Otherwise stated, lands actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock
REPUBLIC v SALVADOR LOPEZ (GR 178895)
In this case, the factual findings of the DAR Regional Director,
the DAR Secretary and the CA are contrary to one another with respect to the
following issue: whether the Lopez lands were actually, directly and
exclusively used for SNLABCs livestock business; and whether there was
intent to evade coverage from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) based on the documentary evidence. On the other hand, SNLABC
argues that these authorities misapprehended and overlooked certain relevant
and undisputed facts as regards the inclusion of the Limot lands under the
CARL. These circumstances fall within the recognized exceptions and, thus,
the Court is persuaded to review the facts and evidence on record in the
disposition of these present Petitions.
The Lopez lands of SNLABC are actually and directly being used for
livestock and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
Briefly stated, the DAR questions the object or autoptic evidence
relied upon by the DAR Regional Director in concluding that the Lopez lands
were actually, directly and exclusively being used for SNLABCs livestock
business prior to the enactment of the CARL.
In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform,[13] the Court
declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions[14] that included lands devoted
to livestock under the coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the
word "agricultural" showed that it was never the intention of the framers of
the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage
of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the
government.[15] Thus, lands devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, and thus exempt
from agrarian reform.[16]
In the instant case, the MARO in its ocular inspection[22] found on
the Lopez lands several heads of cattle, carabaos, horses, goats and pigs, some
of which were covered by several certificates of ownership. There were
likewise structures on the Lopez lands used for its livestock business,
structures consisting of two chutes where the livestock were kept during
nighttime. The existence of the cattle prior to the enactment of the CARL was
positively affirmed by the farm workers and the overseer who were
interviewed by the MARO. Considering these factual findings and the fact
that the lands were in fact being used for SNLABCs livestock business even
prior to 15 June 1988, the DAR Regional Director ordered the exemption of
the Lopez lands from CARP coverage. The Court gives great probative value
to the actual, on-site investigation made by the MARO as affirmed by the
DAR Regional Director. The Court finds that the Lopez lands were in fact
actually, directly and exclusively being used as industrial lands for livestock-
raising. Hence, the Court looks with favor on the expertise of the MARO in
determining whether livestock-raising on the Lopez lands has only been
recently conducted or has been a going concern for several years already.
Absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or bias, the findings of
the MARO - as affirmed by the DAR Regional Director - are to be accorded
great probative value, owing to the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties.[23]
In the Petition, the DAR argued that that the tax declarations covering the
Lopez lands characterized them as agricultural lands and, thus, detracted from
the claim that they were used for livestock purposes. The Court has since held
that there is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification
embodied in the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe
any further inquiry; hence, tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the
classification of a land.[25] Applying the foregoing principles, the tax
declarations of the Lopez lands as agricultural lands are not conclusive or
final, so as to prevent their exclusion from CARP coverage as lands devoted
to livestock-raising. Indeed, the MAROs on-site inspection and actual
investigation showing that the Lopez lands were being used for livestock-
grazing are more convincing in the determination of the nature of those lands.
Neither can the DAR in the instant case assail the timing of the incorporation
of SNLABC and the latters operation shortly before the enactment of the
CARL. That persons employ tactics to precipitously convert their lands from
agricultural use to industrial livestock is not unheard of; they even exploit the
creation of a new corporate vehicle to operate the livestock business to
substantiate the deceitful conversion in the hopes of evading CARP coverage.
Exemption from CARP, however, is directly a function of the lands usage,
and not of the identity of the entity operating it.
are exempt from CARP coverage, regardless of the change of owner.[26] In the
instant case, whether SNLABC was incorporated prior to the CARL is
immaterial, since the Lopez lands were already being used for livestock-
grazing purposes prior to the enactment of the CARL, as found by the MARO.
Although the managing entity had been changed, the business interest of
raising livestock on the Lopez lands still remained without any indication that
it was initiated after the effectivity of the CARL.
As stated by SNLABC, the Lopez lands were the legacy of Don Salvador
Lopez, Sr. The ownership of these lands was passed from Don Salvador
Lopez, Sr., to Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., and subsequently to the latters children
before being registered under the name of SNLABC. Significantly, SNLABC
was incorporated by the same members of the Lopez family, which had
previously owned the lands and managed the livestock business.[27] In all these
past years, despite the change in ownership, the Lopez lands have been used
for purposes of grazing and pasturing cattle, horses, carabaos and goats.
Simply put, SNLABC was chosen as the entity to take over the reins of the
livestock business of the Lopez family. Absent any other compelling
evidence, the inopportune timing of the incorporation of the SNLABC prior to
the enactment of the CARL was not by itself a categorical manifestation of an
intent to avoid CARP coverage. The substantial quantity of livestock heads
could only mean that respondent is engaged in farming for this purpose. The
single conclusion gathered here is that the land is entirely devoted to livestock
farming and exempted from the CARP.
The Court affirms the findings of the DAR Regional Director and the Court of
Appeals that the Lopez lands were actually, directly and exclusively being
used for SNLABCs livestock business and, thus, are exempt from CARP
coverage.
The Limot lands of SNLABC are not actually and directly being used for
livestock and should thus be covered by the CARL.
In contrast, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to
coconut trees and rubber and are thus not subject to exemption from CARP
coverage.
Verily, the Limot lands were actually, directly and exclusively used for
agricultural activities, a fact that necessarily makes them subject to the CARP.
These findings of the inspection team were given credence by the DAR
Regional Director who denied the application, and were even subsequently
affirmed by the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals.
Verily, the MARO itself, in the Investigation Report cited by no
less than SNLABC, found that the livestock were only moved to the Limot
lands sporadically and were not permanently designated there. The DAR
Secretary even described SNLABCs use of the area as a seasonal extension of
the applicants grazing lands during the summer. Therefore, the Limot lands
cannot be claimed to have been actually, directly and exclusively used for
SNLABCs livestock business, especially since these were only intermittently
and secondarily used as grazing areas. The said lands are more suitable -- and
are in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used -- for agricultural
purposes.
The lands were undoubtedly being used for agricultural purposes,
not for its livestock business; thus, these lands are subject to CARP coverage.
Had SNLABC indeed utilized the Limot lands in conjunction with the
livestock business it was conducting on the adjacent Lopez lands, there was
nothing that would have prevented it from simultaneously applying for a total
exemption of all the lands necessary for its livestock. In any case, SNLABC
admits that the title to the Limot lands has already been transferred to the
Republic and subsequently awarded to SNLABCs farm workers. [31] This fact
only demonstrates that the land is indeed being used for agricultural activities
and not for livestock grazing.
The confluence of these factual circumstances leads to the logical
conclusion that the Limot lands were not being used for livestock grazing and,
thus, do not qualify for exemption from CARP coverage. SNLABCs belated
filing of the application for exemption of the Limot lands was a ruse to
increase its retention of its landholdings and an attempt to save these from
compulsory acquisition.
HOLY TRINITY v DELA CRUZ (GR200454)
Was the Dakila property agricultural land within the coverage of Republic Act
No. 6657 or Presidential Decree No. 27?
Clearly, an ordinance is required in order to reclassify agricultural lands, and
such may only be passed after the conduct of public hearings. The petitioner
claims the reclassification on the basis of Municipal Resolution No. 16-98.
Given the foregoing clarifications, however, the resolution was ineffectual for
that purpose. A resolution was a mere declaration of the sentiment or opinion
of the lawmaking body on a specific matter that was temporary in nature, and
differed from an ordinance in that the latter was a law by itself and possessed
a general and permanent character.49 We also note that the petitioner did not
show if the requisite public hearings were conducted at all. In the absence of
any valid and complete reclassification, therefore, the Dakila property
remained under the category of an agricultural land.
Nonetheless, the Dakila property was not an agricultural land subject to the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 or Presidential Decree No. 27.
Verily, the basic condition for land to be placed under the coverage of
Republic Act No. 6657 is that it must either be primarily devoted to or be
suitable for agriculture.50 Perforce, land that is not devoted to agricultural
activity is outside the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657. 51 An agricultural
land, according to Republic Act No. 6657, is one that is devoted to
agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land.52Agricultural activity includes the “cultivation
of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising livestock, poultry
or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products; and other farm
activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such
farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.”53
Consequently, before land may be placed under the coverage of Republic Act
No. 6657, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) that the land must be
devoted to agricultural activity; and (2) that the land must not be classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Considering that the
Dakila property has not been classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial, the second requisite is satisfied. For the first
requisite to be met, however, there must be a showing that agricultural activity
is undertaken on the property.
It is not difficult to see why Republic Act No. 6657 requires agricultural
activity in order to classify land as agricultural. The spirit of agrarian reform
laws is not to distribute lands per se, but to enable the landless to own land for
cultivation. This is why the basic qualification laid down for the intended
beneficiary is to show the willingness, aptitude and ability to cultivate and
make the land as productive as possible. Here, no evidence was submitted to
show that any agricultural activity – like cultivation of the land, planting of
crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, or poultry or fish, including
the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices –
were being performed on the Dakila property in order to subject it to the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6657. We take particular note that the previous
tenants had themselves declared that they were voluntarily surrendering their
tenancy rights because the land was not conducive to farming by reason of its
elevation, among others.57 Also notable is the second Whereas Clause of
Municipal Resolution No. 16-98, which mentioned that the Dakila property
was not fit for agricultural use due to lack of sufficient irrigation and that it
was more suitable for residential use
Even if we supplemented the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27, the
outcome is still the same, because the Dakila property was still not within the
scope of the law. For land to be covered under Presidential Decree No. 27, it
must be devoted to rice or corn crops, and there must be a system of share-
crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, the land
must be excluded. Hence, exemption from coverage followed when the land
was not devoted to rice or corn even if it was tenanted; or the land was
untenanted even though it was devoted to rice or corn.62 Based on these
conditions, the DAR Regional Office erred in subjecting the Dakila property
under the OLT.
What can be gathered from the report of the Legal Services Division was that
the land owned by the petitioner and covered by Presidential Decree No. 27
was the Sumapang Matanda property under TCT No. 103697. As to the
Dakila property, we can only infer from the report that it was merely
subdivided. The report did not mention whatsoever the agricultural activities
performed in the Dakila property. Nor was there a finding that the Dakila
property was devoted to either rice or corn cultivation as to justify its
coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27. Such a finding was necessary, for
the Court has observed in Solmayor v. Arroyo:64
Although this Court will not disregard the evidence presented by petitioners
that the land is devoted to rice and corn crops in 1993, when the ocular
inspection by the DAR personnel was conducted, it must be noted that around
the time of the passage of Presidential Decree No. 27 up to 1978, when the
subject property was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer,
the available evidence issued and certified by the different government
agencies, closer in time to the mentioned time frame will show that
respondent’s property has, indeed, been classified as within the residential and
commercial zones of Davao City. It cannot escape the notice of this Court
that more than a decade before the issuance of the said ocular investigation
report stating that the land is devoted to agricultural production, government
agencies equipped with the technical expertise to determine the proper
classification of the subject land have already determined that the land is part
of the residential and commercial zones of Davao City making it suitable for
other urban use. Therefore, it is only reasonable to conclude, based on the
certification of various executive agencies issued when this controversy arose,
that at the time of the passage of Presidential Decree No. 27, respondent’s
property was not agricultural.65
For land to come within the coverage of the OLT, indeed, there must be a
showing that it is devoted to the cultivation of rice or corn, and there must be
a system of share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining on October 21, 1972, the
time when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect.66 Unfortunately, no such
evidence was presented, nor was there any field investigation conducted to
verify whether or not the landholding was primarily devoted to the cultivation
of rice or corn. Accordingly, the Dakila property should be excluded from the
OLT.
The DAR Secretary affirmed the validity of the EPs in favor of the
respondents only “pursuant to the Order of the Regional Director.”67 We
note, however, that the evidence to establish in the proceedings below that
they or their predecessors had been tenants of the petitioner’s predecessor-in-
interest to make them the rightful beneficiaries of the Dakila property was
severely wanting. For tenancy to exist, there must be proof that: (1) the parties
are the landholder and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there
is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is
consideration;68 and (6) there is a sharing of the harvests. All these requisites
are necessary to create a tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more
of them will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant.69 Unless a person
has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure; nor is he covered by the land reform program of the Government
under the existing tenancy laws.70 Here, the consent to establish a tenant-
landlord relationship was manifestly absent. In view of the petitioner’s
repeated denial of the tenancy, the respondents ought then to establish the
tenancy relationship, but did not do so. Tenancy could not be presumed, but
must be established by evidence; its mere allegation is neither evidence nor
equivalent to proof of its existence.71
There was also no showing that the respondents were engaged in any
agricultural activities, or agreed with Santiago or the petitioner on the sharing
of harvests. The OIC-Regional Director obviously disregarded the affidavit of
Barangay Captain Felino M. Teodoro of Dakila, Malolos, Bulacan stating that
the respondents were never the actual farmers on the Dakila property.72
ARBA v FIL-ESTATE(GR163598)
She also cited Natalia Realty Inc. v. DAR,14 which has held that land located
within the Lungsod Silangan Townsite has been converted to residential use.
