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Aida Eugenio vs Civil Service Commission

280 SCRA 713 – Law on Public Officers – Creation and Abolition of a Public Office is Essentially
Legislative

In 1993, Aida Eugenio passed the Career Executive Service Eligibility (CES). She was then recommended
to be appointed as a Civil Service Officer Rank IV. But her appointment to said rank was impeded when
in the same year, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) abolished the Career Executive Service Board
(CESB). CESB is the office tasked with promulgating rules, standards, and procedures on the selection,
classification and compensation of the members of the Career Executive Service.

Eugenio then assailed the resolution which abolished CESB. She averred that the CSC does not have the
power to abolish CESB because the same was created by law (P.D. 1). CSC on the other hand argued that
it has the power to do so pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 which granted the CSC the right
to reorganize the CSC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission may validly abolish the Career Executive Service
Board.

HELD: No. The CESB is created by law. It can only be abolished by the legislature. The creation and
abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function, except for Constitutional offices. The power
to restructure granted to the CSC is limited to offices under it. The law that created the CESB intended
said office to be an autonomous entity although it is administratively attached to the CSC.

Aparri vs CA GR L-30057

Facts:

On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following resolution # 13, hereby appointing Mr.
Bruno Aparri, as general manager of NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives and compensations to take
effect on January 116, 1960.
On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which stating thereat that the
incumbent general manager shall perform his duty up to the close of office hour on March 31, 1962. In
accordance with the provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It hereby fixes the term of office
of the incumbent general manager until march 31, 1962. Petitioner file a mandamus with preliminary
injunction with the first instance court. The petition pray for the annulment of the resolution of NARRA
board.

Issue:

Whether or not board resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause.
Held:

It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It is necessary in each
case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate the statutory
scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by
law. However, the power to fix the term is rested in the board of directors subject to the
recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the approval of the president of the
philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the
petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and
phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention of the legislative must be
determined from the language employed and where there is no ambiguity in words, there is no room for
construction.

The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term rather, his right to hold
office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.

Morfe v. Mutuc

22 SCRA 424, January 31, 1968

J. Fernando

Facts: Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), provides that “every public officer, ...after his
assumption to office and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the
termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, a true
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources
of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for
the next preceding calendar year...”

Jesus Morfe, disputing that such requirement is violative of due process as an oppressive
exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the
ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-
incrimination, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan.
After the submission of pleadings and stipulation of facts, the CFI found for Morfe, affirming that the
requirement of periodical submission of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the
permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause – hence, Section 7
of R.A. 3019 is unconstitutional.

Aggrieved, Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc appealed the decision of the CFI before the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not, the requirement of periodical submission of the sworn statement of assets and
liabilities, pursuant to R.A. 3019, exceeds the permissible limit of the State’s police power and is thus
offensive to the due process clause?

Ruling: No. Nothing can be clearer than that R.A. 3019 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing
the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is
intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public
trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The
conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a remedial
device.

In the absence of a factual foundation, the presumption of a statute’s validity must prevail over mere
pleadings and stipulation of facts (Ermita-Malate Hotel, et. al. v. Mayor of Manila). While in the
attainment of attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible,
there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable that what the Constitution condemns, the
statute allows.

While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as such not amounting to
property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there can be no disputing the proposition that from the
standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution the mantle of protection afforded
by due process could rightfully be invoked.

Evelyn Abeja vs Federico Tañada

236 SCRA 60 – Law on Public Officers – Public Office is Personal to the Incumbent

In 1992, Rosauro Radovan was declared the winner of the mayoralty elections in Pagbilao, Quezon. His
rival, Evelyn Abeja, filed an election protest where she questioned the results in 22 precincts. Radovan
filed a counter protest where he questioned the results in 36 precincts with counterclaim for damages.
Abeja then caused the revision of the ballots covering the 22 precincts and paid the expenses therefor.
Abeja then urged Radovan to cause the revision of the 36 precincts he is questioning. Radovan however
refused and so Abeja filed a motion that a judgment be rendered based on the results from the 22
precincts. The original judge did not rule on the motion before he was transferred. Before the judge
could be replaced, Radovan died. Radovan was then substituted by the vice mayor (Conrado de Rama)
and Radovan’s wife, Ediltrudes. Ediltrudes substituted his deceased husband insofar as the latter’s
counterclaim for damages is concerned.

In 1993, the new judge, Federico Tañada ruled that Abeja’s motion is premature because the 36
precincts are not yet revised. Tañada agreed with Radovan that the 36 precincts may only be revised if
Abeja can show that she (Abeja) leads by at least one point vote over Radovan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judge is correct.


