Australia and the Fall of Singapore

A historical analysis of the political consequences after the Battle of Singapore

By Ethan Fitzsimmons

Figure 1: Japan occupies Singapore.1 Figure 2: Curtin and Churchill.2 Figure 3: Bombing of Singapore.3

Introduction: Background:

The Fall of Singapore sparked a political
evolution in Australia, as the impact of the loss
of Singapore intertwined with the assertive
politics of John Curtin’s government, brought
a new diplomatic direction for Australia. The
failures of the British Empire in the defence of
the far east and the pressures of possible
invasion by Japan, would lead Australia on a
road to becoming more self-sufficient in its
defensive and foreign policies. These new
policies would lead to Australia ‘looking to
America’ as its prominent ally in the war,
building the foundations of the current
Australian – U.S. alliance. Ultimately
Singapore was the flashpoint that changed
Australia from a fledgling power dependent on
Britain to the strong independent nation state
that it stands today.
In the years preceding the Second World War
Singapore was built into a symbol of British
power and navel strength. After the demise of
the Anglo – Japanese alliance in August 17th,
1923 the security of Britain’s pacific
possessions was at risk. In response the
decision was made that same year to develop a
new imperial defence policy based on the
premise that each dominion was responsible
for its own local defence; whilst helping
develop Singapore into a naval base capable of
servicing a large fleet.4 The Australian
interwar government however contrary to
British wishes put the Singapore strategy at the
centre of its defence policy. Blindly hoping
that British naval power would ensure
Australian security. Ignoring the strong
possibility that in the event of war against both

1 ‘Japanese march into Singapore’, (February 1942), < https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/search?query=HU+2787 >

2
Herald and Weekly Times, ‘Prime Minister John Curtin talks with Winston Churchill at the Premiers Conference’, (1 st May 1942) <
http://john.curtin.edu.au/manofpeace/crisis.html >
3 ‘Firefighters struggle to extinguish a blaze after the bombing of the Naval Yards in Singapore’, (January 1942), <

http://www.awmlondon.gov.au/battles/singapore >
4
Lee Cecil, ‘Sunset of the Raj: Fall of Singapore 1942’, (Durham, UK: The Pentland Press Ltd., 1994) pp.xx-xxi

1
Germany and Japan, Britain would focus its Both ships where sunk two days later due to
naval resources in Europe and not in the lack of air support.9
Pacific.5 On September 1939 Britain declared
war on Germany, Australia immediately joined
Britain in the war, organising military
expeditions to support its mother country.
Most professional Australian military units in
1940 to 1941 were deployed into the
Mediterranean and North Africa theatres.6
Leaving its home defences seriously
underequipped, understaffed, and unprepared
for war against an expansive Japan.

Figure 5: Sinking of the HMS Repulse10

Within the space of two months Japan had

Figure 4: British Warship docked at Singapore7
The Battle for Malaya:
On the 7th December 1941, same day as pearl
harbour, Japanese zero fighters attacked the
British airbases in Singapore and Malaya,
wiping out 90% of its aircraft. The Japanese
declaration of war followed a day after.8 In
response Force Z comprising of two
battleships ‘Prince of Wales’ and ‘Repulse’
along with six support destroyers sailed on
December 8th to take on the invading force.
defeated Britain’s numerically superior forces,
overrunning the Malayan peninsular. The
northern cities of Kedah and Kelantan was lost
in the first week. A few days later British
forces were pushed out of their defensive
positions on the Slim river, resulting in a
week-long retreat to Johore. The Battle of
Muar was the last decisive battle of the
Malayan Campaign where the Australian 8th
division held out against the Japanese
onslaught for more than a fortnight. The
Japanese were able to overrun the Australians
however, resulting in a retreat of the remaining
allied forces to the Singapore straits.11

5 Augustine Meaher IV, ‘The Road to Singapore’: The Myth of British Betrayal, (Melbourne, Australia Scholarly Publishing Ltd., 2010) pp.
54-58
6 Antony Beevor, ‘The Second World War’, (London, Phoenix, 2013) p.176
7‘British Warship inside Admiralty IX floating dock’, (September 1941), < https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/007748 >
8
Stephen Weir ‘History’s Worst Decisions’, (Millers Point, NSW, Pier 9, 2005) p.145
9 Lee Cecil, ‘Sunset of the Raj: Fall of Singapore 1942’, (Durham, UK: The Pentland Press Ltd., 1994) p.xxv
10 ‘South China Sea. 1941-12-10. Last moments of British battlecruiser Repulse’, (10th December 1941), <

https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/127891 >
11
Lee Cecil, ‘Sunset of the Raj: Fall of Singapore 1942’, (Durham, UK: The Pentland Press Ltd., 1994) pp.102-196

