versus
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 is the Decision2 dated December 4, 2015 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06127, which affirmed the Decision3 dated
October 1, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 (RTC) in
Criminal Case No. 11427 finding accused-appellant Nestor Ano y Del Remedios (Ano)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165,4 otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.”
The Facts
This case stemmed from an Information5 filed before the RTC, charging Ano with
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of August 2009 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province
of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to poseur buyer, P02 Ruel T. Ayad,
0.03 gram of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet which substance was found positive to the tests for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, also known as “shabu”, a dangerous drug, in consideration of the
amount of Php.200.00, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
The prosecution alleged that at around five (5) o’clock in the afternoon of August 3,
2005 and after receiving information about Ano’s drug activities at Daangbakal,
Guitnangbayan II, Police Officer (PO) 2 Ruel T. Ayad (PO2 Ayad), PO1 Aldwin Ortilla
(PO1 Ortilla), and PO1 Jenesis A. Acuin7 (PO1 Acuin) formed a buy-bust team
designating P02 Ayad as the poseur-buyer, with PO1 Ortilla and PO1 Acuin as back-
ups, and marked two (2) P1 00.00 bills to be used in the operation.8 Thereafter, the
team headed to the house of Ano where P02 Ayad knocked on the door and upon
seeing Ano, whispered that he “wants to score” worth P200.00. Ano replied that he has
drugs with him and gave P02 Ayad a transparent plastic sachet, while the latter
simultaneously handed the marked money as payment. As Ano placed the money
inside his pocket, PO2 Ayad introduced himself as a policeman, causing Ano to flee.
Fortunately, PO2 Ayad caught Ano and asked him to empty his pockets which produced
the two (2) P100.00 bills. Due to the commotion caused by Ano’s relatives who were
preventing his arrest, the team moved at a distance of around 100 meters from the
place of arrest, marked the confiscated sachet, and completed the inventory thereat.
Barangay Captain Leo S. Buenviaje (Brgy. Captain Buenviaje) witnessed and signed
the Inventory of Seized/ Confiscated Items,9 photographs were also taken in the
presence of Ano, PO2 Ayad, and PO1 Acuin.10 On the same day, PO2 Ayad delivered
the seized sachet to the Crime Laboratory where it was turned over to Police Inspector
Forensic Chemist Beaune V. Villaraza (FC Villaraza) for examination. In Laboratory
Report No. D-198-09,11 FC Villaraza confirmed that the seized sachet was positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.12
Upon arraignment, Ano pleaded not guilty and denied the charges leveled against him.
He claimed that on said date, he was at home celebrating the 4 th birthday of his nephew
when suddenly, three police officers whom he identified to be PO2 Ayad, PO1 Ortilla,
and PO1 Acuin, forcibly arrested him and brought him to the police station for inquiry.
The following day, he learned that he was being charged of drug pushing. 13
In a Decision14 dated October 1, 2012, the RTC found Ano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Section 5 of RA 9165, sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00. 15
The RTC found all the elements for the prosecution of sale of dangerous drugs present,
noting that the identity of Ano as the seller of the illegal drug was clearly established
when he was arrested in flagrante delicto during a buy-bust operation.16
Aggrieved, Ano elevated his conviction before the Court of Appeals (CA).17
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated December 4, 2015, the CA upheld the RTC ruling, 19 likewise
finding that all the elements constituting the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
were present. Moreover, it ruled that the apprehending officers duly complied with the
chain of custody rule under Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as PO2 Ayad testified in detail the links in the chain of
custody of the seized drug from the time of its confiscation until its presentation in court
as evidence.
The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not Ano is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case
for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.20 “The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.”21
Here, Ano was charged with the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. In order to secure the conviction of an
accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment.22 It is likewise essential for a conviction that
the drugs subject of the sale be presented in court and its identity established with
moral certainty through an unbroken chain of custody over the same. In cases like this,
the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the
dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence
of the corpus delicti.23
In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule,
outlining the procedure that police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs in
order to ensure that their integrity and evidentiary value are preserved.24 Under the said
section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,25 the apprehending team shall, among
others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and take
photographs of the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom such items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same;
and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-
four (24) hours from confiscation for examination purposes.26 In the case of People v.
Mendoza,27 the Court stressed that “[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, ‘planting’ or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as
to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said
drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely
affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x
presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.” 28
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. 29 In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165-which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 1064030-provide that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165-under justifiable grounds-will not
automatically render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized
items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.31In other words, the failure
of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of
RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved.32 In People v. Almorfe,33 the Court explained that
for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved.34 Also, in People v. De
Guzman,35 it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must
be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are
or that they even exist.36
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that there are substantial gaps in the
chain of custody of the seized items from Ano which were unfortunately, left unjustified,
thereby putting into question their integrity and evidentiary value.
