pickup set at 30-40% of full load (Xd).
- Time delay set to coordinate with transmission
backup.
Voltage Restrained Overcurrent Relays

- Current pickup varies proportional to voltage and set
150% of gen. rating at gen. rated voltage.
- Time delay set to coordinate with transmission
backup.
Blackout Avoidance
Under Frequency (81) – Coordinated with

System Load Shedding
Coordinate Under Frequency Tripping of Generator
With North American Electric Reliability Council
(NERC) System Load Shedding Regions – WECC,
ECAR, ERCOT, PJM, Others.
Hydro Generators not affected by Under Frequency
Gas Turbines Controls Run Back Mw Output When

Frequency Drops
Blackout Avoidance
Out of Step Protection (78) – Set to trip the

Generator if it Losses Synchronism
Blackout Avoidance
Undervoltage Power Plant Trippings

Brought About By System Var Deficits
Undervoltage Condition Not Itself Harmful To
Synchronous Generators – V/Hz is a Low Limit.
Auxiliary System is Effected By Low Voltage –

Auxiliary Motor Tripping Can Shut Down Gens.
U.S. Nuclear Plants Have Second Level Voltage

Separation Relays on Auxiliary System.
Automatic Generator Control (AGC) can Cause

Problems when the Power System Breaks-up into
Islands.
Blackout Avoidance
CONCLUSIONS
Voltage collapse is the major cause of blackouts in
U.S. power systems.
Generator protection needs to be made more secure
during low voltage conditions and be coordinated with
generator controls.
Methods to accomplish this are scattered in various
textbooks and manufacturers’ literature.
This paper provides a single document with this
information.
The paper highlights the important role that the AVR
plays during major disturbances.
Blackout Avoidance
Generator Protection
Affected by Major System
Disturbances
THE SEMINAR WILL COVER SETTING

THESE GENERATOR PROTECTION
FUNCTIONS IN DETAIL
THE END
Blackout Avoidance
Power Plant Protection and

Control Strategies for
Blackout Avoidance
THE END
??? Questions ???

POWER PLANT
PROTECTION AND
CONTROL STRATEGIES
FOR BLACKOUT
AVOIDANCE
Paper

Power Plant Protection and Control Strategies
For Blackout Avoidance
Charles Mozina
Consultant
Beckwith Electric Co., Inc.
marketing@beckwithelectric.com
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent misoperations of generation protection during major system disturbances have

highlighted the need for better coordination of generator protection with generator
capability, generator Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) control and transmission
system protection. Generator protection misoperations contributed to the 1996 outages
in the western U.S. and played a role in the 2003 U.S. East Coast blackout. Since most
recent major power system disturbances are the result of voltage collapse, generator
protection must be secure during low voltage system conditions while still providing
generator protection. In addition, the generator AVR needs to properly control VAr
support to rapidly stabilize system voltage during major disturbances. This paper
discusses in detail the important role that the generator AVR plays during major system
disturbances. As a result of recent blackouts, NERC (North Electric Reliability Council)
has mandated tests to verify the coordination of generator protection and control. This
paper provides practical guidance on providing this coordination.
II. ROOT CAUSES COMMON TO RECENT BLACKOUTS
Power systems today are much more susceptible to voltage collapses than they were
25 years ago as we increasingly depend on generation sources that are located
remotely from load centers. Generators in eastern Canada and the Midwestern U.S.
provide large amounts of power to east coast load centers such as New York City.
Generators in Washington, Oregon and western Canada provide substantial power to
California. Two factors promote generation that is remote from load centers:
1. The economics of purchasing power from lower cost remote sources rather than
more expensive local generation.
2. The public does not want new generating plants in urban high load areas,
causing utilities/IPPs to build plants that are remote from these load centers.
These two fundamental changes in operation of the U.S. power grid result in the
transmission of power over long distances. This makes the power grid very dependent
on the transmission system to deliver power to the load centers. It also results in
increased reactive power losses.
Reactive power (VArs) cannot be transmitted very far, especially under heavy
load conditions, and so it must be generated close to the point of consumption. This is
1
because the difference in voltage causes VArs to flow and voltages on a power system are
only typically +/- 5% of nominal which does not cause substantial VArs to flow over long
distances. Real power (MW) can be transmitted over long distances through the
coordinated operation of the interconnected grid whereas reactive power must be
generated at, or near, the load center.
Since VArs cannot be transmitted over long distances, the sudden loss of transmission
lines results in an instantaneous need for local reactive power to compensate for the
increased losses of transporting the same power over fewer transmission lines. If that
reactive support is not available at the load center, the voltage will go down. The impact
of reduced voltage on load depends on the nature of the load. For resistive load, the
load current will decrease and help limit the need for local reactive support. Motor loads
are essentially constant kVA devices. The lower the voltage, the more current they
draw—increasing the need for local reactive support. Power systems loads consist of
both resistive loads as well as reactive motor loads. During hot weather, however, air
conditioning motor loads make up a large portion of total load, thereby making the
system more susceptible to voltage collapse.
Power Transfer-Voltage Analysis of Voltage Collapse
Fig. 1 Real Power vs. Voltage (P-V) Curve
Fig. 1 illustrates how voltage decays as real power at the load center increases. This
type of P-V analysis (real power relative to voltage) is an analysis tool, used by system
planners, to determine the real power transfer capability across a transmission interface
to supply local load. Starting from a state of a base-case system, computer-generated
load flow cases with increasing power transfers are run while monitoring voltages at
critical buses. When power transfers reach a high enough level, a stable voltage cannot
be sustained and the system collapses.
2
On a P-V curve (see Fig. 1), this point is called the “nose” of the curve. This set of P-V
curves illustrates that for baseline conditions shown in curve A, voltage remains
relatively steady (changing along the vertical axis) as local load increases. System
conditions are secure and stable to the left of point A1. After a contingency occurs, such
as a transmission circuit or generator trip, the new condition is represented by curve B,
with lower voltages (relative to curve A). The system must be operated to stay well
inside the load level for the nose of curve B. If the B contingency occurs, then the next
worst contingency must be considered, and the operator and local generator AVR
controls must adjust the system voltage to pull back operations to within the safe zone
to avoid going over the nose of curve C.
Reactive power system support can only come from two sources: shunt capacitors and
generators/synchronous condensers. Shunt capacitors are a double-edged sword. They
do provide reactive support, but they also generate fewer VArs as the voltage dips.
Shunt capacitor banks cannot quickly adjust the level of reactive power. Modern static
VAr compensators do allow rapid reactive power adjustment but these devices are
expensive and limited in application.
Generation at the load center can provide a dynamic source of reactive power. As the
voltage goes down, the generator can quickly provide increased reactive support within
its capability limits. Unlike shunt capacitors, the amount of reactive support does not
drop as system voltage goes down. The amount of reactive power is controlled by the
generator AVR. It is essential that the AVR control be properly set and the generator
protection system allow the generator to contribute the maximum reactive power to
support the system while staying within the capability of the generator.
2003 U.S. East Coast Blackout
For the reasons cited above, almost all major blackouts occurring in the last ten years
involve voltage collapse. The 2003 East Coast blackout was a classic example and
demonstrated the importance of keeping generators at the load center in-service during
system low-voltage conditions. System voltage for this event decayed over a few
hours— giving system operators ample time for corrective action. The loss of SCADA-
monitoring prevented them from properly assessing the situation and taking action.
The loss of Eastlake 5—a 597 MW (net) generating unit located east of Cleveland on
Lake Erie—was the first major event in the collapse of the system. This unit is a major
source of reactive power support for the Cleveland area. The unit tripped 2 hours before
the blackout. Analysis by the joint Canadian/U.S. Commission Task Force [1] indicated
that had this one generator remained in-service, it would have prevented the blackout.
The Eastlake 5 unit tripped when the plant operator removed the generator from
automatic AVR control and manually attempted to increase the machine VAr output to
raise system voltage. This requires increasing the generator field current. The field
current was increased beyond its rating or the AVR excitation limit was exceeded, which
resulted in tripping of the field. This resulted in the subsequent proper tripping of the unit
by loss-of-field protection. The loss of Eastlake 5, coupled with the tripping of three 345-
Kv transmission lines (tree contacts) supporting the Cleveland area, resulted in a
cascading event triggered by voltage collapse. This also caused the phase angles
3
between local and remote generations to become large and eventually unstable—
resulting in the power grid breaking up into islands.
Major Generator Instability Conditions During Major Disturbances
When the phase angle between local generators and remote generators becomes too
large, phase angle instability can occur. In many cases, this event happens in
conjunction with the voltage collapse scenario described above. There are three types
of generator instability that occur during major disturbances: steady state, transient and
dynamic. Each of these instable conditions adversely effects generators and requires
protection. The first two are protected by relays at the generator and the third by the
generator AVR control.
Steady-State Instability occurs when there are too few transmission lines to transport
power from the generating source to the local load center. Loss of transmission lines
into the load center results in voltage collapse as described above, but it can also result
in steady-state instability. Fig. 2 illustrates how steady-state instability occurs. The
ability to transfer real (MW) power is described by the power transfer equation below
and is plotted graphically.
Pmax = Eg Es
Max. X POWER TRANSFER EQUATION
Transfer Pe = Eg Es Sin ( 0g- 0s )
X
Line 1
Tripped Where: Eg = Voltage at the Load Center
Generation
Pe
Line 2 X = Reactance Between Local and
Tripped Remote Generation
0g = Votage Angle and Local Generation
0 90o 1800
0g - 0s
Fig. 2 Power Angle Analysis - Steady-state Instability
From the power transfer equation above, it can be seen that the maximum power
(Pmax) that can be transmitted is when θg-θs = 90°, i.e. sin 90° = 1. When the voltage
phase angle between local and remote generation increases beyond 90°, the power that
can be transmitted is reduced and the system becomes unstable and usually splits apart
into islands. If enough lines are tripped between the load center and remote generation
supplying the load center, the reactance (X) between these two sources increases
thereby reducing the maximum power (Pmax), which can be transferred. The power
angle curve in Fig. 2 illustrates this reduction as line 1 trips the height of the power
angle curve and maximum power transfer is reduced because the reactance (X) has
increased. When line 2 trips, the height of the power angle curve is reduced further to
the point where the power being transferred cannot be maintained and the system goes
unstable. During unstable conditions, generators may slip poles and lose synchronism.
4
Out-of-step protection (78 function) is necessary to protect the generator from damage.
Voltage collapse and steady-state instability can occur together as transmission lines
tripping increases the reactance between the load center and remote generation. A
graphical method can be used to determine the steady-state stability limit for a specific
generator. This method, as well as protection requirements, is discussed in Sections III
and VI of this paper.
Transient Instability occurs when a fault on the transmission system near the generating
plant is not cleared rapidly enough to avoid a prolonged unbalance between mechanical
and electrical output of the generator. A fault-induced transient instability was not a
cause of the 2003 U.S. Northeast blackout. However, generators need to be protected
from damage that can result when transmission system protection is slow to operate.
Relay engineers design transmission system protection to operate faster than a
generator can be driven out of synchronism, but failures of protection systems have
occurred that resulted in slow clearing transmission system faults. It is generally
accepted [3] that loss-of-synchronism protection at the generator is necessary to avoid
machine damage. The larger the generator, the shorter is the time to drive the machine
unstable for a system fault.
Fig. 3 illustrates a typical breaker-and-a-half power plant substation with a generator

