POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|1
1. G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO
ARICAYOS, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal
filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private
respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St.
Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of
employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in
the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for
payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). 1
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee
but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral
Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an
overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of
Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily
helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over
the management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in
the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported
to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the
business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to
participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a
complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.2
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision
in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee
relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction
over the case. 3
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC
contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence
submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as an
employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996,
or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-
employee relationship between him and petitioner.4
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned
decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate
proceedings.5 Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,6 hence the
present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.7
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it
is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic
practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with
respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find
their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years into
the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the
Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural
aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in
the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions
were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately,
to the President of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same
to take effect six months after its promulgation. 8 Created and regulated therein is
the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment
for program and policy coordination only.9 Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223)
thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of
the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said
provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been
provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals
from the decision of the NLRC. 10 The present Section 223, as last amended by
Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall
decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and
that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt
thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of
Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court
nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the

courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction
even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial
review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the
substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances
which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications. 11
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court,
the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as
a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail
of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now
fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously,
although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already
have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held
that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on
jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period
under Rule 65. 14
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129
originally provided as follows:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall
exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or
commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases
and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling
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within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals. 15
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No.
7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines
under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of
this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary
to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original
and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the
Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed
within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower
appellate court, 16 the following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9
of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.:

1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the
Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced
by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials
and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to
paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now
provides "except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." (Emphasis supplied).
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial
agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the
Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impassè, both in point of purpose
and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of
the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special
original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess
of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications
of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically
referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This
would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal
does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. 17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally
construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals,
but to this Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court
of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the
aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|3
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have
intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that
matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades
us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the
said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did
intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases
by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the
intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently
arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of
Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee
Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452. 18
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship
speech 19 from which we reproduce the following excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time
expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate
jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of
Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129
and of subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4
of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of
the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review
of factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever
benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last
paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes
from its coverage the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the
Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495

seeks to eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and,
additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court
of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees
Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases
elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from
Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the
workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of
the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief
Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme
Court:
. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to
relieve the Supreme Court of the burden of
reviewing these cases which present no
important issues involved beyond the particular
fact and the parties involved, so that the
Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to
cases of public interest in the discharge of its
mandated task as the guardian of the
Constitution and the guarantor of the people's
basic rights and additional task expressly vested
on it now "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr.
President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years
ago. I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we
distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to
mount and add to the number of cases pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the
reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human
Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.
xxx xxx xxx
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Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee
Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the following proceedings
transpired: 20
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So
that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the
Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be
deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House
of Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the
House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr.
President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of
Committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was
passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on third
reading followed. 21 The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and
House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of
Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20,
1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court
earlier discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that
the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial

review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto
and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because
appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial
review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them,
however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special
civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court
and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would
subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on
Senate Bill No. 1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the
opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the
process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings.
On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure
would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be
appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the
advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and
reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said
bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly
the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final
and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A
perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in
nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute
resolutions. 24
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the
wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a
growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier
of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution
of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally
equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component
divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action
on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared
to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such
petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|5
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for
the relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in
accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs.
Vasquez, et al. 25 should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case
a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the
same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses
before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial
system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact
that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of
their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by
law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only
because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but
also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under
the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues
since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the
judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED,
to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the
views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

2. G.R. No. L-62255 January 30, l986
ALFREDO BAGSICAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO AGOT and LECATEDRA
AGOT, respondents.
CUEVAS, J.:p
Petition for review of the Decision of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
10054-CAR, entitled "Alfredo Bagsican, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. Pedro Agot and
Lecatedra Agot, Defendants-Appellants", which reversed and set aside the decision
of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations-Branch 111, Ozamis City, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered:
(1) Declaring the plaintiff herein, Alfredo Bagsican, the lawful
tenant on the coconut landholding in question, situated at
Buntawan, Oroquieta City;
(2) Ordering the defendants to reinstate immediately plaintiff
thereon;
(3) Ordering the defendants to pay, as damages, to plaintiff the
following:
(a) The sum of Eighty Pesos (P80.00) for the last quarter of the
year 1973 and P80.00 every quarter thereafter until reinstated;
(b) the sum of Twenty-Five Pesos (P25.00) as actual expenses for
transportation and meals.
(4) Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims for lack of proof.
Subject matter of the instant controversy is a 4-hectare landholding situated at
Buntawan, Oroquieta City. It forms part of a big tract of land consisting of 114
hectares, more or less, originally owned by the late Severo Jonson, father of private
respondent Lecatedra Jonson Agot.
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The aforementioned 4-hectare landholding was originally worked on and tenanted
by Juan Bagsican, father of the herein petitioner Alfredo Bagsican. After Juan's
death, his wife, assisted by the herein petitioner, continued tenanting the aforesaid
landholding. Petitioner's mother on the other hand died in 1940, and from then on
herein petitioner continued in working and tenanting the landholding in question
thereby planting an additional 267 coconut trees, bananas, fruit trees, cassava and
other root crops.
Severo Jonson died sometime in 1948. The big tract of land was then partitioned
among his children and the portion being worked on and tenanted by the petitioner
was alloted to Lecatedra Jonson Agot, the herein appellee. After the partition,
herein petitioner nevertheless continued with his occupation and tenancy of the
questioned landholding thereby delivering to herein private respondent her share
as an owner, on a 50-50 sharing basis, until September, 1973 when he was ejected
therefrom by the herein private respondent that culminated in the filing by the
petitioner of a complaint for Reinstatement with Damages, 1 against herein private
respondents before the Court of Agrarian Relations.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner with the disposition as
herein earlier stated. From the aforesaid judgment, private respondents appealed
to the defunct Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision appealed
from. 2
Petitioner now comes before Us through the instant petition contending among
other things, that (1) the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the "preponderance of
evidence rule" instead of the mere "substantial evidence rule" in the resolution of
the instant case, the same being an agrarian case; (2) the Court of Appeals cannot
disturb the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations on the mere issue of
credibility of witnesses; and (3) that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based
on a misapprehension of facts,
We find merit in petitioner's submittal that in agrarian cases, all that is required is
mere "substantial evidence". That has been the consistent ruling of this Court in a
long line of cases. 3 This substantial evidence rule was later incorporated in P.D.
946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 and has been expressly made applicable to
agrarian cases. Section 18 of the said decree provides:
The Court of Appeals shall affirm the decision or order or the
portions thereof appealed from if the findings ** of fact in the said
decision or order are supported by substantial evidence as basis
thereof, and the conclusions stated therein are not clearly against
the law and jurisprudence. . .

Under this rule, all that the appellate court has to do, insofar as the evidence is
concerned, is to find out if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. 4 So
much so that, the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations, if supported
by substantial evidence, are conclusive on the appellate tribunal. 5
Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is
required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its
absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct
or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or
criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence
or what evidence is entitled to belief. 6
In the case at bar, the trial court ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner on the
basis of the following findings of fact:
There is abundance of undenied evidence that the late Juan
Bagsican, father of the herein plaintiff, during his lifetime, was a
former tenant of a portion of the big tract of land owned by the
late Severo Jonson, defendant's father.
The Court, after careful examination of the evidence on record,
lends more credence to plaintiff's undisturbed claim, substantially
corroborated by his witness, that he succeeded and is in
continuous possesion and cultivation of his parents' landholding.
This started sometime in 1940, the year his mother died, who
succeeded also as tenant on the landholding after the death of her
spouse, Juan Bagsican (plaintiff's father) who died earlier than his
mother. After his mother's death, he succeeded and cultivated the
landholding and was able to plant 267 coco trees, bananas, fruit
trees, cassava, etc., but during the lifetime of his mother, he had
however, planted 30 coco trees. When these trees became fruit
bearing in 1948, which coincidentally was the year the big tract of
land was partitioned among the heirs of the late Severo Jonson,
plaintiff shared the harvest with the defendant Locatedra Jonson
Agot at a 60-50 sharing ratio since he was the one who planted
the coco trees (tsn, pp. 4-8, August 8, 1975; and tsn, pp. 2-4,
August 21, 1975).
The records disclose that after the estate of the late Severo Jonson
was partitioned in 1948, the tenanted landholding of the herein
plaintiff became the share or is now owned by the herein
defendant Lecatedra Jonson Agot which is not denied by the latter,
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|7
and as testified to by Felicisima Jonson, brother of the defendant
Lecatedra Jonson Agot (tsn, p. 2, August 21, 1975).
Such quantum of evidence cannot be washed away by a mere denial of the
existence of tenancy relationship as that set up by the private respondents who
claimed that petitioner was never a tenant of theirs in the land folding in question.
The observation and conclusion of the trial court that said cassava is bereft of merit
appeared to be well taken, since the persons who testified to be tenants on the said
landholding, separately described areas and boundaries different from that
admitted by the parties 7 and more so when their individual description materially
differs from each other. 8 The respondent court also took notice of said deficiency
in private respondent's evidence, but it rationalized its stand on this point in the
following manner:
The supposed discrepancies in the statement of boundaries are
understandable. Various new acquisitions had been made re: the
share of the other heirs. At any rate, this will indicate that the
defense witnesses were not iii collusion with one another.
Anent private respondent's assertion that it was Julio Lagamon and Brigido
Lagamon, father and son, respectively, who had been tenanting the landholding in
dispute, We find the trial court's finding on the said subject, which runs thus:
This confirm the belief of the court that these two tenants, namely:
Julio Lagamon and Brigido Lagamon, father and son, respectively,
are tenanting other portions of defendant's land other than the
land in question. This is buttressed by the fact that Julio Lagamon,
father-in-law of the herein plaintiff became a tenant of the
defendant only sometime in 1949 after the marriage of his
daughter to the herein plaintiff (now petitioner). It could be
informed that this Julio Lagamon came to know of the defendant
Lecatedra Jonson Agot only after this marriage for prior to this
period, he was arriving in Buenavista, Pagadian City which is
located in Zamboanga del Sur. (TSN, p. 38-40, Hearing of October
24, 1975).
to be likewise supported by the evidence on record and very much in accord with
logic and ordinary human experience.
Finally, with respect to petitioner's motive in filing the instant case, We quote with
approval the court's findings and observations on said issue. And it runs thus:
The court cannot sustain defendants' view that plaintiff's motive in
filing this case is retaliatory in nature due to the former's criminal
 POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|8

complaint against the latter's son, because, as so decided in Overo

vs. Caret, et al., CA-G.R. No. 43940-R, October 27, 1971, the
plaintiff..... like any man of ordinary intelligence, would not resort
to filing an action in Court for his reinstatement as a tenant had
there been no justifiable reason therefore. Man is presumed to
take ordinary care of his concerns. Indeed, it would be contrary to
human nature if the herein plaintiff would venture on an expensive
litigation, Poor as they are, and face the rigors of trial if they have
not been done any wrong. Even if defendants' view were true, the
same could not defeat a right which is protected by law. Besides,
plaintiff has substantially shown that he was indeed ejected by the
herein defendants as testified to by Felicisima Jonson (TSN, pp. 4-
5, August 21, 1975).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment of the respondent

Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and that of the Court of
Agrarian Relations is hereby REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs,

SO ORDERED.

3. G.R. No. 188952, September 21, 2016
PEÑAFRANCIA SHIPPING CORPORATION AND SANTA CLARA SHIPPING
CORPORATION, Petitioners, v.
168 SHIPPING LINES, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This case questions the propriety of the dismissal by the Court of Appeals (CA) of
a Rule 43 petition for review of a decision of the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA), for failure to appeal the same to the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and subsequently, to the Office of the
President (OP).
Facts
On September 28, 2007, respondent 168 Shipping Lines, Inc. (respondent) filed
with the MARINA Regional Office V (MARINA RO V), Legaspi City an application1 for
the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate M/V Star Ferry
I, a roll-on-roll-off vessel, in the route Matnog, Sorsogon to Allen, Northern Samar,
and vice versa. The schedule of trips as reflected in the application has 90
departures from the port of Matnog, Sorsogon and 86 departures from the port of
Allen, Northern Samar.2
Peñafrancia Shipping Corporation and Santa Clara Shipping Corporation
(petitioners), existing operators who own and operate ferry boats serving the ports
of Allen, Northern Samar and Matnog, Sorsogon, intervened in the proceeding and
opposed3 the application on the following grounds: (1) respondent failed to submit
a Certificate of Berthing as required under MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 74-
B;4 (2) the proposed schedule of trips in the original application is physically
impossible to perform by the applicant's lone vessel, the M/V Star Ferry I;5 and (3)
there exists an overtonnage in the route applied for by the respondent, thus
warranting the intervention of MARINA.6 Respondent countered that under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 92957 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR): (1) an
application for CPC is not adversarial in character and thus, a motion to intervene
and opposition are not allowed; and (2) there is no requirement for the CPC
applicant to secure a Certificate of Berthing from the Philippine Ports Authority.8
On December 13, 2007, the MARINA RO V required respondent to file an amended
CPC application with workable sailing frequencies/schedule of trips.9 However,
instead of complying with the directive, respondent merely submitted a pleading
denominated as RE: ADOPTION OF AMENDED SCHEDULE OF TRIPS. 10
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|9
The MARINA RO V, in its Decision11 dated February 1, 2008, denied due course to
respondent's application. Respondent filed its Motion for Reconsideration but this
was denied.12
Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal on March 26, 2008 before the Office of the
MARINA Administrator.13
On August 8, 2008, MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., joined by Deputy
Administrator for Operations Primo V. Rivera, all acting by authority of the Board,
reversed the Decision of the MARINA RO V and granted respondent's application for
issuance of a CPC.14 Thus, petitioners sought reconsideration of the MARINA
Decision, but their motion was denied through a Resolution15 signed by the MARINA
Officer-in-Charge Maria Elena H. Bautista who was then concurrent Undersecretary
for Maritime Transport of the DOTC.
Petitioners appealed to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However, the CA
dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative
remedies, hence, for lack of cause of action.16
The CA dismissed the petition through its Resolution17 dated March 24, 2009,
holding that:
Contrary to petitioners' stance that the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) is an
independent agency and that it has the final say in the outcome of its adjudication
in any contested matter, this Court finds and holds that MARINA is an entity within
the Executive Department. It will be noted that Presidential Decree No. 474
(Maritime Industry' Decree of 1974) organized MARINA under the Office of the
President. This was modified on July 23, 1979 by Executive Order No. 546 wherein
MARINA was made an attached agency of the then Ministry of Transportation and
Communications (MOTC) for policy and program coordination. This was confirmed
by the Administrative Code of 1987 x x x which explicitly provides that MARINA is
an agency attached to the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC).
Hence, MARINA is not independent of the executive structural organization and the
ruling of the MARINA Administrator is subject to the consecutive reviews of the
DOTC Secretary and the Office of the President as its administrative superiors in
the Executive Department pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies which requires an administrative decision to first be appealed to the
administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court
of justice for review. Thus, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still
be had by giving the administrative body concerned the opportunity to decide
on,the matter that comes within its jurisdiction, then such remedy should be priorly
exhausted before the court's judicial power is invoked.

Petitioners' failure to resort to the DOTC Secretary and then the Office of the
President, in case of an adverse decision, and the filing of the herein petition before
this Court is a premature invocation of the Court's intervention which renders the
instant petition without cause of action, hence, dismissible.18 (Underscoring
supplied; citations omitted.)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied.19 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioners, relying on the IRR of R.A. No. 9295, argue that: (1) a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is the immediate and direct remedy from the
adverse rulings of the MARINA;20 (2) the proper forum for review of the decision
rendered by a quasi-judicial agency is the CA;21 (3) the decision and resolution
subject of the Rule 43 petition were acts of the MARINA Board, and not merely by
the Administrator;22 (4) assuming an appeal to the DOTC Secretary and the Office
of the President is necessary, this case is an exception because . an appeal would
be a superfluity;23 (5) the doctrine of qualified political agency applies because the
DOTC Secretary, who is the chairman of the MARINA Board, is the alter ego of the
President;24 and (6) it would be impractical to file an appeal with the OP because
an individual from the OP is also a member of the MARINA Board.25
In its Comment,26 respondent counters that: (1) the IRR provision on appeal is void
and cannot supplant Section 19, Chapter IV, Book VII of the Administrative Code
of 1987 which provides that an appeal from a final decision of the agency may be
taken to the Department Head unless otherwise provided by law;27 (2) the IRR is
inapplicable since it did not provide for the mode of appeal of the decisions of the
MARINA Board, rather, it provided for appeals from an order, ruling, decision or
resolution of the MARINA Administrator;28 (3) the DOTC is an attached agency
under the control of the executive department and the decisions or rulings rendered
by the MARINA Board in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions are subject to
the review of the DOTC Secretary and the OP;29 (4) the MARINA was never taken
out of the framework of the executive department;30 (5) even assuming that the
decisions by the MARINA are not reviewable by the DOTC, the Constitution and the
Administrative Code of 1987 provide that the President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices;31 and (6) the case is not an exception
to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.32
Respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners committed
a willful act of forum shopping.33 Petitioners filed a Petition34 (moratorium petition)
dated March 22, 2010 before the MARINA, praying the latter to issue a moratorium
in the grant of CPCs for carriage of passengers and cargoes covering the routes
Matnog, Sorsogon - Allen, Northern Samar or Matnog; Sorsogon - Dapdap, Allen,
Northern Samar or Matnog; Sorsogon — San Isidro, Northern Samar and vice-
versa. They contend that the moratorium petition is an attempt by the petitioners
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|10
to achieve what they sought to achieve in the present case, i.e., to prevent
respondent or other entities from operating in the subject routes.35
Petitioners, in their Comment (To Respondent's Manifestation/Submission with
Leave of Court dated June 1, 2010),36 maintain that there is no forum shopping
since the two cases have different causes of action. In the present case, if the
judgment is favorable to petitioners, the effect will be retroactive, i.e., voidance of
the CPC already issued by the MARINA to respondent. Meanwhile, if the moratorium
petition is granted, the effect of the moratorium will be prospective, i.e., the
freezing of new applications for CPC or additional bottoms in the subject route.
Issues
(1) Whether petitioners committed forum shopping when they filed the
moratorium petition; and
(2) Whether the decision of the MARINA Board in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial function should be appealed first to the DOTC Secretary, and
subsequently to the OP, before appeal to the CA.
Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
I. No forum shopping.
There is, no forum shopping. There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively
avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues
either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court."37 The test to
determine'the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res
judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements
are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties representing
the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under
consideration.38
The moratorium petition prays for a relief different from that sought in the main
case, from which the present petition arose. In the moratorium petition, the
petitioners did not pray for the cancellation, or revocation of the CPC issued to the

respondent. What petitioners prayed for was a "moratorium or stoppage in the
grant of Certificates of Public Convenience for carriage of passengers and cargoes
involving the routes MATNOG, SORSOGON - ALLEN, NORTHERN SAMAR or
MATNOG, SORSOGON - DAPDAP, ALLEN, NORTHERN; SAMAR, or MATNOG,
SORSOGON - SAN ISIDRO, NORTHERN SAMAR AND VICE VERSA."39 Thus, any
decision of the MARINA on the moratorium petition will not affect the CPC already
issued in favor of the respondent and appealed before the CA, the subject matter
of the present case.
II. The CA properly dismissed the appeal.
Petitioners justify their direct resort to the CA by invoking the IRR of R.A. No.
9295,40 which provides for a procedure for appeal of decisions involving CPCs,41 to
wit:
RULE XV
APPEALS
Sec. 1. Appeal on Decisions Involving the CPC — Any order, ruling, decision or
resolution of the CO/MRO Director/OIC relating to the application for issuance of
Entity/Company CPC shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days unless a
Motion for Reconsideration is filed within the same period with the CO/MRO
Director/OIC concerned after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party affected.
The decision of the CO/MRO Director/OIC shall be final and executory unless within
the same period an appeal to the MARINA Administrator has been perfected.
The order, ruling decision or resolution of the MARINA Administrator shall be final
.and executory within fifteen (15) days unless an administrative appeal is filed with
the MARINA Board or petition for judicial review is filed with the Court of Appeals
or Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Petitioners claim that this provision of the IRR shows that "the appropriate remedy
against the adverse ruling of;the MARINA Board is a petition for review to the
Honorable Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court."42 However, as
correctly pointed out by the respondent, paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule XV of the IRR
applies only to an appeal of the order, ruling, decision or resolution of the MARINA
Administrator. There is no procedure for appeal of the decisions of the MARINA
Board. Hence, the IRR cannot be the basis for petitioners' appeal. Moreover, no
procedure for appeal before the courts is provided by R.A. No. 9295. Rules and
regulations issued to implement a law cannot go beyond its terms and provisions.43
Rule 43 governs all appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of
or authorized by any quasi-judicial1 agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions. Resort to the CA is authorized by Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
12944 which provides that the CA shall have jurisdiction over the decisions or final
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|11
orders of quasi-judicial agencies. The MARINA is a quasi-judicial agency, and
though it is not among the enumerated agencies in Rule 43, the list is not meant
to be exclusive.45
However, while Rule 43 provides for the appeal procedure from quasi-judicial
agencies to the CA, the aggrieved party must still exhaust administrative remedies
prior to recourse to the CA. Thus, Executive Order No. 292 otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides for the framework of administrative appeal
prior to judicial review:
BOOK VII - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 4 - ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL IN CONTESTED CASES
Sec. 19. Appeal.—Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an appeal
from a final decision of the agency may be taken to the Department head.
Sec. 20. Perfection of Administrative Appeals.—
(1) Administrative appeals under this Chapter shall be perfected within fifteen
(15) days after receipt of a copy of the decision complained of by the party
adversely affected, by filing with the agency which adjudicated the case a
notice of appeal, serving copies thereof upon trie prevailing party and the
appellate agency, and paying the required fees.
(2) If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right
to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal,
reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is
reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to perfect his
appeal.
(3) The agency shall, upon perfection of the appeal, transmit the records of
the case to the appellate agency.
Sec. 21. Effect of Appeal.—The appeal shall stay the decision appealed from unless
otherwise provided by law, or the appellate agency directs execution pending
appeal, as it may deem just, considering the nature and circumstances of the case.
Sec. 22. Action on Appeal.—The appellate agency shall review the records of the
proceedings and may, on its own initiative or upon motion, receive additional
evidence.
Sec. 23. Finality of Decision of Appellate Agency.—In any contested case, the
decision of the appellate agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days
after the receipt by the parties of a copy thereof.
xxx
 POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|12

officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
Sec. 25. Judicial Review.— the former with that of the latter."47