As the prosecution submits, upon Ano’s arrest, PO1 Ortilla called Brgy. Captain
Buenviaje to witness the marking and to sign the inventory. After which, PO2 Ayad
marked the sachet of shabu subject of the sale with Ano’s intials, “NDRA,” while PO1
Ortilla prepared an inventory of the seized items, which was signed by Brgy. Captain
Buenviaje as witness, and had them photographed. Thereafter, the buy-bust team
escorted Ano to the police station and turned over the sachet for examination to FC
Villaraza.
While the fact of marking and inventory of the seized item was established by the
attached Inventory of Seized/ Confiscated Items,37the records are glaringly silent as to
the presence of the required witnesses, namely, the representatives from the media and
the DOJ. To reiterate, Section 21 (1) of RA 9165, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,
as well as its IRR requires the presence of the following witnesses during the conduct of
inventory and photography of the seized items: (a) the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel;
(b) any elected public official; and (c) a representative from the media and the DOJ.38 In
their absence, the prosecution must provide a credible explanation justifying the non--
compliance with the rule; otherwise, the saving clause under the IRR of RA 9165 (and
now, the amended Section 21, Article II of RA 9165) would not apply.
Here, no such explanation was proffered by the prosecution to justify the procedural
lapse. It then follows that there are unjustified gaps in the chain of custody of the items
seized from Ano, thereby militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
which resultantly warrants his acquittal.39 It is well-settled that the procedure under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed
aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects.40
As a final note, the Court finds it fitting to echo its recurring pronouncement in recent
jurisprudence on the subject matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict
this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as
this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights
for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the
guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however
praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of
the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x.41
In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to
prove compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended.
As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any
perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the
trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the
accused, the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed
out in the court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court,
from fully examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure
had been completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to
excuse any deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court’s bounden
duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 4, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06127 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Nestor Ano y Del Remedios is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged. The Director of Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers
must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under
the said section, the apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a
physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.
By and large, the foregoing sufficiently established the existence of a continuous chain of custody which
preserved the identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the items confiscated from the accused,
notwithstanding the absence of the representatives from the media and the DOJ at the time of the arrest
and the taking of inventory. Notably, the absence of media representatives at the time Ominga prepared
the inventory was sufficiently explained by her during her cross-examination when she testified that when
contacted, the media representatives told them that they were still far from the area and would not be able
to arrive on time. As regards the absence of the DOJ representative, Eulogio Gapasin, the DOJ clerk who
signed the inventory, explained that it has been the practice in their office for him to go to the PDEA office
to sign the inventories instead of going to the site of the crime. While this is not ideal and the Court by no
means condones it, the Court is also cognizant of the fact that this is not the fault of the apprehending
officers. Verily, under varied field conditions, the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In People v. Rebotazo, 89 the Court held that so long as this
requirement is met, as in this case, non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 will not render
the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized or confiscated inadmissible.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
After the prosecution had rested its case, Dans filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer
to Evidence) dated December 7, 1992, based on Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court.[11] He argued that the prosecution failed to establish the fact that the lease
agreement covering the Sta. Cruz lot (Exhibit C) was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government.[12]
On February 10, 1993, the court a quo denied the said motion in this wise:
Since per testimony of witness Ramon Cuervo, Jr. (tsn, pp. 20 to 26, August
13, 1992) that considering the nature of the terminal at the Sta. Cruz Station,
which would be (the) subject of the lease contract between the Light Rail
Transit Authority and the PGH Foundation, Inc. (Exhibit C), the rental of the
premises in question could go up to P400,000.00 per month if the LRTA would
put up the building as against the stipulated rental of P92,437.00 actually
entered into between the parties, there would appear cause to believe that the
lease contract in question was grossly disadvantageous for (sic) the
government.
For this reason, the Demurrer to Evidence of accused Jose P. Dans, Jr.,
dated December 7, 1992, is DENIED for lack of merit.
Dans questioned the denial on the ground that the demurrer should have been
resolved solely on the basis of the prosecutions evidence; and even assuming that it could
be resolved using the evidence for the defense, the latter must have been previously
formally offered.[13]
These arguments are specious and must, therefore, be rejected.
