SECOND DIVISION
:
[G.R. No. 96914. July 23, 1992.]
CECILIA U. LEDESMA, Petitioner, v. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, and JOSE T. DIZON,
Respondents.
Edgar V. Mendoza and Epifania N. Mendoza for
Petitioner.
Gaudioso C. de Lunas for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1508; PERSONAL
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN PARTIES
MANDATED BY SECTION 9 THEREOF;
RATIONALE; EXCEPTIONS TO PERSONAL
CONFRONTATION; CASE AT BAR. — As stated
earlier, Section 9 of P.D 1508 mandates personal
confrontation of the parties because: ". . . a personal
confrontation between the parties without the
intervention of a counsel or representative would
generate spontaneity and a favorable disposition to
amicable settlement on the part of the disputants. In
other words, the said procedure is deemed conducive
to the successful resolution of the dispute at the
barangay level." Petitioner tries to show that her
failure to personally appear before the Barangay
Chairman was because of her recurring psychological
ailments. But for the entire year of 1988 —
specifically September to December 6 -- there is no
indication at all that petitioner went to see her
psychiatrist for consultation. The only conclusion is
that 1988 was a lucid interval for petitioner. There
was, therefore, no excuse then for her non-
appearance at the Lupon Chairman’s office.
Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent,
cannot be represented by counsel or even by
attorney-in-fact who is next of kin. As explained by
the Minister of Justice with whom We agree: "To
ensure compliance with the requirement of personal
confrontation between the parties, and thereby, the
effectiveness of the barangay conciliation
proceedings as a mode of dispute resolution, the
above-quoted provision is couched in mandatory
language. Moreover, pursuant to the familiar maxim
in statutory construction dictating that ‘expressio
unius est exclusio alterius,’ the express exceptions
made regarding minors and incompetents must be
construed as exclusive of all others not mentioned.
Petitioner’s non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of
P.D. 1508 legally barred her from pursuing the
ejectment case in the MTC of Manila. Having arrived
at this conclusion, there is no need for Us to discuss
the other issues involved.
2. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, ISSUE OF
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTIONS 6 AND 9
OF P.D. 1508 RAISED IN TRIAL COURT BY
ALLEGATIONS IN THE ANSWER. — We do not
agree with petitioner that the issue of non-compliance
with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 was raised only
for the first time in the Court of Appeals. When
private respondent stated that he was never
summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay
Chairman, he, in effect, was stating that since he was
never summoned, he could not appear in person for
the needed confrontation of the parties before the
Lupon Chairman for conciliation and/or amicable
settlement. Without the mandatory personal
confrontation, no complaint could be filed with the
MTC. Private respondent’s allegation in paragraph 4
of his Answer that he was never summoned or
subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman; that plaintiff
has no cause of action against him as alleged in
paragraph 7 of the Answer; and that the certification
to file action was improperly issued in view of the
foregoing allegations thereby resulting in non-
compliance with the mandatory requirements of P.D.
No. 1508, as stated in paragraph 8 of the Answer are
in substantial compliance with the raising of said
issues and/or objections in the court below.
DECISION
NOCON, J.
Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma prays before this Court
for the reversal of the Decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals of August 30, 1990 1 ordering the
dismissal of her ejectment complaint before the
Manila Metropolitan Trial Court for lack of cause of
action due to non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9
of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) as
well as the Resolution of January 7, 1991 2 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of said
Decision.
The facts of this case as summarized by the petitioner
in her Memorandum are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Petitioner is the owner-lessor of an apartment
building located at 800-802 Remedios Street, Malate,
Manila. Two (2) units of said apartment building
were leased (now being unlawfully occupied) to
private respondent at monthly rates of P3,450.00 for
the unit/apartment located at 800 Remedios Street,
Malate, Manila and P2,300.00 for the unit/apartment
located at 802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila,
respectively, . . . .
"Said lease was originally covered by written
contracts of lease both dated December 10, 1984 and
except for the rates and duration, the terms and
conditions of said contracts were impliedly renewed
on a `month-to-month’ basis pursuant to Article 1670
of the Civil Code.
"One of the terms and conditions of the said Contract
of Lease, that of monthly rental payments, was
violated by private respondent and that as of October
31, 1988, said private respondent has incurred arrears
for both units in the total sum of P14,039.00 for
which letters of demand were sent to, and received
by, private Respondent.
