Garces vs. Court of Appeals
Section
No. L-76836. June 23, 1988.*
Municipal Corporation; Barangay Conciliation, PD
1508; Decision of the Regional Trial Judge based on
finding that there had been a failure on the part of
plaintiff to comply with the requirements of Section 6 of
Presidential Decree No. 1508.—The regional trial judge,
noting that both parties were then residents of Manila,
based his decision on the finding that there had been a
failure on the part of plaintiff to comply with the
requirements of Section 6 of Presidential Decree No.
1508—i.e., the controversy had not been submitted for
conciliation before the barangay LupongTagapayapa or
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo, and no Certification to File
Action had been issued by the appropriate barangay
official, prior to the institution of ejectment proceedings
in court.
Same; Same; Same; There being no Certificate to
File Action issued prior to the initial filing by petitioner
Garces of his complaint in Court, the dismissal of the
ejectment suit was not improper.—In paragraph 1 of
both the Complaint and the Amended Complaint filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court, it was alleged that
“plaintiff [i.e., petitioner Garces] is a Filipino of legal age,
and residing at 2363 Jacobo Street, Singalong, Manila,
while defendant [i.e., respondent Escalante] is, likewise,
of legal age, Filipino and residing at 1603 Indiana,
Malate, Manila, where she may be served with summons
and other court processes.” A similar allegation
appeared in the Petition for Review filed by plaintiff
Garces with the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, the
record of this case indicates that no Certificate to File
Action was issued by the barangay official concerned
prior to the initial filing by petitioner Garces of his
complaint in court. Clearly, therefore, dismissal of the
ejectment suit—ordered initially by the Regional Trial
Court and later affirmed by the Court of Appeals—was
not improper, especially considering that, per allegations
of complainant himself in his pleadings, both parties
were then in fact residents of barangays situated “in the
same city or municipality.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Assertion by petitioner
that the leased premises is only the place where
respondent stays during workdays as respondent is
working in Manila is not persuasive; The decree shall
beapplicable to desputes between or among persons
actually residing in the same barangay and to disputes
involving actual residents of different barangays within
the same city or municipality.—Petitioner Garces,
however, in order to justify non-application in this case
of P.D. 1508, would now urge the Court to reverse the
dismissal of his complaint on the assertion that the
leased apartment unit in Malate “is only the place where
(respondent stays) during workdays as respondent Daisy
Escalante is working in Manila”—i.e., “(respondent’s)
intention to establish residence is in Cavite where she
has her house.” The argument is not persuasive.
3 of P.D. 1508 specifically provides that the Decree shall
be applicable to disputes “between or among persons
actually residing in the same barangay” and to disputes
“involving actual residents of different barangays within
the same city or municipality.” We think it clear, and so
hold, that P.D. 1508 does not refer here to one’s legal
residence or domicile which, for differing purposes, may
differ from the actual or physical habitation of a litigant.
The policy of the law is evidently to promote dispute
settlement through non-litigious, compulsory
conciliation procedures and disputes arise where people
actually or physically reside. The fact that respondent
Escalante stays in the apartment unit in Malate five (5)
days a week, every week, is more than adequate proof
that, within the meaning of the Decree, respondent
“actually resides” in Manila.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the fact of
non-compliance with and non-observance of such
procedure has been reasonably raised as an issue before
the Court first taking cognizance of the complaint,
dismissal of the action is proper.—In fine, we have held
in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation
procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a
jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with which
would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the
subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
Where, however, the fact of non-compliance with and
non-observance of such procedure has been seasonably
raised as an issue before the court first taking
cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the action is
proper.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Court
concludes that respondent Escalante had not waived
expressly or impliedly the procedural requirement under
PD 1508.—We note from the record that respondent
Escalante had filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court a
total of four (4) pleadings—an Answer, a Motion for
Opposition of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint, an Amended Answer, and a Position Paper—
before a decision was rendered in this case. In those
four pleadings, respondent, then defendant argued,
among other things, that the procedural requirement
under Section 6 of P.D. 1508 had been improperly
bypassed by the plaintiff Garces. It should also be borne
in mind that this case was, before the Metropolitan Trial
Court, governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure and
that under Section 15 (a) and (g) of that Rule, no motion
to dismiss and no petition for certiorari or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court,
is possible. Thus, respondent Escalante could not have
moved to dismiss, in the Metropolitan Trial Court, upon
the ground of failure to comply with the requirements of
P.D. 1508. Neither could respondent Escalante have
gone on certiorari before the Regional Trial Court at
anytime before rendition by the Metropolitan Trial Court
of its decision. We conclude that respondent Escalante
(contrary to the suggestion of petitioner) had not waived
expressly or impliedly the procedural requirement under
P.D. 1508 and that, since the Decree is applicable in the
present case, petitioner Garces’ complaint should have
been dismissed outright.
Same; Same; Same; Effect of non-compliance with
the requirement of PD 1508.—The precise technical
effect of failure to comply with the requirement of P.D.
1508 where applicable is much the same effect
produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies:
the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-
maturity; the controversy there alleged is not ripe for
judicial determination. The complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
Mangila vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125027. August 12, 2002
Actions; Attachments; Pleadings and Practice; A party to
a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of
the provisional remedies under the Rules of Court, and,
specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of
the grant of the remedy “at the commencement of the
action or at any time thereafter.”—As a preliminary
note, a distinction should be made between issuance
and implementation of the writ of attachment. It is
necessary to distinguish between the two to determine
when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
should be acquired to validly implement the writ. This
distinction is crucial in resolving whether there is merit
in petitioner’s argument. This Court has long settled the
issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant should be acquired in cases where a party
resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a suit may, at
any time after filing the complaint, avail of the
provisional remedies under the Rules of Court.
Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of
the grant of the remedy “at the commencement of the
action or at any time thereafter.” This phrase refers to
the date of filing of the complaint which is the moment
that marks “the commencement of the action.” The
reference plainly is to a time before summons is served
on the defendant, or even before summons issues.
Same; Same; The grant of the provisional remedy of
attachment involves three stages—the issuance by the
court of the order granting the application, the issuance
of the writ of attachment pursuant to the order, and the
implementation of the writ; For the initial two stages, it
is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant be first obtained, but once the
implementation of the writ commences, the court must
have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant.—
Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the
provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages:
first, the court issues the order granting the application;
second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the
order granting the writ; and third, the writ is
implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not
necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant be first obtained. However, once the
implementation of the writ commences, the court must
have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for
without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and
authority to act in any manner against the defendant.
Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the
defendant.
Same; Same; Summons by Publication; If the
defendant’s whereabouts could not be ascertained after
the sheriff had served the summons at her given address,
then plaintiff should immediately ask the court for
service of summons by publication on the defendant; The
condition of a resident temporarily out of the country is
the exact situation contemplated in Section 16, Rule 14
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, providing for service of
summons by publication.—The rules provide for certain
remedies in cases where personal service could not be
effected on a party. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court provides that whenever the defendant’s
“whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained
by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be
effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation x xx.” Thus, if petitioner’s
whereabouts could not be ascertained after the sheriff
had served the summons at her given address, then
respondent could have immediately asked the court for
service of summons by publication on petitioner.
Moreover, as private respondent also claims that
petitioner was abroad at the time of the service of
summons, this made petitioner a resident who is
temporarily out of the country. This is the exact situation
contemplated in Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, providing for service of summons by
publication.
Same; Same; An alias summons belatedly served on
a defendant cannot be deemed to cure the fatal defect in
the enforcement of the writ of preliminary attachment.—
In conclusion, we hold that the alias summons belatedly
served on petitioner cannot be deemed to have cured
the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial
court cannot enforce such a coercive process on
petitioner without first obtaining jurisdiction over her
person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be
served after or simultaneous with the service of
summons on the defendant whether by personal
service, substituted service or by publication as
warranted by the circumstances of the case. The
subsequent service of summons does not confer a
retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person
because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a
belated service.
Same; Venue; A mere stipulation on the venue of an
action is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a
case in other venues—the parties must be able to show
that such stipulation is exclusive; Venue stipulations in a
contract, while considered valid and enforceable, do not
as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of
the Revised Rules of Court.—The Rules of Court provide
that parties to an action may agree in writing on the
venue on which an action should be brought. However, a
mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough
to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues.
The parties must be able to show that such stipulation
is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show the parties’
intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a particular
place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any venue,
as long as jurisdictional requirements are followed.
Venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid
and enforceable, do not as a rule supersede the general
rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. In
the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, they
should be considered merely as an agreement on
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place.
Same; Same; Parties; Sole Proprietorships; A sole
proprietorship does not have a separate juridical
personality that could enable it to file a suit in court—
there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships to file a
suit in court.—In the instant case, it was established in
the lower court that petitioner resides in San Fernando,
Pampanga while private respondent resides in
Parañaque City. However, this case was brought in Pasay
City, where the business of private respondent is found.
This would have been permissible had private
respondent’s business been a corporation, just like the
case in Sy v. Tyson Enterprises, Inc. However, as
admitted by private respondent in her Complaint in the
lower court, her business is a sole proprietorship, and as
such, does not have a separate juridical personality that
could enable it to file a suit in court. In fact, there is no
law authorizing sole proprietorships to file a suit in court.
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the personality of
the owner of the enterprise. The law merely recognizes
the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of
business organization conducted for profit by a single
individual and requires its proprietor or owner to secure
licenses and permits, register its business name, and pay
taxes to the national government. The law does not vest
a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or
empower it to file or defend an action in court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the residence of the
proprietor which should be considered as one of the
proper venues, not the business address of the sole
proprietorship.—Thus, not being vested with legal
personality to file this case, the sole proprietorship is not
the plaintiff in this case but rather Loreta Guina in her
personal capacity. In fact, the complaint in the lower
court acknowledges in its caption that the plaintiff and
defendant are Loreta Guina and Anita Mangila,
respectively. The title of the petition before us does not
state, and rightly so, Anita Mangila v. Air Swift
International, but rather Anita Mangila v. Loreta
Guina. Logically then, it is the residence of private
respondent Guina, the proprietor with the juridical
personality, which should be considered as one of the
proper venues for this case. All these considered, private
respondent should have filed this case either in San
Fernando, Pampanga (petitioner’s residence) or
Parañaque (private respondent’s residence). Since
private respondent (complainant below) filed this case in
Pasay, we hold that the case should be dismissed on the
ground of improper venue.
Same; Same; The objective of the rules on venue to
insure a just and orderly administration of justice or the
impartial and evenhanded determination of every action
and proceeding will not be attained if the plaintiff is
given unrestricted freedom to choose where to file the
complaint or petition.—The rules on venue, like other
procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and
orderly administration of justice or the impartial and
evenhanded determination of every action and
proceeding. Obviously, this objective will not be attained
if the plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to choose
where to file the complaint or petition.
Latorre v. Latorre, G.R. No. 183926, March 29, 2010, 617
SCRA 88
Actions; Venue; Where the action in the Regional
Trial Court is for the Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale involving a real property, the venue for
such action is unquestionably the proper court of the
place where the real property or part thereof lies.—
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provide an answer to the issue of venue.
Actions affecting title to or possession of real property
or an interest therein (real actions) shall be commenced
and tried in the proper court that has territorial
jurisdiction over the area where the real property is
situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal
actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper
courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides. The action in the RTC,
other than for Collection, was for the Declaration of
Nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale involving the subject
property, which is located at No. 1366 Caballero St.,
Dasmariñas Village, Makati City. The venue for such
action is unquestionably the proper court of Makati City,
where the real property or part thereof lies, not the RTC
of Muntinlupa City.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; In this jurisdiction,
we adhere to the principle that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations in the Complaint itself,
rather than by its title or heading; It is also a settled rule
that what determines the venue of a case is the primary
objective for the filing of the case.—In this jurisdiction,
we adhere to the principle that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations in the Complaint itself,
rather than by its title or heading. It is also a settled rule
that what determines the venue of a case is the primary
objective for the filing of the case. In her Complaint,
petitioner sought the nullification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale on the strength of two basic claims that (1)
she did not execute the deed in favor of respondent; and
(2) thus, she still owned one half (½) of the subject
property. Indubitably, petitioner’s complaint is a real
action involving the recovery of the subject property on
the basis of her co-ownership thereof.
Same; Same; Certiorari; Where the denial by a
regional trial court of a Motion to Dismiss is done
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, the aggrieved party could file a petition for
certiorari and/or prohibition.—Respondent also did not
do very well, procedurally. When the RTC denied his
Motion to Dismiss, respondent could have filed a
petition for certiorariand/or prohibition inasmuch as the
denial of the motion was done without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. However, despite this
lapse, it is clear that respondent did not waive his
objections to the fact of improper venue, contrary to
petitioner’s assertion. Notably, after his motion to
dismiss was denied, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to contest such denial. Even in his
Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent stood his ground that
the case ought to be dismissed on the basis of improper
venue.
Appeals; Three (3) Modes of Appeal from Decisions of the
Regional Trial Court.—Petitioner came directly to this
Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure
on alleged pure questions of law. In Murillo v. Consul, we
laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, this Court
had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal
from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or
appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in
a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where
judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the
Supreme Court. The first mode of appeal, governed by
Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The
second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought
to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal,
provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only
on questions of law.
Same; Questions of Law; Questions of Fact; Words
and Phrases; A question of law arises when there is
doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.—A question of
law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact
when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. Our ruling in Velayo-Fong v. Velayo, 510
SCRA 320 (2006) is instructive: A question of law arises
when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
For a question to be one of law, the same must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the
test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not
the appellation given to such question by the party
raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate
court can determine the issue raised without reviewing
or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question
of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
Same; Hierarchy of Courts; Pursuant to the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts, direct resort from the lower courts
to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the
appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the
lower tribunals.—In her Reply to respondent’s
Comment, petitioner prayed that this Court decide the
case on the merits. To do so, however, would require
the examination by this Court of the probative value of
the evidence presented, taking into account the fact that
the RTC failed to adjudicate this controversy on the
merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus
becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the case
directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct
resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will
not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy
sought cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This
Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is
to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by
the Constitution and by immemorial tradition.
General Milling Corp. v. Uytengsu, 494 SCRA 241
Jurisdictions; Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction
of the court is determined by the relevant allegations in
the complaint and the character of the relief sought.—
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint
and the character of the relief sought. It cannot be made
to depend on the defenses made by the defendant in his
answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on
the defendant.
Same; Where the complaint based its cause of
action on the defendant’s refusal to surrender the
Original Certificates of Title (OCTs), and as primary relief
the complaint sought the delivery of the said OCTs, the
subject matter of the case is not a real action requiring
an allegation of the assessed value of the property but
one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation and
which is within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.—The complaint based its cause of action on
petitioner’s refusal to surrender the OCTs. As primary
relief, the complaint sought the delivery by petitioner of
the said OCTs. Clearly, the subject matter of the case at
bar was not a real action requiring an allegation of the
assessed value of the property but one which was
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, it was within
the jurisdiction of the RTC. Any other consequence of
the primary relief sought in the complaint could not
properly be a basis for impugning the jurisdiction of the
trial court. “In determining whether an action is one the
subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. . . . Where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money . . . this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject
of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money
and are cognizable by [the regional trial courts].”
Saraza v. Francisco, G.R. No. 198718, November 27,
2013
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for
Review on Certiorari; When supported by substantial
evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not
reviewable by the Supreme Court; Exceptions.—At the
outset, the Court underscores the limited scope of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Section 1 of Rule 45 provides that the
petition shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth. Questions of fact are not
entertained, for the Court is not duty-bound to analyze
again and weigh the evidence introduced in and already
considered by the tribunals below. When supported by
substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not
reviewable by the Court, save in some recognized
exceptions such as: (1) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
Same; Evidence; Testimonial Evidence; Parol Evidence;
Unsubstantiated testimony, offered as proof of verbal
agreements which tend to vary the terms of the written
agreement, is inadmissible under the rule.—Given this
categorical statement, the petitioners’ denial that they
have received the amount necessitated concrete and
substantial proof. A perusal of the case records shows
that the petitioners failed in this regard. Even their
unsubstantiated claim that the document’s notarization
was irregularly made cannot prevail over the
presumption that the notary public’s duty has been
regularly performed. The CA also correctly held that the
parol evidence rule applies to this case. Unsubstantiated
testimony, offered as proof of verbal agreements which
tend to vary the terms of the written agreement, is
inadmissible under the rule.
Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Basic is the rule
that no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been
brought before the lower tribunals for consideration.—
The petitioners also raise in their Supplemental Petition
some defenses which were not introduced during the
proceedings before the lower courts. These pertain to
the alleged failure of Spouses Saraza to fully understand
the contents of the Agreement as these were written in
English, and their claim that the Agreement was a
contract of adhesion for having been prepared solely by
the respondent. Basic is the rule, however, that no issue
may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought
before the lower tribunals for consideration. To consider
such issues and arguments that are belatedly raised by a
party would be tantamount to a blatant disregard of the
basic principles of fair play, justice and due process. In
any case, the new defenses that are raised by the
petitioners deserve scant consideration.
Same; Same; Actions; Venue; Section 2, Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court provides that personal actions “may
be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.”—Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court then governs the venue for the respondent’s
action. It provides that personal actions “may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of
a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.” Considering the respondent’s
statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus,
Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was
proper.
Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corp. v. Goldstar
Elevators Phils., 473 SCRA 705
Civil Procedure; Actions; Venue; Residence is the
permanent home—the place to which, whenever absent
for business or pleasure, one intends to return. Residence
is vital when dealing with venue.—Residence is the
permanent home—the place to which, whenever absent
for business or pleasure, one intends to return.
Residence is vital when dealing with venue. A
corporation, however, has no residence in the same
sense in which this term is applied to a natural person.
This is precisely the reason why the Court in Young Auto
Supply Company v. Court of Appeals ruled that “for
practical purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical
sense a resident of the place where its principal office is
located as stated in the articles of incorporation.” Even
before this ruling, it has already been established that
the residence of a corporation is the place where its
principal office is established. This Court has also
definitively ruled that for purposes of venue, the term
“residence” is synonymous with “domicile.”
Corporation Law; Domicile; The residence or
domicile of a juridical person is fixed by “the law creating
or recognizing” it.—It now becomes apparent that the
residence or domicile of a juridical person is fixed by
“the law creating or recognizing” it. Under Section 14(3)
of the Corporation Code, the place where the principal
office of the corporation is to be located is one of the
required contents of the articles of incorporation, which
shall be filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).
Civil Procedure; Actions; Venue; It is a legal truism
that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed
for the convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses
subject to regulation by the Rules of Court.—Indeed, it is
a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal
actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and
their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle
that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a
plaintiff’s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of
Court. Allowing petitioner’s arguments may lead
precisely to what this Court was trying to avoid in Young
Auto Supply Company v. CA: the creation of confusion
and untold inconveniences to party litigants.
Golden Arches Development Corp. v. St. Francis Square
Holding Inc., 640 SCRA 227
Remedial Law; Actions; Venue; Venue, in essence,
concerns a rule of procedure. In personal actions, it is
fixed for the greatest possible convenience of the plaintiff
and his witnesses, and to promote the ends of justice;
Specifically with respect to a domestic corporation, it is
“in a metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its
principal office is located as stated in the articles
of incorporation.—Venue, in essence, concerns a rule of
procedure. In personal actions, it is fixed for the greatest
possible convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses,
and to promote the ends of justice. Respondent’s
complaint, being one for enforcement of contractual
provisions and recovery of damages, is in the nature of a
personal action which, under Section 2, Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court, shall be filed at the plaintiff’s residence.
Specifically with respect to a domestic corporation, it is
“in a metaphysical sense a resident of the place where
its principal office is located as stated in the articles of
incorporation.”
Ang v. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Venue; The Rules
give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his
complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself
or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any
of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff
or the defendant must be residents of the place where
the action has been instituted at the time the action is
commenced.―It is a legal truism that the rules on the
venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience
of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled,
however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an
action is not left to a plaintiff’s caprice; the matter is
regulated by the Rules of Court. The petitioners’
complaint for collection of sum of money against the
respondents is a personal action as it primarily seeks the
enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff
the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He
can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of
them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the
defendant must be residents of the place where the
action has been instituted at the time the action is
commenced.
Same; Same; Same; If the plaintiff does not reside
in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be
filed in the court of the place where the defendant
resides.―If the plaintiff does not reside in the
Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed
in the court of the place where the defendant resides.
In Cohen and Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., 34
Phil. 526 (1916), this Court held that there can be no
election as to the venue of the filing of a complaint when
the plaintiff has no residence in the Philippines. In such
case, the complaint may only be filed in the court of the
place where the defendant resides.
Same; Real Party in Interest; A real party in interest
is the party who, by the substantive law, has the right
sought to be enforced.―Interest within the meaning of
the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest
in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved. A real party in interest is the party
who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be
enforced.
Same; Venue; It bears stressing that the rules on
venue, like the other procedural rules, are designed to
insure a just and orderly administration of justice or the
impartial and even-handed determination of every action
and proceeding.―At this juncture, it bears stressing that
the rules on venue, like the other procedural rules, are
designed to insure a just and orderly administration of
justice or the impartial and even-handed determination
of every action and proceeding. Obviously, this objective
will not be attained if the plaintiff is given unrestricted
freedom to choose the court where he may file his
complaint or petition. The choice of venue should not be
left to the plaintiff's whim or caprice. He may be
impelled by some ulterior motivation in choosing to file a
case in a particular court even if not allowed by the rules
on venue.
Gumabon v. Larin, G.R. No. 142523, November 27, 2001
Remedial Law; Actions; Venue; Real actions, as so
opposed to personal actions, are those which affect the
title to or possession of real property.—Real actions, as
so opposed to personal actions, are those which affect
the title to or possession of real property. Where a
contrary claim to ownership is made by an adverse
party, and where the relief prayed for cannot be granted
without the court deciding on the merits the issue of
ownership and title, more specifically so as to who,
between the contending parties, would have a better
right to the property, the case can only be but a real
action.