HELD: No. There is no rule in election protests cases which states that a protestant (Abeja) must first
show that she won in the precincts she is contesting before evidence on the protestee’s (Radovan)
counter-protest can be had. This will render the protestant’s case to be at the mercy of the protestee
who can just prolong the case until his term is over.

Also, the Supreme Court ruled that the substitution of Ediltrudes for her deceased husband is
erroneous. This is notwithstanding the counter-claim for damages in the counter protest. Public office is
personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs. The heirs may no longer
prosecute the deceased protestee’s counter-claim for damages against the protestant for that was
extinguished when death terminated his right to occupy the contested office.

Petitioner: Nat’l Land Titles and Deeds Registration Admin (NALTDRA)

Respondent: CSC; Violeta Garcia

Ponente: Campos, Jr.

FACTS:

 Garcia was an LLB grad and a first grade civil service.

 She was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII.

 She was later appointed as Deputy Register of Deeds III, upon reclassification of the
position.

 She was designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.

 Executive Order No. 649 was enacted.

 It authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National Land


Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, and it regionalized the offices of the
registers therein.

 The law imposed a new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for permanent
appointment as Deputy Register od Deeds II or higher.

 Garcia issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on temporary status for not being a
member of the Philippine Bar.

 Sec. of Justice notified Garcia of the termination of her services on the ground that she was
receiving Bribe Money.

 Garcia appealed, but the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) dropped her appeal on
the ground that the termination of her services was due to the expiration of her
temporary appointment.
 The CSC issued a resolution, directing that Garcia be restored to her position.

 According to the CSC, under the vested right theory, the new requirement of the BAR
membership will not apply to her but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer position on
or after Feb 9, 1981, the date the order took effect.

 NALTDRA assailed the validity of the CSC Resolution

ISSUE: WON membership in the bar, which is a qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to
the position of Deputy Register of Deeds under EO. No. 649, Section 4, should be applied only to new
applicants and not to those who were already in service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at the
time of the issuance and implementation of the EO.

HELD: No. The requirement shall also apply to those already in service.

RATIO:

 EO No. 649, in express terms, provided for the abolition of existing positions:

 Section 8. Abolition of Existing Positions. All structural units in the LRC and in the
registries of deeds, and all positions therein shall cease to exist from the date specified
in the implementing order to be issued by the president pursuant to the preceding par.
The pertinent functions, applicable appropriations, records, equipment and property
shall be transferred to the appropriate staff or offices therein created.

 The law, therefore, mandates that from the moment an implementing order is issued,
all positions in the LRC is deemed non-existent. This is NOT removal. Removal implied
post subsists and one is merely separated therefrom, while here, there is no position at
all. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of.

 Abolition of office is valid if (1) carried out by a legitimate body and (2) done in good faith.

(1) LEGITIMATE BODY

 In this case, it was by LEGITIMATE BODY. There is no dispute over the authority to carry
out a valid reorganization in any branch/agency of gov’t under Sec 8, Article XVII of the
1973 Consti.

(2) GOOD FAITH

 Re: good faith, if the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional
functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office different
from the one abolished, even though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old
office, it will be considered an abolition and creation of new one. The same is true if the
office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy, are given to an existing office.
 In this case, EO No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the
LRC. The requirement of Bar membership was imposed to meet changing circumstnaces
and new developments. It was imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization
measure.

 Re: “Vested right theory,” no such thing as a vested interest or estate in an office, except
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure.

JUDGMENT: Garcia has no vested property right to be re-employed in a reorganized office. She cannot
be reinstated to her former position. CSC Resolution reinstating Garcia was set aside.

Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore.
His services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like
Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises.

On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its
Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla,
a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued
to and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or
remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as
custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.

After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made
representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever
responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from
him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the
warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.

Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of
malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision
sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision
mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion
for new trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a
custodian of distrained property.

Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the
only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the
complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public
officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.

The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory
to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the
petitioner be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.

Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the
receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity
constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither
was he appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR had authority to
require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not
grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a private individual to act
as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Thus,
Azarcon is not a public officer.