The land not being agricultural, Regional Adjudicator Minas held that the
DARAB did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners'
complaint. It cited Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR, where we found that
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20, 132 hectares of land in the
Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban, Rizal to absorb the
population overspill in the metropolis. These areas were designated as the
Lungsod Silangan Townsite in which the land is located. The Court of
Appeals also ruled that petitioners are not bonafide tenants of the subject
property as there was neither consent from the landowner nor evidence of
sharing of harvests. Citing Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR,37 the Court of Appeals
also ruled that the inclusion of the land within the Lungsod Silangan Townsite
meant that the areas therein have been effectively converted from agricultural
to non-agricultural and reclassified into residential. Though some areas remain
undeveloped, these are still residential or commercial lands by reason of the
conversion prior to June 15, 1998 when the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) took effect. Hence, the subject property is outside the ambit of
CARP. The Court of Appeals concluded that the DARAB erred in taking
cognizance of the case. In view of the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case, its decision is void and the principle on res
judicata does not apply. However, the case of Natalia Realty, Inc., v.
DAR,52 has long held that lots included in the Lungsod Silangan Townsite
Reservation were intended exclusively for residential use. They ceased to be
agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan
Reservation by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1637.
JOSE JUNIO v GARILAO (GR147146)
Section 4 of RA 6657 sets forth the coverage of the CARL as follows:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall
cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public
and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the
agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.
Section 3(c) of the CARL defines agricultural land as that which is devoted to
agricultural activity x x x and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land. The meaning of agricultural lands covered by
the CARL was explained further by the DAR in its Administrative Order No.
1, Series of 1990,[12] entitled Revised Rules and Regulations Governing
Conversion of Private Agricultural Land to Non-Agricultural Uses, issued
pursuant to Section 49 of CARL, which we quote:
x x x. Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor
agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as
approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its
preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential,
commercial or industrial use. (Emphasis supplied)
the CA properly applied Natalia Realty v. Department of Agrarian
Reform,[20] which had earlier held that lands previously converted by
government agencies, other than DAR, to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of the CARL were outside the coverage of that law. Our ruling
in Natalia was not confined solely to agricultural lands located within
townsite reservations, but applied also to real estate converted to non-
agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL, [21] provided the
conversion was made by government agencies other than the DAR -- like the
HLURB and its predecessor, the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission
(HSRC).[22]
The Courts ruling in Natalia was reiterated in Pasong Bayabas Farmers
Association v. Court of Appeals,[23] which affirmed the authority of the
Municipal Council of Carmona to issue a zoning classification and to
reclassify the property in question from agricultural to residential, as approved
by the HSRC (now the HLURB). The Court held that Section 3 of RA
2264,[24]amending the Local Government Code, specifically empowered
municipal and/or city councils, in consultation with the National Planning
Commission, to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations.
Hence, the power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands to
residential or non-agricultural was not subject to the approval of the DAR.[25]
Consequently, even if the subject landholding has been declared as
agricultural for taxation purposes, once a local government has reclassified it
as residential, that determination must prevail for zoning purposes.
DAR v BERENGUER (GR154094)
In ruling that the respondents landholdings were not devoted to cattle raising,
the DAR relied on DAR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 9, series of 1993,
which required that properties should be considered excluded from the
coverage of the CARL only if it was established that as of June 15, 1988, the
date of effectivity of the law, there existed the minimum ratio of one head of
cattle to one hectare of land, and one head of cattle to 1.7815 hectares of
infrastructure.
According to the DAR, only 15 heads of cattle were found within the 58
hectares sought to be excluded based on the semestral survey conducted in
Sorsogon by the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics in the period from 1988 to
1992, which was in contravention of DAO No. 9, series of 1993.
The CA found, however, that heads of cattle were really being raised in the
landholdings of the respondents. This finding was not disputed by the DAR.
In view of the finding of the CA, we cannot now hold differently, for we are
bound by the finding of fact of the CA. Verily, the insufficiency of the number
of heads of cattle found during the semestral survey did not automatically
mean that the landholdings were not devoted to the raising of livestock. We
concur with the CA that there could be several reasons to explain why the
number of cattle was below the ratio prescribed under DAO No. 9 at the time
of the survey, including pestilence, cattle rustling, or sale of the cattle.
That the Constitutional Commission never intended to include lands used for
raising livestock and poultry, and commercial, industrial and residential lands
within the coverage of the Agrarian Reform Program of the Government is
already settled. In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform,[12] the Court pointed this out:
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986
on the meaning of the word agricultural clearly show that it was never the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which
includes private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry
and swine raising in the definition of commercial farms is invalid, to the
extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by
the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include
livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.
Moreover, the policy objective of DAO No. 9 was to prevent landowners from
taking steps to convert their agricultural lands to lands devoted to the raising
of livestock, poultry, and swine in order to accord with Luz Farms.
Nonetheless, the CA also correctly clarified that the respondents landholdings,
even if they were not devoted to cattle raising, would still be excluded from
the coverage of the CARL, because the DAR failed to establish that the
landholdings were agricultural.
The presumption assumed by the appellate court that a parcel of land which is
located in a poblacion is not necessarily devoted to residential purposes is
wrong. It should be the other way around. A lot inside the poblacion should be
presumed residential, or commercial, or non-agricultural unless there is a
clearly preponderant evidence to show that it is agricultural.
To the same effect was Natalia Realty Corporation v. DAR,[14] thus:
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of
R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands. As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred to as land devoted
to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. Agricultural lands are only
those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands.
Likewise, the CA correctly concluded that the DAR erred in designating
Baribag as the beneficiary of the landholdings.In designating Baribag, the
DAR did not show how its choice of Baribag as beneficiary, to the exclusion
of the actual workers, could have accorded with Section 22 of the CARL,
which provides:
Section 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. The lands covered by the CARP shall be
distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or
in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the
following order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.
Provided, however, that the children of landowners who are qualified under
Section 6 of this Act shall be given preference in the distribution of the land of
their parents: and provided, further, that actual tenant-tillers in the
landholdings shall not be ejected or removed therefrom.
Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably sold,
disposed of, or abandoned their land are disqualified to become beneficiaries
under this Program.

A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude, and
ability to cultivate and make the land as productive as possible. The DAR
shall adopt a system of monitoring the record or performance of each
beneficiary, so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land
or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as such
beneficiary. The DAR shall submit periodic reports on the performance of the
beneficiaries to the PARC.
If, due to the landowners retention rights or to the number of tenants, lessees,
or workers on the land, there is not enough land to accommodate any or some
of them, they may be granted ownership of other lands available for
distribution under this Act, at the option of the beneficiaries.
Farmers already in place and those not accommodated in the distribution of
privately-owned lands will be given preferential rights in the distribution of
lands from the public domain.
The only reason given by the DAR for not including the workers of the
landholdings as farmer beneficiaries was that it could be that either they have
manifested lack/loss of interest in the property, as it has happened in many
other areas placed under CARP coverage, because of their loyalty to the
original landowner, like respondents, or because of fear or, simply, they
refused to heed/answer the call of our field offices to submit to the screening
process.[15] Such reason is unacceptable.
The highly irregular actuations of the DAR did not end with the unwarranted
awarding of the landholdings to Baribag in violation of Section 22 of the
CARL. The DAR also violated the respondents right of retention under
Section 6 of the CARL, which accorded to the respondents as the landowners
the right to retain five hectares of their landholdings, and the right to choose
the areas to be retained, which should be compact or contiguous. Thus,
assuming that the respondents landholdings were covered by the CARL, and
that the DAR was correct in awarding the landholdings to Baribag, the DARs
cancellation of all of the respondents TCTs effectively nullified the
respondents right of retention, thereby depriving them of their property
without due process of law.
Lastly, RARAD Florins issuance of the writ of execution in favor of Baribag
was highly irregular. It must be noted, first of all, that because Baribag was
not even a party in relation to the respondents application for exclusion before
Regional Director Dalugdug, RARAD Florin did not acquire jurisdiction over
Baribag. As such, the legal authority of RARAD Florin to implement the
award to Baribag by execution did not exist. Secondly, the denial of the
respondents application for exclusion was still pending review by the DAR
Secretary when RARAD Florin issued the writ of execution to implement
Regional Director Dalugdugs order to place Baribag in possession of the
respondents landholdings. Hence, the issuance of the writ of execution was
premature and bereft of legal basis.
In fine, the appeal of the DAR cannot prosper. The CA properly acted in
reversing and undoing the DARs several violations of the letter and spirit of
the CARL. It is timely to stress that the noble purpose of the CARL to
emancipate the tenants from the bondage of the soil and to transfer to them the
ownership of the lands they till should not be the guise to trample upon the
landowners rights by including lands that are unquestionably outside the
coverage of the CARL. Neither should such noble intention be frustrated by
designating beneficiaries who are neither the tenants or tillers of the land, nor
otherwise qualified under the law to be the beneficiaries of land reform.
DELESTE v LBP(GR169913)
Petitioners contend that the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is
outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment
of City Ordinance No. 1313 by the City of Iligan reclassifying the area into a
residential/commercial land.[41]
Unconvinced, the DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the record is bereft of
any evidence that the city ordinance has been approved by the HLURB,
thereby allegedly casting doubt on the validity of the reclassification over the
subject property.[42] It further noted that whether the subject property is
exempt from the OLT Program is an administrative determination, the
jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the DAR Secretary, not with the
DARAB.
Indeed, it is the Office of the DAR Secretary which is vested with the primary
and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the
agrarian reform program.[43] However, this will not prevent the Court from
assuming jurisdiction over the petition considering that the issues raised in it
may already be resolved on the basis of the records before Us. Besides, to
allow the matter to remain with the Office of the DAR Secretary would only
cause unnecessary delay and undue hardship on the parties.
[w]e have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court for
further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position
to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the
Court, in the public interest and for the expeditious administration of
justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to
the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice,
would not be subserved by the remand of the case.
Thus, we shall directly rule on the dismissal issue. And while we rule that the
CA could not validly rule on the merits of this issue, we shall not hesitate to
refer back to its dismissal ruling, where appropriate. (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify
agricultural into non-agricultural lands. In Pasong Bayabas Farmers
Association, Inc. v. CA,[45]this Court held that pursuant to Sec. 3 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 2264, amending the Local Government Code, municipal and/or
city councils are empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. It was
also emphasized therein that [t]he power of the local government to convert or
reclassify lands [from agricultural to non-agricultural lands prior to the
passage of RA 6657] is not subject to the approval of the [DAR]. [46]
Likewise, it is not controverted that City Ordinance No. 1313, which was
enacted by the City of Iligan in 1975, reclassified the subject property into a
commercial/residential area. DARAB, however, believes that the approval of
HLURB is necessary in order for the reclassification to be valid.
Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial
land with the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer
be considered as an agricultural land within the ambit of RA 6657. As
this Court held in Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M.
Ramos and Sons, Inc.,[50] To be exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one
valid reclassification of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a
duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL
took effect.
Despite the foregoing ruling, respondents allege that the subsequent
reclassification by the local zoning ordinance cannot free the land from the
legal effects of PD 27 which deems the land to be already taken as of October
21, 1972, when said law took effect. Concomitantly, they assert that the rights
which accrued from said date must be respected. They also maintain that the
reclassification of the subject property did not alter its agricultural nature,
much less its actual use.[51]
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, this Court resolved the
issue of whether lands already classified for residential, commercial or
industrial use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) and its precursor agencies, i.e., National Housing Authority and
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, prior to 15 June 1988, are
covered by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. We answered in the negative, thus:
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of
R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands. As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred to as land devoted
to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. Agricultural lands are only
those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not include
commercial, industrial and residential land.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of
CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses
prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than
respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion
of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined
agricultural land thus
. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies,
and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding
competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or
industrial use.

Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent
DAR is bound by such conversion. . . . .
However, Natalia should be cautiously applied in light of Administrative
Order 04, Series of 2003, which outlines the rules on the Exemption on Lands
from CARP Coverage under Section (3) of Republic Act No. 6657, and
Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990. It reads:
I. Prefatory Statement
Republic Act (RA) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL), Section 3, Paragraph (c) defines agricultural land as referring to land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, (or DOJ Opinion 44-
1990 for brevity) and the case of Natalia Realty versus Department of
Agrarian Reform (12 August 2993, 225 SCRA 278) opines that with respect
to the conversion of agricultural land covered by RA 6657 to non-agricultural
uses, the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to approve
such conversion may be exercised from the date of its effectivity, on 15 June
1988. Thus, all lands that are already classified as commercial, industrial or
residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.
However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not
operate to divest tenant[-]farmers of their rights over lands covered by
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, which have been vested prior to 15 June
1988.
As emphasized, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural cannot be
applied to defeat vested rights of tenant-farmers under Presidential
Decree No. 27.
Indeed, in the recent case of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v.
Amante, where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether the
contentious property therein is agricultural in nature on the ground that the
same had been classified as park since 1979 under the Zoning Ordinance of
Cabuyao, as approved by the HLURB, the Court said:
The Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and
convert lands through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved
by the HLURB. Municipal Ordinance No. 110-54 dated November 3, 1979,
enacted by the Municipality of Cabuyao, divided the municipality into
residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural and institutional districts, and
districts and parks for open spaces. It did not convert, however, existing
agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, or institutional.
While it classified Barangay Casile into a municipal park, as shown in its
permitted uses of land map, the ordinance did not provide for the retroactivity
of its classification. In Co vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, it was held that
an ordinance converting agricultural lands into residential or light
industrial should be given prospective application only, and should not
change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal
relationships existing over such land. . . . .