 Same; Same; Same; Venue, unlike jurisdiction which
is conferred by law, essentially concerns a rule of
procedure which looks primarily at the convenience of
the litigants; Venue can even be the subject of
agreement by the parties; An objection to venue may still
be made in an answer if no motion to dismiss is filed.—
Referring to the place where a civil action must be tried,
venue, unlike jurisdiction which is conferred by law,
essentially concerns a rule of procedure which looks
primarily at the convenience of the litigants. A plaintiff
impliedly elects venue by choosing the court where he
files his complaint. Venue can even be the subject of
agreement by the parties. Under Section 4, Rule 4, of the
old rules, such an agreement to venue may be impliedly
made by the defendant when he fails to seasonably
object to it. While the present 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, particularly Section 1, Rule 9, thereof, does
not contain provisions similar to Sections 3 and 4 of the
old rules, the deletion, however, cannot be taken to
mean that objection to venue may now be raised at any
time but that, rather, an objection to venue may still be
made in an answer if no motion to dismiss is filed.
Same; Same; Same; Dismissals; Under the new
rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it
appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is
another cause of action pending between the same
parties for thesame cause, or where the action is barred
by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations.—As so
aptly observed by Mr. Justice Jose A.R. Melo during the
deliberations, the motu proprio dismissal of a case was
traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when
the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time
or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order
of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu
proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the
right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying
and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17,
of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical
change. Under the new rules, a court may motu
proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the
pleadings or evidence on record that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is
another cause of action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred
by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
Improper venue not being included in the enumeration,
it should follow that motu proprio dismissal on said
ground would still not be allowed under the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Briones v. CA, G.R. No. 204444, January 14, 2015
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari;
Grave Abuse of Discretion; The Supreme Court (SC)
stresses that “[t]o justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, [the petitioner] must satisfactorily
show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely
abused the discretion conferred upon it.”—At the outset,
the Court stresses that “[t]o justify the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, [the petitioner] must
satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial
authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon
it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment
exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered
‘grave,’ discretion must be exercised in a despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
law.”
Same; Civil Procedure; Venue; The general rule is
that the venue of real actions is the court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the
venue of personal actions is the court which has
jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides,
at the election of the plaintiff.—The general rule is that
the venue of real actions is the court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the
venue of personal actions is the court which has
jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides,
at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception,
jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils., 559 SCRA
410 (2008), instructs that the parties, thru a written
instrument, may either introduce another venue where
actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or
restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive
venue.
Unimasters Conglomeration Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 119657,
February 7, 1997
Remedial Law; Action; Venue; Parties may by
stipulation waive the legal venue and such waiver is valid
and effective being merely a personal privilege, which is
not contrary to public policy or prejudicial to third
persons.—Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the
principles generally governing the venue of actions,
whether real or personal, or involving persons who
neither reside nor are found in the Philippines or
otherwise. Agreements on venue are explicitly
allowed. “By written agreement of the parties the venue
of an action may be changed or transferred from one
province to another.” Parties may by stipulation waive
the legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective
being merely a personal privilege, which is not contrary
to public policy or prejudicial to third persons. It is a
general principle that a person may renounce any right
which the law gives unless such renunciation would be
against public policy.
Same; Same; Same; Written stipulations as to
venue may be restrictive or merely permissive.—Written
stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense
that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon,
or merely permissive in that the parties may file their
suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the
places fixed by law (Rule 4, specifically). As in any other
agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the
intention of the parties respecting the matter.
 Same; Same; Same; Venue stipulations should be
deemed permissive merely, and that interpretation
should be adopted which most serves the parties’
convenience.—Since convenience is the raison d’etre of
the rules of venue, it is easy to accept the proposition
that normally, venue stipulations should be deemed
permissive merely, and that interpretation should be
adopted which most serves the parties’ convenience. In
other words, stipulations designating venues other than
those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as
designed to make it more convenient for the parties to
instituteactions arising from or in relation to their
agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or
expanding the venues indicated in said Rule 4.
Same; Same; Same; Unless the parties make very
clear, by employing categorical and suitably limiting
language, that they wish the venue of actions between
them to be laid only and exclusively at a definite place,
and to disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements
on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory or
restrictive, but merely permissive or complementary of
said rule.—An analysis of these precedents reaffirms and
emphasizes the soundness of the Polytrade principle. Of
the essence is the ascertainment of the parties’
intention in their agreement governing the venue of
actions between them. That ascertainment must be
done keeping in mind that convenience is the
foundation of venue regulations, and that that
construction should be adopted which most conduces
thereto. Hence, the invariable construction placed on
venue stipulations is that they do not negate but merely
complement or add to the codal standards of Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court. In other words, unless the parties
make very clear, by employing categorical and suitably
limiting language, that they wish the venue of actions
between them to be laid only and exclusively at a
definite place, and to disregard the prescriptions of Rule
4, agreements on venue are not to be regarded as
mandatory or restrictive, but merely permissive, or
complementary of said rule. The fact that in their
agreement the parties specify only one of the venues
mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for their actions
different from those specified by said rule, does not,
without more, suffice to characterize the agreement as a
restrictive one. There must, to repeat, be accompanying
language clearly and categorically expressing their
purpose and design that actions between them be
litigated only at the place named by them, regardless of
the general precepts of Rule 4; and any doubt or
uncertainty as to the parties’ intentions must be
resolved against giving their agreement a restrictive or
mandatory aspect. Any other rule would permit of
individual, subjective judicial interpretations without
stable standards, which could well result in precedents
in hopeless inconsistency.
Same; Same; Same; Rule 4 gives UNIMASTERS the
option to sue KUBOTA for breach of contract in the
Regional Trial Court of either Tacloban City or Quezon
City.—The record of the case at bar discloses that
UNIMASTERS has its principal place of business in
Tacloban City, and KUBOTA, in Quezon City. Under Rule
4, the venue of any personal action between them is
“where the defendant or any of the defendants resides
or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.” In other
words, Rule 4 gives UNIMASTERS the option to sue
KUBOTA for breach of contract in the Regional Trial
Court of either Tacloban City or Quezon City. But the
contract between them provides that "** All suits arising
out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper
Courts of Quezon City,” without mention of Tacloban
City. The question is whether this stipulation had the
effect of effectively eliminating the latter as an optional
venue and limiting litigation between UNIMASTERS and
KUBOTA only and exclusively to Quezon City. In light of
all the cases above surveyed, and the general postulates
distilled therefrom, the question should receive a
negative answer. Absent additional words and
expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the
parties’ desire and intention that actions between them
should be ventilated only at the place selected by them,
Quezon City—or other contractual provisions clearly
evincing the same desire and intention—the stipulation
should be construed, not as confining suits between the
parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as
allowing suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at
the option of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Venue has nothing
to do with jurisdiction except in criminal actions.—
One last word, respecting KUBOTA’s theory that the
Regional Trial Court had “no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of ** (UNIMASTERS') action considering that
venue was improperly laid.” This is not an accurate
statement of legal principle. It equates venue with
jurisdiction; but venue has nothing to do with
jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. This is
fundamental. The action at bar, for the recovery of
damages in an amount considerably in excess of
P20,000.00, is assuredly within the jurisdiction of a
Regional Trial Court. Assuming that venue were
improperly laid in the Court where the action was
instituted, the Tacloban City RTC, that would be a
procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment—precluding
ventilation of the case before that Court of wrong
venue notwithstanding that the subject matter is within
its jurisdiction. However, if the objection to venue is
waived by the failure to set it up in a motion to dismiss,
the RTC would proceed in perfectly regular fashion if it
then tried and decided the action.
Remedial Law; Action; Venue; Jurisdiction; The rule is
that if the parties to a contract merely agree on the
venue of any case arising therefrom, in addition to or
aside from the legal venue provided by the Rules of
Court or the law, that stipulation is merely permissive.—
Summarized, the rule is that if the parties to a contract
merely agree on the venue of any case arising
therefrom, in addition to or aside from the legal venue
provided therefor by the Rules of Court or the law, that
stipulation is merely permissive and the parties may
choose to observe the same or insist on the alternative
venues in the Rules or the law.
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Sherman, G.R.
No. 72494, August 11, 1989
Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; A state does not have
jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for
exercising it whether the proceedings are in rem, quasi in
rem or in personam.—While it is true that “the
transaction took place in Singaporean setting” and that
the Joint and Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-
forum clause, the very essence of due process dictates
that the stipulation that “[t]his guarantee and all rights,
obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be
construed and determined under and may be enforced
in accordance with the laws of the Republic of
Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore
shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this
guarantee” be liberally construed. One basic principle
underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a
State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some
reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the
proceedings are in rem, quasi in rem or in personam. To
be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some
minimum contacts that will not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Same; Same; Same; Defense of private respondents
that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is
based merely on technicality.—The defense of private
respondents that the complaint should have been filed
in Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did
not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the
action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble,
damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no
showing that petitioner BANK filed the action here just
to harass private respondents.
Same; Same; Venue; A stipulation that the parties
agree to sue and be sued in the courts of Manila does not
preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant.—In the case of Polytrade Corporation vs.
Blanco, G.R. No. L-27033, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA
187, it was ruled: “x xx. An accurate reading, however, of
the stipulation,The parties agree to sue and be sued in
the Courts of Manila,’ does not preclude the filing of
suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain
meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued
in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would
indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are
totally absent therefrom. We cannot read into that
clause that plaintiff and defendant bound themselves to
file suits with respect to the last two transactions in
question only or exclusively in Manila. For, that
agreement did not change or transfer venue. It simply is
permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts
of Manila sa tribunals to which they may resort. They did
not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts
specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4.
Renuntiatio non praesumitur.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the case at bar, the
parties did not stipulate that only the courts of Singapore
to the exclusion of all the rest has jurisdiction;
Jurisdiction defined.—Applying the foregoing to the case
at bar, the parties did not thereby stipulate that only the
courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has
jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate
to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International
Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the right of a State
to exercise authority over persons and things within its
boundaries subject to certain exceptions.
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Citibank, N.A. and
Bank of America S.T. & N.A., G.R. 170290, April 11, 2012,
669 SCRA 191
Mercantile Law; Banks and Banking; Where a bank
maintains branches, each branch becomes a separate
business entity with separate books of account;
Nevertheless, when considered with relation to the
parent bank they are not independent agencies; they are,
what their name imports, merely branches, and are
subject to the supervision and control of the parent bank;
Ultimate liability for a debt of a branch would rest upon
the parent bank.—For lack of judicial precedents on this
issue, the Court seeks guidance from American
jurisprudence. In the leading case of Sokoloff v. The
National City Bank of New York, 130 Misc. 66, 224 N.Y.S.
102, where the Supreme Court of New York held: Where
a bank maintains branches, each branch becomes a
separate business entity with separate books of
account. A depositor in one branch cannot issue checks
or drafts upon another branch or demand payment from
such other branch, and in many other respects the
branches are considered separate corporate entities and
as distinct from one another as any other
bank. Nevertheless, when considered with relation to the
parent bank they are not independent agencies; they are,
what their name imports, merely branches, and are
subject to the supervision and control of the parent bank,
and are instrumentalities whereby the parent bank
carries on its business, and are established for its own
particular purposes, and their business conduct and
policies are controlled by the parent bank and their
property and assets belong to the parent bank, although
nominally held in the names of the particular
branches. Ultimate liability for a debt of a branch would
rest upon the parent bank. [Emphases supplied] This
ruling was later reiterated in the more recent case
of United States v. BCCI Holdings Luxembourg, 48 F.3d
551, 554 (D.C.Cir.1995), where the United States Court
of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, emphasized that
“while individual bank branches may be treated as
independent of one another, each branch, unless
separately incorporated, must be viewed as a part of the
parent bank rather than as an independent entity.”
Same; Same; Both Section 75 of R.A. No. 8791 and
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7221 require the head office of a
foreign bank to guarantee the prompt payment of all the
liabilities of its Philippine branch.—In addition, Philippine
banking laws also support the conclusion that the head
office of a foreign bank and its branches are considered
as one legal entity. Section 75 of R.A. No. 8791 (The
General Banking Law of 2000) and Section 5 of R.A. No.
7221 (An Act Liberalizing the Entry of Foreign Banks)
both require the head office of a foreign bank to
guarantee the prompt payment of all the liabilities of its
Philippine branch, to wit: Republic Act No. 8791: Sec. 75.
Head Office Guarantee.—In order to provide effective
protection of the interests of the depositors and other
creditors of Philippine branches of a foreign bank, the
head office of such branches shall fully guarantee the
prompt payment of all liabilities of its Philippine branch.
Residents and citizens of the Philippines who are
creditors of a branch in the Philippines of foreign bank
shall have preferential rights to the assets of such
branch in accordance with the existing laws. Republic
Act No. 7721: Sec. 5. Head Office Guarantee.—The head
office of foreign bank branches shall guarantee prompt
payment of all liabilities of its Philippine branches.
Same; Same; Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC); The purpose of the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) is to protect the depositing public in
the event of a bank closure.—The purpose of the PDIC is
to protect the depositing public in the event of a bank
closure. It has already been sufficiently established by US
jurisprudence and Philippine statutes that the head
office shall answer for the liabilities of its branch. Now,
suppose the Philippine branch of Citibank suddenly
closes for some reason. Citibank N.A. would then be
required to answer for the deposit liabilities of Citibank
Philippines. If the Court were to adopt the posture of
PDIC that the head office and the branch are two
separate entities and that the funds placed by the head
office and its foreign branches with the Philippine
branch are considered deposits within the meaning of
the PDIC Charter, it would result to the incongruous
situation where Citibank, as the head office, would be
placed in the ridiculous position of having to reimburse
itself, as depositor, for the losses it may incur occasioned
by the closure of Citibank Philippines. Surely our law
makers could not have envisioned such a preposterous
circumstance when they created PDIC.
Same; Same; The head office of a bank and its
branches are considered as one under the eyes of the
law. While branches are treated as separate business
units for commercial and financial reporting purposes, in
the end, the head office remains responsible and
answerable for the liabilities of its branches which are
under its supervision and control.—It is clear that the
head office of a bank and its branches are considered as
one under the eyes of the law. While branches are
treated as separate business units for commercial and
financial reporting purposes, in the end, the head office
remains responsible and answerable for the liabilities of
its branches which are under its supervision and control.
As such, it is unreasonable for PDIC to require the
respondents, Citibank and BA, to insure the money
placements made by their home office and other
branches. Deposit insurance is superfluous and entirely
unnecessary when, as in this case, the institution holding
the funds and the one which made the placements are
one and the same legal entity.
PLEADINGS
Rosete v. Lim, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006
Criminal Procedure; Rights of the Accused; Self-
Incrimination; The right against self-incrimination is
accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil,
criminal or administrative proceeding.—The right against
self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntary or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative
proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself. It secures to a witness, whether
he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any
particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to
which has atendency to incriminate him for some crime.
However, the right can be claimed only when the
specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually
put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other
time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the
time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The
witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as
required, take the stand, be sworn and answer
questions. It is only when a particular question is
addressed to which may incriminate himself for some
offense that he may refuse to answer on the strength of
the constitutional guaranty.
Same; Same; Same; Under the Rules of Court, in all
criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among
others, to the following.—An accused “occupies a
different tier of protection from an ordinary witness.”
Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the
defendant is entitled among others—1) to be exempt
from being a witness against himself, and 2) to testify as
witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a
witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness;
however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not
in any manner prejudice or be used against him.
Same; Same; Same; As long as the suit is criminal in
nature, the party thereto can altogether decline to take
the witness stand—it is not the character of the suit
involved but the nature of the proceedings that
controls.—It is clear, therefore, that only an accused in a
criminal case can refuse to take the witness stand. The
right to refuse to take the stand does not generally apply
to parties in administrative cases or proceedings. The
parties thereto can only refuse to answer if incriminating
questions are propounded. This Court applied the
exception—a party who is not an accused in a criminal
case is allowed not to take the witness stand—in
administrative cases/ proceedings that partook of the
nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a
criminal proceeding. It is likewise the opinion of the
Court that said exception applies to parties in civil
actions which are criminal in nature. As long as the suit is
criminal in nature, the party thereto can altogether
decline to take the witness stand. It is not the character
of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings
that controls.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Issues; Issues are
joined when all the parties have pleaded their respective
theories and the terms ofthe dispute are plain before the
court.—Issues are joined when all the parties have
pleaded their respective theories and the terms of the
dispute are plain before the court. In the present case,
the issues have, indeed, been joined when petitioners,
as well as the other defendants, filed their answers. The
respective claims and defenses of the parties have been
defined and the issues to be decided by the trial court
have been laid down.
Korea Technologies Co. Inc. v. Judge Lerma, G.R. No.
143581, January 7, 2008
Contracts; Arbitration; Conflict of Laws; While it is
established in this jurisdiction is the rule that the law of
the place where the contract is made governs—lex loci
contractus—Art. 2044 of the Civil Code sanctions the
validity of mutually agreed arbitral clause or the finality
and binding effect of an arbitral award.—Established in
this jurisdiction is the rule that the law of the place
where the contract ismade governs. Lex loci
contractus. The contract in this case was perfected here
in the Philippines. Therefore, our laws ought to govern.
Nonetheless, Art. 2044 of the Civil Code sanctions the
validity of mutually agreed arbitral clause or the finality
and binding effect of an arbitral award. Art. 2044
provides, “Any stipulation that the arbitrators’ award or
decision shall be final, is valid, without prejudice to
Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Arts. 2038, 2039, and 2040 abovecited refer to instances
where a compromise or an arbitral award, as applied to
Art. 2044 pursuant to Art. 2043, may be voided,
rescinded, or annulled, but these would not denigrate
the finality of the arbitral award.
Same; Same; Same; Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL
Model Law); Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004
(R.A. 9285); As signatory to the Arbitration Rules of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UN-CITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration of the UNCITRAL in the New York Convention
on 21 June 1985, the Phil-ippines committed itself to be
bound by the Model Law; The Philip-pines has
incorporated the Model Law in Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004.—For domestic arbitration
proceedings, we have particular agencies to arbitrate
disputes arising from contractual relations. In case a
foreign arbitral body is chosen by the parties, the
arbitration rules of our domestic arbitration bodies
would not be applied. As signatory to the Arbitration
Rules of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in
the New York Convention on June 21, 1985, the
Philippines committed itself to be bound by the Model
Law. We have even incorporated the Model Law in
Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known as the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 entitled An
Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute
Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the
Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other
Purposes, promulgated on April 2, 2004. Secs. 19 and 20
of Chapter 4 of the Model Law are the pertinent
provisions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory
Construction; RA 9285 is a procedural law which has a
retroactive effect.—While RA 9285 was passed only in
2004, it nonetheless applies in the instant case since it is
a procedural law which has a retroactive effect. Like-
wise, KOGIES filed its application for arbitration before
the KCAB on July 1, 1998 and it is still pending because
no arbitral award has yet been rendered. Thus, RA 9285
is applicable to the instant case. Well-settled is the rule
that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and
to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any
personal rights because no vested right has yet attached
nor arisen from them.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Sec. 24 of
R.A. 9285, the Regional Trial Court does not have
jurisdiction over disputes that are properly the subject of
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause, and
mandates the referral to arbitration in such cases.—
Under Sec. 24, the RTC does not have jurisdiction over
disputes that are properly the subject of arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration clause, and mandates the
referral to arbitration in such cases, thus: SEC.
24. Referral to Arbitration.—A court before which an
action is brought in a matter which is the subject matter
of an arbitration agreement shall, if at least one party so
requests not later than the pre-trial conference, or upon
the request of both parties thereafter, refer the parties
to arbitration unless it finds that the arbitration
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial
Review; Even if foreign arbitral awards are mutually
stipulated by the parties in the arbitration clause to be
final and binding, the same are not immediately
enforceable or cannot be implemented immediately—
they must still be confirmed by the Regional Trial
Court.—Foreign arbitral awards while mutually
stipulated by the parties in the arbitration clause to be
final and binding are not immediately enforceable or
cannot be implemented immediately. Sec. 35 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law stipulates the requirement for the
arbitral award to be recognized by a competent court for
enforcement, which court under Sec. 36 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law may refuse recognition or
enforcement on the grounds provided for. RA 9285
incorporated these provisos to Secs. 42, 43, and 44
relative to Secs. 47 and 48.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is now
clear that foreign arbitral awards when confirmed by the
Regional Trial Court are deemed not as a judgment of a
foreign court but as a foreignarbitral award, and when
confirmed, are enforced as final and executory decisions
of our courts of law—the concept of a final and binding
arbitral award is similar to judgments or awards given by
some quasi-judicial bodies, like the National Labor
Relations Commission and the Mines Adjudication
Board.—It is now clear that foreign arbitral awards when
confirmed by the RTC are deemed not as a judgment of
a foreign court but as a foreign arbitral award, and when
confirmed, are enforced as final and executory decisions
of our courts of law. Thus, it can be gleaned that the
concept of a final and binding arbitral award is similar to
judgments or awards given by some of our quasi-judicial
bodies, like the National Labor Relations Commission
and Mines Adjudication Board, whose final judgments
are stipulated to be final and binding, but not
immediately executory in the sense that they may still be
judicially reviewed, upon the instance of any party.