(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the OP to review
chapter and applicable laws.
any determination or disposition of a department head. The doctrine allows, indeed
requires, an administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative
(2) Any party aggrieved or adversely affected by an agency decision may seek
superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for
judicial review.
review.48

(3) The action for judicial review may be brought against the agency, or its
The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests
officers, and all indispensable and necessary parties as defined in the
on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance
Rules of Court.
to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and
practical reasons for the principle. The administrative process is intended to provide
(4) Appeal from an agency decision shall be perfected by filing with the agency
less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof a notice of appeal,
indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of
and with the reviewing court a petition for review of the order. Copies of
administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts—for reasons of law, comity,
the petition shall be served upon the agency and all parties of record. The
and convenience—will not entertain a case unless the available administrative
petition shall contain a concise statement of the issues involved and the
remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given
grounds relied upon for the review, and shall be accompanied with a true
an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative
copy of the order appealed from, together with copies of such material
forum.49
portions of the records as are referred to therein and other supporting
papers. The petition shall be under oath and shall show, by stating the
While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is flexible and may be
specific material dates, that it was filed within the period fixed in this
disregarded in certain instances,50 we find, however, that the case does not fall
chapter.
under any of the recognized exceptional circumstances. Petitioners claim that
appeal to the DOTC Secretary, who is already the chairman of the MARINA Board,
(5) The petition for review shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days from
is a needless superfluity, the latter being the alter ego of the President. Moreover,
receipt of the final administrative decision. One (1) motion for
petitioners state that filing an appeal with the Office of the President would be
reconsideration may be allowed. If the motion is denied, the movant shall
impractical because a member of the MARINA Board also came from the Office of
perfect his appeal during the remaining period for appeal reckoned from
the President. Both arguments fail to convince.
receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on
reconsideration, the appellant shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of
A quick look into the nature and functions of the MARINA is necessary to understand
the resolution to perfect his appeal.
its nature, powers, and relationship to the executive department, and in turn
(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified by statute or, in determine the applicability of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
the absence thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance
with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court. The MARINA was created under Presidential Decree No. 47451 as an agency under
the Office of the President.52 Under Executive Order No. 546,53 the MARINA was
(7) Review shall be made on the basis of the record taken as a whole. The designated as an attached agency of the Ministry of Transportation and
findings of fact of the agency when supported by substantial evidence shall Communications.54 Under Executive Order No. 1011,55 the MARINA was granted
be final except when specifically provided otherwise by law. the quasi-judicial functions formerly exercised by the Board of Transportation
pertaining to water transportation.56 The Administrative Code of 1987 reiterated
The above procedure notwithstanding, decisions of the various agencies of that the MARINA is an attached agency of the DOTC:
government have been appealed to the OP, consistent with the President's power BOOK IV - THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
of control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.46 We defined TITLE XV - TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
the presidential power of control over the executive branch of government as "the CHAPTER 6 - ATTACHED AGENCIES
power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate

Sec. 23. Attached Agencies and Corporations.—The following agencies and
corporations are attached to the Department: The Philippine National Railways, the
Maritime Industry Authority, the Philippine National Lines, the Philippine Aerospace
Development Corporation, the Metro Manila Transit Corporation, the Office of
Transport Cooperatives, the Philippine Ports Authority, the Philippine Merchant
Marine Academy, the Toll Regulatory Board, the Light Rail Transit Authority, the
Transport Training Center, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the National
Telecommunications Commission and the Manila International Airport Authority.
R.A. No. 9295, which was enacted on May 3, 2004, provides the jurisdiction, power
and duties of the MARINA including the power to:
Section 10. Jurisdiction; Powers; and Duties of MARINA.—
xxx
(2) Issue certificates of public convenience or any extensions or amendments
thereto, authorizing the operation of all kinds, classes and types of vessels
in domestic shipping: Provided, That no such certificate shall be valid for
a period of more than twenty-five (25) years;
xxx
The status of the MARINA as an attached agency of the DOTC is crucial to the
determination of whether the DOTC has the power to review the decisions of the
MARINA Board. Under Section 38, Chapter VII, Book IV of the Administrative Code
of 1987,57 there are three kinds of administrative relationship: (1) supervision and
control; (2) administrative supervision; and (3) attachment.
Among the three, the relationship of supervision and control between a department
and a subordinate agency is the most stringent since the department has the power
to review the decisions of the subordinate agency. This power is not available in
administrative supervision as Section 38 expressly states that the department shall
have no power to review the decisions of regulatory agencies in the exercise of
their regulatory or quasi-judicial functions. As to the relationship of attachment,
while the law is silent on the presence or absence of such power to review by the
department, Section 38(3) would indicate that the Legislature did not intend that
the decisions of an attached agency be subject to review by the department prior
to appealing before the proper court. Section 38(3) indicates the most lenient kind
of administrative relationship since the lateralrelationship is limited to policy and
program coordination. Thus, in Beja v. Court of Appeals,58 we distinguished an
attached agency from one which is under departmental supervision and control or
administrative supervision:
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to
which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control
or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|13
the Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and
program coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the independence
of an attached agency from Departmental control and supervision is further
reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Department's administrative
supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments
and other personnel actions "in accordance with the decentralization of personnel
functions" under the Administrative Code of 1987. Moreover, the Administrative
Code explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and
control shall not apply to chartered institutions attached to a
Department.59 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
Section 39, Chapter VIII, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 expressly
states that the chapter on supervision and control shall not apply to chartered
institutions or government-owned or controlled corporations attached to the
department. Section 39 provides:
Sec. 39. Secretary's Authority.—
(1) The Secretary shall have supervision and control over the bureaus, offices,
and agencies under him, subject to the following guidelines:
xxx
(2) This Chapter shall not apply to chartered institutions or government-
owned or controlled corporations attached to the department.
Reading Section 39 together with Section 38, the decision of an attached agency
such as the MARINA in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function is not subject to
review by the department. Section 39 makes it clear that the supervision and
control exercised by the department over agencies under it with respect to matters
including the exercise of discretion (performance of quasi-judicial function) do not
apply to attached agencies. Thus, in this respect, petitioners are correct in saying
that the decisions of the MARINA are not subject to the review of the DOTC
Secretary.
This is not to say, however, that decisions of the MARINA are not proper subjects
of appeal to the OP.
In Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. Board of Investments,60 we
recognized that under Administrative Order No. 18,61 a decision or order issued by
a department or agency need not be appealed to the OP when there is a special
law that provides for a different mode of appeal.62 R.A. No. 9295 does not provide

for an appeal procedure; thus, the assailed decision and resolution from the
MARINA should have been appealed with the OP.
More importantly, contrary to the petitioners' claim, the doctrine of qualified
political agency does not apply in this case.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, heads of the various executive
departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by
such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the
President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts. This is a
recognition of the fact that in our presidential form of government, all executive
organizations, are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that the heads of the
Executive Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that
the multiple executive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are
performed through the Executive Departments. The doctrine has been adopted here
out of practical necessity, considering that the President cannot be expected to
personally perform the multifarious functions of the executive office.63
But the doctrine of qualified political agency does not apply to the actions of heads
of executive departments in the performance of their duties as ex officio members
of the various agencies or entities under the executive department.64
Ex officio, is defined in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary65 as:
x x x The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an
"authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise
denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office."
An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a
certain office, and without further wan-ant or appointment. x x x66
In Manalang-Demigillo v. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines67 (TIDCORP), we: held that the doctrine of qualified political agency
cannot be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of the TIDCORP, though
some of its members are cabinet members. We clarified that even if the Secretary
of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Governor of the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, the Director-General of the National Economic and Development
Authority, and the Chairman of the Philippine Overseas Construction Board are
members of the cabinet, they sat on the TIDCORP Board by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 1080, as amended by R.A. No. 8494 and by reason of their office or
function, or in their ex officio capacity, and not because of their direct appointment
to the Board by the President. Thus, they were acting as members of the Board,
and not as alter egos of the President. We said:
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|14
But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of
the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves
the appointees of the President to the Cabinet. Under Section 10 of Presidential
Decree No. 1080, as further amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8494, the
five ex officio members were the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and
Industry, the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Director-General of
the National Economic and Development Authority, and the Chairman of the
Philippine Overseas Construction Board, while the four other members of the Board
were the three from the private sector (at least one of whom should come from the
export community), who were elected by the ex officio members of the Board for a
term of not more than two consecutive years, and the President of TIDCORP who
was concurrently the Vice-Chairman of the Board. Such Cabinet members sat on
the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function,
not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it
was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board.
Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board of Directors effected the
assailed 2002 reorganization, they were acting as the responsible members of the
Board of Directors of TIDCORP constituted pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1080, as amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not as the alter egos of the President.
We cannot stretch the application of a doctrine that already delegates an enormous
amount of power. Also, it is settled that the delegation of power is not to be lightly
inferred.68
In this case, the DOTC Secretary and the Executive Secretary are ex
officio members of the MARINA Board by yirtue of Section 7 of Presidential Decree
No. 474, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 7. Composition and Organization.—The Board shall be composed of eight
members as follows: The Secretary of Trade, the Secretary of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications, the Secretary of National
Defense, the Executive Secretary, the Chairman of the Board of Investments,
the Chairman of the Development Bank of the Philippines, the Chairman of the
Board of Transportation and the Maritime Administrator. The Chairman of the Board
shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines from among its members.69 x
x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Following our ruling in Manalang-Demegillo, the actions of the DOTC Secretary and
the Executive Secretary, as ex officio members of the MARINA Board: were made
not in their capacity as alter egos of the President. As such, an appeal to the OP is
still warranted. If petitioners are still dissatisfied with the decision of the OP, then
it would be the proper time to file a petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA.
To summarize, the DOTC Secretary does not have supervision and control over the
MARINA, which is an attached agency to the DOTC. Consequently, it cannot review
 POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|15

the decisions of the MARINA Board. However, decisions of the MARINA Board are
proper subjects of appeal to the OP, having been made by its members in their ex
officio capacity, and not as his alter egos. Failing to avail of such appeal, petitioners'
petition for review with the CA was properly dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated

March 24, 2009 and July. 23, 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

4. G.R. No. 191787 June 22, 2015
MACARIO CATIPON, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
JEROME JAPSON, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the December 11, 2009
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94426 affirming the July
6, 2005 Decision3 of the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region
(CSC-CAR) in CAR-05-034DC, as well as its March 17, 2010 Resolution4 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.5
Factual Antecedents
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Macario U. Catipon, Jr. is the holder of a Bachelor's Degree in Commerce
from the Baguio Colleges Foundation. When applying for graduation, he was
allowed to join the graduation ceremonies despite a deficiency of 1.5 units in
Military Science, pursuant to a school policy allowing students with deficiencies of
not more than 12 units to be included in the list of graduates. However, a restriction
came after, which is, that the deficiency must be cured before the student can be
considered a graduate.
In 1985, petitioner found employment with the Social Security System (SSS) in
Bangued, Abra. Sometime in September 1993, the personnel head of the SSS in
Bangued, Abra informed petitioner that the Civil Service Commission was
conducting a Career Service Professional Examination (CSPE) in October of the
same year. Petitioner filed an application to take the examination, believing that
the CSC still allowed CSPE applicants to substitute the length of their government
service for any academic deficiency which they may have. However, the above-
mentioned policy of the CSC had been discontinued since January 1993 pursuant
to Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991 and Office
Memo. No. 63, Series of 1992.
Nevertheless, petitioner took the CSPE tests on October 17, 1993 and obtained a
rating of 80.52%. Eventually, petitioner was promoted to Senior Analyst and
Officer-in-Charge Branch Head of the SSS at Bangued, Abra. In October 1995, he
finally eliminated his deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science.
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|16
On March 10, 2003, respondent Jerome Japson, a former Senior Member Services
Representative of SSS Bangued, filed a letter-complaint with the Civil Service
Commission-CAR Regional Director, alleging that petitioner made deliberate false
entries in his CSPE application, specifically, that he obtained his college degree in
1993 when actually he graduated in 1995 only, after removing his deficiency of 1.5
units in Military Education. Also, that petitioner was not qualified to take the CSPE
examination in 1993 since he was not yet then a graduate of a four-year college
course, contrary to the entry in his application form.
After preliminary investigation, petitioner was charged with Dishonesty,
Falsification of Official documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service by the CSC-CAR.6
Respondent’s Letter-Complaint7 against petitioner was docketed as CSC
Disciplinary Administrative Case No. BB-03-006.
In his Answer,8 petitioner essentially pleaded good faith, lack of malice, and honest
mistake. He maintained that at the time of his application to take the CSPE, he was
of the honest belief that the policy of the CSC – that any deficiency in the applicant’s
educational requirement may be substituted by his length of service – was still
subsisting.
On July 6, 2005, the CSC-CAR, through Director IV Atty. Lorenzo S. Danipog,
rendered a Decision9 containing the following pronouncements:
Clearly, respondent Catipon is not without any fault under the foregoing
circumstances. The only issue now left is with respect to the particular offense for
which Catipon may be held responsible. Respondent Catipon is charged (with) four
offenses: Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents, Grave Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
The key document allegedly falsified in this case is the Application Form x x x of
respondent Catipon for the purpose of taking the CS Professional Examination
scheduled on October 17, 1993. Close and careful perusal of the said application
form reveals that most of the entries filled up by respondent are typewritten. The
only entries handwritten by respondent are those corresponding to "Year
Graduated" and "School Where Graduated" which were answered by Macario with
"1984" and "BCF" respectively. Another handwritten entry is with respect to
"Degree Finished", the handwritten "BSC" entry, however, was just superimposed
on the typewritten "Commerce".
The fact that majority of the entries or data in the application form is typewritten
suggests that the said application form was consciously drafted and meticulously
prepared before its actual submission to the CSC for processing. They are relevant

and material entries or data sought from respondent. It is worth emphasizing
however that the pre-drafted application form, considering the typewritten entries,
shows respondent’s confusion on how to make entries thereat. Respondent
answered both the IF YES column and IF NO column corresponding to the question
"Are you a college graduate" in Item 8. x x x
xxxx
The manner that Item 8 was filled up by respondent Catipon shows lack of
deliberate intent to defraud the government. He manifested in his application his
uncertainty on how to take the fact that he only lacks 1.5 units Military Science to
be conferred a graduate status, vis-à-vis the CSC policy on educational
requirement. Though the entry "undergrad" was erased, the CSC employee who
processed the application would have doubted the truthfulness and authenticity of
respondent’s entries in Item 8 of the Application Form, and thus the educational
status of Macario. x x x
xxxx
Catipon had tried to show the real state of the matter regarding his educational
attainment as can be deduced from the manner he answered Item No. 8 in the
application form. This may be taken as good faith, which will serve to mitigate any
liability incurred by respondent Catipon. The premeditated intent to deceive or
willfully distort the facts in this case is not present. The acts of Catipon do not even
show blatant disregard of an established rule or a clear intent to violate the law if
at all, there was attempt to reveal the truth to the examination division processing
the application.
xxxx
With [regard] to the eligibility earned by respondent Macario in view of his passing
the October 17, 1993 Career Service Professional Examination, the same needs to
be revoked being the fruit of a poisonous tree, so to speak. Paragraph 2 of Sec. 6,
Rule II, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 states:
Provided that when an applica[nt] for examination is found to have x x x
intentionally made any false statement of any material fact in his application, x x x
the Commission shall invalidate such examination x x x.
With the foregoing, respondent Macario U. Catipon, Jr., Senior Analyst and OIC
Branch Head, Social Security System, Bangued, Abra, is hereby exonerated of the
charges Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Grave Misconduct.
However, respondent is found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service.
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|17
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the imposable
penalty on the first offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
is suspension of six months and one day to one year.
Under Section 53 of the same Rules, good faith is enumerated as one mitigating
circumstance. Thus, respondent Macario Catipon, Jr. is hereby meted a penalty of
six months and one day suspension, without pay, which is the minimum period of
the penalty attached to the offense committed. The Career Service Professional
eligibility of respondent is also ordered revoked, without prejudice however to
retaking of the said examination. Thus, Catipon, after serving suspension herein
provided should not be allowed to go back to his current position without CS
Professional eligibility. Consequently, in case respondent Catipon fails to retake or
pass CSPE, after serving his suspension, he may be demoted to any available
position that fits his subprofessional eligibility.10
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,11 but the CSC-CAR sustained its judgment in
a March 23, 2006 Decision,12which contained the following pronouncement:
Catipon also asserted that in view of his exoneration of Dishonesty, Falsification of
Official Documents and Grave Misconduct, there is no longer any basis to hold
respondent guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. This
contention is without legal basis. In the case of Philippine Retirement Authority vs.
Rupa 363 SCRA 480, the Honorable Supreme Court held as follows:
Under the Civil Service laws and rules, there is no description of what specific acts
constitute the grave offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service.
As alluded to previously in Decision No. CAR-05-034DC, Catipon is not without fault
under the circumstances. To completely exonerate respondent would be inequitable
and iniquitous considering the totality of events surrounding this case. Though
there was no deliberate intent to falsify or to make dishonest entry in the
Application Form as deduced from the manner that the said form was accomplished,
the fact that there was indeed such dishonest or false entry in the CSPE Application
Form is undisputedly established. In view of such an established fact, the integrity
of the Civil Service Examination, particularly the CSPE has been blemished which
is sufficient to constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service.13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Petition for Review docketed with the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 94426, petitioner
prayed for injunctive relief and the reversal of the above CSC-CAR decision. He
argued that the CSC-CAR incorrectly found him guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service when he has been declared innocent of the charges of