Although a demurrer to evidence must be resolved based on the evidence of the
prosecution, there is nothing in the rules which would bar the court from taking cognizance
of any matter taken up during the trial or which has become part of the records of the
case, especially in this instance where the disputed evidence was taken in advance at
the request of the defendant himself. Additionally, it is erroneous to suppose that Cuervos
testimony was not formally offered at the time because (t)estimonial evidence is formally
offered by the calling of the witness to the stand.[14] Thus, we find merit in the manner by
which the trial court justified the denial of Dans demurrer to evidence,[15] viz.:
First, the advance testimony of Mr. Cuervo taken at the instance of Engr. Dans
on August 12 and 13, 1992, was already part of the record(s) in these cases
when the Demurrer to Evidence was filed by Engr. Dans on December 7,
1992. The testimony was introduced into the record in exactly the same manner
as any other testimony would be presented in evidence during trial. x x x.
Being already part of the record in these cases, the advance testimony
of Mr. Cuervo could be taken judicial notice of.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . (J)udicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal force. As a
means of establishing facts it is therefore superior to evidence. In its
appropriate field it displaces evidence since, as it stands for proof, it
fulfills the objects which the evidence is designed to fulfill and makes
evidence unnecessary. Consequently, the party desiring to establish
[16]
duty of presenting evidence of the admitted fact and (t)he court, for the
proper decision of the case, may and should consider, without the
introduction of evidence, the fact admitted by the parties. [19]
Third, since the advance testimony of Mr. Cuervo was given in open
court and duly recorded, the Court could not just ignore the solemn
declarations therein on the technicality that the testimony had not been
formally offered in evidence. x x x.
In any event, even if the testimony of Cuervo were to be excluded, there was enough
evidence proffered by the prosecution, particularly Exhibits B (the lease agreement in
favor of the PGHFI) and D (the sublease agreement in favor of TNCC) which would have
more than justified the denial of the demurrer. In other words, notwithstanding Cuervos
testimony, these exhibits constitute solid documentary proof of petitioners liability under
Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, as will be shown later in our discussion of
Issue No. 5, Was the evidence properly appreciated by respondent court?
2) Were the informations filed in Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453
sufficient in form?
Marcos claims that she was not adequately represented by counsel at the trial due to
the suspension from the practice of law of her counsel of record, Atty. Antonio Coronel. It
appears from the records, however, that during the absence of Atty. Coronel and
sometime thereafter, she was still represented by other lawyers, including Renato Dilag,
Luis Sillano, Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose and Cristobal Fernandez, Vicente D. Millora,
Juan T. David, Balbino Diego, and the law firm of Manuel M. Lazaro and Associates. The
representation of Atty. Millora and the Fernandezes subsisted even in this Court, where
they were later substituted by Atty. Estelito Mendoza. In any event, at the time Atty.
Coronel and his replacements withdrew their respective appearances, all evidence had
already been presented. It is just that Marcos opted not to present any evidence for her
defense, relying, perhaps, on what she perceived to be glaringly weak prosecution
evidence. Or it is not impossible or far-fetched that her refusal may have been due to her
indifference to or open defiance of the justice system.
While these observations cannot be said to be flawed, they were made only after the
trial, in fact, after the assailed decision was promulgated, and these conclusions are the
courts alone. The prosecution never attempted to establish a connection between the two
defendants in committing the acts for which they were charged. It is a fundamental rule,
however, that a charge of conspiracy must be proven just like any other criminal
accusation, that is, independently and beyond reasonable doubt.[35] In this regard,
therefore, this Courts opinion that the alleged conspiracy between the petitioners was not
sufficiently established by the States evidence.
The Court notes that while petitioners have been making such an outcry since the
promulgation of the questioned judgment regarding the line of questioning followed by
respondent court, none of them ever objected to such queries during the trial. Neither did
they attempt to salvage the situation by asking questions on re-direct examination if they
harbored the impression that the courts cross-examination seriously prejudiced their
case. This observation was likewise made by the court a quo, to wit:
It is now too late in the day to object to the alleged leading, misleading,
and badgering questions of the Presiding Justice Garchitorena and to
ask (the court) to expunge the answers thereto from the
record. Needless to say, Engr. Dans (and Marcos, for that matter)
should have done so when the supposed objectionable nature of the
questions and/or answers were propounded or given. (Section 36, Rule
132, 1985 Rules on Evidence). As it happened, he (and she) did not
even raise his (and her) objections at the close of the testimony of Mr.