Therefore, the final foreign arbitral awards are similarly
situated in that they need first to be confirmed by the
RTC.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) does not have jurisdiction over
disputes governed by arbitration mutually agreed upon
by the parties, still the foreign arbitral award is subject to
judicial review by the RTC which can set aside, reject, or
vacate it.—While the RTC does not have jurisdiction over
disputes governed by arbitration mutually agreed upon
by the parties, still the foreign arbitral award is subject
to judicial review by the RTC which can set aside, reject,
or vacate it. In this sense, what this Court held in Chung
Fu Industries (Phils.), Inc., 206 SCRA 545 (1992), relied
upon by KOGIES is applicable insofar as the foreign
arbitral awards, while final and binding, do not oust
courts of jurisdiction since these arbitral awards are not
absolute and without exceptions as they are still
judicially reviewable. Chapter 7 of RA 9285 has made it
clear that all arbitral awards, whether domestic or
foreign, are subject to judicial review on specific grounds
provided for.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Grounds
for judicial review different in domestic and foreign
arbitral awards—for foreign or international arbitral
awards, the grounds for setting aside, rejecting or
vacating the award by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are
provided under Art. 34(2) of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Model Law, while for final domestic arbitral awards, they
may only be assailed before the RTC and vacated on the
grounds provided under Sec. 25 of RA 876.—The
differences between a final arbitral award from an
international or foreign arbitral tribunal and an award
given by a local arbitral tribunal are the specific grounds
or conditions that vest jurisdiction over our courts to
review the awards. For foreign or international arbitral
awards which must first be confirmed by the RTC, the
grounds for setting aside, rejecting or vacating the
award by the RTC are provided under Art. 34(2) of the
UNCITRAL Model Law. For final domestic arbitral awards,
which also need confirmation by the RTC pursuant to
Sec. 23 of RA 876 and shall be recognized as final and
executory decisions of the RTC, they may only be
assailed before the RTC and vacated on the grounds
provided under Sec. 25 of RA 876.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An
arbitration clause, stipulating that the arbitral award is
final and binding, does not oust our courts of jurisdiction
as the international arbitral award is still judicially
reviewable under certain conditions provided for by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UN-CITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration (ICA) as applied and incorporated in RA
9285.—Petitioner is correct in its contention that an
arbitration clause, stipulating that the arbitral award is
final and binding, does not oust our courts of jurisdiction
as the international arbitral award, the award of which is
not absolute and without exceptions, is still judicially
reviewable under certain conditions provided for by the
UNCITRAL Model Law on ICA as applied and
incorporated in RA 9285.
Same; Same; Rescission; Where an arbitration
clause in a contract is availing, neither of the parties can
unilaterally treat the contract as rescinded since
whatever infractions or breaches by a party or
differences arising from the contract must be brought
first and resolved by arbitration, and not through an
extrajudicial rescission or judicial action.—What this
Court held in University of the Philippines v. De Los
Angeles, 35 SCRA 102 (1970) and reiterated in
succeeding cases, that the act of treating a contract as
rescinded on account of infractions by the other
contracting party is valid albeit provisional as it can be
judicially assailed, is not applicable to the instant case on
account of a valid stipulation on arbitration. Where an
arbitration clause in a contract is availing, neither of the
parties can unilaterally treat the contract as rescinded
since whatever infractions or breaches by a party or
differences arising from the contract must be brought
first and resolved by arbitration, and not through an
extrajudicial rescission or judicial action.
Same; Same; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; A sheriff is
not technically competent to ascertain the actual status
of the equipment and machineries as installed in the
plant.—Whatever findings and conclusions made by the
RTC Branch Sheriff from the inspection made on October
28, 1998, as ordered by the trial court on October 19,
1998, is of no worth as said Sheriff is not technically
competent to ascertain the actual status of the
equipment and machineries as installed in the plant.
Same; Same; Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004 (R.A. 9285); The pendency of an arbitral proceeding
does not foreclose resort to the courts for provisional
reliefs—the RTC has authority and jurisdiction to grant
interim measures of protection.—In the recent 2006 case
of Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation,
490 SCRA 14 (2006), we were explicit that even “the
pendency of an arbitral proceeding does not foreclose
resort to the courts for provisional reliefs.” We
explicated this way: As a fundamental point, the
pendency of arbitral proceedings does not foreclose
resort to the courts for provisional reliefs. The Rules of
the ICC, which governs the parties’ arbitral dispute,
allows the application of a party to a judicial authority
for interim or conservatory measures. Likewise, Section
14 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 876 (The Arbitration Law)
recognizes the rights of any party to petition the court to
take measures to safeguard and/or conserve any matter
which is the subject of the dispute in arbitration. In
addition, R.A. 9285, otherwise known as the “Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 2004,” allows the filing of
provisional or interim measures with the regular courts
whenever the arbitral tribunal has no power to act or to
act effectively. It is thus beyond cavil that the RTC has
authority and jurisdiction to grant interim measures of
protection.
Spouses Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159746,
July 18, 2012
Certiorari; Prohibition; Mandamus; Certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are extraordinary remedies intended to
correct errors of jurisdiction and to check grave abuse of
discretion.―Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
extraordinary remedies intended to correct errors of
jurisdiction and to check grave abuse of discretion. The
term grave abuse of discretion connotes capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
excess, or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Yet,
here, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the CA
abused its discretion, least of all gravely.
Civil Procedure; Compulsory Counterclaims;
Parameters in the Determination of a Compulsory
Counterclaim.―A counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it
arises out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of
the opposing party’s claim; (b) it does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount
and nature, except that in an original action before the
RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory
regardless of the amount.
Same; Res Judicata; Elements of Res Judicata.―Bar
by res judicataavails if the following elements are
present, to wit: (a) the former judgment or order must
be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the
merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (d)
there must be, between the first and the second action,
identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.
Same; Venue; Venue relates only to the place of
trial or the geographical location in which an action or
proceeding should be brought and does not equate to
the jurisdiction of the court.―To be clear, venue related
only to the place of trial or the geographical location in
which an action or proceeding should be brought and
does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is
intended to accord convenience to the parties, as it
relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their
access to the courts. In contrast, jurisdiction refers to
the power to hear and determine a cause, and is
conferred by law and not by the parties.
Bungcayao Sr. v. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and
Development Corp., G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010
Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice;
“Compulsory Counterclaim,” Defined.—A compulsory
counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which
a defending party may have against an opposing party,
which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily
connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s complaint. It is
compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction
of the court, does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties over whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if
not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same
case. Any other counterclaim is permissive.
Same; Same; Same; Criteria to Determine whether
the Counterclaim is Compulsory or Permissive.—The
criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive are as follows: (a) Are issues of
fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim
largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a
subsequent suit on defendant’s claim, absent the
compulsory rule? (c) Will substantially the same
evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as
defendant’s counterclaim? (d) Is there any logical
relations between the claim and the counterclaim? A
positive answer to all four questions would indicate that
the counterclaim is compulsory.
Sam; Same; Same; Docket Fees; The rule in permissive
counterclaim is that for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees.—The rule in permissive
counterclaim is that for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees. Any decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at
any time, even on appeal before this Court. In this case,
respondent did not dispute the non-payment of docket
fees. Respondent only insisted that its claims were all
compulsory counterclaims. As such, the judgment by the
trial court in relation to the second counterclaim is
considered null and void without prejudice to a separate
action which respondent may file against petitioner.
Same; Judgments; “Summary Judgments, Defined;
“Genuine Issue,” Defined; A summary judgment is
permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and a moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.—Summary judgment is a
procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long
drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the
pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues
of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain
immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is,
when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to
decide the case summarily by applying the law to the
material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a
genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A
“genuine issue” is such issue of fact which requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. Section 3 of the said
rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment
to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to
any material fact, except for the amount of damages;
and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary
judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face
appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and
admissions presented by the moving party show that
such issues are not genuine.”
Firaza Sr. v. Ugay, G.R. No. 165838, April 3, 2013
Civil Law; Property; Land Registration; Property
Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529); Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree proscribes a collateral attack to a certificate of
title and allows only a direct attack thereof.—Section 48
of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree proscribes a collateral attack to a
certificate of title and allows only a direct attack
thereof, viz.: Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral
attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or
cancelled except in a direct proceedings in accordance
with law. In Arangote v. Maglunob, 579 SCRA 620
(2009), the Court, after distinguishing between direct
and collateral attack, classified a counterclaim under
former, viz.: The attack is considered direct when the
object of an action is to annul or set aside such
proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. Conversely, an
attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to
obtain a different relief, an attack on the proceeding is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Such action to
attack a certificate of title may be an original action or a
counterclaim, in which a certificate of title is assailed as
void.
Same; Same; Same; Counterclaims; The petitioner’s
counterclaim is a permissible direct attack to the validity
of respondents’ torrens title.—The petitioner’s
counterclaim is a permissible direct attack to the validity
of respondents’ torrens title. As such counterclaim, it
involves a cause of action separate from that alleged in
the complaint; it has for its purpose the vindication of a
right in as much as the complaint similarly seeks the
redress of one. As the plaintiff in his own counterclaim,
the petitioner is equally entitled to the opportunity
granted the plaintiff in the original complaint, to
establish his cause of action and to prove the right he
asserts. The courts a quo deprived the petitioner of such
opportunity when they barred him from propounding
questions relating to the validity of the respondents’
title; they unjustifiably precluded him from presenting
evidence of fraud and misrepresentation upon which his
counterclaim is grounded. The courts a quo, the RTC
especially, should have instead dealt with such issues
and allowed the presentation of the facts and evidence
necessary for a complete determination of the
controversy.
Banco de Oro v. Court of Appeals, 468 SCRA 166
Actions; Counterclaims; Pleadings and Practice; The
counter-claim must be existing at the time of the filing of
the answer, though not at the commencement of the
action—a premature counterclaim cannot be set in the
answer; The party who fails to interpose a counterclaim
although arising out of or is necessarily connected with
the transaction or occurrence of the plaintiff’s suit but
which did not exist or mature at the time said party files
his answer is not thereby barred from interposing such
claim in a future litigation.—It bears noting that when
petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim to the
Locsins’ complaint on September 11, 1998, the Real
Estate Mortgages covering the 1st TLA and the CLA had
not been extrajudicially foreclosed, the extrajudicial
foreclosure having taken place subsequent thereto or
on September 23, 1998. It bears noting too that until
after the Locsins allegedly refused and failed to settle
the alleged deficiency amount of their outstanding
obligation, despite petitioner’s February 5, 1999 letter of
demand sent to the Locsins on February 9, 1999,
petitioner’s cause of action had not arisen. Petitioner
could not, therefore, have set its claim—subject of its
complaint in Civil Case No. MC-99-935 as,
assuming arguendo that it is, a compulsory counterclaim
when it filed on September 11, 1998 its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim to the Locsins’ complaint.
The counterclaim must be existing at the time of filing the
answer, though not at the commencement of the action
for under Section 3 of the former Rule 10, the
counterclaim or cross-claim which a party may aver in
his answer must be one which he may have “at the time”
against the opposing party. That phrase can only have
reference to the time of the answer. Certainly a
premature counterclaim cannot be set up in the answer.
This construction is not only explicit from the language
of the aforecited provisions but also serves to harmonize
the aforecited sections of Rule 10, with section 4 of the
same rule which provides that “a counterclaim . . . which
either matured or was acquired by a party after serving
his pleading may, with the permission of the court, be
presented as a counterclaim . . . by supplemental
pleading before judgment.” Thus a party who fails to
interpose a counterclaim although arising out of or is
necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence of the plaintiff’s suit but which did not exist
or mature at the time said party files his answer is not
thereby barred from interposing such claim in a future
litigation. . .
Same; Same; Same; Setting up of an “after-
acquired counter-claim” is merely permissive, not
compulsorily.—While petitioner could have, after the
Locsins filed on March 26, 1999 a Supplemental
Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-35337, set up, in its
Supplemental Answer, its claim subject of Civil Case No.
MC-99-935, again assuming arguendo that it is a
Compulsory Counterclaim, the setting up of such “after-
acquired counterclaim,” is merely permissive, not
compulsory.
GSIS v. Heirs of Caballero, G.R. No. 158090, October 4,
2010
Actions; Counterclaims; Tests to Determine
Whether a Counterclaim is Compulsory or Permissive.—
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
not, the Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are
the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
counterclaim largely the same? (b)
Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s
claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c)
Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim?
and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim
and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four
questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.
Same; Same; Docket Fees; Jurisdiction; The rule in
permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay
the prescribed docket fees.—The rule in permissive
counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees. This, petitioner did not do,
because it asserted that its claim for the collection of
rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since
petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The
judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to
Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which he claims although specified are left for determination of the
collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any court is limited only to any damages that may arise after
decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it
and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor
before this Court. speculate as to the amount thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The provision
in the Charter of the Government Service Insurance Sy-Vargas v. Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr., G.R. No.
System (GSIS), i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, 221062, October 5, 2016
which exempts it from “all taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot operate to exempt
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Period; Since March
it from the payment of legal fees—the Supreme Court
29, 2014 fell on a Saturday, petitioner and Kathryn were
now has the sole authority to promulgate rules
completely justified in filing their motion for
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
reconsideration on the next working day: Monday,
courts.—In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the
March 31, 2014.—The CA failed to take into
Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System
consideration that March 29, 2014 fell on a Saturday. In
from Payment of Legal Fees, 612 SCRA 193 (2010), the
these situations, Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court
Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the
provides that: Section 1. How to compute time.—In
GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which
computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
exempts it from “all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or
these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any
duties of all kinds,” cannot operate to exempt it from the
applicable statute, the day of the act or event from
payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935
which the designated period of time begins to run is to
and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to
be excluded and the date of performance included. If
repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme
the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a
Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where
1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress.
the court sits, the time shall not run until the next
Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to
working day. Since March 29, 2014 fell on a Saturday,
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
petitioner and Kathryn were completely justified in filing
procedure in all courts.
their motion for reconsideration on the next working
Same; Same; Same; The third rule laid down in Sun
day: Monday, March 31, 2014. Accordingly, the CA
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989),
should not have considered it filed out of time, and
regarding awards of claims not specified in the pleading,
instead, resolved such motion on the merits. In such an
refers only to damages arising after the filing of the
instance, court procedure dictates that the instant case
complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional
be remanded to the CA for resolution on the merits.
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
However, when there is already enough basis on which a
judgment.—Petitioner also invoked our ruling in Sun
proper evaluation of the merits may be had — as in this
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274
case — the Court may dispense with the time-
(1989), where the Court held that: x x x x 3. Where the
consuming procedure of remand in order to prevent
trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing
further delays in the disposition of the case and to better
of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
serve the ends of justice. In view of the foregoing — as
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
well as the fact that petitioner prayed for the resolution
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
of the substantive issues on the merits — the Court finds
specified the same has been left for determination by
it appropriate to resolve the substantive issues of this
the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
case.
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
Same; Same; Counterclaims; Docket Fees; The rule
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay
additional fee. In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, 181
the prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the
SCRA 687 (1990), the Court, in interpreting the third rule
prevailing rule with respect to compulsory
laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge
counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the
Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989), regarding awards of
trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject
claims not specified in the pleading, held that the same
matter.—Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is
refers only to damages arising after the filing of the
determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is
complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional
required to pay docket fees. The rule in permissive
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire
judgment. The amount of any claim for damages,
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint
prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the
or any pleading should be specified. While it is true that
prevailing rule with respect to compulsory counterclaims
the determination of certain damages as exemplary or
is that no filing fees are required for the trial court to
corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In general,
to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the
a counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may
court may make a proper determination, and for the
have against an opposing party.—In general, a
counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may
have against an opposing party. A compulsory
counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the
regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected
with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A
compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the
same action. On the other hand, a counterclaim is
permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily
connected with the subject matter of the opposing
party’s claim. It is essentially an independent claim that
may be filed separately in another case.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Docket Fees;
Counterclaims; Permissive Counterclaims; In view of the
finding that the counterclaim is permissive, and not
compulsory as held by the courts a quo, respondents are
required to pay docket fees. However, it must be clarified
that respondents’ failure to pay the required docket fees,
per se, should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of
their counterclaim.—In view of the finding that the
counterclaim is permissive, and not compulsory as held
by the courts a quo, respondents are required to pay
docket fees. However, it must be clarified that
respondents’ failure to pay the required docket fees, per
se, should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of their
counterclaim. It has long been settled that while the
court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees, its nonpayment
at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not
automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the
fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there
was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud
the government.
Same; Same; Docket Fees; Counterclaims; The
counterclaim should not be dismissed for nonpayment of
docket fees. Instead, the docket fees required shall
constitute a judgment lien on the monetary awards in
respondents’ favor.—Verily, respondents’ reliance on the
findings of the courts a quo, albeit erroneous, exhibits
their good faith in not paying the docket fees, much
more their intention not to defraud the government.
Thus, the counterclaim should not be dismissed for non-
payment of docket fees. Instead, the docket fees
required shall constitute a judgment lien on the
monetary awards in respondents’ favor.
In Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v.
Alonzo-Legasto, 487 SCRA 339 (2006), citing Section 2,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the Court held that in
instances where a litigant’s nonpayment of docket fees
was made in good faith and without any intention of
defrauding the government, the clerk of court of the
court a quo should be ordered to assess the amount of
deficient docket fees due from such litigant, which will
constitute a judgment lien on the amount awarded to
him, and enforce such lien, as in this case.
Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc. v. Paras, G.R. No.
161909, April 25, 2012
Civil Law; Damages; Moral Damages; Generally,
moral damages are not recoverable in an action
predicated on a breach of contract because such an
action is not included in Article 2219 of the Civil Code as
one of the actions in which moral damages may be
recovered; Exceptions.—As a general rule, indeed, moral
damages are not recoverable in an action predicated on
a breach of contract. This is because such action is not
included in Article 2219 of the Civil Code as one of the
actions in which moral damages may be recovered. By
way of exception, moral damages are recoverable in an
action predicated on a breach of contract: (a) where the
mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided
in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, (3), of the Civil
Code; and (b) where the common carrier has been guilty
of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Article 2220 of
the Civil Code.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Third-Party
Complaints; Requisites for a Third-party Action.—The
requisites for a third-party action are, firstly, that the
party to be impleaded must not yet be a party to the
action; secondly, that the claim against the third-party
defendant must belong to the original
defendant; thirdly, the claim of the original defendant
against the third-party defendant must be based upon
the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant;
and, fourthly, the defendant is attempting to transfer to
the third-party defendant the liability asserted against
him by the original plaintiff.
Civil Law; Damages; Actual Damages; Actual
damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of
proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty.—Actual damages, to be recoverable,
must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. The
reason is that the court “cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the
fact and amount of damages,” but “there must be
competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence
can be given only to claims which are duly supported by
receipts.”
Same; Same; Temperate Damages; Article 2224 of
the Civil Code expressly authorizes the courts to award
temperate damages despite lack of certain proof of
actual damages.—There is no question that Article 2224
of the Civil Code expressly authorizes the courts to
award temperate damages despite the lack of certain
proof of actual damages, to wit: Article 2224. Temperate
or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but
less than compensatory damages, may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty.
Same; Same; Loss of Earning Capacity; According to
Article 2205, (1), of the Civil Code, damages may be
recovered for loss or impairment of earning capacity in
cases of temporary or permanent personal injury.—
According to Article 2205, (1), of the Civil Code, damages
may be recovered for loss or impairment of earning
capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal
injury. Indeed, indemnification for damages
comprehends not only the loss suffered (actual damages
or damnum emergens) but also the claimant’s lost
profits (compensatory damages or lucrum cessans). Even
so, the formula that has gained acceptance over time
has limited recovery to net earning capacity; hence, the
entire amount of P72,000.00 is not allowable. The
premise is obviously that net earning capacity is the
person’s capacity to acquire money, less the necessary
expense for his own living. To simplify the
determination, therefore, the net earning capacity of
Paras during the 9-month period of his confinement,
surgeries and consequential therapy is pegged at only
half of his unearned monthly gross income of P8,000.00
as a trader, or a total of P36,000.00 for the 9-month
period, the other half being treated as the necessary
expense for his own living in that period.
Samala v. Judge Victor, 170 SCRA 453
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Third-Party Complaint; It
is not indispensable in the premises that the defendant
be first adjudged liable to plaintiff before the third-party
defendant may be held liable to the plaintiff.—Under this
Rule, a person not a party to an action may be
impleaded by the defendant either (a) on an allegation
of liability to the latter; (b) on the ground of direct
liability to the plaintiff; or, (c) both (a) and (b). The
situation in (a) is covered by the phrase “for
contribution, indemnity or subrogation;” while (b) and
(c) are subsumed under the catch-all “or any other relief,
in respect of his opponent’s claim.” The case at bar is
one in which the third party defendants are brought into
the action as directly liable to the plaintiffs upon the
allegation that “the primary and immediate cause as
shown by the police investigation of said vehicular
collision between (sic) the above-mentioned three
vehicles was the recklessness and negligence and lack of
imprudence (sic) of the third-party defendant Virgilio
(should be Leonardo) Esguerra y Ledesma then driver of
the passenger bus.” The effects are that “plaintiff and
third party are at issue as to their rights respecting the
claim” and “the third party is bound by the adjudication
as between him and plaintiff.” It is not indispensable in
the premises that the defendant be first adjudged liable
to plaintiff before the third-party defendant may be held
liable to the plaintiff, as precisely, the theory of
defendant is that it is the third party defendant, and not
he, who is directly liable to plaintiff. The situation
contemplated by appellant would properly pertain to
situation (a) above wherein the third party defendant is
being sued for contribution, indemnity or subrogation,
or simply stated, for a defendant’s “remedy over”.
Same; Same; Same; It is immaterial that the third-
party plaintiff asserts a cause of action against the third-
party defendant on a theory different from that asserted
by the plaintiff against the defendant.—Anent
appellant’s claim that plaintiff who sued on contractual
breach cannot recover on the basis of quasi-delict,
suffice it to say that as the primary purpose of this rule is
to avoid circuity of action and to dispose of in one
litigation, the entire subject matter arising from a
particular set of facts it is immaterial that the third-party
plaintiff asserts a cause of action against the third party
defendant on a theory different from that asserted by
the plaintiff against the defendant. It has likewise been
held that “a defendant in a contract action may join as
third-party defendants those liable to him in tort for the
plaintiff’s claim against him or directly to the plaintiff.”