2
 Figure 7: Surrender of Singapore15

Australia’s Reaction:

The Fall of Singapore not only signalled the

Figure 6: Japanese troops advancing in Malaya12 decline of British power and prestige in the

The Fall of Singapore: Pacific but was also a devastating loss to

By late January the Japanese were on the
causeway linking Singapore with Malaya.
th
Starting on the 8 of February Japan began its
heavy bombardment of the city, shortly after,
the first amphibious offensives began against
the defenders.13 The British outnumbering the
Japanese 3 to 1 held off their offensives for six
days. However, due to lack of airpower,
artillery and low morale the Commonwealth
forces couldn’t counter the more battle-
hardened and experienced Japanese soldiers.
This combined with a lack of water and threat
of massive casualties forced the British to
surrender Singapore to Japan. General Arthur
Pericaval capitulation to the Japanese on the
th 14
10 of February 1942.
Australia, as Singapore was a vital part of its
defence policy. Australia’s reaction was one of
immense shock and fear both domestically and
politically. The Daily Mercery writes
“the fall of Singapore brought aching hearts
to many and anxious minds to all”.16
Whilst the Prime Minister John Curtin
compared Australia’s dire situation to that of
Britain earlier in the war…
“Just as Dunkirk opened the battled for
Britain, Singapore opened the battle for
Australia”.17
Like Britain in 1941 Australia was isolated as
the speed of the Japanese offensives was
unprecedented. By mid-1942 Japan had taken
not only Singapore but Hong Kong, the

12 ‘Gemas, Malaya. 1942-01-14. Japanese troops advancing during the Invasion of the Malayan Peninsula’, (January 1941) <
https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C218428 >
13 Lee Cecil, ‘Sunset of the Raj: Fall of Singapore 1942’, (Durham, UK: The Pentland Press Ltd., 1994) p.199
14
Stephen Weir ‘History’s Worst Decisions’, (Millers Point, NSW, Pier 9, 2005) p.147
15 ‘The day Singapore fell to the Japanese’, (February 1941) < http://www.asiaone.com/singapore/photos-feb-15-day-singapore-fell-

japanese >
16 ‘The Fall of Singapore’, The Canberra Times, 16th Feb. 1942, 2, in Trove [online database], accessed 1st Oct. 2018.
17
‘Singapore, Australia’s Dunkirk’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 17th Feb. 1942, 5, in Trove [online database], accessed 1st Oct. 2018.

3
Philippines and the Dutch East Indies.18 The
loss of those territories marked the end of any
possible Allied counter attacks on Japan. As a
result, Australia could only call on its own
forces and resources against a Japanese
onslaught.
Australia and the Decaying Empire:
Australia was ill-equipped for a Japanese
invasion; though it had expanded its Volunteer
Defence Corps to almost 100,000 units, the
volunteers lacked training and equipment.
Australia’s defence capacity was also
technologically behind Japan and the country
had a lack of transport infrastructure to move
troops and supplies. These deficiencies were
further compounded by the nations lack of any
ability to assert command over the air or sea
due to its forces being scattered across Europe
and the Mediterranean.19 Australis woes
worsened as on the 19th of February Japan
would began to commit air raids on Darwin.20
John Curtin in fear of an imminent Japanese
invasion focused all diplomatic initiatives on
preserving national security, putting British
interests secondary to Australian survival.
Since the beginning of the Pacific war Curtin
pushed continuously to see the pacific theatre
recognised as an equal to the war in Europe.
Churchill in contrast promoted a policy to
attain victory in Europe first, whilst mounting
a defensive strategy with limited British
American presence in the Pacific.21 In defiance
18 Antony Beevor, ‘The Second World War’, (London, Phoenix, 2013) p.301
19 Ibid. pp.168-73
20 Antony Beevor, ‘The Second World War’, (London, Phoenix, 2013) p.307
21 Roger J. Bell ‘Unequal Allies’, (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1977) p.34
22 AA: A3196, 1942, 0.5403
23
William Mahony, Daily Telegraph, ‘Long distance thinking’, 1942, < http://john.curtin.edu.au/shapingthenation/essay/leader.html >
Curtin locked horns with Churchill over the
deployment of its remaining professional
divisions fighting in the middle east to be sent
to defend Burma. Curtin insisted that the 7th
and 9th divisions be sent back to Australia to
shore up the meagre defences there.22 When
Churchill relented to Curtin it exposed
Australia’s loss of faith in Great Britain’s
military power. This event between the two
war leaders would be considered as the
geneses of Australian self-sufficiency over the
greater British empire.
Figure 8: Cartoon depicting the Churchill - Curtin cables23
Though the Pacific war and the Fall of
Singapore did break Australia’s traditional
reliance on Britain; it did not cause a
permanent break in relations with Britain nor
did it reduce Australian co-operation with the
Empire. On the contrary by the end of the war
Australia was preoccupied with establishing
itself as a representative of British civilization
in the Pacific. This was achieved through the
ANZAC pact with New Zeeland in January
1944 designed to counter anti-British
ambitions and guarantee Australian security in
4
the Pacific.24 Thus, by the end of the war
Australia had been promoted from a dependent
subordinate to an autonomous partner in the
wider empire, becoming the leading
spokesmen of British interests and culture in
the eastern hemisphere.
Australia and America:
Since the destruction of the Battleships
‘Repulse’ and ‘Prince of Wales’ in early
December Australia had been clamouring for
American protection against the Japanese. One
th
famous example was on December 27 , 1941,
two months before Singapore, where John
Curtin publicly pleaded for American support
in his new year message. In the article titled
the ‘The task ahead’ Curtin wrote
‘The task ahead’ would be the first public plea
for American support in the defence of
Australia. Privately however, Australia had
been constantly calling for more American
support in both Singapore and later Australia
itself.27 Unfortunately for Australia, America
viewed Churchill as the spokesperson for
Australian interests, who saw more American
support in the pacific detrimental to his Europe
first policy.28 To combat this Curtin along with
the minor pacific powers would aggressively
push for direct political contact with
Washington; so to assert their war concerns
and aims. The pacific War Council in
Washington was formed as a result on April
1st, 1942 with representatives from Britain,
Australia, New Zealand, China, Netherlands