"Upon failure of private respondent to honor the
demand letters, petitioner referred the matter to the
Barangay for conciliation which eventually issued a
certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted by
her son, Raymond U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer)
during the barangay proceeding as she was suffering
from recurring psychological and emotional ailment
as can be seen from the receipts and prescriptions
issued by her psychiatrist copies of which are
attached as Annexes `E-E10’ of the said Petition.
"Due to the stubborn refusal of the private respondent
to vacate the premises petitioner was constrained to
retain the services of counsel to initiate this ejectment
proceeding." 3
The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila,
rendered a decision on June 21, 1989 ordering private
respondent to vacate the premises, to pay rentals
falling due after May 1989 and to pay attorney’s fees
in the amount of P2,500.00. 4 The Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch IX, on appeal, affirmed the
MTC ruling except for the award of attorney’s fees
which it reduced to P1,000.00. 5
Private respondent, however, found favor with the
respondent Court of Appeals when he elevated the
case in a Petition for Review, when it ruled,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision dated October
13, 1989 of the RTC of Manila, Br. IX in Civil Case
No. 89-49672 is reversed and set aside and the
Complaint for Ejectment against petitioner is
dismissed for lack of cause of action. No costs." 6
Thus, this appeal, raising several assignments of
error, namely, that the Court of Appeals erred —
1. In holding that private respondent raised the
issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of
P.D. 1508 in the lower court when in fact and in truth
his answer and position paper failed to do so,
contrary to evidence on record;
2. In failing to consider that private respondent
had waived his right to question the lack of cause of
action of the complaint, if there is any, contrary to
law, established jurisprudence, and evidence on
record;
3. In giving undue weight and credence to the
self-serving allegations of the private respondent that
summons was not served him, contrary to law,
established jurisprudence and evidence on record.
4. In disregarding the well-known principle of
law that barangay authorities are presumed to have
performed their official duties and to have acted
regularly in issuing the certificate to file action and
grossly and manifestly erred in making an opposite
conclusion to this effect, contrary to law, established
jurisprudence and evidence on record.
5. In not holding that the settlement was
repudiated, contrary to law and evidence on record.
6. In not affirming the judgment rendered by
the Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial
Court below.
Petitioner assails private respondent for raising the
issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of
P.D. 1508 only in his petition for review with the
appellate court and which mislead the court to
erroneously dismiss her complaint for ejectment.
Section 6 of P.D. 1508 states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of
complaint. — No complaint, petition, action or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority
of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be
filed or instituted in court or any other government
office for adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon
Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the
Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement
has been repudiated. . . .
x x x the complaint) was improperly or irregularly issued
while Section 9 states that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 9. Appearance of parties in person. — In all
proceedings provided for herein, the parties must
appear in person without the assistance of
counsel/representative, with the exception of minors
and incompetents who may be assisted by their next
of kin who are not lawyers."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been
raised by private respondent in the court below,
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, specially
in the Court of Appeals, citing Saludes v. Pajarillo. 7
Private respondent had waived said objection,
following the line of reasoning in Royales v.
Intermediate Appellate Court. 8
Private respondent denies having waived the defenses
of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D.
1508. His Answer before the Metropolitan Trial
Court, specifically paragraphs 4, 7 & 8, substantially
raised the fact of non-compliance by petitioner with
Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 and consequently,
subjected petitioner’s complaint to dismissal for lack
of cause of action, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
x x x
"4. Answering defendant denies the allegations
of paragraph 8, the truth of the matter being that he
was not duly summoned nor subpoenaed by the
Barangay Chairman, who issued the alluded
certification, to appear for hearing." 9
x x x
"7. Plaintiff has no cause of action against
answering defendant.
"8. The certification to file action (annex D of
as the defendant was never summoned nor
subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman to appear for
hearing in connection with the alleged complaint of
the plaintiff. In effect the mandatory provision of
P.D. 1508 was not complied with warranting the
dismissal of the instant complaint."cralaw virtua1aw
library
x x x 10
We do not agree with petitioner that the issue of non-
compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 was
raised only for the first time in the Court of Appeals.
When private respondent stated that he was never
summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay
Chairman, he, in effect, was stating that since he was
never summoned, he could not appear in person for
the needed confrontation of the parties before the
Lupon Chairman for conciliation and/or amicable
settlement. Without the mandatory personal
confrontation, no complaint could be filed with the
MTC. Private respondent’s allegation in paragraph 4
of his Answer that he was never summoned or
subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman; that plaintiff
has no cause of action against him as alleged in
paragraph 7 of the Answer; and that the certification
to file action was improperly issued in view of the
foregoing allegations thereby resulting in non-
compliance with the mandatory requirements of P.D.