dishonesty, falsification of official documents, and grave misconduct; that while the
Supreme Court has held that making false entries in public documents may be
considered as conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, such act must
be accompanied by deliberate intent or a willful desire to defy or disregard
established rules or norms in the service;14 and that with the finding that he merely
committed an innocent mistake in filling up the application form for the CSPE, he
may not be found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
On December 11, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition,
decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision [sic] of the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative
Region dated July 6, 2005 and March 23, 2006 is [sic] AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.15
The CA held that instead of filing a petition for review directly with it, petitioner
should have interposed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
pursuant to Sections 5(A)(1),43 and 49 of the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases;16 that by filing a petition directly with it, petitioner violated the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies; that petitioner’s case is not exceptional as
would exempt it from the application of the doctrine; that per the ruling in Bayaca
v. Judge Ramos,17 the absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or
disregard established rules or norms in the service does not preclude a finding of
guilt for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and that petitioner
did not act with prudence and care, but instead was negligent, in the filling up of
his CSPE application form and in failing to verify beforehand the requirements for
the examination.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA stood its ground. Hence, the
instant recourse. Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
(A)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
FAILED TO REALIZE THAT GIVEN THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE SUSPENSION
IMPOSED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION-CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION AGAINST THE PETITIONER, HE WAS JUSTIFIED IN SEEKING JUDICIAL
RECOURSE BEFORE (THE COURT OF APPEALS);
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|18
(B)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
MISAPPLIEDIN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE THE RULE ON PRIOR EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
(C)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE PETITIONER ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND THIS
NEGATES GUILT FOR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
SERVICE.18
Petitioner’s Arguments
In his Petition and Reply19 seeking a reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and,
consequently, exoneration from the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, petitioner argues that he was constrained to file the petition
for review with the CA as his decreed six-month suspension was imminent as a
consequence of the executory nature of the CSC-CAR decision; that immediate
judicial intervention was necessary to "prevent serious injury and damage" to him,
which is why his CA petition included a prayer for injunctive relief; that the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies should not have been applied strictly in
his case, given the special circumstance that his suspension would mean loss of his
only source of income;20 that he should be completely exonerated from the charges
against him, since conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service must be
accompanied by deliberate intent or a willful desire to defy or disregard established
rules or norms in the service – which is absent in his case; and that his career
service professional eligibility should not be revoked in the interest of justice and
in the spirit of the policy which promotes and preserves civil service eligibility.
Respondent’s Arguments
In his Comment21 seeking denial of the petition, respondent counters that
completion of all the academic requirements – and not merely attendance at
graduation rites – confers the necessary degree which qualifies a student to take
the CSPE; that petitioner’s claim that he is a graduate as of 1984 is belied by his
Transcript of Records22 and other pieces of evidence submitted, which reflect the
date of his graduation as October 1995 – or after completion of his 1.5-unit
deficiency in Military Science; that petitioner cannot claim to suffer irreparable
injury or damage as a result of the CSC-CAR’s Decision, which is valid and binding;
that the revocation of petitioner’s eligibility is only proper, since he was then not
qualified when he took the CSPE; that the CSC-CAR was correct in finding that
petitioner’s act compromised the image and integrity of the civil service, which

justified the imposition of a corresponding penalty; that this Court in the Rupa case
made it clear that the act of making false entries in public documents constitutes
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, a grave offense punishable
by suspension for six months and one day to one year for the first offense, and
dismissal for the second offense; and that indeed, petitioner violated the doctrines
of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies when he
proceeded directly to the CA, instead of filing an appeal with the CSC.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
Our fundamental law, particularly Sections 2 (1) and 3 of Article IX-B, state that –
Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote
morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the
civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the
President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
Thus, "the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction
over disputes involving the removal and separation of all employees of government
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole
arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service."23
In line with the above provisions of the Constitution and its mandate as the central
personnel agency of government and sole arbiter of controversies relating to the
civil service, the CSC adopted Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999 (MC
19), or the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
which the CA cited as the basis for its pronouncement. Section 4 thereof provides:
Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. — The Civil Service
Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought
before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and shall review
decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|19
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service
Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters
relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.
As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of MC 19, the Civil Service
Commission Proper, or Commission Proper, shall have jurisdiction over decisions of
Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review. And under
Section 43, "decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities,
municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty days
suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to
the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen days from receipt
thereof."24 "Commission Proper" refers to the Civil Service Commission-Central
Office.25
It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on
petition for review, under Section 50 of MC 19, which provides thus:
Section 50. Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. – A party may elevate a
decision of the Commission before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.26
Thus, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that in filing his petition for review directly
with it from the CSC-CAR Regional Director, petitioner failed to observe the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As correctly stated by the appellate court,
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies renders petitioner’s CA petition
premature and thus dismissible.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that "before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed
himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.
Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made
by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought.1âwphi1 The
premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of
action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical
and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses
and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of
justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as
to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error
and dispose of the case."27 Indeed, the administrative agency concerned – in this

case the Commission Proper – is in the "best position to correct any previous error
committed in its forum."28
The CA is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the petition for review,
as "[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence."29 When petitioner’s
recourse lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in MC 19, the CA may not be faulted for refusing to
acknowledge petitioner before it.
We likewise affirm the CA’s pronouncement that petitioner was negligent in filling
up his CSPE application form and in failing to verify beforehand the specific
requirements for the CSPE examination. Petitioner’s claim of good faith and absence
of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard the rules relative to the
CSPE is not a defense as to exonerate him from the charge of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service; under our legal system, ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.30 Moreover, petitioner – as mere
applicant for acceptance into the professional service through the CSPE – cannot
expect to be served on a silver platter; the obligation to know what is required for
the examination falls on him, and not the CSC or his colleagues in office. As aptly
ruled by the appellate court:
In Bacaya31 v. Ramos, the Supreme Court found respondent judge guilty of both
negligence and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he issued
an arrest warrant despite the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment imposed on
an accused in a particular criminal case. Respondent judge in the said case claimed
that the issuance of the warrant was a mistake, done in good faith and that it has
been a practice in his office for the Clerk of Court to study motions and that he
would simply sign the prepared order. The Supreme Court rejected his defense and
stated that negligence is the failure to observe such care as a reasonably prudent
and careful person would use under ordinary circumstances. An act of the will is
necessary for deliberate intent to exist; such is not necessary in an act of
negligence.
Here, petitioner failed to verify the requirements before filing his application to take
the CSPE exam. He simply relied on his prior knowledge of the rules, particularly,
that he could substitute his deficiency in Military Science with the length of his
government service. He cannot lay blame on the personnel head of the SSS-
Bangued, Abra, who allegedly did not inform him of the pertinent rules contained
in Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991. For, [if] he were truly
a reasonably prudent and careful person, petitioner himself should have verified
from the CSC the requirements imposed on prospective examinees. In so doing, he
would certainly have been informed of the new CSC policy disallowing substitution
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|20
of one’s length of government service for academic deficiencies. Neither should
petitioner have relied on an unnamed Civil Service employee’s advice since it was
not shown that the latter was authorized to give information regarding the
examination nor that said employee was competent and capable of giving correct
information. His failure to verify the actual CSPE requirements which a reasonably
prudent and careful person would have done constitutes negligence. Though his
failure was not a deliberate act of the will, such is not necessary in an act of
negligence and, as in Bacaya, negligence is not inconsistent with a finding of guilt
for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.32
The corresponding penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
may be imposed upon an erring public officer as long as the questioned act or
conduct taints the image and integrity of the office; and the act need not be related
to or connected with the public officer’s official functions. Under our civil service
laws, there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the following acts or omissions
have been treated as such: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of
office; failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to safe keep public
records and property; making false entries in public documents; falsification of
court orders; a judge’s act of brandishing a gun, and threatening the complainants
during a traffic altercation; a court interpreter’s participation in the execution of a
document conveying complainant’s property which resulted in a quarrel in the
latter’s family; selling fake Unified Vehicular Volume Program exemption cards to
his officemates during office hours; a CA employee’s forging of receipts to avoid
her private contractual obligations; a Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) employee’s act of repeatedly changing his IP address, which caused network
problems within his office and allowed him to gain access to the entire GSIS
network, thus putting the system in a vulnerable state of security;33 a public
prosecutor’s act of signing a motion to dismiss that was not prepared by him, but
by a judge;34 and a teacher’s act of directly selling a book to her students in
violation of the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers.35 In petitioner’s case, his
act of making false entries in his CSPE application undoubtedly constitutes conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service; the absence of a willful or deliberate
intent to falsify or make dishonest entries in his application is immaterial, for
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service "may or may not be
characterized by corruption or a willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules."36
Finally, the Court cannot consider petitioner's plea that "in the interest of justice
and in the spirit of the policy which promotes and preserves civil service eligibility,"
his career service professional eligibility should not be revoked. The act of using a
fake or spurious civil service eligibility for one's benefit not only amounts to violation
of the civil service examinations or CSPE; it also results in prejudice to the
government and the public in general. It is a transgression of the law which has no
place in the public service.37 "Assumption of public office is impressed with the
 POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|21

paramount public interest that requires the highest standards of ethical conduct. A
person aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor, and faithful
compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected."38

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 11, 2009 Decision and March
17, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94426 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. 142571 May 5, 2006
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner,
vs.
LEONCIO C. ENCISO, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
The instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision dated March 20, 20001 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59681 affirming an earlier decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 141, in its Civil Case No. 94-005, an action
for a sum of money with damages thereat commenced by the respondent against
the herein petitioner, its Administrator and its Assistant Administrator for Systems
and Operations and Equipment Management.
Succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals in the assailed decision are the
following undisputed facts:
Records show that in 1984, defendant-appellant [petitioner] National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) commenced the widening of the Binahaan River in Brgy.
Cansamada, Dagami, Leyte. This project was divided into small sections costing not
more than P50,000.00 each so as not to require public bidding. However, pre-
bidding was nevertheless conducted by NIA and participated in by different
contractors to determine the possible lowest bid which shall serve as the cost of
the project. With this arrangement, contractors are assigned to work on specific
sections without formal contracts. When the works for the assigned sections are
completed to NIA’s satisfaction, NIA will then prepare the requisite contract and
other pertinent documents so that the contractor can collect payment.
Plaintiff-appellant [respondent] Enciso, doing business as a contractor under the
name LCE Construction, worked on a portion of the river from "station 16 + 400 to
station 16 + 900". His first billing of P227,165.90 was paid by NIA. However, his
second and final billing of P259,154.01 was denied on the ground that the work
done on the right side of the river was not accomplished. [Words in bracket
supplied.]
Respondent finally instituted a complaint for collection of a sum of money with
damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Makati City, thereat docketed as Civil
Case No. 94-005 and eventually raffled to Branch 141 thereof. Petitioner and co-
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of non-exhaustion of administrative
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|22
remedies and lack of cause of action. The RTC denied the motion and proceeded to
trial.
In a decision dated February 27, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment for respondent,
as plaintiff, holding petitioner, as defendant, liable, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant National Irrigation
Administration to pay plaintiff the sum of P259,154.01 with legal rate of interest of
12% per annum effective on 1 August 1985 until fully paid; P50,000.00, as and for
attorney’s fees; and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Both parties went up to the Court of Appeals (CA). For its part, petitioner contended
that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss and thereafter holding it
liable to respondent. On the other hand, respondent interposed that the trial court
erred in failing to hold petitioner’s co-defendants personally liable for damages and
in adjudging petitioner NIA solely liable based on the face value of the work
accomplished in 1985. The CA, however, found no reversible error in the appealed
decision and affirmed it as follows:1avvphil.net
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision which is in accord
with the evidence and jurisprudential principle on the matter, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Only petitioner NIA came to this Court via this petition for review raising the
following issues for resolution:
the court of appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the regional trial court denying
petitioner’s motion to dismiss (annex "c" hereof) which averred, among other
things, that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies available to him
under the law.
the court of appeals erred in declaring that petitioner is liable to respondent for the
alleged work at petitioner’s project though the alleged assignment was done in
violation of existing rules and regulations.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Petitioner raised the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies in its
appeal before the CA, on account of respondent’s failure to file his claim before the

Commission on Audit (COA) prior to instituting a complaint for collection of sum of
money with the RTC. Instead of addressing the question, however, the CA discussed
NIA’s separate and distinct corporate personality from the government or the State,
which is a non-issue. What the CA failed to rule upon is, given the fact that NIA is
a government entity vested with a separate corporate personality from the State,
whether NIA, being a government entity disbursing public funds or tax-payers’
money is subject to the jurisdiction of COA such that any claim for collection of sum
of money against it, specially in this instance where it is not covered by any written
contract, must be initially lodged before the COA.
The issue should have been resolved in the affirmative.
Among the powers vested upon COA as provided for in Section 26, Presidential
Decree No. 1445, are the following:
SECTION 26. General jurisdiction. – The authority and powers of the Commission
shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures,
systems and controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the
preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the
examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to those
accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting
funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as
the examination, audit, and settlement of all claims of any sort due from or owing
to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The
said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled corporations,
including their subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards, commissions,
agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed, including non-governmental
entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donations through the
government, those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which
the government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the
government. [Emphasis supplied.]
COA, as one of the three (3) independent constitutional commissions, is specifically
vested with the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property owned or held in trust by the government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities. To ensure the effective discharge of its functions,
COA has been empowered, subject to the limitations imposed by Article IX(D) of
the 1987 Constitution, to define the scope of its audit and examination and establish
the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance
of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures
or uses of government funds and properties.2
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|23
In the instant case, when determining the regularity of disbursement of public funds
by the petitioner NIA for the alleged services rendered by respondent in the
widening project involving a portion of Binahaan River in Barangay Cansamada,
Dagami, Leyte more specifically, from station 16 + 400 to station 16 + 900 thereof,
the accounting and auditing principles, rules and regulations set by COA must be
taken into consideration. In this light, it is highly doubtful whether respondent may
compel petitioner NIA’s officers to release payment of his claims without any
previously approved contract for the supposed river-widening project in violation of
existing COA rules and regulations, without subjecting said official to administrative
and/or personal liabilities and/or accountabilities.
Be that as it may, for the supposed refusal or failure by the concerned public
officials to act over respondent’s money claim or even the mere inaction for an
unreasonable period, the proper and immediate remedy of the respondent was to
file his claim with the COA, such inaction or refusal to pay being tantamount to
disallowance of the claim. Only after COA has ruled on the claim, may the injured
party invoke judicial intervention by bringing the matter to this Court on petition
for certiorari.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a doctrine of long standing and courts
have clear guidelines on the matter. Paat vs. Court of Appeals3 wrote:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have
availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s
intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of
waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.
This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical
and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true
to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy
away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not
amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as
tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one
and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a
violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3)
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
 POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|24

concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied
and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.

Petitioner had timely raised this ground to dismiss the action before the RTC, and
since there is no showing that respondent’s case falls under any one of the accepted
exceptions, petitioner’s motion to dismiss should have been granted, forthwith
dismissing the case for lack of cause of action.

Anent the second issue, the legality or regularity of petitioner’s payment of

respondent’s claim may be best addressed in a proper case before the COA,
considering that there might be factual matters involved therein, which is definitely
not within the province of the present petition for review on certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed decision is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and respondent’s Complaint before the RTC is
DISMISSED for lack of cause of action, with costs against respondent.

SO ORDERED.

6. G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
At issue in this case is the validity of a resolution, dated March 24, 1993, of the
Philippine Coconut Authority in which it declares that it will no longer require those
wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a
condition for engaging in such business.
Petitioner Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (hereafter referred to as
APCD) brought this suit for certiorari and mandamus against respondent Philippine
Coconut Authority (PCA) to invalidate the latter's Board Resolution No. 018-93 and
the certificates of registration issued under it on the ground that the resolution in
question is beyond the power of the PCA to adopt, and to compel said administrative
agency to comply instead with the mandatory provisions of statutes regulating the
desiccated coconut industry, in particular, and the coconut industry, in general.
As disclosed by the parties' pleadings, the facts are as follows:
On November 5, 1992, seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging
to the APCD brought suit in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region
in Makati, Metro Manila, to enjoin the PCA from issuing permits to certain applicants
for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. Petitioner
alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's
Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were seeking permits
to operate in areas considered "congested" under the administrative order.1
On November 6, 1992, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, on
November 25, 1992, a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA from
processing and issuing licenses to Primex Products, Inc., Coco Manila, Superstar
(Candelaria) and Superstar (Davao) upon the posting of a bond in the amount of
P100,000.00.2
Subsequently and while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the
Governing Board of the PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No. 018-93,
providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation
of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of
coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring"
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|25
of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards. The full text
of the resolution reads:
RESOLUTION NO. 018-93
POLICY DECLARATION DEREGULATING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW COCONUT
PROCESSING PLANTS
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to promote free enterprise
unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red
tapes;
WHEREAS, the deregulation of certain sectors of the coconut industry, such
as marketing of coconut oils pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1960, the
lifting of export and commodity clearances under Executive Order No.
1016, and relaxation of regulated capacity for the desiccated coconut
sector pursuant to Presidential Memorandum of February 11, 1988, has
become a centerpiece of the present dispensation;
WHEREAS, the issuance of permits or licenses prior to business operation
is a form of regulation which is not provided in the charter of nor included
among the powers of the PCA;
WHEREAS, the Governing Board of PCA has determined to follow and
further support the deregulation policy and effort of the government to
promote free enterprise;
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that,
henceforth, PCA shall no longer require any coconut oil mill, coconut oil
refinery, coconut desiccator, coconut product processor/factory, coconut
fiber plant or any similar coconut processing plant to apply with PCA and
the latter shall no longer issue any form of license or permit as condition
prior to establishment or operation of such mills or plants;
RESOLVED, FURTHER, that the PCA shall limit itself only to simply
registering the aforementioned coconut product processors for the purpose
of monitoring their volumes of production, administration of quality
standards with the corresponding service fees/charges.
ADOPTED this 24th day of March 1993, at Quezon City.3
The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to
operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the

Office of the President of the Philippines on April 26, 1993 not to approve the
resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent on May 25 and June 2, 1993,
petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The "certificates of
registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new
coconut mills to operate. Hence this petition.
Petitioner alleges:
I
RESPONDENT PCA'S BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 018-93 IS NULL AND VOID
FOR BEING AN UNDUE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY AN
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY.
II
ASIDE FROM BEING ULTRA-VIRES, BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 018-93 IS
WITHOUT ANY BASIS, ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE AND THEREFORE IN
VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
III
IN PASSING BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 018-93, RESPONDENT PCA
VIOLATED THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT OF
CONSULTATION PROVIDED IN PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1644,
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 826 AND PCA ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 002,
SERIES OF 1991.
On the other hand, in addition to answering petitioner's arguments, respondent
PCA alleges that this petition should be denied on the ground that petitioner has a
pending appeal before the Office of the President. Respondent accuses petitioner
of forum-shopping in filing this petition and of failing to exhaust available
administrative remedies before coming to this Court. Respondent anchors its
argument on the general rule that one who brings an action under Rule 65 must
show that one has no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
I.
The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may
seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of
respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was
issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making or legislative power. However,
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|26
only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of
their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. The exhaustion
doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet complete4 and it is clear, in
the case at bar, that after its promulgation the resolution of the PCA abandoning
regulation of the desiccated coconut industry became effective. To be sure, the PCA
is under the direct supervision of the President of the Philippines but there is nothing
in P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D. No. 1644 defining the powers
and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued by it to be
approved by the President before they become effective.
In any event, although the APCD has appealed the resolution in question to the
Office of the President, considering the fact that two months after they had sent
their first letter on April 26, 1993 they still had to hear from the President's office,
meanwhile respondent PCA was issuing certificates of registration indiscriminately
to new coconut millers, we hold that petitioner was justified in filing this case on
June 25, 1993.5 Indeed, after writing the Office of the President on April 26,
19936 petitioner sent inquiries to that office not once, but twice, on May 26,
19937 and on June 2, 1993,8 but petitioner did not receive any reply.
II.
We now turn to the merit of the present petition. The Philippine Coconut Authority
was originally created by P.D. 232 on June 30, 1973, to take over the powers and
functions of the Coconut Coordinating Council, the Philippine Coconut
Administration and the Philippine Coconut Research Institute. On June 11, 1978,
by P.D. No. 1468, it was made "an independent public corporation . . . directly
reporting to, and supervised by, the President of the Philippines,"9 and charged with
carrying out the State's policy "to promote the rapid integrated development and
growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure
that the coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such
development and growth."10 through a regulatory scheme set up by law.11
Through this scheme, the government, on August 28, 1982, temporarily prohibited
the opening of new coconut processing plants and, four months later, phased out
some of the existing ones in view of overproduction in the coconut industry which
resulted in cut-throat competition, underselling and smuggling of poor quality
products and ultimately in the decline of the export performance of coconut-based
commodities. The establishment of new plants could be authorized only upon
determination by the PCA of the existence of certain economic conditions and the
approval of the President of the Philippines. Thus, Executive Order No. 826, dated
August 28, 1982, provided:
Sec. 1. Prohibition. — Except as herein provided, no government agency
or instrumentality shall hereafter authorize, approve or grant any permit