David Aguila vs Melecio Genato

103 SCRA 380 – Law on Public Officers – No Vested Right to a Public Office – Continuing Eligibility

Dominador Borje was an elected member of the Board of Directors of the Misamis Occidental Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (MOELC). While still serving as a director for MOELC, he ran for an elective position to
the Sangguniang Bayan of Ozamiz City. Therafter, David Aguila of the National Electrification
Administration issued a memorandum which states that all officials and employees of electric
cooperatives who run for public office, win and assume office, shall be considered resigned. Borje won
in the elections. The other directors of MOELC then sought to enforce the memorandum against Borje.
Borje filed a petition in court questioning said memorandum. Borje claimed that the memorandum is
not applicable to him because when he assumed the Directorship in MOELC he was already qualified
and so he must be allowed to continue holding office. Judge Genato agreed with Borje and so he issued
a TRO against MOELC from considering Borje as resigned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling is correct.

HELD: No. The court has no jurisdiction over the said matter. PD 269 which created NEA provides that
electric cooperatives (like MOELC) have the right to prescribe qualifications of its directors and their
manner of election and removal. MOELC has to comply with the memorandum of NEA, a superior office
under which MOELC is being administered. Further still, Borje has not shown that he has an explicit right
to continue holding the Directorship. Further, Borje being considered resigned by reason of his election
to the Sanggunian is not merely grounded on the NEA memorandum. It is also grounded on PD 269
which provides that elective officials are ineligible to become officers and/or directors of any
cooperatives except if such elective position is no higher than a barangay captain.

There is no merit to Borje’s contention that since he was originally qualified he shall be allowed to
continue his unexpired term in MOELC. Eligibility to an office should be construed as of a continuing
nature and must exist at the commencement of the term and during occupancy of the office. Borje
ceased to be qualified and so he must be resigned from MOELC.

Ramon Labo, Jr. vs Commission on Elections

176 SCRA 1 – Law on Public Officers – Election Laws – Citizenship of a Public Officer – Dual Citizenship –
Labo Doctrine

In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for
quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that
he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an
Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino;
that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was
lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further
asserts that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality
which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.

2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace
Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.

HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was
naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an
Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of
Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980;
and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino
citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian
citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or
repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress – none of this happened.

Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not
overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by
electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The
electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at
least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them
as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.

2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be
declared the mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest
number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public
elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for
that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality
of the legal votes cast in the election.

Sec. Ricardo T. Gloria [D.E.C.S.], et al., petitioners, vs


Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr., et al., respondents.

G.R. No. 116183 October 6, 1995

FACTS:

Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) by virtue
of temporary appointments because at the time of their appointment, they lacked appropriate civil
service eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet the necessary qualification standards for their respective
positions. One of them was Rosario Cerillo who was appointed as Board Secretary II of PAFCA. However
she was relieved from the position by reason of loss of confidence. Subsequently, she was designated as
"Coordinator for Extension Services". Said appointments expired when the PAFCA was dissolved and
replaced by the PSCA (Philippine State College of Aeronautics) Aggrieved, private respondents filed a
Petition for Mandamus and Reinstatement for reinstatement before the RTC of Pasay Petitioners filed
an answer upon the ground that mandamus will not lie to compel reinstatement because the
reappointment prayed for is discretionary on the part of the appointing power (Board of Trustees).
Respondent Judge de Guzman rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of Cerillo as coordinator
for extension services. Thus, Sec. Gloria filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo is entitled to reinstatement to the position
of "Coordinator for Extension Services"?

RULING:

The judgment of respondent Judge de Guzman which orders the reinstatement of Ms. Rosario V.
Cerillo to the position of "Coordinator for Extension Services" is patently improper because it finds no
support as to facts and the law. The fact is that private respondent's assignment to the said position was
a mere designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the designation to the position cannot be the
subject of a case for reinstatement.

The fact that private respondent Cerillo passed the requisite Civil Service Examination after the
termination of her temporary appointment is no reason to compel petitioners to reappoint her.
Acquisition of civil service eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment. Still to be considered by the
appointing authority are: performance, degree of education, work experience, training, seniority, and,
more importantly, as in this case, whether or not the applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the
appointing power, considering that the position of Board Secretary II, by its nature, is primarily
confidential. Reappointment to such position is an act which is discretionary on the part of the
appointing power hence it cannot be the subject of an application for a writ of mandamus.

Reinstatement is technically issuance of a new appointment which is essentially discretionary, to


be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. Such exercise of the discretionary
power of appointment cannot be controlled, not even by the Court as long as it is exercised properly by
the appointing authority. Thus the order of the lower court for the reinstatement of the private
respondent amounts to an undue interference by the court in the exercise of a discretionary power
vested in the PSCA Board of Trustees.

To the question as to the legality of the termination of the services of the petitioners, the only
answer is there was no termination to speak of. Termination presupposes an overt act committed by a
superior officer. There was none whatsoever in the case at bar. At most, PSCA Chairman of the Board of
Trustees Col. Julian gave notice to the petitioners of the expiration of their respective contracts,
Petitioners appointment or employment simply expired either by its very own terms, or because it may
not exceed one year, but most importantly because the PAFCA was dissolved and replaced by the PSCA.