and a short circuit on a transmission line near the substation. If the short circuit is three-
phase, very little real power (MW) will flow from the generator to the power system until
the fault is cleared. The high fault current experienced during the short circuit is
primarily reactive or VAr current. From the power transfer equation, it can be seen that
when Eg drops to almost zero, almost no real power can be transferred to the system.
The generator AVR senses the reduced generator terminal voltage and increases the
field current to attempt to increase the generator voltage during the fault. The AVR
control will go into field forcing mode where field current will be briefly increased beyond
steady-state field circuit thermal limits. During the short circuit, the mechanical turbine
power (PM) of the generator remains unchanged. The resulting unbalance between
mechanical and electrical power (Pe) manifests itself with the generator accelerating,
increasing its voltage phase angle with respect to the system phase angle as illustrated
in Fig. 3.
5
Pmax = Eg Es
Max. X
Transfer Breakers 1 and 2
Tripped
A2
PM = Pe
A1
0C
0 90o 1800
0g - 0s
Fig. 3 Power Angle Analysis – Transient Instability
The speed with which the generator accelerates depends on its inertia. The larger the
generator, the faster it will accelerate. If the transmission system fault is not cleared
quickly enough, the generator phase angle will advance so that it will be driven out of
synchronism with the power system. Computer transient stability studies can be used to
establish this critical switching angle and time. The equal area criteria can also be
applied to estimate the critical switching angle (θc). When area A1 = A2 in Fig. 3, the
generator is just at the point of losing synchronism with the power system. Note that
after opening breakers 1 and 2 to clear the fault, the resulting power transfer is reduced
because of the increase in reactance (X) between the generator and the power system.
This is due to the loss of the faulted transmission line. In the absence of detailed
studies, many users establish the maximum instability angle at 120°. Because of the
dynamic nature of the generator to recover during fault conditions, the 120° angle is
larger than the 90° instability point for steady-state instability conditions. The time that
the fault can be left on the system that corresponds to the critical switching angle is
called the “critical switching time.” If the fault is left on longer than that time, the
generator will lose synchronism by “slipping a pole.” For this condition, the generator
must be tripped to avoid shaft torque damage. Relay function 78, discussed in Section
VI of this paper, describes such protection.
Dynamic Instability occurs when a fast-acting AVR control amplifies rather than damps
some small low frequency oscillations that can occur in a power system. This problem has
been most often associated with the western region of the U.S. It can, however, occur
anywhere the load is remote from the generation. While fast excitation systems are
important to improve transient stability as discussed above, a fast-responding excitation
system can also contribute a significant amount of negative damping. This reduces the
natural damping torque of the system, causing undamped megawatt oscillations after a
disturbance such as a system fault. It can occur if the generator is interconnected to a weak
system and loads are far from the generating plant. As discussed above, the operation of
today’s power grid makes this scenario much more likely in many regions of the U.S.
6
Small signal stability is defined as the ability of the power system to remain stable in the
presence of small disturbances most often caused by remote faults. If sufficient
damping torque does not exist, the result can be generator rotor angle oscillations of
increasing amplitude. When these megawatt oscillations grow, the generator can
eventually be driven unstable, lose synchronism and slip a pole. To address this
problem, a Power System Stabilizer (PSS) is utilized in conjunction with the generator
AVR to provide positive damping when megawatt oscillations occur. Section VII of the
paper discusses PSS in more detail.
III. GENERATOR/CONTROL CAPABILITY AND SYSTEM CALCULATIONS
The role that the AVR plays in maintaining generator operation within generator
capability limits is an important concept for protection engineers to understand. During
system stress conditions, these limits are frequently challenged when system conditions
such as voltage collapse or steady-state stability limits might be reached. A graphical
method, discussed in this section of the paper, can be used to determine the steady-
state stability limit and provide an important tool to ensure coordination with generator
protection and AVR control.
Excitation AVR Control Basics
The excitation system of a generator provides the energy for the magnetic field that
keeps the generator in synchronism with the power system. In addition to maintaining
the synchronism of the generator, the excitation system also affects the amount of
reactive power that the generator may absorb or produce. If the terminal voltage is
fixed, increasing the excitation (field) current will increase the reactive power output.
Decreasing the excitation will have the opposite effect, and in extreme cases, may
result in loss of synchronism of the generator with the power system. If the generator is
operating isolated from the power system, and there are no other reactive power
sources controlling terminal voltage, increasing the level of excitation current will
increase the generator terminal voltage and vice versa.
The most commonly used voltage control mode for generators of significant size that
are connected to a power system is the AVR (Automatic Voltage Regulator) mode. In
this mode, the excitation system helps to maintain power system voltage within
acceptable limits by supplying or absorbing reactive power as required. In disturbances
where short circuits depress the system voltage, electrical power cannot fully be
delivered to the transmission system. Fast response of the AVR and excitation system
help to increase the synchronizing torque to allow the generator to remain in
synchronism with the system. The over excitation limiter (OEL) must limit excitation
current before the generator field overload protection operates. The under excitation
limiter (UEL) prevents the AVR from reducing excitation to such a low level that the
generator is in danger of losing synchronism. Section VII of this paper has a more
detailed discussion of AVR control response during major system disturbances.
7
Generator Capability
A typical generator capability curve is shown in Fig. 4. The capability curve establishes
the generator operating limits. The curve also shows how the AVR control limits
operation to within generator capabilities.
Fig 4 Typical Generator Capability Curve and Operating Limits
The generator capability is a composite of three different curves: the stator winding limit,
the rotor heating limit and the stator end iron limit. The stator winding limit is a long-term
condition relative to the generator winding current carrying capability. The rotor heating
limit is relative to the rotor’s current carrying capability. It is also associated with longer
time conditions. The stator end iron limit is a relatively short time condition, caused by a
reduction in the field current to the point where a significant portion of the excitation is
being supplied from the system to the generator. Significant underexcitation of the
generator causes the rotor retaining ring to become saturated. The eddy currents
produced by the flux cause localized heating. Hydrogen-cooled generators have
multiple capability curves to reflect the effect of operating at different H2 pressures.
The generator AVR control limiters restrict operation of the generator to within its
capabilities and must be set to coordinate with the capability curve as shown in Fig. 4.
The setting of the AVR UEL control is coordinated with the steady-state stability limit of
the generator which is a function of the generator impedance, system impedance and
generator terminal voltage. The generator minimum excitation limiter prevents the
8
exciter from reducing the field below the steady-state stability limit. Section II of this
paper discusses steady-state stator stability in general terms and the next sections of
this paper will outline a graphical method for determining the steady-state stability limit
for a specific generator. The overexcitation control (OEL) limits generator operating in
the overexcited region to within the generator capabilities curve. Some users set the
OEL just under the machine capability curve as shown in Fig.4, while others set it just
above the capability curve.
P-Q to R-X Conversion
Both Figures 4 and 5b illustrate the capability of a generator on a MW-MVAr (P-Q)

diagram. This information is commonly available from all generator manufacturers.
Protection functions for the generator, such as loss-of-field (40) and system backup
distance (21) relaying measure impedance, thus these relay characteristics are typically
displayed on a Resistance-Reactance (R-X) diagram. To properly coordinate the
generator capability with these impedance relays, it is necessary to convert the
capability curve and excitation limiters (UEL and OEL) to an R-X plot. Figure 5
illustrates this conversion. The CT and VT ratios (Rc/Rv) convert primary ohms to
secondary quantities that are set within the relay and KV is the rated voltage of the
generator.
a) R-X Plot b) MW-MVAr Generator Capability Curve
Fig. 5 Transformation for Mw-MVAr to R-X Plot
Steady-State Stability Limit
The steady-state stability limit (see Section II) reflects the ability of the generator to
adjust for gradual load changes. The steady-state stability limit is a function of the
generator voltage and the impedances of the generator, step-up transformer and power
system to which the generator is connected. A graphical method of determining steady-
state stability is widely used within the industry to ensure that protective relay such as
9
the loss-of-field (40) protection and AVR under excitation limiter (UEL) are properly
coordinated. The graphical method illustrated below displays the steady-state stability
limit on both an MW-MVAr and R-X diagram.
In Fig. 6a, V is the per-unit terminal generator voltage, and XT and Xs are the per-unit
generator step-up (GSU) transformer and system impedances, respectively, as viewed
from the generator terminals. Xd is the per-unit unsaturated synchronous reactance of
the generator. All reactances should be placed on the generator MVA and voltage base.
Generator GSU System

