[G.R. Nos. L-49705-09. February 8, 1979.
] assess the vital circumstances clearly and accurately, cannot be said to have acted whimsically or capriciously, or without
basis.
Petition dismissed.
TOMATIC ARATUC, SERGIO TOCAO, CISCOLARIO DIAZ, FRED TAMULA, MANGONTAWAR
GURO and BONIFACIO LEGASPI, petitioners, vs. TheCOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
REGIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS for Region XII (Central Mindanao), ABDULLAH
DIMAPORO, JESUS AMPARO, ANACLETO BADOY, et al., respondents.
Of the Ruling of the Court
[G.R. Nos. L-49717-21.]
LINANG MANDANGAN, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, The REGIONAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS for Region XII, and ERNESTO ROLDAN, respondents.
Lino M. Patajo for petitioners in G.R. No. L-49705-09 and for private respondent in G.R. No. L-49717-21.
Estanislao A. Fernandez for private respondents in G.R. No. L-49705-09 and for petitioner in G.R. No. L-49717-21.
Office of the Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan (KB) candidates, the Regional Board of Canvassers of Region XII issued a
resolution declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL) candidates elected representatives to the Batasang
Pambansa. The KB candidates appealed the resolution to the Comelec which consequently issued the now assailed
resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidates as having obtain the first eight places, and ordering the
Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. The Aratuc petition alleged that the Comelec in arriving
at its conclusion committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Mandangan petition, on the
other hand, claims that it was error of law for Comelec to consider spurious and manufactured the returns in voting centers
showing that the votes of the candidates obtaining the highest number of votes exceeded the highest possible number of
valid votes, because the excess was not more than 40% as was the rule followed in Bashier/Basman (L-33758, February
24, 1972), and that the Comelec exceeded its jurisdiction and denied due process to petitioner in extending its inquiry
beyond the election records of "the 878 voting centers examined by the KB experts and passed upon by the Regional
Board of Canvassers" and in excluding from the canvass the returns form voting centers showing 90% to 100% voting in
places where military operations were certified by the army to be going on, the same being unsupported by evidence.
The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the actuations of the Comelec and in Mandangan held (1) that
considering the historical antecedents relative to the highly questionable manner in which elections have been held in the
past in the provinces involved, the Comelec may deem spurious and manufactured the returns in voting centers showing
that the votes of the candidates obtaining the highest number of valid votes exceeded the highest possible number of
votes cast therein even if the excess number of votes were not more than 40%; and (2) that the Comelec could extend its
inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board of Canvassers and take cognizance of the fact that voting centers affected by
military operations have been transferred to the poblaciones, because as a superior body having supervision and control
over the Board of Canvassers, it may do directly what the latter was supposed or ought to have done. In Aratuc et al., the
Supreme Court found that the Comelec did consider the high percentage of voting coupled with mass substitute voting as
proof that the pertinent returns had been manufactured, and that apart from presuming regularity in the performance of its
duties, the Comelec had adhered to the Supreme Court's guidelines in examining and passing on the returns from the
voting centers and in denying petitioner's motion for the opening of ballot boxes concerned. Further, the High Court stated,
it might disagree with theComelec as to which voting center should be excluded or included, but still a case of grave abuse
of discretion would not come out considering that Comelec, which concededly is in a better position to appreciate and
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; NATURE AND EXTENT OF SUPREME COURT'S POWER OF CERTIORARI OVER
DECISIONS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS OF THE COMELEC UNDER THE 1978 CONSTITUTION. — While under
the constitution of 1935 "the decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commissions shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court" (Section 2, first par., Article X), the 1973 Constitution provides somewhat differently thus: "Any
decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within 30 days from his receipt of a copy thereof" (Section II, Article XII), even as it ordains that
the Commission shall "be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of all
members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials" (Section 2(2), Article XII).
Correspondingly, the Election Code of 1978, which is the first legislative construction of these pertinent constitutional
provisions, makes theCommission also the "sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies" and further provides
that "any of its decisions, orders or rulings (in such controversies) shall be final and executory", just as in election
contests, "the decisions of the Commission shall be final and appealable" (Section 192). The framers of the
new Constitutionmust be presumed to have definite knowledge of what its means to make the decisions, orders and
rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court". And since instead of maintaining that provision
intact, it ordained that the Commission's actuations be instead brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", the
Supreme Court cannot insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited
scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial law. A review includes digging into the merits or
unearthing errors of judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist
even when the decision is otherwise erroneous. Certiorari implies indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and
caprice, an omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation. While the
effects of an error of judgment may not differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters that
by their nature ought to be left for final determination to the sound discretion of certain officers or entities, reserving it
to the Supreme Court to insure the faithful observance of due process only in cases of patent arbitrariness.
2. CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; CONSIDERING AS SPURIOUS VOTES EXCEEDING THE
HIGHEST POSSIBLE NUMBER OF VALID VOTES THAT CAN BE CAST IN A VOTING CENTER, NOT A CASE OF.
— It is not grave abuse of discretion for the Comelec to deem as spurious and manufactured votes exceeding the
highest possible number of valid votes that can be cast in a voting center even if the total number of excess votes in
the voting center is not more than 40%, considering the historical antecedents relative to the highly questionable
manner in which elections have been held in the past in the provinces involved in this case, of which the Supreme
Court has judicial notice.
3. ID.; ID.; NOT A CASE OF; COMELEC MAY DO DIRECTLY WHAT THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS IS
SUPPOSED TO DO OR OUGHT TO HAVE DONE. — Under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978,
the Comelec shall have direct control and supervision of the board of canvassers, and that relatedly Section 175 of
the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies." The authority of
the Commission in reviewing actuations of the board of canvassers does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction
conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision any where in the Election Code, but from
the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed by Section 168 of the Code. And in administrative
law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation, that a superior body or office having supervision
and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.
4. ID.; ID.; ERRORS OF JUDGMENT NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE SUPREME COURT. — Where it appears from
the records that the Comelec has taken pains to consider as meticulously as the nature of the evidence presented by
both parties would permit all the contentions of petitioners relative to the weight that should be given to such
 evidence, the Supreme Court will not hold that the Comelec acted wantonly and arbitrarily in drawing its conclusions.
If errors there are in any of those conclusions, they are errors of judgment which are not reviewable in certiorari, so
long as they are founded on substantial evidence.
5. ID.; ID.; NOT A CASE OF; WHERE COMELEC PASSED UPON RETURNS USING COMMON SENSE AND
PERCEPTION ONLY; PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES. — Where
the Comelec did not examine the questioned election returns with the aid of experts but "using common sense and
perception only", apart from presuming regularity in the performance of its duties, a case of grave abuse of discretion
would not come out, considering that Comelec cannot be said to have acted whimsically or capriciously or without
any rational basis, particularity if it is considered that in many respects and from the very nature of the Supreme
Court's and the Commission's respective functions, the Commission is in a better position to appreciate and assess
the vital circumstances closely and accurately.
6. ID.; NON-IDENTIFICATION OF BALLOT BOXES IN DEFECTIVE CONDITIONS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE COMELEC HAS EXAMINED, STUDIED AND PASSED UPON THE
RECORDS RELATED THERETO. — Non-identification of defective ballot boxes by the Comelec does not constitute
grave abuse of discretion where it has examined, studied and passed upon the records related thereto. If at all,
deeper inquiry into this point would be of real value in an electoral protest.
||| (Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. L-49705-09, [February 8, 1979], 177 PHIL 205-246)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1051. May 19, 1903.]
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. FRED L. DORR ET AL., defendants-appellants.
F .G. Waite for appellants.
Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; SEDITION; GOVERNMENT DEFINED. — The term "government" as employed in Act No.
292 of the United States Philippine Commission is used in the abstract sense of the existing political system as
distinguished from the concrete organism of the Government.
2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION. — When an offense may be committed in any
of several different modes and the complaint alleges the crime to have been committed in two or more modes, it
is sufficient to prove the offense committed in any one of them.
