D.
Equal Protection
1. Concept
The constitutional right to equal
protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner.
(Source: ABRC 2017 Special Lecture Notes)
2. Requisites for Valid Classification
The requirements for a valid and
reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class. (Source:
Political Law Reviewer 2018, Atty. Alexis
Medina)
3. Standards of Judicial Review
(Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al.,
G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc
[Bersamin])
a. Rational Basis Test
The rational basis scrutiny
(also known as the rational relation
test or rational basis test) demands
that the classification reasonably
relate to the legislative purpose.
The rational basis test often applies
in cases involving economics or
social welfare, or to any other case
not involving a suspect class.
b. Strict Scrutiny Test
The strict scrutiny review
applies when a legislative
classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to
the peculiar class disadvantage of a
suspect class. The Government
carries the burden to prove that
the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest,
and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.
c. Intermediate Scrutiny Test
When the classification
puts a quasi-suspect class at a
disadvantage, it will be treated
under intermediate or heightened
review. Classifications based on
gender or illegitimacy receives
intermediate scrutiny. To survive
intermediate scrutiny, the law must
not only further an important
governmental interest and be
substantially related to that
interest, but the justification for
the classification must be genuine
and must not depend on broad
generalizations. (Source: ABRC
2017 Special Lecture Notes)
E. Searches and Seizure
1. Concept
The right of a person against
unreasonable searches and seizure is
recognized and protected by no less than
the Constitution, particularly, Sections 2 and
3(2) of Article III which provide:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding
 section shall be inadmissible
(Source: Political Law Reviewer
2018, Atty. Alexis Medina)
2. Warrant requirement; Requisites for a
valid warrant
Accordingly, Sections 4 and 5, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure laid down the following
requisites for the issuance of a valid search
warrant:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search
warrant. – A search warrant shall
not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of
complainant; record. – The judge
must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he
may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements,
together with the affidavits
submitted.
Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a
search warrant rests upon the following
factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by
the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge
must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and (4) the warrant
issued must particularly describe the place
to be searched and persons or things to be
seized. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066,
August 11, 2010) (Source: Political Law
Reviewer 2018, Atty. Alexis Medina)
3. Warrantless Search
In a search incident to a lawful
arrest, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made --
the process cannot be reversed. Search
incident to a lawful arrest: A search
incidental to a lawful arrest requires that
there must first be a lawful arrest before a
search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful
arrest must precede the search; the process
cannot be reversed. (Source: Political Law
Reviewer 2018, Atty. Alexis Medina)
4. Warrantless Arrest
There are three (3) grounds that
will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant;
When Lawful. -A peace officer or a
private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment
or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known
as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity
of this warrantless arrest requires
compliance with the overt act test:
[F]or a warrantless arrest of in
flagrante delicto to be affected,
"two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he [or
she] has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting
officer." (Veridiano v. People, G.R.
No. 200370, 07 June 2017) (Source:
Political Law Reviewer 2018, Atty.
Alexis Medina)
5. Administrative Arrest
Vivo v. Montesa, G.R. No. L-24576 July 29,
1968
As long as the offense of the respondents
has not yet been established and their
expulsion finally decided upon, their arrest
upon administrative warrant violates the
provisions of our Bill of Rights. The
constitutional guarantees of individual
liberty must be liberally construed and
applied if we are to enjoy the blessings of a
regime of justice, liberty and democracy
that the Philippine Constitution sought to
secure and consolidate.
6. Drug, Alcohol and Blood Tests
Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July
23, 2014
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover
persons apprehended or arrested for any
unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts
listed under Article II of R.A. 9165. A drug
test can be made upon persons who are
apprehended or arrested for, among
others, the "importation," "sale, trading,
administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution and transportation",
"manufacture" and "possession" of
dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals;
To make the provision applicable to all
persons arrested or apprehended for any
crime not listed under Article II is
tantamount to unduly expanding its
meaning. Note that accused appellant
here was arrested in the alleged act of
extortion. A charge for violation of Section
15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of
the intent of the law to rehabilitate
persons apprehended or arrested for the
unlawful acts enumerated above instead
of charging and convicting them of other
crimes with heavier penalties.
F. Privacy of Communications and Correspondence
1. Private and Public Communications
Section 3. (1) The privacy of
communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
Case Doctrines
Exclusionary Rule (Sec3, par2)
People v. Marti – package bound for
Switzerland – The Bill of Rights is not
meant to be invoked against act of
private individuals. It is directed
against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement
of the law. The constitutional against
unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed
by a private individual.
