A172 212

Criminal Law Review (Case Digests – Book 2, RPC)
Section 4D, AY 2016-2017

San Beda College Manila
J. Amparo Cabotaje-Tang
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FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND USE OF FALSIFIED William Sato failed to account for the same and never delivered the proceeds
DOCUMENTS to Manolita.
(Art. 172, RPC)
The City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint.4 On appeal,
CASE 1: INTESTATE ESTATE OF GONZALES vs. PEOPLE (Santos) however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set and directed the City
G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010 Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of
Corona, J. Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
DOCTRINE: When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332
of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded,
of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a
the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting
necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation,
circumstance.
the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code. The
falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of
The trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal
committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized
case.
to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated,
damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
Motion for Reconsideration: The Trial Prosecutor’s contention is that the death
falsification of a public, official or commercial document. In other words, the
of the wife of the accused severed the relationship of affinity between accused
crime of falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of
and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the
estafa. Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to
accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.
defraud another is estafa. The damage to another is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.
TC: DENIED
Certiorari in the CA: Dismissed. TC finding was sustained.
FACTS:
Petitioner’s contention
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code. In particular, it calls for the determination of the
After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the
following: (1) the effect of death on the relationship by affinity created between
children of my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our
a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2)
mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.
the extent of the coverage of Article 332.
In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato,
age[d] 27 and 24 respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my
Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or
November 24, 1992, their father William Sato, through fraudulent
swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to
misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and thumbmark of my
civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to
mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko
the offended party.
Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact,
to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. William
If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of
Sato told her that the documents she was being made to sign involved her
one’s spouse, does the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse
taxes. At that time, my mother was completely blind, having gone blind almost
dissolve the relationship by affinity?
ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.
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The continuing affinity view maintains that relationship by affinity between the necessary means as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more
surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used
after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third
produced children or not. Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures persons.
even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the
death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification
where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means
"tie of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form
be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties. a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code. The falsification of a
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa
mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another,
provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to
swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public,
mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification was
through falsification or estafa through falsification. committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa. Actually utilizing
the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is
ISSUE: Whether or not falsification of public documents is necessary means estafa. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by
to commit estafa? the falsification of the document.
RULING: YES. Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information
show that the falsification of public document was consummated when Sato
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS MAY BE A NECESSARY presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a
MEANS FOR COMMITTING ESTAFA EVEN UNDER ARTICLE 315 (3) statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification
was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly
Revised Penal Code are as follows: when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the
sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document; the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document; the time she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and the said document. That is why the falsification of the public document was
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party. used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the
commission of the estafa.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does
not require that the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement,
does not mean that the falsification of the document cannot be considered as had made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or
a necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision. in favor of third parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused by,
and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the document, not prior
The phrase necessary means does not connote indispensable means for if it thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only have been the simple
did, then the offense as a necessary means to commit another would be an crime of estafa. On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as if
indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. In this Manolita herself had been the one who asked that a document pertaining to
case, the crime of falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for her
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signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime of
falsification. Therefore, the crime committed would only have been the simple crime of
estafa.63 On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as if Manolita
The allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not herself had been the one who asked that a document pertaining to her taxes
simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, be prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for her signature
the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime of falsification.
commit the estafa.
Petition is hereby GRANTED. The case is remanded to the trial court which is
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but directed to try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato through falsification of public documents.
cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code in his favor. CASE 2: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA (Quintos)
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa G.R. Nos. 164368-69, April 2, 2009
through falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the Brion, J.
component crimes separately from each other. While there may be two
component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both felonies are
animated by and result from one and the same criminal intent for which there DOCTRINE: In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked
is only one criminal liability.48 That is the concept of a complex crime. In other at the totality of the circumstances obtaining in Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose
words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a Velarde" vis-à-vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here whether
single criminal liability. Estrada’s use of an alias when he occupied the highest executive position in
the land was valid and legal; we simply determined, as the Sandiganbayan
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is did, whether he may be made liable for the offense charged based on the
violated (e.g., homicide which violates the right to life, theft which violates the evidence the People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt must be
right to property),49 a complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical based on the evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of
rights or interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime criminal liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden, as they
in itself.50 Since only a single criminal intent underlies the diverse acts, did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do so now
however, the component crimes are considered as elements of a single crime, in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in the assailed
the complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as Sandiganbayan ruling.
treated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is FACTS: On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder was filed with the
only one crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed and the two or Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A
more crimes constituting the same are more conveniently termed as separate Information for illegal use of alias, was likewise filed against him. In
component crimes.53 (emphasis supplied) the information, it was alleged that on or about 04 February 2000, in the City
—∞——∞——∞— of Manila, then President Estrada without having been duly authorized,
judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and committing
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten
they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE
conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even in President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully,
the case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN
evil intent of the offender is only one. SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias “Jose
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Velarde” which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, a. Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde" in his dealings with
in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. Dichavez and Ortaliza after February 4, 2000 is not relevant in light
of the conclusion that the acts imputed to Estrada under the
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the Information were the act/s committed on February 4, 2000 only.
Sandiganbayan issued. A Special Division in the Sandiganbayan was made Additionally, the phrase, "Estrada did … represent himself as ‘Jose
to try, hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related against respondent Velarde’ in several transactions," standing alone, violates Estrada’s
Estrada. At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation,
evidence to prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal use of because it is very general and vague. This phrase is qualified and
alias, and perjury. explained by the succeeding phrase – "and use and employ the said
alias ‘Jose Velarde’" – which "is neither his registered name at birth
After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI
to file a demurrer to evidence in these cases. In its Joint Resolution, the Bank and/or other corporate entities." Thus, Estrada’s
Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file demurrers in illegal use representations before persons other than those mentioned in the
of alias and perjury. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the people failed to present Information are immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not fall within
evidence that proved Estrada’s commission of the offense. the "Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities" specified in
the Information. Estrada’s representations with Ortaliza and
Sandiganbayan’s Ruling Dichavez are not therefore covered by the indictment.
The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now assailed in
this petition. The salient points of the assailed resolution are: Movant’s act of signing "Jose Velarde" in bank documents being
absolutely confidential, the witnessing thereof by bank officers who
“Second – the People’s failure to present evidence that proved Estrada’s were likewise sworn to secrecy by the same law cannot be
commission of the offense. The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed considered as ‘public’ as to fall within the ambit of CA 142 as
to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished under amended. On account of the absolute confidentiality of the
Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 transaction, it cannot be said that movant intended to be known by
(CA 142), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of this name in addition to his real name. Confidentiality and secrecy
Appeals.13 It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA negate publicity. Ursua instructs:
142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual. In Estrada’s case, the
Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the principles was not as simple Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to
because of the complications resulting from the nature of the transaction another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that
involved – the alias was used in connection with the opening of a numbered the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name
trust account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as amended,14 and from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition in C.A. No. 142
prior to the enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160.15 as amended.
Estrada did not publicly use the alias "Jose Velarde": c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to be
publicly known by the name "Jose Velarde" is shown by the nature
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of a numbered account – a perfectly valid banking transaction at the Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are
time Trust Account C-163 was opened. The opening, too, of a statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy. Given the private nature
numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not of Estrada’s act of signing the documents as “Jose Velarde” related to the
opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already
impose on Estrada the obligation to disclose his real identity – the
a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. Petition
obligation R.A. No. 6713 imposes is to file under oath a statement of was denied
assets and liabilities.16 Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A.
No. 6713 together, Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose
2. To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as
his assets including the amount of his bank deposits, but he was Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily
under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the bank indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In
account (such as the name he used to open it).” relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had
no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired
in Malacañan where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with
ISSUES:
whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua
1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep
dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not
an exception to the illegal use of alias punishable under be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public
Commonwealth Act No. 142 consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the
2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in room at that time. The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations
dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use by with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations
respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias "Jose Velarde" was not to be admissible. All of Estrada’s representations to these people were made
public despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.
Fernando Chua on 4 February 2000
RULING: 1. No. The Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel
– that mere communication to a third person is publicity – does not apply to
FALSE TESTIMONY IN CIVIL CASES
violations of CA No. 142. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No.
142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall (Art. 182, RPC)
publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly
use the alias must be manifest. The presence of Lacquian and Chua when CASE 3: ARK TRAVEL EXPRESS, INC., VS HON. ABROGAR (Tabilog)
Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does G.R. No. 137010, August 29, 2003
not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Austria-Martinez, J.
Velarde. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose
Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua DOCTRINE: To constitute the crime of False Testimony in a Civil Case under
were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estrada’s Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must concur:1.
alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence the testimony must be given in a civil case; 2. the testimony must relate to the
for these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada’s representations to issues presented in the case; 3. the testimony is false; 4. the false testimony
these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false; and 5. such
publicity. testimony must be malicious and given with and intent to affect the issues
presented in the case.
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FACTS: Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Travel for brevity) filed with the City appearing that the Department of Justice had reconsidered its previous ruling
Prosecutor of Makati a criminal complaint for False Testimony in a Civil Case directing the City Prosecutor of Makati City to withdraw the information filed
under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code against Violeta Baguio and against the accused in the above-entitled cases, the Motion to Withdraw
Lorelei Ira. In a resolution dated November 20, 1996, the City Prosecutor Information filed by the prosecution is hereby DENIED. Set these cases
found probable cause to indict Baguio and Ira for violation of said law and therefore for arraignment on July 30, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning. SO
accordingly filed the respective Informations against each of them before the ORDERED.
MTC, which read as follows: The undersigned 2 nd Assistant Prosecutor
accuses VIOLETA S. BAGUIO of the crime of Violation of Article 182 of the In the meanwhile, private respondents Baguio and Ira filed a Motion for
Revised Penal Code (False Testimony), committed as follows: That on or Reconsideration of the May 27, 1998 resolution of then Secretary Bello III,
about the 19th day of February, 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines and alleging that: (1) the March 9, 1998 resolution of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did finding no probable cause to indict them has become final and executory
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously give false testimony upon a because the Urgent Petition for Automatic Review was filed way beyond the
material fact in Civil Case, relative to a complaint for Collection of sum of 10-day reglementary period; and (2) the said resolution of May 27, 1998 did
money, torts and damages filed by Ark Travel against New Filipino Maritime not reverse the finding of the March 9, 1998 resolution that respondents did
Agencies, Inc. (NFMA, Inc. for short) in the following manner, to wit: during not really act with malice/criminal intent because the resolution of the
the trial of the aforesaid civil case on aforestated date before the Regional Secretary merely stated that there was false testimony. DOJ Undersecretary
Trial Court of Makati City, in which one of the principal issues was whether or Jesus A. Zozobrado, Jr., signing For the Secretary, granted the Motion for
not payment of the claim of ARK, Inc. has been made by NFMA, Inc., the said Reconsideration in a resolution dated June 26, 1998, disposing thus:
accused while testifying for NFMA, Inc., with malicious intent, did, then and WHEREFORE, our resolution dated May 27, 1998 is reconsidered and set
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly testified on direct aside; and consequently, our resolution dated March 9, 1998 is reinstated.
testimony, by way of a sworn statement, and while under oath on the witness You are accordingly, directed to immediately cause, with leave of court, the
stand, that the claims of ARK, Inc. supported by a statements of accounts sent withdrawal of the informations for false testimony in a civil case filed against
to and received by NFMA, Inc. is baseless and/or been paid, which testimony Violeta S. Baguio and Lorelei Ira. Report to us the action taken within ten (10)
as accused very well knew and ought to know, by reason of their position as days from receipt hereof.
cashier, was false inasmuch as the claim based on the statement of accounts
of ARK, Inc. (Exhibits E to GG are, in truth and in fact, valid, legal and unpaid Consequently, Baguio and Ira filed with the MTC a Motion for Reconsideration
accounts of NFMA, Inc. with ARK Travel Inc., herein represented by MA. PAZ of its June 10, 1998 Order alleging that there is no longer any obstacle, legal
ALBERTO, to the damage and prejudice of the latter. CONTRARY TO LAW. or otherwise, to the granting of the Motion to Withdraw Information previously
filed by the prosecution. The MTC denied the motion in an Order, dated July
Baguio and Ira filed a petition for review of the City Prosecutors resolution 21, 1998, which we quote verbatim, as follows: Submitted for resolution is a
dated November 20, 1996 with the Department of Justice (DOJ). In a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused through counsel which seeks
resolution dated March 9, 1998, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito P. Zuo a reversal of the courts order denying the Motion to Withdraw filed by the
reversed the City Prosecutors resolution dated November 20, 1996. The prosecution. In the Crespo Mogul case, it was held by the Supreme Court that
prosecution office of Makati then filed with the MTC a Motion to Withdraw once an information is filed in court, such filing sets in motion the criminal
Information. However, on May 15, 1998, Ark Travel filed an Urgent Petition for action against the accused before the court, and any motion to dismiss or
Automatic Review with the DOJ. In a letter dated May 27, 1998, Secretary withdraw information is always addressed to the discretion of the court. The
Silvestre H. Bello III resolved to treat the urgent petition as a motion for denial or grant of any motion is done by the court not out of subservience to
reconsideration, reversed its resolution dated March 9, 1998 and directed the the secretary of justice but in faithful exercise of its judicial prerogative. A
City Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of the said Criminal Cases. reading of the information sufficiently alleges the facts which make out the
For this reason, the MTC issued an Order dated June 10, 1998, denying the offense charged and in keeping with the above ruling of the Supreme Court,
aforesaid Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the prosecution, to wit: It this court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration. Set this case for
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arraignment of both accused on July 30, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning. SO to wit: SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not
ORDERED. later than sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case
a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
Private respondents questioned the MTC Orders dated June 10, 1998 and required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
July 21, 1998 via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the respondent denial of said motion. In which case, the filing of the petition on January 26,
RTC of Makati. The RTC issued herein assailed Order dated October 2, 1998, 1999 was filed on the 60th day from November 27, 1998, Ark Travels date of
portions of which read: As aptly stated in Ledesma vs. CA (Supra) the trial receipt of notice of the order denying Ark Travels motion for reconsideration.
Court nonetheless should make its own study and evaluation of the said Thus, filing is proper.
motion and not reply merely on the awaited action of the secretary. No such
evaluation was ever conducted by the respondent Court before it issued the It is settled that when confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on
two (2) questioned orders. In view hereof, it is this Courts opinion and stand the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary
that the respondent Court may have indeed acted with grave abuse of of the Department of Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the Motion independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired
to Withdraw and the motion for reconsideration based solely on its bare and jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is
ambiguous reliance on the Crespo Doctrine, since an independent evaluation required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial and should
and assessment of the existence of a probable cause is necessary before embody such assessment in the order disposing the motion. Thus, MTC
such orders denying the said motions could be issued. Foregoing Premises decision is unmeritorious.
Considered, the petition for Certiorari is hereby granted. Thus a petition for
Certiorari was filed in court with regard to the Order of the RTC. But the RTC, acting on the petition for certiorari before it, not only committed
grave abuse of discretion but acted in excess of or beyond its jurisdiction in
ISSUE: Whether or not probable cause exists for the crime of False Testimony considering the criminal cases pending in the MTC as withdrawn, which in
in a Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code. effect, causes the dismissal of the two criminal cases. First, the subject cases
are not within the jurisdiction of the RTC to dismiss. The only issue brought to
HELD: No. Supreme Court directed MTC to SUSPEND the criminal it is whether or not the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
proceedings until after the final decision in Civil Case. the motion to withdraw without making any independent evaluation as to
whether or not there is a probable cause. Second, while ruling that the MTC
The issue raised in the present petition concerns the jurisdiction of the RTC in should have made an independent assessment on the merits of the Motion to
ordering the dismissal of the criminal cases pending before the MTC and Withdraw Informations, the RTC itself omitted to do the very thing that it
therefore, the proper remedy is certiorari. As such, the present petition for prescribed the MTC to do. It unceremoniously considered the criminal cases
certiorari ought to have been dismissed for late filing. The assailed Order as withdrawn, without evaluation or determination of the existence of the
dated October 2, 1998 was received by Ark Travel on October 16, 1998. Ark probable cause. Thus, RTC order is unmeritorious.
Travel filed the Motion for Reconsideration fourteen days later or on October
30, 1998. On November 27, 1998, Ark Travel received the Order of the denial However, inasmuch as we have taken cognizance of this case in the interest
of the Motion for Reconsideration. Pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on of speedy justice and considering that the entire records have been forwarded
Civil Procedure, then prevailing, the petition should have been filed on the to us, it is befitting that we determine the existence of probable cause to put
forty-sixth day (60 days minus 14 days) from November 27, 1998 or on an end to this issue which had been unresolved since 1998, not to mention
January 12, 1999, the last day of the 60-day reglementary period; instead, the the fact that the subject Informations were initially filed in 1996. A remand of
petition was filed on January 26, 1999. However, during the pendency of the case to the MTC for an independent evaluation of the existence of
herein petition, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-2-03, amending Section 4, probable cause will only delay the disposition of the case and contribute in the
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, effective September 1, 2000, clogging of the dockets. To constitute the crime of False Testimony in a Civil
Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code, the following requisites
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must concur: 1. the testimony must be given in a civil case; 2. the testimony criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
must relate to the issues presented in the case; 3. the testimony is false; 4. petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
the false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be action at any time before the prosecution rests.
false; and 5. such testimony must be malicious and given with and intent to (Emphasis supplied)
affect the issues presented in the case. There is no doubt that the first two
requisites are extant in this case. The records show that Ark Travel filed a Hence, pending determination of the falsity of the subject testimonies of
complaint for collection of sum of money, torts and damages against New private respondents in the civil case, the criminal action for false testimony
Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMAI) and Angelina T. Rivera with the must perforce be suspended. As such, under the attendant circumstances,
Regional Trial Court of Makati. In said civil case, private respondents were although there is no motion to suspend proceedings on the part of the private
presented by NFMAI as witnesses. They executed their respective sworn respondents, orderly administration of justice dictates that the criminal cases
statements and testified before the trial court that NFMAI has no outstanding should be suspended.
obligation with Ark Travel as the same had been paid in full. The existence of
the last three requisites is quite dubious. The falsity of the subject testimonies FALSE TESTIMONY IN OTHER CASES AND PERJURY IN SOLEMN
of private respondents is yet to be established. It is noted that at the time of AFFIRMATION
the filing of the criminal complaints, the civil case filed by Ark Travel is still (Art. 183, RPC)
pending decision. Ark Travel has yet to prove the validity of its monetary
claims and damages against NFMAI. It is only after trial that the RTC can CASE 4: PEOPLE vs. ANGANGCO (Tamondong)
assess the veracity or falsity of the testimony and correspondingly render a
decision. Thus, the civil case is so intimately connected with the subject crime GR No. L-47693, October 12, 1943
that it is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondents in the
criminal cases. DOCTRINE: It is not necessary that there be a specific provision of the law
requiring a sworn statement or an affidavit. The phrase “in case in which the
In other words, whether or not the testimonies of private respondents in the law so requires” found in Paragraph 1 of Article 183 should have a permissive-
civil cases are false is a prejudicial question. It is clear that the elements of a not mandatory- effect.
prejudicial question are present as provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
FACTS: Juan L. Quintos was suspected of acts of embezzlement of the estate
SEC. 7 Elements of Prejudicial question. The elements of a of a deceased person. An investigation ensued after an anomaly is discovered
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil in the administration of said person. Accused Angangco identified several
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the signatures allegedly made by Quintos. When the papers of the case were
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the forwarded to to the City Fiscal and the latter examined accused Angancgo
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the undert oath about the same signatures, he repudiated his statement contained
criminal action may proceed. in his affidavit.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures provides:
When prosecuted for perjury, accused Angangco contented that the phrase
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A “in case which the law so requires” appearing at the end of the first paragraph
petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon of Art. 183 refers to the affidavit or any statement under oath, so that if the
the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may sworn statement is not required by law to be made, no perjury is committed.
be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the
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ISSUE: Is Angangco criminally liable for perjury? In view of the foregoing statement of Barbara Capistrano, the assistant fiscal
De la Rosa, having found reasonable grounds for proceeding against the
RULING: Yes. The term “in case which the law so requires” in the phrase person mentioned by Barbara Capistrano in her said statement, filed the
corresponding information of the criminal cause No. 16900, accusing Alejo
mentioned should have a permissive- not mandatory- effect so as to make the
Capistrano of the crime of rape.
said phrase read: “in cases in which the law so authorizes.” Hence, it is not
necessary that there be a specific provision of law requiring the affidavit to be On May 11 of the same year, several days before the hearing of the cause
made in the particular case. No. 16900 instituted upon said information, the said Barbara Capistrano filed
a motion with the court praying for the dismissal of the cause against her father
It is sufficient that the oath had been administered with a view of carrying into on the ground that it was not the latter who had raped her, as she has
effect a legal purpose intended. In the instant case, the investigating officer previously stated before the fiscal of the city, but a Spaniard named Juan, an
administered oath to the accused undoubtedly with a view of being assured employee of the Lerma Park Cabaret, Caloocan, Rizal Province, and that if
she had made a different statement before at the police station, it was on
of the veracity of the latter and thus be furnished with foundational evidence
account of the instructions of the said Spaniard Juan.
with which to proceed against Juan L. Quintos in his suspected acts of
Embezzlement of the estate of the deceased. The case for rape was heard before the lower court on May 15, 1918, and
after taking the necessary oath, the offended party, Barbara Capistrano,
testified before the court in substance as follows: that she made a statement
CAE 5: UNITED STATES vs. BARBARA CAPISTRANO (Tan) before the prosecuting attorney accusing her father of the crime of rape for
G.R. No. L-15001, March 15, 1920 the reason that her statement before the fiscal that her father was the author
Araullo, J. of the rape upon her person was not true; that her father was not the one who
raped her but the Spaniard aforesaid.
DOCTRINE: A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the
contradictory sworn statements of the defendant, but the state must prove At the hearing of this crime, the accused testified and again swore before the
which of the two statements is false and must show that statement to be false court that what she in reality stated before the fiscal was what the said
by evidence other than the contradictory statement. Spaniard, Juan Sol by name, had insinuated to her; that when she declared
before the fiscal, the Spaniard aforesaid was not present; that her statement
FACTS: On the 27th of April, 1918, the accused Barbara Capistrano and the before the said Fiscal was not the truth but that, for her fear of Juan Sol, on
policeman Varsovia appeared before the office of the prosecuting attorney of account of the latter's threat upon her, she stated the person who raped her
the City of Manila to file a complaint against one Alejo Capistrano, the father was her father.
of the accused Barbara Capistrano, for the crime of rape committed by the
former upon the person of the latter. From this testimony, the fiscal having been obliged to move for the dismissal
of the cause, same was dismissed by the court in his decree of the 15th of the
After taking the oath required by law before the corresponding official or the same month of May, ordering Alejo Capistrano's immediate release. In view
assistant fiscal of this city, Luciano de la Rosa, Barbara Capistrano declared thereof, the fiscal filed against said Barbara Capistrano the information giving
before the said officer the following: that between 11 and 12 o'clock on the rise to the present cause for the crime of perjury. The information read as
night of April 26, 1918, she was raped by her father Alejo Capistrano in a follows:
house on calle Dimas-Alang, Caloocan. xxx
That this last testimony, taken before the Honorable Judge,