A reading of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, series of 1981, does
not disclose any provision converting existing agricultural lands in the
covered area into residential or light industrial. While it declared that after the
passage of the measure, the subject area shall be used only for residential or
light industrial purposes, it is not provided therein that it shall have retroactive
effect so as to discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands located
within the zone which are neither residential nor light industrial in
nature. This simply means that, if we apply the general rule, as we must,
the ordinance should be given prospective operation only. The further
implication is that it should not change the nature of existing agricultural
lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such
lands. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
This, however, raises the issue of whether vested rights have actually accrued
in the instant case. In this respect, We reckon that under PD 27, tenant-farmers
of rice and corn lands were deemed owners of the land they till as of October
21, 1972. This policy, intended to emancipate the tenant-farmers from the
bondage of the soil, is given effect by the following provision of the law:
The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall
be deemed owner of a portion constituting a family size farm of five (5)
hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It should be clarified that even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are deemed
owners as of October 21, 1972, this is not to be construed as automatically
vesting upon these tenant-farmers absolute ownership over the land they were
tilling. Certain requirements must also be complied with, such as payment of
just compensation, before full ownership is vested upon the tenant-farmers.
This was elucidated by the Court in Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform:[53]
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer
as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a
portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the
land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had
become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative. It
was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also
had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October
21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the
said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers
cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also
perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the lease
rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972
(pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall
be considered as advance payment for the land.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains
with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated
either. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements, tenant-farmers have, at
most, an inchoate right over the land they were tilling. In recognition of this, a
CLT is issued to a tenant-farmer to serve as a provisional title of ownership
over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of [just
compensation] or for as long as the [tenant-farmer] is an amortizing
owner.[54] This certificate proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land
primarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the
tenant-farmer to acquire the land[55] he was tilling.
Concomitantly, with respect to the LBP and the government, tenant-farmers
cannot be considered as full owners of the land they are tilling unless they
have fully paid the amortizations due them. This is because it is only upon
such full payment of the amortizations that EPs may be issued in their favor.
In Del Castillo v. Orciga, We explained that land transfer under PD 27 is
effected in two (2) stages. The first stage is the issuance of a CLT to a farmer-
beneficiary as soon as the DAR transfers the landholding to the farmer-
beneficiary in recognition that said person is its deemed owner. And the
second stage is the issuance of an EP as proof of full ownership of the
landholding upon full payment of the annual amortizations or lease rentals by
the farmer-beneficiary.[56]
In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984. Therefore, for all intents
and purposes, it was only in 1984 that private respondents, as farmer-
beneficiaries, were recognized to have an inchoate right over the subject
property prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements.
Considering that the local zoning ordinance was enacted in 1975, and
subsequently approved by the HSRC in 1978, private respondents still
had no vested rights to speak of during this period, as it was only in 1984
that private respondents were issued the CLTs and were deemed owners.
The same holds true even if EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, since
reclassification had taken place twenty-six (26) years prior to their
issuance. Undeniably, no vested rights accrued prior to reclassification
and its approval. Consequently, the subject property,
particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform
program.
\
ROM v ROXAS (GR 169331)
The fact that respondent had previously voluntarily offered to sell the subject
properties to the DAR is immaterial in this case.

Indeed, respondent had previously voluntarily offered to sell to the
DAR Hacienda Caylaway, where the properties subject of this case are
located. However, this offer to sell became irrelevant because respondent was
later able to establish before the DAR that the subject 27 parcels of land were
reclassified as non-agricultural (residential) by virtue of (Nasugbu) Municipal
Zoning Ordinance No. 4 prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15,
1988. In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform,[56] it was
held that lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of
CARL including lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to
the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than the DAR. [57] This
being the case, respondent is not bound by its previous voluntary offer to sell
because the subject properties cannot be the subject of a VOS, they being
clearly beyond the CARPs coverage.
FAJARDO v FLORES (GR 167891)
The issue in this case is whether it is MTC or the DARAB which has
jurisdiction over the case.
There is no dispute that, on June 28, 1991, the parties executed an agreement,
denominated as KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT
PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG
PANIG. Therein, it was admitted that Jesus Fajardo was the tiller of the
land. This Kasunduan was subsequently followed by another agreement,
KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA, whereby an area of 10,923 sq m of
Lot No. 2351 was given to petitioners. The portion of the land where
petitioners house is erected is the subject of the instant case for unlawful
detainer. Respondent argues that this portion is not included in the deed of
partition, while petitioners insist that it is.
We agree with the RTC when it clearly pointed out in its Order dated
December 10, 2002 that the resolution of this case hinges on the correct
interpretation of the contracts executed by the parties. The issue of who has a
better right of possession over the subject land cannot be determined without
resolving first the matter as to whom the subject property was allotted. Thus,
this is not simply a case for unlawful detainer, but one that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, definitely beyond the competence of the MTC.[11]
More importantly, the controversy involves an agricultural land, which
petitioners have continuously and personally cultivated since the 1960s. In
the Kasunduan, it was admitted that Jesus Fajardo was the tiller of the land.
Being agricultural lessees, petitioners have a right to a home lot and a right to
exclusive possession thereof by virtue of Section 24, R.A. No. 3844 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code.[12] Logically, therefore, the case involves an
agrarian dispute, which falls within the contemplation of R.A. No. 6657, or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
An agrarian dispute[13] refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It relates
to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to
agriculture.[14]
Undeniably, the instant case involves a controversy regarding tenurial
arrangements. The contention that the Kasunduans, which allegedly
terminated the tenancy relationship between the parties and, therefore,
removed the case from the ambit of R.A. No. 6657, is untenable. There still
exists an agrarian dispute because the controversy involves the home lot of
petitioners, an incident arising from the landlord-tenant relationship.
.Amurao v. Villalobos is quite instructive:
The instant case undeniably involves a controversy involving tenurial
arrangements because the Kasulatan will definitely modify, nay, terminate the
same. Even assuming that the tenancy relationship between the parties had
ceased due to the Kasulatan, there still exists an agrarian dispute because the
action involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship.
In Teresita S. David v. Agustin Rivera, this Court held that:
[I]t is safe to conclude that the existence of prior agricultural tenancy
relationship, if true, will divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction the previous
juridical tie compels the characterization of the controversy as an agrarian
dispute. x x x Even if the tenurial arrangement has been severed, the action
still involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant
relationship. Where the case involves the dispossession by a former landlord
of a former tenant of the land claimed to have been given as compensation in
consideration of the renunciation of the tenurial rights, there clearly exists an
agrarian dispute. On this point the Court has already ruled:
Indeed, section 21 of the Republic Act No. 1199, provides that all cases
involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party
and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship
of landlord and tenant . . . shall be under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. This jurisdiction does not
require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and tenantat the time
of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arises, precisely
from the previous termination of such relationship. If the same existed
immediately, or shortly, before the controversy and the subject-matter thereof
is whether or not said relationship has been lawfully terminated, or if the
dispute springs or originates from the relationship of landlord and tenant, the
litigation is (then) cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations . . .
In the case at bar, petitioners claim that the tenancy relationship has been
terminated by the Kasulatan is of no moment. As long as the subject matter of
the dispute is the legality of the termination of the relationship, or if the
dispute originates from such relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR,
through the DARAB. The severance of the tenurial arrangement will not
render the action beyond the ambit of an agrarian dispute. [15]
Furthermore, the records disclose that the dispute between the parties,
regarding the interpretation of the Kasunduan, was, in fact, raised and referred
to the DAR, which in turn referred the case to the DARAB. [16] In view of the
foregoing, we reiterate Hilario v. Prudente,[17] that:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a
controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.For agrarian reform cases,
jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more
specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
GALOPE v BUGARIN (GR 185669)
The main issue to be resolved is whether there exists a tenancy relationship
between the parties.
Petitioner submits that substantial evidence proves the tenancy relationship
between him and respondent. Specifically, he points out that (1) his
possession of the land is undisputed; (2) the DAR certified that he is the
registered farmer of the land; and (3) receipts prove his payment of irrigation
fees. On the absence of receipts as proof of rental payments, he urges us to
take judicial notice of an alleged practice in the provinces that payments
between relatives are not supported by receipts. He also calls our attention to
the affidavits of Jose Allingag, Rolando Alejo and Angelito dela Cruz
attesting that he pays 15 cavans of palay to respondent.[11]
In her comment, respondent says that no new issues and substantial matters
are raised in the petition. She thus prays that we deny the petition for lack of
merit.[12]
The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject
matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.[13]
Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondents act of
allowing the petitioner to cultivate her land and receiving rentals therefor
indubitably show her consent to an unwritten tenancy agreement. An
agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit provisions of a
written contract alone.[17] Section 5[18] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844,
otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, recognizes that an
agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement.
Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are
present. Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is her tenant. The subject
matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a farm land.[19] They mutually
agreed to the cultivation of the land by petitioner and share in the harvest. The
purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring about agricultural
production. After the harvest, petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its
equivalent in cash. Respondents motion[20] to supervise harvesting and
threshing, processes in palay farming, further confirms the purpose of their
agreement. Lastly, petitioners personal cultivation of the land[21] is conceded
by respondent who likewise never denied the fact that they share in the
harvest.
Petitioners status as a de jure tenant having been established, we now address
the issue of whether there is a valid ground to eject petitioner from the land.
Respondent, as landowner/agricultural lessor, has the burden to prove the
existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of petitioner, the
tenant/agricultural lessee.[22] This rule proceeds from the principle that a
tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a security of
tenure.[23] The tenant can only be ejected from the agricultural landholding on
grounds provided by law.[24]
Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844 enumerates these grounds, to wit:
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any
agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural
lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding
except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment
that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will
personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if
suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful
non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his
landholding in addition to his rights under Sections [25] and [34], except
when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor is not more than
five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee
may be entitled to an advance notice of at least one agricultural year before
ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should
the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to
substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession
of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant
shall have the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for
any loss incurred by him because of said dispossession;
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms
and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his
failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose
other than what had been previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined
under paragraph 3 of Section [29];
(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is
substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through
the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls
due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop
failure to the extent of seventy-five per centumas a result of a fortuitous event,
the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the
obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby
extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the
terms of paragraph 2 of Section [27].
Through Rabang, respondent alleged (1) nonpayment of any consideration, (2)
lack of tenancy relationship, (3) petitioner mortgaged the land to Allingag
who allegedly possesses the land, and (4) she will manage/cultivate the
land.[25] None of these grounds were proven by the respondent.
As aforesaid, respondent herself admitted petitioners payment of rentals. We
also found that a tenancy relationship exists between the parties.
On the supposed mortgage, Allingag himself denied it in his affidavit.[26] No
such a deed of mortgage was submitted in evidence. Rabangs claim is based
on a hearsay statement of Cesar Andres that he came to know the mortgage
from residents of the place where the land is located. [27]
That Allingag possesses the land is also based on Andress hearsay
statement. On the contrary, Allingag stated in his affidavit that he is merely
petitioners farm helper.[28] We have held that the employment of farm laborers
to perform some aspects of work does not preclude the existence of an
agricultural leasehold relationship, provided that an agricultural lessee does
not leave the entire process of cultivation in the hands of hired
helpers. Indeed, while the law explicitly requires the agricultural lessee and
his immediate family to work on the land, we have nevertheless declared that
the hiring of farm laborers by the tenant on a temporary, occasional, or
emergency basis does not negate the existence of the element of personal
cultivation essential in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold
relationship.[29] There is no showing that petitioner has left the entire process
of cultivating the land to Allingag. In fact, respondent has admitted that
petitioner still farms the land.[30]
On respondents claim that she will cultivate the land, it is no longer a valid
ground to eject petitioner. The original provision of Section 36 (1) of R.A. No.
3844 has been removed from the statute books[31] after its amendment by
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389[32] on September 10, 1971, to wit:
SEC. 7. Section 36 (1) of the same Code is hereby amended to read as
follows:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation
of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee
shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the
average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding
calendar years.
Since respondent failed to prove nonpayment of rentals, petitioner may not be
ejected from the landholding. We emphasize, however, that as long as the
tenancy relationship subsists, petitioner must continue paying rentals. For the
law provides that nonpayment of lease rental, if proven, is a valid ground to
dispossess him of respondents land.Henceforth, petitioner should see to it that
his rental payments are properly covered by receipts.
DAVAO NEWTOWN v SALIGA (GR 174588)
(1) whether the property had been reclassified from agricultural to non-
agricultural uses prior to June 15, 1988 so as to remove it from the coverage
of R.A. No. 6657; (2) whether an agricultural leasehold or tenancy
relationship exists between DNTDC and the respondents; and (3) whether the
compromise agreement signed by the respondents’ children in the RTC case
binds the respondents.
We hold that the property had been reclassified to non-agricultural uses and
was, therefore, already outside the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) after it took effect on July 15, 1988.
1. Power of the local government units to reclassify lands from agricultural to
nonagricultural uses; the DAR approval is not required
Indubitably, the City Council of Davao City has the authority to adopt zoning
resolutions and ordinances. Under Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264 30 (the then
governing Local Government Code), municipal and/or city officials are
specifically empowered to "adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission."
onsidering that the property is no longer agricultural as of June 15, 1988, it is
removed from the operation of R.A. No. 6657. By express provision, the
CARL covers only those public or private lands devoted or suitable for
agriculture,43 the operative word being agricultural. Under Section 3(c) of
R.A. No. 6657, agricultural lands refer to lands devoted to agricultural activity
and not otherwise classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or
industrial land.44 In its Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1990,45 the DAR
further explained the term "agricultural lands" as referring to "those devoted
to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and x x x not classified in
town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities
prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use." If only
to emphasize, we reiterate – only those parcels of land specifically classified
as agricultural are covered by the CARL; any parcel of land otherwise
classified is beyond its ambit.