3. ID.; SEDITION. — The publication of an article can not be punished under Act No. 292 of the United States
Philippine Commission as having seditious tendencies unless it has a tendency to produce disaffection or a
feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to its laws.
4. ID.; ID. The publication of an article abusive of the United States Philippine Commission and its members is
not a libel upon the Government and does not fall within said Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine
Commission.
||| (U.S. v. Dorr, G.R. No. 1051, [May 19, 1903], 2 PHIL 332-343)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 86695. September 3, 1992.]
MARIA ELENA MALAGA, doing business under the name B.E. CONSTRUCTION; JOSIELEEN
NAJARRO, doing business under the name BEST BUILT CONSTRUCTION; JOSE N. OCCEÑA,
doing business under the name THE FIRM OF JOSE N. OCCEÑA; and the ILOILO BUILDERS
CORPORATION,petitioners, vs. MANUEL R. PENACHOS, JR., ALFREDO MATANGGA, ENRICO
TICAR AND TERESITA VILLANUEVA, in their respective capacities as Chairman and Members
of the Pre-qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC)-BENIGNO PANISTANTE, in his
capacity as President of Iloilo State College of Fisheries, as well as in their respective
personal capacities; and HON. LODRIGIO L. LEBAQUIN, respondents.
Salas, Villareal & Velasco for petitioners.
Virgilio A. Sindico for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY, DEFINED. — The 1987 Administrative Code
defines a government instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government,
not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).
2. ID.; CHARTERED INSTITUTION; DEFINED; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — The 1987 Administrative Code
describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered institution — refers to any agency organized or operating under a
special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory
Provisions). It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered
by P.D. 1818. There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was
created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the
government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines
shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the
Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National
Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such
apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious
detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the
National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would
henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law. (Presidential Decree No. 1523)
3. ID.; PROHIBITION OF ANY COURT FROM ISSUING INJUNCTION IN CASES INVOLVING INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECTS OF GOVERNMENT (P.D. 1818); POWER OF THE COURTS TO RESTRAIN APPLICATION. — In the
case of Datiles and Co. vs. Sucaldito, (186 SCRA 704) this Court interpreted a similar prohibition contained in P.D.
605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was there declared that the prohibition pertained to the issuance
of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or
the exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters
would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla made it clear, however,
that on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented
by P.D. No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. We see no reason why the
above ruling should not apply to P.D. 1818. There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified
injunction of the bidding and the award of the project.
4. ID.; POLICIES AND GUIDELINES PRESCRIBED FOR GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE (PD 1594); RULES
IMPLEMENTING THEREOF, NOT SUFFICIENTLY COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — Under the Rules
Implementing P.D. 1594, prescribing policies and guidelines for government infrastructure contracts, PBAC shall
provide prospective bidders with the Notice to Pre-qualification and other relevant information regarding the
proposed work. Prospective contractors shall be required to file their ARC-Contractors Confidential Application for
Registration & Classifications & the PRE-C2 Confidential Pre-qualification Statement for the Project (prior to the
amendment of the rules, this was referred to as Pre-C1) not later than the deadline set in the published Invitation to
Bid, after which date no PRE-C2 shall be submitted and received. Invitations to Bid shall be advertised for at least
three times within a reasonable period but in no case less than two weeks in at least two newspapers of general
circulations. (IB 13 1.2-19, Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. 1594 as amended) PBAC advertised the
pre-qualification deadline as December 2, 1988, without stating the hour thereof, and announced that the opening of
bids would be at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988. This scheduled was changed and a notice of such
change was merely posted at the ISCOF bulletin board. The notice advanced the cut-off time for the submission of
pre-qualification documents to 10 o'clock in the morning of December 2, 1988, and the opening of bids to 1 o'clock in
the afternoon of December 12, 1988. The new schedule caused the pre-disqualification of the petitioners as
recorded in the minutes of the PBAC meeting held on December 6, 1988. While it may be true that there were
fourteen contractors who were pre-qualified despite the change in schedule, this fact did not cure the defect of the
irregular notice. Notably, the petitioners were disqualified because they failed to meet the new deadline and not
because of their expired licenses. (B.E. & Best Built's licenses were valid until June 30, 1989. [Ex. P & O
respectively: both were marked on December 28, 1988]) We have held that where the law requires a previous
advertisement before government contracts can be awarded, non-compliance with the requirement will, as a general
rule, render the same void and of no effect. (Caltex Phil. v. Delgado Bros., 96 Phil. 368) The fact that an invitation for
bids has been communicated to a number of possible bidders is not necessarily sufficient to establish compliance
with the requirements of the law if it is shown that other possible bidders have not been similarly notified.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — The purpose of the rules implementing P.D. 1594 is to
secure competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism, collusion and fraud in the award of these contracts to the
detriment of the public. This purpose was defeated by the irregularities committed by PBAC. It has been held that the
three principles in public bidding are the offer to the public, an opportunity for competition and a basis for exact
comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive character
of the system and thwarts the purpose of its adoption. (Hannan v. Board of Education, 25 Okla. 372) In the case at
bar, it was the lack of proper notice regarding the pre-qualification requirement and the bidding that caused the
elimination of petitioners B.E. and Best Built. It was not because of their expired licenses, as private respondents
now claim. Moreover, the plans and specifications which are the contractors' guide to an intelligent bid, were not
issued on time, thus defeating the guaranty that contractors be placed on equal footing when they submit their bids.
The purpose of competitive bidding is negated if some contractors are informed ahead of their rivals of the plans and
specifications that are to be the subject of their bids.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE THEREOF. — It has been held in a long line of cases that a
contract granted without the competitive bidding required by law is void, and the party to whom it is awarded cannot
benefit from it. It has not been shown that the irregularities committed by PBAC were induced by or participated in by
any of the contractors. Hence, liability shall attach only to the private respondents for the prejudice sustained by the
petitioners as a result of the anomalies described above.
7. CIVIL LAW; NOMINAL DAMAGES; AWARD THEREOF, WHEN AVAILABLE. — As there is no evidence of the
actual loss suffered by the petitioners, compensatory damage may not be awarded to them. Moral damages do not
appear to be due either. Even so, the Court cannot close its eyes to the evident bad faith that characterized the
conduct of the private respondents, including the irregularities in the announcement of the bidding and their efforts to
persuade the ISCOF president to award the project after two days from receipt of the restraining order and before
they moved to lift such order. For such questionable acts, they are liable in nominal damages at least in accordance
with Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of
the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or, recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. These damages are to be assessed against the
private respondents in the amount of P10,000.00 each, to be paid separately for each of petitioners B.E.
Construction and Best Built Construction.
||| (Malaga v. Penachos, Jr., G.R. No. 86695, [September 3, 1992], 288 PHIL 410-425)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 97149. March 31, 1992.]
FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE REINERIO O.
REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications; COMMODORE ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of
the Philippine Ports Authority; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BOARD; and JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ,
in his capacity as Chairman of the Administrative Action Board, DOTC, respondents.
Rogelio Zosa Bagabuyo for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICE; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION; NOT A PENALTY IN ITSELF BUT A
MERE MEASURE OF PRECAUTION. — The imposition of preventive suspension on a government employee
charged with an administrative offense is subject to the provision of Section 41 of the Civil Service Law,P.D. No. 807.
Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is
merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from
the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHED FROM REMOVAL FROM OFFICE. — Preventive suspension is distinct from the
administrative penalty of removal from office such as the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No. 857. While the
former may be imposed on a respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is the penalty
which may only be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final disposition of the case.
3. ID.; PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA); GENERAL MANAGER; WITH JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE
AND DECIDE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS AGAINST ITS OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES. — The PPA general
manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors,
subject a respondent in an administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers are sanctioned, not
only by Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 857 aforequoted, but also by Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 granting heads of agencies the
"jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees" in the
PPA.
4. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION; PERIOD LIMITED TO NINETY (90)
DAYS. — The period of preventive suspension is limited. It may be lifted even if the disciplining authority has not
finally decided the administrative case provided the ninety-day period from the effectivity of the preventive
suspension has been exhausted. The employee concerned may then be reinstated.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PERIOD INTERRUPTED BY COURT PROCESSES. — However, the said ninety-day period may
be interrupted. Section 42 of P.D. No. 807 also mandates that any fault, negligence or petition of a suspended
employee may not be considered in the computation of the said period. Thus, when a suspended employee obtains
from a court of justice a restraining order or a preliminary injunction inhibiting proceedings in an administrative case,
the lifespan of such court order should be excluded in the reckoning of the permissible period of the preventive
suspension.
 6. ID.; ID.; ATTACHMENT; DEFINED. — "Attachment" is defined in Sec. 38, Book IV, Chapter 7 of the Administrative
Code of 1987, as to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and the attached agency or
coordination.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; AN ATTACHED AGENCY HAS A LARGER MEASURE OF INDEPENDENCE FROM THE
DEPARTMENT TO WHICH IT IS ATTACHED; WITH FREEDOM FROM INTERFERENCE WITH RESPECT TO
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER. — An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to
which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This
is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely
for "policy and program coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached
agency from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a
Department's administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and
other personnel actions "in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions" under theAdministrative
Code of 1987. Moreover, the Administrative Code explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and
control shall not apply to chartered institutions attached to a Department. Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that
with respect to the management of personnel, an attached agency is, to a certain extent, free from Departmental
interference and control. This is more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857.
8. ID.; PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY; GENERAL MANAGER; POWER TO REMOVE ERRING EMPLOYEES
BELOW THE RANK OF ASSISTANT MANAGER, IMPLIEDLY GRANTED. — Although the foregoing section does
not expressly provide for a mechanism for an administrative investigation of personnel, by vesting the power to
remove erring employees on the General Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the law impliedly
grants said officials the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged
with an administrative offense.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROVAL OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, ESSENTIAL. — During such investigation, the
PPA General Manager, as earlier stated, may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The
investigation should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807. Only after
gathering sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager impose the proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the
latter action which requires the approval of the PPA Board of Directors.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPEAL MAY BE MADE TO DEPARTMENT HEAD OR SECRETARY OR DIRECTLY TO
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. — From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board of
Directors, the employee concerned may elevate the matter to the Department Head or Secretary. Otherwise, he may
appeal directly to the Civil Service Commission. The permissive recourse to the Department Secretary is sanctioned
by the Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807).
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TRANSMITTAL OF COMPLAINT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BOARD (AAB),
PREMATURE. — It is clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General Manager to the AAB
(Administrative Action Board) which was created during the tenure of Secretary Reyes under Office Order No. 88-
318 dated July 1, 1988, was designed to act, decide and recommend to him "all cases of administrative
malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the Department," was premature.
12. ID.; ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BOARD; NOT EXEMPT FROM THE OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS;
CASE AT BAR. — Its special nature as a quasi-judicial administrative body notwithstanding, the AAB is not exempt
from the observance of due process in its proceedings. We are not satisfied that it did so in this case the
respondents protestation that petitioner waived his right to be heard notwithstanding. It should be observed that
petitioner was precisely questioning the AAB's jurisdiction when it sought judicial recourse.
||| (Beja, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97149, [March 31, 1992])
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 115863. March 31, 1995.]
AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., respondent.
Mauricio Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC); CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD (CESB); AN
OFFICE CREATED BY LAW AND CAN ONLY BE ABOLISHED BY LAW. — The Career Executive Service Board
(CESB) was created by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974 which adopted the Integrated
Reorganization Plan. As the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an
unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. As aptly
summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public Officers and Employees, viz: Except for such offices as are created by the
Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in this
respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what
offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and
define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created,
or whether these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the
legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers
and duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office." In the petition at bench, the legislature has not
enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriation Acts from
1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTONOMOUS ENTITY THAT CANNOT BE ABOLISHED BY CSC. — Respondent Commission
invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its
power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates
the offices under the respondent Commission. As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent
Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16. From its
inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent
Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to
view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook." The
essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said
attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code
of 1987, the purpose of attaching any functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain "policy and
program coordination." This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code.
||| (Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 115863, [March 31, 1995], 312 PHIL 1145-1156)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120319. October 6, 1995.]
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK
EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR, respondents. cdasia
Eusebio P. Navarro, Jr. and Adolfo R. Fandialan for petitioner.
Ester S. Garcia for respondent Voluntary Arbitrator.
Napoleon Banzuela, Jr. for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; ARBITRATION; DEFINED. — Arbitration is the reference of
a labor dispute to an impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by
such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATION; COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION. — Arbitration
may be classified as either compulsory or voluntary. Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a
dispute are compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of
their dispute through arbitration by a disinterested third party normally appointed by the government, and whose
decision is final and binding on the parties. Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the
parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective agreement, to an impartial third person
who is mutually acceptable, for a final and binding resolution.
3. ID.; ID.; ARBITRATORS AND LABOR ARBITERS; JURISDICTION AND APPEALS, COMPARED AND
DISCUSSED. — Article 261 of the Labor Code provides for exclusive original jurisdiction of voluntary arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators. Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise jurisdiction over
other labor disputes. On the other hand, a labor arbiter has jurisdiction on cases enumerated under Article 217 of
the Labor Code.The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite
limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter. The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides
that "(t)he award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties," while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders." Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the
decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary
arbitrator. Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated
to the Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari, in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the
Court of Appeals. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.
4. ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS; STATUS IS THAT OF A QUASI-JUDICIAL INSTRUMENTALITY;
DECISIONS APPEALABLE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS. — In Volkschel Labor Union, et al., v. NLRC, et al., this
Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the
same legal effect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this Court ruled that
"a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under these rulings, it follows
that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agencybut
independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter. Section 9 of B.P. Blg.
129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies and
instrumentalities. Governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are synonymous. Either of them is a means by which a
government acts, or by which a certain government act or function is performed. The voluntary arbitrator performs a
state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions in the Labor Code and he
falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The award or decision of
the voluntary arbitrator is equated with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from
that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme
Court. As a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for
proper disposition.
||| (Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, G.R. No. 120319, [October 6, 1995],
319 PHIL 262-272)
[G.R. No. 134990. April 27, 2000.]
MANUEL M. LEYSON, JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, TIRSO ANTIPORDA,
Chairman, UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and OSCAR A. TORRALBA, President, CIIF Oil
Mills, respondents.
Dioscoro P. Timtiman, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Lope R. Torres for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Manuel M. Leyson, Jr., Executive Vice President of International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC) a
domestic corporation engaged in the lighterage or shipping business, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a case
against Tirso Antiporda, Chairman of United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and CIIF Oil Mills, and respondent Oscar A.
Torralba, President of the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) companies, with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Public respondent Ombudsman dismissed the complaint based on its finding that the case was a simple
case of breach of contract with damages which should have been filed in the regular court. The Ombudsman said that it
had no jurisdiction to determine the legality or validity of the termination of the contract entered into by CIIF and ITTC.
Reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint was denied. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner asserted that private
respondents Antiporda and Torralba are public officers subject to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court ruled that jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his
claim that the CIIF companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without resorting to
the definition of "government owned or controlled corporation" contained in par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating
to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one
(51) percent of its capital stock. In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were
organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of
GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT. Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI
OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled corporation. The Court further noted that the
two corporations comprising the CIIF Companies were not vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature placing them outside the scope of government-owned or controlled corporations.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987; GOVERNMENT OWNED OR
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS; DEFINED; REQUISITES. — The jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in
support of his claim that the CIIF companies are government owned or controlled corporations are incomplete
without resorting to the definition of "government owned or controlled corporation" contained in par. (13), Sec. 2,
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned
by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The definition mentions three (3)
 requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; second, vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and third, owned by the Government directly
or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent
of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock.
