CASE DIGESTS IN NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL

LAWS

Chavez vs NHA Gr No 164527, August 15, 2001

FACTS: On March 1, 1988, President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum Order

No. 161, approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and
Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time,
Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, is being made residence of
many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.

As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite

into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-
Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of private sectors
as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415
applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also established
EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan,
respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).

Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were
published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the
bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint
Venture Agreement with RBI.

Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual
development into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI
is expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40
hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the
commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as
enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the Government
through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate
RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return
not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of
such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by
both parties.

Thus, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project
involves clearing, leveling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary
housing units for the current residents on the cleared and leveled site. Phase II
involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of
the garbage at the dumpsite.

Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA
which is now considered as ARJVA was amended and restated to accommodate
the design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the
project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992.
The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79
hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by

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President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an
enabling component for Phase II of the project.

Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the
establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey
Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later
reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements.
During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21
permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority
to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA.

(2) Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by
DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands

(3) Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands
considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man

RULING:
(1) Yes. The Supreme Court held that President’s delegation to NHA, a national
government agency, to reclaim lands under the SMDRP, is legal and valid, firmly
anchored on PD 3-A buttressed by EO 525 notwithstanding the absence of any
specific grant of power under its charter, PD 757.

Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf
of the National Government but does not hold that PEA shall be responsible for all.
The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project are approval by the
President, favorable recommendation of PEA, and undertaken either by PEA or
entity under contract of PEA or by the National Government Agency.

(2) The Supreme Court held that it is clear that the DENR, through its acts and
issuances, has ratified and confirmed the reclamation of the subject lands for the
purposes laid down in Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465.

Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have
granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is
one of the members of the EXECOM which provided reviews for the project.
ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are within the
scope of its power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the
President through the MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be

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noted that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the
Philippine President.

(3) The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable through MO 415
issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 issued by President
Ramos.

Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no
longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be
“disposed to qualified beneficiaries.” Furthermore, these lands have already been
necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law.

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GMMSWM v Jancom GR No 163663 June 30, 2006

FACTS: After bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA, Jancom
won a contract for the MMDA’s San Mateo waste management project. A BOT
contract for the waste to energy project was signed on Dec 19, 1997, between
Jancom and the Philippine Government, represented by the Presidential Task Force
on Solid Waste Management through DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, CORD-
NCR chair Dionisio dela Serna, and MMDA chair Prospero Oreta. The contract,
however, was never signed by President Ramos as it was too close to the end of his
term. He endorsed it to President Estrada, but Estrada refused to sign it, for two
reasons: the passage of RA 8749, or the Clean Air Act of 1999 and the clamor of
San Mateo residents for the closure of the dumpsite. When the MMDA published
another call for proposals for solid waste management projects for Metro Manila,
Jancom filed a petition with the Pasig RTC asking the court to declare as void the
resolution of the Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management
Committee disregarding the BOT contract with Jancom, and the call for bids for a
new waste management contract.

ISSUE: Whether the contract with Jancom is valid and binding.

RULING: The contract with Jancom is valid: citing Article 1305, 1315 and 1319
of the Civil Code. In asserting that there was no valid and binding contract,
MMDA can only allege that there was no valid notice of award; the contract does
not bear the signature of the President; the conditions precedent specified in the
contract were not complied with. But the Court said that the lack of notice was the
government’s fault; though the President did not sign, his alter-ego did; and
anyway his signature was only necessary for the effectivity of the contract, not its
perfection; and that the two-month period within which Jancom should comply
with the conditions had not yet started to run because the contract had not yet taken
effect, precisely because of the absence of the President’s signature. The Court of
Appeals did not err when it declared the existence of a valid and perfected contract
between the Republic of the Philippines and Jancom. The MMDA cannot revoke
or renounce the same without the consent of the other. Although the contract is a
perfected one, it is still ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is
approved by the President

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Henares vs. LTFRB, GR. No. 158290

FACTS: The Petitioners sought to require the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board and the Department of Transport and Communications to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) in their public utility vehicles. They alleged that
particulate matter emitted from vehicles had caused serious health problems and
lowered the overall quality of life, and contended that this problem was likely to
grow as vehicle ownership in the Philippines increased.

In response to this problem, the Petitioners brought before the Supreme Court a
petition for a writ of mandamus compelling the authorities to switch the fuel used
in public vehicles from petrol and diesel to CNG, which was considered the
cleanest fossil fuel. The evidence before the Court was that CNG produced up to
90 percent less carbon monoxide than diesel or petrol; 50 percent less nitrous oxide
and hydrocarbons; 60 percent less particulate matter; and released virtually no
sulfur dioxide.