CDCP v. Cuenca, 466 SCRA 714
Actions; Parties; Pleadings and Practice; Third-Party
Complaints; Words and Phrases; The third-party
complaint is a procedural device whereby a “third party”
who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed
complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the
case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as
third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party
defendant a right for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of plaintiff’s
claim; A third-party complaint is actually independent of
and separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint,
and were it not for Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court, it would have to be filed independently and
separately from the original complaint by the defendant
against the third party.—In Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company of the Philippines v. Tempongko, we
emphasized the nature of a third-party complaint,
particularly its independence from the main case: The
third-party complaint is, therefore, a proceduraldevice
whereby a “third party” who is neither a party nor privy
to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be
brought into the case with leave of court, by the
defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce
against such third-party defendant a right for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief,
in respect of the plaintiff’s claim. The third-party
complaint is actually independent of and separate and
distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. Were it not for
this provision of the Rules of Court, it would have to be
filed independently and separately from the original
complaint by the defendant against the third-party. But
the Rules permit defendant to bring in a third-party
defendant or so to speak, to litigate his separate cause
of action in respect of plaintiff’s claim against a third
party in the original and principal case with the object of
avoiding circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation
of lawsuits and of disposing expeditiously in one
litigation the entire subject matter arising from one
particular set of facts. . . . When leave to file the third-
party complaint is properly granted, the Court renders in
effect two judgments in the same case, one on the
plaintiff’s complaint and the other on the third-party
complaint. When he finds favorably on both complaints,
as in this case, he renders judgment on the principal
complaint in favor of plaintiff against defendant and
renders another judgment on the third-party complaint
in favor of defendant as third-party plaintiff, ordering
the third-party defendant to reimburse the defendant
whatever amount said defendant is ordered to pay
plaintiff in the case. Failure of any of said parties in such
a case to appeal the judgment as against him makes
such judgment final and executory. . . .
Same; Same; Same; Same; The plaintiff in the main
action may not be regarded as a party to third-party
complaint, nor may the third-party defendant be
regarded as a party to the main action; If only the third-
party defendant files an appeal, the decision in the main
case becomes final.—It follows then that the plaintiff in
the main action may not be regarded as a party to the
third-party complaint; nor may the third-party
defendant be regarded as a party to the main action. As
for the defendant, he is party to both the main action
and the third-party complaint but in different
capacities—in the main action, he is the defendant; in
the third-party complaint, he is the plaintiff. In the
present case, the petitioner PNCC which was the third-
party defendant appealed before this Court from the
decision of the CA. Case law is that if only the third-party
defendant files an appeal, the decision in the main case
becomes final. Therefore, the CA’s decision in the main
action, holding UITC liable to MICI and dismissing the
case as against the Cuencas, became final and executory
when none of the said parties filed an appeal with this
Court.
Same; Same; Corporation Law; Doctrine of Piercing
the Veil of Corporate Fiction; A corporation, upon coming
into existence, is invested by law with a personality
separate and distinct from those persons comprising it as
well as from any other legal entity to which it may be
related.—The petitioner cannot be made directly liable
to MICI under the indemnity agreement on the ground
that it is UITC’s majority stockholder. It bears stressing
that the petitioner was not a party defendant in the
main action. MICI did not assert any claim against the
petitioner, nor was the petitioner impleaded in the third-
party complaint on the ground of its direct liability to
MICI. In the latter case, it would be as if the third-party
defendant was itself directly impleaded by the plaintiff
as a defendant. In the present case, petitioner PNCC was
brought into the action by respondent Cuenca simply for
a “remedy over.” No cause of action was asserted by
MICI against it. The petitioner’s liability could only be
based on its alleged assumption of respondent Cuenca’s
liability under the indemnity agreement. In any case,
petitioner PNCC, as majority stockholder, may not be
held liable for UITC’s obligation. A corporation, upon
coming into existence, is invested by law with a
personality separate and distinct from those persons
composing it as well as from any other legal entity to
which it may be related. The veil of corporate fiction
may only be disregarded in cases where the corporate
vehicle is being used to defeat public convenience,
justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime. Mere
ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a
corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for
disregarding the separate corporate personality. To
disregard the separate juridical personality of a
corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and
convincingly established.
Paramount Life & General Insurance v. Castro, G.R. No.
195728, April 19, 2016
Mortgage Redemption Insurance; Words and
Phrases; In Great Pacific Life Assurance Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 316 SCRA 677 (1999), the Supreme Court (SC)
defined mortgage redemption insurance as a device for
the protection of both the mortgagee and the
mortgagor.—In Great Pacific Life Assurance Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 677 (1999), we defined
mortgage redemption insurance as a device for the
protection of both the mortgagee and the mortgagor:
On the part of the mortgagee, it has to enter into such
form of contract so that in the event of the unexpected
demise of the mortgagor during the subsistence of the
mortgage contract, the proceeds from such insurance
will be applied to the payment of the mortgage debt,
thereby relieving the heirs of the mortgagor from paying
the obligation. In a similar vein, ample protection is
given to the mortgagor under such a concept so that in
the event of death, the mortgage obligation will be
extinguished by the application of the insurance
proceeds to the mortgage indebtedness.
Administrative Law; Judges; Disqualification and
Inhibition of Judges; The rule on inhibition of judges
contemplates a scenario in which judges are tasked to
review their own decisions on appeal, not when their
decisions are being appealed to another tribunal.—
Counsel for the Castros postulates that since six rulings
of the judge are being assailed for grave abuse of
discretion, the judge should inhibit himself. According to
counsel, no judge shall sit in any case if the latter’s ruling
is subject to review. The Court reminds counsel that the
rule contemplates a scenario in which judges are tasked
to review their own decisions on appeal, not when their
decisions are being appealed to another tribunal.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Default; Failure to
file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period
is the sole ground for an order of default under Rule 9.
On the other hand, under Rule 18, failure of the
defendant to appear at the pretrial conference results in
the plaintiff being allowed to present evidence ex
parte.—Counsel apparently confuses a declaration of
default under Section 3 of Rule 9 with the effect of
failure to appear under Section 5 of Rule 18. Failure to
file a responsive pleading within the reglementary
period is the sole ground for an order of default under
Rule 9. On the other hand, under Rule 18, failure of the
defendant to appear at the pretrial conference results in
the plaintiff being allowed to present evidence ex parte.
The difference is that a declaration of default under Rule
9 allows the Court to proceed to render judgment
granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may
warrant; while the effect of default under Rule 18 allows
the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte and for the
Court to render judgment on the basis thereof. The
lower court may have declared defendants therein as in
default; however, it did not issue an order of default,
rather, it ordered the plaintiff to present evidence ex
parte in accordance with the Rules. In any case, the
Castros could have availed themselves of appropriate
legal remedies when the CA failed to resolve the issue,
but they did not. They cannot now resurrect the issue
through a Comment before this Court.
Same; Same; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The well-
settled principle of hierarchy of courts dictates that
petitioners should have filed the Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals (CA), and not directly with the
Supreme Court (SC).—Upon denial of their Motion to
Dismiss, the Castros were not left without any recourse.
In such a situation, the aggrieved party’s remedy is to file
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. However, the aggrieved parties herein
resorted to filing a Petition for Review under Rule 45
before this Court. Even if the present Petition is treated
as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it must still be
dismissed for violation of the principle of hierarchy of
courts. This well-settled principle dictates that
petitioners should have filed the Petition
for Certiorari with the CA, and not directly with this
Court.
Intervention: Bon-Mar Realty and Sport Corp. v.
Spouses de Guzman, G.R. No. 182136-37
Remedial Law; Actions; Intervention; Requisites to
Warrant Intervention.—To warrant intervention, two
requisites must concur: (a) the movant has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, and (b) intervention
must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the parties nor should the claim of the
intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a
separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles a
person to intervene in a suit, must involve the matter in
litigation and of such direct and immediate character
that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment.
Same; Same; Third-Party Claim; Proceedings to
resolve the possession of third-party claimants may
proceed independently of the action which said claimants
may bring to enforce or protect their claim of ownership
over the property.—The above provision bestows upon
third parties claiming rights to property under execution
the right to protect their interests by interposing a third-
party claim in the same case, or by instituting a separate
reivindicatory action against the executing creditor. The
third-party claim that is heard in the same case may be
tried at length or summarily. Proceedings to resolve the
possession of third-party claimants may proceed
independently of the action which said claimants may
bring to enforce or protect their claim of ownership over
the property.
Same; Writs of Possession; A proceeding for the
issuance of a writ of possession is a mere incident in the
transfer of title; The true owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of the property, not summarily
through a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession.—A proceeding for the issuance of a writ of
possession is a mere incident in the transfer of title; the
courts may not grant the writ where title is in doubt, as
in this case, where the trial court still has to hear BON-
MAR on its claim. The prudent course of action,
therefore, is to hold in abeyance proceedings for the
issuance of the writ. Actual possession under claim of
ownership raises a disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of the property, not summarily
through a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession.
Parties; Locus Standi; The Rules of Court provide
that a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action.—It is clear that BON-MAR has acquired legal
interest over the subject lots by virtue of the final and
executory decision in Civil Case No. 67315, which
adjudged it as the owner of the disputed lots. The Rules
of Court provide that a person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to
be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of
an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action.
Ownership; Actual possession under claim of ownership
raises a disputable presumption of ownership.—We do
not subscribe to the DE GUZMANS’ argument that since
the decision in Civil Case No. 67315 cannot bind them,
then the writ of possession should be issued in their
favor. The most prudent course of action is to allow
BON-MAR to be heard on its intervention cum third-
party claim. Rather than sow further chaos and
confusion and open the door to fraud, falsehood and
misrepresentation should BON-MAR’s claim prove to be
true, the trial court should hear its case. It must be
remembered that BON-MAR is in possession of the
disputed lots, and it appears that the reason why it is in
possession thereof is because it is a transferee of the DE
GUZMANS, precisely as a result of the execution of the
decision in Civil Case No. 56393. Actual possession under
claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of
ownership; the DE GUZMANS are not entitled to a writ
of possession under the circumstances.
Judgments; It must be borne in mind that
annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where
there is no available or other adequate remedy.—The
pendency of a case for annulment of the decision in Civil
Case No. 67315 cannot affect the character of our
disposition in the instant case; unless annulled, the
decision in said case stands. It must be borne in mind
that annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where
there is no available or other adequate remedy. Having
given the parties herein the opportunity to confront
each other head on in Civil Case No. 56393, we cannot,
on mere unilateral assertions, bordering on
contumacious conduct, of obtaining a better resolution
devoid of our “erroneous assumptions,” see the wisdom
of DE GUZMANS’ argument that a resolution of the
issues could be better had via a petition for annulment
of judgment.
Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 174385, February 20, 2013
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; In
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty
(60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial
of said motion.―We find that the present petition was
filed within the reglementary period. Contrary to the
private respondents’ position, the 60-day period within
which to file the petition for certiorari is counted from
the Republic’s receipt of the July 5, 2006 order denying
the latter’s motion for reconsideration. Section 4, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is clear on this point―“In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty
(60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial
of said motion.” We find too that the present petition
complied with the rules on proof of filing and service of
the petition. Attached to the petition―in compliance
with Sections 12 and 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court―are the registry receipts and the affidavit of the
person who filed and served the petition by registered
mail.
Same; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; While the principle of
hierarchy of courts does indeed require that recourses
should be made to the lower courts before they are made
to the higher courts, this principle is not an absolute rule
and admits of exceptions under well-defined
circumstances.―While the principle of hierarchy of
courts does indeed require that recourses should be
made to the lower courts before they are made to the
higher courts, this principle is not an absolute rule and
admits of exceptions under well-defined circumstances.
In several cases, we have allowed direct invocation of
this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari on the ground of special and important
reasons clearly stated in the petition; when dictated by
public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
when demanded by the broader interest of justice;
when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or
when analogous exceptional and compelling
circumstances called for and justified our immediate and
direct handling of the case.
Same; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice;
Service of Pleadings; Actions; Under our rules of
procedure, service of the petition on a party, when that
party is represented by a counsel of record, is a patent
nullity and is not binding upon the party wrongfully
served.―Under our rules of procedure, service of the
petition on a party, when that party is represented by a
counsel of record, is a patent nullity and is not binding
upon the party wrongfully served. This rule, however, is
a procedural standard that may admit of exceptions
when faced with compelling reasons of substantive
justice manifest in the petition and in the surrounding
circumstances of the case. Procedural rules can bow to
substantive considerations through a liberal construction
aimed at promoting their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; The essence of
due process is the opportunity to be heard, logically
preconditioned on prior notice, before judgment is
rendered.―Due process of law is a constitutionally
guaranteed right reserved to every litigant. Even the
Republic as a litigant is entitled to this constitutional
right, in the same manner and to the same extent that
this right is guaranteed to private litigants. The essence
of due process is the opportunity to be heard, logically
preconditioned on prior notice, before judgment is
rendered.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motion for Intervention;
Notice and Hearing; A motion for intervention, like any
other motion, has to comply with the mandatory
requirements of notice and hearing, as well as proof of
its service, save only for those that the courts can act
upon without prejudice to the rights of the other
parties.―A motion for intervention, like any other
motion, has to comply with the mandatory requirements
of notice and hearing, as well as proof of its service, save
only for those that the courts can act upon without
prejudice to the rights of the other parties. A motion
which fails to comply with these requirements is a
worthless piece of paper that cannot and should not be
acted upon. The reason for this is plain: a movant asks
the court to take a specific course of action, often
contrary to the interest of the adverse party and which
the latter must then be given the right and opportunity
to oppose. The notice of hearing to the adverse party
thus directly services the required due process as it
affords the adverse party the opportunity to properly
state his agreement or opposition to the action that the
movant asks for. Consequently, our procedural rules
provide that a motion that does not afford the adverse
party this kind of opportunity should simply be
disregarded.
Same; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary
Injunctions; Notice and Hearing; Under Section 5, Rule 58
of the Rules of Court, no preliminary injunction shall be
granted without a hearing and without prior notice to
the party sought to be enjoined.―The notice
requirement is even more mandatory when the movant
asks for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or a
TRO. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, no
preliminary injunction shall be granted without a hearing
and without prior notice to the party sought to be
enjoined. The prior notice under this requirement is as
important as the hearing, as no hearing can meaningfully
take place, with both parties present or represented,
unless a prior notice of the hearing is given. Additionally,
in the same way that an original complaint must be
served on the defendant, a copy of the complaint-in-
intervention must be served on the adverse party with
the requisite proof of service duly filed prior to any valid
court action. Absent these or any reason duly explained
and accepted excusing strict compliance, the court is
without authority to act on such complaint; any action
taken without the required service contravenes the law
and the rules, and violates the adverse party’s basic and
constitutional right to due process.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Grave Abuse of
Discretion; Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower
court or tribunal violates the Constitution or grossly
disregards the law or existing jurisprudence.―All told,
the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion warranting the issuance of the corrective writ
of certiorari. Grave abuse of discretion arises when a
lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution or
grossly disregards the law or existing jurisprudence. The
term refers to such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, as when the
act amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law. The respondent judge
so acted so that the orders he issued should be declared
void and of no effect.
Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141947, July 5, 2001
Remedial Law; Pleadings and
Practices; Verification; There is substantial compliance if
the verification is executed by an attorney, it being
presumed that facts alleged by him are true to his
knowledge and belief.—It is true that insofar as
verification is concerned, we have held that there is
substantial compliance if the same is executed by an
attorney, it being presumed that facts alleged by him are
true to his knowledge and belief. However, the same
does not apply as regards the requirement of a
certification against forum shopping.
Same; Same; Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping; The certification must be made by petitioner
himself and not by counsel.—It is clear from the above-
quoted provision that the certification must be made by
petitioner himself and not by counsel since it is petitioner
who is in the best position to know whether he has
previously commenced any similar action involving the
same issues in any other tribunal or agency.
Same; Certiorari; There are three (3) essential dates
that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought
under Rule 65.—Moreover, the petition failed to indicate
the material dates that would show the timeliness of the
filing thereof with the Court of Appeals. There are three
(3) essential dates that must be stated in a petition for
certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when
notice of the judgment or final order or Resolution was
received; second, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the
denial thereof was received. Petitioners failed to show
the first and second dates, namely, the date of receipt of
the impugned NLRC Decision as well as the date of filing
of their motion for reconsideration.
Same; Same; Same; Utter disregard of the Rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of
liberal construction.—Technical rules of procedure are
not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are
provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of
cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court
dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.
Heirs of Lazaro Gallardo v. Soliman, G.R. No. 178952,
April 10, 2013
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Certification of Against
Forum Shopping; Where the petitioners are immediate
relatives, who share a common interest in the property
subject of the action, the fact that only one of the
petitioners executed the verification or certification of
[non] forum shopping will not deter the court from
proceeding with the action.―In Traveño v. Bobongon
Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, 598 SCRA
27 (2009), the Court held that: 5) The certification
against forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who
did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as
when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially
complies with the Rule. The same position was taken
in Medado v. Heirs of the Late Antonio Consing, 665
SCRA 534 (2012), where the Court held that “where the
petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a
common interest in the property subject of the action,
the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the
verification or certification of [non] forum shopping will
not deter the court from proceeding with the action.”
The same situation obtains in this case. Petitioners are
all heirs of the deceased Lazaro. As such, they
undoubtedly share a common interest in the land, as
well as common claims and defenses, as against
respondents.
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; While the
tenant is emancipated from bondage to the soil, the
landowner is entitled to his just compensation for the
deprivation of his land.―As the farmer tenant-transferee
of the land under PD 27, Porferio is by law required to
make amortizations on the land until he completes
payment of the fixed price thereof. Under
the Kasunduanand Deed of Transfer, he has to make
good on his payments to the landowners. If he fails to
pay, cancellation of any Certificate of Land Transfer or
Emancipation Patent issued in his name is proper,
pursuant to Section 2 of PD 816. Considering the tenor
of the law, the PARAD’s and DARAB’s pronouncement
that respondents cannot be faulted for they “labored
under the honest belief that they were now vested with
absolute ownership” of the land, and that they “cannot
be expected to understand the legal implications of the
existing lien/encumbrances annotated on their
respective titles entered into in 1990 to insure payment
of the land value” to petitioners, appears to be anchored
not on legal ground. Besides, it is common maxim that
“ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.” Moreover, when one party enters into a
covenant with another, he must perform his obligations
with fealty and good faith. This becomes more
imperative where such party has been given a grant,
such as land, under the land reform laws. While the
tenant is emancipated from bondage to the soil, the
landowner is entitled to his just compensation for the
deprivation of his land.
Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 193415,
April 18, 2012
Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary
Injunction; A writ of preliminary injunction is auxiliary to,
an adjunct of, and subject to the outcome of the main
case, thus, a writ of preliminary injunction is deemed
lifted upon dismissal of the main case, any appeal
therefrom notwithstanding.—A writ of preliminary
injunction is a provisional remedy. It is auxiliary to, an
adjunct of, and subject to the outcome of the main case.
Thus, a writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted
upon dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom
notwithstanding, as this Court emphasized in Buyco v.
Baraquia, 107 SCRA 187 (2009).
Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; As a condition
precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual
controversy between litigants must first exist.—The
Constitution provides that judicial power “includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.” The exercise of judicial
power requires an actual case calling for it. The courts
have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory
opinions, or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems
or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties
without real adverse interests. Furthermore, courts do
not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. As
a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power,
an actual controversy between litigants must first exist.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial resolution, as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping;
Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively
avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies in different
fora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances; and raising
substantially similar issues either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court; or for the
purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a
favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another.—
Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively
avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies in
different fora, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances; and raising
substantially similar issues either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other court; or for the
purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a
favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another.
The rationale against forum-shopping is that a party
should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies
in two different courts, for to do so would constitute
abuse of court processes which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly
judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the
heavily burdened dockets of the courts.
Same; Same; Same; Every litigant is required to
notify the court of the filing or pendency of any other
action or such other proceeding involving the same or
similar action or claim within five (5) days of learning of
that fact.—Every litigant is required to notify the court
of the filing or pendency of any other action or such
other proceeding involving the same or similar action or
claim within five (5) days of learning of that fact.
Petitioners claim that it was merely due to inadvertence
that they failed to disclose the said filing within five (5)
days, contrary to their undertaking.
Norris v. Parentela Jr., February 27, 2003
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum-
shopping; Petitioner’s petition for relief from judgment
filed before the trial court is included in the enumeration
of initiatory pleadings because it is a new petition where
a party seeks relief based on grounds different from
those in the original case, namely, fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence.—Petitioner failed to
accompany her petition for relief from judgment before
the trial court with certification against forum shopping
in violation of this court’s Administrative Circular No. 04-
94, which requires that complaints and other initiatory
pleadings filed in all courts and agencies other than the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals be
accompanied by such certification. Second paragraph of
Section 1 of the said circular clearly includes in its
enumeration of initiatory pleadings a petition where the
party assertshis claim for relief. Petitioner’s petition for
relief from judgment filed before the trial court is
included in said enumeration because it is a new petition
where a party seeks relief based on grounds different
from those in the original case, namely, fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence. Undoubtedly, said
petition was covered by the circular.
Same; Same; Notices; Section 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court clearly provides that notice of hearing
shall be addressed to all parties concerned; Notice
addressed to the clerk of court and not to the parties
does not suffice as notice to all.—Petitioner failed to put
a notice of hearing addressed to the parties in her
motion for reconsideration of the order denying her
petition for relief. This is again procedurally flawed
because Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court clearly
provides that notice of hearing shall be addressed to all
parties concerned. Notice addressed to the clerk of
court and not to the parties does not suffice as notice to
all. A motion that does not contain a notice of hearing to
the adverse party is nothing but a mere scrap of paper
and the clerk of court does not have the duty to accept
it, much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding
judge.
Same; Same; The liberal interpretation and
application of rules apply only in proper cases of
demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.—Clearly from the abovecited
circumstances, the Court of Appeals could not be faulted
for dismissing the petition for certiorari. At this point, it
should be stressed that procedural rules are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants
alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in
certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the
application of the rules, we never intend to forge a
weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of
rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit
and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it
is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party
litigants and their counsels are well advised to abide by,
rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these rules
illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit
of justice.