Reactance
Per Unit
MVAR
G
XS
Xd XT
V
V2 __ 1____ + 1
V2 ___1___ 1 2 XT + XS Xd
2 XT + XS Xd
Per Unit MW X
XT + XS
a) MW - MVAR PER UNIT PLOT
Xd - XT + XS R
2
Xd + XT + XS
2
Xd
b) R-X DIAGRAM PLOT
Fig. 6 Graphical Method for Steady-state Stability Analysis
The generator cannot be operated beyond the steady-state stability limit. It should be
noted that the weaker the transmission system, the smaller the circle radius. Often, the
system reactance model will consist of the normal system without the single strongest
line to address the worst-case line out-of-service condition. This increases the system
reactance—providing a more conservative value of Xs. In most cases, the steady-state
stability limit is outside the generator capability curve, and does not restrict generator
operation.
10
IV. COORDINATION OF GENERATOR PROTECTION WITH AVR CONTOL
It is important that the generator AVR control and generator protection is coordinated
and that the generator protective relay system be secure for the lowest credible voltage
for which utility planning people expect the system to survive. AVR control and
generator protection should allow generators to provide the maximum reactive power
support to the system. Once the system voltage collapse occurs, the system typically
breaks up into islands. There are islands where there is an excess of reactive power
versus reactive load resulting in high voltage. Generators—being a dynamic VAr
source—can operate underexcited to absorb system VArs to reduce voltage. It is
important to check the underexcited capability of the generator AVR control as well as
protection to ensure that the generator can operate in this mode without tripping.
Coordination of AVR Control with Loss-of-Field (40) Protection
To limit system voltage during islanding conditions, generators may have to operate
underexcited and absorb VArs from the power system. It is important that the generator
be able to do so within its capabilities as defined by the generator capability curve. The
generator AVR under excitation limiter (UEL) must be set to maintain operation within
the capability curve as show in Fig. 4. The loss-of-field relay should also be set to allow
the generator to operate within its underexcited capability. The generator AVR uses the
generator terminal voltage and phase current to calculate generator operating
conditions. By comparing the actual point of operation to the desired limit, the AVR
determines when it is appropriate to adjust the generator field current to maintain the
desired generator operating voltage.
Partial or total loss-of-field on a synchronous generator is detrimental to both the

generator and the power system to which it is connected. The condition must be quickly
detected and the generator isolated from the system to avoid generator damage. A loss-
of-field condition, which is not detected, can have a devastating impact on the power
system by causing both a loss of reactive power support, as well as creating a
substantial reactive power drain. This reactive drain, when the field is lost on a large
generator, can cause a substantial system voltage dip. When the generator loses its
field, it operates as an induction generator causing the rotor temperature to rapidly
increase due to the slip-induced eddy currents in the rotor. The high reactive current
drawn by the generator from the power system can overload the stator windings.
The most widely applied method for detecting a generator loss-of-field condition is the
use of distance relays to sense the variation of impedance as viewed form the generator
terminals. A two-zone distance relay approach is widely used within the industry to
provide high-speed detection. Fig. 7 illustrates this approach. An impedance circle
diameter equal to the generator synchronous reactance (Xd) and offset downward by ½
of the generator transient reactance (Xd’) is used for the zone 2 distance element. The
operation of this element is delayed approximately 30-45 cycles to prevent misoperation
during a stable transient power swing. A second relay zone (zone 1) is set at an
impedance diameter of 1.0 per unit (on the generator base), with the same offset of ½ of
11
the generator transient reactance. This zone has a slight time delay of 2 to 5 cycles and
is used for high-speed detection of more severe loss-of-field conditions. The loss-of-field
setting, determined as described above, must be checked for coordination with the
generator capability curve, AVR under excitation limiter setting and steady-state stability
limit using the calculation method described in Section III of this paper. Fig. 7 illustrates
this coordination on a R-X diagram.
+X
- Xd’ Heavy Load Light Load

2
-R +R
1.0 pu Impedance Locus

Zone 1 During Loss of Field
Xd
Steady State
Zone 2 Stability Limit
Generator
Capability
Under Excitation
Limiter (UEL)
-X
Fig. 7 Modern Loss-of-Field Protection Using a Two-Zone Off-Set Mho Method
Coordination of AVR Control with Overexcitation V/Hz (24) Protection
The flux in the stator core of a generator or core of a transformer is directly proportional
to voltage and inversely proportional to frequency. Overexcitation of a generator or any
transformer connected to the generator terminals will occur whenever the ratio of
voltage to frequency (V/Hz) applied to the terminals exceeds 1.05 pu (generator base)
for a generator, and 1.05 pu (transformer base) for a transformer at full load. The
transformer no-load level is 1.10 pu. For transformers, the point of measurement is the
output terminals. IEEE/ANSI C50.12 and C50.13 [2] provide minimum standards for
generators. The manufacturer should be consulted for V/Hz capability of a specific
generator. When these V/Hz ratios are exceeded, saturation of the iron core of
generators and transformers will occur—resulting in excessive eddy current heating and
voltage breakdown of inter-lamination insulation.
12
During system disturbances, overexcitation is caused by the sudden loss of load due to
transmission line tripping, which can island the generator from the power grid with little
load, and the shunt capacitance of the unloaded transmission lines. Under these
conditions, the V/Hz level may exceed 1.25 pu. With the AVR control in service, the
overexcitation will generally be reduced to safe limits in a few seconds by the reduction
of generator field current. The AVR OEL limiter will limit the V/Hz generator output to a
set maximum within the generator capability curve. Even with a V/Hz limiter in the
excitation control, it is common and recommended practice [3] to provide separate V/Hz
relaying to protect the generator and any transformers connected to the generator
terminals. In modern applications where digital relays are used, the V/Hz protection of
the transformer resides in the transformer protection relay and is set to protect the
transformer. Both generator and transformer protection must be coordinated with the
AVR control. The exciter’s V/Hz limiting should be set at the upper limit of the normal
operating range and below the continuous operating limit for the generator and unit-
connected transformer. Similarly, a V/Hz relay(s) should be set with enough delay to
allow AVR control action to take place before tripping the unit. This relay, however, must
still protect the generator from damage.
There are two basic types of V/Hz protection schemes used within the industry. The first
and most common is the dual definite time setpoint method. Typical conservative
protection applications recommend a maximum trip level at 1.18 pu V/Hz with a 2-6
second time delay for the first setpoint. The second setpoint is set at 1.10 pu V/Hz with
a time delay of 45-60 seconds.
The second method uses an inverse-time characteristic curve as well as definite time
setpoints to better match the inverse time V/Hz capability of the generator. This scheme
can be precisely applied when a V/Hz versus time curve for a specific generator is
available. The minimum pickup is typically 1.10 pu V/Hz. The inverse-time function is
set with a greater time delay than the exciter to permit the exciter to operate to reduce
the voltage before protection action takes place.
V. GENERATOR PR0TECTION TACTICS TO PROVIDE SECURITY