RULING: The Supreme Court did not grant the writ of mandamus. It first
recognized that the Petitioners had standing by virtue of the effect on pollution on
their rights to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology, as well as because of
public interest considerations.

However, it held that while air pollution was a serious environmental and health
issue, the Petitioners could not point to a law that mandated the provision of CNG.
As the writ of mandamus was only available to enforce a specific duty under law,
the Petitioners could not point to general obligations under the Constitution and
environmental legislation. The Petitioners needed to point to a law that specifically
required the authorities to mandate the use of CNG instead of petrol or diesel.
Additionally, mandamus could not be used by one branch of government against
another, because of the equality of the branches of the government. It was therefore
inappropriate to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the executive to order the
legislature to bring in new environmental regulations.

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Salalima v ECC & SSS GR No. 146360

FACTS: Petitioner’s husband, Juancho S. Salalima, was employed for 29 years as

a route helper and as route salesman for the Meycauayan Plant of Coca-Cola
Bottlers Phils., Incorporated. In 1989, Juancho was diagnosed with minimal
pulmonary tuberculosis. His illness remained stationary until October 1994 when
Juancho was confined at the Manila Doctor’s Hospital to undergo section biopsy.
His biopsy revealed that he had "Adenocarcinoma, poorly differentiated,
metastatic".Consequently, he underwent chemotherapy at the Makati Medical
Center. On February 1, 1995, he was found to be suffering from pneumonia. On
February 14, 1995, he was confined at the Makati Medical Center. He died two
days later due to "Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs with widespread metastasis to
Neck, Brain, Peritoneal Cavity, Paracaval Lymph Nodes, Abscen; Acute Renal
Failure; Septicemia; Upper Gastrointestinal Bleeding"

A claim for compensation benefits was filed by his surviving wife, Azucena, with
the Social Security System (SSS), which was denied on the ground that Lung
Cancer had no causal relationship with Juancho’s job as a route
salesman.Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner brought the
case to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the
decision of the SSS. In its Decisiondated October 7, 1999, the ECC relied upon the
Quality Assurance Medical Report prepared by Dr. Ma. Victoria M. Abesamis for
the SSS stating that Juancho’s exposure to smog and dust is not associated with the
development of lung cancer.

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals arguing that Juancho’s route as
a salesman exposed him to all kinds of pollutants, not to mention the daily hazards
and fatigue that came with his tasks. She pointed out that the SSS and the ECC
disregarded Juancho’s medical history and the fact that the risk of contracting
Juancho’s ailment was increased by the nature of his work.

In its Comment, ECC averred that the presumption of compensability and the
theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmen’s Compensation Act have
been abandoned. Under the implementing rules of P.D. 626, as amended, for the
sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must
be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Rules with the
conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.

In her reply, she cited the raison d’être for the passage of Republic Act No. 8749,
otherwise known as the Clean Air Act. Petitioner stated that the Act provides for a
comprehensive pollution control policy that mainly concentrates on the prohibition
of leaded gasoline due to its scientifically proven deleterious effect on the health of
individuals. CA denied the motion for lack of merit.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the honorable court of appeals denying
petitioner’s claim under PD 626, as amended, is in accordance with the rules on
employees’ compensation and existing jurisprudence.

HELD: The degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial
evidence, which means, "Such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." What the law requires is a reasonable
work-connection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis
on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the
contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for
inferring a work-connection. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. In
Juancho’s case, we believe that this probability exists. Juancho’s job required long
hours on the streets as well as his carrying of cases of soft drinks during sales calls.
The combination of fatigue and the pollutants that abound in his work environment
verily contributed to the worsening of his already weak respiratory system. His
continuous exposure to these factors may have led to the development of his cancer
of the lungs.

P.D. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption of

compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. Despite such abandonment, however, the present law has not
ceased to be an employees’ compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the
liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and the
official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social
justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims
for compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor
which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.

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SIS vs Atienza, GR No. 156052, February13, 2008

FACTS: On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted

Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November 28,
2001 which became effective on December 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 was
enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a
principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within
constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general
welfare of the society

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under
Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months
from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the
area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the very
same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a
period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution
No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business
permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a
reassessment of the ordinance.

Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4,

2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.

ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or
repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

RULING: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City
Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he
has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the courts.

On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding
were contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and
made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only
until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No.
8027.

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