2. No vested rights over the property accrued to the respondents under P.D.
No. 27
Under P.D. No. 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn agricultural lands are
"deemed owners" of the land that they till as of October 21, 1972. Under these
terms, vested rights cannot simply be taken away by the expedience of
adopting zoning plans and ordinances reclassifying an agricultural land to an
"urban/urbanizing" area. In this case, the record does not show that the
respondents had been issued CLTs. The CLT could have been their best
evidence of the government’s recognition of their inchoate right as "deemed
owners" of the property. Similarly, the record does not show that the
government had placed the property under its OLT program or that the
government, through the MARO, recognized the respondents as the actual
tenants of the property on the relevant date, thereby sufficiently vesting in
them such inchoate right.
No tenancy relationship exists between
DNTDC and the respondents; the
tenancy relationship between the
respondents and Eugenio ceased
when the property was reclassified
In Solmayor v. Arroyo,50 the Court outlined the essential requisites of a
tenancy relationship, all of which must concur for the relationship to exist,
namely:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
The absence of any of these requisites does not make an occupant a cultivator,
or a planter, a de jure tenant.51Consequently, a person who is not a de
jure tenant is not entitled to security of tenure nor covered by the land reform
program of the government under any existing tenancy laws.52
In this case, we hold that no tenancy relationship exists between DNTDC, as
the owner of the property, and the respondents, as the purported tenants; the
second essential requisite as outlined above – the subject is agricultural land –
is lacking. To recall, the property had already been reclassified as non-
agricultural land. Accordingly, the respondents are not de jure tenants and are,
therefore, not entitled to the benefits granted to agricultural lessees under the
provisions of P.D. No. 27, in relation to R.A. No. 6657.
In effect, therefore, whether the leasehold relationship between the
respondents and Eugenio had been established by virtue of the provisions of
R.A. No. 3844 or of the five-year lease contract executed in 1981, this
leasehold relationship had been terminated with the reclassification of the
property as non-agricultural land in 1982. The expiration the five-year lease
contract in 1986 could not have done more than simply finally terminate any
leasehold relationship that may have prevailed under the terms of that
contract.
Consequently, when the DNTDC purchased the property in 1995, there was
no longer any tenancy relationship that could have subrogated the DNTDC to
the rights and obligations of the previous owner.
CALUZOR v LLANILLO (GR 155580)
he petitioner’s insistence on his being the tenant of Leonardo and on his
entitlement to disturbance compensation required factual and legal bases. The
term tenant has a distinct meaning under the law. Section 5 subparagraph (a)
of R.A. No. 1199 provides:
A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to, or
possessed by another, with the latter’s consent for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or
paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in
money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
For tenancy relationship to exist, therefore, the following elements must be
shown to concur, to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2)
the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties
to the relationship; (4) the purpose is of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between landowner
and tenant or agricultural lessee.23 The presence of all these elements must be
proved by substantial evidence;24 this means that the absence of one will not
make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant.25 Unless a person has established his
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure or to be
covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws.26
Being the party alleging the existence of the tenancy relationship, the
petitioner carried the burden of proving the allegation of his
tenancy.27 According to Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,28 to wit:
It is a matter of jurisprudence that tenancy is not purely a factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land but more importantly
a legal relationship. (Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, 118 SCRA 484) Under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural
Tenancy Act, the term "agricultural tenancy" is defined as –
[T]he physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture
belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production
through the labor of the former and with the members of his immediate farm
household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest
with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in
money, or in both.
In establishing the tenancy relationship, therefore, independent evidence, not
self-serving statements, should prove, among others, the consent of the
landowner to the relationship, and the sharing of harvests.29
The third and sixth elements of agricultural tenancy were not shown to be
presented in this case.
To prove the element of consent between the parties, the petitioner testified
that Lorenzo had allowed him to cultivate the land by giving to him the
sketch30 of the lot31 in order to delineate the portion for his tillage.
Yet, the sketch did not establish that Lorenzo had categorically taken the
petitioner in as his agricultural tenant. This element demanded that the
landowner and the tenant should have agreed to the relationship freely and
voluntarily, with neither of them unduly imposing his will on the other. The
petitioner did not make such a showing of consent.
The sixth element was not also established. Even assuming that Lorenzo had
verbally permitted the petitioner to cultivate his land, no tenancy relationship
between them thereby set in because they had not admittedly discussed any
fruit sharing scheme, with Lorenzo simply telling him simply that he would
just ask his share from him.32 The petitioner disclosed that he did not see
Lorenzo again from the time he had received the sketch until Lorenzo’s
death.33 Although the petitioner asserted that he had continued sharing the
fruits of his cultivation through Ricardo, Lorenzo’s caretaker, even after
Lorenzo’s death, producing the list of produce to support his claim,34 the list
did not indicate Ricardo’s receiving the fruits listed therein. The petitioner did
not also contain Ricardo’s authority to receive Leonardo’s share.
We underscore that harvest sharing is a vital element of every tenancy.
Common sense dictated, indeed, that the petitioner, if he were the de jure
tenant that he represented himself to be, should fully know his arrangement
with the landowner. But he did not sufficiently and persuasively show such
arrangement. His inability to specify the sharing arrangement was
inconceivable inasmuch as he had depended on the arrangement for his own
sustenance and that of his own family. The absence of the clear-cut sharing
agreement between him and Lorenzo could only signify that the latter had
merely tolerated his having tilled the land sans tenancy. Such manner of
tillage did not make him a de jure tenant, because, as the Court observed in
Estate of Pastor M. Samson v. Susano:35
If tenanted land is converted pursuant to Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844,
as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, the dispossessed tenant is entitled to
the payment of disturbance compensation.36 Reflecting this statutory right, the
conversion order presented by Moldex included the condition for the payment
of disturbance compensation to any farmerbeneficiary thereby affected.
Yet, the query has to be answered in the negative because the petitioner was
not entitled to disturbance compensation because he was not the de jure tenant
of the landowner.
It is timely to remind that any claim for disturbance compensation to be
validly made by a de jure tenant must meet the procedural and substantive
conditions listed in Section 25 of Republic Act No. 3844, to wit:
Section 25. Right to be Indemnified for Labor - The agricultural lessee shall
have the right to be indemnified for the cost and expenses incurred in the
cultivation, planting or harvesting and other expenses incidental to the
improvement of his crop in case he surrenders or abandons his landholding for
just cause or is eje ition, he has the right to be indemnified for one-half of the
necessary and useful improvements made by him on the landholding:
Provided, That these improvements are tangible and have not yet lost their
utility at the time of surrender and/or abandonment of the landholding, at
which time their value shall be determined for the purpose of the indemnity
for improvements. (Emphasis supplied)
In short, the de Jure tenant should allege and prove, firstly, the cost and
expenses incurred in the cultivation, planting or harvesting and other expenses
incidental to the improvement of his crop; and, secondly, the necessary and
useful improvements made in cultivating the land. Without the allegation and
proof, the demand for indemnity may be denied.
LIGTAS v PEOPLE (GR 200751)
The uncontested declaration of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board that Monico Ligtas was a tenant negates a finding of theft
beyond reasonable doubt. Tenants having rights to the harvest cannot be
deemed to have taken their own produce.
The elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were not
established since he was a bona fide tenant of the land.133 The DARAB's
recognition of petitioner as a legitimate tenant necessarily "implie[d] that he
ha[d] the authority to harvest the abaca hemp from [private complainant's
land]."134 This shows that petitioner had no criminal intent.
As to the existence of another element of theft—that the taking was done
without the consent of the owner—petitioner argues that this, too, was negated
by his status as private complainant's tenant:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The purported lack of consent on the part of the private complainant as
alleged by the prosecution, is misplaced. In fact, it was even improper for
Anecita Pacate to stop or prevent petitioner from harvesting the produce of the
landholding because as tenant, petitioner is entitled to security of tenure. This
right entitled him to continue working on his landholding until the leasehold
relation is terminated or until his eviction is authorized by the DARAB in a
judgment that is final and executory. Petitioner argues that the constitutional
presumption of innocence must be upheld:
Well-settled is the rule that where "inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction." In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is
lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we are declaring his innocence
because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is
insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the
fundamental law."136 The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings
of the trial court finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft.

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE. 308. Who are Liable for Theft. — Theft is committed by any
person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without
the latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver
the same to the local authorities or to its owner;cralawlawlibrary
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of
another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the
damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where
trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the
consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall
gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.
The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the
property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the owner's
consent; (4) there was intent to gain; and (5) the taking was done without
violence against or intimidation of the person or force upon things.137
Tenants have been defined as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their
immediate farm households — cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the
produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under
the leasehold tenancy system.138 (Citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she
cultivates. The landowner's share in the produce depends on the agreement
between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the tenant is with the
landowner's consent.
The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy
between petitioner and private complainant negates the existence of the
element that the taking was done without the owner's consent. The DARAB
Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca.
The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.
In Pit-og v. People,139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of sugarcane and
banana crops on the basis of reasonable doubt.140 The prosecution failed to
prove lack of criminal intent on petitioner's part.141 It failed to clearly identify
"the person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and
consent, was wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him."142 There were
doubts as to whether the plants taken by petitioner were indeed planted on
private complainant's lot when petitioner had planted her own plants adjacent
to it.143 Thus, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the property
belonged to private complainant. This court found that petitioner "took the
sugarcane and bananas believing them to be her own. That being the case, she
could not have had a criminal intent."144
In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to
the produce as a legitimate tenant cultivating the land owned by private
complainant. Personal property may have been taken, but it is with the consent
of the owner.
No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed
innocent of the crime until proven guilty.145 "[I]t is better to acquit ten guilty
individuals than to convict one innocent person."146Thus, courts must consider
"[e]very circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence[.]"147 Equally
settled is that "[w]here the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of
which is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must
be given the benefit of doubt and should be acquitted."148
DAR v ROBLES (GR 190482)
In resolving the sole issue of whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over
the DAR's petition for annulment of deeds of sale and cancellation of titles,
the Court is guided by the following rules on jurisdiction laid down in Heirs of
Julian dela Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz:14
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial
officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition
or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the
character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or
complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature
and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law,
and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise
would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor
can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties.
Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has
none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to challenge the
jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the
issue, especially where the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the
face of the complaint or petition.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses
or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to
dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status
or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions
that is the subject of the controversy. If the issues between the parties are
intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the DARAB, such dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB.
The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its
decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral
attacks.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Paramount Holdings Equities,
Inc.,16 the Court defined the limits of the quasi-judicial power of DARAB,
thus:
The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited under the law, as it was created
under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 129-A specifically to assume powers and
functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under E.O.
No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A. Significantly, it was organized under the Office
of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The limitation on the authority of it to
mere agrarian reform matters is only consistent with the extent of DAR's
quasi-judicial powers under R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 229, which read:
SECTION 50 [of R.A. No. 6657]. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.—The
DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
SECTION 17 [of E.O. No. 229]. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.—The
DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and
adjudicate agrarian. reform matters, and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and
the Department of Agriculture (DA).17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,18 the Court pointed
out that the jurisdiction of the DAR under the aforequoted provisions is two-
fold. The first is essentially executive and pertains to the enforcement and
administration of the laws, carrying them into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance, while the second is quasi-judicial and
involves the determination of rights and obligations of the parties.
At the time the petition for annulment of deeds of sale and cancellation of
titles was filed on May 26, 2006, the administrative function of the DAR was
governed by Administrative Order No. 03, Series of 2003 which provides for
the 2003 Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.
Under said Rules of Procedure, the Regional Director19 has primary
jurisdiction over all ALI cases, while the DAR Secretary20 has appellate
jurisdiction over such cases. Section 2 of the said Rules provides:
Section 2. ALI Cases. These Rules shall govern all cases arising from or
involving:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2.1 Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the
agrarian reform program and the initial issuance of Certificate of Land
Ownership Awards (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs), including
protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of such coverage.
2.2 Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification or
disqualification of potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries;
2.3 Subdivision surveys of land under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP)
2.4 Recall, or cancellation of provisional release rentals, Certificates of Land
Transfers (CLTs), and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside
the purview of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 816, including the issuance,
recall or cancellation of Emancipation Patents (EPs) or Certificates of Land
Ownership Awards (CLOAs) not yet registered with the Register of Deeds;
2.5 Exercise of the right of retention by the landowner;
2.6 Application for exemption from coverage under Section 10 of RA 6657;
2.7 Application for exemption pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ)
Opinion No. 44 (1990)
2.8 Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for livestock,
swine, and poultry raising;
2.9 Cases of exemption/exclusion of fishpond and prawn farms from the
coverage of CARP pursuant to RA 7881;
2.10 Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for land subject to Voluntary Offer
to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) found unsuitable for
agricultural purposes;
2.11 Application for conversion of agricultural land to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non agricultural uses and purposes including
protests or oppositions thereto;
2.12 Determination of rights of agrarian reform beneficiaries to homelots;
2.13 Disposition of excess area of the tenant's/farmer-beneficiary's
landholdings;
2.14 Increase in area of tillage of a tenant/farmer-beneficiary;
2.15 Conflict of claims in landed estates administered by the DAR and its
predecessors; and
2.16 Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by
the Secretary of the DAR.