Luego vs CSC, 143 SCRA 327

(Public Officer, Appointments, CSC)


Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon.
The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,” subject to the
final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.

Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the
contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the
petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the
position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.

The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the
respondent’s appointment.

Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another
person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.

Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right
to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.

Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the
power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service…
….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required
qualifications.”

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of
the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements
are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC
Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better
qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

Rodulfo Niere vs Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental

54 SCRA 165 – Political Law – Appointments – Residual Power to Appoint

La Carlota City (Negros Occidental) was created by Republic Act 4585 in 1965.

In 1966, Rodulfo Niere was appointed by the mayor of La Carlota as the City Engineer.

In 1968, Jose Quiambao was appointed by the President as the City Engineer of the same city (La
Carlota). Quiambao’s appointment was pursuant to the Decentralization Act (effective January
1968). Sec 4 thereof provides that the position of the city engineer must be filled in by the appointment
of the President. Niere relinquished the office but it was in protest and so he filed a quo warranto case
before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Niere lost in that case and so he filed a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Nieri asserts that the charter of La Carlota provides that it is the
City Mayor who should appoint the City Engineer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nieri was legally appointed as the City Engineer.

HELD: No. It appears that the charter of La Carlota did not have a provision which authorizes the mayor
thereof to appoint the city engineer. In fact, the deliberations in Congress when La Carlota’s charter was
being drafted revealed that it was the intention of the lawmakers to exclude the position of city
engineer from among those local officers whom the mayor can appoint.

Since the city mayor, under La Carlota’s charter, is without authority to appoint the city engineer, this
prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the Philippines, who, under Section 10(3) of Article
7 of the [1935] Constitution, shall nominate “all other officers of the government whose appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for”; because when a statute does not specify how an officer is to be
appointed, the appointment must be made by the President (residual power of appointment).

The appointing power is essentially the exclusive prerogative of the President. Consequently, any
diminution in its scope must be clear and unequivocal.

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO

G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

FACTS:

On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’s EID by then
Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent
Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim
appointment. While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman
issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested
Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department.
She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads
of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period.
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300
dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.

Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also
filed an administrative and criminal complaint16 with the Law Department17against Benipayo, alleging
that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No.
3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil
service laws, rules and regulations.

During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:

We find petitioner’s argument without merit.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in
the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in
Brillantes vs. Yorac34 and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.35 The ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which
authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect
immediately.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent"36, this provision should be
harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the
independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to
make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning
and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution.

Dela Cruz v. COA

November 29, 2001

ELEANOR DELA CRUZ, FEDERICO LUCHICO, JR., SOLEDAD EMILIA CRUZ, JOEL LUSTRIA, HENRY PAREL,
HELENA HABULAN, PORFIRIO VILLENA, JOSEPH FRANCIA, CARMELLA TORRES, JOB DAVID, CESAR
MEJIA, MA. LOURDES V. DEDAL, ALICE TIONGSON, REYDELUZ CONFERIDO, PHILIPPE LIM, NERISSA
SANCHEZ, MARY LUZ ELAINE PURACAN, RODOLFO QUIMBO, TITO GENILO and OSCAR ABUNDO, as
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY FROM THE PERIOD COVERING
1991-1996, petitioners, vs.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, represented by its COMMISSIONERS, respondents.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.:

NATURE: Certiorari under ROC 65. Action arising from a COA disallowance

FACTS

 Office involved: National Housing Authority (NHA)

 Officers involved: Officials of various Cabinet-level departments who sat on the NHA Board as
alternates of the Cabinet secretaries who were ex-officio members of the NHA Board, by virtue
of PD 757§7 (the NHA Law) [THE ALTERNATES].

 Sep. 19, 1997 – In compliance with the ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, the
Commission on Audit (COA) issued a memorandum stating that EO 284 had been declared
unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies, and assistants to hold
other offices; and directing its designated auditors in all national government offices to:

o immediately cause the disallowance of additional compensation/remuneration given to


and received by government officials affected by the decision’s ruling on the multiple
position rule

o effect the refund of such payments from the time the decision became final on Feb. 22,
1991

 Oct. 23, 1997 – NHA Resident Auditor Salvador VASQUEZ thus issued a Notice of Disallowance
against the payment of representation allowances and per diems to the Cabinet members who
were ex-officio members of the NHA Board and/or their alternates who actually received such
payments.

o The total amount disallowed was P276,000, covering the years 1991-1996.