or license for the establishment or operation of new desiccated coconut
processing plants, including the importation of machinery or equipment for
the purpose. In the event of a need to establish a new plant, or expand the
capacity, relocate or upgrade the efficiencies of any existing desiccated
plant, the Philippine Coconut Authority may, upon proper determination of
such need and evaluation of the condition relating to:
a. the existing market demand;
b. the production capacity prevailing in the country or locality;
c. the level and flow of raw materials; and
d. other circumstances which may affect the growth or viability of the
industry concerned,
authorize or grant the application for, the establishment or expansion of
capacity, relocation or upgrading of efficiencies of such desiccated coconut
processing plant, subject to the approval of the President.
On December 6, 1982, a phase-out of some of the existing plants was ordered by
the government after finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of existing
plants will not afford a viable solution to the problem considering that the total
available limited market is not adequate to support all the existing processing
plants, making it imperative to reduce the number of existing processing
plants."12 Accordingly, it was ordered:13
Sec. 1. The Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby ordered to take such
action as may be necessary to reduce the number of existing desiccated
coconut processing plants to a level which will insure the survival of the
remaining plants. The Authority is hereby directed to determine which of
the existing processing plants should be phased out and to enter into
appropriate contracts with such plants for the above purpose.
It was only on October 23, 1987 when the PCA adopted Resolution No. 058-87,
authorizing the establishment and operation of additional DCN plants, in view of
the increased demand for desiccated coconut products in the world's markets,
particularly in Germany, the Netherlands and Australia. Even then, the opening of
new plants was made subject to "such implementing guidelines to be set forth by
the Authority" and "subject to the final approval of the President."
The guidelines promulgated by the PCA, as embodied in Administrative Order No.
002, series of 1991, inter alia authorized the opening of new plants in "non-
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|27
congested areas only as declared by the PCA" and subject to compliance by
applicants with "all procedures and requirements for registration under
Administrative Order No. 003, series of 1981 and this Order." In addition, as the
opening of new plants was premised on the increased global demand for desiccated
coconut products, the new entrants were required to submit sworn statements of
the names and addresses of prospective foreign buyers.
This form of "deregulation" was approved by President Aquino in her memorandum,
dated February 11, 1988, to the PCA. Affirming the regulatory scheme, the
President stated in her memorandum:
It appears that pursuant to Executive Order No. 826 providing measures
for the protection of the Desiccated Coconut Industry, the Philippine
Coconut Authority evaluated the conditions relating to: (a) the existing
market demands; (b) the production capacity prevailing in the country or
locality; (c) the level and flow of raw materials; and (d) other
circumstances which may affect the growth or viability of the industry
concerned and that the result of such evaluation favored the expansion of
production and market of desiccated coconut products.
In view hereof and the favorable recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture, the deregulation of the Desiccated Coconut Industry as
recommended in Resolution No. 058-87 adopted by the PCA Governing
Board on October 28, 1987 (sic) is hereby approved.14
These measures — the restriction in 1982 on entry into the field, the reduction the
same year of the number of the existing coconut mills and then the lifting of the
restrictions in 1987 — were adopted within the framework of regulation as
established by law "to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the
coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that the coconut
farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and
growth." 15 Contrary to the assertion in the dissent, the power given to the
Philippine Coconut Authority — and before it to the Philippine Coconut
Administration — "to formulate and adopt a general program of development for
the coconut and other palm oils industry"16 is not a roving commission to adopt any
program deemed necessary to promote the development of the coconut and other
palm oils industry, but one to be exercised in the context of this regulatory
structure.
In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the PCA adopted on March 24, 1993
the questioned resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new
coconut processing plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory
infrastructure whereby, forsaking controls theretofore placed in its keeping, the
PCA limits its function to the innocuous one of "monitoring" compliance by coconut

millers with quality standards and volumes of production. In effect, the PCA would
simply be compiling statistical data on these matters, but in case of violations of
standards there would be nothing much it would do. The field would be left without
an umpire who would retire to the bleachers to become a mere spectator. As the
PCA provided in its Resolution No. 018-93:
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that,
henceforth, PCA shall no longer require any coconut oil mill, coconut oil
refinery, coconut desiccator, coconut product processor/factory, coconut
fiber plant or any similar coconut processing plant to apply with PCA and
the latter shall no longer issue any form of license or permit as condition
prior to establishment or operation of such mills or plants;
RESOLVED, FURTHER, that the PCA shall limit itself only to simply
registering the aforementioned coconut product processors for the purpose
of monitoring their volumes of production, administration of quality
standards with the corresponding service fees/charges.
The issue is not whether the PCA has the power to adopt this resolution to carry
out its mandate under the law "to promote the accelerated growth and development
of the coconut and other palm oil industry."17 The issue rather is whether it can
renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating it for that is what the
resolution in question actually is.
Under Art. II, § 3(a) of the Revised Coconut Code (P.D. No. 1468), the role of the
PCA is "To formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut
and other palm oil industry in all its aspects." By limiting the purpose of registration
to merely "monitoring volumes of production [and] administration of quality
standards" of coconut processing plants, the PCA in effect abdicates its role and
leaves it almost completely to market forces how the coconut industry will develop.
Art. II, § 3 of P.D. No. 1468 further requires the PCA:
(h) To regulate the marketing and the exportation of copra and its by-
products by establishing standards for domestic trade and export and,
thereafter, to conduct an inspection of all copra and its by-products
proposed for export to determine if they conform to the standards
established;
Instead of determining the qualifications of market players and preventing the entry
into the field of those who are unfit, the PCA now relies entirely on competition —
with all its wastefulness and inefficiency — to do the weeding out, in its naive belief
in survival of the fittest. The result can very well be a repeat of 1982 when free
enterprise degenerated into a "free-for-all," resulting in cut-throat competition,
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|28
underselling, the production of inferior products and the like, which badly affected
the foreign trade performance of the coconut industry.
Indeed, by repudiating its role in the regulatory scheme, the PCA has put at risk
other statutory provisions, particularly those of P.D. No. 1644, to wit:
Sec. 1. The Philippine Coconut Authority shall have full power and authority
to regulate the marketing and export of copra, coconut oil and their by-
products, in furtherance of the steps being taken to rationalize the coconut
oil milling industry.
Sec. 2. In the exercise of its powers under Section 1 hereof, the Philippine
Coconut Authority may initiate and implement such measures as may be
necessary to attain the rationalization of the coconut oil milling industry,
including, but not limited to, the following measures:
(a) Imposition of floor and/or ceiling prices for all exports of copra, coconut
oil and their by-products;
(b) Prescription of quality standards;
(c) Establishment of maximum quantities for particular periods and
particular markets;
(d) Inspection and survey of export shipments through an independent
international superintendent or surveyor.
In the exercise of its powers hereunder, the Philippine Coconut Authority
shall consult with, and be guided by, the recommendation of the coconut
farmers, through corporations owned or controlled by them through the
Coconut Industry Investment Fund and the private corporation authorized
to be organized under Letter of Instructions No. 926.
and the Revised Coconut Code (P.D. No. 1468), Art. II, § 3, to wit:
(m) Except in respect of entities owned or controlled by the Government
or by the coconut farmers under Sections 9 and 10, Article III hereof, the
Authority shall have full power and authority to regulate the production,
distribution and utilization of all subsidized coconut-based products, and to
require the submission of such reports or documents as may be deemed
necessary by the Authority to ascertain whether the levy payments and/or
subsidy claims are due and correct and whether the subsidized products

are distributed among, and utilized by, the consumers authorized by the
Authority.
The dissent seems to be saying that in the same way that restrictions on entry into
the field were imposed in 1982 and then relaxed in 1987, they can be totally lifted
now without prejudice to reimposing them in the future should it become necessary
to do so. There is really no renunciation of the power to regulate, it is claimed.
Trimming down of PCA's function to registration is not an abdication of the power
to regulate but is regulation itself. But how can this be done when, under Resolution
No. 018-93, the PCA no longer requires a license as condition for the establishment
or operation of a plant? If a number of processing firms go to areas which are
already congested, the PCA cannot stop them from doing so. If there is
overproduction, the PCA cannot order a cut back in their production. This is because
the licensing system is the mechanism for regulation. Without it the PCA will not be
able to regulate coconut plants or mills.
In the first "whereas" clause of the questioned resolution as set out above, the PCA
invokes a policy of free enterprise that is "unhampered by protective regulations
and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape" as justification for abolishing the licensing
system. There can be no quarrel with the elimination of "unnecessary red tape."
That is within the power of the PCA to do and indeed it should eliminate red tape.
Its success in doing so will be applauded. But free enterprise does not call for
removal of "protective regulations."
Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-
faire as an economic principle.18 Although the present Constitution enshrines free
enterprise as a policy,19 it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to
intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. This is clear from
the following provisions of Art. XII of the Constitution which, so far as pertinent,
state:
Sec. 6. . . . Individuals and private groups, including corporations,
cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the right to
own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of
the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the
common good so demands.
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public
interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair
competition shall be allowed. (Emphasis added).
At all events, any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of
the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the
power of an administrative agency to dismantle it. Indeed, petitioner charges the
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|29
PCA of seeking to render moot a case filed by some of its members questioning the
grant of licenses to certain parties by adopting the resolution in question. It is
alleged that members of petitioner complained to the court that the PCA had
authorized the establishment and operation of new plants in areas which were
already crowded, in violation of its Administrative Order No. 002, series of 1991.
In response, the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction,
enjoining the PCA from issuing licenses to the private respondent in that case.
These allegations of petitioner have not been denied here. It would thus seem that
instead of defending its decision to allow new entrants into the field against
petitioner's claim that the PCA decision violated the guidelines in Administrative
Order No. 002, series of 1991, the PCA adopted the resolution in question to render
the case moot. In so doing, the PCA abdicated its function of regulation and left the
field to untrammeled competition that is likely to resurrect the evils of cut-throat
competition, underselling and overproduction which in 1982 required the temporary
closing of the field to new players in order to save the industry.
The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of then President Aquino for authority to
adopt the resolution in question. As already stated, what President Aquino approved
in 1988 was the establishment and operation of new DCN plants subject to the
guidelines to be drawn by the PCA.20 In the first place, she could not have intended
to amend the several laws already mentioned, which set up the regulatory system,
by a mere memoranda to the PCA. In the second place, even if that had been her
intention, her act would be without effect considering that, when she issued the
memorandum in question on February 11, 1988, she was no longer vested with
legislative authority.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all
certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for
having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to
adopt or issue.
SO ORDERED.

7. G.R. No. L-47821 September 15, 1988
BENITO ROSALES, EMILIA R. ROSALES and ROMMEL ROSALES
represented by Guardian-Ad-Litem, ROMMEL ROSALES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DON BOSCO TECHNICAL INSTITUTE, FR.
AGUSTIN LOPEZ; MRS. S.A. MENDOZA, assisted by her husband
GODOFREDO MENDOZA and MISS FELICIDAD GORDON. respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals * dated July 26, 1977 in CA-G.R. No. 54674-R entitled
"BENITO ROSALES, et al, v. DON BOSCO TECHNICAL INSTITUTE" which affirmed
the decision of the court a quo ** dated September 14, 1973, dismissing
petitioners' complaint for damages. The decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
... (It) is clearly evident that plaintiffs were not candid when they
maintained that they knew nothing about the school's petition for
reconsideration, and that after all there was nothing 'mysterious'
about the School's actuations. Further, it is likewise clear from the
evidence that plaintiffs did seek the review by the Secretary of
Education of the Director's ruling, and that at the time the School
filed its motion to dismiss, the matter was still pending resolution
with the Secretary of Education. Hence, the court a quoincurred in
no error when it found that the decision of the Director of Private
Schools dated May 5, 1972 was far from being final and that the
administrative remedies availed of by plaintiffs had not yet been
exhausted.
As to the claim that plaintiffs have been denied due process,
suffice it to say that the dismissal of the complaint was based on
the ground that it was premature, administrative remedies not
having been exhausted.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed in toto. No costs. (pp. 26-27, Rollo)
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On April 11, 1972, the Don Bosco Technical Institute (School, for short) posted the
list of honor students for the graduation of its elementary department which was
to take place on April 22,1972. Rommel Rosales a student of Grade VI, candidate
for graduation and likewise candidate for Valedictorian, reported to his parents that
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|30
he was not listed as Valedictorian of the class but that it was another boy by the
name of Conrado Valerie. The parents of Rommel demanded for a re-computation
of the grades of their son who, they averred, should be class valedictorian and filed
a formal complaint with the Director of Bureau of Private Schools against the school
claiming anomalous ranking of honor pupils for the grade school with a request for
a review of the computations made by the school.
On April 20, 1972, the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Private Schools
sent a copy of the complaint by first indorsement to the Rector of herein respondent
school. Said comment was made on April 21, 1972, stating, among others, that the
complaint had lost its validity because the same was filed on the eve of the
commencement exercises of the school, in violation of the provision of paragraph
176, Section XI of the Manual of Regulation for Private Schools requiring complaints
of the kind to be filed not later than ten (10) days before commencement exercises.
However, defendant Rector indicated that he would welcome an investigation in
order to erase any doubt as to the selection of the honor students of the grade
school concerned.
On May 5, 1972, the Director of Private Schools rendered a decision holding that
Rommel Rosales was the rightful valedictorian.
On November 29, 1972, Rosales filed a complaint for damages itemized as follows:
P25,000.00 for moral damages; P15,000.00 for correctional damages and
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, in view of the failure of the school to graduate
Rommel Rosales as valedictorian of his class.
In its answer, respondent school prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the
ground that the Director of Private Schools acting on its motion dated May 11, 1972
reconsidered and set aside his decision of May 5, 1972 and instead "approved
and/or confirmed the selection and award of honors to the students concerned for
the school year 1971-1972 as effected by the school." (p. 14, Rollo [R.A., p. 31])
Petitioners, in their reply, averred that said motion for reconsideration was
mysteriously filed, there being no original copies of the same in the Office of the
Director of Private Schools which would show the date of filing thereof and their
corresponding receipt of a copy thereof by the petitioners.
Respondent school however, insisted that their motion for reconsideration was
regularly filed and the assailed decision was in fact reconsidered as above stated
on December 18,1972. The records show that petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration on January 11, 1973 of said decision of December 18, 1972 but
was denied on January 19, 1973. Thus, on February 7, 1973, petitioners appealed
both decisions of December 18, 1972 and January 19, 1973 to the Secretary of

Education which appeal was still pending at the time of the filing of their complaint
in court.
At the pre-trial, plaintiffs (petitioners herein) confirmed their filing of said appeal
with the Secretary of Education. For this reason, respondent school moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action on the ground of plaintiff's
(petitioner's) failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
On September 14, 1973, the trial court issued an order which reads:
Acting on the motion to dismiss dated August 20, 1 973 and the
opposition thereto filed by the plaintiffs and after hearing the oral
argument of the plaintiffs during the hearing of the motion, the
Court finds that plaintiffs have not exhausted all administrative
remedies against the defendants and that it does not fall within
any of the recognized exceptions to the requirement. Since the
complaint does not allege exhaustion of said remedies principally
on appeal to the Secretary of Education which was available to
him, the Court finds that the complaint does not allege facts
sufficient to constitute cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is granted and the complaint
is DISMISSED, without costs. (Rollo, pp. 23-24)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the court a quo incurred no error when
it found that the decision of the Director of Private Schools dated May 5, 1972 was
far from being final and that the administrative remedies availed of by plaintiffs had
not yet been exhausted and affirmed the decision appealed from in toto.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I 1972, it was however, mentioned in the letter of the Director of Private Schools
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DECISION
OF THE BUREAU OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS DATED MAY 5, 1972 HAS
ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
EXHAUSTION OF ADMIMSTRATIVE REMEDIES IS NOT APPLICABLE
IN THIS INSTANT CASE.
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|31
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ACTING AND DISREGARDING THE
APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW TO THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF
THE PLAINTIFFS- APPELLANT. (pp. 10-11, Rollo).
The main issues in this case are:
1. Whether or not the decision of the Director of the Bureau of
Private Schools dated May 5, 1972 has already become final and
conclusive; and
2. Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is applicable in this case.
The first issue involves findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court
which as a general rule are final and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court,
subject to certain exceptions which have been recognized and accepted by this
court at one time or another (Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 238 [1987]).
Petitioners' position is to the effect that there was no motion for reconsideration of
the May 5, 1972 decision of the Director of Private Schools, so that the same has
become final and executory.
The Court of Appeals found that although the Record on Appeal does not contain a
copy of the alleged motion for reconsideration of the subject decision of May 5,
dated January 19, 1973 addressed to counsel of plaintiffs (petitioners herein) which
reads:
This has reference to your request in behalf of Mrs. Emilia R.
Rosales, for reconsideration of the action taken by this Office as
per letter dated December 18, 1972, reconsidering its original
stand on the matter of the ranking of honor students at the Don
Bosco Technical Institute, Mandaluyong, Rizal, for the school year
1971-72, as contained in a letter dated May 5, 1972.
 POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|32

After a careful review of the records of the present case, in the
light of existing rules and regulations on the matter, this Office
finds no valid cause or reason to modify or disturb its action as
embodied in a letter dated December 18, 1972.
Accordingly, please be informed that your request for
reconsideration, as per letter dated January 11, 1973, is denied.
(p. 14, Rollo [R.A. pp. 28-29].
Thus, as correctly concluded by the Court of Appeals, the contents of aforesaid
letter indubitably establish that there was in fact the questioned motion for
reconsideration which was acted upon by the Director of Private Schools on
December 18, 1972, reconsidering his stand on May 5,1972; that petitioners knew
about this reconsidered stand otherwise they would not have written said request
for reconsideration of the decision of said Director of December 18, 1972, and that
the request for reconsideration written by Atty. Rabago in behalf of his clients, the
herein petitioners was dated January 11, 1973 which was denied on January 19,
1973.
Subject complaint, Civil Case No. 16998, was filed with the trial court on November
29,1972, showing beyond dispute that the request for reconsideration judicially
admitted to have been filed by the petitioners on February 7, 1973 with the
Secretary of Education and Culture had not yet been resolved at the time of the
filing of Civil Case No. 16998.
to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only
on convenience but likewise on respect; convenience of the party
litigants and respect for a co-equal office in the government. If a
remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this
should be resorted to before resort can be made to (the) court.
(citing Cruz vs. Del Rosario, 119 Phil. 63, 66).
Petitioners however, claim that they were denied due process, obviously to show
that their case falls within one of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Such contention is however untenable, because in the first place, they were made
to avail in the same administrative agency, the opportunity or right to oppose,
which in fact they did, when they filed a motion for reconsideration and later when
the motion was denied, they appealed to the Secretary of Education and Culture.
Precisely, a motion for reconsideration or appeal is curative in character on the
issue of alleged denial of due process (Sampang vs. Inciong, 137 SCRA 56 [19851;
REMERCO Garments v. MOLE, 135 SCRA 167 [1985])
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit and the decision of
the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Hence, the said civil case which is an action for damages is premature. The finality
of the administrative case which gives life to petitioners' cause of action has not
yet been reached. This was still pending as evidenced in the certificate issued by
the agency trying the same (Record on Appeal, pp. 53-54; Rollo, p. 14). The court a
quo was thus correct in acting upon the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents
on the ground that plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through

court action, as a general rule, cannot prosper until all the remedies have been
exhausted at the administrative level, (Pacana vs. Consunji, 108 SCRA 631[1981];
Pestañas et al. v. Dyogi, et al., 81 SCRA 574 [1978]; Antonio v. Tanco, 65 SCRA
448 [1975]).

Thus, in Abe-Abe et al. v. Manta (90 SCRA 524, 531 [1979]) we emphatically
declared:

When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive

Department of the government, but nevertheless, a litigant fails
or refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline

8. G.R. No. L-53851 July 9, 1991
CHUA HUAT, ONG CHOAN, DOMINADOR FELINO, RUFINO CLEMENTE,
TEODORA CLEMENTE, and LOURDES MEMPIN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE ELVIRO PERALTA, SHERIFF
OF MANILA, and THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, and
MANUEL UY AND SONS, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. L-63863 July 9, 1991
CHUA HUAT, LOURDES MEMPIN, RUFINO CLEMENTE, DOMINADOR
FELINO, MARIA GAMBOA, and ONG CHOAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAMON D. BAGATSING, City Mayor of Manila; ROMULO M. DEL
ROSARIO, City Engineer and Building Official, City of Manila; and MANUEL
UY AND SONS, INC., respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In the resolution of 9 January 1984, this Court resolved to consolidate these cases
as they are related.
The first case, G.R. No. 53851, is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
of the Court of Appeals of 29 February 1980 in C.A.-G.R. No. 09251 SP1 and its
resolutions of 30 April 1980 and 8 July 1980 denying, respectively, petitioners' first
and second motions for the reconsideration of said decision.
The second case, G.R. No. 63863,2 is a petition for prohibition, with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, directed against the notices of
condemnation and the demolition orders issued by the respondent City Engineer,
upon authority of the respondent City Mayor, concerning the buildings occupied by
petitioners at 1271 to 1277 Pedro Gil St. and 1553 to 1557 Paz St., Paco, Manila.
For sheer lack of merit, these cases must be dismissed.
The antecedent facts and proceedings are not disputed.
On 31 May 1972, a decision was rendered in Civil Case No. 746343 by the Court of
First Instance, Branch XVII, then presided by Honorable Judge –– now Associate
Justice of this Court –– Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|33
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, a) sentencing defendant
Dominador Felino, Lourdes Mempin, Chua Huat, Ong Choan, Francisco,
Rufino and Teodora, all surnamed Clemente, to pay plaintiff UY the
following monthly sums set out after their respective names beginning
January 1, 1963, until the date they have vacated the property, with
interest at 6% per annum from the date of this Decision as to the amounts
due on May 31, 1972:
DOMINADOR FELINO — P 25.00/month
LOURDES MEMPIN — P 30.00/ "
CHUA HUAT — P 100.00/ "
portion subleased by Gamboa — P 38.00/ "
portion subleased by Kho Chong — P 110.00/ "
portion subleased by Chua Chia — P 55.00/ "
ONG CHOAN — P 100.00/ "
FRANCISCO, RUFINO and
TEODORA CLEMENTE — P 25.00/ "
b) Ordering said defendants, including Maximo Yambao or anyone claiming
under him, to vacate the hands respectively occupied by them and to
surrender the same to plaintiff UY; to remove their improvements thereon
or to abandon them within sixty (60) days from receipt of this judgment.
After the lapse of said sixty days, plaintiff can submit the corresponding
motion under Section 14, Rule 39;
c) On Ong Choan's Third-Party Complaint, sentencing third-party
defendant SY PUT to reimburse the former for whatever amount he shall
pay to UY pursuant to this judgment, with interest at the legal rate on the
total amount from the date of payment until fully paid. SY PUT shall either
remove all the improvements he has constructed on the land, or abandon
them in favor of plaintiff within sixty (60) days from receipt of this
judgment.
Costs against defendants proportionately.

SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied with the said decision, herein petitioners, as defendants therein,
appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as C.A.-G.R. No.
51337-R. In its decision of 19 January 1977, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the aforesaid decision.4 Petitioners, except Ong Choan, filed a Petition for
Review on certiorari with this Court (G.R. No. L-47603) on 8 February 1978 to set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Ong Choan separately filed a
similar petition with this Court (G.R. No. L-48649), arguing that: "the case was
actually an unlawful detainer case and therefore, the Court of First Instance had no
jurisdiction over it, making the decision null and void."
Both petitions for review on certiorari were denied by this Court.5
On 15 November 1978, after the decision in Civil Case No. 74634 became final and
executory, the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) filed a motion to execute the
same, which was granted by the trial court (Branch XXVII) on 20 November 1978.6
Re: G.R. No. 53851
On 21 November 1978, petitioner Chua Huat filed with the Court of First Instance
of Manila a complaint for the annulment of the judgment in Civil Case No. 74634.
This complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 119751 and was assigned to Branch
XXII. Petitioner Ong Choan and others also filed a separate complaint for annulment
of judgment which was docketed as Civil Case No. 119884. Both complaints were
based on the ground that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 74634 because the said action was one for ejectment and not
for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) which was, therefore, cognizable by
the City Court of Manila; hence, the decision in said Civil Case No. 74634 is null
and void.
On 23 February 1979, despite the filing of the above cases for annulment of
judgment, the Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the execution of the
judgment in Civil Case No. 74634. Petitioners field a motion for reconsideration of
the said order and to suspend proceedings in Civil Case No. 74634 pending
termination of the annulment case which was, however, denied by the trial court in
its Order of 5 April 1979, which reads:
All the points raised in defendants' motion for reconsideration and to
suspend proceedings are already thoroughly covered in the order of
February 23, 1979 which in effect holds that Branch XXII, a coordinate
court, cannot interfere with this branch in its prerogative to carry out its
decision, long final and affirmed by the higher courts, into effect, and said
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|34
motion is hereby denied. It is only the superior court which can prohibit
this branch from executing its decision.
The Sheriff of Manila, unless restrained by either the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals, shall immediately implement the writ of execution upon
the expiration of thirty (30) days from receipt by the defendants of a copy
of the order, if to give them time to bring the incident up on certiorari to
said superior courts.7
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 09251 SP, to set aside the order of execution
of judgment, and to prohibit the respondents from executing the judgment until
Civil Case No. 119751 pending in Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of
Manila is finally decided and terminated.
In the Decision promulgated on 29 February 1980, the Court of Appeals denied the
petition for lack of merit, stating inter alia:
The instant petition must be denied for lack of merit.
1. The judgment in Civil Case No. 74634 is undisputedly final and
executory. As such, the issuance of a writ of execution thereof becomes
the ministerial duty of the respondent judge. . . .
2. Civil Case No. 119751 filed by petitioners herein to annul the judgment
in Civil Case No. 74634 cannot stop the execution thereof because of
finality of judgment or res judicata. A cursory reading of the questioned
judgment, Civil Case No. 74634, discloses that the issue raised in the
annulment of judgment case, C.C. No. 119751, has been decided in the
prior case when the court then presided by now Supreme Court Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera who penned the said decision stated, as
follows:
A. This is an accion publiciana and not one for unlawful detainer,
for which reason, it was rightfully brought before this Court. What
is involved is not the recovery of physical possession only but the
recovery of the right to possess.
We find application in the following doctrines:
A party may not, by changing the form of a lawsuit or adopting a
different method of presenting the matter, escape the application
of the principle that the same cause of action may not be litigated

twice between the same parties. (Paz vs. Indanan, 76 Phil. 608;
Pascual vs. Palermo, L-2185, April 29, 1950, 47 O.G. 6184;
Francisco vs. Blas, L-5078, May 4, 1953; Barrera vs. Del Rosario,
L-8928, April 28, 1956).
Another aspect of the doctrine is that once an issue has been
raised and finally decided by a court of competent jurisdiction,
generally speaking it becomes res judicata or can be made the
basis of a plea of estoppel by judgment as between the parties to
that litigation, no matter in what manner it was raised and Official
or not it was the principal issue or merely an incidental one.
(Eugenio vs. Tiangco L-2804, Sept. 20, 1949; Robis vs. Caspe, L-
6166, Sept. 28, 1964.).
WHEREFORE, there being no finding of a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment by the respondent court equivalent to lack of jurisdiction which
may be the subject of a writ of certiorari, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED, with costs against petitioners.8
The first and second motions for reconsideration filed by the petitioners were denied
on 30 April 1980 and 8 July 1980, respectively, for the reason that the ground relied
upon was already discussed, taken up and passed upon by the Court.9
Hence, this petition which was filed on 7 August 1980.
Petitioners claim that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that Civil Case
No. 119751 cannot stop the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 74634
because of the finality of such judgment, or on the ground of res judicata, and it
was the court's ministerial duty to execute it; and in not finding that the pendency
of Civil Case No. 119751 to annul the judgment in Civil Case No. 74634 on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction justifies the stay of execution of said judgment.
In the resolution of 3 September 1980, We required respondents to comment on
the petition which private respondents complied with on 14 October 1980.10 To this
comment, petitioners filed a reply on 29 October 1980.11
On 19 November 1980, We gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to submit simultaneously their memoranda which petitioners complied with on 12
January 1981 and the private respondents on 20 January 1981.
It further appears that Civil Case No. 119751 aforestated was dismissed by the trial
court in its Order of 24 September 1979. Herein petitioner Chua Huat appealed
from said Order to the Intermediate Appellate Court which docketed the same as
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|35
A.C.-GR CV No. 66303.12 In its Decision of 12 March 1984,13 the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirmed in toto the questioned order holding:
Plaintiff-appellant contends that the principle of res judicata does not apply
in the case at bar because "although there may be identity of parties and
of subject matter between Civil Case No. 74634" (which is for recovery of
possession) "and Civil Case No. 119751" (which is for annulment of
judgment) "there is no Identity of causes of action between these two
cases."
While there is, certainly on the face of the argument, merit in the
contention that there is no identity of causes of action between Civil Case
No. 74634 and this instant case, upon closer scrutiny, however, of the
records of the said two cases, We find the same to be utterly devoid of
merit.
The records of the aforesaid two cases will bear it out that the issue of lack
of jurisdiction (which is the cause of action in Civil Case No. 119751) has
been squarely ruled upon, not only by the trial court in Civil Case No. 74634
but also by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.
Plaintiff-appellant further contends that since the issue of jurisdiction in
Civil Case No. 74634 was raised in their motion for reconsideration before
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51337-R, the Appellate Court did not,
in its resolution denying said motion, pass on the same and on appeal by
petition for review to the Supreme Court in L-47603 and L-48649, where
the same issue among others was raised, the High Court in its minutes'
(sic) did not rule squarely on said issue, "the court a quo should have
proceeded with the hearing of this case on the judgments and thereafter
decide (sic) the same based on the evidence adduced by the parties". We
find the same likewise untenable.
Issues raised by the parties in their brief and passed upon
subsilencio by the appellate court in a decision which has become
final and executory are considered closed and can no longer be
revived by the parties in a subsequent litigation without doing
violence to the principle of res judicata. (Corda vs. Maglinti, G.R.
No. L-17476, Nov. 30, 1961).
What more, neither the Supreme Court nor the Appellate Court is duty
bound to discuss the pros and cons of appellant's argument.
Lastly, in Kabigting vs. Acting Director of Prisons (116 Phil. 589; 1962) the
Supreme Court pointed out: "It need not be stated that the Supreme Court,

being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions
properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case
constitutes the law of that particular case. Once its judgment becomes
final, it is binding on all inferior courts, and hence beyond their power and
authority to alter or modify". The High Tribunal further pointed out that
"Nor is it to be lost sight of that such principle does not apply only to the
express terms of decision, but likewise to what is therein implicit, which
must be implemented faithfully, no circumvention or evasion being
allowed". (Sanchez vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-26932, 27 SCRA
490).
Petitioners made no attempt to inform the Court of the dismissal of Civil Case No.
119751 and of the above action of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Re: G.R. No. 63863
On 14 September 1982, Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., respondent in G.R. No. 53851,
requested Romulo M. del Rosario the City Engineer and Building Officials, of Manila,
to condemn the dilapidated structures located at 1271 to 1277 Pedro Gil St. and
1553 to 1557 Paz St., Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners.14
On 17 November 1982, said official issued notices of condemnation addressed to
petitioners Chua Huat, Maria Gamboa, Lourdes Mempin, Dominador Felino, Ong
Choan, Rufino Clements, and several other persons. The condemnation orders
stated that the subject buildings were found to be in dangerous condition and
therefore condemned, subject to the confirmation of the Mayor as required by
Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. It further stated
that the notice is not an order to demolish as the findings of the City Engineer is
(sic) still subject to the approval of the Mayor.15 The orders were based on the
inspection reports made by Architect Oscar D. Andres and the Memorandum-
Reports made by the Evaluation Committee of the Office of the City Engineer, which
all showed that the subject buildings suffer from structural deterioration by more
than 50% and as much as 80%.16
On 19 January 1983, Civil Engineer Romulo C. Molas, a private practitioner,
inspected the abovementioned structures upon the request of petitioners herein. In
his evaluation report dated 21 January 1983, he stated that although the buildings
are old, they are still structurally sound and have a remaining economic life of at
least eight years.17
On 22 February 1983, or three months after the notices of condemnation were
issued, petitioners formally protested against said notices of condemnation on the
ground that the buildings are still in good physical condition and are structurally
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|36
sound based on the abovementioned certification of Civil Engineer Romulo C. Molas
dated 21 January 1983.18
On 26 April 1983, Maria Gamboa, one of the petitioners herein, was informed of
the issuance by the City Engineer of the demolition order with respect to the
building located at 1565 Paz St., Paco, Manila, and was told to vacate the premises
within 15 days from notice.19
On 2 May 1983, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Prohibition, with Preliminary
Injunction and/or Restraining Order, against City Mayor Ramon Bagatsing, City
Engineer and Building Officer Romulo del Rosario and Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc.,
praying that a restraining order or preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
respondents from proceeding with the announced demolition of the subject
buildings, this petition be given due course, and after hearing, respondents be
prohibited from demolishing said buildings.20 They allege in their petition that:
RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE CONDEMNATION ORDERS.
THERE IS NO APPEAL OR ANY OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE
REMEDY.
On 9 May 1983, this Court directed respondents to comment on the petition and
issued a Temporary Restraining Order against the respondents City Mayor and City
Engineer restraining them from enforcing and/or carrying out the demolition order
on the building occupied by Maria Gamboa at 1565 Paz
Street.21
On 6 July 1983, the respondent Mayor of Manila confirmed the rest of the
condemnation orders issued by the respondent City Engineer. Pursuant thereto, the
respondent City Engineer, on 12 September 1983, issued demolition orders
addressed to Chua Huat, Ong Choan, Dominador Felino and Lourdes Mempin,
whereby they were ordered to vacate and commence the demolition and/or removal
of the buildings occupied by them after fifteen days from receipt of the order.22
On 18 May 1983, respondents City Mayor and City Engineer filed their
Comment23 praying that the petition be dismissed on the following grounds: (a)
that it involves questions of facts which should be ventilated before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila; (b) the subject buildings were condemned and ordered
removed after it was established that they had suffered from defects or
deterioration thereby posing perils to the lives and limbs not only of petitioners but
also to the public in general; (c) the power to condemn buildings and structures in
the City of Manila falls within the exclusive domain of the City Engineer pursuant to
Sections 275 and 276 of its Compilation of Ordinances (also Revised Ordinances

1600); (d) the power to condemn and remove buildings and structures is an
exercise of the police power granted the City of Manila to promote public safety;
and (e) administrative decisions falling within the executive jurisdiction cannot be
set aside by courts of justice except on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or
error of law.
On 20 May 1983, private respondent Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. filed its
Comment24 wherein it contends that the petition is premature, unreasonable and
deserves no consideration as petitioners have not exhausted readily-available
administrative remedies and that the validity of the questioned condemnation and
demolition orders entails questions of facts not entertainable in this petition. It
alleges that the condemnation orders were not immediately executory, as the
finding of the City Engineer/Building Officials, is still subject to the approval of the
Mayor per Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.
Moreover, under Section 5.3, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of P.D. No. 1096, the owner of a building may appeal to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, whose decision is final, the finding or declaration of
the Building Officials, and ask that a re-inspection or re-investigation of the building
or structure be made; for not availing of this remedy, petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Petitioners filed a Reply on 3 October 1983,25 to Which respondents filed a rejoinder
on 14 November 1983.26
On 4 January 1984, this case was consolidated with G.R. No. 53851.
On 30 July 1986, We gave due course to this petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.27 Private respondent filed its Memorandum on
3 October 1986, while petitioners filed theirs on 3 November 1986.28
On 18 January 1987, petitioners filed a rejoinder29 to the Memorandum of private
respondents.
We now resolve these petitions.
A. The first, G.R. No. 53851, is frivolous and is dismally bereft of merit. The
antecedent facts stated above unmistakably disclose a clear pattern to make a
mockery of the judicial process, or to abuse it. The decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 74634 of 31 May 1972, which was affirmed, first, by the Court of Appeals
in its decision of 19 January 1977 (C.A.-G.R. No. 51337-R) and second, by this
Court (G.R. No. L-47603 and G.R. No. L-48649), had long become firm and final.
To maliciously stop its execution pursuant to the Order of 20 March 1978, petitioner
Chua Huat filed with the trial court Civil Case No. 119751 to annul the decision,
reviving therein issues which he had squarely raised in C.A.-G.R. No. 51337-R.
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|37
Then, he filed a motion in Civil Case No. 74634 to set aside the order of execution
and to suspend proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the annulment case.
Unfazed by his failure to hold the trial court hostage to his scheme, he went to the
Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 09251 SP) to question the denial by the trial court
of his aforesaid motion, and when he failed again, he came to this Court via this
petition with issues which, as his counsel fully knew, had long been laid to rest.
At the same time, when Civil Case No. 119751 was dismissed on 24 September
1979, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals (A.C.-G.R. CV No. 66303), also raising
the same issues. He, however, deliberately chose not to inform this Court of the
unfavorable decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court of 12 March 1984. The
reason of course is all too obvious, and in the light of his remarkable effort to
frustrate or subvert the ends of justice, petitioner cannot be expected to do so.
We find, therefore, the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals to
be in full accord with law and jurisprudence But this should not be the end of this
case. We must state here for the petitioners and their counsel and on all others
similarly inclined to resort to the same or related scheme or stratagem that this
Court cannot condone or tolerate any abuse of the judicial process. We must, once
again, remind counsel and litigants, as We did in Cantelang, et al. vs. Medina, et
al.,30 that "this Court win ever be vigilant to nip in the bud any dilatory maneuver
calculated to defeat or frustrate the ends of justice, fair play and the prompt
implementation of final and executory judgments." And, more particularly for
lawyers, in Banogon, et al. vs. Zerna, et al.,31 We said in no uncertain terms:
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless
petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this
Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and
the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be
permitted to be flied to merely clutter the already congested judicial
dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by
commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the
attention of the courts.
In another portion of said decision, We said:
This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and
it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice
that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.

Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to
bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong
them.32
There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that
the time of the judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too
valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from
commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and
executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear
and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite
obvious and indisputable.33
This appeal, moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an
insubstantial (sic) objection bereft of any persuasive force.
Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality.
From Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt
as to our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to
render justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are
precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective.
Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which
they are intended deserves condemnation. We have done so
before. We do so again.34
B. G.R. No. 63863 must equally fall. It is patently obvious that petitioners
have no valid grievance for the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to be available to them. It is explicitly clear from Section 1
of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court that for certiorari to be available: (a) a
tribunal, board or office exercising judicial function acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and (b)
that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Petitioners failed to show the presence of both
elements. The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of
Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at
the same time the Building Officials, (Sec. 206, P.D. 1096). Sections 275
and 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila (also Revised
Ordinances 1600), provide:
Sec. 275. Deterioration and Defects. — All buildings or parts of
buildings which show defects in any essential parts shall be
repaired and put in safe condition at once, or if the deterioration
be greater than fifty per centum of the value of the building, as
estimated by the city engineer, they shall be removed.
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|38
Sec. 276. Condemnation Proceeding. — Whenever in the judgment
of the City Engineer any building or portion of building has been
damaged by any cause to such an extent as to be dangerous for
use, he may condemn the same and shall immediately notify the
owner and the Mayor of his action. If the owner or his agent be
not willing to abide by this order of condemnation, he may make
formal objection within the period of seven days following such
notification. The Mayor shall hear the owner or his agent and his
experts and also the city engineer, deciding the case on the
evidence presented. If the Mayor confirms the action of the city
engineer, the owner or his agent shall immediately proceed to
remove the building within fifteen days from the date on which he
was notified of such final action. Should the owner or his agent not
comply with the decision of the Mayor the building shall be
removed at his expense and the city will proceed to recover
against him for the amount expended.
Section 215 of P.D. 1096, otherwise known as the National Building Code,
also states the authority of the Building Officials, with respect to dangerous
buildings, to wit:
When any building or structure is found or declared to be
dangerous or ruinous, the Building Officials, shall order its repair,
vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to
life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action
that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to
707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
From the abovementioned provisions, it is unquestionable that the Building
Officials, has the authority to order the condemnation and demolition of
buildings which are found to be in a dangerous or ruinous condition. It is
also clear from the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila that the
Mayor has the power to confirm or deny the action taken by the Building
Officials, with respect to the dangerous or ruinous buildings.
Respondent City Engineer and Building Official, Romulo M. del Rosario, can,
therefore, validly issue the questioned condemnation and demolition
orders. This is also true with the respondent Mayor who can approve or
deny the condemnation orders as provided in Section 276 of the
Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.
The only issue then is Official or not said officials committed grave abuse
of discretion in the exercise of their aforesaid powers.
 POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|39

It is a settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction "when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."35
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent City
Engineer because the orders were made only after thorough ocular
inspections were conducted by the City's Building Inspectors. The results
of the inspections were set forth in a memorandum dated 16 November
1982 where it was shown that all the buildings had architectural, structural,
sanitary, plumbing and electrical defects of up to 80%.36
The respondent Mayor's act of approving the condemnation orders was
likewise done in accordance with law. The protest made by petitioners was
submitted only on 22 February 1983, or three months after the notices of
condemnation were issued, and clearly beyond the seven days prescribed
under Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.
Certiorari will not he then because petitioners failed to exhaust all the
administrative remedies. This Court has long upheld the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies because it rests on the assumption
that the administrative body, board or officer, if given the chance to correct
its/his mistake or error, may amend its/his decision on a given
matter.37 Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for
administrative review, and provides a system of administrative appeal, or
reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience,
will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have
been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative
forum.38 There are, of course, exceptions to this rule,39 but none is
available to petitioners.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING these cases for lack of merit with treble costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Moreover, appeal was likewise available to petitioners. As correctly

contended by private respondents, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the then Ministry of Public Works to implement
P.D. No. 1096, under the title Abatement/Demolition of Buildings, provide:

5. Procedure for Demolition of Buildings. — The following steps

shall be observed in the abatement/demolition of buildings under
this Rule:

5.1. There must be a finding or declaration by the Building

Officials, that the building or structure is a nuisance, ruinous or
dangerous,
...