2. ID.; ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER SUBJECT CORPORATIONS; SAID CORPORATIONS NOT VESTED WITH FUNCTIONS RELATING TO
PUBLIC NEEDS WHETHER GOVERNMENTAL OR PROPRIETARY IN NATURE. — In the present case, all three
(3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns
44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of
UNITED COCONUT. Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition
of a government owned or controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and the
UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite. Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to
substantiate his contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/or UNITED COCONUT was vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature unlike PETROPHIL in Quimpo. The
Court concludes that the CIIF companies are, as found by public respondent, private corporations not within the
scope of its jurisdiction.
||| (Leyson, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 134990, [April 27, 2000], 387 PHIL 241-250)
[G.R. No. 83578. March 16, 1989.]
THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE TEOFILO L. GUADIZ, JR.,Presiding Judge, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, Branch 147, NCR (MAKATI),and KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT
CO.,INC., respondents.
K.V. Faylona & Associates for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; WHERE LEGISLATION PROVIDES FOR AN APPEAL
FROM DECISIONS OF CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, SUCH BODIES
ARE CO-EQUAL WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS. — As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal
from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal
with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY; DEFINITION. — A quasi-judicial body has been defined
as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rule making."
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1936;
PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE; DOES NOT HAVE POWER TO EXERCISE QUASI-
JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS BUT ONLY OF PROSECUTING "DOLLAR-SALTING" ACTIVITIES. — A perusal of the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-
judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon
to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by
the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more.
4. ID.;ID.;ID.;DUTIES ARE TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY PRELIMINARY TO A JUDICIAL RECOURSE AND TO
RECOMMEND ACTION "OF APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES." — The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force's undertaking, as we said, is simply, to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the
filing of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse,
and to recommend action "of appropriate authorities".It is not unlike a fiscal's office that conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine whether or not prima facie evidence exists to justify haling the respondent to court,
and yet, while it makes that determination, it cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court. For it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
5. ID.;ID.;ID.;POWERS SIMILAR TO PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT BUT BOTH
ARE NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL ENTITIES. — It is not unlike the Presidential Commission on Good Government
either, the executive body appointed to investigate and prosecute cases involving "ill-gotten wealth".It had been
vested with enormous powers, like the issuance of writs of sequestration, freeze orders, and similar processes,
but that did not, on account thereof alone, make it a quasi-judicial entity as defined by recognized authorities. It
cannot pronounce judgment of the accused's culpability, the jurisdiction to do which is exclusive upon the
Sandiganbayan.
6. ID.;ID.;ID.;NOT CO-EQUAL OR COORDINATE WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AS IT IS NOT A
QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY. — If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body,
it cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling
statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.
7. ID.; ID.; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1936, UNCONSTITUTIONAL, REASONS. — We agree that the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on
that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable
cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success
of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the
person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue
search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is
neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent,Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.
8. ID.; 1973 CONSTITUTION; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR
PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS AND EFFECTS; OFFICER HIMSELF MUST BE "RESPONSIBLE; MEANING
OF "RESPONSIBILITY." — It is our ruling, thus, that when the 1973 Constitution spoke of "responsible officer"
to whom the authority to issue arrest and search warrants may be delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the
legislator with the license to give that authority to whomsoever it pleased. It is to be noted that the Charter itself
makes the qualification that the officer himself must be "responsible". We are not saying, of course, that the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (or any similar prosecutor) is or has been irresponsible in discharging
its duty. Rather, we take "responsibility", as used by the Constitution, to mean not only skill and competence but
more significantly, neutrality and independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. A
prosecutor can in no manner be said to be possessed of the latter qualities.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCLUSION OF PROSECUTORS THEREUNDER DEMANDED BY PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS. — According to the Court of Appeals, the implied exclusion of prosecutors under
the 1973 Constitution was founded on the requirements of due process, notably, the assurance to the
respondent of an unbiased inquiry of the charges against him prior to the arrest of his person or seizure of his
property. We add that the exclusion is also demanded by the principle of separation of powers on which our
republican structure rests. Prosecutors exercise essentially an executive function (the petitioner itself is chaired
by the Minister, now Secretary, of Trade and Industry), since under the Constitution, the President has pledged
to execute the laws. As such, they cannot be made to issue judicial processes without unlawfully impinging the
prerogative of the courts.
||| (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83578, [March 16, 1989], 253 PHIL 344-364)
[G.R. No. 57883. March 12, 1982.]
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo,
ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C.
ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO
AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners, vs. MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO
TANTUITCO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of
Justice,respondents.
Fidela Vargas, Leonardo S. Gonzales and Raul Gonzales for petitioners.
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefore and for other Purposes," the same being contrary to the security of tenure provision of
the Constitution as it separates from the judiciary Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to
municipal circuit courts except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the
inferior courts established by such Act. They likewise impute lack of good faith in its enactment and characterize as undue
delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and
judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. The
Solicitor General maintains that there is no valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of the statute, it being a
legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence
of good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in
law.
After an intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition,
the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown. It held that the enactment thereof was in
answer to a pressing and urgent need for a major reorganization of the judiciary; that the attendant abolition of the
inferior courts which shall cause their incumbents to cease from holding office does not impair the independence of
the judiciary and the security of tenure guarantee as incumbent justices and judges with good performance and clean
records can be named anew in legal contemplation without interruption in the continuity of their service; that the
provision granting the President authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges survives
the test of undue delegation of legislative power, a standard having been clearly adopted therefor; that the
reorganization provided by the challenged Act will be carried out in accordance with the President's constitutional duty
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and the judiciary's commitment to guard constitutional rights.
The petition was dismissed. Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee dissented in a separate opinion; Justices Felix V.
Makasiar and Venicio Escolin concurred with the main opinion; Justice Hermogenes Concepcion concurred in the
result; Justices Antonio P. Barredo, Ramon C. Aquino, Ramon C. Fernandez, Juvenal K Guerrero, Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera and Vicente G. Ericta concurred in separate opinions; Justices Vicente Abad-Santos and Efren I.
Plana submitted separate concurring and dissenting opinions.
SYLLABUS
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980; ENACTMENT THEREOF
IN ANSWER TO A PRESSING AND URGENT NEED; GOOD FAITH OBSERVED IN ITS ENACTMENT. — The
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would firstly, result in the attainment "of more efficiency in the disposal of
cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary
consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together with
the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to
the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." It may be observed
that the volume containing the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were
devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as exhaustive study
before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a background, it become quite manifest
how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears
undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that characterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of the
Presidential signature. cdasia
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESULTING ABOLITION OF COURTS IN GOOD FAITH, WITH DUE RECOGNITION OF THE
SECURITY OF TENURE GUARANTEE; VALIDITY OF ABOLITION OF AN OFFICE, SETTLED RULE. — Nothing is
better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good
faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr., L-28573, June 13, 1968,
reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of
petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is
for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of
the incumbents. . . . And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold
office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the
abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid,
the abolition must be made in good faith." The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. vs.
Provincial Governor, L-28614, Jan. 17, 1974, two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it. As
with the offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the Judiciary. The test remains whether the
abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent.
4. ID.; ID; ID.; ENACTMENT THEREOF MAINTAINS UNIMPAIRED THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE
JUDICIARY; TERMINATION BY VIRTUE OF THE ABOLITION OF THE OFFICE DOES NOT IMPAIR
SECURITY OF TENURE; SUPREME COURT TO BE CONSULTED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
REORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY. — Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing Inferior Courts
collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the
Constitution. There was a similar provision the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on
this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior courts. Moreover, this Court is empowered "to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. "Thus it
possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested
with such power. Removal is, of course, to be, distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the
office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the stand-point of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of 'Inferior Courts abolished,
the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the
office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the Judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted
and that its view be accorded, the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to
accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is
involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of
the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been
put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure
therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of
reorganizing the Inferior Courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
 ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not
readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be
in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and
another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The
principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any unconstitutional taint must be
applied.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO FIX THE COMPENSATION AND ALLOWANCES OF
JUSTICES AND JUDGES NOT AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; EXISTENCE OF A
STANDARD TO AVOID THE TAINT OF UNDUE DELEGATION CLEAR. — Petitioners would characterize as an
undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the
allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is quite
clear. The questioned provision reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges,
Metropolitan Trial Judges, Municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such
compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of
Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597."