Argana v. Republic, G.R. No. 147227, November 19,
2004, 443 SCRA 184
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Since an
order setting the case for further proceedings, issued
after the original judgment rendered pursuant to a
compromise agreement is set aside, is an interlocutory
order which is not appealable, the proper remedy to
assail it is a special civil action for certiorari.—The Court
does not agree with respondent’s contention that a
petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail
the February 22, 2001 Order of the Sandiganbayan
which affirmed its earlier directive to set the case
against petitioners for pre-trial following the annulment
of its judgment by compromise agreement. A special civil
action for certiorari may be instituted when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The Court has previously held that an
order setting the case for further proceedings, issued
after the original judgment rendered pursuant to a
compromise agreement is set aside, is an interlocutory
order and is therefore not appealable. Since no appeal is
available against such an order, the proper remedy to
assail it is a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy
taken by petitioners is therefore proper.
Same; Same; Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG); Public Officers; Ill-Gotten Wealth;
Forfeiture Proceedings; Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG); There is no requirement under the law that
pleadings and motions filed by lawyers of the
government or the PCGG must first be approved by the
PCGG En Banc and by the President of the Philippines;
R.A. No. 1379 expressly authorized the OSG to prosecute
cases of forfeiture of property unlawfully acquired by any
public officer or employee.—Petitioners’ contention that
the Motion to Rescind filed by the lawyers of the PCGG
and of the OSG should have been treated by the
Sandiganbayan as a mere scrap of paper because the
motion was filed without the authority of the PCGG En
Banc and of the President of the Republic has no legal
basis. There is no requirement under the law that
pleadings and motions filed by lawyers of the
government or the PCGG must first be approved by the
PCGG En Banc and by the President of the Philippines.
More importantly, R.A. No. 1379 expressly authorizes
the OSG to prosecute cases of forfeiture of property
unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee. It
must be remembered that it was the OSG which filed
Civil Case No. 0026 for the forfeiture of petitioners’
allegedly ill-gotten wealth, and that the Compromise
Agreement between petitioners and respondent was an
amicable settlement of that case. By filing an action for
rescission of the Compromise Agreement based on
extrinsic fraud, the OSG was merely performing its legal
duty to recover the wealth purportedly amassed
unlawfully by the late Mayor Argana during his terms as
Mayor of Muntinlupa. The Motion to Rescind was filed
precisely because the PCGG, as respondent’s authorized
representative in the compromise, discovered that the
execution of the Compromise Agreement was attended
by fraud and sought the help of the OSG which in turn is
the duly authorized government agency to represent
respondent in forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan correctly upheld the
authority of the OSG, assisted by the PCGG, in filing
the Motion to Rescind.
Same; Same; Compromise Agreements; Petition for
Relief; The sixty-day and six-month reglementary periods
within which to file a petition for relief should be
reckoned from the date when the decision approving the
compromise agreement was rendered.—The Court has
previously held that as applied to a judgment based on
compromise, both the sixty (60)-day and six (6)-month
reglementary periods within which to file a petition for
relief should be reckoned from the date when the
decision approving the compromise agreement was
rendered because such judgment is considered
immediately executory and entered on the date that it
was approved by the court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although as a general
rule, the party filing a petition for relief must strictly
comply with the sixty (60)-day and six (6)-month
reglementary periods, it is not without exceptions; In the
instant case, it involves an alleged fraud committed
against the Republic, and thus justifies the liberal
interpretation of procedural laws by the
Sandiganbayan.—The sixty (60)-day period should be
counted from July 31, 1998, the date of the
Sandiganbayan Decision granting the Motion to Approve
Compromise Agreement. The sixtieth day from July 31,
1998 is September 29, 1998. The Motion to Rescind was
filed by the OSG only on October 5, 1998, clearly several
days after the sixtieth day from the rendition of the July
31, 1998 Decision. This notwithstanding, the Court finds
that no grave abuse can be ascribed to the
Sandiganbayan in admitting the Motion to Rescind as a
petition for relief was timely filed. Although as a general
rule, the party filing a petition for relief must strictly
comply with the sixty (60)-day and six (6)-month
reglementary periods under Section 3, Rule 38, it is not
without exceptions. The Court relaxed the rule in several
cases and held that the filing of a petition for relief
beyond the sixty 60-day period is not fatal so long as it is
filed within the six (6)-month period from entry of
judgment. The Court notes that the filing of the Motion
to Rescind on October 5, 1998 was indeed seven days
beyond the sixty 60-day period but still well within the
six (6)-month period from entry of judgment. Moreover,
the case involves an alleged fraud committed against the
Republic, and thus justifies the liberal interpretation of
procedural laws by the Sandiganbayan.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Affidavits of Merit; The
absence of an affidavit of merit does not always result in
the denial of the petition for relief, so long as the facts
required to be set out in the affidavit appear in the
verified petition—the oath which forms part of the
petition elevates it to the same category as an
affidavit.—Petitioners’ claim that respondent failed to
attach an affidavit of merit to its Motion to Rescind is
belied by the record of the case. Petitioners in fact
attached, as Annex “N” of their Petition for Certiorari, a
copy of the respondent’s Motion to
Rescind. The Affidavit of Merit signed by Dennis M.
Taningco, the counsel of the PCGG in Civil Case No.
0026, was attached to the Motion to Rescind. In any
case, the Court in Mago v. Court of Appeals held that the
absence of an affidavit of merit does not always result in
the denial of the petition for relief, so long as the facts
required to be set out in the affidavit appear in the
verified petition. The oath which forms part of the
petition elevates it to the same category as an affidavit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certification Against
Forum Shopping; A Motion to Rescind, which in effect is a
petition for relief, is not an initiatory pleading which
requires the inclusion of a Certification Against Forum
Shopping.—Neither was it necessary for respondent to
attach a Certification against Forum Shopping to
the Motion to Rescind. As correctly held by the
Sandiganbayan, the Motion to Rescind, which in effect
was a petition for relief, is not an initiatory pleading
which requires the inclusion of a Certification against
Forum Shopping. Section 2, Rule 38 requires that a
petition for relief must be filed with the court which
rendered the judgment or order sought to be set aside,
and in the same case wherein the judgment or order
was rendered. If the court finds that the allegations in
the petition for relief are true, it shall set aside the
judgment and try the principal case upon the merits as if
a timely motion for new trial had been granted. Clearly,
then, a petition for relief is not an initiatory pleading in a
new case which would require the filing by the
petitioner therein of a Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping.
Courts; Judges; Inhibition and Disqualification of
Judges; The import of the rule on voluntary inhibition is
that the decision of a judge on whether or not to inhibit
is left to his or her sound discretion and conscience,
based on his or her rational and logical assessment of the
case where the motion for inhibition is filed.—The Court
finds no abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan in
denying petitioners’ Urgent Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition. As explained in Gutang v. Court of
Appeals, the import of the rule on voluntary inhibition is
that the decision of a judge on whether or not to inhibit
is left to his or her sound discretion and conscience,
based on his or her rational and logical assessment of
the case where the motion for inhibition is filed. It
implies that in addition to pecuniary interest,
relationship, or previous participation in the matter
under litigation—which are grounds for mandatory
inhibition under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule
137 of the Revised Rules of Court—there might be other
causes that could diminish the objectivity of the judge,
thus warranting his or her inhibition. Petitioners’ claim
of bias and partiality on the part of the Sandiganbayan
justices who issued the April 11,
2000 Resolution, evaluated in light of the resolution
itself, is evidently more imagined than real. To say, as is
petitioners’ wont, that a judge who throws out a party’s
motion in the language employed by the Sandiganbayan
in the questioned Resolution is necessarily prejudiced, is
to be indiscriminate and precipitate.
Public Officers; Ill-Gotten Wealth; Public
Officers; Presidential Commission on Good
Government; Compromise Agreements; The Court holds
that no error nor grave abuse of discretion can be
ascribed to the Sandiganbayan for ruling that the
execution of the Compromise Agreement was tainted
with fraud on the part of the private parties and in
connivance with some PCGG officials—fraud was
perpetuated upon the Republic as the assessed or market
values of the properties offered for settlement had been
concealed from the reviewing authorities such as the
PCGG En Banc and even the President of the Republic.—
Anent the propriety of the Sandiganbayan’s nullification
of the Compromise Agreement on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, the Court holds that no error nor grave abuse of
discretion can be ascribed to the Sandiganbayan for
ruling that the execution of the Compromise
Agreement was tainted with fraud on the part of
petitioners and in connivance with some PCGG officials.
A circumspect review of the record of the case reveals
that fraud, indeed, was perpetuated upon respondent in
the execution of the Compromise Agreement, the
assessed or market values of the properties offered for
settlement having been concealed from the reviewing
authorities such as the PCGG En Banc and even the
President of the Republic.
Same; Estoppel; It is an established rule that the State
cannot be estopped by the mistakes of its agents.—It is
evident from the foregoing that the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan is grounded on facts and on the law. The
Court sees no reason to depart from the conclusions
drawn by the Sandiganbayan on the basis of its findings,
especially considering that the three justices comprising
the Sandiganbayan’s Third Division conducted a
thorough examination of the documents submitted by
the parties to this case, heard the testimonies of the
parties’ witnesses and observed their deportment during
the hearing on the Motion to Rescind. Moreover, it is an
established rule that the State cannot be estopped by
the mistakes of its agents. Respondent cannot be bound
by a manifestly unjust compromise agreement reviewed
on its behalf and entered into by its representatives
from the PCGG who apparently were not looking after
respondent’s best interests.
Green Asia Construction and Development Corp. v. CA,
508 SCRA 79
Actions; Extrajudicial Foreclosure of
Mortgage; Writs of Possession; Pleadings and
Practice; Certifications on Non-Forum Shopping; Words
and Phrases; A certification on non-forum shopping is
required only in a complaint or a petition which is an
initiatory pleading—a petition, or a motion, for the
issuance of a writ of possession is not an initiatory
pleading; An original action is not necessary to acquire
possession in favor of the purchaser at an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property; The purpose of a motion is
not to initiate litigation, but to bring up a matter arising
in the progress of the case where the motion is filed.—
Anent the first issue, it bears stressing that a certification
on non-forum shopping is required only in a complaint
or a petition which is an initiatory pleading. In this case,
the subject petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession filed by private respondent is not an
initiatory pleading. Although private respondent
denominated its pleading as a petition, it is more
properly a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a
petition or other pleading is not its form or the title
given by the party executing it, but its purpose. The
purpose of a motion is not to initiate litigation, but to
bring up a matter arising in the progress of the case
where the motion is filed. Indeed, an original action is
not necessary to acquire possession in favor of the
purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
property. The right to possession is based simply on the
purchaser’s ownership of the property. Thus, the mere
filing of an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession would suffice. No verification and
certification on non-forum shopping need be attached
to the motion at all. Hence, it is immaterial that the
verification and certification on non-forum shopping in
private respondent’s questioned petition was signed by
its lawyer. Such insignificant lapse does not render the
said petition defective in form.
Same; Same; Same; Section 8 of Act No. 3135
specifically lists the exclusive grounds for a petition to set
aside the sale at the extra-judicial foreclosure and cancel
the writ of possession, namely, (1) that the mortgage
was not violated, and, (2) that the sale was not made in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135—any
question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its
foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the
issuance of a writ of possession.—The remedy of
petitioners from the assailed Orders of the trial court
was to file a petition to set aside the sale and cancel the
writ of possession. Under the aforequoted provision, the
aggrieved party may thereafter appeal from any
disposition by the court on the matter. We note,
however, that what petitioners filed with the trial court
were an urgent omnibus motion and a supplement to
the urgent omnibus motion to set aside the sale and
cancel the writ of possession. In the said motions,
petitioners alleged there was no basis for the
extrajudicial foreclosure because the mortgage was void.
Note that the nullity of the mortgage is not covered by
the remedy outlined under Section 8 of Act No. 3135.
The said provision specifically lists the following
exclusive grounds for a petition to set aside the sale and
cancel the writ of possession: (1) that the mortgage was
not violated; and (2) that the sale was not made in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135. Any
question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its
foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the
issuance of a writ of possession. Indeed, regardless of
whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of
the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is
entitled to a writ of possession.
Parents-Teachers Association of St. Matthew Christian
Academy v. Metro Bank, G.R. No. 176518
Remedial Law; Foreclosures; Writs of Possession; As a
rule, it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of
possession after the foreclosure sale and during the
period of redemption; Exception is where it appears that
there is a third party in possession of the property who is
claiming a right adverse to that of the
debtor/mortgagor.—As a rule, it is ministerial upon the
court to issue a writ of possession after the foreclosure
sale and during the period of redemption. Section 7 of
Act No. 3135 explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during
the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion
under oath for that purpose “in the registration or
cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in
special proceedings in the case of property registered
under the Mortgage Law” with the Regional Trial Court
of the province or place where the real property or any
part thereof is situated, in the case of mortgages duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds. Upon filing of such
motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the
law also directs in express terms the said court to issue
the order for a writ of possession. However, this rule is
not without exception. In Barican v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 358 (1988), we held that the
obligation of a court to issue an ex parte writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears
that there is a third party in possession of the property
who is claiming a right adverse to that of the
debtor/mortgagor.
Same; Same; Same; The ex parte petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act
No. 3135 is not strictly speaking a “judicial process” as
contemplated in Article 433 of the Civil Code.—This ex
parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking,
a “judicial process” as contemplated in Article 433 of the
Civil Code. As a judicial proceeding for the enforcement
of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure
sale, it is not an ordinary suit by which one party “sues
another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.”
Same; Same; Same; Even if the application for the writ of
possession was denominated as a “petition,” it was in
substance merely a motion; no verification and
certification on non-forum shopping need be attached to
the motion.—It is not necessary to initiate an original
action in order for the purchaser at an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property to acquire possession. Even
if the application for the writ of possession was
denominated as a “petition,” it was in substance merely
a motion. Indeed, any insignificant lapse in the
certification on non-forum shopping filed by the MBTC
did not render the writ irregular. After all, no verification
and certification on non-forum shopping need be
attached to the motion.
Same; Same; Same; The nature of the ex parte
petition for issuance of possessory writ under Act. No.
3135 to be a non-litigious proceeding and summary in
nature.—In Idolor v. Court of Appeals, 450 SCRA 396
(2005), we described the nature of the ex parte petition
for issuance of possessory writ under Act No. 3135 to be
a non-litigious proceeding and summary in nature. As
an ex parte proceeding, it is brought for the benefit of
one party only, and without notice to, or consent by any
person adversely interested. It is a proceeding where the
relief is granted without requiring an opportunity for the
person against whom the relief is sought to be heard. It
does not matter even if the herein petitioners were not
specifically named in the writ of possession nor notified
of such proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; As it is, the law does not
require that a petition for a writ of possession may be
granted only after documentary and testimonial
evidence shall have been offered to and admitted by the
court.—Here in the present case, we similarly reject
petitioners’ contention that the trial court should have
conducted a trial prior to issuing the Order denying their
motion to intervene. As it is, the law does not require
that a petition for a writ of possession may be granted
only after documentary and testimonial evidence shall
have been offered to and admitted by the court. As long
as a verified petition states the facts sufficient to entitle
the petitioner to the relief requested, the court shall
issue the writ prayed for. There is no need for
petitioners to offer any documentary or testimonial
evidence for the court to grant the petition.
Same; Same; Same; Any question regarding the
regularity and validity of the sale (and the consequent
cancellation of the writ) is left to be determined in a
subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8.—In De
Gracia v. San Jose, 94 Phil. 623 (1954), we held that: x x x
the order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of
course upon the filing of the proper motion and the
approval of the corresponding bond. No discretion is left
to the court. And any question regarding the regularity
and validity of the sale (and the consequent cancellation
of the writ) is left to be determined in a subsequent
proceeding as outlined in section 8. Such question is not
to be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance
of the writ of possession, since, under the Act, the
proceeding for this is ex parte.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Certification of Non-
forum Shopping; Verification; A non-forum shopping is
required only in a complaint or a petition which is an
initiatory pleading.—x x x it bears stressing that a
certification on non-forum shopping is required only in a
complaint or a petition which is an initiatory pleading. In
this case, the subject petition for the issuance of a writ
of possession filed by private respondent is not an
initiatory pleading. Although private respondent
denominated its pleading as a petition, it is more properly
a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or
other pleading is not its form or the title given by the
party executing it, but its purpose. The purpose of a
motion is not to initiate litigation, but to bring up a
matter arising in the progress of the case where the
motion is filed.
Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; As a
general rule, a motion for reconsideration should
precede recourse to certiorari in order to give the trial
court an opportunity to correct the error that it may have
committed; Exceptions.—As a general rule, a motion for
reconsideration should precede recourse to certiorari in
order to give the trial court an opportunity to correct the
error that it may have committed. The said rule is not
absolute and may be dispensed with in instances where
the filing of a motion for reconsideration would serve no
useful purpose, such as when the motion for
reconsideration would raise the same point stated in the
motion or where the error is patent for the order is void
or where the relief is extremely urgent, as in cases
where execution had already been ordered where the
issue raised is one purely of law.
Same; Same; Equity; Equity is available only in the
absence of law and not as its replacement.—While
equity which has been aptly described as “justice outside
legality” is applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.
Positive rules prevail over all abstract arguments based
on equity contra legem. For all its conceded merit,
equity is available only in the absence of law and not as
its replacement.
de Guzman v. Chico, G.R. No. 195445, December 7, 2016
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Certification Against
Forum Shopping; A certificate against forum shopping is
not a requirement in an ex parte petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession.—We affirm the ruling of the CA
that a certificate against forum shopping is not a
requirement in an ex parte petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession. An ex parte petition for the issuance
of writ of possession is not a complaint or other
initiatory pleading as contemplated in Section 5, Rule 7
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Writs of Possession; By its very
nature, a writ of possession is a mere incident in the
transfer of title. It is an incident of ownership, and not a
separate judgment. It would thus be absurd to require
that a petition for the issuance of this writ to be
accompanied by a certification against forum
shopping.—We note that there is no law or
jurisprudence which provides that the petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession depends on the nature
of the proceeding in which it is filed. Thus, we find no
logical reason for petitioners’ contention that only cases
covered by Act No. 3135 are exempt from the
requirement of a certificate against forum shopping. As
explained in the previous paragraphs, by its very nature,
a writ of possession is a mere incident in the transfer of
title. It is an incident of ownership, and not a separate
judgment. It would thus be absurd to require that a
petition for the issuance of this writ to be accompanied
by a certification against forum shopping.
Civil Law; Possession; The right to possess a
property merely follows the right of ownership, and it
would be illogical to hold that a person having ownership
of a parcel of land is barred from seeking possession.—
Contrary therefore, to petitioners’ contentions, the CA
did not err in upholding the writ of possession in this
case. In St. Raphael Montessori School, Inc. v. Bank of the
Philippine Islands, 773 SCRA 419 (2015), an action
involving the application of Act No. 3135, this Court
recognized that the writ of possession was warranted
not merely on the basis of the law, but ultimately on the
right to possess as an incident of ownership. The right to
possess a property merely follows the right of
ownership, and it would be illogical to hold that a person
having ownership of a parcel of land is barred from
seeking possession. Precisely, the basis for the grant of
the writ of possession in this case is respondent’s
ownership of the property by virtue of a tax delinquency
sale in her favor, and by virtue of her absolute right of
ownership arising from the expiration of the period
within which to redeem the property.
Brown-Araneta v. Araneta, G.R. No. 190814, October 9,
2013
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; A
circumstance of forum shopping occurs when, as a result
or in anticipation of an adverse decision in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through
means other than appeal or certiorari by raising identical
causes of action, subject matter and issues.―A
circumstance of forum shopping occurs when, as a result
or in anticipation of an adverse decision in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum
through means other than appeal or certiorari by raising
identical causes of action, subject matter and issues.
Stated a bit differently, forum shopping is the institution
of two or more actions involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, on the supposition that one or the other
court would come out with a favorable disposition. An
indicium of the presence of, or the test for determining
whether a litigant violated the rule against, forum
shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other case.
Same; Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; Litis
pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil suit,
refers to that situation wherein another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action,
such that the second action becomes vexatious and
unnecessary.―Litis pendentia, as a ground for the
dismissal of a civil suit, refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for
the same cause of action, such that the second action
becomes vexatious and unnecessary. For the bar of litis
pendentia to be invoked, the concurring requisites must
be present: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties
as represent the same interests in both actions; (2)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of
the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party
is successful would amount to res judicata in the other.
Same; Same; Same; Instances Where Forum
Shopping Exists.―It has been held that there is forum
shopping (1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision
in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other
than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (2) if, after he
has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party
files another before the CA since in such case said party
deliberately splits appeals “in the hope that even as one
case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed,
another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be
open”; or (3) where a party attempts to obtain a
preliminary injunction in another court after failing to
obtain it from the original court.
Same; Same; Same; The evil sought to be avoided
by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by
two competent tribunals of two separate and
contradictory decisions.―The evil sought to be avoided
by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by
two competent tribunals of two separate and
contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants,
taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals,
may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora
until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant
confusion, the Court adheres to the rules against forum
shopping, and a breach of these rules results in the
dismissal of the case.
Same; Same; Same; That a party is the petitioner in
one case and at the same time, the respondent in the
other case does not, without more, remove the said
cases from the ambit of the rules on forum
shopping.―That a party is the petitioner in one case and
at the same time, the respondent in the other case does
not, without more, remove the said cases from the
ambit of the rules on forum shopping. So did the Court
hold, for example in First Philippine International Bank v.
Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 259 (1996), that forum
shopping exists even in cases like this where petitioners
or plaintiffs in one case were impleaded as respondents
or defendants in another. Moreover, this Court has
constantly held that the fact that the positions of the
parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case
are the defendants in the second case or vice versa,
does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of
determining whether the case is dismissible on the
ground of litis pendentia.