No. 1508, as stated in paragraph 8 of the Answer are
in substantial compliance with the raising of said
issues and/or objections in the court below.
Petitioner would like to make it appear to this Court
that she appeared before the Lupon Chairman to
confront private Respondent. She stated in her
Petition 11 and her Memorandum 12
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Upon failure of private respondent to honor the
demand letters, petitioner referred the matter to the
barangay for conciliation which eventually issued a
certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted by
her son, Raymond U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer)
during the barangay proceeding as she was suffering
from recurring psychological and emotional ailment
as can be seen from the receipt and prescriptions
issued by her psychiatrist copies of which are
attached herewith as Annexes ‘E-E10’."cralaw
virtua1aw library
However, as found out by the respondent
court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We agree with the petitioner that private respondent
Cecile Ledesma failed to comply with section 6 of
P.D. 1508. The record of the case is barren showing
compliance by the private Respondent. Indeed, the
documentary evidence of the private respondent
herself attached to the complaint buttresses this
conclusion. They show that it is not the private
respondent but her son, Raymund U. Ledesma, and
her lawyer, Atty. Epifania Navarro who dealt with
the petitioner regarding their dispute. Thus, the
demand letter dated October 18, 1988 sent to the
petitioner for payment of rentals in the sum of
P14,039.00 was signed by Raymund Ledesma. On
the other hand, the demand letter dated November 14,
1988 was signed by Atty. Epifania Navarro. More
telling is the Certification to File Action signed by
Barangay Chairman, Alberto A. Solis where it
appears that the complainant is Raymund U.
Ledesma and not the private Respondent." 13
As stated earlier, Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates
personal confrontation of the parties
because:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . a personal confrontation between the parties
without the intervention of a counsel or
representative would generate spontaneity and a
favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the
part of the disputants. In other words, the said
procedure is deemed conducive to the successful
resolution of the dispute at the barangay level." 14
Petitioner tries to show that her failure to personally
appear before the Barangay Chairman was because of
her recurring psychological ailments. But for the
entire year of 1988 15 — specifically September to
December 6 — there is no indication at all that
petitioner went to see her psychiatrist for
consultation. The only conclusion is that 1988 was a
lucid interval for petitioner. There was, therefore, no
excuse then for her non-appearance at the Lupon
Chairman’s office.
Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent,
cannot be represented by counsel or even by
attorney-in-fact who is next of kin. 16
As explained by the Minister of Justice with whom
We agree:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To ensure compliance with the requirement of
personal confrontation between the parties, and
thereby, the effectiveness of the barangay
conciliation proceedings as a mode of dispute
resolution, the above-quoted provision is couched in
mandatory language. Moreover, pursuant to the
familiar maxim in statutory construction dictating
that `expressio unius est exclusio alterius’, the
express exceptions made regarding minors and
incompetents must be construed as exclusive of all
others not mentioned." 17
Petitioner’s non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of
P.D. 1508 legally barred her from pursuing the
ejectment case in the MTC of Manila. 18 Having
arrived at this conclusion, there is no need for Us to
discuss the other issues involved.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and
resolution of the respondent Court are affirmed in
toto with treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-85475 June 30, 1989
MANUEL A. RAMOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
DOMINGO RAMOS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Domingo Ramos authorized his brother Manuel
Ramos to sell his share of certain lands owned by
them in common with their other brothers and sisters.
Manuel did. Later, Domingo revoked the power of
attorney and demanded an accounting from Manuel.
Manuel refused. Domingo then filed a complaint with
the Punong Barangay of Pampanga, Buhangin
District, City of Davao, which was docketed as Case
No. 008-87. 1 The Punong Barangay scheduled a
hearing on March 14, 1987. 2 Manuel appeared but
Domingo did not. He was represented, however, by
his wife who said her husband wanted to avoid a
direct confrontation with his brother. 3 She requested
that the Punong Barangay issue a certification that no
settlement had been reached so a complaint could be
filed in court. The Punong Barangay complied. 4
Thereupon, Domingo sued Manuel in the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, also for accounting, in
Civil Case No. 18560-87.