(Chapter IV, Sec. 41 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) The existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that
underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to
make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions
when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta, L-32096, Oct. 24, 1970, "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation,
there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and
lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repeal. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either
express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to
be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO AMBIGUITY EXISTS IN THE EXECUTION OF THE REORGANIZATION LAW. — Another
objection based on the absence in the statute of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is
equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to
the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this Act, a staffing pattern for all courts
constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be issued by the President in
accordance with the immediately succeeding section." (Sec. 43, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) The first sentence of the
next Section is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with
an Executive Order to be issued by the President." (Sec. 44, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) Certainly petitioners cannot
be heard to argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. In the meanwhile, the existing Inferior Courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the completion
of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall
be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office. "There is no ambiguity.
The incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be entertained
by incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named anew, in
legal contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service. It is equally reasonable to assume that
from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law professors will come the new
appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain
incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of
the good faith that will characterize its implementation by the Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of
Justice Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a
law, a generalization qualified as earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute that could be done, "there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." (Cf, Roschen v. Ward,
279 US 337, 339 [1929]) LLjur
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTICIPATION OF SEVERAL JUSTICES IN THE PREPARATION OF AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN
FOR REORGANIZATION NOT OBJECTIONABLE; SUPREME COURT DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH JUDICIAL
REFORM. — On the morning of the hearing of the petition, petitioners sought to disqualify the Chief Justice and
Associate Justices Ramon Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera because the first named was the Chairman and
the other two, members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. The motion was denied. It was made clear
then and there that not one of the three members of the Court had any hand in the framing or in the discussion
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the
product of the efforts of the legislative body. Their work was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting
alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has
had administrative supervision over inferior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial
business is conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, either the then Chairman or
members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines consulted members of the Court in
drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the
1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the Twentieth century the Chief Justice of the United States has played a leading
part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have been responsible for the development of this role, and foremost
among them has been the creation of explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate reform." Also: "Thus the
Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the extent
issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." (Fish, William Howard Taft and Charles Evan Hughes,
1975 Supreme Court Review 123)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; GUARANTEE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE OBSERVED. — It is a cardinal article of faith of our
constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted.
Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they
exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language of
ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." (Art. XIII, Sec. I) That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal
imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and
fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure
judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice
undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be
inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence
of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a significance
transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged
legislation was thus subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and
circumspection, it allows the erosion of that ideal so firmly embedded in the national consciousness.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE PRESERVED DESPITE THE REORGANIZATION OF INFERIOR
COURTS. — At emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 57 O.G. 147(1955)
"there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed to
the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behaviour, but if they are of such stuff
as allows them to be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after
another, the independence of the Judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or any empty ideal. Our judges, we are
confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the power of Congress — we do not say
unlimited but as herein exercised — to reorganize inferior courts."
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY THEREOF WILL NOT RESULT IN DELETERIOUS
CONSEQUENCES TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — There is no reason to assume that the failure of
this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration
of justice. It does not follow that the abolition In good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan
and the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge
with independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less
than good faith will attend the exercise of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an
independent and efficient Judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said
that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments are as
one in their determination to pursue the ideals and aspirations and to fulfill the hopes of the sovereign people as
expressed in the Constitution. Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 57 Phil. 600
(1932) said: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by
any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
 expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional
system, this Court remains committed.
||| (De la Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. 57883, [March 12, 1982], 198 PHIL 1-130)
[G.R. Nos. L-8895 & L-9191. April 30, 1957.]
SALVADOR ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ETC.,
ET AL., respondents. EXEQUIEL SORIANO, ET AL.,petitioners-appellees, vs. SALVADOR
ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon for
petitioners.
San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ACTIONS; DECLARATORY RELIEF; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER PROPER SUBJECT OF ACTION. — The constitutionality of an executive order can be ventilated in a
declaratory relief proceeding. (Hilado vs. De la Costa, 83 Phil., 471).
2. ID.; APPEALS; EFFECT ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; EXCEPTION. — It is an elementary rule of
procedure that an appeal stays the execution of a judgment. However in injunction, receivership and patent
accounting cases, a judgment shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the
pendency of an appeal unless otherwise ordered by the court. (Sec. 4, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INJUNCTION; ISSUANCE RESTS IN SOUND DISCRETION OF COURT; CASE AT BAR. —
The State's counsel contends that while judgment could be stayed in injunction, receivership and patent
accounting cases, the present complaint, although styled "Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief with Preliminary
Injunction," is one for declaratory relief, there being no allegation sufficient to convince the Court that the
plaintiffs intended it to be one for injunction. But aside from the title of the complaint, plaintiffs pray for the
declaration of the nullity of Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80; the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
and for such other relief as may be deemed just and equitable. This Court has already held that there are only
two requisites to be satisfied if an injunction is to issue, namely, the existence of the right sought to be
protected, and that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right (North
Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Serafin Hidalgo, 63 Phil., 664). There is no question that in the case at bar, at least
11 of the complaining trawl operators were duly licensed to operate in any of the national waters of the
Philippines, and it is undeniable that the executive enactments sought to be annulled are detrimental to their
interests. And considering further that the granting or refusal of an injunction, whether temporary or permanent,
rests in the sound discretion of the Court, taking into account the circumstances and the facts of the particular
case (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 42 Off. Gaz., 2439), the trial Court committed no abuse of discretion when it treated
the complaint as one for injunction and declaratory relief and executed the judgment pursuant to the provisions
of section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
4. ID.; ID.; ACTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IS ONE AGAINST GOVERNMENT; BOND
REQUIREMENT. — An Action against Government officials sued in their official capacity, is essentially one
against the Government, and to require these officials to file a bond would be indirectly a requirement against
the Government, for as regards bonds or damages that may be proved, if any, the real party in interest would be
the Republic of the Philippines (L. S. Moom and Co. vs. Harrison, 43 Phil., 39; Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil.,
724-727, and others). The reason for this pronouncement is understandable; the State undoubtedly is always
solvent (Tolentino vs. Carlos, 66 Phil., 140; Government of the P. I. vs. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo, 34 Phil.,
157, cited in Joaquin Gutierrez et al. vs. Camus et al., 96 Phil., 114).
5. FISHERIES LAW; TRAWL FISHING; WHO MAY BAN OR RESTRICT TRAWL FISHING; POWER OF
PRESIDENT THROUGH EXECUTIVE ORDERS, TO BAN TRAWL FISHING. — Under sections 75 and 83 of
the Fisheries Law, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who, in compliance with his duties may even cause the
criminal prosecution of those who in violation of his instructions, regulations or orders are caught fishing with
trawls in Philippine waters. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its
functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines (Section 75, Revised
Administrative Code), the President can exercise the same power and authority through executive orders,
regulations, decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned (Section 79-
A,Revised Administrative Code). Hence, Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, restricting and
banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay (Camarines) are valid and issued by authority of law.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY BY THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS. — For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small and immature
fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of Act No. 4003, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing
device like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete the supply of sea food, and to that end authorized the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations such restrictions as he deemed
necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the land. In so far as the protection of fish fry or fish
eggs is concerned the Fisheries Act is complete in itself leaving only to the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural
Resources the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent. Consequently,
when the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive
Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel
Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and
dispose of issues of general concern (Section 63, Revised Administrative Code) which were in consonance and
strict conformity with the law. The exercise of such authority did not, therefore, constitute an undue delegation of
the powers of Congress.
||| (Araneta v. Gatmaitan, G.R. Nos. L-8895 & L-9191, [April 30, 1957], 101 PHIL 328-349)
[G.R. No. L-27811. November 17, 1967.]
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, defendants-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera for plaintiff-appellant.
Victorio Advincula for defendant Jose Paño.
Solicitor General for defendant Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Executive Secretary.
SYLLABUS
 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. — Appellant's claim that decisions of the Director of
Lands under Sec. 4 of Commonwealth Act 141 as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and therefore controlling not only upon the courts but also upon
the President, is incorrect. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his
control of all executive departments. Thus it is that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the
power to appoint them, his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs
their acts. Implicit, then, is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department
secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of
a department secretary.