“Australia looks to America, free of any pangs and Canada.29 The council is not only

as to our traditional links or kingship with important because Australia could directly

United Kingdom”.25 communicate its war goals and interests to

America, but it would also be the first time
where non-commonwealth countries would
recognise Australia’s national interests as
separate from the greater British
commonwealth. By mid-1942 the overall
command of the Pacific theatre was
relinquished by the weakened British to
America; who saw the defence of Australia as
paramount to the war effort. This was due to
Australia being the only viable Pacific base
Figure 9:'The Task Ahead"26
from which the U.S. could prepare for counter
offensives against Japan.30 On the 21st March

24 Stuart Ward ‘Australia and the British Embrace’, (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 2001) pp. 38-40
25 ‘The Task Ahead’, The Herald, 27th Dec. 1942, 10, in Trove [online database], accessed 1st Oct. 2018.
26
Melbourne Herald, ‘The Task Ahead’, (1941), < http://john.curtin.edu.au/roosevelt/friction.html >
27. James Curran, ‘Curtin’s Empire’, (Cambridge, University press, Cambridge,2011) p.91
28 Roger J. Bell ‘Unequal Allies’, (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1977) p.39
29 Ibid. p.50
30
Ibid. p.40

5
1942 General Douglas MacArthur arrived in
Melbourne to take control of allied command
in the south Pacific. 25,000 American troops
soon followed, reinforcing Australia’s weak
position and relieving anxiety’s over a
Japanese invasion.31

Figure 11: Yorktown at the Battle of Midway34

Australia would participate in these campaigns

until August 15th when Japan announced its
surrender, bringing an end to the Pacific
War.35 Australia’s American alliance was built
from a political necessity and was not
translated into an immediate post war alliance.
However, the wartime experience between the
two countries and the effective military
association between them provided a
Figure 10: Curtin and MacArthur32
foundation for the ANZUS alliance, between
By June 1942 the Americans would win two
Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. more
decisive naval victories over the Japanese; the
than a decade after the fall of Singapore.36 The
Battle of Coral Sea on the 8th of May and the
Tripartite alliance would replace the ANZAC
Battle of Midway on June 7th. The former was
pact, but the core interests of protecting
considered a turning point in the pacific war
Australia’s sovereignty and Anglo-Saxon
not only ending the threat of Australian
identity remained. The ANZUS treaty would
invasion, but also resulting in several
become the cornerstone of Australian
offensives within Australian New Guinea,
defensive policy as it guaranteed Australian
Philippines, and East Indies.33
independence in the pacific through leading
joint missions such as in east Timor, and
supporting Americas interests in Korea,

31 Antony Beevor, ‘The Second World War’, (London, Phoenix, 2013) p.460
32 ‘PM John Curtin shaking hands with General Douglas MacArthur’, (8th June 1943), < http://john.curtin.edu.au/macarthur/essay1.html >
33 Antony Beevor, ‘The Second World War’, (London, Phoenix, 2013) pp.460-469
34
Official U.S. Navy Photography, U.S. National Archives, ‘USS Yorktown (CV-5) is hit by a torpedo’, (4th June 1942), <
https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-events/world-war-ii/midway/80-G-414423.html >
35
Antony Beevor, ‘The Second World War’, (London, Phoenix, 2013) pp.776
36
Roger J. Bell ‘Unequal Allies’, (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1977) p.39