Clark Development Corp. v. Mondragon Leisure and
Resorts Corp., G.R. No. 150986, March 2, 2007
Forum Shopping; “Same Objective” Standard; Pleadings
and Practice; Words and Phrases; Forum shopping is the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one
or the other would make a favorable disposition, or, the
act, of a party against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and
possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than
by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari; The
filing by a party of two apparently different actions, but
with the same objective, constitutes forum shopping.—
We defined forum shopping as the “institution of two (2)
or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition” or “the act of a
party against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly
favorable) opinion in another forum other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari.” In First
Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 252
SCRA 259 (1996), we held that the test to determine
whether forum shopping exists is whether the elements
of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Res
judicata means a matter or thing adjudged, judicially
acted upon or decided, or settled by judgment. Its
requisites are: (1) the former judgment or order must be
final; (2) the judgment or order must be one on the
merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4)
between the first and second actions, there must be
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
Thus, in First Philippine International Bank, we explained
further: Consequently, where a litigant (or one
representing the same interest or person) sues the same
party against whom another action or actions for the
alleged violation of the same right
and the enforcement of the same relief is/are still
pending, the defense of litis pendencia in one case is a
bar to the others; and, a final judgment in one would
constitute res judicata and thus would cause the
dismissal of the rest. In either case, forum shopping
could be cited by the other party as a ground to ask for
summary dismissal of the two (or more) complaints or
petitions, and for the imposition of the other sanctions,
which are direct contempt of court, criminal
prosecution, and disciplinary action against the erring
lawyer. We further held in First Philippine International
Bank that “the filing by a party of two apparently
different actions, but with the same objective,
constituted forum shopping.”
Same; Same; Same; Where a party had only one
objective in filing two cases, such as the perpetuation of
a lease, there exists an identity of causes of action and
reliefs based on the “same objective” standard.—In the
case at bar, there is no question that the first
requirement of identity of parties was met. As regards
the rights asserted and reliefs sought, we depart from
the findings of the CA and hold that there existed an
identity of causes of action and reliefs based on the
“same objective” standard enunciated in the aforecited
cases. Mondragon had only one objective in filing the
two cases, that is, the perpetuation of its lease. In Civil
Case No. 9242, Mondragon tried to prevent the
termination of the Lease Agreement, while in Civil Case
No. 9596, it tried to prevent the termination of the
Compromise Agreement. While they differ in
nomenclature and specific provisions, the subject of the
two agreements was the same—the lease over the
Mimosa Leisure Estate. Mondragon’s cause of action
against petitioner CDC, in essence, was the latter’s
alleged premature termination of the lease over the
Mimosa Leisure Estate. The ultimate relief sought by
Mondragon from the courts, on the other hand, is to be
allowed to continue the lease. Without doubt,
Mondragon’s objectives in filing the two civil cases were
the same, that is, to continue its lease over the Mimosa
Leisure Estate.
Same; Same; Same The decisive test in forum
shopping is the possible vexation caused to the courts
and litigants by the filing of actions based on the same or
related issues in different fora.—In the end, the decisive
test in forum shopping is the possible vexation caused to
the courts and litigants by the filing of actions based on
the same or related issues in different fora. We held
that: Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in
determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the
vexation caused the courts and parties-litigant by a party
who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies
to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the different fora upon the same issue. x xx
Same; Courts; Doctrine of Non-Interference; Words
and Phrases; Under the doctrine of non-interference, a
trial court has no authority to interfere with the
proceedings of a court of equal jurisdiction, much less to
annul the final judgment of a co-equal court.—The
vexation to the courts in this case is evident. There is a
high risk of conflict between the decisions of the RTC
Branches 58 and 60 regarding their respective civil cases.
A decision by one branch of court will constitute res
judicata in the other case pending before the other
branch of court. Alternatively, if the RTC Branch 60
exercised its jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory
relief, then it would have to restrain the execution
proceedings in the RTC Branch 58. Thus, interference
with the proceedings in another court would ensue.
Under the doctrine of non-interference, “a trial court
has no authority to interfere with the proceedings of a
court of equal jurisdiction, much less to annul the final
judgment of a co-equal court.” In Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 151 SCRA 161 (1987), we declared that a court
has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution proceedings
in another court with concurrent jurisdiction.
Judgments; Compromise Agreements; A
compromise is binding and has the force of law between
the parties, unless the consent of a party is vitiated—
such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or
undue influence—or when there is forgery, or if the
terms or the settlement are so palpably
unconscionable.—Thus, in Genova v. De Castro, 407
SCRA 165 (2003), we held that: A compromise is an
agreement between two or more persons who, for
preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their
respective positions by mutual consent in the way they
feel they can live with. Reciprocal concessions are the
very heart and life of every compromise agreement,
where each party approximates and concedes in the
hope of gaining balance by the danger of losing. It is, in
essence, a contract. A compromise is binding and has
the force of law between the parties, unless the consent
of a party is vitiated—such as by mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence—or when
there is forgery, or if the terms of the settlement are so
palpably unconscionable. Certainly, a compromise
agreement becomes the law between the parties and
will not be set aside other than the grounds mentioned
above. In Ramnani v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 645
(2001), we held that the main purpose of a compromise
agreement is to put an end to litigation because of the
uncertainty that may arise from it. Once the compromise
is perfected, the parties are bound to abide by it in good
faith. Should a party fail or refuse to comply with the
terms of a compromise or amicable settlement, the
other party could either enforce the compromise by a
writ of execution or regard it as rescinded and so insist
upon his/her original demand.
Heirs of Andres Naya v. Naya, G.R. No. 215759,
November 28, 2016
Quieting of Titles; To make out an action to quiet title,
the initiatory pleading has only to set forth allegations
showing that (1) the plaintiff has title to real property or
any interest therein and (2) the defendant claims an
interest therein adverse to the plaintiffs arising from an
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable.—To
make out an action to quiet title, the initiatory pleading
has only to set forth allegations showing that (1) the
plaintiff has title to real property or any interest therein
and (2) the defendant claims an interest therein adverse
to the plaintiffs arising from an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable.
Reconveyance; In an action for reconveyance, all
that must be alleged in the complaint are two (2) facts
which, admitting them to be true, would entitle the
plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1)
that the plaintiff was the owner of the land or possessed
the land in the concept of owner, and (2) that the
defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the land.—In
an action for reconveyance, all that must be alleged in
the complaint are two facts which, admitting them to be
true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the
disputed land, namely, (1) that the plaintiff was the
owner of the land or possessed the land in the concept
of owner, and (2) that the defendant had illegally
dispossessed him of the land. As already enumerated
above, the allegations in petitioners’ complaint certainly
measure up to the requisite statement of facts to
constitute an action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust.
Same; Under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, if the
registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose
name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee,
and the real owner is entitled to file an action for
reconveyance of the property.—Under Article 1456 of
the Civil Code, if the registration of the land is
fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is
registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the real owner
is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the
property. On its face, therefore, the complaint states a
cause of action and raises issues of fact that can be
properly settled only after a full-blown trial.
Laches; Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that
cannot be established by mere allegations in the
pleadings and cannot be resolved in a motion to
dismiss.—We reiterated the well-settled rule that the
elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is
evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established
by mere allegations in the pleadings and cannot be
resolved in a motion to dismiss. We, thus, concluded
that at such stage, the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint
on the ground of laches was premature because the
issue must be resolved at the trial of the case on the
merits where both parties will be given ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims and
defenses.
Forum Shopping; Forum shopping, however, may or
may not be deliberate, intentional, or willful. The
consequences in relation to the dismissal of the cases
simultaneously or successively filed vary as to whether
forum shopping is deliberate, intentional, or willful.—
Forum shopping, however, may or may not be
deliberate, intentional, or willful. The consequences in
relation to the dismissal of the cases simultaneously or
successively filed vary as to whether forum shopping is
deliberate, intentional, or willful. If the forum shopping
is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent
case shall be dismissed without prejudice, on the ground
of either litis pendentia or res judicata. If the forum
shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there
are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with
prejudice. However, the question as to whether there
was deliberate or willful intent to forum shop is a
question of fact, which the trial court is in the best
position to determine.
Tumpag v. Tumpag, G.R. No. 199133, September 29,
2014
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It is
well-settled that jurisdiction over a subject matter is
conferred by law, not by the parties’ action or conduct,
and is, likewise, determined from the allegations in the
complaint.—It is well-settled that jurisdiction over a
subject matter is conferred by law, not by the parties’
action or conduct, and is, likewise, determined from the
allegations in the complaint. Under Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts over civil actions
involving title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, is limited to cases where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings.
Same; Same; Motion to Dismiss; The defendant, in
filing a motion to dismiss, hypothetically admits the truth
of the factual and material allegations in the
complaint, as well as the documents attached to a
complaint whose due execution and genuineness are not
denied under oath by the defendant; these attachments
must be considered as part of the complaint without
need of introducing evidence thereon.—In his comment
to the present petition, the respondent contends that
the assessed value of the property subject of the case is
actually much below than the value stated in the
attached Declaration of Real Property. However, the test
of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is
whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment upon the complaint in
accordance with the plaintiff’s prayer. The defendant, in
filing a motion to dismiss, hypothetically admits the truth
of the factual and material allegations in the complaint,
as well as the documents attached to a complaint whose
due execution and genuineness are not denied under
oath by the defendant; these attachments must be
considered as part of the complaint without need of
introducing evidence thereon.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case can always be since
jurisdictional issues, as a rule, cannot be acquired
through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of raised
anytime, even for the first time on appeal, the parties or
conferred by the acquiescence of the court.—Lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case can
always be raised anytime, even for the first time on
appeal, since jurisdictional issues, as a rule, cannot be
acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission
of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the
court. Thus, the respondent is not prevented from
raising the question on the court’s jurisdiction in his
appeal, if any, to the June 3, 2002 decision of the RTC in
Civil Case No. 666.
• Santos v. Alcazar, G.R. No. 183034, March 12,
2014
Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence;
While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy
prevails over a mere photocopy, there is no harm if in a
case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are
authenticated, identified and formally offered in evidence
by the party proponent.—While it is a basic rule of
evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere
photocopy, there is no harm if in a case, both the
original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated,
identified and formally offered in evidence by the party
proponent.
Same; Same; Same; By the admission of the genuineness
and due execution [of such document] is meant that the
party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or
that it was signed by another for him with his authority;
that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures
exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying
upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any
formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are
waived by him.—More to the point is the fact that
petitioners failed to deny specifically under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment
in their Answer. The effect of this is that the genuineness
and due execution of the Acknowledgment is deemed
admitted. “By the admission of the genuineness and due
execution [of such document] is meant that the party
whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that
it was signed by another for him with his authority; that
at the time it was signed it was in words and figures
exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying
upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any
formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are
waived by him. Hence, such defenses as that the
signature is a forgery x x x; or that it was unauthorized
x x x; or that the party charged signed theinstrument in
some other capacity than that alleged in the pleading
setting it out x x x; or that it was never delivered x x x,
are cut off by the admission of its genuineness and due
execution.”
Same; Same; Same; There is no need for proof of
execution and authenticity with respect to documents
the genuineness and due execution of which are
admitted by the adverse party.—There is no need for
proof of execution and authenticity with respect to
documents the genuineness and due execution of which
are admitted by the adverse party.” With the
consequent admission engendered by petitioners’
failure to properly deny the Acknowledgment in their
Answer, coupled with its proper authentication,
identification and offer by the respondent, not to
mention petitioners’ admissions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of
their Answer that they are indeed indebted to
respondent, the Court believes that judgment may be
had solely on the document, and there is no need to
present receipts and other documents to prove the
claimed indebtedness. The Acknowledgment, just as an
ordinary acknowledgment receipt, is “valid and binding
between the parties who executed it, as a document
evidencing the loan agreement they had entered into.”
The absence of rebutting evidence occasioned by
petitioners’ waiver of their right to present evidence
renders the Acknowledgment as the best evidence of
the transactions between the parties and the
consequential indebtedness incurred. Indeed, the effect
of the admission is such that “a prima facie case is made
for the plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity of
evidence on his part and entitles him to a judgment on
the pleadings unless a special defense of new matter,
such as payment, is interposed by the defendant.
Same; Civil Procedure; Postponements; The grant or
denial of a motion for postponement rests on the court’s
sound discretion; it is a matter of privilege, not a right.—
The grant or denial of a motion for postponement rests
on the court’s sound discretion; it is a matter of
privilege, not a right. “A movant for postponement
should not assume beforehand that his motion will be
granted. The grant or denial of a motion for
postponement is a matter that is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Indeed, an order declaring a
party to have waived the right to present evidence for
performing dilatory actions upholds the trial court’s duty
to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate
delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.”
Heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas v. Limbaco, G.R. No. 175291,
July 27, 2011
Remedial Law; Appeals; Modes of Appeal.—The
first mode of appeal, the ordinary appeal under Rule 41
of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC,
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and resolves
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The
second mode of appeal, the petition for review under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from
the RTC, acting in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, the
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
is brought to the Supreme Court and resolves only
questions of law.
Same; Same; Same; Where a litigant files an appeal that
raises only questions of law with the Court of Appeals
(CA), Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court expressly
mandates that the CA should dismiss the appeal outright
as the appeal is not reviewable by that court.—Where a
litigant files an appeal that raises only questions of law
with the CA, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court
expressly mandates that the CA should dismiss the
appeal outright as the appeal is not reviewable by that
court. There is a question of lawwhen the issue does not
call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. On
the other hand, there is a question of fact when the
doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts.
Same; Same; Same; When there is no dispute as to
the facts, the questions of whether or not the conclusion
drawn from these facts is correct is a question of law.—
When there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of
whether or not the conclusion drawn from these facts is
correct is a question of law. When the petitioners
assailed the summary judgment, they were in fact
questioning the conclusions drawn by the RTC from the
undisputed facts, and raising a question of law.
Same; Summary Judgments; Concept of summary
judgment explained in Asian Construction and
Development Corporation vs. Philippine Commercial
International Bank, 488 SCRA 192 (2006).—Under the
Rules of Court, a summary judgment may be rendered
where, on motion of a party and after hearing, the
pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and
admissions on file show that, “except as to the amount
of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” The Court explained the concept of
summary judgment in Asian Construction and
Development Corporation v. Philippine Commercial
International Bank, 488 SCRA 192 (2006): Summary or
accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed
at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage
of litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of
time involved in a trial. Under the Rules, summary
judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine
issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence
in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings
appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions
and admissions show that such issues are not genuine,
then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must
ensue as a matter of law. The determinative factor,
therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the
presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any
material fact.
Civil Law; Sales; Buyer in Good Faith; It is a well-
settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to
facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard,
and then claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor.—A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the
property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in such property, and
pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such
purchase or before he has notice of the claim of another
person. It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot
close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man
upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith
under the belief that there was no defect in the title of
the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect
exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of
the existence of a defect in his vendor’s title, will not
make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it
afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective,
and it appears that he had such notice of the defect as
would have led to its discovery had he acted with that
measure of precaution which may reasonably be
required of a prudent man in a like situation.
Same; Same; Same; One who buys from one who is
not the registered owner is expected to examine not only
the certificate of title but all factual circumstances
necessary for one to determine if there are any flaws in
the title of the transferor, or in the capacity to transfer
the land.—As the Court pronounced in Abad v. Sps.
Guimba, 465 SCRA 356 (2005): [The law protects to a
greater degree a purchaser who buys from the
registered owner himself. Corollarily, it] requires a
higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a
person who is not the registered owner, although the
land object of the transaction is registered. While one
who buys from the registered owner does not need to
look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from
one who is not the registered owner is expected to
examine not only the certificate of title but all factual
circumstances necessary for [one] to determine if there
are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in [the]
capacity to transfer the land.
Fernando Medical Enterprises Inc. v. Wesleyan
University Phils. Inc., G.R. No. 207970, January 20, 2016
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgment on the
Pleadings; The essential query in resolving a motion for
judgment on the pleadings is whether or not there are
issues of fact generated by the pleadings.—The essential
query in resolving a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is whether or not there are issues of fact
generated by the pleadings. Whether issues of fact exist
in a case or not depends on how the defending party’s
answer has dealt with the ultimate facts alleged in the
complaint. The defending party’s answer either admits
or denies the allegations of ultimate facts in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading. The allegations of
ultimate facts the answeradmit, being undisputed, will
not require evidence to establish the truth of such facts,
but the allegations of ultimate facts the answer properly
denies, being disputed, will require evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Specific Denial; Any material
averment in the complaint not so specifically denied are
deemed admitted except an averment of the amount of
unliquidated damages.—The answer admits the material
allegations of ultimate facts of the adverse party’s
pleadings not only when it expressly confesses the truth
of such allegations but also when it omits to deal with
them at all. The controversion of the ultimate facts must
only be by specific denial. Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Court recognizes only three modes by which the
denial in the answer raises an issue of fact. The first is by
the defending party specifying each material allegation
of fact the truth of which he does not admit and,
whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the
matters upon which he relies to support his denial. The
second applies to the defending party who desires to
deny only a part of an averment, and the denial is done
by the defending party specifying so much of the
material allegation of ultimate facts as is true and
material and denying only the remainder. The third is
done by the defending party who is without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of a material averment made in the complaint by stating
so in the answer. Any material averment in the
complaint not so specifically denied are deemed
admitted except an averment of the amount of
unliquidated damages.
Same; Same; Same; Actionable Documents; In the
case of a written instrument or document upon which an
action or defense is based, which is also known as the
actionable document, the pleader of such document is
required either to set forth the substance of such
instrument or document in the pleading, and to attach
the original or a copy thereof to the pleading as an
exhibit, which shall then be deemed to be a part of the
pleading, or to set forth a copy in the pleading.—In the
case of a written instrument or document upon which
an action or defense is based, which is also known as the
actionable document, the pleader of such document is
required either to set forth the substance of such
instrument or document in the pleading, and to attach
the original or a copy thereof to the pleading as an
exhibit, which shall then be deemed to be a part of the
pleading, or to set forth a copy in the pleading. The
adverse party is deemed toadmit the genuineness and
due execution of the actionable document unless he
specifically denies them under oath, and sets forth what
he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath
does not apply when the adverse party does not appear
to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with
an order for an inspection of the original instrument is
refused.
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the
Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for
ascertaining whether the complaint’s material
allegations were admitted or properly denied.—We
should emphasize that in order to resolve the
petitioner’s Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer
of the respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116.
Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the
answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the
complaint’s material allegations were admitted or
properly denied. As such, the respondent’s averment of
payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner
made in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to
the resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a factual issue
on the total liability of the respondent remained to be
settled through trial on the merits. It should have openly
wondered why the respondent’s answer in Civil Case No.
09-122116 did not allege the supposed payment of the
P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if only to
buttress the specific denial of its alleged liability. The
omission exposed the respondent’s denial of liability as
insincere.
Go Tong Electrical Supply v. BPI Family Savings Bank, G.R.
No. 187487, June 29, 2015
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; General Denial; A
general denial does not become specific by the use of the
word “specifically.”—A reading of the Answer shows that
petitioners failed to specifically deny the execution of
the Credit Agreement, PN, and CSA under the auspices
of the above quoted rule. The mere statement in
paragraph 4 of their Answer, i.e., that they “specifically
deny” the pertinent allegations of the Complaint “for
being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit
plaintiff’s purposes,” does not constitute an effective
specific denial as contemplated by law. Verily, a denial is
not specific simply because it is so qualified by the
defendant. Stated otherwise, a general denial does not
become specific by the use of the word “specifically.”
Neither does it become so by the simple expedient of
coupling the same with a broad conclusion of law that
the allegations contested are “self-serving” or are
intended “to suit plaintiff’s purposes.”
Same; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Case law
enlightens that [t]he admission of the genuineness and
due execution of a document means that the party
whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily
signed the document or it was signed by another for him
and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it
was in words and figures exactly as set out in the
pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document
was delivered; and that any formalities required by law,
such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp,
which it lacks, are waived by him.—Section 8, Rule 8 of
the Rules further requires that the defendant “sets forth
what he claims to be the facts,” which requirement,
likewise, remains absent from the Answer in this case.
Thus, with said pleading failing to comply with the
“specific denial under oath” requirement under Section
8, Rule 8 of the Rules, the proper conclusion, as arrived
at by the CA, is that petitioners had impliedly admitted
the due execution and genuineness of the documents
evidencing their loan obligation to respondent. To this,
case law enlightens that “[t]he admission of the
genuineness and due execution of a document means
that the party whose signature it bears admits that he
voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by
another for him and with his authority; that at the time
it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set
out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the
document was delivered; and that any formalities
required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or
revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Also, it
effectively eliminated any defense relating to the
authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g.,
that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of
different import on its face as the one executed by the
parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were
forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized.”
Civil Law; Obligations; Payment; When the creditor
is in possession of the document of credit, proof of
nonpayment is not needed for it is presumed.—Of
particular note is the affirmative defense of payment
raised during the proceedings a quo. While petitioners
insisted that they had paid, albeit partially, their loan
obligation to respondent, the fact of such payment was
never established by petitioners in this case.
Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who
pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the burden
rests on the defendant, i.e., petitioners, to prove
payment, rather than on the plaintiff, i.e., respondent, to
prove nonpayment. When the creditor is in possession
of the document of credit, proof of nonpayment is not
needed for it is presumed. Here, respondent’s
possession of the Credit Agreement, PN, and CSA,
especially with their genuineness and due execution
already having been admitted, cements its claim that the
obligation of petitioners has not been extinguished.
Instructive too is the Court’s disquisition in Jison v. Court
of Appeals, 286 SCRA 495 (1998), on the evidentiary
burdens attendant in a civil proceeding.