Manuel Vivencio del Rosario, is a false testimony for the
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said accused knew very well upon testifying before said essential and important in said cause. Wherefore, the fact alleged by the
judge that the real author of the rape of which she was the accused to support her demurrer to said information is true. For the crime of
victim was not the so-called Juan but her father called Alejo perjury to be punishable, the false testimony willfully taken or subscribed
Capistrano; that the sworn statements made by said contrary to the oath must relate to, or concern, "any material matter which he
accused before the said assistant fiscal, Luciano de la (the witness) does not believe to be true." "Perjury, as modified by statute (Act
Rosa, on the 27th day of April, 1918, where very essential No. 1697), may be defined to be the willful and corrupt assertion to a
to the investigations conducted by the latter, inasmuch as falsehood, under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law, in a
without said statements, said fiscal would not have filed, as material matter, the offense being enlarged and made to extend to false oaths
he did, the information for the crime of rape against the said other than those taken in the course of judicial proceedings."
Alejo Capistrano, which information is now pending before
the Court of First Instance of this city of Manila and bearing It is, therefore, necessary that in the information filed in this instant case
R. G. No. 16900. Acts committed against the law. against Barbara Capistrano and inserted in the beginning of this decision, it
should have been expressly and definitely stated that the testimony — alleged
The accused demurred to the foregoing information on the ground that same to be false according to said information, and given by the accused Barbara
was fatally defective for the reason that in said information it does not appear Capistrano before the Court of First Instance whereby she stated that the real
that the testimony — taken by the accused before the court at the hearing of author of the crime denounced by her was not her father Alejo Capistrano but
the aforesaid cause for the crime of rape and which was false according to the one Juan, a Spaniard — was important and material to the issues involved in
information, and expressive of the fact that the real author of the crime of rape the said case for rape against Alejo Capistrano. The want of this allegation in
denounced by her before the fiscal was not her father, as she had previously the information makes the latter fatally defective, and in no way can it be
declared under oath before the said fiscal, but one called Juan, a Spaniard — accepted that such an omission, in the instant case, had been cured by the
was a statement important and essential to the question involved in said allegation in same information that said testimony was false and by the
criminal cause or raised at the hearing thereof. This demurrer was overruled admission in evidence, without the objection on the part of the defense, of the
by the trial court and the accused excepted to this ruling and pleaded not record of the case for rape against Alejo Capistrano whereby it appears,
guilty. according to the fiscal, that the false testimony taken by the accused in the
said case was so material that same was dismissed by the order of the court.
After the hearing of this present cause, the Court of First Instance aforesaid Where a complaint is fatally defective, either in form or in
rendered his judgment on April 25, 1918, declaring the accused guilty of the substance, and no objection is taken at the trial but is raised
aforementioned crime of perjury mentioned and penalized in section 3 of Act for the first time on appeal, it is not error for this court to
No. 1697. But in view of the fact that the accused was below 18 years of age, refuse to sustain such object when the fatal defects are
the court suspended the judgment, ordering the commitment of the said supplied by competent proofs. (Serra vs. Mortiga, 204 U.
accused in the government's reformatory until she becomes of age, and S., 470, reported in 11 Phil. Rep., 762.)
sentencing her, furthermore, to be forever disqualified from testifying before
any court of these Islands. The abovementioned doctrine finds no application in this case. The accused
having demurred in due time to the information for being fatally and essentially
ISSUES AND RULING: defective, and having excepted to the ruling dismissing said demurrer, the
omission in the information of the aforesaid allegation — the materiality and
WON the trial court erred in overruling the demurrer interposed against importance of the statement alleged as false therein had not been cured by
the information in question. the filing of an amended information. Nor was such a defect cured by the
allegation in the information that the aforementioned statement was false or
by the admission in evidence without defendant's objection of the record of
YES. It is not alleged in the information that the aforesaid testimony, taken by
the aforementioned cause for rape against Alejo Capistrano. The overruling
the accused at the hearing of the cause for rape against her father, was
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of the demurrer aforementioned having been assigned by the appellant in her she believed that which she testified to before the Court of First Instance was
brief before us as the first error committed by the lower court, this court cannot not true.
set aside the consideration of said objection in view of the appellant's appeal
interposed against such decision. And one of the essential elements of the A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely on the contradictory sworn
crime of perjury created by the law being the materiality and importance of the statements of the defendant, but the state must prove which of the two
fact alleged as having been falsely uttered, and there being no allegation in statements is false and must show that statement to be false by other
the information relative to the materiality and importance of the testimony evidence than the contradictory statement. . . Of course where perjury is
taken by the accused at the hearing of the case for rape against Alejo charged in giving testimony contrary to that given on a prior examination, the
Capistrano to the issues therein involved, said information is null and void ab accused is entitled to show that his statements on the prior examination were
initio and the criminal proceedings must be dismissed. induced by threats and duress; and after adducing evidence in support of this
contention, he may properly insist that the court explicitly instruct the jury to
WON the accused is guilty of perjury. determine whether or not such testimony was voluntary.
NO. The accused Barbara Capistrano stated under oath two contradictory The prosecution confined itself in proving that the accused stated under oath
statements: one before the assistant prosecuting attorney of the city who the two contradictory statements aforementioned and that the accused stated
conducted the preliminary investigation before filing the information against to the policeman Varsovia, on the morning of April 27, 1918, that her father
her father Alejo Capistrano for rape, whereby she was accusing the latter of Alejo Capistrano raped her between the hours of 11 and 12 of the previous
the said crime; and another before the Court of First Instance at the hearing night, as well as the fact that the same policeman was present when the
of the same cause for rape, saying that the one who raped her was not her accused took her oath before the fiscal prior to the latter's taking the
father but one called Juan Sol, and that for her fear to the latter who had declaration of the accused in the aforesaid preliminary investigation. The
threatened her, she made the former statement before the fiscal of the city, foregoing is not proving which of the two contradictory statements of the
imputing the commission of the said crime to her father. accused was the false statement or showing the falsity of either upon other
evidence distinct from the same contradictory statements. It is simply showing
According to section 3 of Act No. 1697, a person is guilty of the crime of perjury or exposing said two statements in order to point out that the accused,
and must be punished by the penalty mentioned in said Act, "who, having declaring under oath in one or the other, made two statements contradictory
taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in with each other and involving one and the same fact.
which the law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered,
that he will testify, declare, depose or certify truly, or that any written In the testimony given by her at the hearing of the present cause for perjury,
testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, the accused reiterated what she has said before, i. e., that it was not her father
willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter who raped her but a Spaniard; that she stated before Fiscal De la Rosa that
which he does not believe to be true. . . " her father had committed upon her the said rape, but that afterwards she said
that it was not her father because she was told by her aunt to tell the truth;
The testimony of the accused taken under oath, which is alleged as false in that the Spaniard was the real author of said rape; that she does not know the
the information, was the second statement or that one taken by her before the name of the Spaniard for she could not remember it, but that she could
Court of First Instance at the hearing of the cause for rape, and the one alleged recognize him should she see him. And when asked by counsel for the
in said information as true was her statement under oath before the fiscal of defense to look around that place whether she could find the Spaniard to
the city at the preliminary investigation. Wherefore, in order to hold the whom she was referring and to tell where the latter was, she answered: "There
accused guilty of the crime of perjury, it was necessary to prove that she did he is," pointing at Juan Sol, who was then present at the hearing; and upon
not believe said testimony as true or, what amounts to the same thing, that being immediately asked why it was that she told the fiscal it was her father
who raped her when in reality it was that Juan Sol, the Spaniard, who
committed said crime, she replied: "Because this gentlemen was threatening
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to kill me in case I would not tell it was my father;" she further said that said the clear and definite statement made by the accused against the said
threat took place on the day the rape was committed and that under this Spaniard, not only in the sense that the latter had raped her but also in that
influence she made the statement before Fiscal De la Rosa accusing her said he had induced and compelled her, by threats and duress, to declare at the
father; that the Spaniard Juan Sol was then carrying a penknife with which he preliminary investigation before the fiscal that which was true according to the
threatened her, and that this threat was made by said Spaniard after the information, an affirmation which the prosecution was in duty bound to prove
consummation of the criminal act. by producing the said Juan Sol as a witness. And having failed to do so, such
a failure is fatal to the prosecution.
With the means within her reach, the accused then proved that her statement
at the preliminary investigation before the fiscal of the city, accusing her father In the face of the notorious insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution
and not the Spaniard Juan Sol, as the author of the rape of which she was the and the effect of the evidence adduced by the accused, it not being, on the
victim, was made on account of the duress and threats that the Spaniard made other hand, improbable that the accused, a young woman 14 years of age,
upon her so that she should declare in that sense — a fact which, having taken would have declared in the terms she did before the fiscal of the city at
place without any eyewitness, was not possible to be related by anyone other preliminary investigation of the cause for rape against her father Alejo
than the own testimony of the accused taken under oath as a witness in her Capistrano, compelled by threats alleged by her to have been made upon her
own behalf at the hearing. But she presented another evidence of great by Juan Sol, nor is it also improbable that the latter was the one who raped
importance at the very time of the hearing by pointing out Juan Sol, who was her and not her own father, and it not being proven that when the accused
present at the moment, as the very person who had raped her and who testified under oath before the Court of First Instance at the hearing of the said
afterwards had intimidated and threatened her in order that she should declare cause for rape, giving the statements which gave rise to the dismissal of said
in the manner she did before the fiscal of the city, as has been said before. cause, she would have transgressed the truth, and there being on the
Moreover, counsel for the defense presented in evidence on that very contrary, sufficient reasons leading us to believe, with sufficient ground, that
occasion the proceeding No. 3511 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal she (the accused) was induced or compelled by threats and duress, to state
entitled "The United States vs. Juan Sol" for rape, consisting of 12 pages, i.e., what she had stated before the fiscal of the city at the preliminary investigation
the criminal cause against said Juan Sol for the rape committed upon the of the cause for rape aforesaid — it is not proper to hold the accused guilty of
person of the accused. the crime of perjury aforementioned nor to impose upon her any penalty for
said crime.
On the other hand, the prosecution presented no other evidence, as has been
said before, than the two contradictory statements of the accused; and For the foregoing reasons and considerations, we reverse the judgment
according to the doctrines laid down by American courts in the two decisions appealed from and ACQUIT the accused, with the costs of both instances de
hereinbefore inserted, it must prove by other evidence than the two officio. So ordered.
contradictory statements themselves, which of them was false or more
properly speaking, that the false statement, according to the allegation in the MACHINATIONS IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS
information, was the one given by the accused before the Court of First (Art. 185, RPC)
Instance at the hearing of the cause for rape aforementioned and in which she
testified that it was not her father who raped her but the Spaniard Juan Sol. CASE 6: DIAZ VS. KAPUNAN (Tutaan)
The prosecution did not only fail to present evidence tending to prove the 45 Phil. 482
existence of said falsehood, but when it should have produced as a witness Malcolm, J.
Juan Sol, who was in the court room and was pointed out by the accused with
her finger as the author of the rape of which she had been the victim, and
when it was within its power to produce said man on the witness-stand, who DOCTRINE: Article 542 [of the Old Penal Code] is consummated by the mere
must be the first to protest and reject the said imputation in the presence of act of soliciting a gift or promise for the purpose of abstaining from taking part
the court, did not avail itself of these evidence in order to contradict and belie in the auction. The courts will consider an agreement between a judgment
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creditor and one claiming an interest in the thing about to be sold under an Causing refused to do on the ground that it was a personal matter.
execution, that neither shall bid against the other, as void, unless all parties Nevertheless, the clerk of the Court handed the P500.
concerned know of the arrangement and consent thereto.
From correspondence, it further is evident that the family of Mendezona was
FACTS: This action for malpractice brought by Vicente Diaz against Attorney led to believe that the P500 would shortly be sent them. During the time here
Ruperto Kapunan. The ultimate question on which we would concentrate mentioned, Kapunan was the attorney of Mendezona. Kapunan was given
attention concerns the agreement between Diaz and Kapunan at the time of extensive authority by the letter of Mendezona. When Kapunan took part in
the sale of the property of Mendoza, whereby Kapunan, on the promise of the sale, it must be assumed that he was bidding in representation of his client
Diaz to pay him P1,000, agreed to desist from further participation in the sale, and for the benefit of the client.
all in alleged violation of article 1459 of the Civil Code and article 542 of the
Penal Code. The usual investigation of his professional conduct was made by the provincial
fiscal of Leyte acting under the supervision of the Attorney-General. From the
Diaz and Mendezona formed a partnership and entered into extensive report of the fiscal, three charges seem to have been considered. The first
business transactions in the Province of Leyte. The business failed to prosper two, relating to Kapunan's attempt to represent both the parties in the case,
and was found to have suffered a loss. To settle up their affairs, they and to molest and disturb Diaz by frivolous motions, the law officer of the
eventually formulated a document of sale and mortgage in which Mendezona Government finds not substantiated; and with this conclusion we fully agree.
recognized a debt in favor of Diaz, laid upon the hacienda "Mapuyo,". When The third charge is more serious and has to do with Kapunan having
the year had expired Mendezona was not to be found and his family was intervened in the manner in which he did in the sale of the property of his client
unable to meet the payment. There followed the usual proceedings for Mendezona. The Attorney-General is of the opinion on this point that the facts
foreclosure and sale. constitute a flagrant violation of the provisions of article 1459 of the Civil Code
and article 542 of the Penal Code.
At the time fixed for the sale, there appeared Vicente Diaz, and Attorney
Ruperto Kapunan. Luis Velarde(deputy sheriff), in his statement, said that ISSUE: WON Kapunan should be held liable for violating article 1459 of the
Kapunan told him that he, was ready to bid on the property up to P16,000 in Civil Code and article 542 of the Penal Code.
order to assist the Mendezona family which was in financial straits. The
bidding was opened by Kapunan offering P12,000 for the property and with HELD:
Diaz and Kapunan raising the bids until finally Diaz offered P12,500. There 1. NO - Article 1459 of the Civil Code was held in force in the case of
the bids stopped on account of Diaz and Kapunan entering into the agreement Hernandez vs. Villanueva. It provides that the following persons, naming
that Kapunan should withdraw his bid and refrain from bidding at the said them, "cannot take by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
auction as he does hereby withdraw his bid, and in consideration thereof, Diaz person or through the mediation of another." The provision contained in the
offers him a premium of P1,000 which Kapunan accepts.Following the last paragraph of said article is made to include lawyers, with respect to any
termination of the sheriff's sale, Diaz gave Kapunan P500 of the P1,000. property or rights involved in any litigation in which they may take party by
virtue of their profession and office. We do not believe this article has been
Diaz lay before the court charges against Attorney Kapunan for alleged infringed by the respondent because he has not purchased property at a
unprofessional conduct. Undoubtedly, before Kapunan had knowledge of the public or judicial auction and because his participation in the auction was in
disbarment proceedings, he presented a motion in the CFI asking that he be representation of his client. It has been held that an execution sale to the
permitted to retain the P500 in question, in part payment of his professional attorney of the defendant is not unlawful if made in good faith, with the consent
fees. Later when Kapunan must have had knowledge of the disbarment of the client, and without any purpose of defrauding the latter's creditors.
proceedings, he filed another motion, withdrawing his former motion and
asking the court to permit him to turn over the P500 to Diaz, which Judge
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2.YES - Article 542 of the Penal Code punishes "any person who shall solicit HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF PATENTS, TRADEMARKS
any gift or promise as a consideration for agreeing to refrain from taking part AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER and H.D. LEE COMPANY, INC.
in any public auction." The crime is consummated by the mere act of soliciting (BUSINE)
a gift or promise for the purpose of abstaining from taking part in the auction. G.R. No. 100098 December 29, 1995
The document formulated by them demonstrates that Kapunan, on the KAPUNAN, J.:
promise of Diaz to pay P1,000, refrained from further participation in the sale
of the property of Mendezona, which is exactly the situation covered by article DOCTRINE: In determining whether colorable imitation exists, jurisprudence
542 of the Penal Code. has developed two kinds of tests:
1. DOMINANCY TEST - focuses on the similarity of the prevalent