AGAINST STABLE SWINGS AND LOAD ENCROACHMENT
It is the widespread and recommended practice [3] to provide direct tripping backup
protection that trip the generators if a transmission system fault is not cleared in a timely
manner. This protection is delayed to coordinate with transmission system backup
protection and breaker failure. The primary purpose of generator backup protection is to
protect the generator from supplying prolonged fault current to faults on the power
system. These relays, however, have frequently operated improperly during major
system disturbances—unnecessarily tripping generators and thereby exacerbating the
disturbance. This was the case during the 1996 West Coast blackout. Investigation
revealed that these relays were improperly set for the system conditions they
encountered and were expected to “ride through.” They operated due to stable power
swings or load encroachment during low system voltage conditions. This section of the
paper addresses improving security for these relays.
13
Two types of relays are commonly used for system phase fault backup: a distance relay
and a voltage-restrained or voltage-controlled time overcurrent relay. The choice of
relay type is usually a function of the type of relaying used on the lines connecting the
generator to the system. To simplify coordination, distance relays are installed where
distance relaying is used for line protection, while the overcurrent type of backup
relaying is used where overcurrent relaying provides line protection. Generally, larger
generators use distance backup protection while smaller generators employ voltage
overcurrent backup.
Generator Phase Distance (21) Backup Protection
A mho distance relay characteristic is commonly used to detect system phase faults and
to trip the generator after a set time delay. The relay’s impedance reach and delay
settings must be coordinated with transmission backup protection and breaker failure to
allow selectivity. Typically, the phase distance relay’s reach begins at the generator
terminals and ideally extends to the length of the longest line out of the power plant
transmission substation. Some factors impacting the settings are as follows:
1. In-feeds: Apparent impedance due to multiple in-feeds will require larger reaches
to cover long lines and will overreach adjacent shorter lines. The apparent
impedance effect occurs because the generator is only one of several sources of
fault current for a line fault. This causes the ohmic value of the faulted line to
appear further away and requires a larger ohmic setting to cover faults at the
remote end of the line.
2. Transmission System Protection: If the transmission lines exiting the power plant
have proper primary and backup protection, as well as local breaker failure, the
need to set the 21 generator relay to respond to faults at the end of the longest
lines is mitigated since local backup has been provided on the transmission
system.
3. Load Impedance: Settings should be checked to ensure the maximum load

impedance (ZLoad =kV2/ MVAG) at the generator’s rated power factor angle
(RPFA) does not encroach into the 21 relay setting. A typical margin of 150-
200% is recommended [4] to avoid tripping during power swing conditions. Due
to recent blackouts caused by voltage collapse, the 21 distance setting should be
checked for proper operating margins when the generator is subjected to low
system voltage. Note that the impedance is reduced by the square of the voltage.
System voltage under emergency conditions can reduce to planned levels of 90
to 94 percent of nominal ratings. Utility transmission planners should be
consulted for worst-case emergency voltage levels. In almost all cases, the
loadability considerations limit the reach of the generator 21 backup relay setting.
Distance relays with a mho characteristic and one or two zones are commonly used for
phase fault backup. If only one zone is used, its setting is based on the zone 2 criteria
outlined below. Setting generator backup protection with adequate margin over load and
stable power swings is an art as well as a science. The suggested criteria below provide
14
reasonable settings that can be verified for security using transient stability computer
studies.
The zone 1 relay element is set to the smaller of two conditions:
1. 120% of the unit transformer impedance.

2. Faults 80% of the zone 1 relay setting of the shortest transmission line
exiting the power plant (neglecting in-feeds).
A time delay of approximately 0.5 seconds gives the primary protection (generator
differential, transformer differential and overall differential) enough time to operate
before the generator backup function.
The zone 2 relay element is typically set at the smallest of the following three criteria:
1. 120% of the longest line with in-feeds.

2. 50 to 67% of the generator load impedance (Zload ) at the rated power
factor angle (RPFA) of the generator. This provides a 150 to 200% margin
over generator full load. This is typically the prevailing criteria.
3. 80 to 90% of generator load impedance at the maximum torque angle of
the zone 2 impedance relay setting (typically 85°).
The capability curve for the generator and settings are plotted on the R-X diagram as
shown in Fig. 8. The time delay for the zone 2 relay should be set longer than the
transmission lines backup and breaker failure protection with appropriate margin for
proper coordination.
JX

Z2 Must be Less then 80 to 90%
of Capability Curve
Generator
Capability
Curve
Max.
Torque
Angle
Z1
Z2 Reach at 50 to 67% of
RPFA
Fig. 8 Generator Phase Distance Backup Protection Settings
15
To enhance security and safe load margins while still providing the necessary zone 2
relay reach, it is possible to use both load encroachment and out-of-step blocking
techniques. Out-of-step blocking uses a zone 3 impedance element that completely
surrounds the zone 2 trip element to provide blocking logic. The zone 3 distance
element must be set less than the capability of the generator as illustrated in Fig. 9. For
power system swing conditions, the impedance locus will first enter into zone 3 before
entering zone 2. For fault conditions, the impedance will instantaneously enter the zone
2 trip characteristic. Out-of-step logic is provided such that if zone 3 operates prior to
zone 2, a power swing condition exists and zone 2 is blocked from operating. To
enhance steady-state loadability, a notch blinder is used as illustrated in Fig. 9. The part
of the zone 2 trip circle is blocked from operating to increase loadability at the
generator’s rated power factor angle (RPFA). Both these techniques are available in
multifunction digital generator relay packages.
Z3 out of step blocking

JX
Z3

Z2 Must be Less then 80 to 90%
of Capability Curve
Generator
Capability
Curve
Max.
Torque
Angle Z2 Reach at 50 to 67% of
Z1
Load Encroachment
Blocking
RPFA
Fig. 9 Security Enhancements for Generator Phase Backup Distance Protection
Generator Voltage Overcurrent (51V) Backup Protection
Two types of voltage overcurrent relays are widely used to provide generator phase
fault backup protections. As with distance backup protection, these relays are installed
at the generator and provide direct tripping for slow clearing system faults. Tripping
must be delayed to coordinate with system backup and breaker failure protection. For
generators connected to weak systems, the voltage drop at the generator for remote
system fault may not be substantially different than emergency voltage conditions. For
these cases, settings should be based on providing the necessary security. System
backup shortcoming can be addressed by improving the protection on the transmission
system through the installation for delineated primary and backup line protection, as
well as local breaker failure. Use of distance relay schemes described above can also
provide added flexibility in addressing the problem.
16
Voltage-Controlled Overcurrent Relays are designed to operate a time overcurrent
element when the voltage element within the relay senses a voltage that is below a level
set by the user. Under both normal and emergency operating conditions, the voltage
relay should be set so as not to enable the overcurrent element. For fault backup
conditions, the voltage dip is much greater and the voltage relay is set to operate,
allowing the overcurrent relay to trip. Because of the delay involved in tripping, the
pickup value of the overcurrent relay is set based on fault current levels determined by
the generator synchronous reactance (Xd). This typically requires pickup settings of 30-
40% of generator full load current. Setting the voltage element well below the worst
case voltage for which the system is expected to survive provides the security against
false operating during system disturbances. The worst-case system voltage level could
be as low as 90% of normal. The overcurrent element is delayed to coordinate with
system backup relaying. A number of voltage-controlled overcurrent relays falsely
operated during the 1996 West Coast blackout because the voltage element was
improperly set above emergency system voltage experienced during the event.
Voltage-Restrained Overcurrent Relays are designed such that when voltage is

reduced, the overcurrent element pickup is automatically proportionally reduced. This
occurs over a range of voltages from 25 to 100% of normal. For voltages below 25%,
the overcurrent pickup is maintained at the 25% level. The pickup of the overcurrent
element should be set at 150% of the generator-rated current. This provides a margin of
135% should the system voltage be reduced during emergency conditions to 90% of
normal. The overcurrent element must be delayed to coordinate with system backup
relaying and is set based on fault current levels determined by the generator
synchronous reactance (Xd).
VI. GENERATOR PROTECTION TACTICS TO PROVIDE RELIABILITY FOR

TRIPPING ON UNSTABLE POWER SWINGS AND UNDERVOLTAGE
As discussed in detail in Section II of this paper, power system conditions such as

steady-state and transient instability can cause a generator to be driven unstable, lose
synchronism with the system and slip a pole. When this occurs, the generator should be
tripped as soon as possible to prevent generator damage and before more widespread
system outages develop. Out-of-step conditions when the generator has slipped a pole
cause high currents in the generator windings and high levels of transient shaft torque.
If the slip frequency of the unit with respect to the power system approaches a natural
torsional frequency of the shaft, the torques can be high enough to break a shaft. The
unit step-up transformer will also be subjected to very high transient winding currents
that impose high mechanical stresses on its windings.
Out-of-Step (78) Generator Protection
Following the 1965 U.S. Northeastern power blackout, considerable attention was given
to the need for applying out-of-step protection to generators. Prior to EHV transmission
17
systems and large generators, the electrical center during an out-of-step occurrence
was out in the transmission system. Thus, the impedance locus could be detected by
transmission line out-of-step relaying schemes, and the system could be separated
without the need for tripping generators. With the advent of modern EHV systems,
system impedances have decreased. As a result, in most power systems today, the
electrical center for out-of-step conditions occur in the generator or in the step-up
transformer for a fault near the generator.
Fig. 3 in Section II of this paper provides a detailed description of transient stability from
a power angle analysis point of view. The best way to detect an out-of-step generator
condition, however, is to analyze the apparent impedance variations with time as
viewed at the terminals of the generator. This variation in impedance can be detected
by distance-type relays. The apparent impedance locus depends on the type of
excitation system on the unit as well as the type of fault that initiated the impedance
swing.
Fig. 10 illustrates this concept on an R-X diagram as viewed from the terminals of the
generator. This is the normal location for the out-of-step (78) relay as shown in Fig. 3.
The generator transient reactance (X’d), GSU transformer reactance (XT), and power
system reactance (Xs) are plotted on an R-X diagram. These impedances should be put
on the generator MVA and voltage base. If one assumes |Es| = |Eg|, the locus of the
system swing will be located on a perpendicular line bisecting the line drawn between
XS and X’d as shown in Fig. 10. In this widely used graphical out-of-step method, the
reactance elements in the out-of-step relay are set at θC =120˚.
More precise angle settings can be determined from stability studies or through equal
area criteria analysis as discussed in Section II of this paper. When the swing locus
exits blinder A or the supervising Mho circle, generator tripping is initiated. When this
happens, the generator has lost synchronism; it has slipped a pole and must be
separated from the system.
Fig. 10 Impedance Locus Analysis of Out of Step Protection
18
Undervoltage Tripping Brought About by System VAr Deficits
Undervoltage conditions are not harmful to synchronous generators and there is no