Cuervo. He (and she) did not also ask re-direct questions to correct
whatever mistakes or misimpressions allegedly crept into Mr. Cuervos
testimony. Instead, he formally offered the entire testimony without
making any exceptions or reservations. [39]
We should stress that in affirming the conviction of petitioner Marcos, this Court relies
mainly on the prosecutions documentary evidence showing the chasmic disparity
between the P102,760.00 monthly rental stipulated in Exhibit B and the P734,000.00
monthly rental provided in Exhibit D. The testimony of Cuervo is, at best, opinion only, but
the amounts mentioned in the said two exhibits are facts which cannot be altered by
opinion, however expert. Regardless of Cuervos expert opinion on the probable rental
rate of the Pasay lot, the stubborn fact and cold reality is that the PGHFI was able to lease
it out for an amount that was seven times more than what it stipulated to pay the
government. The sublease (Exhibit D) is the best monument to the gross and manifest
disadvantage suffered by the government due to the willful actions of Marcos. Hence,
even if the questions of Justice Garchitorena and the answers thereto of Cuervo were
totally ignored by this Court, the prosecutions evidence would still firmly stand, and would
definitely be more than sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Going further, petitioners insist that some impropriety attended the promulgation of
the challenged decision. This allegation stems from the dissolution of the Special Division
earlier created by Justice Garchitorena because of the lack of unanimity among the
members of the First Division.
It appears from the records that Justice Narciso T. Atienza initially wanted to acquit
the defendants in Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17451 and 17452, while Justices
Garchitorena and Balajadia wanted to convict them in Criminal Case Nos. 17450, 17451,
17452 and 17453. There was, therefore, no unanimous vote in Criminal Case Nos. 17451
and 17452. Thereupon, aSpecial Division was constituted, with the addition of Justices
Augusto M. Amores and Cipriano A. del Rosario. Over an informal luncheon among the
members of the newly-created Special Division,[40] however, where the merits of the cases
were incidentally discussed, an understanding was reached whereby the two newly-
appointed members agreed with Justice Atienza that the defendants should be cleared
of the charges in Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452. The stance of those present was
that if the actual voting were to take place, the majority would acquit the defendants in
Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452. Consequently, Justices Garchitorena and
Balajadia decided to change their opinions in said two cases, thus giving the First Division
a unanimous vote in all the cases. There seemed to be no further need for the Special
Division; hence, it was dissolved. The result is the assailed decision promulgated, as
scheduled, on September 24, 1993.
Petitioners point out that once the Special Division was created, the First Division was
thereby divested of jurisdiction to decide the case. They also maintain that the informal
discussion of the merits of the cases inside a restaurant was unofficial business and,
therefore, should have no binding effect.
While it is true that under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended,
when a unanimous vote is not reached by a division, two other justices shall be
designated by the Presiding Justice to sit in a special division, and their majority vote shall
be required to reach a valid verdict, this provision does not totally rule out a situation
where all members of the 3-justice division eventually come to a common agreement to
reach a unanimous decision, thus, making another divisions participation in these cases
redundant. This is exactly what transpired in this case. The change of heart of Justices
Garchitorena and Balajadia, though reached unofficially, may be perceived as a
supervening event which rendered the Special Divisions functions superfluous. In any
case, the fact that Justice Atienza signed his concurrence cured the defect, if any, in the
questioned judgment; again, an illustration of the curative effect of ones
signature. Petitioners are of the impression that this chain of events was meant to railroad
their conviction, thus making the magistrates concerned vulnerable to criticism.While the
Court is averse to encouraging this kind of behavior in judges, it is of the view, however,
that the assailed decision is in harmony with the basic right of an accused to a speedy
disposition of his case. This, to our mind, is more important than any consideration of
technical impropriety in resolving a case.
Summing up, was the guilt of petitioners proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the
prosecution?
We distinguish.
In Criminal Case No. 17453, we do not concur with the conclusions reached by the
court a quo. The culpability of petitioners in this case stems from their entering into the
lease agreement (Exhibit C) over the Sta. Cruz lot under terms and conditions manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government, which, in this instance, is the LRTA. To
prove this assertion, the prosecution presented in evidence the sublease agreement
(Exhibit E) over the same property showing the disparity in the rental price. While the
authenticity of Exhibit D, which was used to prove the manifest and gross disadvantage
to the government occasioned by Exhibit B, was admitted by the court and by the parties
themselves, the validity of Exhibit E cannot, even up to this point, be determined with
certainty because it is a mere uncertified photocopy of the original. Thus, the gross and
manifest disadvantage to the government, which Exhibit E was supposed to engender,
remains an allegation which cannot be proved by other direct evidence. The fact that only
Dans objected to its admissibility does not mean that it is valid as to Marcos. As a result,
both petitioners should be, as they are hereby, acquitted in Criminal Case No. 17453 on
ground of reasonable doubt.
In Criminal Case No. 17450, we must further qualify our judgment.