On the other hand, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, the DAR,
through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and its regional and provincial
adjudication boards, adopted the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure. Under
Section 2, Rule II of the said Rules of Procedure, the DARAB shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify, alter, or affirm
resolutions, orders, and decisions of its Adjudicators who have primary and
exclusive original jurisdiction over the following cases:
Rule II
Jurisdiction of the Board and its Adjudicators
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction. — The Adjudicator
shall have primary and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate the following cases:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1.1 The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical,
engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of all agricultural lands
covered by Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), and other related agrarian
laws;
1.2 The preliminary administrative determination of reasonable and just
compensation of lands acquired under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 and
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP);
1.3 The annulment or cancellation of lease contracts or deeds of sale or their
amendments involving lands under the administration and disposition of the
DAR or Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
1.4 Those cases involving the ejectment and dispossession of tenants and/or
leaseholders;
1.5 Those cases involving the sale, alienation, pre-emption, and redemption of
agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARL or other agrarian laws;
1.6 Those involving the correction, partition, cancellation, secondary and
subsequent issuances of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and
Emancipation-Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority;
1.7 Those cases involving the review of leasehold rentals;
1.8 Those cases involving the collection of amortizations on payments for
lands awarded under PD No. 27, as amended, RA No. 3844, as amended, and
RA No. 6657, as amended, and other related laws, decrees, orders,
instructions, rules, and regulations, as well as payment for residential,
commercial, and industrial lots within the settlement and resettlement areas
under the administration and disposition of the DAR;
1.9 Those cases involving the annulment or rescission of lease contracts and
deeds of sale, and the cancellation or amendment of titles pertaining to
agricultural lands under the administration and disposition of the DAR and
LBP; as well as EPs issued under PD 266, Homestead Patents, Free Patents,
and miscellaneous sales patents to settlers in settlement and' re-settlement
areas under the administration and disposition of the DAR;
1.10 Those cases involving boundary disputes over lands under the
administration and disposition of the DAR and the LBP, which arc
transferred, distributed, and/or sold to tenant-beneficiaries and are covered by
deeds of sale, patents, and certificates of title;
1.11 Those cases involving the determination of title to agricultural lands
where this issue is raised in an agrarian dispute by any of the parties or a third
person in connection with the possession thereof for the purpose of preserving
the tenure of the agricultural lessee or actual tenant-farmer or farmer-
beneficiaries and effecting the ouster of the interloper or intruder in one and
the same proceeding; and
1.12 Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section 12 of PD
No. 946 except those cases falling under the proper courts or other quasi-
judicial bodies;
1.13 Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by
the Secretary of the DAR.
Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure further states that
the Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters involving
the administrative implementation of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and other agrarian laws as
enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative orders, which shall be under
the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of
the DAR in accordance with his issuances.
Meanwhile, the Regional Trial .Courts (RTCs) have not been completely
divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters.21 Section 56 of RA 6657
confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are RTCs
designated by the Court — at least one (1) branch within each province — to
act as such. As Special Agrarian Courts (SACs), these RTCs have, according
to Section 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over "all-
petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners" and "the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . [the] Act."22
In order to determine in accordance with the foregoing provisions which
among the DARAB and the Office of the Secretary of DAR, and the SACs
has jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the petition for
annulment of the deeds of sale executed by Eduardo in favor of respondents
and the cancellation of the TCTs issued to them, it is necessary to examine the
following allegations therein and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective whether the petitioner is entitled thereto:23
4.1 The late Eduardo Reyes was the original registered owner of TCT
85055 and TCT 116506, an agricultural land situated at Brgy. Ambling,
Magdalena, Laguna, consisting of 195,366 sq. meters and 7,431 sq. meters,
respectively.
4.2 The land described under TCT 85055 was issued a notice of coverage
under the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) scheme pursuant to Section 7 of R.A.
6657. Subdivision plan over this property has been approved and the DAR is
now on the process of generating the Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) to the qualified recipient of the government's land reform program.
However, pending processing of the case folder, the DAR Municipal Office in
Magdalena received on September 8, 2005 a letter coming from Atty. Homer
Antazo, the alleged counsel of Igmidio Robles and Christina Robles informing
the MAR Office of the subsequent sale of the property in their favor attaching
documents in support of their claim. It was only then, after proper
verification with the Register of Deeds that the DAR found out that
indeed the properties under TCT-T-85055 and TCT T-116506 were all
conveyed and transferred in favor of the herein private respondents by
well intentioned deeds of absolute sale executed in 1997. xxx
Subsequently, by virtue of such deeds of sale the Registry of Deeds caused
the cancellation of TCT T-85055 and TCT 116506 and the issuance of
new titles in private respondents' favor without securing the necessary
clearance from the DAR as mandated under Administrative Order No. 1
series of 1989. xxx The said titles were issued arbitrarily and in clear
violation of Section 6 of R.A. 6657, hence null and void. xxx
4.3 Public respondent Registry of Deeds might [have] overlooked the
transaction entered into and misplaced knowledge on these big track of
landholdings when it proceeded with the registration of the deeds of sale and
the subsequent cancellation of TCT 85055 and TCT 116506.
4.4 The Registry of Deeds was probably not aware and mindful on the extent
of properties of Eduardo Reyes, that it exceeded more than the retention
limit but, thru machinations and crafty action exerted to by the parties to
accomplish an evil end, the immediate cancellation was brought to
completion.
4.5 Hence, because it was tainted with fraud and bad faith, said certificate of
titles cannot enjoy the presumption of having been issued by the register of
deeds in the regular performance of its official duty;
4.6 That, as a consequence of swift and speedy cancellation of TCT 85055
and TCT 116506 and the instantaneous issuance of titles, the DAR, because of
this intervening development cannot now continue with the generation of
CLOA, prompting the filing of the instant petition.
5. PRAYER

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of
this Honorable Adjudication Board that after due notice and hearing,
judgment be rendered annulling the Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by the
late Eduardo Reyes in favor of the herein private respondents and the
subsequent cancellation of the issued transfer certificate of titles.
Petitioner likewise pray for such other relief and remedies as this Honorable
Board may deem just and equitable under the premises.24
Although no tenancy or agrarian relationship between the parties can be
gleaned from the allegations of the petition in order to be considered an
agrarian dispute within the DARAB's jurisdiction, the Court notes that the
petition is anchored on the absence of a clearance for the sale and registration
of the subject agricultural lands in favor of respondents, as required by DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1989 (A.O. No. 01-89)25 or the Rules
and Procedures Governing Land Transaction. Clearly, such petition involves
the matter of implementation of agrarian laws which is, as a general rule,
within the primary jurisdiction of the DAR Regional Director.
It bears stressing that while the rule is that DARAB's jurisdiction is limited to
agrarian disputes where tenancy relationship between the parties exists,
Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 and Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 both plainly state
that the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters. It is also noteworthy that while Section
3(d)26 of R.A. No. 6657 defined the term "agrarian dispute," no specific
definition was given by the same law to the term "agrarian reform matters." In
view thereof, the Court cannot restrict the DARAB's quasi-judicial
jurisdiction only to those involving agrarian disputes where tenancy
relationship exists between the parties, for it should also include other
"agrarian reform matters" which do not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Office of the Secretary of DAR, the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as well as the Special
Agrarian Courts.
Although they are not deemed as "agrarian disputes" falling under the
DARAB's jurisdiction, "[s]uch other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or
concerns" referred to the Adjudicator by the Secretary of the DAR pursuant to
Section 1 (1.13), Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, are still
considered as "agrarian reform matters." A case in point is the DAR's petition
for annulment of deeds of sale and annulment of titles executed in violation of
the provision Section 6, par. 4 of RA 6657. Despite being an agrarian law
implementation case, the Secretary of the DAR expressly referred jurisdiction
over such petition to the Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB through
Memorandum Circular (M.C.) No. 02-0127 on the Guidelines on Annulment of
Deeds of Conveyance of Lands Covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) Executed in Violation of Section 6, Paragraph 4 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657. Section 4 of DAR M.C. No. 02-01 pertinently
provides:
b) The Chief, Legal Division, of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office, shall
have the following responsibilities:
1. Upon receipt of the MARO report, determine whether or not there was
illegal transfer of agricultural lands pursuant to Sec. 6, par. 4 of RA 6657;
2. If there was illegal transfer, file a petition for annulment of the deed of
conveyance in behalf of the PARO before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). The petition shall state the material facts
constituting the violation and pray for the issuance of an order from the
PARAD directing the ROD to cancel the deed of conveyance and the TCT
generated as a result thereof. As legal basis therefor, the petition shall cite
Section 50 of RA 6657 and Rule II, Section 1(c) and (e) of the [1994]
DARAB New Rules of Procedure;28ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Concededly, the properties subject of the petition for annulment of deeds of
sale and cancellation of titles cannot be considered as lands under the
administration of the DAR or LBP, i.e., those already acquired for CARP
purposes and distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.29 Hence, such
petition is outside the DARAB jurisdiction under Section 1 (1.9),30 Rule II of
the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
Nevertheless, it can be gathered from the allegations in the petition that the
subject properties Eduardo conveyed and transferred to respondents are
agricultural lands in excess of the 5-hectare (50,000 sq. m.) retention limit of
the CARL, and that the corresponding TCTs were later issued and registered
in their names without the necessary clearance under DAR A.O. No. 1, series
of 1989.
In Sarne v. Hon. Maquiling,31 the Court construed the phrase "agricultural
lands under the coverage of the CARP" under Section 1(e), 32 in relation to
Section 1 (c),33 Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, which are
similarly-worded as Sections 1 (1.3) and (1.5), Rule II of the 2003 DARAB
Rules of Procedure, thus:34
It is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB in this case is anchored on
Section 1, paragraph (e), Rule II of the [1994] DARAB New Rules of
Procedure covering agrarian disputes involving the sale, alienation, mortgage,
foreclosure, preemption and redemption of agricultural lands under the
coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws. There is nothing in the
provision from which it can be inferred that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is
limited only to agricultural lands under the administration and disposition of
DAR and LBP. We should not distinguish where the law does not
distinguish. The phrase "agricultural lands under the coverage of the
CARP" includes all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture,
as defined under Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657. It is worthy to note that in the
enumeration defining the DARAB's jurisdiction, it is only in paragraph (c),
that is, cases involving the annulment or cancellation of lease contracts or
deeds of sale or their amendments involving lands, that the phrase "involving
lands under the administration and disposition of the DAR or LBP" is used.
That the same proviso does not appear in paragraph (e), which is the basis of
respondents' cause of action, could only mean that it was never intended to be
so limited. xxx35ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Contrary to the view of the CA and the respondents, therefore, a notice of
coverage is not necessary in order for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a
case that involves the sale or alienation of agricultural lands "under the
coverage of the CARP" pursuant to Section 1 (1.5),36 Rule II of the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure, as such phrase includes all private lands devoted
to or suitable for agriculture, as defined under Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657:
CHAPTER II
Coverage.
Section 4. Scope. — The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1989 shall
cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public
and private agricultural lands, as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture.
More specifically the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or
suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until
Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public
domain.
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as
determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for
agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the
agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.
In light of the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of
the petition is conferred by law and determined by the material allegations
therein, and is not affected by the defenses or theories set up in the
respondent's answer or motion to dismiss, the Court finds that the DAR's
petition for annulment of deeds of sale and cancellation of titles falls under the
jurisdiction of the PARAD under Section 1 (1.5), Rule II of the 2003 DARAB
Rules of Procedure, as it contains sufficient allegations to the effect it involves
sales of agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARL.
To be sure, the Court does not undermine the significance of the notice of
coverage for purposes of acquisition of lands under the CARP. A letter
informing a landowner that his/her land is covered by CARP, and is subject to
acquisition and distribution to beneficiaries, and that he/she has rights under
the law, including the right to retain 5 hectares, the notice of coverage first
sprung from DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989,37 to fill in the gap under
Section 16 of the CARL on the identification process of lands subject to
compulsory acquisition. In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court
stressed the importance of such notice as a step designed to comply with the
requirements of administrative due process:
The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of
invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated.
They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative
due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's
police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL
prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived
of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a
taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the
title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights
provides that "if no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." The CARL was not intended to take away
property without due process of law. The exercise of the power of eminent
domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private
property.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Given that the notices of coverage were issued to the wrong persons, the heirs
of the former owner, Eduardo, instead of respondents who are the present
owners of the subject properties, the DAR can hardly be faulted for such
mistake. It bears emphasis that while Eduardo executed the corresponding
deeds of absolute sale in favor of respondents as early as April 17, 1997, it
was only on May 3, 2005 that said deeds were registered in the names of
respondents. Meantime, in view of the death of Eduardo on October 28, 2000,
the DAR had no choice but to send the Notices of Coverage dated September
8, 2004 and November 23, 2004 to his heirs, Julieta and Nenita, respectively.
While said deeds of sale are binding between the said heirs of Eduardo and
respondents, the DAR could not have been aware thereof for lack of
registration which is the operative act that binds or affects the land insofar as
third persons are concerned. Thus, the DAR cannot be blamed for erroneously
issuing such notices to the said heirs because it merely relied on available
public records at the Register of Deeds, showing that the original landowner
of the said properties is the late Eduardo.
For its part, despite the DAR's allegation that it only found out that the subject
properties were already conveyed and transferred in favor of respondents
when its Municipal Office in Magdalena, Laguna, received on September 8,
2005 a letter from the counsel of respondent Igmedio Robles and Christina
Robles; it should be deemed to have constructive notice of said deeds only
from the time of their registration on May 3, 2005. From the date of such
registration, the DAR should have also issued respondents notices of coverage
pursuant to DAR M.C. No. 18-04 (Clarificatory Guidelines on the Coverage,
Acquisition and Distribution of Agricultural Lands Subject of Conveyance
Executed in Violation of Sec. 6, Par. 4 of R.A. No. 6657) which modified
DAR M.C. No. 02-01,
3. Notwithstanding the pendency of the investigation and/or the petition for
annulment of deed of conveyance, the DAR shall issue a notice of coverage to
both old and new landowner/s in order for the LBP to proceed with the
valuation of the property. For this purpose, the DAR Provincial or Regional
Office and the Land Bank of the Philippines may execute an agreement for
purposes of issuing memorandum of valuation and certificate of deposit to be
held in trust for the rightful owner/s.