Waiver of Rights
Veroy v. Layague – search of rebels in
a house – Permission was granted by
Veroy to enter the house but only to
ascertain the presence of rebel
soldiers. Where permission to enter a
residence was given,
it is illegal to search the rooms therein
 and seize firearms without as search
warrant.
Okabe v. Gutierrez – estafa case – An
application for or admission to bail
shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or
the legality of the warrant issued
therefore.. An application for bail
SHALL NOT BE considered as a waiver
of rights. A valid waiver, requisites. 1)
rights must exist; 2) there must be
clear and convincing proof that there
was an actual intention to relinquish
the right
Anti-Wiretapping Act
Navarro v. CA – police complaint gone
bad – where the exchange between
two persons is not private, the tape
recording is not prohibited
Salcedo-Ordonez v. CA – annulment
with damages – husband is cheating
on me case – Unauthorized tape
recordings of telephone conversations
not admissible
Privacy of Bank Accounts
Marquez v. Desierto – secrecy of bank
deposits – exceptions: 1) depositor
consents in writing; 2) subject of an
impeachment case; 3) by court order
in cases of bribery and dereliction by
public officials, 4) deposit is subject of
litigation; 5) unexplained wealth
Privacy of Communication
Roxas v. Zuzuaregui – Contempt of the
Supreme Court – the letter ceased to be
private when Roxas furnished the letter
to all the justices and not just to the one
whom it is addressed.
G. Freedom of Expression
2. Intrusion, when allowed
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24,
2012
The right to privacy is considered a
fundamental right that must be protected
from intrusion or constraint. When the right
to privacy finds tension with a competing
state objective, the courts are required to
weigh both notions. In these cases,
although considered a fundamental right,
the right to privacy may nevertheless
succumb to an opposing or overriding state
interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
3. Writ of Habeas Data
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24,
2012
Habeas data – The writ of habeas data is a
remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data
information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.
Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No.
202666, September 29, 2014
In developing the writ of habeas data, the
Court aimed to protect an individual’s right
to informational privacy, among others The
writ, however, will not issue on the basis
merely of an alleged unauthorized access to
information about a person. Availment of
the writ requires the existence of a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other. Thus, the existence of a
person’s right to informational privacy and a
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of
an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim are indispensable before the
privilege of the writ may be extended.
1. Concept and Scope
a. Prior Restraint (censorship)
Chavez vs. Gonzales G.R.No.
168338 February 15, 2008
This refers to official governmental
restrictions on the press or other
forms of expression in advance of
actual publication or
dissemination. Freedom from prior
restraint is largely freedom from
government censorship of
publications, whatever the form of
censorship, and regardless of
whether it is wielded by the
executive, legislative or judicial
branch of the government. Thus, it
precludes governmental acts that
required approval of a proposal to
publish; licensing or permits as
prerequisites to publication
including the payment of license
taxes for the privilege to publish;
and even injunctions against
publication. Even the closure of the
business and printing offices of
certain newspapers, resulting in
the discontinuation of their
printing and publication, are
deemed as previous restraint or
censorship. 57 Any law or official
that requires some form of
permission to be had before
publication can be made, commits
an infringement of the
constitutional right, and remedy
can be had at the courts.
b. Subsequent Punishment
Clear and Present Danger.—Certain
expression, oral or written, may
incite, urge, counsel, advocate, or
importune the commission of
criminal conduct; other expression,
such as picketing, demonstrating,
and engaging in certain forms of
“symbolic” action, may either
counsel the commission of criminal
conduct or itself constitute criminal
conduct. Leaving aside for the
moment the problem of “speech-
plus” communication, it becomes
necessary to determine when
expression that may be a nexus to
criminal conduct is subject to
punishment and restraint.
