4) G.R. No.

143723 June 28, 2001

LITONJUA GROUP OF COMPANIES, EDDIE LITONJUA and DANILO LITONJUA
vs.
TERESITA VIGAN
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Facts:

Vigan was hired by the Litonjua Group of Companies sometime in 1979 as telex operator. She
had been performing well until 1995, when Danilo Litonjua who was already naturally very ill-tempered,
worsen due to business problems. In fact, a complaint letter was sent by the Litonjua Employees to
the father and his junior regarding the character of Danilo Litonjua but apparently the management
just glossed over this.1âwphi1.nêt

Danilo became physically and verbally abusive to Vigan and accused her of suffereing from
psychoses. She was denied entry from her work upon instructions coming from Danilo. This prompted
Vigan to file a case for illegal dismissal and alleged that she was receiving P8,000.00 as her salary.

The Litonjuas, on the other hand, negate the existence of the Litonjua Group of Companies
and the connection of Eduardo Litonjua thereto. They contend that Vigan was employed by ACT
Theater, Inc., where Danilo Litonjua is a Director. They dispute the charge of illegal dismissal for it
was Vigan who ceased to report for work despite notices and likewise contest the P8,000.00 monthly
salary alleged by Vigan, claiming it was merely P6,850.00.

On 1997, Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding Vigan diseased and unfit for work under
Article 284 of the Labor Code and awarded the corresponding NLRC which modified LA’s decision by
ruling that Art. 284 of the Labor Code is inapplicable in the instant case but affirmed the legality of the
termination of the complainant based on her having effectively abandoned her job; the rest of the
decision was affirmed. Vigan moved for a partial reconsideration which was denied.

Dissatisfied, Vigan filed a petition for certiorari with CA which reversed the decision of NLRC and held
that Litonjua Group liable. MR was filed but was accordingly denied.

Issue: Can the Litonjua group of companies be a party in the suit filed by Vigan?

Held:

Petitioners allege that the Litonjua group of companies cannot be a party to this suit for it is
not a legal entity with juridical personality but is merely a generic name used to describe collectively
the various companies in which the Litonjua family has business interest; that the real employer of
respondent Vigan was the ACT theater Incorporated where Danilo L is a member of the Board of
Directors while Eddie Litonjua was not connected in any capacity.

Petitioners are correct. Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be
parties to a civil action and every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
parties in interest. Petitioners’ claim that Litonjua Group of Companies is not a legal entity with juridical
personality hence cannot be a party to this suit deserves consideration since respondent failed to
prove otherwise. In fact, respondent Vigan’s own allegation in her Memorandum supported petitioners’
claim that Litonjua group of companies does not exist when she stated therein that instead of naming
each and every corporation of the Litonjua family where she had rendered accounting and payroll
works, she simply referred to these corporations as the Litonjua group of companies, thus, respondent
merely used such generic name to describe collectively the various corporations in which the Litonjua
family has business interest. Considering the non-existence of the Litonjua group of companies as a
juridical entity and petitioner Eddie Litonjua’s denial of his connection in any capacity with the ACT
Theater, the supposed company where Vigan was employed, petitioner Eddie Litonjuas should also
be excluded as a party in this case since respondent Vigan failed to prove Eddie Litonjua’s participation
in the instant case. It is respondent Vigan, being the party asserting a fact, who has the burden of
proof as to such fact which however, she failed to discharge.

16) G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005

NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, Pascual G. Quinto, Luis B. Buena, Eusebia V. Tablada, Canuto G.
Tisbe, David R. Carullo, Sofonias E. Colegado, Felix B. Buena, Toribio C. Evangelista, Lebrada A.
Nicolas, Alecia J. Ramos, Mila G. De Los Reyes, Salvador I. De La Torre, Moises Cruz, Rufino
Infante, Alicia Astrologo, Trinidad Lumiqued, Luzminida Quiniquini, & Teodora C. Temeras
vs.
CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts:

Petitioners, in their complaint, alleged that they occupied and possessed parcels of land,
located in Sitio Panayawan, Barangay San Rafael, Montalban (now Rodriquez), Province of Rizal by
virtue of several Deeds of Assignment executed by a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez.

According to the Deeds of Assignment, the Subject Property was part of a vast tract of land
which extended to several provinces and awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of
Spain and evidenced by a Spanish title. Ismael Favila claimed to be one of the heirs and successors-
in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Acting as Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a SPA executed by
his mga kapatid on 1965, Ismael Favila signed the aforementioned Deeds of Assignment, assigning
portions of the Subject Property to the petitioners in exchange for the labor and work done on the
Subject Property by the petitioners and their predecessors.

Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to evict them from the Subject
Property. Two of the petitioners had actually received notices to vacate. Their investigations revealed
that the Subject Property was included in TCTs in the name of respondent.