As regards petitioner Dans, the Court is of the opinion that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt in committing the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. We
believe that his liability, if any, could only stem from a knowledge of the terms of the
sublease agreements, Exhibits D and E, which formed the core of the Courts appraisal of
the manifest and gross disadvantage to the government. Exhibit E, as already discussed,
was correctly disregarded by the court a quo for being unauthenticated. Even though he
was a Board Director of the PGHFI, Dans denied any knowledge of the execution of
Exhibits D and E, and his denial was never disproved by the prosecution. In fact, his
signature does not appear in either sublease agreements. Neither was the alleged
conspiracy between him and Marcos established by the prosecution.
It is this Courts opinion, however, that the guilt of petitioner Marcos was proved by
the State beyond reasonable doubt. She was charged with violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, for executing a lease agreement (Exhibit B) in behalf of the
PGHFI, a private enterprise of which she was the Chairman, over a lot located in Pasay
City owned by the LRTA, a government corporation of which she was undeniably also the
Chairman. The consideration therefor was shown to be unfair and unreasonable upon
comparison with the rental price stipulated in the sublease agreement (Exhibit D) which
she subsequently signed for the PGHFI in favor of TNCC. That she should be held
responsible is shown by the presence of her signature in Exhibits A to E, where she acts
in different capacities. She cannot, under these circumstances, claim ignorance of the
great disparity between the rental price stipulated in the lease and the sublease
agreements. Consequently, in Criminal Case No. 17450, the conviction of petitioner
Marcos should be, as it is hereby, upheld.
Finally, the Court observes that the Sandiganbayan awarded damages to the People
in the amount of P32,172,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 17450 and P92,268,840.00 in
Criminal Case No. 17453. This must be accordingly corrected.
Considering that petitioners were acquitted in Criminal Case No. 17453 due to lack
of evidence, the Court deems them likewise free from any civil liability since the fact from
which such liability might arise no longer exists.[41]
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 17450, the Court observes that an error has
been committed in the computation of the damages to be awarded to the People. The
trial court based its figures on the amount it perceived to be the fair rental value of the
Pasay lot, as estimated by Cuervo, less the rental price stated in Exhibit B. Thus, it
deducted P102,760.00 (the stipulated monthly rental for the Pasay lot) from P210,000.00
(Cuervos estimate, as interpreted by the court a quo) to arrive at a difference
of P107,240.00, which was multiplied by 12 months to reach an annual loss
of P1,286,880.00.[42] This amount was then multiplied by the life span of the lease contract,
which is 25 years, to come up with the final award of P32,172,000.00.[43]
Since the estimates of Cuervo were found to be mere estimates, it is difficult to
imagine why the trial court used them as basis for its calculation of damages. As we have
already demonstrated, the gross and manifest disadvantage to the government in
Criminal Case No. 17450 was determined by comparing Exhibits B and D. The conviction
of Marcos was predicated on the nexus between these two documents, as well as on her
obvious conflict of interest in entering into them. By the same token, her civil liability must
also be made to depend on these two pieces of evidence. The correct figures should be
those stated in Exhibits B and D, to wit: P734,000.00 (the stipulated monthly sublease
rental for the Pasay lot) less P102,760.00 (the agreed monthly lease price for said
property) times 12 months times 25 years. Thus, P734,000.00 - P102,760.00
= P631,240.00 x 12 months = P7,574,880.00 x 25 years= P189,372,000.00.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
FACTS:
An amount of P603,265.00 was released to the DECS for distribution to the newly
nationalized high schools located within the region. Through the initiative of
accused Venancio Nava, a meeting was called among his seven (7) schools
division superintendents whom he persuaded to use the money or allotment for
the purchase of Science Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTD). In other words,
instead of referring the allotment to the one hundred fifty-five (155) heads of the
nationalized high schools for the improvement of their facilities, accused Nava
succeeded in persuading his seven (7) schools division superintendents to use
the allotment for the purchase of science education facilities.
In the purchase of the school materials, the law provides that the same shall be
done through a public bidding. But in the instant case, evidence shows that
accused Nava persuaded his seven (7) schools division superintendents to ignore
the circular.
ISSUE:
For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper, the following elements must be
present:
1) that the accused is a public officer;
2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and
3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
The law on public bidding is not an empty formality. It aims to secure the lowest
possible price and obtain the best bargain for the government. It is based on the
principle that under ordinary circumstances, fair competition in the market tends
to lower prices and eliminate favouritism.