 On behalf of the alternates who received the disallowed allowances and per diems, NHA
Chairman of the Board Dionisio dela Serna appealed the disallowance on the ground that the SC
issued a resolution in the CLU case clarifying that the multiple position rule does not cover other
appointive officials whose rank was Assistant Secretary or lower; and that the alternates were
all ranked Assistant Secretary or lower.

 Sep. 22, 1998 – COA denied the appeal.

o COA conceded that the alternates were indeed ranked Asec. and lower, but ruled that
they were sitting on the NHA board by virtue of authority derived from the office of the
Cabinet secretaries they were representing. As such they are mere agents and their
right to receive benefits flows from their principals. Since their principals were barred
from receiving remuneration from the NHA under the multiple position rule, so should
the agents. The spring cannot rise higher than its source.

 The alternates filed the present petition with the SC

ISSUE (HELD): W/N the disallowance of the remuneration for the alternates of the ex-officio members of
the NHA Board is valid (YES)

RATIO

 Under §7 of the NHA Law, the following Cabinet Secretaries are mandated to sit in the NHA
Board:

o Secretary of Public Works, Transportation, and Communications

o Secretary of Finance

o Secretary of Labor

o Secretary of Industry

o Executive Secretary

o NEDA Director-General

 While the alternates are not these officials, they are their alternates, and still under §7, their
“acts shall be considered the acts of their principals”.

 CLU v. Executive Secretary is controlling: “The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices
or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed
as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise `any other office'
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of
additional duties and functions on said officials.”

 On the term ex-officio: “The term ex officio means `from office; by virtue of office'. It refers to an
`authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual
character, but rather annexed to the official position.' Ex officio likewise denotes an `act done in
an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office.' An ex officio member of a board is one who is a
member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. x x
x”

 On the right to receive remuneration for an ex officio position: "The ex officio position being
actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official
concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position.
The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached
to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a
meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in
monetary banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such
attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the
form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By
whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution."

 CAB: Petitioner officials who are on the NHA Board as ALTERNATES of the Cabinet members and
ex-officio members of the NHA are prohibited from receiving additional compensation. To rule
otherwise would be giving the alternates a better right than their principals. The alternates
cannot receive the compensation to which their principals are not entitled to in the first place.

DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.

Divinagracia, Jr. v. Sto. Tomas

May 31, 1995

J. Bellosillo

Digest by: Flores

Facts: Filomena Mancita was appointed Municipal Development Coordinator (MDC) of Pili, Camarines
Sur, in 1980 in a permanent capacity. When the Local Government Code (LGC) took effect, the office
was renamed Municipal Planning Development Coordinator (MPDC). The Sangguinang Bayan of Pili
approved a Resolution creating and organizing the Office of MPDC. Mancita held over the position until
1985.

Mayor Anastacio Prila notified Mancita that her services were being terminated on the ground that the
Office of MDC was abolished as a result of the reorganization of the local government of Pili.
Respondent Priscilla Nacario, the then Municipal Budget Officer (MBO), was appointed MPDC.

The local Budget Office, among others, was nationalized and placed under the DBM, hence, the
authority to appoint the Budget Officers devolved upon the Secretary of DBM. The position of MBO
became vacant for more than a year (March 1990-Sept 1991) due to the lack of a qualified candidate.
Petitioner Alexis San Luis, Cashier II of the DENR (started his career as casual clerk in 1977 and continued
rising from the ranks), was temporarily appointed MBO of Pili by DBM Sec. Guillermo Carague on Oct
1991. By virtue of the 1991 LGC, control over the Local Government Officers Services was returned to
the LGUs. San Luis was reappointed to the same position in June 1992, in a permanent capacity, by
petitioner Mayor Delfin Divinagracia of Pili.

Mancita appealed her termination to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB).

MSPB: Mancita’s termination was illegal. The Office of the MDC was abolished by the LGC of 1991, not
by the reorganization of the Municipality of Pili. Mancita was in fact qualified for the MPDC since the
powers and duties of the two positions were essentially the same. Mayor Divinagracia was ordered to
reinstate Mancita and to pay backwages.

CSC: Appeal by Mayor Divinagracia dismissed.

Mayor Divinagracia informed Nacario that she was being terminated in compliance with the MSPB
decision. Nacario filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction praying for the annulment of the CSC Resolution. RTC issued a TRO. Mancita then filed a
motion to dismiss but this was denied. Then she filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
before the SC, which was granted.