The Court, however, holds that the DAR cannot be taken to task for failing to
issue notices of coverage to respondents because the land areas of the subject
properties sold to them, respectively, are all within the 5-hectare (50,000 sq.
m.) retention limit. Respondents cannot, therefore, contend that a notice of
coverage is necessary in order for a land to be considered under the coverage
of the CARP for purposes of filing a petition under DAR M.C. No. 02-01 in
relation to violation of Section 6, paragraph 4 of RA 6651. To sustain
respondents' contention would subvert the objectives of the said provision to
prevent circumvention of the retention limits set by law on ownership of
agricultural lands after the effectivity of CARL on June 15, 1988, and to
prevent the landowner from evading CARP coverage. Hence, the Court cannot
uphold such contention, as it would ultimately defeat the purpose of the
agrarian reform program of achieving social justice through equitable
distribution of large landholdings to tenants or farmers tilling the same.
Furthermore, at the time of the sale of the subject properties on April 17,
1997, there were existing tenants thereon as shown by the Deeds of Surrender
of Tenancy Rights40 dated July 10, 1997 later executed in favor of the buyers,
respondents Igmidio and Cristina Robles. Then, in identically-worded
certifications dated August 29, 1997, the BARC Chairman and the Barangay
Chairman of Ambiling, Magdalena, Laguna, both stated that the property
covered by TCT No. 85055 with an area of 195,366 sq. m. is a coconut land
without any tenant and may be converted into an industrial, resort, low-cost
housing or residential subdivision.41 Without ruling on the validity of the
deeds of surrender of tenancy rights, the Court finds that the execution thereof
subsequent to that of the deeds of sale, alongside the certifications of the
BARC Chairman and Barangay Chairman, casts doubt on the validity of the
transfer and conveyance of the subject properties as a ploy to circumvent the
retention limits and. coverage under the CARP.
It is noteworthy that in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Paramount
Holdings Equities, Inc.,42 the Court had resolved in the negative the issue of
whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over a dispute that seeks the
nullification of the sale of agricultural lands because (1) the PARO's petition
failed to sufficiently allege any tenurial or agrarian relations and to indicate an
agrarian dispute, and (2) the said lands had not been the subject of any notice
of coverage under the CARP.
Despite the fact that the same jurisdictional issue is involved in this case, the
Court's ruling in Paramount is inapplicable because of the difference between
the material allegations in the PARO's petitions in both cases.
Given that the PARO's petition in this case likewise failed to allege any
tenancy or agrarian relations and to indicate an agrarian dispute, and its cause
of action is merely founded on the absence of a clearance to cover the sale and
registration of the subject lands, it bears emphasis that the D ARAB'S
jurisdiction is not limited to agrarian disputes where tenancy relationship
between the parties exists. Under Section 1 (1.13),43 Rule II of the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB also has jurisdiction over agrarian
reform matters referred to it by the Secretary of DAR, such as the PARO's
petition for annulment of deeds of sale and annulment of titles filed pursuant
to DAR A.O. No. 01-8944 and DAR M.C. No. 02-0145for violation of the legal
requirement for clearances in the sale and transfer of agricultural lands.
In contrast to Paramount where it is undisputed that the subject lands had not
been subject of any notice of coverage under the CARP, the PARO's petition
in this case alleged that one of the subject lands was issued a notice of
coverage.46 At any rate, the Court holds that such notice is unnecessary in
order for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case that involves the sale of
"agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP," arsuant to Section 1
(1.5),47 Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure. As held in Sarne v.
Maquiling,48 the said phrase includes all private lands devoted to or suitable
for agi iculture, as defined under Section 449 of RA No. 6657. In view of the
rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the petition is
determined by the allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
irrespective of whether the petitioner entitled to any or all such reliefs,50 the
Court finds that the PARO's petition for annulment of sale and cancellation of
titles falls under the jurisdiction of the DARAB, as it contains allegations to
the effect that it involves sales of agricultural lands under the coverage of the
CARL.
Significantly, unlike in this case where the transfer of the subject properties
appears to have been done to evade the retention limits and coverage under
CARP, the Court found the original petition inParamount dismissible on the
merits as the records clearly showed that the subject lands were already
classified as "industrial" long before the effectivity of the CARL.
The Court also overrules respondents' argument that the subject properties are
outside the coverage of CARP and registerable, since no annotation of any
disposition of the properties or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or
pursuant to P.D. No. 27, CARL or any other law or regulations on agrarian
reform was inscribed on Eduardo's titles and their derivative titles. Quite the
contrary, TCT Nos. T-85055 and T-116506 under the name of Eduardo
contain provisions stating that he is the owner thereof in fee simple, subject to
the encumbrances mentioned in Section 39 of Act No. 496, or the Land
Registration Act,51and Section 44 of P.D. 1529, or the Property Registration
Decree, respectively.
Section 39 of Act No. 496 and Section 44 of P.D. No. 1529 similarly provide
for statutory liens which subsist and bind the whole world, even without the
benefit of registration under the Torrens System:
Section 39. Every applicant receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a
decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who
takes a certificate of title for value in good faith, shall hold the same free of all
encumbrance except those noted on said certificate, and any of the following
encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or
Constitution of the United States or of the Philippine Islands which the
statutes of the Philippine Islands cannot require to appear of record in
the registry. x x x52
SEC. 44. Statutory liens affecting title. - Every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value
and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those
noted in said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be
subsisting, namely: x x x
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof
by virtue of, or pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law
or regulations on agrarian reform.53ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court is of the view that the provision on retention limits under Section 6
of RA 6657 constitutes as statutory liens on Eduardo's titles, which were
carried over to respondents' derivative titles, even if no such annotations were
inscribed on all of the said titles. In particular, such statutory liens pertain to
paragraph 4 of Section 6 of RA 6657 in relation to Section 73 of the same law,
which read:
Section 6. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no
person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a
viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure,
and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner
exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of
the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least
fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm: provided, that landowners whose lands have been covered
by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the areas originally
retained by them thereunder: provided, further; that original homestead
grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead
at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as
they continue to cultivate said homestead.
xxxx
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management,
contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original
landowner in violation of the Act shall be null and void: provided,
however, that those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when
registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after
the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) within thirty (30) days of any
transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.
Section 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. — The following are prohibited:
(a) The ownership or possession, for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Act, of agricultural lands in excess of the total retention
limits or award ceilings by any person, natural or juridical, except those
under collective ownership by farmer-beneficiaries.
xxxx
(e) The sale, transfer, conveyance or change of the nature of lands outside
of urban centers and city limits either in whole or in part after the
effectivity of this Act. The date of the registration of the deed of conveyance
in the Register of Deeds with respect to titled lands and the date of the
issuance of the tax declaration to the transferee of the property with respect to
unregistered lands, as the case may be. shall be conclusive for the purpose of
this Act.54ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As Eduardo's titles contain such statutory liens, respondents have imputed
knowledge that the transfer of the subject properties in excess of the
landowner's 5-hectare (50,000 sq. m.) retention limit under the CARL could
have been illegal as it appears to circumvent the coverage of CARP. Thus,
until the PARAD has decided with finality the DAR's petition for annulment
of deeds of sale and cancellation of titles for alleged violation of Section 6,
paragraph 4 of RA 6657, respondents cannot claim that they are innocent
purchasers for value and in good faith.
There is also no merit in respondents' contention that the TCTs issued in their
favor have become incontrovertible and indefeasible, and can no longer be
altered, canceled or modified or subject to any collateral attack after the
expiration of one (1) year from the date of entry of the decree of registration,
pursuant to Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529. In Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs
of Vicente Ermac,55 the Court clarified the foregoing principle in this wise:
While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of
registration becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether
deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The acceptability of the
Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against
the real owners.
Furthermore, ownership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a
piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is
merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described
therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in
the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the
registered owner.56ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr.,57 the Court noted that what cannot be collaterally
attacked is the certificate of title, and not the title itself:
x x x The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of
Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means
ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document, xxx
Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of
title as evidence of such ownership although both, are interchangeably used.
In this case, what is being assailed in the DAR's petition for annulment of
deeds of sale and cancellation of titles is the legality of the transfer of title
over the subject properties in favor of respondents, and not their
corresponding TCTs, due to the absence of DAR clearance and for possible
violation of Section 6, paragraph 4 of R.A. No. 6657.
All told, the CA erred in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the DAR's petition
for annulment of deeds of sale and cancellation of titles before the PARAD,
and in holding that it is the regular courts that should determine if indeed there
were violations of the agrarian laws which would justify the grant of such
petition. As can be determined from the allegations of the petition, the
DARAB has jurisdiction over such case which involves agrarian reform
matters under Section 1 (1.5)58 and (1.13),59 Rule II of the 2003 DARAB
Rules of Procedure
ALMERO v PACQUING (GR 199008)
Section 10 of R.A. 6657, as amended,18 expressly provides for the lands
exempted or excluded from the CARP, namely:
(a) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest
reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and
mangroves shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act
(b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and
fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided, that said
prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate of Land
Ownership (CLOA) issued under the Agrarian Reform Program; and
xxxx
(c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farms
stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds
and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and
covenants appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant
thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal
farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and
quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over,
except those already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of this
Act.
The subject land, being agricultural in nature, is clearly not exempt from
CARP coverage.
But Linda argues that the subject land is exempt from CARP primarily
because it was acquired by her father viaa homestead patent. She claims that
the rights of homestead grantees have been held superior to those of agrarian
reform tenants and, thus, her right to the subject land must be upheld. The OP,
agreeing with the respondent, stated that:
"There can be no question that, weighed against each other, the rights of a
homesteader prevail over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by agrarian
reform laws.
As early as the case of Patricio v. Bayug, it has been held that the more
paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the right of the
homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land acquired
from the State without being encumbered by tenancy relations.
Just right after the promulgation of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the doctrine enunciated
in Patricio was applied in Alita v. Court of Appeals where it was held
thatPresidential DecreeNo. 27 cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of
the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. It was
further pointedout that even the Philippine Constitution respects the
superiority of the homesteaders’ rights over the rights of the tenants
guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute."19(Citations omitted.)
The right of homestead grantees to retain or keep their homestead is, however,
not absolutely guaranteed by law.1âwphi1Section 6 of R.A 6657 provides
that:
"Section 6. Retention Limits.— Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no
person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a
viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure,
and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner
exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of
the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least
fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm: provided, that landowners whose lands have been covered
by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the areas originally
retained by them thereunder: provided, further, that original homestead
grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead
at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as
they continue to cultivate said homestead. (Emphasis ours)
Thus, in order for the homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs to
retain or keep their homestead, the following conditions must first be satisfied:
(a) they must still be the owners of the original homestead at the time of the
CARL's effectivity, and (b) they must continue to cultivate the homestead
land.
In this case, Linda, as the direct compulsory heir of the original homestead
grantee, is no longer cultivating the subject homestead land. The OP
misinterpreted our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche20 when it held that Linda's mere
expression of her desire to continue or to start anew with the cultivation of the
land would suffice to exempt the subject homestead land from the CARL. On
the contrary, we specifically held in Paris v. Alfeche that:
"Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own
and retain the original homestead, only for "as long as they continue to
cultivate" them. That parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will
not automatically exempt them from the operation of land reform. It is the fact
of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory
heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage."
DAR v CARRIEDO (GR 176549)
Carriedo did not waive his right of retention over the land.1âwphi1
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes landowner retention rights under
Article XIII, Section 4, to wit:
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to
own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right
of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
land-sharing. (Emphasis supplied.)
RA No. 6657 implements this directive, thus:
Section 6. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no
person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a
viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure,
and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner
exceed five (5) hectares.
xxx
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or
contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner: Provided, however, That in case
the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall
have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the
same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case
the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a
leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case
the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his
right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must
exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the
landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention. In all cases, the
security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the land prior to the
approval of this Act shall be respected. xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
In Danan v. Court of Appeals,65 we explained the rationale for the grant of the
right of retention under agrarian reform laws such as RA No. 6657 and its
predecessor PD No. 27, to wit:
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to
qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory
land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and
by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an
injustice against the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land
which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus
sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it
to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process. For as long
as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and does not exceed the
retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner's choice of the area to be
retained must prevail. xxx66
To interpret Section 6 of RA No. 6657, DAR issued Administrative Order No.
02, Series of 2003 (DAR AO 02-03). Section 6 of DAR AO 02-03 provides
for the instances when a landowner is deemed to have waived his right of
retention, to wit:
Section 6. Waiver of the Right of Retention. – The landowner waives his right
to retain by committing any of the following act or omission:
6.1 Failure to manifest an intention to exercise his right to retain within sixty
(60) calendar days from receipt of notice of CARP coverage.
6.2 Failure to state such intention upon offer to sell or application under the
[Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT)]/[Direct Payment Scheme (DPS)] scheme.
6.3 Execution of any document stating that he expressly waives his right to
retain. The MARO and/or PARO and/or Regional Director shall attest to the
due execution of such document.
6.4 Execution of a Landowner Tenant Production Agreement and Farmer’s
Undertaking (LTPA-FU) or Application to Purchase and Farmer’s
Undertaking (APFU) covering subject property.
6.5 Entering into a VLT/DPS or [Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)] but failing to
manifest an intention to exercise his right to retain upon filing of the
application for VLT/DPS or VOS.
6.6 Execution and submission of any document indicating that he is
consenting to the CARP coverage of his entire landholding.