2. ID.; ID.; DELEGATION OF POWERS; ACTS OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ACTING BY AUTHORITY OF
THE PRESIDENT ARE THOSE OF PRESIDENT HIMSELF. — It is correct to say that constitutional powers
there are which the President must exercise in person. Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief
Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he
perform in person, for the President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President.
The rule which has thus gained recognition is that under our constitutional set-up the Executive Secretary who
acts - for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even
reverse any order that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may
issue. Where the Executive Secretary acts "by authority of the President," his decision is that of the President's.
Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary
is to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do
so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," that remains the
act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; PRESIDENT'S POWER OF CONTROL AND
DIRECTION OVER THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS; ACTS OF DEPARTMENT SECRETARIES
PRESUMPTIVELY THE ACTS OF THE PRESIDENT. — In the leading case of Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67
Phil. (1939), the Supreme Court held: "After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the
government in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of
government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued
in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or
the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.
2. ID.; ID.; HEADS OF THE VARIOUS EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS ARE THE PRESIDENT'S ALTER EGO. —
The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the
enunciation of the principle that "the executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This
means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines and no other.
The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and,
in the language of Tomas Jefferson, `should be of the President's bosom confidence' (7 Writings Ford ed., 498),
and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), `are subject to the direction of
the President.' Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in
reality but the projection of that of the Chief Executive.
||| (Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Paño, G.R. No. L-27811, [November 17, 1967], 129 PHIL 123-134)
[G.R. No. L-54554. March 30, 1981.]
EUSTAQUIO M. MEDALLA, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE MARCELINO N. SAYO, Judge
of the CFI of Rizal, Branch XXXIII and HONORATO G. MACKAY, acting Hospital Administrator
of the Caloocan City General Hospital and the CITY MAYOR OF CALOOCAN, respondents.
Manuel A. Abad for petitioner.
Juan P. Bañaga for respondent City Mayor.
Teofilo F. Manalo for respondent Mackay.
SYNOPSIS
The Mayor of Caloocan City appointed Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician, to the position of Hospital Administrator of the
Caloocan City General Hospital, in disregard of the Decision of the Presidential Executive Assistant sustaining the Order of
the Civil Service Commission which revoked the appointment of Dr. Mackay as Assistant Hospital Administrator and found
the protestant Chief of Clinics, Dr. Medalla, entitled to the said position, being next in rank and possessed of the same
qualifications as Dr. Mackay. On protest by Dr. Medalla, the Civil Service Commission disapproved Dr. Mackay's
appointment and ordered the Mayor to appoint the protestant instead. Mackay moved for reconsideration but before the
same could be resolved, he filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction with the
Court of First Instance which Dr. Medalla sought to dismiss but failed. Hence, this petition to restrain the Court of First
Instance from proceeding with the hearing of the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to review by Certiorari decisions and/or resolutions
of the Civil Service Commission and of the Presidential Executive Assistant; but rather than remanding the case for further
proceedings decided the case on the merits holding, that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Civil Service
Commission and the Presidential Executive Assistant since (1) the appointing power of the City Mayor is subject to the
next-in-rank rule of the Civil Service law,rules and regulations; (2) the petitioner has followed the prescribed administrative
procedure for redress of his grievance; and (3) the assailed Decision contains a judicious assessment of the qualifications
of both the contenders for the position.
Petition granted.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL REVIEW; JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE TO REVIEW
BY CERTIORARI DECISIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT;
RATIONALE THEREFOR. — The power of judicial review should be upheld in so far as jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance to review by Certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the
Presidential Executive Assistant is concerned. The Supreme Court has ruled that "when a presidential act is
challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and
subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to
the courts, but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or
implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil
Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be
governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all administrative officers." (Montes vs. Civil Service
Board of Appeals, et al., 101 Phil 490, 492-493 [1957]. Further, "the courts may always examine into the exercise of
power by a ministerial officer to the extent of determining whether the particular power has been granted to the
officer, whether it is a legal power that could have been granted to him, and whether it has been exercised in a legal
manner. This jurisdiction does not depend upon an act of the legislature authorizing it, butinheres in the courts of
 general jurisdiction as an essential function of the judicial department. (State Racing Commission v. Latonia Agri.
Asso. 123 SW 681)" (2Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law § 566 p. 379).
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CITY MAYOR; POWER OF APPOINTMENT; LIMITATIONS THEREON; CASE AT BAR.
— Under the Revised Charter of the City of Caloocan (RA No. 5502), it is clear that the power of appointment by the
City Mayor of heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds is subject to Civil Service law,rules and regulations (ibid.,
section 19). The Caloocan City General Hospital is one of the city departments provided for in said law (ibid., section
17). The Hospital Administrator is appointed by the City Mayor (ibid., section 66-B).
3. ID.; CIVIL SERVICE DECREE (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 807); SELECTION OF EMPLOYEES FOR
PROMOTIONS; NEXT-IN- RANK RULE. — Under section 19(3) of theCivil Service Decree (Presidential Decree No.
807, effective October 6, 1975), the recruitment or selection of employees for promotions is drawn from the next-in-
rank.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE BY AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE IN CASE OF NON-
OBSERVANCE OF RULE; FOLLOWED BY PETITIONER IN CASE AT BAR — Section 19(6) of Presidential Decree
No. 807 provides that "A qualified next-in-rank employee shall have the right to appeal initially to the department
head and finally to the Office of the President an appointment made . . . (2) in favor of one who is not next-in-rank, . .
.if the employee making the appeal is not satisfied with the written special reason or reasons given by the appointing
authority for such appointment: . . . ." The prescribed procedure has been followed by petitioner Medalla. He had
appealed to the department head and from thence, in view of the latter's unfavorable action, to the Civil Service
Commission and thereafter to the Office of the President.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED TO CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner Medalla is entitled to appointment as Hospital
Administrator for, while his qualifications are at par with those of private respondent Mackay, yet, it is clear that the
position of Medalla as Chief of Clinics is the next lower position to Hospital Administrator under the organizational
line-up of the hospital. Consequently, at the time of Mackay's appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator,
Medalla outranked Mackay who was only a Resident Physician and, therefore, as the next- in-rank, Medalla is
entitled to appointment as Hospital Administrator.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REVOCATION OF APPOINTMENT IN CASE AT BAR NOT ARBITRARY. — The revocation of
Mackay's appointment reveals no arbitrariness nor grave abuse of discretion. Although it is true that, as respondent
City Mayor alleges, a local executive should be allowed the choice of men of his confidence, provided they are
qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity, knowledgeability,
energy and judgment, however, the Decision of the Civil Service Merit Systems Board, upheld by the Office of the
President, contains a judicious assessment of the qualifications of both petitioner Medalla and private respondent
Mackay for the contested position, revealing a careful study of the controversy between the parties, which cannot be
ignored.
||| (Medalla, Jr. v. Sayo, G.R. No. L-54554, [March 30, 1981], 191 PHIL 170-182)
[G.R. No. L-10759. May 20, 1957.]
LEONARDO MONTES, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF APPEALS and
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondents-appellees.
Gonzalo U. Garcia for appellant.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Eriberto D. Ignacio for appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF APPEALS; DECISION OF, REVIEWABLE BY THE PRESIDENT; JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF PRESIDENT'S DECISION DOES NOT MAKE EXECUTIVE SUBORDINATE TO COURTS. —
When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the
Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial review,
not because the executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself,
and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement the law. A judicial review of the President's decision on
a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the
bringing of the case to the courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all
administrative acts of all administrative officers.
2. ID.; APPEAL FROM DECISION OF; EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FIRST BEFORE
RESOLVING TO COURTS. — The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where an
administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts
will act. If, as in this case, the President, under whom the Civil Service directly falls in our administrative system
as head of the executive department may be able to grant the remedy that petitioner pursues, reasons of comity
and orderly procedure demand that resort be made to him before recourse can be had to the courts.
||| (Montes v. Civil Service Board of Appeals, G.R. No. L-10759, [May 20, 1957], 101 PHIL 490-494)
[G.R. No. L-30637. July 16, 1987.]