recommendation within IEEE protection guides (such as C37.102) [3] that recommend
tripping of the machines for low-voltage conditions. This statement is true only if the
excitation system AVR control operates properly. An indirect effect of low system voltage
that has tripped generators during system disturbances is the loss of auxiliary motors,
which overheat due to extended operation at low voltages. Local motor protection trips
these motors. With the loss of key auxiliary motors, steam and gas turbines typical trip—
resulting in the loss of these generators.
Auxiliary system undervoltage tripping is applied at all U.S. nuclear plants where
protection of safety-related auxiliary equipment is of paramount importance. These
undervoltage relays are located on the auxiliary system bus and are typically set close to
90% of normal operating voltage, with time delays to prevent tripping for system fault
conditions. These schemes are designed to separate the nuclear auxiliary system from
the power system at these voltage levels because the system voltage has decayed to a
point where the nuclear plant cannot safely shut down because of the worst-case
scenario of a loss-of-coolant accident. System relay engineers and system planners
should recognize the loss of nuclear generation at low voltage levels when modeling
disturbances.
During some system disturbances where interconnected regions become separated,

scheduled interchanges can no longer be maintained during the immediate post-
disturbance timeframe. If Automatic Generation Control (AGC) is in service, it may try to
adjust generator outputs in a fruitless attempt to maintain scheduled interconnection
transactions though transmission paths that no longer exist. Such blind AGC control can
result in unacceptable voltage and frequency. Special protection schemes applied for
system protection may include control action to suspend AGC under these conditions.
VII. RESPONSE OF AVR CONTROL AND LIMITERS DURING MAJOR

DISTURBANCES
In North America, the North America Electric Reliability Council (NERC) requires that
system operators have positive assurances that generator excitation controls are in
service and that specified generator reactive power is available. Assurance of this
capability requires periodic testing of the AVR control to ensure it is operating properly
and it coordinates with the protection system. NERC is also requiring specific data for
generators that are interconnected to the power grid and above a specific MVA size (in
some cases, as small as 10 MVA). This information includes:
• Reactive capability range of the generator

• Excitation system models with data validated by tests
19
• Generator characteristics and synchronous, transient and subtransient
reactances that are verified by test data
• Excitation limiters must be modeled and verified
• Generator protection relays must be verified that they coordinate with
excitation limiters. (The methods for doing this coordination are described
in this paper.)
• The excitation system must be operated in the automatic mode.
• For generators operating in the western United States, a power system
(PPS) must be enabled and a verified model provided.
These NERC requirements [6] point out the importance of the generators AVR control
and associated excitation systems in helping avoid system blackouts. During system
stress conditions, the AVR limits are frequently challenged when system conditions such
as voltage collapse or steady-state stability limits might be approached. The AVR control
limiters play an important role in making sure the generator is operated within its
capability while providing short-time positive and negative field forcing to help stabilize
both high- and low-transient system voltage due to fault and load rejections.
Effects of Voltage Depression on AVR Control and Limiters
The generator AVR uses the generator terminal voltage and phase current to calculate
generator operating conditions as shown in Fig. 11. By comparing the actual point of
operation to the desired level, the AVR determines when it is appropriate to adjust the
generator field current to maintain the desired generator operating voltage. Depending
on the specific manufacturer, the AVR limiter settings may change with voltage. Some
AVR limiters change as the square of the voltage (90% voltage results in 81% of the
setting), while others are proportional with the voltage (90% voltage results in 90% of
the setting). Still other limiters may not change with voltage at all. To assure proper
operation for all conditions, the specific limiter voltage variation characteristic should be
identified when setting the limiter and the performance at the lowest credible operating
voltage examined.
Generator Step-up
Transformer
Generator
Field CT VT
Gen.
Excitation
AVR
Transformer
Static
Exciter
Fig. 11 Basic Static Excitation System
20
AVR Limiters and Response During Disturbances
In disturbances where short circuits depress the system voltage, electrical power cannot
fully be delivered to the transmission system. Fast response of the AVR and excitation
system help to increase the synchronizing torque to allow the generator to remain in
synchronism with the system. Field-forcing techniques are used to rapidly increase field
current above the steady-state rating for a short time to increase synchronizing torque
to enhance generator stability. Negative field-forcing provides fast response for load
rejection and de-excitation during internal generator faults. After the short circuit has
been cleared, the resulting oscillations of the generator rotor speed with respect to the
system frequency will cause the terminal voltage to fluctuate above and below the AVR
setpoint. AVR control limiters are used to prevent the AVR from imposing unacceptable
conditions upon the generator. These controls are the maximum and minimum
excitation limiters that are also discussed in Section III of this paper. The overexcitation
limiter (OEL) prevents the AVR from trying to supply more excitation current than the
excitation system can supply or the generator field can withstand. The OEL must limit
excitation current before the generator field overload protection operates. The under
excitation limiter (UEL) prevents the AVR from reducing excitation to such a low level
that the generator is in danger of losing synchronism. The UEL must be coordinated
with the generator capability, steady-state stability limits and loss-of-field relay as
discussed in Section IV of this paper.
Using PSS to Maintain Stability
As discussed above, a fast-acting AVR is very desirable to help stabilize generator

voltage during major disturbances such as fault or load rejection situations. However,
these fast-acting systems can also contribute a significant amount of negative damping
that results in amplifying small, low-frequency MW oscillations that can occur in a power
system. These MW oscillations after a fault may vary in frequency typically from 0.1 to 2
Hz. This problem has been most often associated with the western region of the U.S.
and Canada, where transmission lines connect generators to the load center over long
distances. It can, however, occur anywhere the load is remote from the generation.
When this occurs, the generator can eventually be driven unstable, lose synchronism
and slip a pole. To address this problem, a Power System Stabilizer (PSS) is utilized in
conjunction with the generator AVR to provide positive damping when megawatt
oscillations occur. The PSS is a low frequency filter that prevents the AVR from
amplifying low frequency MW oscillations. With the aid of a PPS, the excitation system
will vary the generator field current to apply torque to the rotor to damp these
oscillations. PSSs are required by NERC/Western Electric Coordinating Council
(WECC) in the western U.S. and Canada for generators exceeding 30 MVA, or groups
of generators exceeding 75 MVA with excitation systems installed after November 1993.
VIII CONCLUSIONS
Recent misoperations of generation protection during major system disturbances have

highlighted the need for better coordination of generator protection with generator
21
capability, generator excitation control (AVR) limiters and transmission system
protection. The techniques, methods and practices to provide this coordination are well
established but scattered in various textbooks, papers and relay manufacturers’
literature. This paper provides a single document that can be used by relay engineers to
address these coordination issues. In addition, security improvements that are made
possible, and practical, through the use of digital generator protection are also
highlighted.
This paper also discusses in detail the important role the generator AVR plays during
major system disturbances. Since most recent major power system disturbances are
the result of voltage collapse, generator protection must be secure during low-voltage
system conditions while still providing generator protection. In addition, the generator
AVR needs to properly control VAr support to rapidly stabilize system voltage during
major disturbances. This paper provides practical guidance on proper coordination of
generator protection and generator control to enhance security and system stability.
IX REFERENCES
[1] “Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada:
Causes and Recommendations”, U.S. – Canada Power System Outage Task Force,
April 5, 2004.
[2] “American National Standard for Cylindrical Rotor Synchronous Generators”,
ANSI/IEEE C50.13 and C50.12-latest revision
[3] “IEEE Guide for AC Generator Protection”, ANSI/IEEE C37.102-1995.
[4] IEEE Committee Report “A Survey of Generator Back-Up Protection Practices” IEEE
Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol.5 April 1990.
[5] IEEE Committee Report “ Performance of Generator Protection During Major System
Disturbances” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery,
[6] D.S.Kral, R.C. Schaefer “NERC Power Industry Policies” IEEE Industrial Applications
Magazine, March/April 2004
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Charles (Chuck) Mozina is a Consultant, Protection and Protection Systems, for

Beckwith Electric Company, Inc., specializing in power plant and generator protection.
Chuck is an active 20-year member of the IEEE Power System Relay Committee
(PSRC) and is the past chairman of the Rotating Machinery Subcommittee. He is active
in the IEEE IAS I&CPS committee, which addresses industrial protection system. He is
the past U.S. representative to the CIGRE Study Committee 34 on System Protection
and has chaired a CIGRE working group on generator protection. He also chaired the
IEEE task force that produced the tutorial “The Protection of Synchronous Generators,”
which won the PES‘s 1995 Outstanding Working Group Award. Chuck is the 1993
recipient of the PSRC‘s Career Service Award.
Chuck has a BSEE from Purdue University and has authored a number of papers and
magazine articles on protective relaying. He has over 25 years of experience as a
protective engineer at Centerior Energy, a major investor-owned utility in Cleveland,
Ohio.
22
Blackout
Avoidance
Panel Discussion and
Open Forum on
Blackout Avoidance
Bob Stuart
Principal T&D Consultant and
Director of Business Development,
EleQuant