2. Content-based and Content-neutral
regulations
a. Test
Chavez vs. Gonzales G.R.No. 168338
February 15, 2008
A distinction has to be made whether the
restraint is (1) a content-
neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned
with the incidents of the speech, or one that
merely controls the time, place or manner,
and under well defined standards;60 or (2)
a content-based restraint or
censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on
the subject matter of the utterance or
speech. 61 The cast of the restriction
determines the test by which the challenged
act is assayed with.
b. Applications
When the speech restraints take
the form of a content-neutral
regulation, only a substantial
governmental interest is required
for its validity. Because regulations
of this type are not designed to
suppress any particular message,
they are not subject to the strictest
form of judicial scrutiny but
an intermediate approach—
somewhere between the mere
rationality that is required of any
other law and the compelling
interest standard applied to
content-based
restrictions. The test is
called intermediate because the
Court will not merely rubberstamp
the validity of a law but also
require that the restrictions be
narrowly-tailored to promote an
important or significant
governmental interest that is
unrelated to the suppression of
expression. The intermediate
approach has been formulated in
this manner:
A governmental regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the
Government, if it furthers an
important or substantial
governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incident
restriction on alleged [freedom of
speech & expression] is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.
On the other hand, a governmental
action that restricts freedom of
speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest
scrutiny in light of its inherent and
invasive impact. Only when the
challenged act has overcome
the clear and present danger
rule will it pass constitutional
muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming
the presumed unconstitutionality.
Unless the government can
overthrow this presumption,
the content-based restraint will be
struck down.
With respect to content-
based restrictions, the government
must also show the type of harm
the speech sought to be restrained
would bring about— especially the
gravity and the imminence of the
threatened harm – otherwise the
prior restraint will be invalid. Prior
restraint on speech based on its
content cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears, "but only by
showing a substantive and
imminent evil that has taken the
life of a reality already on
ground." As formulated, "the
question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It
is a question of proximity and
degree."
The regulation which restricts the
speech content must also serve an
important or substantial
government interest, which is
unrelated to the suppression of
free expression. (Chavez vs.
Gonzales G.R. No. 168338 February
15, 2008)
3. Facial challenges and Overbreadth
doctrine
Facial Challenge
James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819, April 8,
2014, En Banc [Mendoza]
The application of doctrines originating
from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While the Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly
penal statutes (Romualdez v. Commission on
Elections, 576 Phil. 357 [2008]; Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265 [2004];
Estradfa v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290
[2001]), it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech,
but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights(Resolution,
Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 594
Phil. 305, 316 [2008]). The underlying
reason for this modification is simple. For
unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court,
under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated
by the Fundamental Law not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable,
but also to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Overbreadth doctrine
Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The
 Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335,
Feb. 11, 2014, En Banc [Abad]
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper
governmental purpose, constitutionally
subject to state regulation, may not be
achieved by means that unnecessarily
sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading
the area of protected freedoms. But Section
4[a][3] does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what
essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of
wilfully destroying without right the things
that belong to others, in this case their
computer data, electronic document, or
electronic data message. Such act has no
connection to guaranteed freedoms. There
is no freedom to destroy other people’s
computer systems and private documents.
4. State Regulation of Different Types of
Mass Media
GMA Network v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014
Where there is a need to reach a large
audience, the need to access the means and
media for such dissemination becomes
critical. This is where the press and
broadcast media come along. At the same
time, the right to speak and to reach out
would not be meaningful if it is just a token
ability to be heard by a few. It must be
coupled with substantially reasonable
means by which the communicator and the
audience could effectively interactPolitical
speech is one of the most important
expressions protected by the Fundamental
Law. "[F]reedom of speech, of expression,
and of the press are at the core of civil
liberties and have to be protected at all
costs for the sake of democracy."
Accordingly, the same must remain
unfettered unless otherwise justified by a
compelling state interest.
5. Commercial Speech
Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited
ads would deny a person the right to read
his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him. Commercial speech is a
separate category of speech which is not
accorded the same level of protection as
that given to other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless entitled to protection.The State
cannot rob him of this right without
violating the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
6. Private vs Government Speech
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
Freedom of expression constitutes one of
the essential foundations of a democratic
society, and this freedom applies not only to
those that are favorably received but also to
those that offend, shock, or disturb.
Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014
Libel is unprotected speech and may be
penalized. The government has an
obligation to protect private individuals
from defamation. The cybercrime law
penalizing the author of a libelous online
statement or article is valid.
The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015
Speech with political consequences is at the
core of the freedom of expression and must
be protected by this court.
7. Heckler’s Veto
In the free speech context, a heckler's
veto is either of two situations in which a
person who disagrees with a speaker's
message is able to unilaterally trigger events
that result in the speaker being silenced.