Public policy discountenances combinations or agreements on the part of features of the competing trademarks which might cause confusion
bidders at execution sales, the objects and effects of which are to stifle or deception and thus constitutes infringement
competition. The courts will consider an agreement between a judgment 2. HOLISTIC TEST mandates that the entirety of the marks in
creditor and one claiming an interest in the thing about to be sold under an question must be considered in determining confusing similarity.
execution, that neither shall bid against the other, as void, unless all parties
concerned know of the arrangement and consent thereto. FACTS: On 18 September 1981, private respondent H.D. Lee Co., Inc., a
foreign corporation organized under the laws of Delaware, U.S.A., filed with
We conclude that Attorney Kapunan has been guilty of a technical the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks & Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a Petition
violation of article 542 of the Penal Code. But we cannot adopt the vigorous for Cancellation of Registration No. SR 5054 (Supplemental Register) for the
recommendation of the Attorney-General, for we consider present certain trademark "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" used on skirts, jeans, blouses, socks, briefs,
mitigating circumstances which exert an influence in favor of the respondent. jackets, jogging suits, dresses, shorts, shirts and lingerie under Class 25,
In the first place, as disclosed by the judicial records, no reported prosecution issued on 27 October 1980 in the name of petitioner Emerald Garment
under article 542 has been attempted, which is eloquent proof of the practical Manufacturing Corporation, a domestic corporation organized and existing
disuse of this article; and the Spanish jurisprudence, while indicative of the under Philippine laws. The petition was docketed as Inter Partes Case No.
meaning of the article, relies principally on the decisions of the French Court 1558.
of Cassation. In the next place, the complainant Diaz is equally guilty with
the respondent Kapunan. And lastly, Kapunan appears to have been
Private respondent, invoking Sec. 37 of R.A. No. 166 (Trademark Law) and
acting in good faith for his client, although adopting an irregular
Art. VIII of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
procedure, and although attempting to make tardy restitution of the
averred that petitioner's trademark "so closely resembled its own trademark,
money received by him.
'LEE' as previously registered and used in the Philippines, and not
abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to or used in connection with
JUDGMENT: Attorney Ruperto Kapunan shall stand reprimanded and that the petitioner's goods, to cause confusion, mistake and deception on the part of
complainant, Vicente Diaz, shall immediately return to the clerk of the the the purchasing public as to the origin of the goods."
P500 received by Diaz from the clerk and who shall transmit the P500.
In its answer dated 23 March 1982, petitioner contended that its trademark
CRIMINAL LIABILITIES UNDER THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY was entirely and unmistakably different from that of private respondent and
CODE that its certificate of registration was legally and validly granted.
(Republic Act No. 8293) On 27 July 1984, private respondent filed a notice of opposition to petitioner's
application for registration also on grounds that petitioner's trademark was
CASE 7: EMERALD GARMENT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. confusingly similar to its "LEE" trademark.
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For lack of adequate proof of actual use of its trademark in the Philippines
On 19 July 1988, the Director of Patents rendered a decision granting private prior to petitioner's use of its own mark and for failure to establish confusing
respondent's petition for cancellation and opposition to registration. similarity between said trademarks, private respondent's action for
infringement must necessarily fail.
On 29 November 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision CASE 8: MCDONALD'S CORPORATION AND MCGEORGE FOOD
affirming the decision of the Director of Patents dated 19 July 1988 in all INDUSTRIES, INC. v. L.C. BIG MAK BURGER, INC., FRANCIS B. DY,
respects.
EDNA A. DY, RENE B. DY, WILLIAM B. DY, JESUS AYCARDO, ARACELI
AYCARDO, AND GRACE HUERTO (Cerda)
ISSUE: Whether or not SYLISTIC MR.LEE is confusingly similar with the LEE
G.R. No. 143993, August 18, 2004
trademark
Carpio, J.
RULING:
NO. Proceeding to the task at hand, the essential element of infringement is DOCTRINES: Tests in determining likelihood of Confusion: Dominancy and
colorable imitation. This term has been defined as "such a close or ingenious Holistic Tests; Similarity in general apperance may be in the devices or words
imitation as to be calculated to deceive ordinary purchasers, or such used in the wrappings
resemblance of the infringing mark to the original as to deceive an ordinary
purchaser giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, and to cause
FACTS:
him to purchase the one supposing it to be the other.”
In determining whether colorable imitation exists, jurisprudence has The Petitioner - “McDonald's” is a corporation organized under the laws of
developed two kinds of tests – 1) DOMINANCY TEST - focuses on the Delaware, United States. It operates, by itself or through its franchisees, a
similarity of the prevalent features of the competing trademarks which might global chain of fast-food restaurants. McDonald's owns a family of marks
cause confusion or deception and thus constitutes infringement; 2) HOLISTIC including the “Big Mac” mark for its “double-decker hamburger sandwich” and
TEST mandates that the entirety of the marks in question must be considered registered the same with the United States Trademark Registry.
in determining confusing similarity.
Based on this Home Registration, McDonald's applied for the registration of
Petitioner's trademark is the whole "STYLISTIC MR. LEE." Although on its the same mark in the Principal Register of the then Philippine Bureau of
label the word "LEE" is prominent, the trademark should be considered as a
Patents, Trademarks and Technology (“PBPTT”), now the Intellectual
whole and not piecemeal. The dissimilarities between the two marks become
conspicuous, noticeable and substantial enough to matter especially in the Property Office (“IPO”). Pending approval of its application, McDonald's
light of the following variables that must be factored in. introduced its “Big Mac” hamburger sandwiches in the Philippine market in
First, the products involved in the case at bar are, in the main, various kinds September 1981. Like its other marks, McDonald's displays the “Big Mac”
of jeans. These are not your ordinary household items like catsup, soysauce mark in items and paraphernalia in its restaurants, and in its outdoor and
or soap which are of minimal cost. Maong pants or jeans are not inexpensive. indoor signages.
Accordingly, the casual buyer is predisposed to be more cautious and
discriminating in and would prefer to mull over his purchase.
Petitioner McGeorge Food Industries “ McGeorge”, a domestic corporation, is
McDonald's Philippine franchisee.
"LEE" is primarily a surname. Private respondent cannot, therefore, acquire
exclusive ownership over and singular use of said term.
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The respondent - Respondent L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. (“respondent - There exist some distinctions between the names “B[ig] M[ac]” and
corporation”) together with its incorporators, stockholders and directors, is a “B[ig] M[ak]” as appearing in the respective signages, wrappers and
domestic corporation which operates fast-food outlets and snack vans in containers of the food products of the parties. But infringement goes
beyond the physical features of the questioned name and the original
Metro Manila and nearby provinces. Respondent corporation's menu includes
name.
hamburger sandwiches and other food items. - The choice of “B[ig] M[ak]” as tradename by defendant corporation
is not merely for sentimental reasons but was clearly made to take
On 21 October 1988, respondent corporation applied with the PBPTT for the advantage of the reputation, popularity and the established goodwill
registration of the “Big Mak” mark for its hamburger sandwiches which of plaintiff McDonald's.
McDonald's opposed on the ground that “Big Mak” was a colorable imitation
of its registered “Big Mac” mark for the same food products. McDonald's also Ruling of CA
informed respondent Dy, the chairman of the Board of Directors of respondent Reversed the RTC Decision and ordered McDonald's to pay respondents
corporation, of its exclusive right to the “Big Mac” mark and requested him to P1,600,000 as actual and compensatory damages and P300,000 as moral
desist from using the “Big Mac” mark or any similar mark. And having received damages. The Court is fully convinced that no colorable imitation exists.
no reply from respondent Dy, petitioners on 6 June 1990 sued respondents in - As to colorable imitation: What the respondent-corporation is using
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, for trademark infringement and unfair is not a trademark for its food product but a business or corporate
name. They use the business name “L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.” in
competition. RTC issued a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against
their restaurant business. Furthermore, said corporate or business
respondents and then replaced it with writ of preliminary injunction. name appearing in such food packages and signages is always
accompanied by the company mascot, a young chubby boy named
Contention of Respondents: Maky who wears a red T-shirt with the upper case “m” appearing
- that McDonald's does not have an exclusive right to the “Big Mac” therein and a blue lower garment. Finally, their food packages are
mark or to any other similar mark since the Isaiyas Group as well as made of plastic material.
one Topacio similarly registered the same prior to McDonald's - As to unfair competition: mere suspected similarity in the sound of
registration on 18 July 1985. the defendants-appellants' corporate name with the Mcdo's
- the “Big Mak” mark they sought to register does not constitute a trademark is not sufficient evidence to conclude unfair competition.
colorable imitation of the “Big Mac” mark. - Respondent corporate name was derived from both the first names
- that they did not fraudulently pass off their hamburger sandwiches of the mother and father of defendant Francis Dy, whose names are
as those of petitioners' Big Mac hamburgers. Maxima and Kimsoy. With this explanation, it is up to the plaintiffs-
appellees to prove bad faith on the part of defendants-appellants.
Contention of Mcdo
the Isaiyas Group did so only in the Supplemental Register of the PBPTT and Contention of Petitioner before SC: respondents' “Big Mak” is undeniably and
such registration does not provide any protection. unquestionably similar to petitioners' “Big Mac” trademark based on the
dominancy test and the idem sonans test resulting inexorably in confusion on
Ruling of the RTC the part of the consuming public; that respondents' use of the “Big Mak” mark
Respondent corporation liable for trademark infringement and unfair on respondents' hamburgers results in confusion of goods; that respondents'
competition. However, RTC dismissed the complaint against private use of the “Big Mak” mark in the sale of hamburgers, the same business that
respondents and the counterclaim against petitioners for lack of merit and petitioners are engaged in, results in confusion of business.
insufficiency of evidence.
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Contention of Respindent: that of the two words in the “Big Mac” mark, it is - confusion of goods “in which event the ordinarily prudent purchaser
only the word “Mac” that is valid because the word “Big” is generic and would be induced to purchase one product in the belief that he was
descriptive (proscribed under Section 4[e]), and thus “incapable of exclusive purchasing the other.”
appropriation.” - confusion of business: “Here though the goods of the parties are
different, the defendant's product is such as might reasonably be
assumed to originate with the plaintiff, and the public would then be
ISSUES: deceived either into that belief or into the belief that there is some
1) whether the mark “Big Mac” is valid; connection between the plaintiff and defendant which, in fact, does
2) whether respondent corporation is liable for trademark infringement not exist.”
and unfair competition.
Since respondents used the “Big Mak” mark on the same goods, i.e.
RULING: hamburger sandwiches, that petitioners' “Big Mac” mark is used, trademark
1) “Big Mac” falls under the class of fanciful or arbitrary marks as it infringement through confusion of goods is a proper issue in this case.
bears no logical relation to the actual characteristics of the product it Whether a hamburger is single, double or triple-decker, and whether wrapped
represents. As such, it is highly distinctive and thus valid.
A mark is valid if it is “distinctive” and thus not barred from in plastic or styrofoam, it remains the same hamburger food product. Even
registration under Section 4 of RA 166 (“Section 4”). However, once respondents' use of the “Big Mak” mark on non-hamburger food products
registered, not only the mark's validity but also the registrant's cannot excuse their infringement of petitioners' registered mark, otherwise
ownership of the mark is prima facie presumed. The “Big Mac” mark, registered marks will lose their protection under the law.
which should be treated in its entirety and not dissected word for
How to determine likelihood of Confusion
word, is neither generic nor descriptive.
Generic marks are commonly used as the name or description of a The dominancy test focuses on the similarity of the prevalent features of the
kind of goods, such as “Lite” for beer or “Chocolate Fudge” for competing trademarks that might cause confusion. In contrast, the holistic test
chocolate soda drink. requires the court to consider the entirety of the marks as applied to the
Descriptive marks, on the other hand, convey the characteristics, products, including the labels and packaging, in determining confusing
functions, qualities or ingredients of a product to one who has never similarity.
seen it or does not know it exists, such as “Arthriticare” for arthritis Note: Court of Appeals, in finding that there is no likelihood of confusion that
medication. could arise in the use of respondents' “Big Mak” mark on hamburgers, relied
on the holistic test.
To establish trademark infringement, the following elements must be shown:
(1) the validity of plaintiff's mark; (2) the plaintiff's ownership of the mark; and The Court relied on dominancy - The dominancy test considers the
(3) the use of the mark or its colorable imitation by the alleged infringer results dominant features in the competing marks in determining whether they are
in “likelihood of confusion.” Of these, it is the element of likelihood of confusion confusingly similar. Under the dominancy test, courts give greater weight to
that is the gravamen of trademark infringement. the similarity of the appearance of the product arising from the adoption of the
dominant features of the registered mark, disregarding minor differences.
Two types of confusion arising from the use of similar or colorable
imitation marks
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Note: The test of dominancy is now explicitly incorporated into law in Section - Respondents have applied on their plastic wrappers and bags
155.1 of the Intellectual Property Code which defines infringement as the almost the same words that petitioners use on their styrofoam box.
“colorable imitation of a registered mark xxx or a dominant feature thereof.” What attracts the attention of the buying public are the words “Big
Mak” which are almost the same, aurally and visually, as the words
“Big Mac.” The dissimilarities in the material and other devices are
Application to the case: Court finds that respondents' use of the “Big Mak” insignificant compared to the glaring similarity in the words used in
mark results in likelihood of confusion. First, “Big Mak” sounds exactly the the wrappings. And since respondents chose to apply the “Big Mak”
same as “Big Mac.” Second, the first word in “Big Mak” is exactly the same as mark on hamburgers, just like petitioner's use of the “Big Mac” mark
the first word in “Big Mac.” Third, the first two letters in “Mak” are the same as on hamburgers, respondents have obviously clothed their goods
the first two letters in “Mac.” Fourth, the last letter in “Mak” while a “k” sounds with the general appearance of petitioners' goods.
the same as “c” when the word “Mak” is pronounced. Fifth, in Filipino, the letter
“k” replaces “c” in spelling, thus “Caloocan” is spelled “Kalookan.” There is no notice to the public that the “Big Mak” hamburgers are
Clearly, respondents have adopted in “Big Mak” not only the dominant but also products of “L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.” This clearly shows respondents'
almost all the features of “Big Mac.” Applied to the same food product of intent to deceive the public.
hamburgers, the two marks will likely result in confusion in the public mind.
CASE 9: DEL MONTE CORPORATION and PHILIPPINE PACKING
CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and SUNSHINE SAUCE
2) Petitioners' failure to present proof of actual confusion does not
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (Chua)
negate their claim of trademark infringement. essential elements of
G.R. No. L-78325 January 25, 1990
an action for unfair competition are (1) confusing similarity in the
CRUZ, J.
general appearance of the goods, and (2) intent to deceive the public
and defraud a competitor. Trademark infringement constitutes unfair
DOCTRINE: Tomato catsup label is a colorable imitation of the Del Monte
competition when there is not merely likelihood of confusion, but also
actual or probable deception on the public because of the general trademark due to prominent similarities in general design although there are
appearance of the goods. some differences.
Defendant gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of his
competitor with the intention of deceiving the public that the goods are those FACTS:
of his competitor. Del Monte granted Philpack the right to manufacture, distribute and sell in the
Philippines various agricultural products, including catsup, under the Del
Monte trademark and logo1. On October 27,1965, Del Monte authorized
Passing off (or palming off) takes place where the defendant, by imitative
Philpack to register with the Philippine Patent Office the Del Monte catsup
devices on the general appearance of the goods, misleads prospective bottle configuration, for which it was granted Certificate of Trademark
purchasers into buying his merchandise under the impression that they are Registration under the Supplemental Register. On November 20, 1972, Del
buying that of his competitors. Monte also obtained two registration certificates for its trademark "DEL
MONTE" and its logo.
Similarity in the general appearance of the goods may be in the “devices or
words” used on the wrappings.
1
Petitioner Del Monte Corporation is a foreign company organized under the laws of Packing Corporation (Philpack) is a domestic corporation duly organized under the laws
the United States and not engaged in business in the Philippines. Petitioner Philippine of the Philippines.
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Respondent Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing Industries was issued a lettering on International, Inc., Q.C., the Philippines by Sunshine
Certificate of Registration by the Bureau of Domestic Trade on April 17,1980, label or mark: Philippines. Sauce Manufacturing
to engage in the manufacture, packing, distribution and sale of various kinds Industries" No. 1 Del Monte
of sauce, identified by the logo Sunshine Fruit Catsup. This logo was Avenue, Malabon, Metro
registered in the Supplemental Register on September 20, 1983. The product Manila.
itself was contained in various kinds of bottles, including the Del Monte bottle, 4. As to color Combination of yellow and White, light green and light
which the private respondent bought from the junk shops for recycling. of logo: dark red, with words "Del red, with words "Sunshine
Monte Quality" in white. Brand" in yellow.
Having received reports that the private respondent was using its exclusively 5. As to shape In the shape of a tomato. Entirely different in shape.
designed bottles and a logo confusingly similar to Del Monte's, Philpack of logo:
warned it to desist. Thereafter, claiming that the demand had been ignored, 6. As to label Seal covering the cap There is a label below the
Philpack and Del Monte filed a complaint against the private respondent for below the down to the neck of the cap which says "Sunshine
infringement of trademark and unfair competition, with a prayer for cap: bottle, with picture of Brand."
damages and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. tomatoes with words
"made from real
Defense tomatoes."
Sunshine alleged that it had long ceased to use the Del Monte bottle and that 7. As to the Darker red. Lighter than Del Monte.
its logo was substantially different from the Del Monte logo and would not color of the
confuse the buying public to the detriment of the petitioners. products:
Regional Trial Court Court of Appeals