6
Vietnam and the War on Terror. Ultimately Conclusion:
America didn’t replace Britain as Australia’s
The consequences of the loss of Singapore not
protector; instead America and Australia had
only pushed Australia into becoming more
become partners in guaranteeing each other’s
self-sufficient to face the threat of Japan; but it
security in the pacific.37 A partnership which
also began a diplomatic revolution within the
has continued to stand throughout the cold war
country, ending its reliance on the weakened
and into the modern era.
British Empire and strengthening its bonds
with the U.S. in the process. Thus, forming a
strong self-determined Australia that continues
to hold prominence in the south pacific to this
very day.

37
Augustine Meaher IV, ‘The Road to Singapore’: The Myth of British Betrayal, (Melbourne, Australia Scholarly Publishing Ltd., 2010) p.82-
84

7
Bibliography:

Primary:

‘The Fall of Singapore’, The Canberra Times, 16th Feb. 1942, 2, in Trove [online database], accessed
1st Oct. 2018.

‘The Task Ahead’, The Herald, 27th Dec. 1942, 10, in Trove [online database], accessed 1st Oct. 2018.

‘Singapore, Australia’s Dunkirk’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 17th Feb. 1942, 5, in Trove [online
database], accessed 1st Oct. 2018.

Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister,
to Mr Clement Attlee, UK Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Cablegram 136, Canberra, 22nd
February 1942.

Secondary:

Beevor, Antony, ‘The Second World War’, (London, Phoenix, 2013)

Meaher, Augustine, ‘The Road to Singapore’: The Myth of British Betrayal, (Melbourne, Australia
Scholarly Publishing Ltd., 2010)

Curran, James, ‘Curtin’s Empire’, (Cambridge, University press, Cambridge,2011)

Cecil, Lee, ‘Sunset of the Raj: Fall of Singapore 1942’, (Durham, UK: The Pentland Press Ltd., 1994)

Bell J., Roger ‘Unequal Allies’, (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1977)

Barclay, Glen St J., ‘Friends in High Places’, (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1985)

Weir, Stephen, ‘History’s Worst Decisions’, (Millers Point, NSW, Pier 9, 2005)

Ward, Stuart ‘Australia and the British Embrace’, (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 2001)

Images:

Figure 1: ‘Japanese march into Singapore’, (February 1942), <

https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/search?query=HU+2787 > accessed 22nd Oct. 2018

Figure 2: Herald and Weekly Times, ‘Prime Minister John Curtin talks with Winston Churchill at the
Premiers Conference’, (1st May 1942) < http://john.curtin.edu.au/manofpeace/crisis.html > accessed
22nd Oct. 2018

Figure 3: ‘Firefighters struggle to extinguish a blaze after the bombing of the Naval Yards in
Singapore’, (January 1942), < http://www.awmlondon.gov.au/battles/singapore > accessed 22nd Oct.
2018

8
Figure 4: ‘British Warship inside Admiralty IX floating dock’, (September 1941), <
https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/007748 > accessed 21st Oct. 2018.

Figure 5: ‘South China Sea. 1941-12-10. Last moments of British battlecruiser Repulse’, (10th
December 1941), < https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/127891 > accessed 1st oct. 2018

Figure 6: ‘Gemas, Malaya. 1942-01-14. Japanese troops advancing during the Invasion of the
Malayan Peninsula’, (January 1941) < https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C218428 > accessed 21st
Oct. 2018.

Figure 7: ‘The day Singapore fell to the Japanese’, (February 1941) <
http://www.asiaone.com/singapore/photos-feb-15-day-singapore-fell-japanese > accessed 1 oct. 2018

Figure 8: William Mahony, Daily Telegraph, ‘Long distance thinking’, (1942), <
http://john.curtin.edu.au/shapingthenation/essay/leader.html > accessed 1st oct. 2018

Figure 9: Melbourne Herald, ‘The Task Ahead’, (1941), <

http://john.curtin.edu.au/roosevelt/friction.html > accessed 1st oct. 2018

Figure 10: ‘PM John Curtin shaking hands with General Douglas MacArthur’, (8th June 1943), <
http://john.curtin.edu.au/macarthur/essay1.html > accessed 21st oct 2018

Figure 11: Official U.S. Navy Photography, U.S. National Archives, ‘USS Yorktown (CV-5) is hit by
a torpedo’, (4th June 1942), < https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-
events/world-war-ii/midway/80-G-414423.html > accessed 21st oct 2018