5.3. Within the fifteen-day period the owner may if he so desires,

appeal to the Secretary the finding or declaration of the Building
Official and ask that a re-inspection or re-investigation of the
building or structure be made. . . .

5.6. The decision of the Secretary on the appeal shall be final.

(emphasis supplied).

9. G.R. No. L-53485 February 6, 1991
PATRIA ESUERTE and HERMINIA JAYME, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Eleventh Division), HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA,
Judge, Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Cebu and MA. BEVERLY
TAN, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction seeks to set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. SP-08999-R, involving the same
parties.
An action for damages was filed by private respondent Beverly Tan against herein
petitioners Patria Esuerte and Herminia Jayme with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Cebu and docketed as Civil Case No. R-17584. The claim
for damages arose from an incident involving the parties and summarized by the
Court of Appeals, as follows:
. . . that on September 22, 23 and 27, 1978, private respondent Ma.
Beverly Tan, a Junior Resident Physician of Corazon Locsin-Montelibano
Memorial Hospital, Bacolod City, without any justifiable reason shouted at,
humiliated and insulted the petitioner, Patria Esuerte, Head Nurse,
Medicare Department of the said hospital and as a result of the said
incident, said petitioner complained to the Chief of the Hospital, Dr.
Teodoro P. Motus, in writing. The other petitioner, Herminia Jayme, who
was one of those who were present at the time of the incident also sent a
letter to the Chief of the Hospital, Dr. Teodoro Motus, informing the latter
of what she had witnessed. As a result thereof, private respondent was
advised to explain in writing by the Chief of the Hospital, but private
respondent instead of explaining only her side of the incident also
complained against the petitioners. The Discipline and Grievance
Committee, Corazon Locsin-Montelibano Memorial Hospital, conducted a
fact-finding investigation and later, the Chief of the Hospital, Dr. Teodoro
P. Motus, issued a resolution dated November 8, 1978, transmitting the
records of the case to the Regional Health Office, No. 6, Jaro, Iloilo City for
appropriate action; . . . . (pp. 91-92, Rollo)
Esuerte and Jayme filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
improper venue and for being premature for failure of Tan to exhaust administrative
remedies.
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|40
On January 2, 1979, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The motion for
reconsideration of the denial was likewise denied by the court on February 16,
1979.
Esuerte and Jayme filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals. On September 18, 1979, the
petition was dismissed without pronouncement as to costs. The motion for
reconsideration of the decision was likewise denied for lack of merit on February
18, 1980.
The following reasons were advanced by petitioners for the allowance of this
petition:
1) The Court of Appeals committed gross error and grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed the petition despite petitioners' overwhelming
evidence showing that the venue of private respondent's action (Civil Case
No. R-17584) was improperly laid.
2) The Court of Appeals committed gross error and grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed the petition despite petitioners' overwhelming
evidence showing that the filing of Civil Case No. R-17584 is premature
due to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
It is the contention of petitioners that the proper venue of the action filed by Tan
should be Bacolod City and not Cebu City. At the time of the filing of her action in
court, Tan was actually residing and may be found in Bacolod City. In fact, in her
"Statement of Assets and Liabilities," submitted by Tan to her employer, the
Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital, she declared that she is a resident
of FRAYU INTERIOR, 6th Street, Bacolod City.
Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance. —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Personal Actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the defendants or any of the defendants resides or may be found,
or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the Regional Trial Court is
given to the plaintiff but not to the plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated
 POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|41

by the Rules of Court (see Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillon, 19 SCRA 379). The
rule on venue, like other procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and orderly
administration of justice or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every
action and proceeding (Sy v. Tyson Enterprises Inc., 19 SCRA 367). The option of
the plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the Regional Trial Court is either the
place where the defendant resides or may be found or the place where the plaintiff
resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.
"Resides" in the rules on venue on personal actions means the place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or defendants as distinguished
from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence (Dangwa
Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-22795, January 31, 1977, 75
SCRA 124). And, in Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., G.R. No. L-29791,
January 10, 1978, 81 SCRA 75), venue of personal actions should be at the place
of abode or place where plaintiffs actually reside, not in domicile or legal residence.
In Koh v. CA, L-40428, December 17, 1975, 70 SCRA 298; 305, We ruled:
end. Justice would be better served if the complaint were heard and tried in Bacolod
City where all the parties resided.
The second ground raised by petitioners is devoid of merit. The alleged need by
private respondent Tan to exhaust administrative remedies before filing the
complaint for damages does not apply to the instant case. Private respondent as
plaintiff in the civil Case for damages has no administrative remedy available to
her. It is true that the same incident complained of in the administrative case filed
by petitioners against Tan is the subject of the action for damages filed by Tan
against the petitioners in the trial court. However, the cause of action in the
administrative case is different from that of the civil case for damages. While the
complainant in the administrative case may be a private person, it is the
government who is the aggrieved party and no award for damages may be granted
in favor of private persons. In the civil action for damages, the trial court's concern
is whether or not damages, personal to the plaintiff, were caused by the acts of the
defendants. The civil action for damages can proceed notwithstanding the pendency
of the administrative action.

Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully WHEREFORE, the position is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of
convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in Appeals is SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. R-17584 is DISMISSED for improper venue.
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to return there
after the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his SO ORDERED.
bringing of an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos
Norte, is entirely of no moment since what is of paramount importance is
where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought
the action, to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of
Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions. . ..

As perspicaciously observed by Justice Moreland, the purpose of procedure is not

to restrict the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter but to give it effective
facility "in righteous action," "to facilitate and promote the administration of justice"
or to insure "just judgments" by means of a fair hearing. If the objective is not
achieved, then "the administration of justice becomes incomplete and
unsatisfactory and lays itself open to criticism." (Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney
General, 20 Phil. 523, 530).

There is no question that private respondent as plaintiff in the Civil Case is a legal
resident of Cebu City.1âwphi1 Her parents live there. However, it cannot also be
denied that at the time of her filing of the complaint against petitioners, she was a
temporary resident of Bacolod City. She was then employed with the Corazon Locsin
Montelibano Memorial Hospital, Bacolod City, as resident physician. Moreover, the
acts complained of were committed in Bacolod City. The private respondents were
all residents of Bacolod City at the time of the bringing of the action. Though Tan's
employment was only temporary there was no showing when this employment will
 POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|42

10. G.R. No. L-29062 March 9, 1987

PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HON. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as Postmaster General, defendant-
appellant.

RESOLUTION

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil
Case No. 72498, 1 entitled "Philippine Refining Company v. Hon. Enrico Palomar,"
finding that plaintiff-appellee's promotion schemes ("Breeze Easy Money" and
"CAMIA Lucky-Key Hunt") were not in the nature of a lottery and enjoining appellant
from issuing a "fraud order" on the aforementioned schemes of appellee.

It appears that the Philippine Refining Company, herein appellee, resorted to two
schemes to promote the sale of its products: Breeze Easy Money and CAMIA Lucky-
Key Hunt, both of which envisioned the giving away for free of certain prizes
(without additional consideration) for the purchase of Breeze soap and CAMIA
cooking oil. In other words, the participants would get the exact value of the price
for the goods plus the chance of winning in the scheme. No one would be required
to pay more than the usual price of the products.

This Court has consistently ruled that a plan whereby prizes can be obtained without
any additional consideration (when a product is purchased) is not a lottery (Uy v.
Palomar L-23248, February 28, 1969; U.S. v. Baguio, 39 Phil. 862; Caltex (Phil.)
Inc. v. Postmaster-General, 18 SCRA 247). It is thus clear that the schemes in the
case at bar are not lotteries.

The allegation that the prohibition by the Postmaster General should have first been
appealed to the Department Secretary concerned in view of the doctrine
denominated as "the exhaustion of administrative remedies" has no application
here because one recognized exception to the doctrine is when the issue raised is
purely a legal one.

In view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS this appeal and to
AFFIRM the assailed decision of the Court of First Instance.

11. G.R. No. 78946 April 15, 1988
DR. NENITA PALMA-FERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
DR. ADRIANO DE LA PAZ, DR. SOSEPATRO AGUILA, and THE SECRETARY
OF HEALTH, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Quo Warranto filed by petitioner, Dr. Nenita Palma-Fernandez,
claiming entitlement to the position of Assistant Director for Professional Services
at the East Avenue Medical Center (formerly Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan) alleged
to be unlawfully held by private respondent, Dr. Sosepatro Aguila.
The background facts follow:
On 1 May 1985, petitioner was extended a permanent appointment to the position
of Chief of Clinics at the Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan (now East Avenue Medical
Center) by then Minister of Health and Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Center, Jesus C. Azurin.
Previous to this appointment, petitioner, a career physician, occupied the positions
of Medical Specialist I in 1978, Medical Specialist II from October 1982 to April
1985, until her appointment as Chief of Clinics on 1 May 1985. Even during her
incumbency as Medical Specialist II, petitioner was already designated as Acting
Chief of Clinics since September 1983 up to her permanent appointment to said
position.
As Chief of Clinics, petitioner exercised direct control and supervision over all heads
of departments in the Medical Center
In 1986, the new organizational structure of the Center retitled the position of Chief
of Clinics to Assistant Director for Professional Services. In partial implementation
of this new set-up, respondent Dr. Adriano de la Paz, as Medical Center Chief,
issued Hospital Order No. 30, Series of 1986, on 8 August 1986, designating
petitioner as Assistant Director of Professional Services (Annex 3, Comment, p. 48,
Rollo). As such, she continued to exercise direct control and supervision over all
heads of departments in the Medical Center.
On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 119 known as the "Reorganization Act of
the Ministry of Health" was promulgated.
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|43
On 29 May 1987, respondent De la Paz, as Medical Center Chief, designated
respondent Dr. Aguila, who was then Medical Specialist I, as Assistant Director for
Professional Services "vice Dr. Nenita Palma-Fernandez, who will be transferred to
the Research Office." (Hospital Order No. 21, series of 1987, Annex B, Petition).
Said order was purportedly issued "in the interest of the hospital service."
On the same date, Hospital Order No. 22, series of 1987, (Annex C, Petition), was
issued by respondent De la Paz, whereby petitioner was relieved "of her present
duties and responsibilities as Chief of Clinic and hereby transferred to the Research
Office. This order being issued in the interest of the hospital service.
Upon receipt of Hospital Order No. 22, petitioner filed on 1 June 1987 a letter-
protest with respondent Secretary of Health, furnishing copies to respondents De
la Paz and Aguila, as well as to the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Chairman
of the Government Reorganization Commission.
Failing to secure any action on her protest within a month's time, petitioner filed
on 8 July 1987 the instant Petition for Quo Warranto with Preliminary Injunction
against respondents Dr. de la Paz, Dr. Aguila, and the Secretary of Health.
On 14 July 1987, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
implementation of Hospital Orders Nos. 21 and 22, series of 1987.
After considering and deliberating on all Comments, the Reply, and the Rejoinder
of the Solicitor General to said Reply, the Court, on 17 March 1988, Resolved to
give due course to the Petition, and dispensing with memoranda, declared the case
submitted for resolution.
The Solicitor General has aptly framed the issues for resolution as follows:
1. Whether or not respondent De la Paz has the power or authority to issue the two
Hospital Orders in question;
2. Whether or not petitioner has a valid cause of action; and
3. Whether or not the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies precludes the
filing of the instant Petition.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Health, makes common cause
with petitioner and answers the first and third issues in the negative, and the
second in the affirmative. For their part, Respondents De la Paz and Aguila uphold
the opposite views.

We rule for petitioner.
1. Since the East Avenue Medical Center is one of the National Health Facilities
attached to the Department of Health, the power to appoint and remove
subordinate officers and employees, like petitioner, is vested in the Secretary of
Health, not the Medical Center Chief. The latter's function is confined to
recommendation. Thus, Section 79 (D). of the Revised Administrative Code
provides:
Section 79 (D). Power to appoint and remove.— The Department
Head, upon the recommendation of the Chief of the bureau or
office concerned, shall appoint all subordinate officers and
employees whose appointment is not expressly vested by law in
the President of the Philippines, and may remove or punish them,
except as especially provided otherwise, in accordance with the
Civil Service Law...
The Department Head also may, from time to time, in the interest
of the service, change the distribution among the several bureaus
and offices of his Department of the employees or subordinates
authorized by law.
Executive Order No. 119, or the Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health,
likewise states:
SEC. 26. New Structure and Pattern...
The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry
shag be prescribed by the Minister within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the approval of this executive order subject to
approval by the Office of Compensation and Classification and the
authorized positions created thereunder shall be filled thereafter
with regular appointments by him or the President, as the case
may be as herein provided...
Respondent Medical Center Chiefs argument that petitioner was not appointed but
was merely transferred in the interest of the public service to the Research Office
pursuant to Section 24 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines 1 will not alter the situation. Even a transfer requires an
appointment, which is beyond the authority of respondent Medical Center Chief to
extend, supra. Besides, the transfer was without petitioner's consent, was
tantamount to removal without valid cause, and as such is invalid and without any
legal effect (Garcia, et al. vs. Lejano, et al., 109 Phil. 116). A removal without cause
is violative of the Constitutional guarantee that "no officer or employee of the civil
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|44
service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law" (Article
IX, B, Section 2(3),1987 Constitution).
Petitioner's "designation" as Assistant Director for Professional Services on 8 August
1986 in accordance with the organizational structure of the Department of Health
under Hospital Order No. 30, Series of 1986, issued by respondent Medical Center
Chief did not make her occupancy of that position temporary in character. It bears
stressing that the positions of Chief of Clinics and Assistant Director for Professional
Services are basically one and the same except for the change in nomenclature.
Petitioner's permanent appointment on 1 May 1985 to the position of Chief of
Clinics, therefore, remained effective.
Neither can respondent Medical Center Chief rely on Section 2, Article III of the
Freedom Constitution and its Implementing Rules and Regulations embodied in
Executive Order No. 17, Series of 1986. The relevant provision was effective only
"within a period of one year from February 25, 1 986." 2 The Hospital Orders in
question were issued only on 29 May, 1987.
Executive Order No. 119, or the 'Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health"
promulgated on 30 January 1987, neither justifies petitioner's removal. The
pertinent provision thereof reads:
Sec. 26. New Structure and Pattern. — Upon approval of this
Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall,
in a holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties
and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and
benefits unless in the meantime they are separated from
government service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or
Article III of the Freedom Constitution.
The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of office ended
on 30 January 1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely
in a hold over capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating
any of her legal rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a hold over
capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25
February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to 2 February
1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon, et al. vs. Hon.
Benjamin B. Esquerra, et al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987). After the said date
the provisions of the latter on security of tenure govern.
And while it may be that the designation of respondent Aguila as Assistant Director
for Professional Services and the relief of petitioner from the said position were not
disapproved by respondent Secretary of Health, it by no means implies that the
 POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|45

questioned acts of respondent Medical Center Chief were approved by the former
official.

2. It follows from the foregoing disquisition that petitioner has a valid cause of
action. Where there is usurpation or intrusion into an office, quo warranto is the
proper remedy. (Lota vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-14803, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA
715).

3. The doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not preclude

petitioner from seeking judicial relief This rule is not a hard and fast one but admits
of exceptions among which are that (1) the question in dispute is "purely a legal
one" and (2) the controverted act is 'patently illegal" (Carino vs. ACCFA, No. L-
19808, September 29,1966,18 SCRA 183). The questions involved here are purely
legal. The subject Hospital Orders violated petitioner's constitutional right to
security of in tenure and were, therefore, "patently illegal." Judicial intervention
was called for to enjoin the implementation of the controverted acts.

There was substantial compliance by petitioner with the requirement of exhaustion

of administrative remedies since she had filed a letter-protest With the respondent
Secretary of Health, with copies furnished the Commissioner of Civil Service, and
the Chairman of the Government Reorganization Commission, but the same
remained unacted upon and proved an inadequate remedy. Besides, an action
for quo warranto must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues
(Sec. 16, Rule 66, Rules of Court), and the pendency of administrative remedies
does not operate to suspend the running of the one-year period (Cornejo vs.
Secretary of Justice L-32818, June 24, 1974, 57 SCRA 663).

WHEREFORE, the Writ of Quo Warranto is granted and petitioner, Dr. Nenita Palma-
Fernandez, is hereby held entitled to the position of Assistant Director of
Professional Services of the East Avenue Medical Center up to the expiration of her
term. The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued enjoining the
implementation of Hospital Orders Nos. 21 and 22, both dated 29 May 1987, is
hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

12. G.R. No. 92285 March 28, 1994
PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR., Presiding Judge Branch 48, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and
A. J. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine corporation
engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan
and Mindoro which it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production
of matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to
engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry
Code1 confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified
ban against importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products.
On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported
four (4) containers of matches from Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs
released on 12 April 1989, and two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore
on 19 April 1989. The records do not disclose when the second shipment was
released.
On 25 April 1989, upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the
Department of Natural Resources and Environment issued a certification that "there
are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at
reasonable price."2
On 5 May 1989, PTFI filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for
injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order against
respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing
matches and "wood-derivated" products, and the Collector of Customs from
allowing and releasing the importations. It was docketed
as Civil Case No. 89-48836 and raffled to respondent Judge Demetrio M. Batario,
Jr. PTFI prays for an order directing the Commissioner of Customs to impound the
subject importations and the AJIC be directed to pay petitioner P250,000.00 in
actual damages, P1,000,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
On 14 June 1989, AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that:
(a) The Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code
and not the regular court, has "exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an
importation or ascertain whether the conditions prescribed by law for an
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|46
importation have been complied with . . . . (and over cases of) seizure, detention
or release of property affected . . . . ;"3 (b) The release of subject importations had
rendered injunction moot and academic;4 (c) The prayer for damages has no basis
as the questioned acts of the Commissioner are in accordance with law and no
damages may be awarded based on future acts;5 and, (d) The complaint for
injunction cannot stand it being mainly a provisional relief and not a principal
remedy.6
PTFI opposed the motion to dismiss. On 28 July 1989, AJIC's motion to dismiss was
denied. However, on 8 February 1990, on motion for reconsideration by AJIC and
despite the opposition of PTFI, the Court reconsidered its 28 July 1989 order and
dismissed the case on the ground that it had "no jurisdiction to determine what are
legal or illegal importations."7
In this present recourse, PTFI seeks to set aside the 8 February 1990 order of
respondent court and prays for the continuation of the hearing in Civil Case No. 89-
48836. PTFI claims that what was brought before the trial court was a civil case for
injunction, i.e., "restraining the entry of safety matches into the country . . . for
the purpose of securing compliance with Sec. 36 (l) of the Forestry Code" and for
damages, "to seek redress of its right which has been clearly violated by the
importation of safety matches . . . . (which) is a denial to the petitioner of the
protection and incentive granted it by Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code . . .
."8 PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in R.A. No. 1125
relative to incidents before the Court of Tax Appeals because the instant action is
not a protest case where the aggrieved party is not an importer. It then argues that
since it could not avail of the remedies afforded by the Tariff and Customs Code,
resort to the courts is warranted, citing Commissioner of Customs v. Alikpala.9
On the formal requirements, we hold that the claim of public respondent that the
petition was filed late has no basis. The records revealed that PTFI received the
assailed order of 8 February 1990 on 20 February 1990, 10 hence, it had until 7
March 1990 to file petition for review on certiorari. On that date, PTFI filed a motion
for extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file the petition.11 On 19 March
1990, this Court granted PTFI a thirty (30)-day non-extendible period to file its
petition,12 thus resetting the new deadline for the petition to 6 April 1990. On that
date the petition was filed.
Petitioner anchors his complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted under
Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code. The only subject of this incentive is
a ban against importation of wood, wood products or wood-derivated products
which is to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has, under the Tariff and
Customs Code, the exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
cases13 and, in fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction
over prohibited importations. 14

The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised
Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct
recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of
Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis. To allow the regular court
to direct the Commissioner to impound the imported matches, as petitioner would,
is clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs
over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit
must inevitably be based on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of
the importation, hence, an usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed
against the Bureau of Customs 15 as well as the prayer for injunction against
importation of matches by private respondent AJIC 16 may not be granted without
the court arrogating upon itself the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.
The claim of petitioner that no procedure is outlined for the enforcement of the
import ban under the Tariff and Customs Code, if true, does not at all diminish the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over the subject matter. The enforcement of
statutory rights is not foreclosed by the absence of a statutory procedure. The
Commissioner of Customs has the power to "promulgate all rules and regulations
necessary to enforce the provisions of this (Tariff and Customs) Code . . . subject
to the approval of the Secretary of Finance."17 Moreover, it has been held that ". .
. . (w)here the statute does not require any particular method of procedure to be
followed by an administrative agency, the agency may adopt any reasonable
method to carry out its functions." 18
But over and above the foregoing, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of
Customs19 contesting the legality of match importations may already take the
nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the
court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, 20 we held that —
. . . . under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary
jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact,
and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v.
Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].)
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability
to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|47
factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of
discretion, has become well nigh indispensable . . . .
Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief
sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the match
importations of AJIC. Since the determination to seize or not to seize is
discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the same cannot be subject
of mandamus. But this does not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the
extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the Bureau
of Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction. Otherwise stated,
the court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin such act which
is within its prerogative, except when in the exercise of its authority it gravely
abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench, we have no occasion to
rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction as it is not
before us.
The petitioner's claim for damages against AJIC being inextricably linked with the
legality of the importations, must necessarily rise or fall with the main action to bar
the question that "(e)very importation of matches by said defendant is a denial to
plaintiff of the protection and incentives granted it by Sec. 36 (l) of the Forestry
Code," 21merely indicates its reliance on the illegality of the importations for its
prayer for damages. In other words, if the importations were authorized, there
would be no denial of the plaintiff's protection and incentives under the Forestry
Code. Necessarily, the claim for damages must await the decision declaring the
importations unlawful.
In Rosales v. Court of Appeals, we categorized a similar case for damages as
premature since "(t)he finality of the administrative case which gives life to
petitioners' cause of action has not yet been reached."22 The pendency of
petitioner's request to the Bureau of Customs for the implementation of the ban
against the importation of matches under the Forestry Code is impliedly admitted;
in fact, it is apparent from the correspondence of counsel for petitioner that the
Bureau is inclined to sustain the validity of the importations. 23 Hence, as
in Rosales, the order of the trial court granting the dismissal of the civil case must
be upheld.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 89-48836 dated 8 February 1990, the same
AFFIRMED and, consequently, the instant petition for review is DENIED.