dismissed the complaint. It held that there were substantial differences affirmed in toto, which is now faulted in this petition for certiorari under Rule
between the logos or trademarks of the parties; that the defendant had ceased 45 of the Rules of Court. The court cited the following test laid down by this
using the petitioners' bottles; and that in any case the defendant became the Court in a number of cases:
owner of the said bottles upon its purchase thereof from the junk yards. In determining whether two trademarks are confusingly similar, the two
Furthermore, the complainants had failed to establish the defendant's malice marks in their entirety as they appear in the respective labels must be
or bad faith, which was an essential element of infringement of trademark or considered in relation to the goods to which they are attached; the
unfair competition. The Trial Court also attempts to make a comparison of the discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant
two products, to wit: words but also on the other features appearing on both labels and
applying the same, it held that there was no colorable imitation of the
Del Monte Sunshine petitioners' trademark and logo by the private respondent.
1.As to the Semi-rectangular with a Regular rectangle.
The Court of Appeals declared that:
shape of label crown or tomato shape
1. The registration of the Sunshine label belied the company's
or make: design on top of the
malicious intent to imitate petitioner's product;
rectangle.
2. it held that the Sunshine label was not improper because the Bureau
2. As to brand Tomato catsup mark. Fruit catsup.
of Patent presumably considered other trademarks before approving
printed on
it; and
label:
3. it cited the case of Shell Co. v. Insular Petroleum, where the Court
3. As to the Clearly indicated words Sunshine fruit catsup is declared that selling oil in containers of another with markings
words or packed by Sysu clearly indicated "made in erased, without intent to deceive, was not unfair competition.
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Any person who shall employ deception or any other means