Manuel moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of non-compliance with the requirements of
P.D. No. 1508. Specifically, he cited the failure of the
Punong Barangay to refer the dispute to the Pangkat
ng Tagapagkasundo after the unsuccessful mediation
proceedings convened by him. The motion was
denied. 5 Manuel then filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari which we referred to the Court of
Appeals. That court denied the petition. It held that
there was no need for such referral because Domingo
had clearly indicated, by his refusal to appear before
the Punong Barangay, that no extrajudicial settlement
was possible between him and his brother. 6 Manuel
is now before us to question this decision.
We hold for the petitioner.
The applicable provisions of P.D. No. 1508
(Emphasis supplied) are as follows:
SEC. 4. Procedure for amicable settlement. —
a) Who may initiate proceedings. — Any individual
who has a cause of action against another individual
involving any matter within the authority of the
Lupon as provided in Section 2 may complain orally
or in writing, to the Barangay Captain of the
barangay referred to in Section 3 hereof.
b) Mediation by Barangay Captain. — Upon receipt
of the complaint, the Barangay Captain shall within
the next working day summon the respondent/s, with
notice to the complainant's for them and their
witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of
their conflicting interests. If he fails in his effort
within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the
parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for
the constitution of the Pangkat in accordance with the
provisions of Section 1 of this Decree.
c) Hearing before the Pangkat. — The Pangkat shall
convene not later than three (3) days from its
constitution, on the day and hour set by the Barangay
Captain, to hear both parties and their witnesses,
simplify issues, and explore all possibilities for
amicable settlement. For this purpose, the Pangkat
may issue summons for the personal appearance of
parties and witnesses before it.
xxx
d) Sanctions. — Refusal or willfull failure of any
party or witness to appear in compliance with the
summons issued pursuant to the preceding two (2)
paragraphs may be punished by the city or municipal
court as for indirect contempt of court upon
application filed therewith by the Lupon Chairman,
the Pangkat Chairman, or by any of the parties.
Further, such refusal or willful failure to appear shall
be reflected in the records of the Lupon Secretary or
in the minutes of the Pangkat Secretary and shall bar
the complainant from seeking judicial recourse for
the same cause of action, and the respondent, from
filing any counterclaim arising out of or necessarily
connected therewith.
xxx
SEC. 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of
complaint. — No complaint, petition, action or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority
of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be
filed or instituted in court or any other government
office for adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon
Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the
Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement
has been repudiated.
It is clear from the above rules that the dispute should
not have ended with the mediation proceedings
before the Punong Barangay because of his failure to
effect a settlement between the brothers. One purpose
of P.D. 1508 is precisely to effect a confrontation
between the parties in the hope that they can resolve
their differences without resort to the courts of
justice. Obviously, this purpose would be nullified if
the matter were to be considered closed simply
because either of the parties refuses to confront the
other.
It was not for the Punong Barangay to say that
referral to the Pangkat was no longer necessary
merely because he himself had failed to work out an
agreement between the petitioner and the private
respondent. Indeed, it is possible that the Pangkat
could have exerted more efforts and succeeded
(where he had not) in resolving the dispute. The
Punong Barangay could in fact have even issued
summons to compel the attendance of Domingo
Ramos, who was the complainant himself in the
mediation hearing. It seems the Punong Barangay
had not tried hard enough. In any event, the
certification he issued was certainly premature and
did not authorize immediate recourse to judicial
action.
The case of Alinsugay v. Cagampang, 7 which was
applied by respondent court, is not on all fours with
the petition at bar. There the parties claiming non-
compliance with P.D. 1508 were the very parties who
did not appear at the mediation proceedings before
the Punong Barangay. The defendants in the case
were the respondents who had earlier disregarded the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law and were later
inconsistently invoking its provisions.
In the case before us, it is Manuel Ramos, the
respondent in the barangay proceedings, who actually
appeared therein and is now invoking the non-
appearance of Domingo Ramos, the complainant
himself. Domingo, the herein private respondent, is
the party who did not appear to support his own
complaint before the Punong Barangay. He invoked
the Punong Barangay's jurisdiction and then
disregarded it. Under Section 4(d), he is now barred,
as complainant in the barangay proceedings, "from
seeking judicial recourse for the same cause of
action."
justifiable. Mere refusal to appear at the
confrontation as required by the law, when the party
invoking P.D. 1508 is the one who disregarded it, is
not a justifiable reason.