In the strict legal sense, a heckler's veto
occurs when the speaker's right is curtailed
or restricted by the government in order to
 prevent a reacting party's behavior. The
common example is the termination of a
speech or demonstration in the interest of
maintaining the public peace based on the
anticipated negative reaction of someone
opposed to that speech or demonstration.
The term was coined by University of
Chicago professor of law Harry Kalven.
In common parlance, the term is used to
describe situations where hecklers or
demonstrators silence a speaker without
intervention of the law.
H. Freedom of Religion
1. Non-establishment Clause
a. Concept and Basis
In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the
Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M.
No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017
The non-establishment clause reinforces the
wall of separation between Church and
State. It simply means that the State cannot
set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one
religion over another nor force nor
influence a person to go to or remain away
from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion;
that the state cannot punish a person for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs
or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
nonattendance; that no tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activity or institution whatever
they may be called or whatever form they
may adopt or teach or practice religion; that
the state cannot openly or secretly
participate in the affairs of any religious
organization or group and vice versa. Its
minimal sense is that the state cannot
establish or sponsor an official religion.
b. Acts permitted and not
permitted by the clause
In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the
Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M.
No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017
In the same breath that the establishment
clause restricts what the government can
do with religion, it also limits what religious
sects can or cannot do. They can neither
cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone,
nor can they cause the government to
restrict other groups. To do so, in simple
terms, would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion and, thus, establish a
state religion.
Father Bernas further elaborated on this
matter, as follows:
"In effect, what non-establishment
calls for is government neutrality in
religious matters. Such
government neutrality may be
summarized in four general
propositions: (1) Government must
not prefer one religion over
another or religion over irreligion
because such preference would
violate voluntarism and breed
dissension; (2) Government funds
must not be applied to religious
purposes because this too would
violate voluntarism and breed
interfaith dissension; (3)
Government action must not aid
religion because this too can
violate voluntarism and breed
interfaith dissension; [and] (4)
Government action must not result
in excessive entanglement with
religion because this too can
violate voluntarism and breed
interfaith dissension."
c. Test
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April
2014
In a situation where the free exercise of
religion is allegedly burdened by
government legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in line with
the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the conscientious
objector's claim to religious freedom would
warrant an exemption from obligations
under the RH Law, unless the government
succeeds in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular
objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from
the RH Law deserves no less than strict
scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is
whether a conscientious objector's right to
religious freedom has been burdened.
Accordingly, a conscientious objector
should be exempt from compliance with the
mandates of the RH Law. If he would be
compelled to act contrary to his religious
belief and conviction, it would be violative
of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined
in the constitutional right to free exercise of
religion.
2. Free Exercise Clause
In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the
Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M.
No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017
The Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution
protects the freedom to believe and the
freedom to act on one’s beliefs. The
individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as
he pleases concerning the hereafter. But
where the individual externalizes his beliefs
in acts or omissions that affect the public,
his freedom to do so becomes subject to
the authority of the State.
3. Tests
a. Clear and present danger test
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union G.R. No. L-25246 September 12,
1974
The constitutional guaranty of free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right can be justified like
other restraints on freedom of expression
on the ground that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil
which the State has the right to prevent
(American Bible Society v. City of Manila
G.R. No. L-9637 April 30, 1957). It is only
where it is unavoidably necessary to
prevent an immediate and grave danger to
the security and welfare of the community
that infringement of religious freedom may
be justified, and only to the smallest extent
necessary to avoid the danger
b. Compelling State Interest
Estrada vs Escritor : AM P-02-1651 : August
4, 2003
The "compelling state interest" test is
proper where conduct is involved for the
whole gamut of human conduct has
different effects on the state's interests:
some effects may be immediate and short-
term while others delayed and far-reaching.
A test that would protect the interests of
the state in preventing a substantive evil,
whether immediate or delayed, is therefore
necessary. The test requires the state to
carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for
to do otherwise would allow the state to
batter religion, especially the less powerful
ones until they are destroyed.
c. Conscientious Objector Test
In a situation where the free
exercise of religion is allegedly
burdened by government
legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in
line with the Court's espousal of
the Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the
conscientious objector's claim to
religious freedom would warrant
an exemption from obligations
under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in
 demonstrating a more compelling
state interest in the
accomplishment of an important
secular objective. Necessarily so,
the plea of conscientious objectors
for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict
scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first
inquiry is whether a conscientious
objector's right to religious
freedom has been burdened. The
Court is of the view that the
obligation to refer imposed by the
orders
RH Law violates the religious belief
and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers
a patient seeking information on
modem reproductive health
products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has
been compelled to perform an act
against his beliefs.