ISSUES: contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods
1. Whether or not there are substantial differences between the logos manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or
or trademarks of the parties as held by the Court of Appeals to services for those of the one having established such goodwill,
warrant acquittal for the offense charged. - No or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result,
2. Whether or not defendant can be held liable of infringement of shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an
trademark and unfair competition by using Del Monte’s exclusively action therefor.
designed bottles. - Liable for unfair competition only
In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of unfair
HELD: competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair
1. No. There’s no substantial difference between the two logos or trademarks. competition:
Sunshine's label is an infringement of the Del Monte's trademark. The law and (a) Any person, who in selling his goods shall give
equity call for the cancellation of the private respondent's registration and them the general appearance of goods of another
withdrawal of all its products bearing the questioned label from the market. manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods
themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in
Sec. 22. Infringement, what constitutes. — Any person who which they are contained, or the devices or words
shall use, without the consent of the registrant, any thereon, or in any other feature of their
reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of any appearance, which would likely influence
registered mark or trade-name in connection with the sale, purchasers to believe that the goods offered are
offering for sale, or advertising of any goods, business or those of a manufacturer or dealer other than the
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others clothes the goods with such appearance as shall
as to the source or origin of such goods or services or identity deceive the public and defraud another of his
of such business; or reproduce, counterfeit copy or colorably legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such
imitate any such mark or trade name and apply such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in
reproduction, counterfeit copy or colorable imitation to labels, selling such goods with a like purpose;
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or (b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or
advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection with who employs ally other means calculated to induce
such goods, business or services, shall be liable to a civil action the false belief that such person is offering the
by the registrant for any or all of the remedies herein provided. services of another who has identified such
services in the mind of the public; or
Sec. 29. Unfair competition, rights and remedies. — A person (c) Any person who shall make any false statement
who has identified in the mind of the public the goods he in the course of trade or who shall commit any
manufactures or deals in, his business or services from those other act contrary to good faith of a nature
of others, whether or not a mark or tradename is employed, has calculated to discredit the goods, business or
a property right in the goodwill of the said goods, business or services of another.
services so identified, which will be protected in the same
manner as other property rights. Such a person shall have the Distinctions between infringement of trademark and unfair competition.
remedies provided in section twenty- three, Chapter V hereof. (1) Infringement of trademark is the unauthorized use of a trademark,
whereas unfair competition is the passing off of one's goods as those of
another.
20
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(2) In infringement of trademark fraudulent intent is unnecessary analytical investigation. But mass products, low priced articles in wide
whereas in unfair competition fraudulent intent is essential. use, and matters of everyday purchase requiring frequent replacement
(3) In infringement of trademark the prior registration of the trademark is are bought by the casual consumer without great care. In this latter
a prerequisite to the action, whereas in unfair competition registration is category is catsup.
not necessary.
At that, even if the labels were analyzed together it is not difficult to see
 It has been correctly held that side-by-side comparison is not the final that the Sunshine label is a colorable imitation of the Del Monte
test of similarity. The ordinary buyer does not usually make such trademark. The predominant colors used in the Del Monte label are green
scrutiny nor does he usually have the time to do so.2 and red-orange, the same with Sunshine. The word "catsup" in both bottles is
 The question is not whether the two articles are distinguishable by their printed in white and the style of the print/letter is the same. Although the logo
label when set side by side but whether the general confusion made by of Sunshine is not a tomato, the figure nevertheless approximates that of a
the article upon the eye of the casual purchaser who is unsuspicious and tomato.
off his guard, is such as to likely result in his confounding it with the
original. What is undeniable is the fact that when a manufacturer prepares to package
 his product, he has before him a boundless choice of words, phrases, colors
A number of courts have held that to determine whether a trademark has
been infringed, we must consider the mark as a whole and not as and symbols sufficient to distinguish his product from the others. When as in
dissected. If the buyer is deceived, it is attributable to the marks as a this case, Sunshine chose, without a reasonable explanation, to use the same
totality, not usually to any part of it. 3 The judge must also be aware of colors and letters as those used by Del Monte though the field of its selection
the fact that usually a defendant in cases of infringement does not was so broad, the inevitable conclusion is that it was done deliberately to
normally copy but makes only colorable changes. Well has it been said deceive .
that the most successful form of copying is to employ enough points of
similarity to confuse the public with enough points of difference to It has been aptly observed that the ultimate ratio in cases of grave doubt is
confuse the courts. the rule that as between a newcomer who by the confusion has nothing
 We also note that the respondent court failed to take into consideration to lose and everything to gain and one who by honest dealing has
several factors which should have affected its conclusion, to wit: age, already achieved favor with the public, any doubt should be resolved
training and education of the usual purchaser, the nature and cost of the against the newcomer inasmuch as the field from which he can select a
article, whether the article is bought for immediate consumption and also desirable trademark to indicate the origin of his product is obviously a
the conditions under which it is usually purchased.Among these, what large one.
essentially determines the attitude of the purchaser, specifically his
inclination to be cautious, is the cost of the goods.4 2. No. Private respondent is not guilty of infringement for having used the Del
 As a general rule, an ordinary buyer does not exercise as much Monte bottle but that of unfair competition. The reason is that the configuration
prudence in buying an article for which he pays a few centavos as he of the said bottle was merely registered in the Supplemental Register. In the
does in purchasing a more valuable thing. Expensive and valuable case of Lorenzana v. Macagba, we declared that:
items are normally bought only after deliberate, comparative and
2 3
The average shopper is usually in a hurry and does not inspect every product on the The court therefore should be guided by its first impression, for a buyer acts quickly
shelf as if he were browsing in a library. Where the housewife has to return home as and is governed by a casual glance, the value of which may be dissipated as soon as
soon as possible to her baby or the working woman has to make quick purchases during the court assumes to analyze carefully the respective features of the mark.
4
her off hours, she is apt to be confused by similar labels even if they do have minute To be sure, a person who buys a box of candies will not exercise as much care as
differences. The male shopper is worse as he usually does not bother about such one who buys an expensive watch.
distinctions.
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(1) Registration in the Principal Register gives rise to a On the argument that no unfair competition was committed, the Shell Case is
presumption of the validity of the registration, the registrant's not on all fours with the case at bar.5
ownership of the mark and his right to the exclusive use thereof.
There is no such presumption in the registration in the With regard to the use of Del Monte's bottle, the same constitutes unfair
Supplemental Register. competition; hence, the respondent should be permanently enjoined
(2) Registration in the Principal Register is limited to the actual from the use of such bottles.
owner of the trademark and proceedings therein on the issue of
ownership which may be contested through opposition or The court must rule, however, that the damage prayed for cannot be granted
interference proceedings or, after registration, in a petition for because the petitioner has not presented evidence to prove the amount
cancellation. thereof as required by section 23 of R.A. No. 166. However, Petitioners, may
Registration in the Principal Register is constructive notice of still find some small comfort in Art. 2222 of the Civil Code. This Court ordered
the registrant's claim of ownership, while registration in the the private respondent to pay the nominal damages in the amount of 1,000.
Supplemental Register is merely proof of actual use of the
trademark and notice that the registrant has used or VIOLATIONS OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
appropriated it. It is not subject to opposition although it may be
(Republic Act No. 9165)
cancelled after the issuance. Corollarily, registration in the
Principal Register is a basis for an action for infringement while
registration in the Supplemental Register is not. CASE 10: PEOPLE vs. SONNY PADUA
(3) In applications for registration in the Principal Register, G.R. No. 174097, July 21, 2010
publication of the application is necessary. This is not so in Leonardo-De Castro, J.:
applications for registrations in the Supplemental Register.
DOCTRINE:
It can be inferred from the foregoing that although Del Monte has actual use 1. Non-compliance with the stipulated procedure for custody and
of the bottle's configuration, the petitioners cannot claim exclusive use thereof disposition of dangeros drugs, under justifiable grounds, shall not
because it has not been registered in the Principal Register. render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items,
for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
However, we find that Sunshine, despite the many choices available to it and are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
notwithstanding that the caution "Del Monte Corporation, Not to be Refilled" 2. Not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs are
was embossed on the bottle, still opted to use the petitioners' bottle to market required to testify in court, as long as the chain of custody of the
a product which Philpack also produces. This clearly shows the private seized drug was clearly established not to have been broken and that
respondent's bad faith and its intention to capitalize on the latter's reputation the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized.
and goodwill and pass off its own product as that of Del Monte.
5
(1) In Shell, the absence of intent to deceive was supported by the fact that the (3) In Shell, the product of respondent was sold to dealers, not to ultimate consumers.
respondent therein, before marketing its product, totally obliterated and erased the As a general rule, dealers are well acquainted with the manufacturer from whom they
brands/mark of the different companies stenciled on the containers thereof, except for make their purchases and since they are more experienced, they cannot be so easily
a single isolated transaction. The respondent in the present case made no similar effort. deceived like the inexperienced public. There may well be similarities and imitations
(2) In Shell, what was involved was a single isolated transaction. Of the many drums which deceive all, but generally the interests of the dealers are not regarded with the
used, there was only one container where the Shell label was not erased, while in the same solicitude as are the interests of the ordinary consumer. For it is the form in which
case at hand, the respondent admitted that it made use of several Del Monte bottles the wares come to the final buyer that is of significance.
and without obliterating the embossed warning.
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FACTS: The RTC-Pasig City found the accused Sonny Padua guilty of illegal and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, popularly known possession, custody and control four (4) heat sealed
as shabu, under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, transparent plastic sachets, each sachet containing 0.20
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. gram, 0.10 gram, 0.20 gram and 0.20 gram, respectively, or
in the aggregate total weight of 0.70 gram, of white
The facts gathered from the records are as follows: crystalline substance, which substance were found positive
to the test for shabu, which is a dangerous drug, in violation
Two separate informations dated August 19, 2002 were filed before the RTC of the above-cited law.[6]
against appellant for illegal sale and possession of shabu under Sections
5[3] and 11,[4] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The accusatory portion of the
informations read: Subsequently, these cases were consolidated. When arraigned on
September 18, 2002, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio,pleaded Not
Criminal Case No. 11595-D guilty to each of the charges.[7]
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor During the pre-trial conference, the public prosecutor marked their evidence
accuses SONNY PADUA y REYES of the crime of violation but the defense did not mark any evidence. The prosecution decided to
of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165, committed as present four witnesses, namely: Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Nilo Banzuela,
follows: Police Officer (PO) 3 Felix Mayuga, PO3 Cirilo Zamora and PO2 Roberto
Jovenir. The parties dispensed with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Maria
That, on or about the 18th day of August 2002, in Ana Rivera-Dagasdas on the stipulation that she received the request for
the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and laboratory examination and the specimen allegedly confiscated from the
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- accused on August 18, 2002 and upon her examination, the specimen proved
named accused, without being authorized by law did, then positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride as appearing in Chemistry
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and Report No. D-1237-02. The defense agreed to present three witnesses, the
give away to another one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic accused, Alicia Padua and Christopher Griego.[8]
sachet containing 0.20 gram of white crystalline substance,
which substance was found positive to the test for shabu, Trial on the merits thereafter followed.
which is a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount
of P200.00 in violation of the above-cited law.[5] In the morning of August 18, 2002 policemen were ordered to conduct a buy-
bust operation against accused-appellant, who was allegedly selling illegal
Criminal Case No. 11596-D drugs in Taguig City. One of the policemen was tasked to pose as the poseur-
buyer and the team proceeded to the residence of accused-appellant at
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Taguig City where the asset and another policeman parked their car about 50
accuses SONNY PADUA y REYES of the crime of violation to 75 meters away from the residence of accused-appellant, conducted a
of Section 11, 2nd Par., No. 3, Article II of Republic Act 9165, surveillance, and observed that there were persons coming in and out of
committed as follows: Paduas house talking to the latter. They then went back to the other police
officers and told them the place where accused-appellant was. Thereafter, the
That, on or about the 18th day of August 2002 in buy-bust team proceeded to the house of accused-appellant. The asset called
the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and Padua, and when the latter went out of his house, the asset introduced PO2
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- Aguilar to him as a delivery truck driver who had just arrived from a provincial
named accused, without being authorized by law did, then trip and in dire need of shabu for his personal consumption. Aguilar handed
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the P200.00 marked money to the accused-appellant, who folded and placed The defense also offered the testimony of Miranda Estanislao, cousin of the
it on his left pocket. Accused-appellant then took something from his right wife of accused-appellant, who testified that on August 18, 2002 in front of
pocket and handed an aluminum sachet to PO2 Aguilar. Subsequently, PO2 the house of her mother and beside the house of accused-appellant, five men
Aguilar removed his cap, the pre-arranged signal to the rest of the buy-bust arrived. The three entered the gate of the premises of accused-appellant, one
team that he had already bought the shabu. When PO1 Esparagoza arrived, was left outside of the gate while the other approached her and asked her of
PO2 Aguilar frisked and arrested the accused-appellant.He recovered the the address of the place. Ten minutes after they entered the house of
buy-bust money in the left pocket and four sachets in the right pocket of the accused-appellant, they came out together with accused-appellant who was
accused-appellant. He informed accused-appellant of his right to remain then handcuffed and half-naked.
silent, and of the fact that he would be charged with violation of Republic Act
No. 9165.They brought him to the police station. Later, PO2 Aguilar turned After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty as
over the seized drugs to the investigator, who thereafter brought the evidence charged.
to the SPD Crime Laboratory Office, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City.
On May 25, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and
The prosecution also adduced documentary and object evidence to conclusion of the RTC.
buttress the testimony of its witness, to wit: (1) joint affidavit of the arresting
officers signed by SPO2 Nilo Banzuela, PO3 Cirilo Zamora, PO2 Dante On appeal to the Supreme Court, the accused-appellant asserts that
Aguilar, PO3 Felix Mayuga, PO2 Roberto Jovenir and PO1 Michael the police officers failed to account for the chain of custody of the seized items
Esparagoza;[14] (2) request for laboratory examination dated August 18, alleged to be shabu. He questions the non-presentation as witness of the
2002;[15] (3) Physical Science Report No. D-1237-02 dated August 18, 2002, alleged investigator, the officer on duty who received the specimen together
signed by Forensic Chemist Maria Ana Rivera-Dagasdas;[16] (4) one heat- with the request for laboratory examination from PO2 Aguilar. He maintains
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.20 gram of shabu; (5) four heat- that the specimen, which PO2 Aguilar turned over to Forensic Chemist Rivera-
sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing 0.20 gram, 0.10 gram, Dagasdas, may no longer be the same specimen taken from him by PO2
0.20 gram and 0.20 gram respectively, of shabu; and (6) photocopy of two Aguilar.
one-hundred-peso bills with serial numbers FW840532 and YR684136.[17]
Accused-appellant testified that there was no buy-bust operation on August ISSUE: Was the buy-bust operation conducted properly and legally ?
18, 2002. On direct examination, accused-appellant asserted that at around
8:00 to 9:00 oclock in the morning of August 18, 2002, he was awakened by HELD: Yes. Contrary to accused-appellants claim, there is no broken chain in
the operatives who went to his house and when he opened his eyes, a gun the custody of the seized items, found to be shabu, from the time PO2 Aguilar
was poked at him. He was handcuffed by the police officers and was brought got the shabu, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, and
to DDEU at Fort Bonifacio, where he was detained. While inside the vehicle up to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist at the PNP Crime
on their way to Fort Bonifacio, accused-appellant alleged that the police Laboratory for laboratory examination.
officers asked him to give them money in the amount of P120,000.00
otherwise a case will be filed against him. The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under
The following day, accused-appellant was allegedly brought to the Capitol paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as follows:
Compound for inquest and was thereafter brought to the Taguig Municipal
Jail. He was not aware of any violation he committed. It was only during the (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
inquest proceedings in court that accused-appellant learned of the charges control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
filed against him. confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
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such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The
representative or counsel, a representative from the media prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. Anent the failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of the
informant, it is well-settled that the testimony of an informant in drug-pushing
cases is not essential for conviction and may be dispensed if the poseur-buyer
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations testified on the same. Informants are almost always never presented in court
of Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said provision, stipulates: because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police.
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody Further, not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure are required to testify in court. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph any rule implementing the same that imposes such requirement. As long as
the same in the presence of the accused or the the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly established not to have
person/s from whom such items were confiscated been broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person who came into
representative from the media and the Department of possession of the drugs should take the witness stand.
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in
given a copy thereof: x x x Provided, further, that non- a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the
compliance with these requirements under justifiable offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor,
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the which the prosecution has satisfactorily established. The prosecution
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and satisfactorily proved the illegal sale of dangerous drugs and presented in court
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. the evidence of corpus delicti.[30]
Under the same proviso, non-compliance with the In the instant case, all the elements of the crime have been sufficiently
stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void established by the prosecution.
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly On the other hand, for an accused to be convicted of illegal possession of
preserved by the apprehending officers. prohibited or regulated drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
Clearly, the purpose of the procedure outlined in the implementing prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
rules is centered on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.
the seized items.
With respect to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under
The fact that the persons who had possession or custody of the Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, all of these elements were
subject drugs, such as the Forensic Chemist Rivera-Dagasdas and the present and duly proven..
alleged investigator, were not presented as witnesses to corroborate SPO2
Aguilars testimony is of no moment. The non-presentation as witnesses of Accused-appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that he
other persons is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of received the money as payment for the sale of illegal drugs, by its failure to
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prove that he was positive for ultraviolet fluorescent powder. The accused- FACTS: The prosecution evidence shows that the Drug Enforcement Group
appellant fails to persuade us since the prosecution has discharged its onus of the Olongapo City Police had received reports of rampant selling of illegal
of proving the accusation, as in fact it presented the prohibited drug and drugs at Compound 7-9th Street, Barangay Ilalim, Olongapo City.
identified accused-appellant as the offender, it is immaterial that prosecution
present report that accused-appellant was indeed positive for ultraviolet On July 19, 2002, within the election period, the police conducted a buy-bust
fluorescent powder. operation at the place. SPO1 Alfredo Flores, acting as a poseur-buyer, and
an informer met the accused Efren M. Ditona in front of the latters
In a last-ditch but futile attempt to evade culpability, the accused-appellant house. SPO1 Flores gave Ditona the marked money consisting of two P100
tried to argue on his behalf that no surveillance was conducted before the buy- bills in exchange for one plastic sachet of shabu.
bust operation.
At a signal, PO3 Norberto Ventura and PO2 Allan Delos Reyes rushed
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or towards the gate of the compound to make the apprehension but, before they
buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook could reach SPO1 Flores and Ditona, the latter noticed their movement and
method. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. However the police carry out ran into his house. The officers arrested him there and four others who were
its entrapment operations, for as long as the rights of the accused have not then sniffing shabu and preparing aluminum tin foils.
been violated in the process, the courts will not pass on the wisdom
thereof. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and The police frisked them and found the marked money on Ditonas person
dispense with the need for prior surveillance. together with transparent plastic sachets containing what appeared to
be shabu substance and one cal. 22 magnum revolver with six live
ammunitions. They confiscated the marked money, the
CASE 11: PEOPLE vs. EFREN DITONA (Claudio) suspected shabu substance in sachets, the gun, and the
G.R. No. 189841, December 15, 2010 ammunitions.[1] Upon laboratory examination, the substance proved positive
Abad, J. for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[2]
DOCTRINE: The City Prosecutor of Olangapo City filed four separate informations against
Ditona before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City for selling and
1. To successfully prosecute an accused for selling illegal drugs, the possessing illegal drugs ,violation of the Omnibus Election Code , and illegal
prosecution has to prove: possession of firearms.The RTC tried all four cases jointly.
(1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and On July 11, 2007 the RTC found Ditona guilty of all the charges. Ditonas
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. denial, said the RTC, cannot prevail over the police officers positive
declarations considering that the latter did not have any motive to concoct a
2. For an accused to be convicted of possession of illegal drugs, the false charge against him and presumably performed their official duties
prosecution is required to prove that: regularly.
(1) the accused was in possession of prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction for the crimes
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the relating to the prohibited drugs but modified the RTC ruling with respect to the
prohibited drug. In both instances, the State has to prove as other charges after observing that it erred in convicting Ditona separately for
well the corpus delicti, the body of the crime. illegal possession of firearms and violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish beyond