It remains to add that the other purpose of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law is to relieve the trial
courts of cases among neighbors that hopefully can
be settled through the mediation of their peers in
peaceful and even friendly confrontations. This
purpose could be defeated if such cases were allowed
immediate access to the already clogged judicial
dockets simply because one of the parties is
unwilling to submit to justice at the barangay level.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
appealed decision is REVERSED. The respondent
judge is ordered to DISMISS Civil Case No. 18560-
87. Costs against the private respondent.
S0 ORDERED.

Domingo argues that he did appear through his wife,

but this was not permitted by P.D. No. 1508. Its
Section 9 reads:

Appearance of parties in person. — In all

proceedings provided for herein, the parties must
appear in person without the assistance of
counsel/representative, with the exception of minors
and incompetents who may be assisted by their next
of kin who are not lawyers.

In Alinsugay, the Court said that "where one party

fails to appear for no justifiable reason, convening the
Pangkat as a necessary second step will serve no
useful purpose." True, but we must stress the word
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 80264 May 31, 1989
SAN MIGUEL VILLAGE SCHOOL, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE AMIR PUKUNUM D. PUNDOGAR
and CHRISTINA TRIÑO, respondents.
Estelito R. Alvia for petitioner.
Macalalag Law Office & Associates for private
respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 2 October 1985, petitioner San Miguel Village
School filed a complaint for breach of contract with
damages against respondent Christina Triño, before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Lanao del Norte,
the complaint being docketed as Civil Case No. L-
111-577. A Certificate to File Action, signed by the
Barangay Captain of Barangay Palao, Iligan City,
dated 17 September 1985, bearing the notation that
the "respondent cannot be contacted," was filed along
with the complaint.
Summons was served upon the private respondent
through her husband. On 22 November 1985, private
respondent having failed to file an answer within the
reglementary period, the petitioner School moved to
declare her in default. The trial court granted the
motion, declared private respondent in default and
designated the Branch Clerk of Court to receive the
evidence of the petitioner and thereafter to report
back to the court.
From the evidence received by the Branch Clerk of
Court from the petitioner, the following facts
emerged:
On 9 May 1985, petitioner, a duly accredited private
school located at Barangay Palao, Iligan City, entered
into a contract of services with private respondent
Christina Triño. Under that contract, Christina Triño
would teach at the petitioner School during the
schoolyear 1985-1986, which would commence in
June 1985 and end in March 1986. She was assigned
to take charge of Grade VI, Intermediate Department.
The contract also provided that any party desiring to
terminate the contract before its scheduled expiration,
would give the other party at least one month notice
of termination in writing. Sometime in August 1985,
while the contract was in full force and effect, and
during a final examination period, private respondent
suddenly stopped teaching at the petitioner School,
without giving notice of termination and thereby
causing not inconsiderable difficulties for the School.
Petitioner School immediately sought the assistance
of the Barangay Captain of Palao and the
commencement of conciliation proceedings, This
attempt failed because private respondent could not
be contacted, she having left Iligan City and having
secured a better paying job at the Philippine Refugee
Center based in Manila.
On 26 January 1986, the trial court then presided
over by Judge Magadapa Rasuman rendered a
decision against private respondent, the dispositive
portion of which read as follows:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing
consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff, San Miguel Village School and
against defendant, Christina Triño as follows;
1. Ordering defendant to pay all compensatory
damages to the plaintiff, the amount of P8,400.00;
2. To pay plaintiff, the amount of P5,000.00, as
moral damages;
3. To pay attorney's fees of P5,000.00, and
4. To pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
Four (4) months later, on 15 May 1986, private
respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment
with the trial court, alleging that the court had no
jurisdiction to render its decision dated 26 January
1986 for failure of petitioner to go through the
mandatory conciliation procedure prescribed by
Sections 2 and 6 of P.D. No. 1508. Private
respondent argued that the certification of the
Barangay Captain of Palao dated 17 September 1985
was inadequate compliance with P.D. No. 1508,
private respondent being a resident, not of Barangay
Palao, Iligan City, but rather of Barangay Tomas
Cabili, Iligan City.