I.Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement
1. Limitations
The constitutional right to travel is not
absolute, it can only be restricted in the
interest of national security, public safety,
or public health, as may be provided by
law. As held in Silveriov. Court of Appeals:
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted
to mean that while the liberty of
travel may be impaired even
without court order, the
appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not
armed with arbitrary discretion to
impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of
national security, public safety, or
public health and as may be
provided by law, a limitive phrase
which did not appear in the 1973
text (The Constitution, Bernas,
Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition,
1987, p. 263). Apparently, the
phraseology in the 1987
Constitution was a reaction to the
ban on international travel
imposed under the previous
regime when there was a Travel
Processing Center, which issued
certificates of eligibility to travel
upon application of an interested
party.
2. Right to Travel
a. Watch-list and Hold departure
A Watchlist Order (WLO) is a list of
persons who cannot leave the
country without first seeking
clearance from the Department of
Justice (DOJ). A Watchlist Order is
valid for sixty (60) days unless
terminated. The WLO may be
extended for a non-extendible
period of not more than sixty (60)
days. A Hold Departure Order
(HDO) stops an individual from
exiting Philippine territory. Hold
Departure Order is valid for five (5)
years unless terminated, reckoned
from the date of issuance.
The instances when an HDO may
be issued are as follows:
(a) Against the accused,
irrespective of nationality, in
criminal cases falling within the
jurisdiction of courts below the
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs).
(b) Against the alien whose
presence is required either as a
defendant, respondent, or witness
in a civil or labor case pending
litigation, or any case before an
administrative agency of the
government.
(c) Against any person, either
motu proprio, or upon the request
by the Head of a Department of
the Government; the head of a
constitutional body or commission;
 the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court for the Judiciary; the Senate
President or the House Speaker for
the Legislature, when the adverse
party is the Government or any of
its agencies or instrumentalities, or
in the interest of national security,
public safety or public
health. (Section 1, Department of
Justice Circular No. 41.)
The instances when a WLO may be
lifted or cancelled are as follows:
(a) Whent the validity of the WLO
has already expired;
(b) When the accused subject of
the WLO has been allowed by the
court to leave the country during
the pendency of the case or has
been acquitted of the charge
(c) When the preliminary
investigation or petition for review
or motion for reconsideration is
terminated. (Section5,
Department of Justice Circular No.
41.)
3. Return to one’s country
FERDINAND MARCOS, ET AL. VS. HON.
RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 88211,
September 15, 1989
The right to return to one’s country, a
totally distinct right under international law,
independent from, though related to the
right to travel. Thus, even the Universal
declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of
the state, the right to leave a country and
the right to enter one’s country as separate
and distinct rights.
The right to return to one’s country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed by
the bill of rights, which treats only of the
liberty of abode and the right to travel, but
it is our well-considered view that the right
to return may be considered as a generally
accepted principle of international law,
under our constitution, is part of the law of
the land.
J. Right to Information
1. Limitations
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (G.R. No.
133250. July 9, 2002) thus laid down the
rule that the constitutional right to
information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must
constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover
recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets
and similar matters affecting national
security and public order. In addition,
Congress has prescribed other limitations
on the right to information in several
legislations.
2. Publication Laws and Regulations
Tanada Vs Tuvera (136 SCRA 27 April 24,
1985) thus stated that Art. 2 of the Civil
Code does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The clear object of this provision
is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It
would be the height of injustive to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
3. Access to Court Records
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution
explains the peoples right to information on
matters of public concern in this manner:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public
concern shall be
recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well
as to government research data
used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all
transactions involving public interest
reinforces the peoples right to information
on matters of public concern. This State
policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of
the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public
interest. (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution
seek to promote transparency in policy-
making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people
sufficient information to exercise effectively
other constitutional rights. If the
government does not disclose its official
acts, transactions and decisions to citizens,
whatever citizens say, even if expressed
without any restraint, will be speculative
and amount to nothing. These twin
provisions are also essential to hold public
officials at all times x x x accountable to the
people, for unless citizens have the proper
information, they cannot hold public
officials accountable for anything. Armed
with the right information, citizens can
participate in public discussions leading to
the formulation of government policies and
their effective implementation. An informed
citizenry is essential to the existence and
proper functioning of any democracy.