Same; Same; Suretyship; Although the contract of a
surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal
obligation, the surety becomes liable for the debt or duty
of another although it possesses no direct or personal
interest over the obligations nor does it receive any
benefit therefrom.—As established through the CSA, Go
had clearly bound himself as a surety to Go Tong
Electrical’s loan obligation. Thus, there is no question
that Go’s liability thereto is solidary with the former. As
provided in Article 2047 of the Civil Code, “the surety
undertakes to be bound solidarily with the principal
obligor. That undertaking makes a surety agreement an
ancillary contract as it presupposes the existence of a
principal contract. Although the contract of a surety is in
essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation,
the surety becomes liable for the debt or duty of
another although it possesses no direct or personal
interest over the obligations nor does it receive any
benefit therefrom. Let it be stressed that
notwithstanding the fact that the surety contract is
secondary to the principal obligation, the surety assumes
liability as a regular party to the undertaking,” as Go in
this case.
Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. v. Valbueco, Inc., G.R. No.
179594, September 11, 2013
Civil Law; Contracts; Contract to Sell; In a
conditional sale, as in a contract to sell, ownership
remains with the vendor and does not pass to the vendee
until full payment of the purchase price.—As found by
the Court of Appeals, the two conditional deeds of sale
entered into by the parties are contracts to sell, as they
both contained a stipulation that ownership of the
properties shall not pass to the vendee until after full
payment of the purchase price. In a conditional sale, as
in a contract to sell, ownership remains with the vendor
and does not pass to the vendee until full payment of
the purchase price. The full payment of the purchase
price partakes of a suspensive condition, and non-
fulfillment of the condition prevents the obligation to
sell from arising. To differentiate, a deed of sale is
absolute when there is no stipulation in the contract that
title to the property remains with the seller until full
payment of the purchase price. Ramos v. Heruela, 473
SCRA 79 (2005), held that Articles 1191 and 1592 of the
Civil Code are applicable to contracts of sale, while R.A.
No. 6552 applies to contracts to sell.
Same; Same; Same; Realty Installment Buyer Act
(R.A. No. 6552); R.A. No. 6552 recognizes in conditional
sales of all kinds of real estate (industrial, commercial,
residential) the right of the seller to cancel the contract
upon non-payment of an installment by the buyer, which
is simply an event that prevents the obligation of the
vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.—The
Court of Appeals correctly held that R.A. No. 6552,
otherwise known as the Realty Installment Buyer Act,
applies to the subject contracts to sell. R.A. No. 6552
recognizes in conditional sales of all kinds of real estate
(industrial, commercial, residential) the right of the seller
to cancel the contract upon non-payment of an
installment by the buyer, which is simply an event that
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title
from acquiring binding force.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under R.A. No. 6552, the right
of the buyer to refund accrues only when he has paid at
least two yearof installments.—Under R.A. No. 6552, the
right of the buyer to refund accrues only when he has
paid at least two years of installments. In this case,
respondent has paid less than two years of installments;
hence, it is not entitled to a refund.
Same; Same; Prescription; Article 1144 of the Civil
Code provides that actions based upon a written contract
must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues.—In this case, petitioner raised the
defense of prescription for the first time before this
Court, and respondent had the opportunity to oppose
the defense of prescription in its Comment to the
petition. Hence, the Court can resolve the issue of
prescription as both parties were afforded the
opportunity to ventilate their respective positions on the
matter. The Complaint shows that the Conditional Deeds
of Sale were executed on November 29, 1973, and
payments were due on both Conditional Deeds of Sale
on November 15, 1974. Article 1144 of the Civil Code
provides that actions based upon a written contract
must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues. Non-fulfillment of the obligation to
pay on the last due date, that is, on November 15, 1974,
would give rise to an action by the vendor, which date of
reckoning may also apply to any action by the vendee to
determine his right under R.A. No. 6552. The vendee,
respondent herein, filed this case on March 16, 2001,
which is clearly beyond the 10-year prescriptive period;
hence, the action has prescribed.
Lina v. CA, 135 SCRA 637
Motions; Defaults; Actions; Granting of extension of
time for filing answer a matter of court discretion.—We
are in agreement with respondent appellate court’s
affirmance of the questioned order of the trial court.
The granting of additional time within which to file an
answer to a complaint is a matter largely addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court. “While trial courts
are persuaded, as a matter of policy, to adopt a basically
flexible attitude in favor of the defendant in this area of
our adjective law, the defense should never be lulled
into the belief that whenever trial courts refuse a second
request for extension to file an answer, the appellate
courts will grant relief (Naga Development Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, 41 SCRA 105)."
Same; Same; Same; Remedies available to
defaulted defendant.—Under the Rules of Court, the
remedies available to a defendant in the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) are: a) The
defendant in default may, at any time after discovery
thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath,
to set aside the order of default on the ground that his
failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious
defense; (Sec. 3, Rule 18) b) If the judgment has already
been rendered when the defendant discovered the
default, but before the same has become final and
executory, he may file a motion for new trial under
Section 1 (a) of Rule 37; c) If the defendant discovered
the default after the judgment has become final and
executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section
2 of Rule 38; and d) He may also appeal from the
judgment rendered against him as contrary to the
evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside
the order -of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2,
Rule 41).
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Defaulted defendant
must not forthwith file a petition for certiorari, but must
first exhaust theremedies available to him.—Petitioner in
this case did not avail himself of any of the above
remedies. Instead, he went to the appellate court on
certiorari/prohibition. On this point, respondent
appellate court aptly said: “x xx where the judgment
rendered by the respondent court is the one sought to
be annulled, a petition for relief, under Rule 38 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which is a remedy in the ordinary
course of law, could have been just as plain, adequate
and speedy as certiorari. Such a remedy could have been
granted by the respondent court. And if the respondent
court still denies the petition, then petitioner can take
an appeal on the order denying the petition, and in the
course of such appeal, petitioner can also assail the
judgment on the merits upon the ground that it is not
supported by the evidence, or it is contrary to law.” (p.
25, Rollo)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Motions; Default; Trial court gravely abused its
discretion when it declared defendant in default despite
fact that motion for extension was already filed.—
Clearly, petitioner’s Motion for extension to file Answer
was already before the Court when it declared petitioner
in default. What is more, the Answer had already been
filed within the extended period requested when
judgment by default was rendered. It has been the
consistent ruling of this Court that cases should be
resolved on the merits rather than on technicalities.
Every partylitigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities (A-One
Feeds, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 590 (1980).
Same; Same; A first motion for extension of time to
file answer should not be looked upon with disfavor.—It
is true that a defendant should not presume that a
Motion for extension would be favorably acted on,
However, under the circumstances of the case, it was
petitioner’s first Motion for extension; said Motion was
filed before the expiration of the reglementary period
within which to submit an Answer; and the Answer
having been filed within the extended period requested,
in the interest of substantial justice, the Order of default
should not have been issued.
Same; Same; Certiorari; Certiorari has been held as
proper remedy to question default order and
judgment.—"That the ordinary remedy which should be
availed of by a party who has been declared in default
and judgment rendered against him is that of appeal and
not certiorari is a rule too elementary to be discussed
herein. Thisrule, however, is not without exceptions for
to insist on its application in all cases may not always
serve the ends of justice. The object of procedural law is
to facilitate the adjudication of conflicting claims. Thus,
although an appeal is available, certiorari still lies when
such appeal does not prove to be a more speedy and
adequate remedy.”
Gajudo v. Traders Royal Bank, March 21, 2006
Civil Procedure; Default; Evidence; Between Section
3 of Rule 9 and Section 1 of Rule 133, both of the Rules of
Court, there is no incompatibility that would preclude the
application of either one of them.—Petitioners challenge
the CA Decision for applying Section 3 of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court, rather than Section 1 of Rule 133 of the
same Rules. In essence, petitioners argue that the
quantum of evidence for judgments flowing from a
default order under Section 3 of Rule 9 is not the same
as that provided for in Section 1 of Rule 133. Between
the two rules, there is no incompatibility that would
preclude the application of either one of them. To begin
with, Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the procedure which
the trial court is directed to take when a defendant fails
to file an answer. According to this provision, the court
“shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant
such relief as his pleading may warrant,” subject to the
court’s discretion on whether to require the
presentation of evidence ex parte. The same provision
also sets down guidelines on the nature and extent of
the relief that may be granted. In particular, the court’s
judgment “shall not exceed the amount or be different
in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages.”
Same; Same; In Pascua vs. Florendo, 136 SCRA 208
(1985), the Supreme Court explained that complainants
are not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for,
once the defendants are declared in default—favorable
relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained
that the relief is warranted by the evidence offered and
the facts proven by the presenting party.—Regarding
judgments by default, it was explained in Pascua v.
Florendo, 136 SCRA 208 (1985),that complainants are
not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once
the defendants are declared in default. Favorable relief
can be granted only after the court has ascertained that
the relief is warranted by the evidence offered and the
facts proven by the presenting party. In Pascua, this
Court ruled that “x xx it would be meaningless to require
presentation of evidence if every time the other party is
declared in default, a decision would automatically be
rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly
according to the tenor of his prayer. This is not
contemplated by the Rules nor is it sanctioned by the
due process clause.”
Mortgages; Foreclosures; Redemption; The one-
year period of redemption provided in Act No. 3135, as
amended, is only directory and, as such can be extended
by agreement of the parties, but two requisites must be
established, namely: (1) voluntary agreement of the
parties to extend the redemption period; and (2) the
debtor’s commitment to pay the redemption price on a
fixed date.—It is true that the one-year period of
redemption provided in Act No. 3135, as amended—the
law under which the property here was sold in a
foreclosure sale—is only directory and, as such can be
extended by agreement of the parties. However, it has
also been held that for legal redemption to be converted
into conventional redemption, two requisites must be
established: 1) voluntary agreement of the parties to
extend the redemption period; and 2) the debtor’s
commitment to pay the redemption price on a fixed
date. Thus, assuming that an offer was made to
Petitioner Chua to buy back the property after the lapse
of the period of legal redemption, petitioners needed to
show that the parties had agreed to extend the period,
and that Petitioner Chua had committed to pay the
redemption price on a fixed date.
Default; Damages; To adjudge damages, paragraph
(d) of Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides
that a judgment against a party in default “shall not
exceed the amount or be different in kind from that
prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.”—To
adjudge damages, paragraph (d) of Section 3 of Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court provides that a judgment against a
party in default “shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award
unliquidated damages.” The proscription against the
award of unliquidated damages is significant, because it
means that the damages to be awarded must be proved
convincingly, in accordance with the quantum of
evidence required in civil cases.
Mortgages; Foreclosures; Act No. 3135, as amended,
does not require personal notice to the mortgagor—
what is required by said law are publication and public
posting of the notice of sale.—As correctly pointed out
by the CA, Act No. 3135, as amended, does not require
personal notice to the mortgagor. In the present case,
there has been no allegation—much less, proof—of
noncompliance with the requirement of publication and
public posting of the notice of sale, as required by Act
No. 3135. Neither has there been competent evidence
to show that the price paid at the foreclosure sale was
inadequate. To be sure, there was no ground to
invalidate the sale.
Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig Pharma Corp., G.R. No. 193494,
March 12, 2014, 719 SCRA 88
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Court of Appeals;
Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals (CA) may, on its
own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal
should the appellant’s brief lack specific requirements
under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and
(f).—Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals may, on its
own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal
should the appellant’s brief lack specific requirements
under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and
(f): Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.—An
appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its
own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds: x x x x (f) Absence of specific assignment of
errors in the appellant’s brief, or of page references to
the record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c),
(d), and (f) of Rule 44. These requirements are the
subject index of the matter in brief, page references to
the record, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged
and with textbooks and statutes cited: Section
13. Contents of the appellant’s brief.—The appellant’s
brief shall contain, in the order herein indicated, the
following: (a) A subject index of the matter in brief with
a digest of the arguments and page references, and a
table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and
statutes cited with references to the pages where they
are cited; x x x x (c) Under the heading “Statement of the
Case,” a clear and concise statement of the nature of the
action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed
rulings and orders of the court, the nature of the
controversy, with page references to the record; (d)
Under the heading “Statement of Facts,” a clear and
concise statement in a narrative form of the facts
admitted by both parties and of those in controversy,
together with the substance of the proof relating
thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible,
with page references to the record; x x x x (f) Under the
heading “Argument,” theappellant’s arguments on each
assignment of error with page references to the record.
The authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page of
the report at which the case begins and the page of the
report on which the citation is found.
Same; Same; Appeals; Except for cases provided in
the Constitution, appeal is a “purely statutory right.”—
Except for cases provided in the Constitution, appeal is a
“purely statutory right.” The right to appeal “must be
exercised in the manner prescribed by law” and requires
strict compliance with the Rules of Court on appeals.
Otherwise, the appeal shall be dismissed, and its
dismissal shall not be a deprivation of due process of
law.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; The subject
index serves as the brief’s table of contents.—The
subject index serves as the brief’s table of contents.
Instead of “[thumbing] through the [appellant’s brief]”
every time the Court of Appeals Justice encounters an
argument or citation, the Justice deciding the case only
has to refer to the subject index for the argument or
citation he or she needs. This saves the Court of Appeals
time in reviewing the appealed case. Efficiency allows
the justices of the appellate court to substantially attend
to this case as well as other cases.
Same; Same; Same; A statement of fact without a
page reference to the record creates the presumption
that it is unsupported by the record and, thus, “may be
stricken or disregarded altogether.”—Page references to
the record guarantee that the facts stated in the
appellant’s brief are supported by the record. A
statement of fact without a page reference to the record
creates the presumption that it is unsupported by the
record and, thus, “may be stricken or disregarded
altogether.”
Same; Same; Same; As for the table of cases,
textbooks, and statutes cited, this is required so that the
Court of Appeals (CA) can easily verify the authorities
cited “for accuracy and aptness.”—As for the table of
cases, textbooks, and statutes cited, this is required so
that the Court of Appeals can easily verify the authorities
cited “for accuracy and aptness.”
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court will not
disregard rules on appeal “in the guise of liberal
construction.”—Lui Enter-
90prises’ appellant’s brief lacked a subject index, page
references to the record, and a table of cases, textbooks,
and statutes cited. These requirements “were designed
to assist the appellate court in the accomplishment of its
tasks, and, overall, to enhance the orderly
administration of justice.” This court will not disregard
rules on appeal “in the guise of liberal construction.” For
this court to liberally construe the Rules, the party must
substantially comply with the Rules and correct its
procedural lapses. Lui Enterprises failed to remedy these
errors. All told, the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing Lui Enterprises’ appeal. It failed to comply
with Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f)
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the required
contents of the appellant’s brief.
Same; Same; Summons; When a defendant is
served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he or
she is required to answer within 15 days from the day he
or she was served with summons. The defendant may
also move to dismiss the complaint “[w]ithin the time for
but before filing the answer.”—When a defendant is
served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he or
she is required to answer within 15 days from the day he
or she was served with summons. The defendant may
also move to dismiss the complaint “[w]ithin the time for
but before filing the answer.” Fifteen days is sufficient
time for a defendant to answer with good defenses
against the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint. Thus,
a defendant who fails to answer within 15 days from
service of summons either presents no defenses against
the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint or was
prevented from filing his or her answer within the
required period due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. In either case, the court may
declare the defendant in default on plaintiff’s motion
and notice to defendant. The court shall then try the
case until judgment without defendant’s participation
and grant the plaintiff such relief as his or her complaint
may warrant.
Same; Same; Default; A defendant declared in
default loses his or her standing in court. He or she is
“deprived of the right to take part in the trial and forfeits
his [or her] rights as a party litigant,” has no right “to
present evidence [supporting his or her] allegations,” and
has no right to “control the proceedings [or] cross-
examine witnesses.”—A defendant declared in default
loses his or her standing in court. He or she is “deprived
of the right to take part in the trial and forfeits his [or
her] rights as a party litigant,” has no right “to pre-
91sent evidence [supporting his or her] allegations,” and
has no right to “control the proceedings [or] cross-
examine witnesses.” Moreover, he or she “has no right
to expect that [the court] would [act] upon [his or her
pleadings]” or that he or she “may [oppose] motions
filed against him [or her].” However, the defendant
declared in default “does not [waive] all of [his or her]
rights.” He or she still has the right to “receive notice of
subsequent proceedings.” Also, the plaintiff must still
present evidence supporting his or her allegations
“despite the default of [the defendant].”
Same; Same; Same; After notice of the declaration
of default but before the court renders the default
judgment, the defendant may file, under oath, a motion
to set aside order of default. The defendant must
properly show that his or her failure to answer was due
to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.—
After notice of the declaration of default but before the
court renders the default judgment, the defendant may
file, under oath, a motion to set aside order of default.
The defendant must properly show that his or her failure
to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. The defendant must also have a
meritorious defense. Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Section 3.
Default; declaration of.—x x x x (b) Relief from order of
default.—A party declared in default may at any time
after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion
under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper
showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he
has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of
default may be set aside on such terms and conditions
as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. If the
defendant discovers his or her default after judgment
but prior to the judgment becoming final and executory,
he or she may file a motion for new trial under Rule 37,
Section 1, paragraph (a) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. If he or she discovers his or her default after
the judgment has become final and executory, a petition
for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Section 1 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure may be filed. Appeal is also
available to the defendant declared in default. He or she
may appeal the judgment for being contrary to the
evidence or to the law under Rule 41, Section 2 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He or she may do so even
if he or she did not file a petition to set aside order of
default. A petition for certiorari may also be filed if the
trial court declared the defendant in default with grave
abuse of discretion.92
Same; Same; Same; The remedies of the motion to
set aside order of default, motion for new trial, and
petition for relief from judgment are mutually exclusive,
not alternative or cumulative.—The remedies of the
motion to set aside order of default, motion for new
trial, and petition for relief from judgment are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or cumulative. This is to
compel defendants to remedy their default at the
earliest possible opportunity. Depending on when the
default was discovered and whether a default judgment
was already rendered, a defendant declared in default
may avail of only one of the three remedies.
Same; Same; Judgments; The general rule is that
courts should proceed with deciding cases on the merits
and set aside orders of default as default judgments are
“frowned upon.”—The general rule is that courts should
proceed with deciding cases on the merits and set aside
orders of default as default judgments are “frowned
upon.” As much as possible, cases should be decided
with both parties “given every chance to fight their case
fairly and in the open, without resort to technicality.”
However, the basic requirements of Rule 9, Section 3,
paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure must
first be complied with. The defendant’s motion to set
aside order of default must satisfy three
conditions. First is the time element. The defendant
must challenge the default order before
judgment. Second, the defendant must have been
prevented from filing his answer due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence. Third, he must have a
meritorious defense. As this court held in SSS v. Hon.
Chaves, 440 SCRA 269 (2004): Procedural rules are not
to be disregarded or dismissed simply because their
nonobservance may have resulted in prejudice to a
party’s substantive rights. Like all rules[,] they are to be
followed, except only when for the most persuasive of
reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Interpleader; Under
Rule 62, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
person may file a special civil action for interpleader if
conflicting claims are made against him or her over a
subject matter in which he or she has no interest.—
Under Rule 62, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a person may file a special civil action for
interpleader if conflicting claims are made against him or
her over a subject matter in which
93he or she has no interest. The action is brought
against the claimants to compel them to litigate their
conflicting claims among themselves. Rule 62, Section 1
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Section
1. When interpleader proper.—Whenever conflicting
claims upon the same subject matter are or may be
made against a person who claims no interest whatever
in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an
action against the conflicting claimants to compel them
to interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves. An interpleader complaint may be filed by a
lessee against those who have conflicting claims over the
rent due for the property leased. This remedy is for the
lessee to protect him or her from “double vexation in
respect of one liability.” He or she may file the
interpleader case to extinguish his or her obligation to
pay rent, remove him or her from the adverse claimants’
dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting claims
to litigate among themselves.
Same; Civil Procedure; Default; The consequence of
the default is that the court may “render judgment
barring [the defaulted claimant] from any claim in
respect to the subject matter.”—At any rate, an adverse
claimant in an interpleader case may be declared in
default. Under Rule 62, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, a claimant who fails to answer within
the required period may, on motion, be declared in
default. The consequence of the default is that the court
may “render judgment barring [the defaulted claimant]
from any claim in respect to the subject matter.” The
Rules would not have allowed claimants in interpleader
cases to be declared in default if it would “ironically
defeat the very purpose of the suit.”
Same; Same; Litis Pendentia; Litis pendentia exists
when “another action is pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action.”—Under Rule 16,
Section 1, paragraph (e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the
ground of litis pendentia: Section 1. Grounds.—Within
the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to
dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
x x x x (e) That there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause; x x x x Litis
pendentia is Latin for “a pending suit.” It exists when
“another action is pending between the same parties for
the same cause of action x x x.” The subsequent
94action is “unnecessary and vexatious” and is instituted
to “harass the respondent [in the subsequent action].”
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (1) Identity of
parties or at least such as represent the same interest in
both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts;
and (3) The identity in the two cases should be such that
the judgment that may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other. All of the requisites must be
present. Absent one requisite, there is no litis pendentia.
Attorney’s Fees; In its ordinary sense, attorney’s
fees “represent the reasonable compensation a client
pays his or her lawyer for legal service rendered.” In its
extraordinary sense, attorney’s fees “are awarded as
indemnity for damages the losing party pays the
prevailing party.”—In its ordinary sense, attorney’s fees
“represent the reasonable compensation [a client pays
his or her lawyer] [for legal service rendered].” In its
extraordinary sense, attorney’s fees “[are] awarded x x x
as indemnity for damages [the losing party pays the
prevailing party].” The award of attorney’s fees is the
exception rather than the rule. It is not awarded to the
prevailing party “as a matter of course.” Under Article
2208 of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees cannot be
recovered in the absence of stipulation, except under
specific circumstances: (1) When exemplary damages
are awarded; (2) When the defendant’s act or omission
has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons
or to incur expenses to protect his interest; (3) In
criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
plaintiff; (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff; (5) Where the
defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and
demandable claim; (6) In actions for legal support; (7) In
actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers,
laborers and skilled workers; (8) In actions for indemnity
under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability
laws; (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability
arising from a crime; (10) When at least double judicial
costs are awarded; (11) In any other case where the
court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
Same; Even if a party is “compelled to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his or her
rights,” attorney’s fees will not be awarded if no bad
faith “could be reflected in a party’s
95persistence in a case.”—Even if a party is “compelled
to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his [or her] rights,” attorney’s fees will not be
awarded if no bad faith “could be reflected in a party’s
persistence in a case.” To award attorney’s fees, the
court must have “factual, legal, [and] equitable
justification.” The court must state the award’s basis in
its decision. These rules are based on the policy that “no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate.”