13. G.R. No. 98084 October 18, 1993
NEMESIO C. VIDAD, EXUPERIO BANTOTO, CRISTITO TEVES and LLOYD
SIEGFRIED SIA, petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, BRANCH 42, SOLICITOR
GENERAL'S OFFICE, MARCELO M. MONTES, GENEROSO CAPUYAN and TEOFILO
GOMEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 98922 October 18, 1993
DR. TEOFILO E. GOMEZ, MARCELO BACALSO, NIEVA MONTES and GENEROSO
CAPUYAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JESUS TABILON, Presiding Judge of Branch 42, RTC-Dumaguete; NEMESIO
VIDAD, EXUPERIO BANTOTO, CRISTETA TEVES, and LLOYD SIEGFRIED SIA,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 100300-03 October 18, 1993
DR. TEOFILO E. GOMEZ, MARCELO BACALSO, NIEVA MONTES and GENEROSO
CAPUYAN, petitioners.
vs.
HON. JESUS TABILON, Presiding Judge of Branch 42, RTC - Dumaguete City,
MARILYN S. NOBLE, ASTERIA R. ABLIR, ANITA R. EUMAGUE, LOVELLA E. UY,
ELLUMINADA C. TAWING, REYNALDO CALLORA, JOSEFINA E. VILLAREAL, CECILIA
P. ARBOLADO, ET AL., respondents.
VITUG, J.:
A group of public school teachers in Negros Oriental held, starting 19 September
1990 and lasting until 21 September 1990, a must action, or a strike from their
school classes, to demand the release of their salaries by the Department of Budget.
The teachers also assailed alleged corruption in the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS). 1
A return-to-work order was promptly issued by DECS Regional Director Teofilo
Gomez with a warning that if the "striking" school teachers were not to resume
their classes within twenty-four hours, administrative charges will be filed. 2 The
order not having been heeded, administrative complaints against the teachers
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|48
concerned were thereupon filed. The teachers were each given five days from
receipt of said complaints within which to submit their respective answers and
supporting documents. Constituted to look into the cases was an investigation panel
composed of three DECS lawyers, namely, Marcelo Baclaso, Nieva Montes and
Generoso Capuyan. 3
On 13 November 1990, a group of school teachers, who were administratively
charged, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete a complaint for
injunction, prohibition and damages, with a prayer for preliminary injunction,
against the aforenamed DECS officials. A temporary restraining order, prohibiting
the defendants from continuing with the administrative investigation, was forthwith
granted by the court. 4
The defendants filed their answer, later followed by a motion to dismiss. The school
teachers, on their part, moved to strike out the appearance of the Office of the
Solicitor General and to accordingly declare the defendants in default. Both motions
of the plaintiffs and the defendants were denied by the court in its Order of 10 April
1991, viz:
In the light of the foregoing, plaintiffs' motion to declare
defendants in default, dated January 7, 1991 and defendants'
motion to dismiss dated January 23, 1991, are all denied for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
From this denial, both parties filed with this Court their respective petitions
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
teachers' petition, that likewise impleaded as respondent, along with the DECS
officials, the Office of the Solicitor General, was docketed as G.R. No. 98084 and
that of the DECS officials as G.R. No. 98922. These cases were consolidated in this
Court's resolution of 28 May 1991. 6
Four other cases, raising like issues, were later also filed with the court below by
other public school teachers concerned. The DECS officials, again represented by
the Solicitor General, filed motions to dismiss, which the court similarly denied. A
joint petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was thence filed with this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100300-03. This Court later resolved the petition to be
likewise consolidated with G.R. No. 98084 and G.R. No. 98922 in its Resolution of
04 July 1991. 7
The issues raised in these consolidated cases are —

(1) Whether or not the Office of the Solicitor General may properly represent the
defendants in the Regional Trial Court cases; 8 nd
(2) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court should have dismissed outright the said
cases. 9
It should be conceded that the various complaints against the DECS officials have
prescinded from the administrative actions taken, and contemplated to be yet
taken, against public school teachers, the plaintiffs in the cases pending with the
court a quo. The said complaints charge the defendants, all government officials,
with having illegally withheld their salaries, having wrongfully filed administrative
charges against the plaintiffs, having unjustifiably refused to inform the latter of
the nature and accuse of accusation upon which the charges were initiated, having
inexcusably violated elemental due process, and having erroneously applied the
law. The school teachers pray for actual and moral damages, plus attorney's fees,
as well as for an order restraining the defendants from further proceeding with the
administrative investigations.
The contention of the school teachers that the DECS officials are being
sued solely in their private capacity certainly is not borne out by their above
allegations and prayers. The root of the cases filed below deals, in fact, on the
performance of official functions by the DECS officials. Whether the actions they
have taken were proper or improper, or whether they have acted in good faith or
bad faith, cannot, pending a full hearing that would aptly afford all parties an
opportunity to ventilate their respective contentions, be yet determined. Until then,
we must presume that official duties have been regularly
performed. 10
Presidential Decree 478, in part, provides:
1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When
authorized by the President of head of office concerned, it shall
also represent government-owned or controlled corporations. The
Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government, and as such, shall discharge duties requiring the
services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and
functions:
a) Represent the government in the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings represent the Government and its
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|49
officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all
civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official
capacity is a party (stress supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
The above provisions are basically reiterated in the Administrative Code of 1987. 11
We accordingly hold that the Solicitor General did not act improperly in deciding to
represent the DECS officials in the above cases.
The defendants' motion to dismiss the complaints have likewise been precipitately
sought, and we see no reversible error in the denial thereof by the lower court. The
various complaints filed by the public school teachers allege bad faith on the part
of the DECS officials. It cannot be pretended this early that the same could be
impossible of proof. On the assumption that the plaintiffs are able to establish their
allegations of bad faith, a judgment for damages can be warranted. Public officials
are certainly not immune from damages in their personal capacities arising from
the acts done in bad faith; in these and similar cases, the public officials may not
be said to have acted within the scope of their official authority, and no longer are
they protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions. 12
It was, nonetheless, inopportune for the lower court to issue the restraining orders.
The authority of the DECS Regional Director to issue the return to work
memorandum, to initiate the administrative charges and to constitute the
investigating panel can hardly be disputed. 13
We see the court cases and the administrative matters to be closely interrelated, if
not, indeed, interlinked. While no prejudicial question strictly arises where one is a
civil case and the other is an administrative proceeding, in the interest of good
order, it behooves the court to suspend its action on the cases before it pending
the final outcome of the administrative proceedings. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve
a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence. We see, in these petitions before us, no cogent reason
to deviate from the rule.
WHEREFORE —
(1) The Petition in G.R. No. 98084 is DISMISSED;
 POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|50

(2) In G.R. No. 98922 (a) the Order of 10 April 1991, appealed from is AFFIRMED;
(b) the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower court is DISSOLVED; and
(c) the lower court is DIRECTED to suspend further hearings in its Civil Case No.
9789, until after a final determination on the administrative proceedings would have
been made;

(3) In G.R. No. 100300 — No. 100303, inclusive, (a) the Joint Order of 28 May
1991, denying the motions to dismiss Civil Case No. 9877, No. 9879, No. 9882 and
No. 9883 is AFFIRMED; (b) the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower
court in said civil cases is DISSOLVED; and (c) the lower court is DIRECTED to
suspend further hearings in the above numbered civil cases, until after a final
determination would have been made on the administrative proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

14. G.R. No. 139583 May 31, 2000
CRUSADERS BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISION and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC, for brevity) denying petitioner's request for
renewal of its temporary permit to operate DWCD-FM, and recalling its assigned
frequency.
Undisputed are the pertinent facts, to wit:
The petitioner, Crusaders Broadcasting System, Inc. (Crusaders, for short), was
the grantee of Temporary Permit No. BSD-0459-92 to operate 10-KW DWCD-FM at
a frequency of 97.9 Mhz.
On July 12, 1994, Mr. Cesar A. Dumlao, Chairman of Crusaders, sent to the
Commission a letter (Exh. "A") requesting permission to stop the broadcast of
DWCD-FM for around a month starting July 12, 1994, so as to renovate its 20-year
old Broadcast Booth and the entire facilities of the station.
Subsequently, upon application of Crusaders, NTC renewed Temporary Permit No.
BSD-0814-94, dated December 14, 1994, covering the period from January 1, 1995
to December 31, 1996. Again, on December 12, 1996, Crusaders applied for
another renewal of its Temporary Permit.
Acting on subject application, the NTC caused the inspection of the radio station of
Crusaders and per report of NTC-National Capital Region, which conducted such
ocular inspection on February 21, 1997, the station of Crusaders was inoperative.
Acting upon such finding, the Broadcast Service Division of the NTC recommended
the cancellation and revocation of the permit of Crusaders and the recall of its
frequency 97.9 Mhz.
Thus, on April 25, 1997 the Commission wrote Chairman Cesar A. Dumlao of
Crusaders, informing the latter of the denial of his application for the renewal of
Crusaders' Temporary Permit.
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|51
Crusaders presented a motion for reconsideration, thru its counsel, Atty. Felino
Canal, explaining that Crusaders was not able to resume its operations because of
the institution of Civil Case No. 64739 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 163, by Conamor Broadcasting Corporation (Conamor, for brevity), against
Crusaders Broadcasting System, Inc. and of the issuance of an order of injunction
by the said Court enjoining Crusaders from operating its radio station.
On July 14, 1997, the Commission issued a show-cause Order directing Crusaders
to explain: (1) Why its application for renewal of Temporary Permit for station
DWCD-FM should not be denied; (2) Why its station, DWCD-FM, should not be
ordered closed; and (3) Why its station DWCD-FM assigned frequency should not
be recalled.
On August 5, 1997, Atty. Feline Ganal filed an "Urgent Motion For Extension" for
the filing of Crusaders' answer/explanation. Such motion was followed by a second
"Urgent Motion For Extension", dated August 15, 1997, and a third motion for
extension, dated August 22, 1997.
On August 28, 1997, for failure of Crusaders to submit a responsive pleading, the
Commission issued an order declaring Crusaders in default, and, thereafter, handed
down its decision recalling the assigned frequency of Crusaders.
The following day, or on February 29, 1997, to be precise, Atty. Ganal filed an
Answer, averring that the show-cause order was served upon him and not upon his
client Crusaders and therefore, it was only upon the filing of its answer that
Crusaders should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction
of the Commission. It was further alleged that Crusaders is a grantee of a
congressional franchise (RA No. 8091) but it could not yet resume its operation
because its transmitter was taken by Conamor by virtue of an order of injunction
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 64739; that it has
already applied with Commission for authority to acquire an additional transmitter;
that the said injunction was already lifted and set aside by the same trial court, in
an Order dated August 27, 1997; that it has mobilized its resources towards the
operation of its radio station and that it has, in fact, made a test broadcast.
On September 22, 1997, Crusaders filed an "urgent Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsideration" praying for the lifting of the order of default, setting aside of the
decision, and for the reopening of the case.
After hearing, the Commission granted the motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration and declared the case reopened for reception of evidence by
Crusaders in order to afford it ample opportunity to be heard and to substantiate
its defense as regards the show-cause order issued by the Commission. The initial

evidence presented in support of the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration
was later adopted as Crusaders evidence in the main case.
Then, the Commission came out with its assailed decision, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Commission believes
and so holds that respondent's request for renewal of its
temporary permit to operate DWCD-FM should be, as it is, hereby
DENIED.
Consequently, respondent's assigned frequency, 97.9 Mhz, is
hereby withdrawn and recalled, the same to be assigned without
reasonable delay to the best qualified applicant.
SO ORDERED.2
Crusaders' next step was to go to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed its petition
for lack of merit.
Undaunted, Crusaders found its way to this Court via the present petition for
review.
It is petitioner's submission that the NTC committed a grave reversible error in
considering as untenable the temporary stoppage of Crusaders' broadcast.
Petitioner insists that were it not for the order of injunction issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, which prohibited it from broadcasting, and caused the
seizure of its transmitter, antenna, and other equipment, its station could have
resumed operations.
Petitioner contends further that had the NTC approved its application, dated
December 12, 1995, for the acquisition of a new transmitter, it could have re-
started to operate DWCD-FM despite the "Court's injunction order. In short,
petitioner maintains that its failure to operate is not unjustified because the
stoppage of its broadcasting was not due to its own fault or negligence.
It is likewise petitioner's stance that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. In upholding the finding of NTC that
the "Programming and Marketing
Agreement" with Conamor Broadcasting
Corporation "to be one for a joint
venture, which is a flagrant violation of
Radio laws in that it would allow a non-
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|52
franchise grantee to operate a public
utility;
2. In finding, in general terms, that "the
findings of the respondent NTC are
supported by substantial evidence and,
therefore, should be "accorded respect
and finality"; and
3. In upholding the NTC decision under
the so-called "doctrine of primary
jurisdiction."
Crusaders likewise assigned some substantive and procedural errors on the part of
the NTC but the same were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner theorizes that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the decision
of NTC, which denied the renewal of its temporary permit to operate DWCD-FM and
caused the withdrawal of its assigned frequency.
On the other hand, respondent NTC, through the Office of Solicitor General (OSG),
countered that the NTC was justified in denying petitioner's application for renewal
of temporary permit and in recalling its assigned frequency. Anent the issue of the
shifting of burden of proof, it alleges that the show-cause order dated July 14, 1997
was based on the inspection reports, dated February 21, 1997 and July 11, 1997,
respectively, which indicated that petitioner failed to rehabilitate its broadcast
booth and other facilities. Consequently, the burden of proof shifted to the
petitioner.
Respondent also contends that subject inspection reports need not be authenticated
and identified by competent witnesses, the same being public documents; citing
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which provides that "Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Indeed, it appears decisively clear that the assailed NTC decision is anchored on
substantial evidence.
The issue at bar may be encapsulated thus: Whether or not the NTC properly denied
the application for renewal of Crusaders' temporary permit to operate DWCD-FM,
and validly ordered the withdrawal of the latter's assigned frequency.
Sec. 1 of Act No. 38463 reads:

Sec. 1. No person, firm, company, association or corporation shall
construct, install, establish, or operate a radio transmitting
station, or a radio receiving station used for commercial purposes,
or a radio broadcasting station, without having first obtained a
franchise therefor from the Congress of the Philippines: . . .
While Section 3 of the same Act provides:
Sec. 3. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications is
hereby empowered, to regulate the construction or manufacture,
possession, control, sale and transfer of radio transmitters or
transceivers (combination transmitter-receiver) and the
establishment, use, the operation of all radio stations and of all
form of radio communications and transmissions within the
Philippines: In addition to the above he shall have the following
specific powers and duties:
(1) He may approve or disapprove any
application for renewal of station or operator
license: Provided, however, That no application
for renewal shall be disapproved without giving
the licensee a hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
It should be noted that by virtue of Executive Order (E.O) No. 546, creating the
Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the
regulation of radio communications is a function assigned to, and being performed
by, the NTC.
Petitioner does not deny and in fact, uses it as the reason for the stoppage of its
broadcast that, it was the filing of the aforementioned civil case against it
(petitioner) which grounded DWCD-FM's broadcasting. It is not disputed, either,
that what prompted Conamor to bring a complaint against petitioner was the latter's
rescission of a "Programming and Marketing Agreement", which gave Conamor the
following rights and privileges akin to those of an owner, among others, to wit:
(a) The sole discretion to determine and
implement whatever programs are
deemed suitable to make the station
competitive;
(b) The full discretion to change the
station call letters, name, slogan or
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|53
tagline and such other services that bear
upon the station's identity to improve the
station's market position;
(c) The acquisition, at its expense, of a
new transmitter, studio, broadcast
equipment recording booth, including
cost of construction; and
(d) A share in the net profit at the rate
of 65%, leaving only 35% to respondent,
when the new facilities of Conamor
became operational. (Exhibits "E-2" and
"E-2-a")
It is uncontested as well, that under the said Agreement, Conamor was free from
any claim arising from employer-employee relationship.
In order to settle the civil case, Crusaders and Conamor later entered into a
"Compromise Agreement" which superseded the programming and marketing
agreement. The Court approved compromise containing the following conditions:
1. Upon execution hereof, the parties hereby agree to jointly
operate DWCD-FM at its original office and Broadcasting Station
at No. 209 Dela Paz Street, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila;
2. The parties shall equally share in the expenses as well as in the
profits or losses, as the case may be, while they are jointly
operating the radio station;
3. The plaintiff shall immediately return the radio station's official
transmitter, antenna system and other available equipment of
DWCD-FM from the Strata 200 Building, Emerald Avenue, Pasig
City, Metro Manila to the above Mandaluyong City office of
defendant;
4. The parties further agree that in the event the subject DWCD-
FM would be sold or assigned to a third part, the written consent
of the plaintiff shall be indispensably necessary to give effect and
validity to any such sale, assignment or disposition of the said
radio station;

5. In case of sale, assignment or any disposition of the subject
radio station to any third party, 78.94% of the proceeds thereof
shall go to the defendant (3.57% of which shall be paid to Atty.
Feline Canal a s (sic) his attorney's fees) while the remaining
21.06% shall belong to the plaintiff. (Exhibit "J")
The said compromise agreement speaks for itself. Conamor has been given the
right to operate and manage a radio station despite the clear mandate of the Radio
Law that only holders of a legislative franchise can do so. Even on this ground alone,
Crusaders can be prevented by the NTC from broadcasting. That the said ground
was not reflected in the show-cause order does not mean that the same cannot be
raised thereafter by the NTC, as it has done in the present case, when it gleaned a
basis therefor during the administrative proceedings, from the evidence presented
by the petitioner itself the substance of the agreement between petitioner and
Conamor. The said findings were not rebutted by petitioner which kept on harping
only on the alleged unfairness of NTC in the application of its procedures as well as
on the existence of the said civil case against it and on the refusal of NTC to approve
its application for the acquisition of a new transmitter.
On the matter of factual findings by the NTC as to the inoperativeness of subject
radio station, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the said findings are
supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. As
aptly stressed upon and ratiocinated by the Court of Appeals:
In the main, therefore, the findings of the respondent NTC are supported by
substantial evidence. As to whether or not it should have adopted a policy of
leniency is a matter that is addressed solely to its discretion.
As in the case of other administrative agencies, the technical matters
involved are entrusted to NTC's expertise. In the matter of issuance of
licenses to operate radio stations, it is in a better position than the courts to
determine to whom such privilege should be granted in order that public
interest will be served. As long as its decisions are supported by substantial
evidence, they are entitled to respect from the courts.
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) numbers among those
administrative agencies discharging specialized functions, in this case, the
regulation of the nation's airwaves. As in the case of other administrative
tribunals, its findings of fact will be accorded respect, and on occasion, even
finality, by reason of their acquired expertise on specific matters within their
particular jurisdiction. (Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 269 SCRA 199 [1997]; Malonzo v.
Commission on Elections, 269 SCRA 380 [1987] (sic); Naguiat v. National
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|54
Labor Relations Commission, 269 SCRA 564 [1997]). The only requirement
is that its decisions must be supported by substantial evidence, which need
be neither overwhelming nor preponderant (Manila Central Line Corporation
v. Manila Central Line Free Workers Union-National Federation of Labor, 290
SCRA 690 [1998]).4
Neither can the Court find merit in the submission by petitioner that the stoppage
of its broadcast would not have happened were it not for the case for injunction
filed against it. In the first place, the said case could not have been instituted had
petitioner not entered into a programming and marketing agreement with
Conamor. What is more, it does not dispute the finding of NTC that it (petitioner)
could have resumed broadcasting had it complied with the Order of RTC-Pasig to
observe the formal requirements for a motion to lift the order of injunction on the
basis of a counterbond. Such a simple step petitioner failed to take, and its failure
to put up a counterbond engendered the stoppage of its operations for three years
and rendered the stoppage of its operation justified.
The Court upholds the primary jurisdiction exercised by the NTC and quotes with
approval the following opinion of the Court of Appeals, to wit:
Moreover, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction prevents this Court from
"arrogating unto itself" the authority to resolve a controversy which falls
under the jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed of a special competence. (Paat
v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167 [1997]). As held in Villaflor v. Court of
Appeals, 280 SCRA 297 [1997], which reiterates the rulings
in Ismael, Jr. and Co. v. Deputy Executive Secretary, 90 SCRA 673 [1990]
and Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502 [1995]:
Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which
is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience and services to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact. 5
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the
petition for review under consideration is DENIED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