reasonable doubt Ditonas guilt for illegal possession and sale of shabu. Quite clearly, the prosecution failed to establish the required chain of custody
of the prohibited drugs through the testimonies of the police officers. While the
RTC noted that SPO1 Flores and PO3 Ventura placed their initials, AF and
HELD: NV, on the seized drugs, they did not identify the markings as theirs during
their direct testimonies nor did they testify when and where they made such
No. To successfully prosecute an accused for selling illegal drugs, the markings. Moreover, they failed to show how the seized drugs reached the
prosecution has to prove: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the laboratory technician who examined it and how the same were stored pending
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the turnover to the court.
payment for it. On the other hand, for an accused to be convicted of
possession of illegal drugs, the prosecution is required to prove that: (1) the Indeed, there is no room to apply the presumption of regularity in the police
accused was in possession of prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not officers performance of official duty. While the testimonies of the police
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the officers who apprehended the accused are generally accorded full faith and
prohibited drug. credit because of the presumption that they have performed their duties
regularly, such presumption is effectively destroyed where the performance of
In both instances, the State has to prove as well the corpus delicti, the body their duties is tainted with failure to comply with the prescribed procedure and
of the crime.It must be shown that the suspected substance the police officers guidelines.
seized from the accused is the same thing presented in court during the
trial. Thus, the chain of custody rule is essential to ensure that doubts The drug enforcement agencies of the government and the prosecution
regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and should put their acts together to ensure that the guilty are punished and the
tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, innocent absolved. Poor handling and preservation of the integrity of evidence
to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court. The witnesses should be able show lack of professionalism and waste the time that the courts could use for
to describe these movements to ensure that there had been no change in the hearing and adjudicating other cases. Prosecutors ought not to file drugs
condition of the item and that no one who did not belong in the chain had cases in court unless the law enforcement agencies are able to show
access to the same. documented compliance with every requirement of Section 21 of Republic Act
9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Likewise
Here, the prosecution dismally failed to prove the corpus delicti since there prosecutors ought to have a checklist of the questions they should ask their
were substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drugs which raised witnesses in drugs cases that would elicit the required proof.
doubts on the authenticity of the evidence presented in court.
The court thus acquitted Ditona of all the charges.
To begin with, SPO1 Flores, PO3 Ventura, and PO2 Delos Reyes executed a
Joint Affidavit, which formed part of their direct testimonies, in which they CASE 12: PEOPLE vs. ROGER VILLANUEVA (Dalaguete)
narrated the details of the buy-bust operation. Yet, they did not say how they GR No. 172116, October 30, 2006
handled the seized drugs from the time they frisked Ditona until they brought Ynares-Santiago, J.
him to the police station. They also omitted these important points in their
testimonies on direct and cross-examination. DOCTRINE:
1. To sustain a conviction under a single prosecution witness, such
PO2 Delos Reyes testified on the details of the seized drugs, the gun, and the testimony needs only to establish sufficiently:
ammunitions taken from the persons in the house but he did not specify what a. the identity of the buyer, seller, object and consideration;
things he confiscated from Ditona. PO3 Ventura, on the other hand, merely and
testified that he issued a receipt for the things the police seized, thus. b. the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.
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2. Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 penalizes the sale, trading,

administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and RTC found him guilty for drug pushing punishable under Sec. 5, Art. II of RA
transportation of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and 9165
essential chemicals regardless of the quantity and purity involved.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of
FACTS: PO1 Ariosto Rana of the Dangerous Drugs Enforcement Group the crime charged
(DDEG), Northern Police District, testified that at 8:00 p.m. of July 9, 2002, a
confidential informant informed them that appellant was selling shabu at HELD: No. Appellant maintains that there was no entrapment and that he
Block 8, lot 2, Phase 2, Area 1, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas. He immediately was arrested in his house on the night of the alleged commission of the
composed a team of police operatives to entrap the appellant, with him crime. While he admits that the resolution of the case would boil down to the
posing as the poseur-buyer. After marking the P100.00 bill and recording in determination of who between the parties is more credible, he insists that the
the blotter its serial number, the team proceeded to the place and arrived presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty alone could not
thereat around 9:30 p.m. He and the informant approached the appellant sustain a conviction; and that the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony
while the rest strategically positioned themselves. The informant introduced of PO1 Rana could not prevail over his constitutionally guaranteed
him to the appellant, who asked them if they wanted to buy shabu. Appellant presumption of innocence.
got one plastic sachet from his pocket containing a white crystalline
substance. After appellant received the marked money, Rana executed the Indeed, in criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond
prearranged signal and the team arrested the appellant. The confiscated reasonable doubt not only the commission of the crime but likewise to
substance was submitted to the Northern Police District-Crime Laboratory establish, with the same quantum of proof, the identity of the person or
for examination, which yielded the following results: persons responsible therefor. This burden of proof does not shift to the
defense but remains in the prosecution throughout the trial. However, when
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof by
presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the
A – one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with allegations in the information or has established a prima facie case against
markings "RVH BB" containing 0.21 gram of white the accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it
crystalline substance. xxx. incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in order to meet and nullify, if not to
overthrow, that prima facie case.
xxxx
To sustain a conviction under a single prosecution witness, such testimony
FINDINGS: needs only to establish sufficiently: 1) the identity of the buyer, seller, object
and consideration; and 2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated thereof. Indeed, what is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually
specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as
Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x evidence. In this case, PO1 Rana, being the poseur-buyer, was the most
competent person to testify on the fact of sale and he did so to the
Denying the accusations against him, appellant testified that on the night of satisfaction of both the trial court and the appellate court.
the alleged commission of the crime, he was at home watching television.
Thereafter, two policemen knocked at the door looking for a certain person A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping
named Roger. When he identified himself as Roger, he was immediately and capturing felons in the execution of their criminal plan. The operation is
handcuffed and brought to the headquarters without explanation. It was only sanctioned by law and has consistently proved to be an effective method of
later that he found out that he was being charged for selling shabu. apprehending drug peddlers. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence
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that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper hydrochloride a dangerous drug/s, without being authorized
motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies with by law.
respect to the operation deserve full faith and credit. Verily, here, from the CONTRARY TO LAW.
evidence adduced, We find no reason to depart from the general rule. We BAIL RECOMMENDED: P200.000
are one with the court a quo’s conclusion that the prosecution was able to Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2004.
establish that a buy-bust operation actually took place starting from the time JESUS P. FELICIANO
the team composed of nine (9) members proceeded to the target area at Prosecutor II, Cebu City
9:00 p.m. for the initial negotiation until the perfection of the sale at 9:30 p.m. (underscoring in the original)
the same night.
At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated "that the Forensic Officer Jude Daniel
Moreover, when the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation have Mendoza will testify, and affirm and confirm his findings and conclusion within
no motive to falsely testify against the accused, the courts shall uphold the the four corners of his forensic report" with the clarification that what was
presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. admitted was the "existence but not the source" of the two sachets.
Prosecution witness PO1 Julius Busico (PO1 Busico) adopted as his
CASE 13: PEOPLE vs. JULIUS GADIANA (Dimayuga) testimony at the witness stand, the February 9, 2004 Joint Affidavit, which he
G.R. No. 184761, September 8, 2010 and PO3 Joseph Dinauanao (PO3 Dinauanao) executed.
Carpio Morales, J.
Version of the prosecution
DOCTRINE: Chain of custody establishes the identity of the subject The Joint Affidavit contains the following:
substance. It requires that testimony be presented about every link in the At about 3:40 P.M. on February 7, 2004, while PO1 Busico, along with PO3
chain, from the moment the item is seized up to the time it is offered in Dinauanao, PO2 Erwin Ferrer, and three other police officers, was conducting
evidence. When nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated is the a saturation drive at Sitio San Roque, Barangay Mambaling, Cebu City, he
same specimen examined and established to be prohibited drug, there can be chanced upon Gadiana holding two small plastic sachets containing
no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug. crystalline substances which he was about to place inside his pocket.
FACTS: Julius Gadiana was charged with the violation of Section 11, Article The policemen, identifying themselves as such, apprehended appellant at
II of Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act) in the once, confiscated the two sachets from his right hand, brought him with the
RTC of Cebu. The information reads: confiscated sachets to their office, and turned over the sachets to the PNP
Crime Laboratory Service which found them positive for methamphetamine
The undersigned Prosecutor II of the City of Cebu accuses hydrochloride. PO1 Busico at the witness stand added that it was PO2 Ferrer
Julius Gadiana y Repollo, for Violation of Sec. 11, Art. 9165, who prepared the request letter for such examination. The request letter was
committed as follows: marked as Exhibit C and that Chemistry Report No. D-241-2004 (lab result)
That on or about the 7th day of February, 2004, at about 3:40 was marked as Exhibit D. PO1 Busico confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness
P.M. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the of the joint affidavit.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, x x x,
with deliberate intent, did then and there have in his/her Version of the defense
possession and under his/her control the following: Gadiana claimed he was walking along an alley in Sitio Tromar, Mambaling,
A – Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic packets of white Cebu City (where his house was situated) on his way to Sitio Paglaum where
crystalline substance with a total net weight of 0.09 grams he used to stand by, after three of the six above-named policemen passed by
locally known as ‘SHABU’, containing methamphetamine
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him, the fourth, prosecution witness PO1 Busico, uttered "This is the one, this the item is seized up to the time it is offered in evidence. When nagging doubts
is the one. This is very obvious." persist on whether the item confiscated is the same specimen examined and
established to be prohibited drug, there can be no crime of illegal possession
PO1 Busico at once held his arms and dipped into his (appellant’s) pocket of a prohibited drug.
upon which he (appellant) suggested that he (appellant) would just be the one
to do it, thereby catching the policeman’s ire. He was at once handcuffed by Except for the charge sheet prepared against appellant which stated that
PO1 Busico who was familiar to him as he always saw him "every Friday evidence consisted of "two (2) heat-sealed clear plastic sachets containing
afternoon [when he and company went] roving there." shabu with markings ‘JGR-1’ and ‘JGR-2,’" nowhere in the record is a showing
that the marking was done in the presence of appellant or his representatives
Appellant specifically denied the claim of PO1 Busico that he was holding two or that a physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken as
plastic packs of shabu which he was about to pocket. required under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 reading:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
RTC immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
The RTC of Cebu City found Gadiana guilty as charged. Gadiana was photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
OR PRISION MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM AND TO PAY A FINE OF (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS together with all of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
accessory penalties provided for by law. The physical evidence is hereby xxxx
forfeited in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law. Non-compliance with the above-quoted requirements does not of course
necessarily render void and invalid the seizure of the dangerous drugs,
CA provided that there are justifiable grounds to warrant exception therefrom. The
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed that of the trial court’s but modified the prosecution must, therefore, explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses
penalty, holding that the nomenclature and periods of the penalties under the and must show that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had been
RPC should not have been used by the trial court in the determination thereof preserved.
as it (the trial court) should have been guided by the provisions of the In their Joint Affidavit, which served as part of PO1 Busico’s testimony, he and
Indeterminate Sentence Law. The accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer PO3 Joseph merely stated that they brought appellant, together with the
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWELVE (12) YEARS AND confiscated evidence, to their office for proper documentation and filing of
ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS as maximum. appropriate charges. No statement was made that the allegedly seized
sachets were the same sachets which were subject of the letter-request for
ISSUE: Was Gadiana’s guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt? laboratory examination prepared and brought to the Crime Laboratory by PO2
Ferrer per PO1 Busico.
RULING: No. The trial court credited the "positive" version of PO1 Busico in
light of the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties During his brief testimony earlier quoted, aside from confirming the contents
and absent a showing of malice. Recall, that during the pre-trial, the "existence of the Joint Affidavit he executed with PO3 Dinauanao which served as his
but not the source" of the two sachets was stipulated on by the parties. It was direct testimony, PO1 Busico declared that PO2 Edwin Ferrer prepared and
thus incumbent on the prosecution to prove the chain of custody rule. brought the letter-request for laboratory examination to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. Not only was PO1 Busico’s testimony that Ferrer prepared the
Chain of custody establishes the identity of the subject substance. It requires letter-request for laboratory examination hearsay as he did not claim having
that testimony be presented about every link in the chain, from the moment seen him actually prepare it. The transcripts of stenographic notes do not
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show that the trial court tested the credibility of witness PO1 Busico and of his For his defense, Marifosque testified that in the morning of the said day, a
testimony. police asset (Elmer) came to his house and reported that he witnessed a
robbery at the gasoline station. Marifosque went to the gasoline station and
DIRECT BRIBERY relayed to Yu So Pong the matter. Thereafter, petitioner and Yu So Pong
(Art. 210, RPC) proceeded to the police station to report the robbery to the desk officer, PFC
Jesus Fernandez, who then dispatched petitioner and a certain Pat Garcia to
conduct an investigation. As they were leaving the police station, the asset
CASE 14: MARIFOSQUE vs. PEOPLE (Dionisio) approached petitioner asking if he could get P350.00 per cylinder tank as his
G.R. No. 156685 ; July 27, 2004 reward. Petitioner relayed the message to Yu So Pong, who said he was
amenable if that was the only way to recover the cylinders and to apprehend
DOCTRINE: A conviction under Art 210 is an issue of credibility which may the robbers. Based on information given by the asset, the police investigators
be established when the prosecution witnesses gave clear and proceeded to the house of one Edgardo Arnaldo where they found the stolen
straightforward testimonies. The Sandiganbayan did not err in giving full gas tanks. The group loaded the gas tanks into the vehicle. Petitioner did not
weight and credence to their version of the events arrest him at that time because he (Edgardo) promised to lead them to the
other stolen cylinder tanks. The group returned to the police station where
FACTS: On October 13, 1990 at around 5:00 in the afternoon, Hian Hian Sy petitioner made a written report of the recovery of the gas tanks. Petitioner
and her husband, Arsenio Sy, went to the office of Captain Alberto Salvo, then gave the asset P1,000 as alleged partial reward.
Chief of the Intelligence and Operating Division in Region 5 (Legazpi City), to
report the robbery of 21 Shellane tanks at the gasoline station of her father, Elmer testified that he worked as an asset of the Legazpi City police force and
Yu So Pong, and the alleged extortion attempt by petitioner, Police Sergeant occasionally received rewards from the police for any information of criminal
Narciso Marifosque, in exchange for the recovery of the lost items. Captain activities. He corroborated the testimony given by petitioner Marifosque and
Salvo and his men set up a plan to entrap the petitioner. Hian Hian Yu Sy further stated that he went with the latter to the store of Yu So Pong to collect
prepared the pay-off money in the amount of P4,800.00 and listed down the the reward money. Suddenly, armed men apprehended the petitioner, so he
serial numbers of the bills. The pay-off was scheduled at 7:00 in the evening ran away.
of that day in Golden Grace Department Store which was owned by Yu So
Pong. At around 6:15 p.m., Captain Calvo and his men arrived at the target
area and strategically positioned themselves outside the Golden Grace SANDIGANBAYAN RULING: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct
Department Store to await the arrival of the suspect. Shortly thereafter, bribery under Article 210
Marifosque arrived on board a tricycle. He went inside the store and
demanded the money from Hian Hian Yu Sy and Yu So Pong. The latter Now before the Supreme Court petitioner contends that the testimonies of the
handed to him the marked money, which was wrapped in a newspaper. When prosecution do not demonstrate with certainty that the receipt of the alleged
petitioner stepped out of the store, Arsenio Sy gave the pre-arranged signal, bribe money constitutes direct bribery since he was not the one who asked for
whereupon the arresting operatives swooped down upon the suspect and reward from complainants. He avers that there was no competent evidence to
arrested him. prove that the amount was really intended for him and not for his asset.
Hian Hian Yu Sy testified that petitioner demanded the amount of P7,200.00 ISSUE: WON petitioner’s receipt of the money constitutes direct bribery
but she bargained for P4,800.00 only because that was all she had at the time.
She proposed that petitioner return the following morning to pick up the RULING: YES. The Court ruled that petitioner cannot feign innocence and
balance. profess good faith since all the indicia point to his guilt and malicious intent.
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First, petitioner did not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So Pong promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration
at the time of the illegal transaction. Neither did he mention the existence of of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to
the asset when he was arrested and interrogated at Camp Ibalon, Instead, he refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the
accepted his arrest and investigation with an air of resignation, which is crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
characteristic of a culprit who is caught red-handed. Also, Captain Calvo There is no question that petitioner was a public officer within the
testified that petitioner attempted to give back the money to Yu So Pong when contemplation of Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, which includes all
they were about to arrest him. This was a clear showing that he was well persons who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by
aware of the illegality of his transaction. Had he been engaged in a competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in
legitimate deal, he would have faced courageously the arresting officers and the Philippine Government, or shall perform in said government or any of its
indignantly protested the violation of his person, which is the normal reaction branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official or any
of an innocent man. rank or class. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a police sergeant
assigned to the Legazpi City Police Station. He directly received the bribe
Second, at the time petitioner was notified by his asset of the robbery incident, money from Yu So Pong and his daughter Hian Hian Yu Sy in exchange for
he was no longer on duty, having been assigned to the night shift the day the recovery of the stolen cylinder tanks, which was an act not constituting a
before. Nonetheless, he was very eager to meet with Yu So Pong although crime within the meaning of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. Lastly, the
the case was already assigned to another police investigator. His justification act of receiving money was connected with his duty as a police officer. The
that he wanted to encourage the victim to pursue the case against the robbers ruling of the Sandiganbayan is thus AFFIRMED
rings hollow and untrue. As shown in the testimony of prosecution
petitioner met with Yu So Pong for no apparent reason than to demand CASE 15: PEOPLE v. EDUARDO ABESAMIS (Enriquez)
money. There was no mention of any attempt by him to investigate, much G.R. No. L-5284. September 11, 1953
less encourage the victims to file charges against the malefactors. More telling Reyes, J.
is petitioners persistence in obtaining the monetary reward for the asset
although the latter was no longer complaining about the P1,000.00 initially DOCTRINE:
given to him. 1. The second paragraph of article 210 distinguishes between two
cases: one in which the act agreed to be performed has been
executed and one in which the said act has not been accomplished,
Third, he did not apprehend Edgardo Arnaldo or invite him for investigation
but there is telling whether the information is for one or the other.
although the cylinder tanks were found in his possession. His excuse that the
2. An information which is insufficient to hold the accused for trial for
latter promised to deliver additional cylinder tanks is unworthy of credence
direct bribery under the first or second paragraph of article 210,
considering that, as a police officer with years of experience; he should have
may still be a sufficient indictment for indirect bribery under article
known that the proper action, under the circumstances, was to at least invite
211.
him to the police precinct for investigation. Curiously, the suspect Edgardo
Arnaldo turned out to be the brother of petitioner’s police asset who directed
the police officers to the location of the stashed articles. This strange
FACTS:
coincidence may well indicate a conspiracy between the petitioner and
"That on or about the 13th day of August, 1947, in the municipality of
the thieves to steal from the victim and later cash in on the recovery of
Echague, province of Isabela, the accused being then the Justice of the
the lost items.
Peace of Echague and Angadanan, Isabela, and as such is a public officer,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, demand and receive
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code from Marciana Sauri the amount of P1,100, with the agreement that he
consists of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) would dismiss the case for Robbery in Band with Rape against Emiliano
that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or Castillo, son of said Marciana Sauri, which was then pending in his Court.
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has not been accomplished, but there is telling whether the information is for
Court of First Insatance dismissed in that court on a motion to quash on the one or the other. The information is, therefore, defective in that aspect.
grounds "that the facts alleged in the information do not sufficiently charge
the crime of Direct Bribery," the case has been appealed to this Court by the But while the information is insufficient to hold the accused for trial for direct
Solicitor General. bribery under the first or second paragraph of article 210, it is a sufficient
indictment for indirect bribery under article 211. And since it is the
ISSUE: WON the accused was guilty of Direct Bribery allegations of fact rather than the denomination of the offense by the
provincial fiscal that determine the crime charged, the information in the
SC RULING: present case may be sustained as one for indirect bribery under the said
article 211 of the Revised Penal Code. Such being the case, the information
The information denominates the crime charged as "direct bribery" under in question should not have been dismissed.
article 210 of the Revised Penal Code — presumably under the first and
second paragraphs thereof, which read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Wherefore, the order appealed from is revoked and the case remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings
"ART. 210. Direct Bribery. — Any public officer who shall agree to perform
an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official INDIRECT BRIBERY
duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by (Art. 211, RPC)
such officer, personnally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine
not less than the value of the gift and not more than three times such value, CASE 16: GREGORY JAMES POZAR v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the APPEALS (Gasapo)
same shall have been committed. G.R. No. L-62439, October 23, 1984
"If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an DOCTRINE: Giving of P100.00 to a Probation Officer to defray expenses
act which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he was in good faith and negatives criminal intent to corrupt a public official.
shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if
said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the FACTS: The accused was convicted of the crime of less Serious Physical
penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Injuries, and the crime of Oral Defamation of the City Court of Angeles City,
the value of the gift and not more than twice such value."cralaw virtua1aw Branch 1, and the said accused was sentenced to an imprisonment of 15 days
library of Arresto Menor and to pay a fine of P50.00 and to pay the complaining
The crime charged does not come under the first paragraph. To fall within witness the amount of P500.00 as moral and exempt damages.
that paragraph the act which the public officer has agreed to perform must
be criminal. To dismiss a criminal complaint, as the accused is alleged to After he was sentenced, he, on November 28, 1979 filed an Application for
have agreed to do in the present case, does not necessarily constitute a Probation. That after filing the application for Probation, the accused, together
criminal act, for the dismissal may be proper, there being no allegation to the with his lawyer Atty. Reynaldo Suarez, went to the Probation Office purposely
contrary. (U.S. v. Gacutan, 28 Phil., 100). to inquire for the requirements need for his client's petition for probation.
Unfortunately, Atty. Suarez and his client did not reach the Probation Officer
It is possible, under the allegations of the information to regard the crime Mr. Danilo Ocampo. It was Mr. Manalo, a clerk of the Probation Office, whom
charged as falling within the second paragraph of article 210. This they reached, and they were requested to come back to the office regarding
paragraph, however, distinguishes between two cases: one in which the act their inquiry inasmuch as the Probation Officer was not in the office. Later,
agreed to be performed has been executed and one in which the said act Atty. Suarez called through the telephone the Probation Office, and, on that
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occasion he was able to talk with the Probation Inspector, Mrs. Primitiva Information Sheet against the accused Gregory Pozar. It is also a fact
Francisco. He was inquiring from Mrs. Francisco the necessary documents admitted by the defense that after the one hundred peso bill was handed and
regarding the application for probation of his client and Mrs. Francisco the Probation Officer was not able to return the same, he informed Atty.
suggested that he would come over the office in order to give him all the Suarez at the sala of City Court Branch II sometime on January 14, 1980.
necessary information. The lawyer just instructed Mrs. Francisco to give a list Petitioner’s defense: The evidence for the defense is that the one hundred
of the requirements to Mr. Pozar, the accused, who was then in the, Office of peso bill the accused-appellant placed in the envelope delivered to the
the Probation Officer, and accordingly, Mrs. Francisco handed to Mr. Pozar a Probation Officer was allegedly intended to take care of the expenses in the
list of the documents needed in his probation. It also appears that all the xerox copying or reproduction of documents that may be needed by the
requirements listed in the list given by Mrs, Francisco were given to Mrs. Probation Office.
Francisco, and at times to Mr. Manalo. The person who conducted the
investigation was actually Mrs. Francisco. Charge: Corruption of a Public Official
City Court (Angeles City, Branch I): Guilty as charged
On December 10, 1979, Pozar had an occasion to see the Probation Officer, Court of Appeals: Affirmed in toto
Mr. Danilo Ocampo, and in that meeting, aside from the fact that he was
asking permission from the Probation Officer to go to Baguio, the Probation ISSUE: Was the guilt of the petitioner proved beyond reasonable doubt?
Officer required him to furnish the Probation Office the xerox copy of his visa,
and his I.D. picture, inasmuch as it was explained to him these were needed, RULING: NO. In the case at bar, We find that the Information against the
he being a foreigner. On December 17, 1979 Mr. Pozar went to the Probation petitioner charged that the accused "did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
Office looking for the Probation Officer, and when the Probation Officer was and feloniously give to the complainant, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, the City
not there, he handed to Mr. Manalo an envelope address to the Probation Of Probation Officer, the sum of one hundred (P100.00) pesos in a paper bill with
officer and asked and requested Mr. Manalo to give the same to Mr. Ocampo. serial No. BC530309, under circumstances that would make the said City
Probation Officer, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, liable for bribery.
It was on December 19,1979 when Mr. Manalo handed the envelope given by
Mr. Pozar to Mr. Danilo Ocampo, and when Danilo Ocampo opened it in the
presence of Mr. Manalo, he found enclose in the envelope a xerox copy of the The trial court found the accused guilty of the offense of Corruption of a Public
applicant's passport, xerox copy of his visa, and attached also with the same Official as charged in the Information and pursuant to Article 212, in relation
document was a one hundred peso bill It would seem that Mr. Ocampo asked to Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code, sentenced the accused to an
Mr. Manalo to keep the one hundred peso bill and return it to Mr. Pozar, but imprisonment of three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor and public
when Mr. Pozar did not arrive to the office, Mr. Manalo gave it back to Mr. censure. This is erroneous. The trial court erred in finding the accused
Ocampo Mr. Danilo Ocampo kept the one hundred peso bill but made it a point guilty of the crime of Corruption of Public Official as consummated
that this incident regarding the receiving of the one hundred peso being be offense (which is affirmed by the respondent appellant court) for it is
included in the post-sentence investigation report which was being prepared clear from the evidence of the prosecution as recited in both decisions
by Mrs. Francisco. At that time when the one hundred peso bill was given, the of the trial and appellate courts, that the complainant Probation Officer
post-sentence investigation report was not yet finished. did not accept the one hundred peso bill. Hence, the crime would be
The record shows that the same was submitted to the court only on attempted corruption of a public official.
February 8, 1980. At the hearing of the application for probation in March
1980, when the Presiding Judge of City Court of Angeles City, Branch 1, noted Be that as it may, the crucial point is whether the prosecution has established
and saw from the report the alleged incident of the accused's giving the one beyond reasonable doubt that the one hundred peso bill was given to bribe
hundred peso bill he called for a conference and in that conference, he and corrupt the City Probation Officer or that it will be used to defray expenses
suggested that the manner should be investigated by the Office of the City in xeroxing or copying of whatever documents needed by the Probation Office
Fiscal Acting upon such suggestion Danilo Ocampo formally filed an
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in connection with petitioner's application for probation then pending in said and thus hasten his probation application, was understandably innocent
office. and not criminal.
The evidence on record disclose that the petitioner was required by the In fine, the facts and circumstances on record amply justify and support the
Assistant Probation Officer, Primitive Francisco, to submit in connection with claim of the defense as against the conjectures, speculation and supposition
his probation application the Court Information (complaint) Court decision, recited in the decision of the trial court and quoted with approval in the
Custody Status (recognizance or bail bond), clearances from the Police, the appealed decision under review. The Government's own evidence as
Court, Barangay Certificate, I.D. pictures (3 copies), residence certificate, and indicated in the Post-Sentence Investigation Report that the giving of the
told to report once a week on Mondays. This was on December 7, 1979. one hundred pesos ( P100.00) was done in good faith, is vital for it belies
petitioner's criminal intent. There being no criminal intent to corrupt the
Aside from these documents, the Probation Officer required of the petitioner Probation Officer, the accused petitioner is entitled to acquittal of the
on December 10, 1979 when the latter was asking permission to go to Baguio crime charged. We hold and rule that the prosecution has not proved the
to submit to the office a copy of his visa and passport. Mrs. Francisco to guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. There is not that moral
testified that the petitioner was asking permission from her to leave for Baguio. certainty required to convict him. Even the complainant himself, the
And according to the petitioner, "during all the time he was applying for Probation Officer, filed the complaint only on the suggestion of the presiding
probation, he made more or less 12 visits in the office as he was directed to judge of the Angeles City Court during the hearing on petitioner's application
report every Monday at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. He reported for 6 to 7 for probation, the complaint having been filed in the City Fiscal's Office on
consecutive weeks and there were times that he went there unscheduled for June 10, 1980 after a lapse and delay of six (6) months.
conference and clarification of the various requirements he needed. During all
the time he went there, he met Manalo, Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo DISSENTING OPINION (MAKASIAR, J.):
himself. Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo interviewed him He submitted all the 1. As stated by the Solicitor General the pretension of the petitioner that he
requirements to the Probation Officer; at times, he submitted them directly to was confused with respect to the requirements and/or processing of his
Mrs. Francisco, and at other times to Mr. Manalo, and also to Mr. Ocampo. application for probation pending before the complaining witness Probation
Other than those listed in the list given by Mrs. Francisco, he was required to Officer Danilo Ocampo of Angeles City, is incredible. As early as December
submit xerox copy of his passport, his visa and his pictures. He explained that 7, 1979, about ten (10) days before December 17, 1979 (the delivery of the
he gave the requirements to the person who was interviewing him, primarily P100 peso bill inside a closed letter envelope petitioner was already
Mrs. Francisco, of the documents needed. Later, he submitted to the office interviewed by Mrs. Primitiva Francisco, Assistant Probation Officer of the
xerox copy of the original He likewise submitted his two passports, and later Probation Office of Angeles City, who gave him the list of documents to be
xerox copy of his passports. When Mrs. Francisco was asking for the original, submitted to the office. Hence, petitioner already knew then what papers were
which documents are in the possession of his lawyer at his office, he had to required of hint
return to get the originals." Petitioner's travail is, therefore, quite evident.
2. His claim that the P100 peso bill contained in the aforesaid closed letter
From the foregoing, We can fairly deduce that the procedure for envelope was for xerox copies of other documents that may be required of
processing petitioner's application for probation in the Probation Office him by the Probation Office, is belied by the aforesaid fact that as early as
at Angeles City was not precise, explicit and clear cut. And since the December 7, 1979, Assistant Probation Officer Francisco already gave him
accused petitioner is a foreigner and quite unfamiliar with probation the list of documents that he should submit to the Probation Office, and that
rules and procedures, there is reason to conclude that petitioner was on December 10, 1979, Probation Officer Ocampo also required him to submit
befuddled, if not confused so that his act of providing and advancing the xerox copies only of his passport and visa as he was a foreigner, in connection
expenses for whatever documentation was needed further to complete with his request for permission to go to Baguio City.
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3. If, as he alleged, the P100 bill was intended for xerox copies of other (Art. 212, RPC)
documents that may be required of him, he should have, as stated by the
Solicitor General in his comment and memorandum, given the same to the
CASE 17: LAURO G. SORIANO, JR. vs SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE
clerk Ricardo Manalo of the Probation Office, with instructions that the same
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (Gatdula)
should cover whatever xerox copies of other documents may be needed. Or
G.R. No. L-65952 July 31, 1984
he should have attached or clipped the P100 bill to a note addressed to
Probation Officer Ocampo that the said money is to cover expenses for xerox
copies of other documents that may be required of him. DOCTRINE: A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is
absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.
4. Petitioner could have just given the P100 bill to his lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo
Suarez, with instructions that the same should be paid for whatever xerox
copies of other documents that may be required of him in connection with his FACTS:
application for probation. Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the
City Fiscal of Quezon City. The case was docketed and assigned for
investigation to the Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., who was then an Assistant City
5. Petitioner saw Assistant Probation Officer Francisco on December 21,
Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the petitioner demanded P4,000.00
1979; but on said date petitioner did not bother to ask either Assistant
from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the
Probation Officer Francisco on December 21, 1979; but on said date petitioner
National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. Because Tan
did not bother to ask either Assistant Probation Officer Francisco or the
was hard put to raise the required amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked
Probation Clerk Ricardo Manalo, whether the P100 bill was spent for xerox
by the NBI which had to supply one-half thereof. The entrapment succeeded
copies of other documents. He went there that day, December 21, 1979,
and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan for Violation of Section
precisely to reiterate his request for permission to leave for Baguio City and
3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Assistant Probation Officer Francisco advised him to talk to Probation Officer
Corrupt Practices Act, for taking advantage of his official position and with
Ocampo whom he did not even try to see that day, December 21, 1979.
grave abuse of authority, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
demand and request from Tan the amount of P4,000, and actually received
6. Petitioner could not presume that his application for probation would be from said Tan P2,000.00, in consideration for a favorable resolution by
favorably acted upon because he was still then being subjected to an dismissing the abovementioned case, wherein said accused has to intervene
investigation by Assistant Probation petition Officer Francisco who submitted in his official capacity as such Investigating Fiscal.
her post-sentence report to the City Court only on February 5, 1980. Said
report included the statement about the bribe money. Probation Officer
Sandiganbayan: Held Soriano GUILTY as charged, and sentenced him to
Ocampo had to recommend in March, 1980 approval of petitioner's application
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 6 YEARS and
for probation; because at that time he had not yet filed the complaint with the
1 MONTH, as minimum, to 9 YEARS and 1 DAY, as maximum; to suffer
City Fiscal's Office for corruption of public officer against petitioner who, as
perpetual disqualification from public office; to suffer loss of all retirement or
stressed by Probation Officer Ocampo, was presumed innocent until adjudged
gratuity benefits under any law; and, to pay costs.
guilty of such corruption,
Of the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) used in
Hence, the conviction of petitioner should be affirmed but only for attempted
the entrapment operations, and which was fully recovered
corruption of a public officer, because Probation officer Ocampo did not accept
from the accused, One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) shall
the money; otherwise, said probation officer would be equally guilty as the
be returned to Tan, and the other half, to the NBI, NCR.
corruptor.
MR: Denied by the Sandiganbayan.

CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
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The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the
The petitioner avers, assuming in gratia argumenti, his guilt, the facts make Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of his constitutional
out a case of Direct Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section 3,
subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. Wrong. A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein
Respondents, on the other hand, that the term 'transaction' as used thereof is clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim
not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction deprivation of the right to be informed.
but includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or The judgment of the Sandiganbayan is MODIFIED in that the petitioner is
administrative in nature, pending with the government. This must be so, deemed guilty of bribery as defined and penalized by Article 210 of the
otherwise, the Act would have so stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
2 thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving no other interpretation than that the penalty of 6 MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years of PRISION
expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of transaction between CORRECCIONAL as maximum, and to pay a fine of P2,000. The rest of the
the government and other party wherein the public officer would intervene judgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
under the law.
CASE 18: FELICITAS P. ONG vs. PEOPLE (Gementiza)
ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be GR No. 176546 September 25, 2009
regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. Ynares-Santiago, J.
No. 3019.
DOCTRINE: COA Resolution No. 95-244 as amended by Resolution No. 95-
HELD: No. 244-A must be read and applied in conjunction with the Local Government
Code. A local chief executive could only resort to a negotiated purchase under
The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows: Sec. 366 LGC and COA Resolution Nos. 95-244 and 95-244A if the following
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions requisites are present: (1) public biddings have failed for at least two
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall consecutive times and; (2) no suppliers have qualified to participate or win in
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be the biddings.
unlawful:
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, FACTS: A letter-complaint was filed against petitioner by her successor,
present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any Mayor Diosdado Siquian and several other Sangguniang Bayan members
other person, in connection with any contract or transaction before the Office of the Ombudsman, accusing her of malversation of public
between the Government and any other party, wherein the funds and property in connection with several alleged irregularities committed
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under during her term as Mayor, including the purchase of the dump truck for being
the law. grossly overpriced. Witnesses testified before the court that the(1) dump truck
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a was bought without conducting public bidding or a resolution by the
contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as Sangguniang Bayan; (2) that the truck was merely reconditioned and not
analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one brand new as can be seen from its deplorable condition, worn tires and old
which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element battery ; and (3), that a subsequent canvass of other suppliers showed that
(consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. better quality dump trucks cost no more than P500,000.00.
After having found probable cause, Ong was indicted for violation of Section
3 (e) of RA No. 3019, the Information reads:
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that the purchase of the dump truck without public bidding was justified by
That on or about August 1996, or sometime prior or COA Resolution Nos. 95-244 and 95-244-A; and that the prosecution was able
subsequent thereto in the Municipality of Angadanan, to prove that had petitioner observed the proper procurement procedure, the
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this municipality could have acquired a dump truck similar to, if not better than that
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Felicitas P. which she bought, for a much lesser price||.
Ong, a public official, being the Municipal Mayor of Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Angadanan, Isabela, taking advantage of her official
position and committing the offense in relation to her office, ISSUE: Whether or not there is merit on Ong’s contention that public bidding
acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross is dispensed with on any negotiated price in amounts not exceeding P10, 000,
inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, 000 pursuant to COA Resolution 95-244 and 95-244A.
unlawfully and feloniously cause injury to the Municipality of
Angadanan by causing and approving, without public RULING:
bidding, the acquisition of an Isuzu dump truck with Plate No merit.
Number T-BBB-206 from J.C. Trucking in the amount of Section 3 (e) RA 3019 has the following essential elements:
SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging
(P750,000.00) when the same or similar type of dump truck administrative, judicial or official functions;
could have been bought at a much lower price of not more
thanFIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident
to the damage and prejudice of the Municipality of bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
Angadanan in the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00). 3. His action caused any undue injury to any party,
CONTRARY TO LAW. including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. 21 acHETI
Ong, on her defense, contended that the municipality appropriated the amount
of P1,000,000.00 for the purchase of a dump truck; that pursuant to said We find that all the elements of the offense charged have been duly
appropriation, the subject vehicle was purchased on August 12, 1996 for established beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner, being then the Mayor
P750,000.00 through a negotiated purchase from Josephine Ching of J.C. of Angadanan, Isabela is a public officer discharging administrative and
Trucking; that the public bidding and prior Sangguniang Bayan resolution were official functions. The act of purchasing the subject truck without the
dispensed with pursuant to Commission on Audit (COA) Resolution Nos. 95- requisite public bidding and authority from the Sangguniang Bayan
244 and 95-244-A which do not require the conduct of a public bidding on any displays gross and inexcusable negligence. Undue injury was caused to
negotiated purchase in amounts not exceeding P10,000,000.00; hat the truck the Government because said truck could have been purchased at a
was not in disrepair as the same was inspected by the Regional Engineer from much lower price.
COA who declared it fit and in good running condition; and that the purchase
was allowed by COA because it did not issue a notice of disallowance. COA Resolution 95-244 and 95-244A must be read and applied in
conjunction with Title VI, 23 Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise
Sandiganbayan known as the Local Government Code of 1991.Section 356 thereof states
Rendered its Decision finding Ong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation the general rule that the acquisition of supplies by the local government
units shall be through competitive bidding. The only instances when
of Section 3 (e) RA 3019. The Sandiganbayan found that as Mayor of
public bidding requirements can be dispensed with are provided under
Angadanan, there is no dispute that petitioner was a public officer discharging
administrative and official functions; that there is no merit to petitioner's claim Section 366.
38
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Thus, a local chief executive could only resort to a negotiated purchase

under Section 366 of RA No. 7160 and COA Resolution Nos. 95-244 and
95-244-A, if the following two requisites are present: (1) public biddings
have failed for at least two consecutive times and; (2) no suppliers have
qualified to participate or win in the biddings.
The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that by procuring the subject truck
through a negotiated purchase without public bidding, petitioner failed to
comply with the above stated procedure. Indeed, as the local chief
executive, petitioner is not only expected to know the proper procedure
in the procurement of supplies, she is also duty bound to follow the same
and her failure to discharge this duty constitutes gross and inexcusable
negligence.
39

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Criminal Law Review (Case Digests – Book 2, RPC)

Section 4D, AY 2016-2017

That this last testimony, taken before the Honorable Judge,

Regional Trial Court Court of Appeals

Any person who shall employ deception or any other means

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish beyond

2. Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 penalizes the sale, trading,

MR: Denied by the Sandiganbayan.

Thus, a local chief executive could only resort to a negotiated purchase

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