We must emphasize however, that the lack of a public bidding and the
violation of an administrative order do not by themselves satisfy the third
element of Republic Act No. 3019. Lack of public bidding alone does not
result in a manifest and gross disadvantage. Indeed, the absence of a public
bidding may mean that the government was not able to secure the lowest bargain
in its favor and may open the door to graft and corruption. Nevertheless, the law
requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. Penal laws are
strictly construed against the government.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
a prayer for the writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
for the nullification of the Resolution[1] of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion
to quash the Informations filed by the petitioners who were the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 27555 to 27558, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019, and its resolution denying their motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
On July 23, 2002, four (4) Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan
charging the petitioners, Librado M. Cabrera, his wife Fe M. Cabrera, and
Luther Leonor, with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The docket
numbers of the cases and the accusatory portion of each of the Informations
respectively read:
That for the period from January 30, 1998 to June 30, 1998, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Taal, Province of Batangas, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused LIBRADO
M. CABRERA and LUTHER LEONOR, both public officers, being then the
Municipal Mayor and Municipal Councilor, respectively, of the Municipality of Taal,
Batangas, committing the offense herein charged, in conspiracy and connivance with
each other and in relation to their office, taking advantage of their official position,
and through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits to
Diamond Laboratories, Inc. (DLI), a corporation owned by the relatives by
consanguinity of the accused LIBRADO M. CABRERA, by directly purchasing
medicines on several occasions only from the said Diamond Laboratories, Inc.
without the benefit of public bidding or canvass from different duly-licensed
manufacturers, thereby depriving the Municipality of Taal, Batangas the opportunity
to avail of a better price of the same quality of supplies, in the total amount of FIVE
HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY PESOS &
THIRTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P503,920.35), with accused LUTHER LEONOR,
who, in conspiracy and connivance with accused LIBRADO M. CABRERA, acted as
the authorized representative of Diamond Laboratories, Inc. despite his being a
Municipal Councilor of Taal, Batangas, by receiving all payments due and on behalf
of the Diamond Laboratories, Inc. and by signing all pertinent documents of the
transactions, at the same time cause undue injury to the Municipality of Taal,
Batangas, to the Government as a whole and to public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
That for the period from March 13, 1998 to June 22, 1998, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Taal, Province of Batangas, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused LIBRADO
M. CABRERA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Taal, Batangas,
committing the offense herein charged in relation to his office, taking advantage of his
official position, and through manifest partiality evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury
to the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, to the Government as a whole and to public
interest, at the same time, give unwarranted benefits to himself by reimbursing,
collecting and appropriating for himself, the aggregate amount of TWENTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-ONE PESOS & EIGHTY-THREE
CENTAVOS (P27,651.83) from the Municipal coffers of Taal, Batangas, representing
his expenses incurred during his unauthorized and illegal travels, to the damage and
prejudice of the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, to the Government as a whole and to
public interest in the said amount of P27,651.83.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
That for the period from July 28, 1998 to July 6, 1999, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Taal, Province of Batangas, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused FE M.
CABRERA and LUTHER LEONOR, both public officers, being then the Municipal
Mayor and Municipal Councilor, respectively, of the Municipality of Taal, Batangas,
committing the offense herein charged, in conspiracy and connivance with each other
and in relation to their office, taking advantage of their official position, and through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits to Diamond
Laboratories, Inc. (DLI), a corporation owned by the relatives by affinity of the
accused FE M. CABRERA, by directly purchasing medicines on several occasions
only from the said Diamond Laboratories, Inc. without the benefit of public bidding or
canvass from different duly-licensed manufacturers, thereby depriving the
Municipality of Taal, Batangas the opportunity to avail of a better price of the same
quality of supplies, in the total amount of ONE MILLION FORTY-TWO
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWO PESOS & FORTY-SIX CENTAVOS
(P1,042,902.46), with accused LUTHER LEONOR, who, in conspiracy and
connivance with accused FE M. CABRERA, acted as the authorized representative of
Diamond Laboratories, Inc. despite his being a Municipal Councilor of Taal,
Batangas, by receiving all payments due and on behalf of the Diamond Laboratories,
Inc. and by signing all pertinent documents of the transactions, at the same time cause
undue injury to the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, to the Government as a whole and
to public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
That for the period from August 31, 1998 to September 1, 1999, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Taal, Province of Batangas, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused FE M.
CABRERA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Taal, Batangas,
committing the offense herein charged in relation to her office, taking advantage of
her official position, and through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause
undue injury to the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, to the Government as a whole and
to public interest, at the same time, give unwarranted benefits to herself by
reimbursing, collecting and appropriating for herself, the aggregate amount of ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SEVEN PESOS
& SIXTY-SIX CENTAVOS (P170,987.66) from the Municipal coffers of Taal,
Batangas, representing her expenses incurred during her unauthorized and illegal
travels, to the damage and prejudice of the Municipality of Taal, Batangas, to the
Government as a whole and to public interest in the said amount of P27,651.83.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
The petitioner must be apprised of the facts that are imputed on him as he
is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. The Information must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.[16] Also, the
Information must state only the relevant facts; the reason therefor could be
proved during the trial.[17]
The accused may file a motion to quash the Information under Section 3(a),
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense.