Pending the SC decision, Nacario asked the CSC about her status a s a permanent employee of the
Municipality of Pili after she had accepted the position of MPDC.

CSC: Mancita’s reinstatement was not a valid cause for Nacario’s termination, and since the latter was
the former MBO, she had the right to return to said position.

Mayor Divinagracia sought reconsideration of the CSC opinion, arguing that San Luis was validly
appointed by the DBM Secretary and confirmed by the CSC, hence, entitled to security of tenure.

CSC: Denied. Nacario is entitled to security of tenure. The reinstatement of Mancita to MPDC could not
be a valid cause for termination of Nacario. It relied on Sec. 13, Rule VI of the IRR of EO 292 (mandates
the return of an appointee, in a chain of promotions, to his former position once appointment is
subsequently disapproved) in directing restoration of Nacario to her former position.

Issues:

1. Whether Sec. 13, Rule VI of the IRR of EO 292, is applicable to this case.  NO
2. Whether the lateral transfer of Nacario was validly made in accordance with Sec. 5, par. 3, Rule
Vii, IRR of EO 2921.  NO

Dispositive: Petition dismissed. Incumbent Mayor ordered to reinstate Nacario to the Office of MBO of
Pili and to order San Luis to vacate said office without prejudice to his regaining his former position if
legally feasible and warranted.

Ratio:

1. Petitioners argue that the provision does not apply to this case because the rule covers only
appointments in a chain of promotions and not where a public officer was merely transferred to another
position of the same rank, grade and level.

Public Respondents insist on the application of the automatic revision rule. The term “chain of
promotions” must not be interpreted in a literal, rigid and narrow sense, but must construed liberally in
favor of Nacario who merely accepted the position to accommodate her superior, unaware that her new
appointment would be disapproved.

SC: Under the provision, before a public official or employee can automatically be restored to her
former position, there must first be a series of promotions; second, all appointments are simultaneously
submitted to the CSC for approval; and third, the CSC disapproves the appointment of a person
proposed to a higher position.

These requisites are not present in this case. The movement of Nacario from MBO to MPDC cannot be
considered a promotion, which connotes an increase in duties and responsibilities as well as a
corresponding increase in salary.

Nacario’s movement was one of lateral transfer. The office of MPDC is not burdened with more duties
and responsibilities than the MBO. On the contrary, there was a reduction in her basic salary. Moreover,
Nacario admitted that the position of MBO and MPDC were of the same rank, salary grade and level.
This was attested to by the HR Management Officer of Pili, citing the Position Allocation List of the
municipality.

1 Transfer shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in which case, the employee concerned shall be
informed of the reasons therefor. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the
commission.
The appointments of the parties concerned were not simultaneously submitted to the CSC for approval.
Nacario’s permanent appointment was approved on June 1985, while the appointment of San Luis was
approved on Feb 1993. The ouster of Nacario from MPDC was a result of the MSBP decision and not by
CSC’s disapproval of her appointment.

2. Petitioners contend that Nacario was deemed to have vacated her position as MBO when she
accepted her appointment as MPDC, considering that there were several appointments made in the
MBO in the past 8 years since her transfer.

On the other hand, Nacario maintains she did not voluntarily apply for transfer but was merely
constrained to accept the new position because of then Mayor Prila; she was merely a “passive
participant in the movement of personnel” in the municipal government. Her acceptance of the MPDC
position, which is of the same rank, salary grade and level as MBO, was motivated by her respect for
Mayor Prila as her superior.

SC: The submissive attitude displayed by Nacario was understandable because it is not common among
local officials to oppose or question the incumbent local executive on his policies and decisions no
matter how improper they may seem.

It appears that Mayor Prila was so determinated in terminating Mancita that it was only 7 days after
Nacario’s appointment when he informed Mancita that her services were being terminated. Nacario was
appointed to a position which was not even vacant at the time. Although she continued to discharge her
duties, she was not discouraged to regain her former position as she still applied with the Office of the
DBM Secretary; however she was not successful.

Sta. Maria v. Lopez: A transfer is a "movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank,
level and salary, without break in service." Promotion is the "advancement from one position to another
with an increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and is usually accompanied by an
increase in salary" A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a
transfer that aims to "lure the employee away from his permanent position," cannot be done without
the employees' consent. For that would constitute removal from office. Indeed, no permanent transfer
can take place unless the officer or employee is first removed from the position held, and then
appointed to another position. xxx Concededly there are transfers which do not amount to removal.
Some such transfers can be effected without the need for charges being proffered, without trial or
hearing, and even without the consent of the employee. The clue to such transfers may be found in the
"nature of the appointment." Where the appointment does not indicate a specific station, an employee
may be transferred or assigned provided the transfer affects no substantial change in title, rank and
salary. Such a rule does not proscribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the
head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of
the agency. Neither does illegality attach to the transfer or reassignment of an officer pending the
determination of an administrative charge against him; or to the transfer of an employee, from his
assigned station to the main office, effected in good faith and in the interest of the service pursuant to
Sec. 32 of the Civil Service Act.