LIANGA BAY LOGGING, CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Agusan and AGO TIMBER
CORPORATION, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE; BUREAU OF FORESTRY; VESTED WITH THE
JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY OVER DEMARCATION OF ALL PUBLIC FOREST AND FOREST RESERVES.
— Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by respondent Ago, asking for the
determination anew of the correct boundary line of its licensed timber area, for the same issue had already been
determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the
President, administrative officials under whose jurisdictions the matter properly belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised
Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection,
management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all public forests and forest reserves and over the
granting of licenses for game and fish, and for the taking of forest products, including stone and earth therefrom. The
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as department head, may repeal or modify the decision of the
Director of Forestry when advisable in the public interests, whose decision is in turn appealable to the Office of the
President.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COURTS OF JUSTICE DEVOID OF JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE PURELY
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. — In giving due course to the complaint below, the respondent court would
necessarily have to assess and evaluate anew all the evidence presented in the administrative proceedings, which is
beyond its competence and jurisdiction. For the respondent court to consider and weigh again the evidence already
presented and passed upon by said officials would be to allow it to substitute its judgment for that of said officials
who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically vested in them by
law. Such a posture cannot be entertained, for it is a well-settled doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not
interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies and
their expertise unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or
when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess or lack
of jurisdiction.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES SHALL NOT BE DISTURBED ON
APPEAL. — A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power to
determine particular questions or matters, upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall prevail
over the courts. The general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, is that
decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted without
or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and agencies
who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only
respect but at times even finality of such findings are supported by substantial evidence. As recently stressed by the
Court, "in this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the
special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable."
4. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; DRAFT OF DECISION DOES NOT OPERATE AS A JUDGMENT ON A CASE UNTIL
THE SAME IS DULY SIGNED AND DELIVERED TO THE CLERK FOR FILING AND PROMULGATION. — It is
elementary that a draft of a decision does not operate as judgment on a case until the same is duly signed and
delivered to the clerk for filing and promulgation. A decision cannot be considered as binding on the parties until its
promulgation. Respondent should be aware of this rule. In still another case of Ago v. Court of Appeals, (where
herein respondent Ago was the petitioner) the Court held that, "While it is to be presumed that the judgment that was
dictated in open court will be the judgment of the court, the court may still modify said order as the same is being put
into writing. And even if the order or judgment has already been put into writing and signed, while it has not yet been
delivered to the clerk for filing, it is still subject to amendment or change by the judge. It is only when the judgment
signed by the judge is actually filed with the clerk of court that it becomes a valid and binding judgment. Prior thereto,
it could still be subject to amendment and change and may not, therefore, constitute the real judgment of the court."
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTION; SUSPICION AND CONJECTURES CAN NOT
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY AND LEGALITY OF OFFICIAL ACTIONS. — The mere
suspicion of respondent that there were anomalies in the non-release of the Leido "decision" allegedly denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and the substitution thereof by the Duavit decision granting reconsideration
does not justify judicial review. Beliefs, suspicions and conjectures cannot overcome the presumption of regularity
and legality of official actions. It is presumed that an official of a department performs his official duties regularly. It
should be noted, furthermore, that as hereinabove stated with regard to the case history in the Office of the
President, Ago's motion for reconsideration of the Duavit decision dated August 9, 1968 was denied in the Order
dated October 2, 1968 and signed by Assistant Executive Secretary Leido himself (who thereby joined in the reversal
of his own first decision dated June 16, 1966 and signed by himself).
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ORDINARY TIMBER LICENSE; OPERATES AS A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT AND THE GRANTEE; TERMS AND STIPULATIONS THEREOF, NOT SUBJECT TO
QUESTIONING BY GRANTEE. — The Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-'60 [New] which approved the transfer to
respondent Ago of the 4,000 hectares from the forest area originally licensed to Narciso Lansang, stipulates certain
conditions, terms and limitations, among which were: that the decision of the Director of Forestry as to the exact
location of its licensed areas is final; that the license is subject to whatever decision that may be rendered on the
boundary conflict between the Lianga Bay Logging Co. and the Ago Timber Corporation; that the terms and
conditions of the license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry and the license may be
made to expire at an earlier date. Under Section 1834 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Director of Forestry,
upon granting any license, may prescribe and insert therein such terms, conditions, and limitations, not inconsistent
with law, as may be deemed by him to be in the public interest. The license operates as a contract between the
government and respondent. Respondent, therefore, is estopped from questioning the terms and stipulation thereof.
7. ID.; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; INJUNCTION; ISSUANCE THEREOF BY COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
LIMITED TO ACTS COMMITTED WITHIN ITS TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES. — Clearly, the injunctive writ should
not have been issued. The provisions of law explicitly provide that Courts of First Instance shall have the power to
issue writ of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in their respective places,
if the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer or person,
within their jurisdiction. The jurisdiction or authority of the Court of First Instance to control or restrain acts by means
of the writ of injunction is limited only to acts which are being committed within the territorial boundaries of their
respective provinces or districts except where the sole issue is the legality of the decision of the administrative
officials.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — A different rule applies only when the point in controversy relates solely to a
determination of a question of law whether the decision of the respondent administrative officials was legally
correct or not. We thus declared in Director of Forestry v. Ruiz: "In Palanan Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc., supra, we
reaffirmed the rule of non-jurisdiction of courts of first instance to issue injunctive writs in order to control acts outside
of their premises or districts. We went further and said that when the petition filed with the courts of first instance not
only questions the legal correctness of the decision of administrative officials but alsoseeks to enjoin the
enforcement of the said decision, the court could not validly issue the writ of injunction when the officials sought to
be restrained from enforcing the decision are not stationed within its territory.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; WRIT IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, VOID. — The writ of preliminary injunction issued by
respondent court is furthermore void, since it appears that the forest area described in the injunctive writ includes
areas not licensed to respondent Ago. The forest area referred to and described therein comprises the whole area
originally licensed to Narciso Lansang under the earlier Ordinary Timber License No. 584-52. Only a portion of this
area was in fact transferred to respondent Ago as described in its Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-'60(New).
10. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; REFUSAL TO DISMISS A
CASE ON APPARENT LACK OF JURISDICTION AND ISSUING WRIT OF INJUNCTION. — It is abundantly clear
that respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 1253 of the Court of First Instance
of Agusan nor has it jurisdiction to decide on the common boundary of the licensed areas of petitioner Lianga and
respondent Ago, as determined by respondents public officials against whom no case of grave abuse of discretion
has been made. Absent a cause of action and jurisdiction, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
and excess, if not lack, of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the case under review and in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the final decision dated August 9, 1968 and the order affirming
the same dated October 2, 1968 of the Office of the President.
||| (Lianga Bay Logging, Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, [July 16, 1987], 236 PHIL 84-102)
[G.R. No. L-4269. April 27, 1951.]
ENRIQUE TAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Manuel C. Briones and Victoriano Salazar, for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. APPEALS; CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 67; APPEAL BY CERTIORARI DISTINGUISHED THEREFROM. —
If the petition filed with the Supreme Court against the Court of Appeals prays that the judgment be set aside
and a new trial ordered, without asking for the revision of the judgment of the Court of Appeals or the acquittal of
the accused, the Supreme Court will consider and pass upon the petition as a special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Whereas if the petition raises the question that, under the facts found by
the Court of Appeals, the crime committed was not qualified theft, but merely a civil liability or at most
misappropriation of public funds; and prays that the Supreme Court grant the accused such other relief as it
may deem proper besides a new trial, the petition will be classified as an appeal by certiorari.
 2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; NEW TRIAL; NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. — The granting or denial of a
motion for new trial in a criminal case lies in the sound discretion of the court to which such motion is submitted.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion as is equivalent to
acting without or in excess of jurisdiction. Affidavits which are merely cumulative, corroborate or impeaching are
not newly-discovered evidence as would probably change the judgment.
||| (Tan v. People, G.R. No. L-4269 (Resolution), [April 27, 1951], 88 PHIL 609-614)
[G.R. No. 73140. May 29, 1987.]
RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP and/or SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and ROGELIO R.
CORIA, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Guillermo H. Pulia for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; ITS ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATIONS AND POLICIES INTERPRETING THE LABOR CODE; HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW AND
ENTITLED TO GREAT RESPECT. — The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and
explicit and leave no room for interpretation. It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative
regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce,
have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314
[1985]).
||| (Rizal Empire Insurance Group v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 73140, [May 29, 1987], 234 PHIL
558-561)
[G.R. No. 111812. May 31, 1995.]
DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; REVISED GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE ACT OF 1977 (P.D. 1146);
EXTENSION OF SERVICE OF RETIREES; DOCTRINE IN CENA CASE (211 SCRA 179 [1992]), DISCUSSED. —
While the Cena decision is barely three (3) years old, the Court considers that it must reexamine the doctrine
of Cena and the theoretical and policy underpinnings thereof. Speaking through Mr. Justice Medialdea, the Court
held that a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the
same time has not yet completed fifteen (15) years of government service required under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No.
1146 to qualify for the Old-Age Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension of his government service for such
period of time as may be necessary to "fill up" or comply with the fifteen (15)-year service requirement. The Court
also held that the authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one vested in the head of the agency
concerned. The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning" of
Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction which has often
been invoked in respect of retirement statutes. While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms,
there were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service that
may be granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age. The first administrative issuance is
Civil Service Commission Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, which states in part, "Any request for the extension of
service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement all be allowed
only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year." The second administrative issuance
— Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President, dated 14 June 1988 — provides: 'Officials
or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained in the
service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.'
Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative regulations by, firstly, considering
as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the Office of the President's
Memorandum Circular No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena.
2. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES; SUBORDINATE RULE-MAKING BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY,
PERMISSIBLE AND VALID. — It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission Memorandum
No. 27, took a very narrow view on the question of what subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is
permissible and valid. That restrictive view must be contrasted with this Court's earlier ruling in People v. Exconde,
where Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said: "It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-
delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate
authority and promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the
reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious
and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but
conform to the standards that the law prescribes."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE. — All that may be reasonably demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation
consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or enabling
statute. This is the test that is appropriately applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series
of 1990, and to this test we now turn.
4. ID.; CIVIL SERVICE LAW AND P.D. 1146; STATUTES GOVERNING EXTENSION OF SERVICE OF RETIREES.
— We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the present Civil Service law —
found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as
theAdministrative Code of 1987 — and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65)
years of age is an area that is covered by both statutes and not alone by Section 11(b) of P.D. No. 1146. This is
crystal clear from examination of many provisions of the present civil service law.
5. ID.; CIVIL SERVICE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 27 LIMITING
EXTENSION OF SERVICE OF RETIREES TO ONE YEAR, AN EXERCISE OF ITS AUTHORITY AS THE CENTRAL
PERSONNEL AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT. — It was on the bases of Section 12 (2, 3, 10, 14, 17 and 19) of
the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In
doing so, the Commission was acting as "the central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate
policies, standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in the government."
It was also discharging its function of "administering the retirement program for government officials and employees"
and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement." In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987
Administrative Code with providing leadership and assistance "in the development and retention of qualified and
 efficient work force in the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the "enforcement of the constitutional
and statutory provisions, relative to retirementand the regulation for the effective implementation of the retirement of
government officials and employees" (Section 16 [14]).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 27, DECLARED VALID AND EFFECTIVE; DOCTRINE IN
CENA CASE (211 SCRA 179 [1992]), MODIFIED. — Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is
hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically
paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be
read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the
government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of
an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of
government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CIVIL
SERVICE RESOLUTION NO. 92-594 DISMISSING APPEAL OF PETITIONER REQUESTING FOR EXTENSION
OF SERVICE BEYOND THE RETIREMENT AGE. — Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the
instant case, we believe and so hold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the
appeal of petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld
and affirmed. Accordingly, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
||| (Rabor v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 111812, [May 31, 1995], 314 PHIL 577-603)
[G.R. No. 119528. March 26, 1997.]
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD and GRAND
INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC., respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza and Alberto E. Valenzuela, Jr. for petitioner.
Belo Gozon Elma Parez Asuncion & Lucila for Grand Air.
SYLLABUS
||| (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. No. 119528, [March 26, 1997], 337 PHIL 254-270)
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD; JURISDICTION ON APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY
OPERATING PERMIT. — The Civil Aeronautics Board has jurisdiction over GrandAir's Application for a Temporary
Operating Permit. This rule has been established in the case of Philippine Air Lines Inc., vs. Civil Aeronautics Board,
promulgated on June 13, 1968. The Board is expressly authorized by Republic Act 776 to issue a temporary
operating permit or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, and nothing contained in the said law negates
the power to issue said permit before the completion of the applicant's evidence and that of the oppositor thereto on
the main petition. Indeed, the CAB's authority to grant a temporary permit "upon its own initiative" strongly suggests
the power to exercise said authority, even before the presentation of said evidence has begun.
Assuming arguendo that a legislative franchise is prerequisite to the issuance of a permit, the absence of the same
does not affect the jurisdiction of the Board to hear the application, but tolls only upon the ultimate issuance of the
requested permit. There is nothing in the law nor in the Constitution, which indicates that a Legislative franchise is an
indispensable requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air transport operator. Although Section 11 of Article
XII recognizes Congress' control over any franchise, certificate or authority to operate a public utility, it does not
mean Congress has exclusive authority to issue the same. Franchise issued by Congress are not required before
each and every public utility may operate. In many instances, Congress has seen it fit to delegate this function to
government agencies, specialized particularly in their respective areas of public service. A reading of Section 10
of RA 776, as amended by PD 1462 reveals the clear intent of Congress to delegate the authority to regulate the
issuance of a license to operate domestic air transport services.
2. ID; DELEGATION OF POWERS; POWER TO GRANT LICENSE FOR OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES. —
Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for, or to authorize the operation of
certain public utilities. With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and towards the approval of the practice by the courts. It is generally
recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency, and to this
extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than those of a
legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges conferred by grant by local authorities as
agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the
Legislature. The trend of modern legislation is to vest the Public Service Commissioner with the power to regulate
and control the operation of public services under reasonable rules and regulations, and as a general rule, courts will
not interfere with the exercise of that discretion when it is just and reasonable and founded upon a legal right.
Congress, by giving the respondent Board the power to issue permits for the operation of domestic transport
services, has delegated to the said body the authority to determine the capability and competence of a prospective
domestic air transport operator to engage in such venture. This is not an instance of transforming the respondent
Board into a mini-legislative body, with unbridled authority to choose who should be given authority to operate
domestic air transport services. Congress, in this instance, has set specific limitations on how such authority should
be exercised, Section 4 of R.A. No. 776, as amended, sets out guidelines or policies. Section 12 and 21 of the same
enumerated the requirements to determine the competency of a prospective operator to engage in the public service
of air transportation. Furthermore, the procedure for the processing of the application of a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity had been established to ensure the weeding out of those entities that are not deserving
of public service.
3. ID; CERTIFICATES OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE; ELUCIDATED. — Many and varied are the definitions of
certificates of public convenience which courts and legal writers have drafted. Some statutes use the terms
"convenience and necessity" while others use only the words "public convenience." The terms "convenience and
necessity", if used together in a statute, are usually held not to be separable, but are construed together. Both words
modify each other and must be construed together. The word 'necessity' is so connected, not as an additional
requirement but to modify and qualify what might otherwise be taken as the strict significance of the word necessity.
Public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility will meet a reasonable want of the public and
supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately afford. It does not mean or require an actual physical
necessity or an indispensable thing. The use of the word "necessity", in conjunction with "public convenience" in a
certificate of authorization to a public service entity to operate, does not in any way modify the nature of such
certification, or the requirements for the issuance of the same. It is the law which determines the requisites for the
issuance of such certification, and not the titled indicating the certificate.