SEC. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on
any of the following grounds:
Section 3(a) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the quashal of an
information when the facts therein averred do not amount to an offense. The
fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash under this
particular ground is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law. In this
examination, matters aliunde are not considered. Anent the sufficiency of the
information, Section 6, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the
information must state the acts or omissions so complained of as constitutive of the
offense.[19]
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, reads:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.[21]
There are two (2) ways by which a public official violates Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing
undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The accused may be
charged under either mode or under both. In Quibal v. Sandiganbayan,[22] the
Court held that the use of the disjunctive term or connotes that either act
qualifies as a violation of Sec. 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.
In fine, the delictual act of the accused may give rise to or cause either an
undue injury to any party, including the government; or the giving to any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, or both undue injury and
warranted benefits, advantage or preference. As explained by the Court
in Bautista v. Sandiganbayan:[23]
Indeed, Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, as amended, provides as one of its elements that the
public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including
the government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or"
connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), or as aptly held
in Santiago, as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This does not,
however, indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an
accused may be charged under eithermode or under both.
In Santiago, petitioner therein assailed the failure of respondent to include the phrase
"causing of undue injury to any party, including the Government" in the amended
informations filed against her. Refuting the claim, the Court cited the minute
resolution in Uy v. Sandiganbayan and clarified that the "act of giving any private
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference" is not an indispensable
element of the offense of "causing any undue injury to any party," although there
maybe instances where both elements concur. Thus, in Pareo v. Sandiganbayan, the
information charged the public officers with "willfully and unlawfully causing undue
injury to the Government and giving unwarranted benefits to Tanduay Distillery, Inc."
by failing to verify and act on the validity and/or veracity of the claim for tax credit
filed by the corporation before the BIR.
R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that
the public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. The use of the disjunctive
term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3, paragraph (e),
or as aptly held in Santiago, as two (2) different modes of committing the offense.
This does not, however, indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but
rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both.[26]
We note that, as pointed out by the petitioners, the Court held in Mendoza-
Arce and other cases[27] that the essential elements for violation of Section 3(e)
of Rep. Act No. 3019 are the following:
1. The accused is a public officer or private person charged in conspiracy with him;
2. Said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his
official duties or in relation to his public position;
3. He causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or private party;
5. The public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.[28]
The petitioners posit that, as gleaned from the enumerations by the Court
of the essential elements of the crime, the only mode by which a public officer
may commit a crime for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 is by
causing undue injury to any party, both the government or private party, the
giving of unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such party being
only a mode of causing such undue injury, which is inconsistent with the rulings
of this Court in Jacinto, Santiago, Bautista and other cases.
We find the contention of the petitioners to be untenable. For one thing, we
have reviewed the rulings of the Court in Mendoza-Arce and kindred cases and
find that the issue of whether or not violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019 may be committed only by causing undue injury to the government or to
a private individual, the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
being only a mode of causing undue injury to the government or to a private
party had not been raised therein, nor resolved by the Court. In any event, the
ruling in this case has categorized any perceived inconsistencies spawned by
the rulings of the Court in Mendoza-Arce and other cases and those
in Jacinto, Santiago, Evangelista, Quibal and Bautista.
In Gallego v. Sandiganbayan,[29] the Court ruled that unwarranted means
lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized; or without
justification or adequate reasons. Advantage means a more favorable or
improved position or condition; benefit or gain of any kind; benefit from course
of action.[30] Preference signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability;
choice or estimation above another.[31]
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, which was approved by Congress in
Spanish reads:
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner questions the Decision of the Sandiganbayan[*] holding him
civilly liable in spite of an acquittal. The facts are not disputed:
"The clearance shall be signed by the PCA officers concerned only when
there is no item appearing under "PENDING ACCOUNTABILITY" or after
every item previously entered thereunder is fully settled. Settlement thereof
shall be written in RED ink." (Exhs. D or D-1 and 1-B)
After the clearance was signed by the PCA officers concerned, it was to be
approved, first, by Atty. Llorente, in the case of a rank-and-file employee, or
by Col. Dueñas, the acting administrator, in the case of an officer, and then
by Atty. Rodriquez, the corporate auditor x x x.