The uncontested transfer of Nacario from the MBO to the MPDC was arbitrary for it amounted to
removal without cause, hence, anathema to security of tenure. When she was extended a permanent
appointment and assumed the position, she acquired a legal, not merely an equitable, right to the
position. Such right to security of tenure is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution
and cannot be taken away from her either by removal, transfer or by revocation of appointment, except
for cause and after prior notice.

Consequently, Nacario could not be said to have vacated her former position when she accepted the
position of MPDC since she could not be deemed to have been separated from or to have terminated
her official relations with her former position. The principle of estoppel cannot bar her from returning to
her former position because of the fact that she reluctantly and hesitantly accepted the second office.
The element of involuntariness tainted her lateral transfer and invalidated her separation from her
former position.

Furthermore, the appointment of San Luis as MBO carried with it a condition: “provided that the
separation of the former incumbent is in order.” Since the separation of Nacario was not in order, San
Luis should relinquish his position in favor of the former, without prejudice to his right to be reinstated
to his former position as Cashier II of DENR.

J. Davide, Jr. dissenting:

It is Nacario who should bear the prejudicial consequence of the reinstatement of Mancita to the
position of MPDC. In restoring Nacario to the position of MBO and ousting therefrom San Luis, the CSC
acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Nacario voluntarily accepted her appointment as MPDC, thereby effectively relinquishing and
abandoning her position as MBO. She held the new position continuously and uninterruptedly until she
was told to vacate it to comply with the decision of the MSPB reinstating Mancita. She was also fully
aware of the fact that several persons had succeeded her as MBO. Contrary to Nacario's explanation
that she assumed the new position only in order to comply with the move of Mayor Prila, she appeared
to have relished the prestige and ascendancy of her new office and the challenge of a new role as
coordinator of planning and development in the municipality. If indeed she was "forced" to accept the
new position, then she could have requested Mayor Divinagracia, to return her to the position of MBO.
Her transfer to the position of MPDC was not an “unconsented lateral transfer.” There was no reception
of evidence before the CSC, but merely a letter-query from Nacario inquiring about her status as
permanent employee of the Municipality, which seems to be a last-ditch effort at damage control after
she realized her fatal mistake of invoking the RTC’s jurisdiction to set aside the CSC resolution
reinstating Mancita. By then, she had already lost her period to seek relief from said resolution.

The appointment of San Luis as MPDC was regularly done and without any protest from Nacario.
Nacario had lost her position as MBO by voluntarily accepting her appointment as MPDC and voluntarily
and faithfully serving the new office. She must be barred on the ground of estoppel. If there is any party
whose security of tenure should be protected, it is San Luis.

Debulgado vs CSC

Facts:

 Petitioner Mayor Rogelio Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros
Occidental.

 He promoted his wife, petitioner Victoria Debulgado, as General Services Officer, that is, as head
of the Office of General Services of the City Government of San Carlos.

 Before her promotion, petitioner Victoria had been in the service of the City Government for
about thirty-two (32) years and she rose from the ranks by successively occupying different
government offices.

 Public respondent CSC received a letter from Congressman Tranquilino Carmona of the First
District of Negros Occidental, calling attention to the promotional appointment issued by
petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife.

 After investigation, the CSC disapproved the promotion of petitioner Victoria to the position
upon the ground that that promotion violated the statutory prohibition against nepotic
appointments.

 Petitioners moved for reconsideration, contending that

 The statutory prohibition against nepotism was not applicable to the appointment of Victoria as
General Services Officer since the prohibition applies only to original appointments and not to
promotional appointments
o Petitioners believe that because petitioner Victoria was already in the service of the
City Government before she married petitioner Mayor, the reason behind the
prohibition no longer applied to her promotional appointment.

o Petitioners also affirm that petitioner Victoria deserves to be promoted to General


Services Officer, considering her long and faithful service to the City Government.

 The CSC had deprived petitioner Victoria of her right to due process by unilaterally revoking her
appointment. Petitioners assert that Victoria can no longer be removed from the position of
General Services Officer without giving her an opportunity to be heard and to answer the
charged of nepotism.

Petitioner Mayor denies that he had been motivated by personal reasons when he appointed his wife to
the new post.