Arquero v. CA, G.R. No. 168053, September 21, 2011,
658 SCRA 70
Actions; Default; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure;
Remedies of a Party Declared in Default; The fourth
remedy, that of appeal from the judgment rendered
against a party declared in default, is anchored on
Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules—even after the
deletion of that provision under the 1997 Rules, such
remedy is still available.—In Martinez v. Republic, 506
SCRA 134 (2006), the Court has clearly discussed the
remedies of a party declared in default in light of the
1964 and 1997 Rules of Court and a number of
jurisprudence applying and interpreting said rules.
Citing Lina v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 637 (1985), the
Court enumerated the above-mentioned remedies, to
wit: a) The defendant in default may, at any time after
discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion,
under oath, to set aside the order of default on the
ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has
meritorious defenses; (Sec. 3, Rule 18); b) If the
judgment has already been rendered when the
defendant discovered the default, but before the same
has become final and executory, he may file a motion for
new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37; c) If the
defendant discovered the default after the judgment
hasbecome final and executory, he may file a petition for
relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and d) He may also
appeal from the judgment rendered against him as
contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition
to set aside the order of default has been presented by
him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41) The Court explained
in Martinez that the fourth remedy, that of appeal, is
anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Even
after the deletion of that provision under the 1997
Rules, the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely on
the Lina doctrine, including the pronouncement that a
defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgment
rendered against him.
Same; Quo Warranto; Parties; Words and Phrases;
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine the right or title to the contested public office
and to oust the holder from its enjoyment; In quo
warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name
must prove that he is entitled to the subject public
office.—A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal
remedy to determine the right or title to the contested
public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment.
It is brought against the person who is alleged to have
usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised
the public office. It may be brought by the Republic of
the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled
to such office. In quo warranto, the petitioner who files
the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to
the subject public office. In other words, the private
person suing must show a clear right to the contested
position. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has
a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo
warranto may be dismissed. It is not even necessary to
pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of
his appointment, continues in the undisturbed
possession of his office.
Public Officers; Appointments; An acting appointee
accepts the position on the condition that he shall
surrender the office once he is called to do so by the
appointing authority—his term of office is not fixed, but
endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority; The
essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness
and its consequent revocability at any time by the
appointing authority.—As aptly observed by the CA, the
law created two positions—the VSS and the principal or
secondary school head teacher of each of the units or
branches of the integrated school. The legislators clearly
intendedthat the integrated schools shall be headed by a
superintendent. Admittedly, petitioner did not possess
the qualifications to hold the position and she was
merely designated by the DepEd as the OIC of the PINS.
At that time, she held in a concurrent capacity, the
permanent position of principal of the PNS. Having been
appointed as OIC without the necessary qualifications,
petitioner held the position only in a temporary capacity.
The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to
prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by
authorizing a person to discharge those functions
pending the selection of a permanent or another
appointee. An acting appointee accepts the position on
the condition that he shall surrender the office once he
is called to do so by the appointing authority. Therefore,
his term of office is not fixed, but endures at the
pleasure of the appointing authority. The essence of an
acting appointment is its temporariness and its
consequent revocability at any time by the appointing
authority.
Manuel v. Ong, G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Service of Summons;
Personal Service of Summons; Tendering summons is
itself a means of personal service as it is contained in
Rule 14, Section 6. Personal service, as provided by Rule
14, Section 6, is distinguished from its alternative —
substituted service — as provided by Rule 14, Section
7.—Wehold that jurisdiction over the persons of both
defendants in Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582 — the Spouses
Benedict and Sandra Manuel — was validly acquired.
This is so because personal service of
summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was
made by Sheriff Joselito Sales on March 16, 2010. Rule
14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides: SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant.—
Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by
handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if
he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to
him. Tendering summons is itself a means of personal
service as it is contained in Rule 14, Section 6. Personal
service, as provided by Rule 14, Section 6, is
distinguished from its alternative — substituted service
— as provided by Rule 14, Section 7: SEC. 7. Substituted
service.—If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot
be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant’s office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule 14, Section 6 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires:
personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit
tender is sufficient should the defendant refuse to receive
and sign).—The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on
the supposed variance of address. Personal service of
summons has nothing to do with the location where
summons is served. A defendant’s address is
inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally
handing the summons to the defendant(albeit tender is
sufficient should the defendant refuse to receive and
sign). What is determinative of the validity of personal
service is, therefore, the person of the defendant, not
the locus of service.
Administrative Law; Sheriff’s Return; A sheriff’s
return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the
presumption of regularity and, hence, taken to be an
accurate and exhaustive recital of the circumstances
relating to the steps undertaken by a sheriff.—A sheriff’s
return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the
presumption of regularity and, hence, taken to be an
accurate and exhaustive recital of the circumstances
relating to the steps undertaken by a sheriff. In this case,
the Spouses Manuel have harped on their (self-
serving)claim of maintaining residence elsewhere but
failed to even allege that there was anything irregular
about the sheriff’s return or that it was otherwise
incomplete.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Default; Rule 9,
Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
for when a party to an action may be declared in default.
Further, Rule 9, Section 3(b) governs the grant of relief
from orders of default.—As valid service of summons
was made on them, it was incumbent upon the Spouses
Manuel, pursuant to Rule 11, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, to file their answer within fifteen (15)
days from March 16, 2011. Having failed to do so, they
were rightly declared to be in default. Rule 9, Section 3
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for when a
party to an action may be declared in default. Further,
Rule 9, Section 3(b) governs the grant of relief from
orders of default.
Same; Same; Same; Per Rule 9, Section 3(a), a party
declared to be in default shall nevertheless be “entitled
to notice of subsequent proceedings,” although he or she
may no longer take part in the trial.—Pursuant to Rule 9,
Section 3, a court may proceed to render judgment as
the pleading may warrant should a defendant fail to
timely file his or her answer. However, a court may
decline from immediately rendering judgment and
instead require the plaintiff to present evidence. Per
Rule 9, Section 3(a), a party declared to be in default
shall nevertheless be “entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings,” although he or she may no longer take
part in the trial. As explained in Spouses Delos Santos v.
Carpio, 501 SCRA 390 (2006), “there are three
requirements which must be complied with by the
claiming party before the court may declare the
defending party in default: (1) the claiming party must
file a motion asking the court to declare the defending
party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified
of the motion to declare him in default; and (3) the
claiming party must prove that the defending party has
failed to answer within the period provided by the Rule.”
Same; Same; Same; Consistent with Rule 9, Section
3(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, “the remedy
against an order of default is a motion to set it aside on
the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence.”—Consistent with Rule 9, Section 3(b) of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, “the remedy against an
order of default is a motion to set it aside on the ground
of fraud,accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.”
However, it is not only the motion to lift order of default
which a defendant must file. As this court emphasized
in Agravante v. Patriarca, 183 SCRA 113 (1990), to the
motion to lift order of default must “be appended an
affidavit showing the invoked ground, and another,
denominated affidavit of merit, setting forth facts
constituting the party’s meritorious defense or
defenses.”
Same; Same; Same; Affidavit of Merit; It is through
an affidavit of merit that a defendant seeking relief from
an order of default shows that “the failure to file answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence.”—The need for an affidavit of merit is
consistent with Rule 8, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which requires that “[i]n all averments
of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake must be stated with particularity.”
In Montinola, Jr. v. Republic Planters Bank, 161 SCRA 45
(1988), this court noted that the three (3) requisites that
must be satisfied by a motion in order “to warrant the
setting aside of an order of default for failure to file
answer, are: (1) it must be made by motion under oath
by one that has knowledge of the facts; (2) it must be
shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence; and (3) there
must be a proper showing of the existence of a
meritorious defense.” (Citations omitted) Consistent
with Agravante, it is through an affidavit of merit that a
defendant seeking relief from an order of default shows
that “the failure to file answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is jurisprudence to
the effect that an affidavit of merit is not necessary
“where a motion to lift an order of default is grounded
on the very root of the proceedings [such as] where the
court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
defendants.”—Certainly, there is jurisprudence to the
effect that an affidavit of merit is not necessary “where a
motion to lift an order of default is grounded on the very
root of the proceedings [such as] where the court has
not acquired jurisdiction over the defendants.” Similarly,
there is jurisprudence stating that “when a motion to lift
an order of default contains the reasons for the failure
to answer as well as the facts constituting the
prospective defense of the defendant and it is sworn to
by said defendant, neither a formal verification nor a
separate affidavit of merit is necessary.” However, in
thiscase, the Spouses Manuel failed not only in attaching
an affidavit of merit but also in making their motion
under oath. They are, therefore, left without any
alternative on which to rest. Their motion is utterly
ineffectual.
Same; Same; Same; Apart from a motion to lift
order of default, other remedies are available to a
defaulted defendant even after judgment has been
rendered.—Indeed, apart from a motion to lift order of
default, other remedies are available to a defaulted
defendant even after judgment has been rendered.
Thus, if judgment had already been rendered but has
not yet become final and executory, an appeal asserting
that the judgment was contrary to the law or to the
evidence, or a motion for new trial under Rule 37, may
be filed. In the case of the latter, the same affidavits as
are required in a motion to lift order of default must be
attached. If judgment has become final and executory, a
defaulted defendant may file a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38. Still, should the defaulted
defendant fail to file a petition for relief, a petition for
annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud remains available.
Same; Same; Rule 9, Section 3(b) of the Rules of
Court gives an exclusive list of only four (4) grounds that
allow for relief from orders of default.—Rule 9, Section
3(b) gives an exclusive list of only four (4) grounds that
allow for relief from orders of default. Moreover, these
grounds — extrinsic fraud, accident, mistake, and
excusable negligence — relate to factors that are
extraneous to a defendant, that is, grounds that show
that a defendant was prevented, by reasons beyond his
or her influence, from timely filing an answer. The
recognition that it is the defendant who is at fault and
must suffer the consequences of his or her own failure is
analogous to the dismissal of an action due to the fault
of a plaintiff, as provided by Rule 17, Section 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 17, Section 3
reads: SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.—If for no
justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date
of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the
complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these
Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or
in a separate action. This dismissal shall havethe effect
of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
declared by the court. Rule 17, Section 3 is qualified by
the phrase “for no justifiable cause.” Thus, in cases
covered by Rule 17, Section 3, should the failure to
comply with court processes be the result of the
plaintiff’s own fault, it is but logical that a plaintiff must
suffer the consequences of his own heedlessness. Rule
9, Section 3 — on default — applies the same logic to a
culpable defendant.
Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc. v. Tansipek, G.R. No. 181235,
July 22, 2009
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Orders of Default; The
remedy against an Order of Default is a Motion to Lift
Order of Default, not a Motion for Reconsideration; A
Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an
ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified,
and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect, and meritorious defenses.—Respondent
Tansipek’s remedy against the Order of Default was
erroneous from the very beginning. Respondent
Tansipek should have filed a Motion to Lift Order of
Default, and not a Motion for Reconsideration, pursuant
to Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court: (b) Relief
from order of default.—A party declared in default may
at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file
a motion under oath to set aside the order of default
upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due
to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and
that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the
order of default may be set aside on such terms and
conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of
justice. A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different
from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should be
verified; and must show fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses. The
allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect, and (2) of meritorious defenses must concur.
Same; Same; Certiorari; Law of the Case; The
dismissal of a Petition for Certiorari assailing the denial
of a party’s Motion constitutes a bar to the retrial of the
same issue of default under the doctrine of the law of the
case.—Assuming for the sake of argument, however,
that respondent Tansipek’s Motion for Reconsideration
may be treated as a Motion to Lift Order of Default, his
Petition for Certiorari on the denial thereof has already
been dismissed with finality by the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Tansipek did not appeal said ruling of the
Court of Appeals to this Court. The dismissal of the
Petition for Certiorari assailing the denial of respondent
Tansipek’s Motion constitutes a bar to the retrial of the
same issue of default under the doctrine of the law of
the case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Law of
the case” has been defined as the opinion delivered on a
former appeal—more specifically, it means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule of decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court.—
In People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992 (1958), we held that:
“Law of the case” has been defined as the opinion
delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means
that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule of decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the casebefore the court. It
may be stated as a rule of general application
that, where the evidence on a second or succeeding
appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or
preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues
adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the case on
all subsequent appeals and will not be considered or
readjudicated therein.
Appeals; Certiorari; Law of the Case; There is no
substantial distinction between an appeal and a Petition
for Certiorari when it comes to the application of the
Doctrine of the Law of the Case.—There is no substantial
distinction between an appeal and a Petition
for Certiorari when it comes to the application of the
Doctrine of the Law of the Case. The doctrine is founded
on the policy of ending litigation. The doctrine is
necessary to enable the appellate court to perform its
duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be
impossible if a question once considered and decided by
it were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any
and every subsequent appeal.
Orders of Default; A party declared in default is not
barred from appealing from the judgment on the main
case, whether or not he had previously filed a Motion to
Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless of the result of
the latter and the appeals therefrom.—It is important to
note that a party declared in default—respondent
Tansipek in this case—is not barred from appealing from
the judgment on the main case, whether or not he had
previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default,
and regardless of the result of the latter and the appeals
therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on the
Decision’s being contrary to law or the evidence already
presented, and not on the alleged invalidity of the
default order.
Bitte v. Jonas, G.R. No. 212256, December 9, 2015
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Default; The rule is
that “right to appeal from the judgment by default is not
lost and can be done on grounds that the amount of the
judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that
prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the
material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision
is contrary to law.”—The rule is that “right to appeal
from the judgment by default is not lost and can be done
on grounds that the amount of the judgment is excessive
or is different in kind from that prayed for, orthat the
plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his
complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law.” If a
party who has been declared in default has in his arsenal
the remedy of appeal from the judgment of default on
the basis of the decision having been issued against the
evidence or the law, that person cannot be denied the
remedy and opportunity to assail the judgment in the
appellate court. Despite being burdened by the
circumstances of default, the petitioners may still use all
other remedies available to question not only the
judgment of default but also the judgment on appeal
before this Court. Those remedies necessarily include an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Civil Law; Contracts; Public Documents; Article 1358
of the New Civil Code requires that the form of a contract
transmitting or extinguishing real rights over immovable
property should be in a public document.—Article 1358
of the New Civil Code requires that the form of a
contract transmitting or extinguishing real rights over
immovable property should be in a public document.
Pertinently, Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
reads: Section 19. Classes of documents.—For the
purposes of their presentation in evidence, documents
are either public or private. Public documents are: (a)
The written official acts, or records of the official acts of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country; (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary
public except last wills and testaments; and (c) Public
records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein. All other writings
are private.
Same; Same; Same; It has been settled that a sale of
real property, though not consigned in a public
instrument or formal writing is, nevertheless, valid and
binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule is
that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate
produces legal effects between the parties.—Not having
been properly and validly notarized, the deed of sale
cannot be considered a public document. It is an
accepted rule, however, that the failure to observe the
proper form does not render the transaction invalid. It
has been settled that a sale of real property, though not
consigned in a public instrument or formal writing is,
nevertheless, valid and binding among the parties, for
the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of
sale or real estate produces legal effects between
theparties. Not being considered a public document, the
deed is subject to the requirement of proof under
Section 20, Rule 132, which reads: Section 20. Proof of
private document.—Before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By
anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker. Any other private document
need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Same; Agency; Doctrine of Apparent Authority; Under
the doctrine of apparent authority, acts and contracts of
the agent within the apparent scope of the authority
conferred on him, although no actual authority to do
such acts or has been beforehand withdrawn, revoked or
terminated, bind the principal.—Basic is the rule that the
revocation of an agency becomes operative, as to the
agent, from the time it is made known to him. Third
parties dealing bona fide with one who has been
accredited to them as an agent, however, are not
affected by the revocation of the agency, unless notified
of such revocation. This refers to the doctrine of
apparent authority. Under the said doctrine, acts and
contracts of the agent within the apparent scope of the
authority conferred on him, although no actual authority
to do such acts or has been beforehand withdrawn,
revoked or terminated, bind the principal. Thus, as to a
third person, “apparent authority, when present, trumps
restrictions that the principal has privately imposed on
the agent. The relevant appearance is that the principal
has conferred authority on an agent. An actor may
continue to possess apparent authority although the
principal has terminated the actor’s actual authority or
the agency relationship between them. This is so
because a third party may reasonably believe that the
actor continues to act as an agent and within the scope
of actual authority on the basis of manifestations
previously made by the principal. Such a manifestation,
once made, remains operative until the third party has
notice of circumstances that make it unreasonable to
believe that the actor continues to have actual
authority.” Hence, apparent authority may survive the
termination of actual authority or of an agency
relationship.
Same; Same; Under Article 1924 of the New Civil
Code, “an agency is revoked if the principal directly
manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing
directly with third persons.”—Under Article 1924 of the
New Civil Code, “an agency is revoked if theprincipal
directly manages the business entrusted to the agent,
dealing directly with third persons.” Logic dictates that
when a principal disregards or bypasses the agent and
directly deals with such person in an incompatible or
exclusionary manner, said third person is deemed to
have knowledge of the revocation of the agency. They
are expected to know circumstances that should have
put them on guard as to the continuing authority of that
agent. The mere fact of the principal dealing directly
with the third person, after the latter had dealt with an
agent, should be enough to excite the third person’s
inquiring mind on the continuation of his authority.
Same; Contracts; Unenforceable Contracts; A
contract entered into in the name of another by one who
has no authority or legal representation, or who has
acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless
it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on
whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked
by the other contracting party.—“It is a basic axiom in
civil law embodied in our Civil Code that no one may
contract in the name of another without being
authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right
to represent him. A contract entered into in the name of
another by one who has no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers,
shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or
impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been
executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting
party.” Considering that the sale was executed by an
agent whose authority, be it actual or apparent, had
been revoked, the transaction is unenforceable pursuant
to Article 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which read:
Article 1317. No one may contract in the name of
another without being authorized by the latter, or unless
he has by law a right to represent him. A contract
entered into in the name of another by one who has no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted
beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is
ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose
behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the
other contracting party. (1259a) ART. 1403. The
following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified: (1) Those entered into the name of another
person by one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
x x x.
Same; Sales; One can sell only what one owns or is
authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more
right than what the seller can transfer legally.—
Considering that the deed of absolute sale was executed
at a time when Spouses Bitte were deemed notified of
the termination of the agency, the sale must be treated
as having been entered into by Andrea in her personal
capacity. One can sell only what one owns or is
authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more
right than what the seller can transfer legally.
Accordingly, Spouses Bitte acquired no better title than
what Andrea had over the property, which was nil. In
sum, the deed of absolute sale executed by Andrea in
favor of Spouses Bitte is unenforceable against Rosa Elsa
because of their notice of the revocation of the agency.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Foreclosure of
Mortgage; Redemption; Section 27 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court enumerates the persons who may exercise
the right of redemption of a foreclosed property.—
Section 27 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court enumerates
the persons who may exercise the right of redemption of
a foreclosed property: Section 27. Who may redeem real
property so sold.—Real property sold as provided in the
last preceding section, or any part thereof sold
separately, may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter
provided, by the following persons: (a) The judgment
obligor or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any
part of the property; and (b) A creditor having a lien by
virtue of an attachment, judgment or mortgage on the
property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to
the lien under which the property was sold. Such
redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner.
Civil Law; Sales; Buyer in Good Faith; Burden of
Proof; Settled is the rule that the burden of proving the
status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies
upon one who asserts that status.—Settled is the rule
that the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in
good faith and for value lies upon one who asserts that
status. This onus probandi cannot be discharged by mere
invocation of the ordinary presumption of good faith.
Considering that the title was still registered in the name
of Rosa Elsa when Spouses Yap bought it from Spouses
Bitte, the burden was on them to prove that they were
purchasers in good faith. In this regard, they failed. Not
an iota of evidence was adduced by them to prove their
ignorance of the true situation.
Same; Same; Same; The rule is that a person who
buys from one who is not the registered owner is
expected to examine not only the certificate of title but
all factual circumstances necessary for [one] to
determine if there are any flaws in the title of the
transferor, or in [the] capacity to transfer the land.—
Spouses Yap were not purchasers in good faith and for
value. Significantly, Ganzon transacted with someone
who was not even the registered owner of the property.
At the time of the transfer, the property was still
registered in the name of Rosa Elsa. The rule is that a
person who buys from one who is not the registered
owner is expected to “examine not only the certificate of
title but all factual circumstances necessary for [one] to
determine if there are any flaws in the title of the
transferor, or in [the] capacity to transfer the land. A
higher degree of prudence is thus expected from that
person even if the land object of the transaction is
registered.”
Alimboboyog v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163655, June
16, 2006
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Certiorari will lie only if
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against
the acts of respondent.—The unquestioned rule in this
jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law against the acts of
respondent. In this case, the plain and adequate remedy
was a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
Decision and the resolution thereof, which was not only
expected to be but would actually have provided an
adequate and more speedy remedy than the present
petition for certiorari.
Same; Same; Failure to file a motion for
reconsideration deprived the appellate court of its right
and opportunity to review and purge its decision of any
oversight.—The filing of a motion for reconsideration
would have afforded the Court of Appeals the
opportunity to correct the errors attributed to it and
allowed Alimboboyog to ventilate his side. His failure to
file such motion deprived the appellate court of its right
and opportunity to review and purge its decision of any
oversight. In view of the fact that Alimboboyog failed to
take advantage of the procedural remedy of filing a
motion for reconsideration without any concrete,
compelling and valid explanation, we cannot allow him
to now seek relief by certiorari.