The clearance of Mrs. Javier of the same date of October 30, 1981, was also
signed by all PCA officers concerned, including Mrs. Sotto even though the
former had unsettled obligations noted thereon, viz: GSIS loan P5,387.00
and UCPB car loan P19,705.00, or a total of P25,092.00, and later on
approved by Col. Dueñas, Mrs. Javier being an officer, and Atty. Rodriguez
(Exh. O). Similarly, the voucher of Mrs. Javier for her gratuity benefits
likewise recited her accountabilities of P25,092.00 plus P92,000.00, which
was handwritten. Both amounts were deducted from her gratuity benefits,
and the balance released to her on November 16, 1981. The voucher passed
post-audit by Atty. Rodriguez on December 1, 1981 (Exhs. L, L-1, L-2, and
L-3).
The said P92,000.00 was the disallowed portion of the cash advances
received by Mr. Curio in connection with his duties as "super cargo" in the
distribution of seed nuts throughout the country. He received them through
and in the name of Mrs. Javier from the UCPB. When the amount was
disallowed, the UCPB withheld from the PCA certain receivables; the later,
in turn, deducted the same amount from the gratuity benefits of Mrs.
Javier, she being primarily liable therefor (Exhs. L, L-1, L-2, and L-3). At
the time of the deduction, the additional liquidation papers had already
been submitted and were in process. Just in case she would not be
successful in having the entire amount wiped out, she requested Mr. Curio,
who admittedly received it, to execute, as he did, an affidavit dated
November 26, 1981, in which he assumed whatever portion thereof might
not be allowed x x x.
The reason given by Atty. Llorente was that when the clearance was
presented to him on December 8, 1981, he was already aware of the
affidavit dated November 26, 1981, in which Mr. Curio assumed to pay any
residual liability for the disallowed cash advances, which at the time,
December 8, 1981, stood at P92,000.00 (Exhs. 2 and 2-A). Moreover, Mr.
Curio had other pending obligations noted on his clearance totalling
P10,714.98 (Exh. 1-a). To justify his stand, Atty. Llorente invoked Condition
(a) of the clearance (Exhs. D and I-B), which, he said, was "very stringent"
and could not be interpreted in any other way x x x.
Between December 1981 and December 1986, Mr. Curio failed to get gainful
employment; as a result, his family literally went hungry. In 1981, he
applied for work with the Philippine Cotton Authority, but was refused,
because he could not present his PCA clearance. The same thing happened
when he sought employment with the Philippine Fish Marketing
Administration in January 1982. In both prospective employers, the item
applied for was P2,500.00 a month. At that time, he was only about 45
years old and still competitive in the job market. But in 1986, being already
past 50 years, he could no longer be hired permanently, there being a
regulation to that effect. His present employment with the Philippine Ports
Authority, which started on March 16, 1987, was casual for that reason. Had
his gratuity benefits been paid in 1981, he would have received a bigger
amount, considering that since then interest had accrued and the foreign
exchange rate of the peso to the dollar had gone up x x x.[1]
On December 10, 1986, an Information for violation of Section 3(c) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against the petitioner:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Finally, Atty. Llorente was officiously, though incidentally, taking care also
of the interest of Mrs. Javier who, justice and equity demanded, should not
be made to shoulder the P92,000.00 unliquidated cash advances, for the
reason that it was Mr. Curio who admittedly spent them or who, at the very
least, should be able to get reimbursement of what she paid, totally or
partially, from his gratuity benefits (See Exh. 5, pp. 2-3).[4]
The Sandiganbayan, as we also indicated earlier, took the petitioner to task
civilly, and ordered him to pay "compensatory damages" in the sum of
P90,000.00. According to the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner was guilty
nonetheless of abuse of right (under Article 19 of the Civil Code) and as a
public officer, he was liable for damages suffered by the aggrieved party
(under Article 27).
Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, amending Rules 110 through
127 of the Rules of Court, the judgment of the court shall include, in case of
acquittal, and unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist, "a finding on the civil liability of the
accused in favor of the offended party."[5] The rule is based on the
provisions of substantive law,[6] that if acquittal proceeds from reasonable
doubt, a civil action lies nonetheless.
The records show that the office practice indeed in the Philippine Coconut
Authority was to clear the employee (retiree) and deduct his
accountabilities from his gratuity benefits. There seems to be no debate
about the existence of this practice (the petitioner admitted it later on) and
in fact, he cleared three employees on the condition that their obligations
should be deducted from their benefits.[9] We quote:
As we said, the acts of the petitioner were legal (that is, pursuant to
procedures), as he insists in this petition, yet it does not follow, as we said,
that his acts were done in good faith. For emphasis, he had no valid reason
to "go legal" all of a sudden with respect to Mr. Curio, since he had cleared
three employees who, as the Sandiganbayan found, "were all similarly
circumstanced in that they all had pending obligations when, their
clearances were filed for consideration, warranting similar official
action."[12]
IT IS SO ORDERED.