4. Right to Information relative to:
a. Government contract
negotiations
Initiative vs Power Sector G.R. No.
192088, October 9, 2012.
The Court distinguished the duty to
disclose information from the duty to
permit access to information on matters of
public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution. Unlike the disclosure of
information which is mandatory under the
Constitution, the other aspect of the
people’s right to know requires a demand
or request for one to gain access to
documents and paper of the particular
agency. The duty to disclose covers only
transactions involving public interest,
while the duty to allow access has a
broader scope of information which
embraces not only transactions involving
public interest, but any matter contained
in official communications and public
documents of the government agency.
Such relief must be granted to the party
requesting access to official records,
documents and papers relating to official
acts, transactions, and decisions that are
relevant to a government contract.
b. Diplomatic Negotiations
Akbayan v Aquino G.R. No. 170516, July 16,
2008
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are
recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction,
the JPEPA negotiations constituting no
exception. It bears emphasis, however, that
such privilege is only presumptive. For as
Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of
information as privileged does not mean
that it will be considered privileged in all
instances. Only after a consideration of the
context in which the claim is made may it
be determined if there is a public interest
that calls for the disclosure of the desired
 information, strong enough to overcome its
traditionally privileged status.
K. Right of Association
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Association, et
al. (G.R. No. L-25246, September 12, 1974), the
Supreme Court declared that the right to join a union
includes the right to abstain from joining any
union, for a right comprehends at least two broad
notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the
absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee
may act for himself without being prevented by law;
and second, power, whereby an employee may, as
he pleases, join or refrain from joining an
association. In as much as what both the
Constitution and the Labor Code have recognized
and guaranteed to the employee is the right to join
associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say
that the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon
the employee the duty to join associations.
L. Eminent Domain
1. Concept
In Republic, et al. v. Limbonhari& Sons, G.R.
No. 217956, November 16, 2016, Peralta, J,
the SC was confronted with the issue as to
whether title to a property which the State
took under the power of eminent domain
was transferred since there was no payment
of just compensation.
The right of eminent domain is usually
understood to be an ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate any
property within its territorial sovereignty for
a public purpose. The nature and scope of
such power has been comprehensively
described as follows: (Jesus is Lord Christian
School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now
City) of Pasig, Metro Manila, 503 Phil. 845
[2005])
2. Expansive concept of “public use”
Republic vs Borbon G.R. No. 165354,
January 12, 2015
Public use, in common acceptation, means
“use by the public.” However, the concept
has expanded to include utility, advantage
or productivity for the benefit of the public.
To be valid, the taking must be for public
use. The meaning of the term “public use”
has evolved over time in response to
changing public needs and exigencies.
Public use which was traditionally
understood as strictly limited to actual “use
by the public” has already been abandoned.
“Public use” has now been held to be
synonymous with “public interest,” “public
benefit,” and “public convenience.”
3. Just Compensation
a. Determination
Republic v. Mupas, G.R. No. 181892,
September 8, 2015
It is he full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. Just compensation means that
the former owner must be returned to the
monetary equivalent of the position that
the owner had when the taking occurred.
We use the standard value of "fair market
value" of the property at the time of the
filing of the complaint for expropriation or
at the time of the taking of property,
whichever is earlier.
b. Effect of Delay
4. Abandonment of intended use and right
of repurchase
 Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Lozada, Sr. G.R. No. 176625
February 25, 2010
With respect to the element of public use,
the expropriator should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in
the petition for expropriation filed, failing
which, it should file another petition for the
new purpose.If not, it is then incumbent
upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter
desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise,
the judgment of expropriation suffers an
intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper
exercise of the power of eminent domain,
namely, the particular public purpose for
which the property will be devoted.
5. Miscellaneous Application
Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v.
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R.
No. 171101, July 5, 2011
In Agrarian Reform, The basic law allows
two (2) modes of land distribution: direct
and indirect ownership. Direct transfer to
individual farmers is the most commonly
used method by DAR and widely accepted.
Indirect transfer through collective
ownership of the agricultural land is the
alternative. By using the word collectively,
the Constitution allows for indirect
ownership of land and not just outright
agricultural land transfer. Thus, allowing
corporations or associations to own
agricultural land with the farmers becoming
stockholders or members does not violate
the agrarian reform policy under the
Constitution.