 He states that his wife was the most qualified among the candidates for appointment to that
position, she having worked for the City Government for thirty-two (32) years and being highly
recommended by the OIC-Treasurer of San Carlos City.

 It is also claimed by petitioner Mayor that his choice of his wife for the position was concurred in
by the Sangguniang Panglungsod.

 He further avers that he had consulted the Field and Regional Officers of the CSC in Bacolod City,
and raised the question of applicability of the prohibition against nepotism to the then proposed
promotion of his wife in one of the seminars conducted by the Commission's Regional Office
held in San Carlos City. According to petitioner Mayor, one Gregorio C. Agdon, a supervising
personnel specialist in the Commission's Bacolod Office, informed him that the promotional
appointment was not covered by the prohibition.

Issue:

Does the prohibition against nepotism apply to promotional appointments as well? YES.

Held:

FIRST ISSUE
The prohibition against nepotism applies to BOTH original and promotional appointments. Both an
original appointment and a promotion are particular species of personnel action, which must comply
with the prohibition against nepotism.

 The original appointment of a civil service employee and all subsequent personnel actions
undertaken by or in respect of that employee such as promotion, transfer, reinstatement,
reemployment, etc., must comply with the Implementing Rules including, of course, the
prohibition against nepotism

 The purpose is to ensure that all appointments and other personnel actions in the civil
service should be based on merit and fitness and should never depend on how close or
intimate an appointee is to the appointing power.

 The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public service is set out in Section 59, Book V of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (also known as EO 292) under Section 59:

 All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any
branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority,
or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate
supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.

 As used in this Section the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are
those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.”

 The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons
employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full
report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission.

 The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be applicable to the case of a
member of any family who, after his or her appointment to any position in an office or
bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which event
the employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.

 In order to give immediate effect to these provisions, cases of previous appointment


which are in contravention hereof shall be corrected by transfer and pending such
transfer, no promotion or salary increase shall be allowed in favor of the relative or
relatives who were appointed in violation of these provisions.

 The prohibition was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms.

 Firstly, it explicitly covers "all appointments," without seeking to make any distinction between
differing kinds or types of appointments.

 Secondly, Section 59 covers all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal
government, as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all government owned or
controlled corporations.
 Thirdly, there is a list of exceptions set out in Section 59 itself, but it is a short exclusive list: (a)
persons employed in a confidential capacity; (b) teachers; (c) physicians; and (d) members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The subsequent marriage of one to the other of petitioners did not retroactively convert the original
appointment of petitioner Victoria into a prohibited nepotic one.

 It is the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor to petitioner Victoria in 1 October


1982 that is at stake.

It is essential to stress, however, that the prohibition applies quite without regard to the actual merits of
the proposed appointee and to the good intentions of the appointing or recommending authority, and
that the prohibition against nepotism in appointments whether original or promotional, is not intended
by the legislative authority to penalize faithful service.

 The purpose of Section 59 is precisely to take out of the discretion of the appointing and
recommending authority the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative.

 In other words, Section 59 insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official by
preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested.

 The importance of this statutory objective is difficult to overstress in the culture in which we live
and work in the Philippines, where family bonds remain, in general, compelling and cohesive.

SECOND ISSUE

The promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria as formerly approved by the CSC did not vest in her
a right to that position, therefore, she was not deprived of due process when she was terminated.

 Victoria was not deprived due process as there were no administrative charges in respect of
which she would have been entitled to notice and hearing.

 The CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, only examines the conformity of the
appointment with applicable provisions of law and whether the appointee possesses all the
minimum qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
 At all events, as the Solicitor General has noted, petitioner Victoria was afforded an opportunity
to be heard when she filed an MR with the CSC and there challenged the disapproval by the
Commission.

Since the promotional appointment in favor of petitioner Victoria was a violation of Section 59, it was
null and void from the beginning. A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part
of the holder of such appointment.

 The CSC is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel
actions, e.g., promotions.

 Such power includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of
applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations.

 Section 20 of Rule VI of the Omnibus Implementing Rules makes this clear:

 Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on
any of the following grounds:

(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency's Merit Promotion Plan;

(b) Failure to pass through the agency's Selection/Promotion Board;

(c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to
promotion; or

(d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.

 The recall or withdrawal by the CSC of the approval which had been issued by one of its Field
Officers, Director Escobia, was accordingly lawful and appropriate, the promotional
appointment of petitioner Victoria being void "from the beginning."

 The approval issued by Director Escobia did not, as it could not, cure the intrinsic vice of that
appointment.