2005 Beckwith Electric Protection Seminar
Common Causes of Recent Disturbances

z Vegetation Management
- August 10th 1996 and August 14th 2003 disturbances
- Tree related outages hours before final bang
- 345 kV and 500 kV lines below 50% of their normal rating!
z Operator Training
- August 10th 1996, August 14th 2003 & June 14 2004 dist.
- Operator awareness – didn’t know single worst contingency
- Operational planning – hadn’t studied feasible scenarios
Common Causes of Recent Disturbances

z Operating Tools
- Visualization – dynamic mapboards
- EMS/SCADA failures
- Lack of robust state estimation
- Inability to do real time contingency analysis
z Protective Relays and RAS/SPS Schemes
- Zone 3 relay load encroachment
- Remote backup protection – both relay and breaker failure
- Out-of-step tripping – RAS/SPS Schemes
August 14th Disturbance Report 100

Relay Recommendations
50 East
z Zone 3 Relay Loadability
West
z Recommendation 8a 0
1st 3rd North
z Sammis – Star 345 kV line Qtr Qtr
- 120% of Emergency Rating
- .97 p.u. & 27 degree angle
z Defining moment
z SPCTF formed in 2004
z 14 Technical Exceptions
August 14th Disturbance Report

Recommendations
z Undervoltage Load Shedding
z Recommendation 8b
z Had 1500 MW of load been
tripped – contained to
Cleveland
z WECC Guidelines –
Extensive use of PV and QV
curve analysis
z NERC Planning Committee
has assigned to TIS
subcommittee
August 14th Disturbance Report Recommendations

z Remote Backup Protection
- Within scope of 8a and 21a (US – Canada Task Force)
- Set guidelines for use of local and remote backup
- Sammis Zone 3 relay set for 200% of line to protect remote
transformer
z Switch on to Fault Logic
- A 138 kV line inadvertently tripped on re-energization because
of this feature.
- Intended for 0 voltage faults
- Recommended that SPCTF review this feature
August 14th Disturbance Report Recommendations

z Comprehensive review of underfrequency protection
- Generator underfrequency protection tripped units before UFLS
could arrest frequency decline
- UFLS was constrained from operating due to undervoltage
- Some UFLS time delay settings were too long to arrest decline
- Better coordination with generator underfrequency protection
and UFLS is needed
- Coordination with UVLS to ensure proper operation
- Coordination of UFLS between Regions
Initiating Number of
August 14th Disturbance Report
Recommendations Tripping Relay Generators
Tripped
z Generator Backup Protection
in Cohesive Groups Inadvertent 6
- Generators in Southeastern Energization
Michigan acted as a group Volts/Hertz 10
- Generation relays intended to
protect components reacted to Voltage Restrained 4
transmission system Overcurrent
- Low frequencies combined with Undervoltage 25
high voltages – miscoordination
- Loss of excitation relays need Overcurrent 15
to coordinate with excitation
Loss of Excitation 11
controls
Defense in Depth
A number of generator control, protection systems
and transmission system control interacted
sometimes in an uncoordinated manner across
regional boundaries.
An overall in depth philosophy and integrated strategy

is needed to prevent cascading outages in the future.
This strategy would include the integration of
monitoring, control, protection, new measurements,
analysis and advanced protection systems.
Defense in Depth
z Wide Area and Local Monitoring of System Operating
Conditions
- Combination of SCADA & Wide Area Measurement
z Wide-area high-speed phasor measurements that
measure relative phase angles across major
interconnections – widely known as PMUs
- WAMS – Wide Area Phase Angle Measuring System
- EIPP – Eastern Interconnection Phasor Project
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
Relative Phase Angle
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Normal Angle ~25º
20
10
0
15:05:00 15:32:00 15:44:00 15:51:00 16:05:00 16:06:01 16:09:05 16:10:38
Time (EDT)
Cleveland West MI
Defense in Depth
z Monitoring of inter-area,
slow speed oscillations
- Inter-area oscillations
on August 10, 1996
Defense in Depth
z Priority based alarm processing
- Hierarchal alarms
z State Estimation of existing conditions
- Must be robust enough to converge during contingencies
- Topology and parameter estimation
- New technology that uses non-iterative load flow
- Many major control areas do not yet have robust estimators
z Early Warning contingency analysis of existing and potential
system conditions
- Advanced applications that depend on robust state estimator
Defense in Depth
z Pattern recognition of operationally dangerous system
configurations
z Emergency operation plans for severe contingencies
- Operating nomograms
z Operator training, including severe condition
scenarios, to enhance situational awareness
- New technology that saved real time power flow
cases to DTS
Defense in Depth
z Coordinated UVLS and UFLS systems
z System restoration plans that are adaptable to

conditions existing after an outage
- New technology that uses advanced algorithms to generate an
optimal restoration plan based on state of the system
- In service at PG&E for San Francisco
A* Algorithm is used to determine optimum path
Allowable
Operation
State of System Possible Next

State of System
Combinatorial
Explosion
Target
Initial State
Optimum State
Path
Blackout
Avoidance
Open Forum on
Blackout Avoidance
Dr. Navin Bhatt

Analysis Manager, American Electric Power

AUG. 14, 2003 US-CANADA BLACKOUT
PRESENTATION BY:
NAVIN BHATT
MEMBER, NERC TECHNICAL INVESTIGATION TEAM
(MANAGER - SYSTEM DYNAMICS ANALYSIS, AEP)
(MANAGER – TRANSMISSION R&D PROGRAM, AEP)
2005 BECKWITH ELECTRIC PROTECTION SEMINAR

(PANEL SESSION: POWER PLANT PROTECTION AND CONTROL
STRATEGIES FOR BLACKOUT AVOIDANCE)
SEPTEMBER 27, 2005
1
AUG. 14, 2003 US-CANADA BLACKOUT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:
A part of this material represents NERC investigation

efforts.
2
Presentation Outline
I. Overview of 8/14/03 Blackout

● Sequence of Events
● Root Causes
II. 8/14/03 Blackout: Response of Generating Plants
III. NERC Standards on Generator Control and

Protection
IV. Concluding Remarks

3
I. Overview of 08/14/03 Blackout
● Affected approximately 50 million people in 8 states and

2 provinces.
● 60-65,000 MW of load initially interrupted
− Approximately 11% of Eastern Interconnection
● 400+ transmission lines tripped
● 508+ generating units at 265 plants tripped
● High speed cascading lasted approximately 12 seconds
4
NERC Regions Affected: MAAC, ECAR, NPCC
5
Blackout Started in Midwest
6
Conditions Prior to Blackout
● Electric demands high, but not unusually high

● Power transfer levels high, but
within established limits & previously experienced
levels
● Critical voltage day
Voltages within limits
Operators taking action to boost voltages
● Frequency
Typical for a summer day
● System was within limits prior to 3:05 PM, on both
actual and contingency basis
7
Sequence of Events: Computer Events
Midwest ISO (MISO)
● MISO state estimator (SE) and real time contingency

analysis (RTCA) ineffective from 12:15 to 4:04
● Prevented MISO from performing “early warning”

assessments
8
Sequence of Events: Computer Events
FirstEnergy (FE)
● 2:14 Start of EMS equipment failure.

● 3:59 EMS fully functional
● Contributed to inadequate situational awareness at FE.
9
Sequence of Events: Grid Events
Transmission Lines
765 kV
500 kV
ONTARIO
345 kV
230 kV
10
East Lake 5 Trip: 1:31:34 PM
ONTARIO
11
Chamberlin-Harding (3:05:41)
12
(3:05:41) Hanna-Juniper
(3:32:03)
13
(3:05:41)
(3:32:03)
Star- S. Canton (3:41:35)
14
SUMMARY OF INITIAL LINE TRIPS
LINE TIME LOADING CAUSE
Harding- 3:05:41 PM 44% Summer Tree Contact

Chamberlin Normal/Emerg
345 kV ency (SN/SE)
Hanna- 3:32:03 PM 88% SN/SE Tree Contact
Juniper
345 kV
Star-South 3:41:35 PM 93% SE Tree Contact
Canton
345 kV
15
Dale-W.Canton 138 kV
138 kV Cascade Contributes Further to Overload of
16:05:55 EDT
W.Akron 138 kV Breaker
Chamberlin-W.Akron 138 kV
Sammis-Star
E.Lima-N.Finlay 138 kV
Sammis-Star 345 kV Line
15:51:41 EDT
Canton Central Transformer
W.Akron-Pleasant Valley 138 kV
Babb-W.Akron 138 kV
E.Lima-New Liberty 138 kV
Cloverdale-Torrey 138 kV
Star-S.Canton
15:41:35 EDT
Hanna-
Juniper
15:32:03 EDT
Harding-
Chamberlin
15:05:41 EDT
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
16
% of Normal Ratings
Sammis-Star
(4:05:57.5)
17
Actual Voltages Leading to Sammis-Star
370
Harding - Chamberlin Hanna - Juniper Gaps in Data Records
345 kV Line Trip 345 kV Line Trip
350 100% Voltage
95% Voltage
330
Voltage (kV)
90% Voltage
310
Star - South Canton
Star 345 kV Line Trip
290 Sammis - Star
Hanna 345 kV Line Trip
Beaver
270
Perry
250
15:00 Time - EDT 16:00
18
Major Path to Cleveland Blocked after Loss of Sammis-Star
4:05:57.5 PM
Remaining
Paths
19
345 kV Lines Trip Across Ohio to West
ONTARIO
20
Generation Trips 4:09:08 – 4:10:27 PM
ONTARIO
21
345 kV Transmission Cascade Moves North into Michigan
4:10:36 – 4:10:37 PM
22
Northern Ohio and Eastern Michigan Served Only from Ontario
after 4:10:37.5 – 4:10:38.6 PM
23
Power Transfers Shift at 4:10:38.6 PM
24
Overloads on PJM – NY Ties 4:10:39 PM
25
PJM – NY Separating 4:10:44 PM
26
Cleveland – Toledo Island 4:10:39 - 4:10:46 PM
Cleveland Blacks Out
27
Northeast Completes Separation from Eastern Interconnection
4:10:43 – 4:10:45 PM
28
Island Breaks Up: 4:10:46 – 4:13 PM
29
End of the Cascade
Some Local Load