15. G.R. No. 189852, August 17, 2016
THOMAS BEGNAEN, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES LEO CALIGTAN AND
ELMACALIGTAN, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
The case at Bench is an opportunity for Us to reaffirm and reemphasize Our ruling
in Lim v Gamosa1where We struck down as void an administrative rule that
expanded the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP)
beyond the boundaries of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA). In the process,
it likewise behooves Us to resolve a question of concurrent jurisdiction and
determine the proper tribunal/body to take cognizance of the instant dispute.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 104150. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision4 and
Order5 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain (Mt.)
Province, and reinstated the Resolution6 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Bauko, Mt. Province. The case concerns an ancestral land dispute between
members of an Indigenous Cultural Community (ICC), particularly the Kankanaey
Tribe of Mt. Province.
The basic issue is whether or not the CA, in upholding the jurisdiction of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) over the aforementioned dispute, to the
exclusion of regular courts, committed reversible error.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NCIP-RHO & MCTC
On 3 August 2006, petitioner Thomas Begnaen (Begnaen) filed a Complaint with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against respondents Spouses Leo and Elma
Caligtan (Sps. Caligtan) for "Land Dispute and Enforcement of Rights" before the
Regional Hearing Office (RHO) of the NCIP at La Trinidad, Benguet.7The RHO
thereafter issued an Order8 dismissing the complaint based on respondents'
argument that the case should have gone to the council of elders and not through
the Barangay Lupon, as mandated by the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act
(IPRA).9chanrobleslaw
However, instead of abiding by the Order of the RHO, Begnaen filed against the
Sps. Caligtan a Complaint for Forcible Entry with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction10 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bauko-
Sabangan, Mt. Province.
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|55
Begnaen alleged that he was the owner of a 125 square meter parcel of land
situated in Supang, Sabangan, Mt. Province. He claimed that on two
occasions,11 respondents - by using force, intimidation, stealth, and threat -entered
a portion of the subject property, hurriedly put up a chicken-wire fence, and started
building a shack thereon without Begnaen's knowledge and consent.12
Meanwhile, respondents averred that they owned the area in question as part of
the land they had purchased from a certain Leona Vicente in 1959 pursuant to age-
old customs and traditions. They introduced improvements evidencing their prior
physical possession.13 Respondents further contended that when petitioner's father
Alfonso Begnaen (Alfonso) was still alive, he had always respected their boundary
wherein a "GIKAD" or old pine tree lumber was buried and recovered. The "GIKAD"
established their boundary pursuant to age-old Igorot customs and traditions. To
further mark their boundary, respondents also planted bushes and a mango tree,
all of which Alfonso had likewise respected.14
MCTC RULING
In its Resolution, the MCTC dismissed the ejectment complaint in favor of
respondents. However, this was without prejudice to the filing of a case before the
RHO of the NCIP, which the MCTC recognized had primary, original, and exclusive
jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to the IfjRA. The MCTC further reasoned that
the fact that petitioner initially filed a complaint with the NCIP-RHO shows that he
recognized the primary jurisdiction of the NCIP.16 Aggrieved, petitioner-appellant
filed an appeal before Regional Trial Court Branch 35 of Bontoc, Mt. Province
(RTC).
RTC RULING
In a Decision17 dated 11 March 2008, the RTC reversed and set aside the Resolution
and Order of the MCTC, saying that it was the latter court that had jurisdiction over
the case for forcible entry. The RTC reasoned that the provisions of the IPRA
pertaining to jurisdiction do not espouse exclusivity and thus cannot divest the
MCTC of its jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases as provided
by B.P. Big. 129. According to the RTC, IPRA must be read to harmonize with B.P.
Big. 129.18
Respondent-appellees then moved for a reconsideration of the above Decision, but
their motion was denied by the RTC in its Order19 dated 29 May 2008. Undaunted,
respondents appealed to the CA.
CA RULING
In its Decision,20 the CA reversed and set aside the RTC rulings and reinstated the
 POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|56

Resolution of the MCTC. In upholding the jurisdiction of the NCIP over the present The IPRA confers jurisdiction on the NCIP over "all claims and disputes involving
case, the CA ruled that the passage of the IPRA has divested regular courts of their rights of ICCs/IPs," without qualification as to whether such jurisdiction is original
jurisdiction when the parties involved are members of ICCs/IPs and the disputed and/or exclusive. However, Section 5, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Circular No.
property forms part of their ancestral land/domain.21 Petitioner filed a Motion for 1-03 dated 9 April 2003, known as "The Rules on Pleadings, Practice, and Procedure
Reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its questioned Resolution. 22 Before the NCIP" (NCIP Rules), went beyond the provisions of the IPRA to provide:24
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices
shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs
Hence, this Petition. and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of
R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:
RULING OF THE COURT
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Heaving
The NCIP Rule purporting to Office (RHO):
establish the jurisdiction of the
NCIP-Regional Hearing Officer a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral
as original and exclusive has been lands/domains of ICCs/IPs:
declared VOID for expanding the
law. x x x x

In its assailed Decision, the CA reversed the RTC and held that jurisdiction
properly lies with the NCIP, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Thus:
While admittedly forcible entry cases are cognizable by the regular courts pursuant
to Section 1, rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Court and B.P. Big. 129; nonetheless,
with the passage of the IPRA Law (R.A. 8371), it is our considered view that
the regular courts are divested of their jurisdiction when the parties
involved therein are the ICCs/IPs and the property in question is an
ancestral land. 23
R.A. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, particularly Sections 65
and 66 thereof, provide:
(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs
that have not been settled under customary laws; xxx. (Emphases
supplied)
During the pendency of these proceedings, the NCIP promulgated Administrative
Circular No. 1, Series of 2014, known as "The 2014 Revised Rules of Procedure
before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples"25cralawred (NCIP Revised
Rules). Section 1, Rule III of the NCIP Revised Rules continues to articulate the
"original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO, thus:

SECTION 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices, — When disputes
involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
the dispute.
SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices,
shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs: Provided, however,That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP
unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary
laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute
that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition
precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices
shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs
and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of
R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction
of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):
a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains
of ICCs/IPs;
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
We recently had occasion to scrutinize and categorically rule upon the validity of
the foregoing provisions in Lim,26 specifically "whether the NCIP's jurisdiction is

limited to cases where both parties are ICCs/IPs or primary and concurrent with
regular courts, and/or original and exclusive, to the exclusion of the regular courts,
on all matters involving rights of ICCs/IPs." At the outset, We said:
(I)n Unduran, et at. v. Aberasturi, et al, we ruled that Section 66 of the IPRA does
not endow the NCIP with primary and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. Based on the qualifying proviso,
we held that the NCIP's jurisdiction over such claims and disputes occur only when
they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. Since two of
the defendants therein were not IPs/ICCs, the regular courts had jurisdiction over
the complaint in that case.
In his concurring opinion in Unduran Justice Jose P. Perez submits that the
jurisdiction of the NCIP ought to be definitively drawn to settle doubts that still
linger due to the implicit affirmation done in The City Government of Baguio City,
et al. v. Atty. Masweng, et al. of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of the
parties are not ICCs/IPs.
In Unduran and as in this case, we are hard pressed to declare a primary and/or
exclusive and original grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs where there is no clear intendment by the legislature.
After a comprehensive analysis of the classes of jurisdiction, We held that "the
NCIP cannot be said to have even primary jurisdiction over all the ICC/IP
cases x x x. We do not find such specificity in the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP
in Section 66 of the IPRA. Neither does the IPRA confer original and exclusive
jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs." Furthermore,
That NCIP Administrative Circular 44 expands the jurisdiction of the NCIP as original
and exclusive in Sections 5 and 1, respectively of Rule III x x x is of no moment.
The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of
a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment.
It ought to be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may
be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the
law into effect. The administrative regulation must be within the scope and purview
of the law. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend
the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute
is vested in the legislature. Indeed, administrative issuances must not
override, but must remain consistent with the law they seek to apply and
implement. They are intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify,
the law.
x x x x
Perforce, in this case, the NCIP's Administrative Circulars1 classification
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|57
of its RHO's jurisdiction as original and exclusive, supplants the general
jurisdiction granted by Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 to the trial courts and
ultimately, modifies and broadens the scope of the jurisdiction conferred
by the IPRA on the NCIP. We cannot sustain such a classification.
x x x x
At best, the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the
regular trial courts in the exercise of the latter's general jurisdiction
extending to all controversies brought before them within the legal bounds
of rights and remedies. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, We struck down as void the latest iteration of the NCIP rule purporting to
confer original and exclusive jurisdiction upon the RHO, contrary to the provisions
of the IPRA:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SPNo. 98268 dated 26 April 2010 and the Resolution of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples in RHO 4-01-2006 dated 30 November 2006
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The petition in RHO 4-01-2006 is DISMISSED for
lack of jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. Section 1
of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of
2014, promulgated on 9 October 2014 declaring the jurisdiction of the
Regional Hearing Officer as original and exclusive is declared VOID for
expanding the law. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the foregoing, We find the CA to have erred in reversing the RTC's
findings on the jurisdiction of regular courts and declaring that the NCIP
"has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the instant case to the exclusion of
the regular courts." The appellate court was likewise in error in upholding the NCIP's
primary jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all
cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A.
8371. To reiterate Lim, the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that
of the regular trial courts in the exercise of the latter's general jurisdiction extending
to all controversies brought before them within the legal bounds of rights and
remedies.
Be that as it may, We nevertheless find the MCTC's dismissal; of petitioner-
appellant's case for forcible entry against respondents-appellees to be warranted.
The NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over (1) the parties, who are
all members of the same ICC, and (2) the subject property, which is
ancestral land.
Before proceeding to the pivotal issue of which tribunal shall properly take

cognizance of the dispute between the parties, We first address the NCIP's
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject property.
It is undisputed that the parties are members of ICCs/Indigenous Peoples (IPs).
In point is the Resolution of the MCTC, which states in part:
On the date set, the parties and their respective lawyers appeared. Instead of
immediately hearing the aforesaid prayer, the court, considering that the parties
are natives of this place (Mountain Province) who belong to the so called
groups of Indigenous Peoples/Indigenous Cultural Communities of our
country, and that the land subject of this case is also located within this same
province, asked the following questions to the parties, to wit:
1. Do they admit that they belong to and are members of the Indigenous
Peoples/Indigenous Cultural Communities?
x x x x
To these questions, both parties replied in the affirmative: that indeed, they
belong to and are members of the so called group of Indigenous
Peoples/Indigenous Cultural Communities xxx.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In affirming the MCTC, the CA likewise declared:
Undeniably, both parties herein admitted that they are members of the
Indigenous Cultural Communities, particularly the Kankanaey Tribe of Mt.
Province xxx.28 (Emphasis supplied)
Since the courts below (the CA and the MCTC) concur that the parties to this case
are members of ICCs, particularly the Kankanaey Tribe of Mt. Province, the Court
defers to these undisputed factual findings.
On the matter of the subject property, petitioner claims that land that had been
purchased by respondents from another cannot become ancestral land, which
should have been owned since time immemorial.
We do not agree.
Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Act of 1997, specifically governs the rights of indigenous peoples to their
ancestral lands and domains.30
Section 3(a) and (b) and Section 56 of R.A. 8371 provide for a more comprehensive
definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands:
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|58
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms
shall mean:
Ancestral Domains — Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and
natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the
present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure
their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually
owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial
grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and
lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they tra
ditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly
the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands — Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to lands occupied,
possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members
of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of
government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and
private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.
SECTION 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. — Property rights
within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity
of this Act, shall be recognized and respected.
Indeed, "ancestral lands are lands occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals,
families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial,
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present xxx."
Thus, the claim of petitioner that when land is purchased, it is no longer within the
ambit of ancestral land/domain, is devoid of merit.
It is significant to note that in their Answer, respondents claimed that they owned
the area in question as part of the land they purchased in 1959 "pursuant to age-
old customs and traditions from their relative Leona Vicente."31 This purchase

was well within the rights protected under the IPRA Law or its Rules and
Regulations, to wit:
SECTION 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands. — The right of ownership and possession
of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property. — Such right shall include the right to transfer
land or property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject
to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned.32 "
(Emphases supplied)
PART III
Rights of the ICCs/IPs to Their Ancestral Lands
SECTION 1. Right to Transfer Land or Property. — The various indigenous modes
of acquisition and transfer of property between and among members of the
ICCs/IPs shall be recognized as legal, valid and enforceable. 33 (Emphases
supplied)
Furthermore, when questioned, both parties admitted that the land subject of their
dispute and of the case, was ancestral land.34 This admission was also attested to
in respondents' Comment/Opposition to the Petition, which stated that "the
petitioner again cannot refute or contradict the fact that as per
stipulations/admissions entered into by the parties before the MCTC of Sabangan-
Bauko, Mt. Province on 29 June 2007 the parties herein are members of the
Indigenous Peoples/ Indigenous Cultural Communities and the land subject of this
case is an ancestral land."35
Finally, it must be noted this case stemmed from the "Land Dispute and
Enforcement of Rights" complaint filed by petitioner-appellant before the NCIP-
RHO. When the NCIP-RHO assumed jurisdiction over the case, heard it, and
eventually dismissed it without prejudice to its settlement under customary
practice, the RHO in effect determined that the property was ancestral land, and
that the parties to the dispute must conform to the customary practice of dispute
settlement.
The NCIP-RHO, being the agency that first took cognizance of
petitioner-appellant's complaint, has jurisdiction over the same to the
exclusion of the MCTC.
Even as We squarely ruled on the concurrent jurisdiction of the NCIP and the regular
courts in Lim, this Court likewise said: "We are quick to clarify herein that even as
we declare that in some instances the regular courts may exercise jurisdiction over
cases which involve rights of ICCs/IPs, the governing law for these kinds of disputes
necessarily include the IPRA and the rights the law bestows on ICCs/IPs.”36
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|59
While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with
the same subject matter, We have consistently upheld the settled rule that the
body or agency that first takes cognizance of; the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.37
Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction, "this concurrence is not to be
taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both
bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which1 will first
complete the investigation."
In Department of Justice v. Liwag,39 Mary Ong initially filed a complaint-affidavit
before the Ombudsman, which was acted upon forthwith. Two weeks later, she
executed sworn statements before1 the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Jutsice, alleging the same facts and circumstances. We held that it
was the Ombudsman, before whom the complaint was initially filed, that had the
authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.
Thus:
The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of
preliminary investigation over the cases filed against the respondents would not
promote an orderly administration of justice.
x x x x
To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or more
investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would
also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear
and defend his position before every agency or body where the same
complaint was filed.This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to
appear and plead their cause or defense.
There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct I possibility
that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with
conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents.
Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary
expenditure of public funds, and the use of valuable and limited resources of
Government, in a duplication of proceedings already started with the
Ombudsman." (Emphases supplied)
Similarly, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez10, We declared:
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or
more disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint is filed
first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent

jurisdiction. In this case, since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman,
and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the
Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
It is a hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction, once acquired,
is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is
terminated. When herein complainants first filed the complaint in the Ombudsman,
jurisdiction was already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could no longer be
transferred to the sangguniang bayanby virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by
the same complainants. (Emphasis supplied)
It does not escape Our attention that petitioner-appellant first invoked the NCIP's
jurisdiction by filing with the RHO his complaint against respondents for "Land
Dispute and Enforcement of Rights." The initial filing of the instant case by
petitioner-appellant before the NCIP-RHO only showed that he fully recognized the
NCIP's jurisdiction over this case.41 However, when the Complaint was
dismissed without prejudice for failure of petitioner-appellant to first bring the
matter for settlement before the Council of Elders as mandated by the
IPRA,42 petitioner-appellant took an altogether different route via the MCTC.
The dismissal was pursuant to Section 9, Rule IV of NCIP Administrative Circular
No. 1-03, which dictates that "No case shall be brought before the RHO or the
Commission unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided for under
customary laws,"43 By doing so, the NCIP-RHO did not divest itself of its jurisdiction
over the case; it merely required compliance with the mandatory settlement
proceedings. As aptly observed by the MCTC, the case was dismissed "not on the
issue of jurisdiction as (the NCIP-RHO) has rightful jurisdiction over it, but on the
ground of non-compliance with a condition sine qua non."44 However, instead of
simply complying with the RHO Order, petitioner-appellant filed a forcible entry
case, a complete deviation from customary practice.
Finally, the IPRA's declaration of the primacy of customary laws and practices in
resolving disputes between ICCs/IPs is no less significant:
SECTION 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. — When disputes
involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
the dispute.
Under the foregoing discussions, We find that jurisdiction remains vested in the
NCIP-RHO as the first agency to take cognizance over the case, to the exclusion of
the MCTC. We likewise declare petitioner-appellant estopped from belatedly
impugning the jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO after initiating a Complaint before it
and receiving an adverse ruling.
POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|60
Petitioner-appellant is guilty of forum shopping,
Corollarily, and as already recognized by the MCTC in' the proceedings below45,
We find petitioner-appellant to have engaged in the deplorable and docket-clogging
practice of forum shopping46
On numerous occasions, this Court has held that "a circumstance of forum shopping
occurs when, as a result or in anticipation of an adverse decision in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means
other than appeal or certiorari by raising identical causes of action, subject
matter and issues. Stated a bit differently, forum shopping is the institution of
two or more actions involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would
come out with a favorable disposition." 47
A perusal of the Complaint48 filed by petitioner-appellant before the MCTC, four
months after the NCIP-RHO had dismissed his case without prejudice, reveals no
mention whatsoever of the initial NCIP-RHO proceedings. Indeed, the pertinent
Verification and Certification49 of the said pleading reads:
4. That I hereby certify that I have not commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency and that no other action is pending before the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, and should I learn thereafter that
a similar action or proceeding had been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report the
same within 5 days to the Honorable Court;
Clearly, the non-disclosure of the commencement of the case for "Land Dispute and
Enforcement of Rights" previously filed before the NCIP-RHO, constitutes a violation
of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court against forum shopping:
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agencyand, to the best of his knowledge, no
such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
 POLITICAL REV |Admin Law Assign 2|61

amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance
with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of
court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a
cause for administrative sanctions. (Emphases supplied)

As We held in Brown-Araneta v. Araneta50 "(t)he evil sought to be avoided by the

rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two
separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking
advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in
several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant
confusion, the Court adheres to the rules against forum shopping, and a breach of
these rules results in the dismissal of the case."

The question as to whether such non-disclosure was willful, deliberate, and

ultimately contumacious, is yet to be addressed in a proper proceeding. But for
purposes of the matter before Us, the falsity of such Verification and Certification
is further ground to uphold the MCTC's dismissal of the Complaint, and ultimately,
the dismissal of the instant Petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 104150 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Decision dated 11 March 2008
and the Order dated 29 May 2008, both rendered by the RTC of Bontoc, Mt.
Province, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE; and the Resolution of the MCTC
of Bauko, Sabangan, dated 6 August 2007 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.