Almost a year later, on 6 April 1987, the trial court,
this time presided over by respondent Judge Amir
Pukunum D. Pundogar, issued an order upholding
private respondent's contentions and setting aside the
assailed decision of 26 January 1986. In his order,
while Judge Pundogar acknowledged the impropriety
of the Petition for Relief from Judgment, he
nonetheless in effect granted the relief sought,
holding that the Regional Trial Court in rendering the
decision dated 26 January 1986, acted without
jurisdiction "over the parties and the subject matter of
the action" 1 for failure of petitioner to comply with
the requirements of P. D. No. 1508. A Motion for
Reconsideration by petitioner was denied by the
respondent Judge.
In the instant Petition, it is vigorously contended by
petitioner that the trial court had jurisdiction to render
its decision of 26 January 1986.
The Court notes, at the outset, that respondent Judge
in fact granted the Petition for Relief from Judgment
not because he found one or more of the grounds
specified in Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Revised
Rules of Court (fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence) but rather because respondent Judge
found his predecessor in the same court to have acted
without jurisdiction.
It is, however, firmly settled 2 that failure of a
plaintiff to comply with the requirements of P.D. No.
1508 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court that
tried the action. In, e.g., Millare v. Hernando, the
Court stressed that "the conciliation procedure
required under P.D. No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional
requirement in the sense that failure to have prior
recourse to such procedure would not deprive a court
of its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or
over the person of the defendant." 3 Failure of a
plaintiff to go through the conciliation procedure
established by P.D. No. 1508 merely affects the
sufficiency, or the maturity or ripeness of the
plaintiffs cause of action and the complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss, not on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, but rather for want of cause of
action or for prematurity. 4 Respondent Judge was
thus in palpable error in holding his predecessor
without jurisdiction to render the assailed decision.
Respondent Judge was equally in error when he
either disregarded or misconstrued the Certificate to
File Action, dated 17 September 1985, which had
been, issued by the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Palao.
Respondent Judge simply said apropos this
Certificate to File Action, that no "confrontation" had
taken place between petitioner and private respondent
before the Barangay authorities and immediately
concluded that the requirements of P.D. No. 1508 had
been violated. There is no question that the
"confrontation" or conciliation proceedings did not
materialize here, since private respondent did not
appear before the Lupon. Where, however, the
defendant in an action fails for one reason or another
to respond to a notice to appear before the Lupon, the
requirement of P.D. No. 1508 must be regarded as
having been satisfied by the plaintiff. A defendant
cannot be allowed to frustrate the requirements of the
statute by her own refusal or failure to appear before
the Lupon and then later to assail a judgment
rendered in such action by setting up the very ground
of non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508. In simplest
terms, a defendant cannot be allowed to profit by her
own default.
ACCORDINGLY, the Orders of respondent Judge
In the instant case, private respondent, as noted Amir Pukunum D. Pundogar dated 6 April 1987 and
earlier, had stated in her subsequent Petition for 15 June 1987 in Civil Case No. L-111-577 are hereby
Relief from Judgment that she resided not in REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated
Barangay Palao but in Barangay Cabili, in effect 26 January 1986 of Judge Magadapa Rasuman is
suggesting that she had not received notice to appear hereby REINSTATED. Costs against private
before the Lupon of Barangay Palao. We do not respondent.
believe that the statement and suggestion of private
respondent should be given much credence. In the SO ORDERED.
first place, the Barangay authorities of Barangay
Palao must be presumed to have performed their
official duties and to have acted regularly in issuing
the Certificate to File Action. They must be presumed
to have sent a notice to Christina Triño to appear
before the Lupon; otherwise, they could not
reasonably have stated that Christina "could not be
contacted." Secondly, petitioner School had already
presented evidence during the hearing before the
Commissioner appointed by Judge Rasuman that
both petitioner and private respondent were residents
of Palao, Iligan City.
Finally, and in any event, the alleged failure on the
part of a plaintiff to comply with the procedural
requirement established by P.D. No. 1508 must be
raised in a timely manner, that is, at the first available
opportunity, if such alleged failure is to provide legal
basis for dismissal of the complaint. Such failure
must be pleaded, in other words, in a timely motion
to dismiss or in the answer. Failure to so set up that
defense produces the effect of waiver of such
defense. In the instant case, private respondent was
declared in default and that default order was never
set aside. Accordingly, private respondent must be
held to have waived whatever right she may have had
to raise the defense of failure to comply with the
compulsory conciliation procedure under P.D. No.
1508. Indeed, that was not the only thing she waived;
she also waived the right to appear and to file an
answer and there to set up that and other defenses
that she might have had. It is simply too late to
demand conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 after a
judgment on the merits (albeit by default) has been
rendered and become final and executory.