Interrupted
Areas Affected by the Blackout

Service maintained
in some area
30
Causes of Blackout Initiation
Group 1: Inadequate System Understanding
Group 2: Inadequate Situational Awareness
Group 3: Inadequate Tree Trimming
Group 4: Inadequate Reliability Coordinator (RC)

Diagnostic Support
31
Group 1: Inadequate System Understanding
● FE failed to conduct rigorous long-term planning studies of its system.
● FE did not conduct sufficient voltage analyses of its Ohio control area.
● FE used operational voltage criteria that did not reflect actual voltage
stability conditions and needs
● ECAR did not conduct an independent review or analysis of FE’s voltage

criteria and operating needs.
● Some NERC standards were sufficiently ambiguous that FE could

interpret them to include practices that were inadequate for reliable
system operation.
32
Group 2: Inadequate Situational Awareness
● FE failed to ensure security of its system after significant unforeseen

contingencies
Because FE did not use an effective contingency analysis capability on a
routine basis.
● FE lacked procedures to ensure that its operators were continually

aware functional state of their critical monitoring tools.
● FE control center IT and operations staff did not have effective internal
communication procedures.
● FE lacked procedures to test effectively the functional state of its

monitoring tools after repairs
● FE did not have adequate backup monitoring tools to facilitate its

operators’ understanding of system conditions after failure of primary
monitoring/alarming systems.
33
Group 3: Inadequate Tree Trimming
● FE failed to adequately manage tree growth in its

transmission rights-of-way.
This caused outage of three 345-kV lines and one 138-kV line.
34
Group 4: Inadequate RC Diagnostic Support
● MISO did not have real-time data from DP&L’s Stuart-Atlanta 345 kV
line incorporated in its state estimator.
This precluded MISO from becoming aware of FE’s system problems earlier
and providing assistance to FE.
● MISO was using non-real-time data to support real time flowgate

monitoring.
This prevented MISO from detecting an N-1 violation in FE’s system and
from assisting FE in relief actions.
● MISO lacked an effective way to identify the location and significance of

transmission line breaker operations reported by their EMS.
Such info would have enabled MISO operators to become aware earlier of
important line outages.
● PJM and MISO lacked joint procedures or guidelines on how and when
to coordinate a security limit violation observed by one of them in
other’s area due to a contingency near their common boundary.
35
Recommendations
Set 1: NERC Recommendations, Dated February 10,

2004
Set 2: U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force

Final Report, Dated April 2004
36
II. 08/14/03 Blackout:
Response of Generating Plants
37
● 508+ generating units at 265 plants tripped

● Ontario: 92 Plants
● NY: 70 Plants
● Conventional Steam: 66 Plants
● Combustion Turbine: 70 Plants
● Hydro: 101 Plants
38
East Lake 5 Exciter Failure Causes Trip
(1:31:34 PM)
39
System In Steady State (Until Samis-Star Trip @

about 4:06 PM)
● Initial trips caused by generator protective relays
● In response to overloaded lines
● Reported as due to under-voltage or over-

current
40
Summary:
● Generation outages did not initiate the

cascading blackout
● Generators tripped out in 3 main categories:

● 1. Excitation system overload or failure
● 2. Plant control system action or failure
● 3. Configuration involving tripped lines
41
Protection
● NERC developed Planning Standards in

1996/97.
● Some standards are currently enforced.
● Other standards are currently being

revised.
● All the standards related to generator

control & protection are currently
undergoing revision by NERC.
42
Protection
NERC Generator Control and Protection

(GCP) Standards
● Set One (Currently Posted on NERC

Website for Comments by 10/15/05 )
You are encouraged to provide comments.
http://www.nerc.com/~filez/standards/Phas
e-III-IV.html
● Set Two (Will be posted on NERC Website

for Comments)
43
Protection
Set One (Currently Posted on NERC Website

for Comments )
Standard PRC-003-1 — Regional Requirements

for Analysis of Misoperations of Transmission
and Generation Protection Systems
Standard PRC-004-1 — Analysis and Mitigation

of Transmission and Generation Protection
System Misoperations
44
Protection
Set One (Continued)
Standard PRC-005-1 — Transmission and

Generation Protection System Maintenance and
Testing
Standard PRC-019-1 — Coordination of

Generator Voltage Regulator Controls with Unit
Capabilities and Protection
Standard PRC-024-1 — Generator Performance

During Frequency and Voltage Excursions
45
Protection
Set Two (Will be posted later for comments)
Standard MOD-027-1 - Verification and Status of

Generating Unit Frequency Response
Standard VAR-001-1 - Voltage and Reactive

Control
Standard VAR-002-1 - Generator Operation for

Maintaining Network Voltage Schedules
46
IV. Concluding Remarks
● Generation protection & control play a critical role in

maintaining reliability of the interconnected system.
● The NERC Planning Standards (mentioned in Section III)

are meant to identify the specific role of generator
protection and control.
● It is important for the industry to provide input in the

development of NERC Planning Standards.
Practical, meaningful standards
Reasonable and effective standards
● Compliance with standards: Important

Avoid major outages/blackouts
Avoid penalty
47
Blackout
Avoidance
Open Forum on
Blackout Avoidance
Mohamed A. Ibrahim
Fellow IEEE

Blackout Avoidance
Protection and Control Areas
By:
Mohamed Ibrahim
Fellow IEEE
Blackout Avoidance
Presentation Summary
1. Protection and control design criteria
2. Relay setting criteria
3. Zone 3 as a remote backup
4. Breaker failure protection
5. Power system oscillation
6. Fragmentation of the power system
7. Power system operation
8. Application of Merchant plants
9. Present utility technical environment
10. Management of new numerical relaying
11. Basics of protection and control
Blackout Avoidance
1 – Implementation of sound protection and

control basic design criteria
All elements of the Bulk power system should be

protected by dual protection systems
The use of common components to the two

systems should be avoided
The use of diverse manufacturers is preferable
Dual dc batteries
Dual ac supplies to substations

Blackout Avoidance
Basic design criteria cont’d:
Individual potential and current transformer

windings for each system
Dual breaker trip coils
Dual communication systems
Physical separation of wiring and devices
Meeting the above criteria will enable each of

the protection systems to independently
detect and isolate all faults without undue
disturbance to the power system
Blackout Avoidance
2 – The EHV system should be protected

using a two-zone distance relaying with
simple clear setting criteria
For non-mutually coupled lines:
- Set Z1 phase between 80 – 90 % of line

- Set Z1 ground between 75- 80 % of line
- Set Z2 phase & ground at 125 % of line
These setting limits will provide adequate protection for

the line (provided breaker failure protection is applied)
and will limit the exposure of line relaying to stable
power system swings
Blackout Avoidance
Blackout Avoidance
3 – The use of the third zone element for EHV

systems to provide remote clearing for
breaker failure conditions should be avoided
The EHV system should not be treated similar to HV or
sub-transmission systems
The application of the third zone will require extensive

setting reach to cope with the in-feed phenomena and
its effect on the relay measured apparent impedance
The resulting Z3 setting will limit the line loading and

will react to emergency loading during system
deficiencies and may lead to a cascade of power
system interruptions and blackouts
Blackout Avoidance
Blackout Avoidance
4 – For Bulk Power Systems, breaker

failure protection should be implemented
using dedicated protection systems
The function should be applied using direct
transfer trip systems via dedicated communication
links, separate from the links utilized by line
protection
This will result in faster clearing time with the

isolation of minimum system (as compared to
remote clearing)
Blackout Avoidance
5 – The phenomena of power system

oscillation and how it impacts Z1 distance
relaying should be understood
Oscillations occur whenever:

- Sudden changes in load
- Transmission lines are switched
- Generators trip off line
- Faults occur on the system
Z1 is instantaneous and can be affected by the apparent
impedance swing locus during power system oscillation.
Implementation of power swing blocking (PSB) or out-of-
step tripping (OST) of distance elements can only be done
via extensive stability studies with different operating
conditions.
Blackout Avoidance
System frequency
59 60 61
Load 58 62 Generation
Analogy of the balance between generation and load
Infinite bus
Z Y
Modeling of power system oscillation using rubber band -

weight analogy
Blackout Avoidance
Blackout Avoidance
6 – Fragmentation of the power system in

different classes should be avoided
Different classes, namely transmission, generation and
distribution
Coordination of generator backup relaying with the rest
of the power system can be improved
Automatic under frequency load shedding programs
can be better coordinated
Load shedding compensation for generator trip by
under frequency relays applied for turbine mechanical
protection can then be better coordinated with the
automatic under frequency shedding programs
Verification of relay system performance during black
start conditions can be achieved
Analysis of power system disturbances and in
particular undesired operations can be improved
Blackout Avoidance
7 – Avoid Operating the power system close

to limits, to accommodate energy sales, and
thus limiting the occurrence of the following:
STE operating limits may be exceeded more

frequently even on first contingency basis
Existing relay settings must be re-evaluated for new
“market based” contingency limits
Transmission lines may be loaded to their thermal
limits hence increasing the possibility of line sag into
an under built circuit or making tree contact
Permanent line faults will become more prevalent
making proper automatic reclosing sequences
crititical to maintaining system stability under heavy
loading conditions
Blackout Avoidance
8 – Merchant plant proposals should be

based on planning studies
Deregulation has given rise to merchant plant

proposals and construction
Plants are normally based on the economics of

minimum cost and maximum return on investment
Physical siting is usually driven by the intersection

of available natural gas pipelines and electric
transmission lines
Little consideration is given to the reliability of the

transmission system
Blackout Avoidance
Blackout Avoidance
Blackout Avoidance
This can lead to proposals to:
Create tapped line configurations on bulk

EHV transmission lines that complicate the
protection systems and can severely impact
the reliability of the system
Addition of new special protection systems
In dense metropolitan systems that are near

short – circuit “saturation levels”, new
proposed generation can wreak havoc with
breaker interrupting capacities, requiring
system redesign
Blackout Avoidance
9 – Promote an environment of technical

competency and experience continuation
within each utility (as it was in the old time)
Unfortunately, totally competent managers in the utility
business are presently in short supply
Market based decisions that impact protection may not be
recognized
Spending on protection enhancements may be reduced
because immediate market return is not evident
Spending on protection maintenance may be also reduced
because immediate market return is not evident
Competent protection engineers (if they still exist) may not
be able to function in this “market based environment”
Blackout Avoidance
10 – Manufacturers should improve their

management of the new numerical relaying
technology
The new technology has several advantageous, but at the
same time is painful to implement
Relay setting is tedious and is accomplished using many
parameters as compared to few for the older technology
Several questions are raised:
How many numerical relay manufacturers have complete
control over their software revisions for individual
numerical relays?
How many companies are providing clear implementation
drawings where the users do not have to guess?
Improvements in these areas by manufacturers can
enhance the safe application of this technology
Blackout Avoidance
11 – Importance of the basics associated

with the invention and implementation of
electromechanical and static relays should
be emphasized
These basics are essential for the correct implementations
of the new numerical relaying technology and the
avoidance of undesired relay operations during system
emergencies
Electromechanical and static relaying schemes were

perfected through many years of operating experience are
now being applied by young engineers using the available
logic offered by numerical relaying
This will highlight the importance of familiarity of the basic

schemes to safely apply (often done without checking) the
new logic via the setting of numerical relaying
Blackout Avoidance
Conclusion
Apply sound protection and control criteria
Apply simple clear setting criteria
Avoid the use of Z3 as a remote backup

clearing element for breaker failure protection
Apply dedicated breaker failure protection
Understand power system oscillation

phenomena and its impact on Z1 element
Blackout Avoidance
Conclusion cont’d
Avoid fragmentation of the power system

Avoid operating the system close to limits
Apply merchant plants based on planning
studies for optimum location
Promote an environment of technical
competency and experience continuation
Improve the management of new numerical
relaying technology
Enforce the basics of the protection and
control areas
Blackout
Avoidance
Open Forum on
Blackout Avoidance
Santiago Barcon Palomar

President, INELAP

Blackout
Avoidance
Open Forum on
Blackout Avoidance
C. "Paul" Dalpiaz
Consulting Engineer, Communication,
Controls & Electrical Engineers, Inc.

Outage Avoidance Panel – 2005 BEPS
Paul Dalpiaz CC&E Engineers, Inc. SLC, UT 801-363-2100

IDAHO
Generation
Load Area
+/- 500 KV
To To Nevada To Glen To Four

LADWP Power Canyon Corners
FAST SLOW
Phase Angle Telemetry – Circa 1989

TSM ENCODER CAPTURES IPP HVDC LINE LOSS
GOSHEN ENCODER TREAS ENCODER
CAMP ENCODER
EMERY ENCODER
MONA ENCODER
PINTO ENCODER
IPP HVDC Line Loss – Power Surge
Resistive Brake Application Effect
Summary
• Each interconnected system is one big machine
with many internal “driveshafts”.
• Loss of a line/shaft can happen at any time,
increasing “twist” angle.
• Loss of a corridor requires rapid detection and
separation into islands of generation and load.
• Dispatchers and Operators need “big picture”
information and responses to various scenarios.
• Remedial Action Schemes deserve serious
consideration and planning/simulation.
Thank you!
• And thanks to Dr. Yalla and Tom Beckwith
for the opportunity to join the panel!
• It has been a pleasure to associate with
the other panel members.
• We all hope you will be better equipped to
deal with the future challenges of inter-
connected operation.
000
2
1:
d
re
0
te
90
g is
Re
IS O
BECKWITH ELECTRIC CO., INC.

6190 - 118th Avenue North • Largo, Florida 33773-3724 U.S.A.
Phone: (727) 544-2326 • Fax: (727) 546-0121
E-mail: marketing@beckwithelectric.com
Web Site: www.beckwithelectric.com
© 2005 Beckwith Electric Co.

Printed in U.S.A.

Book 4

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Judul Asli

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Book 4

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Book 4

• Power Plant Protection and Control Strategies for Blackout Avoidance

6190-118th Avenue North – Largo, Florida 33773

2005 Protection Seminar

6190-118th Avenue North – Largo, Florida 33773

 How And Why They Occur

 How They Affect Generators And

2003 - East Coast Blackout

2003 - Italian Blackout

2002 - Swedish Blackout

1997 - PJM Disturbance

1996 - West Coast Blackout

1995 - PECO Disturbance

Root Cause of Recent Blackouts

VOLTAGE COLLAPSE – WHY?

 Today, major generation sources are remote from

 This makes the power system very reliant on

Root Cause of Recent Blackouts

VOLTAGE COLLAPSE – WHY?

 Purchase power from remote sources to save

 New generation built remotely from load

How Voltage Collapses Occur

 As lines trip between remote generation and load

 This increases the reactive (VAR) losses- reducing

 The voltage phase angle between the

Real Power (MW) Flow

Where: Eg = Voltage at the Load Center

0s = Voltage Angle at Remote Generation

Real Power (MW) Flow Example

Where: Eg = Voltage at the Load Center

0s = Voltage Angle at Remote Generation

Real Power (MW) Flow Example

Where: Eg = Voltage at the Load Center

0s = Voltage Angle at Remote Generation

Real Power (Mvars) Flow

2. Voltage on a power system Es O

3. Thus VARS cannot be

Voltage Collapse Scenario

How Load Responds to Low Voltage

 Resistive load current decreases as voltage

 Motor loads are constant KVA devices and

 During “Heat Storm” conditions, most load is

Sources of Reactive (Var) Support

 VAr Support must be provided at the load

 Two major sources of VAr support:

Generators/ Synch. Condensers – A

How Generators Provide Vars to the

Generator Excitation & AVR Control

AVR Limiters Response During Low Voltage

DEPENDS ON THE MANUFACTURER:

 Some Limiters Change as the Square of the

 Some Proportional to Voltage – 90% Voltage

 Some Do Not Change with Voltage at all

Generator Instability During Major System

Three Types of Instability:

Steady State Instability

Steady State Instability

b) R-X DIAGRAM PLOT

Typical Out-of-Step Impedance LOCI

 Occurs when fast acting AVR control amplifies

 Occurs when generators are remote from load

 Solution is AVR Power System Stabilizers

 Required by WECC in the Western USA for

How And Why They Occur

How They Affect Generators And

Today, major generation sources are remote from

This makes the power system very reliant on

Purchase power from remote sources to save

New generation built remotely from load

As lines trip between remote generation and load

This increases the reactive (VAR) losses- reducing

The voltage phase angle between the

Resistive load current decreases as voltage

Motor loads are constant KVA devices and

During “Heat Storm” conditions, most load is

VAr Support must be provided at the load

Two major sources of VAr support:

Some Limiters Change as the Square of the

Some Proportional to Voltage – 90% Voltage

Some Do Not Change with Voltage at all

Occurs when fast acting AVR control amplifies

Occurs when generators are remote from load

Solution is AVR Power System Stabilizers

Required by WECC in the Western USA for

Loss of Field (40)

Overexcitation (24) System Backup (21 & 51V)

Under Frequency (81)

Out of Step Protection (78)

Loss of Field (40) – Must be Coordinated with

Under Frequency (81) – Coordinated with

Out of Step Protection (78) – Set to trip the

Generator (IEEE/ANSI C-50.12 &13)

Transformers (IEEE/ANSI C-57.12 )

Dual Set-point Definite Time

Inverse Time Curve

Voltage Restrained Overcurrent Relays

Hydro Generators not affected by Under Frequency

Gas Turbines Controls Run Back Mw Output When

Auxiliary System is Effected By Low Voltage –

U.S. Nuclear Plants Have Second Level Voltage

Automatic Generator Control (AGC) can Cause