6.7 Performing any act constituting estoppel by laches which is the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable length of time to do that which he may have done
earlier by exercising due diligence, warranting a presumption that he
abandoned his right or declined to assert it.
Petitioners cannot rely on the RD’s Order dated October 2, 2002 which
granted Mendoza’s petition for coverage on the ground that Carriedo violated
paragraph 4 Section 667 of RA No. 6657 for disposing of his agricultural land,
consequently losing his right of retention. At the time when the Order was
rendered, up to the time when it was affirmed by the DAR-CO in its Order
dated February 22, 2005, the applicable law is Section 6 of DAR 02-03.
Section 6 clearly shows that the disposition of agricultural land is not an act
constituting waiver of the right of retention.
Thus, as correctly held by the CA, Carriedo "[n]ever committed any of the
acts or omissions above-stated (DAR AO 02-03). Not even the sale made by
the herein petitioner in favor of PLFI can be considered as a waiver of his
right of retention. Likewise, the Records of the present case is bereft of any
showing that the herein petitioner expressly waived (in writing) his right of
retention as required under sub-section 6.3, section 6, DAR Administrative
Order No. 02-S.2003."68
Petitioners claim that Carriedo’s alleged failure to exercise his right of
retention after a long period of time constituted a waiver of his retention
rights, as envisioned in Item 6.7 of DAR AO 02-03.
We disagree.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could
or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.69 Where a party sleeps
on his rights and allows laches to set in, the same is fatal to his case.70
Section 4 of DAR AO 02-03 provides:
Section 4. Period to Exercise Right of Retention under RA 6657
4.1 The landowner may exercise his right of retention at any time before
receipt of notice of coverage.
4.2 Under the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) scheme, the landowner shall
exercise his right of retention within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice of
coverage.
4.3 Under the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and the Voluntary Land Transfer
(VLT)/Direct Payment Scheme (DPS), the landowner shall exercise his right
of retention simultaneously at the time of offer for sale or transfer.
The foregoing rules give Carriedo any time before receipt of the notice of
coverage to exercise his right of retention, or if under compulsory acquisition
(as in this case), within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of coverage.
The validity of the notice of coverage is the very subject of the controversy
before this court. Thus, the period within which Carriedo should exercise his
right of retention cannot commence until final resolution of this case.
Even assuming that the period within which Carriedo could exercise his right
of retention has commenced, Carriedo cannot be said to have neglected to
assert his right of retention over the land. The records show that per Legal
Report dated December 13, 199971 prepared by Legal Officer Ariel Reyes,
Carriedo filed an application for retention which was even contested by Pablo
Mendoza’s son, Fernando.72 Though Carriedo subsequently withdrew his
application, his act of filing an application for retention belies the allegation
that he abandoned his right of retention or declined to assert it.
In their Memorandum73 however, petitioners, for the first time,
invoke estoppel, citing DAR Administrative Order No. 05 Series of
200674 (DAR AO 05-06) to support their argument that Carriedo waived his
right of retention.75 DAR AO 05-06 provides for the rules and regulations
governing the acquisition and distribution of agricultural lands subject of
conveyances under Sections 6, 7076 and 73 (a)77 of RA No. 6657. Petitioners
particularly cite Item no. 4 of the Statement of Policies of DAR AO 05-06, to
wit:
II. Statement of Policies
4. Where the transfer/sale involves more than the five (5) hectares retention
area, the transfer is considered violative of Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657.
In case of multiple or series of transfers/sales, the first five (5) hectares
sold/conveyed without DAR clearance and the corresponding titles issued by
the Register of Deeds (ROD) in the name of the transferee shall, under the
principle of estoppel, be considered valid and shall be treated as the
transferor/s’ retained area but in no case shall the transferee exceed the
five-hectare landholding ceiling pursuant to Sections 6, 70 and 73(a) of R.A.
No. 6657. Insofar as the excess area is concerned, the same shall likewise be
covered considering that the transferor has no right of disposition since CARP
coverage has been vested as of 15 June 1988. Any landholding still registered
in the name of the landowner after earlier dispositions totaling an aggregate of
five (5) hectares can no longer be part of his retention area and therefore shall
be covered under CARP. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing this provision, petitioners argue that Carriedo lost his right of retention
over the land because he had already sold or disposed, after the effectivity of
RA No. 6657, more than fifty (50) hectares of land in favor of another. 78
In his Memorandum,79 Carriedo maintains that petitioners cannot invoke any
administrative regulation to defeat his right of retention. He argues that
"administrative regulation must be in harmony with the provisions of law
otherwise the latter prevails."80
We cannot sustain petitioners' argument. Their reliance on DAR AO 05-06 is
misplaced. As will be seen below, nowhere in the relevant provisions of RA
No. 6657 does it indicate that a multiple or series of transfers/sales of land
would result in the loss of retention rights. Neither do they provide that the
multiple or series of transfers or sales amounts to the waiver of such right.
The relevant portion of Section 6 of RA No. 6657 referred to in Item no. 4 of
DAR AO 05-06 provides:
Section 6. Retention Limits. – Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no
person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a
viable family-size farm, such as the commodity produced, terrain,
infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by
the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. xxx
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management,
contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the
original landowner in violation of the Act shall be null and void: Provided,
however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when
registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after
the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) within thirty (30) days of any
transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 70 of RA No. 6657, also referred to in Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06
partly provides:
The sale or disposition of agricultural lands retained by a landowner as a
consequence of Section 6 hereof shall be valid as long as the total
landholdings that shall be owned by the transferee thereof inclusive of the
land to be acquired shall not exceed the landholding ceilings provided for in
this Act. Any sale or disposition of agricultural lands after the effectivity
of this Act found to be contrary to the provisions hereof shall be null and
void. xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, Section 73 (a) of RA No. 6657 as referred to in Item No. 4 of DAR
AO 05-06 provides,
Section 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. – The following are prohibited:
(a) The ownership or possession, for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Act, of agricultural lands in excess of the total retention
limits or award ceilings by any person, natural or juridical, except those under
collective ownership by farmer-beneficiaries; xxx
Sections 6 and 70 are clear in stating that any sale and disposition of
agricultural lands in violation of the RA No. 6657 shall be null and void.
Under the facts of this case, the reasonable reading of these three provisions in
relation to the constitutional right of retention should be that the consequence
of nullity pertains to the area/s which were sold, or owned by the transferee, in
excess of the 5-hectare land ceiling. Thus, the CA was correct in declaring
that the land is Carriedo’s retained area.81
Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 attempts to defeat the above reading by
providing that, under the principle of estoppel, the sale of the first five
hectares is valid. But, it hastens to add that the first five hectares sold
corresponds to the transferor/s’ retained area. Thus, since the sale of the first
five hectares is valid, therefore, the landowner loses the five hectares because
it happens to be, at the same time, the retained area limit. In reality, Item No.
4 of DAR AO 05-06 operates as a forfeiture provision in the guise
of estoppel. It punishes the landowner who sells in excess of five hectares.
Forfeitures, however, partake of a criminal penalty.82
In Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc.,83 this Court said
that for an administrative regulation to have the force of a penal law, (1) the
violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be
provided by the statute itself.84
Sections 6, 70 and 73 (a) of RA No. 6657 clearly do not provide that a sale or
disposition of land in excess of 5 hectares results in a forfeiture of the five
hectare retention area. Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 imposes a penalty where
none was provided by law.
As this Court also held in People v. Maceren,85 to wit:
The reason is that the Fisheries law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing.
As electro fishing is not banned under the law, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Order
Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision
to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. 86
The repugnancy between the law and Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 is
apparent by a simple comparison of their texts. The conflict undermines the
statutorily-guaranteed right of the landowner to choose the land he shall
retain, and DAR AO 05-06, in effect, amends RA No. 6657.
In Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles (RMBSA) v.
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF),87 this Court was confronted with
the issue of the validity of the amendments to the rules and regulations
implementing PD No. 1752.88 In that case, PD No. 1752 (as amended by RA
No. 7742) exempted RMBSA from the Pag-Ibig Fund coverage for the period
January 1 to December 31, 1995. In September 1995, however, the HDMF
Board of Trustees issued a board resolution amending and modifying the rules
and regulations implementing RA No. 7742. As amended, the rules now
required that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of fund
coverage, it must have a plan providing for both
provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided in the
Pag-Ibig Fund. In ruling against the amendment and modification of the rules,
this Court held that—
In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in
Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both
provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to
qualify for exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of
P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption
through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such
amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are
not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the
law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override,
supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they
intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law. 89 (Citations
omitted; underscoring supplied.)
Laws, as well as the issuances promulgated to implement them, enjoy the
presumption of validity.90 However, administrative regulations that alter or
amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void, and courts not only
may, but it is their obligation to strike down such regulations. 91 Thus, in this
case, because Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 is patently null and void, the
presumption of validity cannot be accorded to it. The invalidity of this
provision constrains us to strike it down for being ultra vires.
In Conte v. Commission on Audit,92 the sole issue of whether the Commission
on Audit (COA) acted in grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed in audit
therein petitioners' claim of financial assistance under Social Security System
(SSS) Resolution No. 56 was presented before this Court. The COA
disallowed the claims because the financial assistance under the challenged
resolution is similar to a separate retirement plan which results in the increase
of benefits beyond what is allowed under existing laws. This Court, sitting en
banc, upheld the findings of the COA, and invalidated SSS Resolution No. 56
for being ultra vires, to wit:
xxx Said Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the
creation of any insurance or retirement plan — other than the GSIS — for
government officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue and
[iniquitous] proliferation of such plans. It is beyond cavil that Res. 56
contravenes the said provision of law and is therefore invalid, void and of no
effect. xxx
We are not unmindful of the laudable purposes for promulgating Res. 56, and
the positive results it must have had xxx. But it is simply beyond dispute that
the SSS had no authority to maintain and implement such retirement plan,
particularly in the face of the statutory prohibition. The SSS cannot, in the
guise of rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse, render them nugatory.
It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative
order, the former must prevail. A rule or regulation must conform to and be
consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or
regulation to be valid. The rule-making power of a public administrative body
is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the
authority given it by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power
beyond the scope intended. xxx Though well-settled is the rule that retirement
laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree, nevertheless, there is
really nothing to interpret in either RA 4968 or Res. 56, and
correspondingly, the absence of any doubt as to the ultra-vires nature and
illegality of the disputed resolution constrains us to rule against
petitioners.93 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law
for administrative regulations cannot extend the law or amend a legislative
enactment.94 Administrative issuances must not override, but must remain
consistent with the law they seek to apply and implement. They are intended
to carry out, not to supplant or modify the law.95 Administrative or executive
acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution.96 Administrative regulations issued by a
Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law. 97 As he
exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a
requisite that he should not transcend the bounds demarcated by the statute for
the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising
legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking
body.98
If the implementing rules and regulations are issued in excess of the rule-
making authority of the administrative agency, they are without binding effect
upon the courts. At best, the same may be treated as administrative
interpretations of the law and as such, they may be set aside by the Supreme
Court in the final determination of what the law means. 99
While this Court is mindful of the DAR’s commitment to the implementation
of agrarian reform, it must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be
permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. 100 Neither the high
dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable
substitute; otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth.101
As a necessary consequence of the invalidity of Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06
for being ultra vires, we hold that Carriedo did not waive his right to retain the
land, nor can he be considered to be in estoppel.
Finally, petitioners cannot argue that the CLOAs allegedly granted in favor of
his co-petitioners Corazon and Orlando cannot be set aside. They claim that
CLOAs under RA No. 6657 are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration
which makes them indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration
proceedings.102 Even as these allegedly issued CLOAs are not in the records,
we hold that CLOAs are not equivalent to a Torrens certificate of title, and
thus are not indefeasible.
CLOAs and EPs are similar in nature to a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT)
in ordinary land registration proceedings. CLTs, and in turn the CLOAs and
EPs, are issued merely as preparatory steps for the eventual issuance of a
certificate of title. They do not possess the indefeasibility of certificates of
title. Justice Oswald D. Agcaoili, in Property Registration Decree and Related
Laws (Land Titles and Deeds),103 notes, to wit:
Under PD No. 27, beneficiaries arc issued certificates of land transfers (ClTs)
to entitle them to possess lands. Thereafter, they are issued emancipation
patents (EPs) after compliance with all necessary conditions. Such EPs, upon
their presentation to the Register of Deeds, shall be the basis for the issuance
of the corresponding transfer certificates of title (TCTs) in favor of the
corresponding beneficiaries.
Under RA No. 6657, the procedure has been simplified. Only certificates of
land ownership award (CLOAs) are issued, in lieu of EPs, after compliance
with all prerequisites. Upon presentation of the CLOAs to the Register of
Deeds, TCTs are issued to the designated beneficiaries. CLTs are no longer
issued.
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the
landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under AO No. 2, series of
1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to
be part of the landowner's retained area.