Meanwhile, respondent contends that an OCT was issued in the name of respondents mother
and three other individuals. On 1968, his mother executed a Deed of Donation transferring the
property to him.

Petitioners filed with the trial court an action for declaration of nullity of respondents certificates
of title on the basis that OCT of respondent was fake and spurious. Respondent filed his Answer with
Prayer for Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses. According to respondent, the allegations
in the Complaint would readily and patently show that the same are flimsy, fabricated, malicious,
without basis in law and in fact.

As an affirmative defense, respondent claimed that the petitioners had no legal capacity to file
the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint stated no cause of action. Since the OCT was genuine and
authentic on its face, then land titles derived therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible and
conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world.
In the instant case, the trial court held a preliminary hearing on the affirmative and issued an order
holding that petitioners were not the lawful owners of the land subject of this case, for they did not
comply with PD 892, they do not have the legal standing to bring before this Court the instant complaint

MR was filed but was denied. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence the Petition for Review.

Issue: Does the petitioners have the personality to sue?

Held: NO.

SC held that the petitioners had no personality to file the said action, not being the parties-in-
interest, and their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause of action.

According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action to remove a cloud on or to
quiet title, must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the subject
matter of the action. Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that they had any legal or equitable
title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify their right to file an action to remove
a cloud on or to quiet title.

Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the
right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule,
assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property by virtue of their actual and
continuous possession of the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in their favor,
attached to and an integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners predecessors-in-interest
based their right to the Subject Property on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
Petitioners, having acquired portions of the Subject Property by assignment, could acquire no better
title to the said portions than their predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title can only be based
on the same Spanish title.

28) G.R. No. 84034 December 22, 1988

ALBERTO SIEVERT
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE ARTEMON D. LUNA and AURELIO CAMPOSANO

FELICIANO, J.:

Facts:

On 1988 Sievert, a citizen and resident of the Philippines, received by mail a Petition for
Issuance of a Preliminary Attachment filed with the Manila RTC Branch 32. Petitioner had not
previously received any summons and any copy of a complaint against him.

On the day set for hearing of the Petition for a Preliminary Writ of Attachment, Sievert's counsel
went before the trial court and entered a special appearance for the limited purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court. He simultaneously filed a written objection to the jurisdiction of the trial court
to hear or act upon the Petition for Issuance of a Preliminary Writ of Attachment. In this written
objection, he prayed for denial for lack of jurisdiction over his person upon the ground that since no
summons had been served upon him in the main case, no jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
had been acquired by the trial court.

The trial court denied his objection. On appeal, CA dismissed his Petition for Certiorari.

Issue: May the respondent Judge issue a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner before
summons is served on the latter.

Held: NO.

There is no question that a writ of preliminary attachment may be applied for a plaintiff "at
the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter" in the cases enumerated in Section 1 of
Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. SC held that critical time is the time of the vesting of jurisdiction
in the court over the person of the defendant in the main case.

Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own sake but rather to enable the
attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal
action. A court which has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant, cannot bind that
defendant whether in the main case or in any ancillary proceeding such as attachment proceedings.
The service of a petition for preliminary attachment without the prior or simultaneous service of
summons and a copy of the complaint in the main case — and that is what happened in this case —
does not of course confer jurisdiction upon the issuing court over the person of the defendant.

Ordinarily, the prayer in a petition for a writ of preliminary attachment is embodied or

incorporated in the main complaint itself as one of the forms of relief sought in such complaint. Thus,
valid service of summons and a copy of the complaint will in such case vest jurisdiction in the court
over the defendant both for purposes of the main case and for purposes of the ancillary remedy of
attachment. In such case, notice of the main case is at the same time notice of the auxiliary proceeding
in attachment. Where, however, the petition for a writ of preliminary attachment is embodied in a
discrete pleading, such petition must be served either simultaneously with service of summons and a
copy of the main complaint, or after jurisdiction over the defendant has already been acquired by such
service of summons. Notice of the separate attachment petition is not notice of the main action. Put a
little differently, jurisdiction whether ratione personae or ratione materiae in an attachment proceeding
is ancillary to jurisdiction ratione personae or ratione materiae in the main action against the defendant.
If a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant in the principal
action, it simply has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary attachment against the defendant or
his property.

It is basic that the requirements of the Rules of Court for issuance of preliminary attachment
must be strictly and faithfully complied with in view of the nature of this provisional remedy.

In the case at bar, the want of jurisdiction of the trial court to proceed in the main case against
the defendant is quite clear. It is not disputed that neither service of summons with a copy of the
complaint nor voluntary appearance of petitioner Sievert was had in this case.