M. Contract Clause
1. Contemporary Application of the
Contract Clause
Social Weather Station v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 208062, April 27, 2015
It is settled that "the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment . . . is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, morals and general welfare." "It is a
basic rule in contracts that the law is deemed written
into the contract between the parties." The
incorporation of regulations into contracts is "a
postulate of the police power of the State." [W]hile
non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to
be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people. x x
x We do not see why public welfare when clashing
with the individual right to property should not be
made to prevail through the state's exercise of its
police power.
This case does not involve a "capricious, whimsical,
unjust or unreasonable" regulation. It effects the
constitutional policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access
to opportunities for public service" and is impelled
by the imperative of "fair" elections.
N. Legal Assistance and free access to courts
People v. Rio G.R. No. 90294 September 24, 1991)
Sec11, ArtIII of the 1987 Constitution imposes a duty
on the judicial branch of the government which can
cannot be taken lightly. "The Constitution", as aptly
stated in one case, "is a law for rulers and for people
equally in war and in peace and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of men at all times
and under all circumstances."
O. Rights of the Suspect
1. Availability
People v. Marra, et.al., G.R. No. 108494
September 20, 1994
Custodial investigation involves any
questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. It
is only after the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and
begins to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect is taken into custody, and the police
carries out a process of interrogations that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements that the rule begins to operate.
Manila Water Company v. Rosario, G.R.
No. 188747, January 29, 2014
The constitutional right to counsel is
available only during custodial investigation.
If the investigation is merely administrative
conducted by the employer and not a
criminal investigation, the admission made
during such investigation may be used as
evidence to justify dismissal.
2. Requisites
Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448,
June 26, 2013
A person under custodial investigation is
guaranteed certain rights which attach upon
the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to
remain silent, (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own
choice, and (3) to be informed of the two
other rights above.
3. Waiver
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a
person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall be in writing
and signed by such person in the presence
of his counsel or in the latter's absence,
upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of
any of the parents, elder brothers and
sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the
municipal judge, district school supervisor,
or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen
by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence
in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or
detained under the provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, or under
custodial investigation, shall be in writing
and signed by such person in the presence
of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be
null and void and of no effect. (Sec 2,
Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992)
P. Rights of the Accused
Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
enumerates rights of the accused in all criminal
prosecutions, to wit:
(a) Right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved;
(b) Right to be heard by himself and
counsel;
(c) Right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him;
(d) Right to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial;
(e) Right to meet the witnesses face to face;
and
(f) Right to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf.
The right to be presumed innocent refers to the
constitutional guarantee that the accused should be
treated as if innocent until he is proven guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
The right to be heard is the heart of criminal due
process. Basically, it refers to all the mechanisms
afforded to the accused during the criminal
proceedings. It is a safeguard against prejudicial and
partial judgments by the courts, as well as a
guarantee that the accused be given an opportunity
to participate during trial in defense of himself.
Right to be informed is again an essential aspect of
procedural due process. The constitutional mandate
is complied with by the arraignment of the accused
in which he is informed by the court of the offense
charged to which the accused either pleads guilty of
not guilty.
Right to speedy trial is based on the maxim that
“justice delayed is justice denied.” Unreasonable
delays may result to a prolonged suffering of an
innocent accused or an evasion of justice by a truly
guilty person. It offends not just the accused but also
the State, inasmuch as what is at stake is the speedy,
inexpensive, and orderly administration of justice.
Undue postponements not only depletes the funds
of the defense but also of prosecution.

The right to confrontation enables the accused to

test the credibility of the witnesses. The right is
reinforced under the rules of criminal procedure by
the so-called cross-examination. Cross-examination
is conducted after the presentation and direct
examination of witnesses by the opposing side. Both
parties are allowed to test the veracity of the
testimonies presented by the other.

In the right to compulsory process, the form of

criminal proceeding is adversarial because two
opposing parties battle out against each other and
only one of them could emerge as victor. It is often
the case that the party with the weightier evidence
wins. In criminal proceedings, the accused needs
only to create reasonable doubt on the mind of the
court to be acquitted. Nevertheless, evidence is
difficult to find because of people’s anxiety in
testifying in court as well as their dislike for
burdensome court processes. In recognition
therefore of this fact, the law and the rules give the
accused the right to avail of compulsory means for
attendance of witnesses and production of needed
document or things.