SANCHEZ v MARIN (GR 171346)
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by Republic Act No. 7881,
explicitly provides:
SEC. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.
x x x x.
b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms
and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided,
That said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to agrarian reform
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell, or
commercial farms deferment or notices of compulsory acquisition, a simple
and absolute majority of the actual regular workers or tenants must consent to
the exemption within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act. When the
workers or tenants do not agree to this exemption, the fishponds or prawn
farms shall be distributed collectively to the workers-beneficiaries or tenants
who shall form a cooperative or association to manage the same
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the consent of the farm workers shall
no longer be necessary; however, the provision of Section 32-A hereof on
incentives shall apply. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the afore-quoted provision, it is crystal clear that fishponds are
excluded/exempted from the coverage of the CARL. This Court affirmed such
exemption/exclusion in Atlas Fertilizer Corp. v. Secretary, Department of
Agrarian Reform.[21] In view of the foregoing, it is beyond doubt that the
subject fishpond is indeed now exempted/excluded from the coverage of the
CARL. Thus, the contention of the petitioner that the subject fishpond cannot
be exempted/excluded from CARL coverage because respondents failed to
prove that the fishpond has not yet been distributed and a CLOA has been
issued to the beneficiary of the agrarian reform, as required by Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by Republic Act No. 7881, is now
unavailing. Moreover, this Court notes that the DARAB already made a
finding in its Decision that no CLOA had been issued to the petitioner as a
beneficiary of the fishpond. Neither was the fishpond voluntarily offered for
sale to the petitioner. Section 54 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended,
expressly states that the findings of fact of the DARAB shall be final and
conclusive if based on substantial evidence. Since the issue as to whether a
CLOA has been issued to the petitioner is a question of fact, and being
convinced that the findings of the DARAB on such issue was not based on
mere surmises or conjectures, this Court upholds the same. Similarly, in this
case, the character of the land was never put in issue as it has long been settled
that the 10-hectare lot was indeed used actually, directly and exclusively as
fishponds. Hence, it is not necessary for the respondents to file an application
for the exemption of the subject fishpond from the coverage of the CARL,
contrary to the claim of the petitioner.
Even as we recognize that the fishpond is not covered by the CARL, pursuant
to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by Republic Act No.
7881, this Court, nonetheless, does not agree in the conclusion arrived at by
the Court of Appeals that since the subject fishpond is no longer an
agricultural land, it follows then that there can be no tenurial arrangement
affecting the parties in this case. And in view of the fact that there is no
agrarian dispute cognizable by the DARAB, then the DARAB had no
jurisdiction to resolve petitioners case.
It bears emphasis that the status of the petitioner as a tenant in the subject
fishpond and his right to security of tenure were already previously settled in
the Decision dated 20 July 1987 of the RTC of Lucena City in Agrarian Case
No. 86-8, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision
dated 11 September 1989. Having been declared as a tenant with the right to
security of tenure as provided in Section 35[22] of Republic Act No. 3844 in
relation to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1199, the law enforced at the time of
the filing of the Complaint before the RTC of Lucena City, the petitioner has
acquired a vested right over the subject fishpond, which right or interest has
become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy.[23] Therefore, even if fishponds, like the subject matter of this
case, were later excluded/exempted from the coverage of the CARL as
expressly provided in Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7881, and despite the fact that no CLOA has been issued to
the petitioner, the same cannot defeat the aforesaid vested right already
granted and acquired by the petitioner long before the passage of Republic Act
No. 7881. And being in the nature of a substantive law, the amendments
introduced by Republic Act No. 7881 to Republic Act No. 6657 in the year
1995 cannot be given a retroactive application as to deprive the petitioner of
his rights under the previous agrarian legislation.[24]
Verily, DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1995, expressly respects
and acknowledges the tenancy relationship that existed between the parties
prior to the amendments made to Republic Act No. 6657 by Republic Act No.
7881, that is, before fishponds and prawn farms were exempted/excluded from
the coverage of the CARL.The aforesaid DAR Administrative Order provides:
II. POLICY STATEMENT
D. Acts of harassment by landowners intended to eject or remove
the workers or tenants or the loss of their rights, benefits and privileges to
which they are entitled shall be sanctioned and dealt with under existing laws,
rules and regulations.
E. Fishpond or prawn farmworkers affected by
exemption/exclusion have the option to remain as workers or become
beneficiaries in other agricultural lands.
A worker who chooses to remain in the exempted area shall remain
therin and shall be entitled to such rights, benefits and privileges granted
to farmworkers under existing laws, decrees, and executive
orders. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indubitably, despite the amendments to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657,
the petitioners right to tenancy and security of tenure over the subject fishpond
must still be honored.
This Court likewise affirms that the DARAB correctly assumed jurisdiction
over the case, contrary to the declaration made by the appellate court in its
Decision. Notably, the present case was instituted as early as 1991 when the
petitioner filed a Petition before the PARAD for the fixing of his lease rental
on the subject fishpond. Respondents subsequently filed a countercharge
against the petitioner for the accounting, collection of sums of money, and
dispossession. At such point, the law applicable was Republic Act No. 6657,
wherein fishponds and prawn farms were not yet exempted/excluded from the
CARL coverage. Evidently, there was an agrarian dispute existing between
the petitioner and the respondents, cognizable by the PARAD at the time it
rendered its Decision on 2 March 1993 in favor of the petitioner. On 20
February 1995, however, Republic Act No. 7881 came into being which
expressly exempted/excluded fishponds and prawn farms from the coverage
of the CARL. In effect, cases involving fishponds and prawn farms are no
longer considered agrarian disputes as to make the case fall within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB or its Adjudicators. Nevertheless, considering
that prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 7881, this case was
already pending appeal before the DARAB, the aforesaid amendments then
cannot be made to apply as to divest the DARAB of its jurisdiction over the
case. It is well-settled that once jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it remains
with it until the full termination of the case
CONCHA v RUBIO (GR 162446)
In Lercana v. Jalandoni,[21] this Court was categorical in ruling that the
identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving
strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter exclusively
cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and
beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.[22]
In addition, in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,[23] this
Court had an occasion to discuss the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary in the
selection of farmer-beneficiaries, to wit:
x x x Suffice it to say that under Section 15 of R.A. No. 6657, the
identification of beneficiaries is a matter involving strictly the
administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter which is
exclusively vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, through its
authorized offices. Section 15 reads:
SECTION 15. Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in coordination with
the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act,
shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farm workers who are
qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP. These potential beneficiaries with
the assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall provide the following data:
(a) names and members of their immediate farm household;
(b) owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of
tenurial relationship;
(c) location and area of the land they work;
(d) crops planted; and
(e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.
A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the
barangay shall be posted in the barangay hall, school or other public buildings
in the barangay where it shall be open to inspection by the public at all
reasonable hours.
Meanwhile, Administrative Order No. 10 (Rules and Procedures Governing
the Registration of Beneficiaries), Series of 1989, provides:
SUBJECT: I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988, the DAR, in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC), as organized pursuant to RA 6657, shall register all
agricultural lessees, tenants and farm workers who are qualified beneficiaries
of the CARP. This Administrative Order provides the Implementing Rules
and Procedures for the said registration.
B. Specific
1. Identify the actual and potential farmer-beneficiaries of the CARP.[24]
Even a perusal of the DARAB Revised Rules shows that matters strictly
involving the administrative implementation of the CARP and other agrarian
laws and regulations, are the exclusive prerogative of, and cognizable by, the
Secretary of the DAR.
LAND BANK v HONEYCOMB (GR 169903)
As a final point, we have not failed to notice that the LBP in this case made
use of trust accounts to pay Honeycomb Farms. In Land Bank of the Phil. v.
CA,[29] this Court struck down as void DAR Administrative Circular No. 9,
Series of 1990, providing for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of the
deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in Section 16(e) of RA 6657. We
said:
It is very explicit x x x [from Section 16(e)] that the deposit must be made
only in cash or in LBP bonds. Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred
that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to
include a trust account among the valid modes of deposit, that should have
been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from
which it can be fairly deduced that a trust account is allowed. In sum, there is
no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded
construction of the term deposit.
xxxx
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to
enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9.
There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the
landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed,
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only
in cash or in LBP bonds. In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA
Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot
outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not
commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being
null and void.[30]
As a result, the DAR issued AO No. 2, Series of 1996, converting trust
accounts into deposit accounts. The pertinent portion of the AO provides:
VI. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
All previously established Trust Deposits which served as the basis for the
transfer of the landowners title to the Republic of the Philippines shall
likewise be converted to deposits in cash and in bonds. The Bureau of Land
Acquisition and Distribution shall coordinate with the LBP for this purpose.
Recognizing that the belated conversion of the trust account into a deposit
account failed to address the injustice caused to the landowner by the delay in
its receipt of the just compensation due, we held in Wycoco that:
In light of the foregoing, the trust account opened by LBP in the name of
Wycoco as the mode of payment of just compensation should be converted to
a deposit account. Such conversion should be retroactive in application in
order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a trust
account and to grant the landowners the benefits concomitant to payment
in cash or LBP bonds prior to the ruling of the Court in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals. Otherwise, petitioners right to payment of
just and valid compensation for the expropriation of his property would be
violated. The interest earnings accruing on the deposit account of landowners
would suffice to compensate them pending payment of just compensation.
In some expropriation cases, the Court imposed an interest of 12% per annum
on the just compensation due the landowner. It must be stressed, however, that
in these cases, the imposition of interest was in the nature of damages for
delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the
government one of forbearance. It follows that the interest in the form of
damages cannot be applied where there was prompt and valid payment of just
compensation. Conversely, where there was delay in tendering a valid
payment of just compensation, imposition of interest is in order. This is
because the replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did
not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination
of this compensation was marred by lack of due process.
Accordingly, the just compensation due Wycoco should bear 12% interest
per annum from the time LBP opened a trust account in his name up to
the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP bonds
deposit accounts. The basis of the 12% interest would be the just
compensation that would be determined by the Special Agrarian
Court upon remand of the instant case. In the same vein, the amount
determined by the Special Agrarian Court would also be the basis of the
interest income on the cash and bond deposits due Wycoco from the time of
the taking of the property up to the time of actual payment of just
compensation.[31] (emphases ours)
In line with this ruling, the LBP is instructed to immediately convert the trust
account opened in the name of Honeycomb Farms to a deposit account.
Furthermore, the just compensation due Honeycomb Farms, as determined by
the RTC, should bear 12% interest per annum from the time LBP opened the
trust account in its name until the account is converted into cash and LBP
bonds deposit accounts.
DELESTE v LBP(GR169913)
Effect of non-compliance with the requirements
under Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
In filing a petition for review as an appeal from awards, judgments, final
orders, or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions, it is required under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
that it be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the award, judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from, with
certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to in the
petition and other supporting papers. As stated:
Sec. 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) state the full
names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies
either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the
facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from,
together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record
referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of
section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing
that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (Emphasis supplied.)
Non-compliance with any of the above-mentioned requirements concerning
the contents of the petition, as well as the documents that should accompany
the petition, shall be sufficient ground for its dismissal as stated in Sec. 7,
Rule 43 of the Rules:
Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the
payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of
service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should
accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, the CA dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471
for petitioners failure to attach the writ of execution, the order nullifying the
writ of execution, and such material portions of the record referred to in the
petition and other supporting papers.[32]
A perusal of the issues raised before the CA would, however, show that the
foregoing documents required by the appellate court are not necessary for the
proper disposition of the case. Specifically:
Is [Lot No. 1407] within the ambit of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program]?
Can the OLT by DAR over the subject land validly proceed without notice to
the landowner?
Can the OLT be validly completed without a certification of deposit by Land
Bank?
[I]s the landowner barred from exercising his right of retention x x x
[considering that EPs were already issued on the basis of CLTs]?
Are the EPs over the subject land x x x valid x x x?[33]
Petitioners complied with the requirement under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court when they appended to the petition filed before the CA
certified true copies of the following documents: (1) the challenged resolution
dated July 8, 2004 issued by the DARAB denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration; (2) the duplicate original copy of petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration dated April 6, 2005; (3) the assailed decision dated March 15,
2004 issued by the DARAB reversing on appeal the decision of the PARAD
and nullifying with finality the order of execution pending appeal; (4) the
Order dated December 8, 2003 issued by the PARAD reinstating the writ of
execution earlier issued; and (5) the Decision dated July 21, 2003 issued by
the PARAD in the original proceedings for the cancellation of the EPs.[34] The
CA, therefore, erred when it dismissed the petition based on such technical
ground.
Even assuming that the omitted documents were material to the appeal, the
appellate court, instead of dismissing outright the petition, could have just
required petitioners to submit the necessary documents. In Spouses Espejo v.
Ito,[35] the Court held that under Section 3 (d), Rule 3 of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals,[36] the Court of Appeals is with authority to
require the parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary to
promote the interests of substantial justice.
Moreover, petitioners subsequent submission of the documents required by
the CA with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance
with Section 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.[37] In Jaro v. CA, this Court
held that subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of
the rules of procedure. Particularly:
The amended petition no longer contained the fatal defects that the original
petition had but the Court of Appeals still saw it fit to dismiss the amended
petition. The Court of Appeals reasoned that non-compliance in the original
petition is admittedly attributable to the petitioner and that no highly
justifiable and compelling reason has been advanced to the court for it to
depart from the mandatory requirements of Administrative Circular No. 3-96.
The hard stance taken by the Court of Appeals in this case is unjustified under
the circumstances.
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial
compliance of an appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of
procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, we ruled that the subsequent submission of the
missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to
substantial compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the petitioners in
these two cases to comply with the required attachments were no longer
scrutinized. What we found noteworthy in each case was the fact that the
petitioners therein substantially complied with the formal requirements. We
ordered the remand of the petitions in these cases to the Court of Appeals,
stressing the ruling that by precipitately dismissing the petitions the appellate
court clearly put a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just
resolution of the case.[38] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of
technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice.[39]As held in Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo:[40]
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. If the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
to promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules or
except a particular case from their operation. Law and jurisprudence
grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the procedural
rules, even the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to
reconcile the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties right to
an opportunity to be heard.
Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive:
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations
that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the
circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the
appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to
undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare
cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always
existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our
judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance
between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that
every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition
of his cause. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, the dismissal of the petition by the CA on mere technicality is

unwarranted in the instant case.