SHIMIZU VS. MAGSALIN, FGU CORP ET.
AL RULING:
Facts:
 Petitioner claims that Magsalin had breached their subcontract
agreement for the supply, delivery, installation and finishing of
the tiles in certain floors in petitioner’s condominium project.
 The agreement was terminated.
 Due to Magsalin’s refusal to return unliquidated advance
payment and other monetary liabilities, petitioner sent a notice
to respondent FGU Insurance demanding damages pursuant
to the bonds the former had issued for the subcontract.
 Petitioner filed a complaint for actual damages for breach of
contract against Magsalin and FGU
 FGU was duly served with summons. With respect to
Magsalin, despite efforts, their new addresses could not be
determined.
 FGU filed a motion to dismiss but was denied. Likewise, MR
was denied. FGU was obliged to file an answer.
 Petitioner filed a motion for leave to serve summons on
respondent Magsalin by way of publication. Then, the
petitioner filed its reply to FGU Insurance’s answer.
 FGU filed a motion for leave of court to file a third-party
complaint. Baetiong, G. Garcia and C. Garcia were named as
third-party defendants.
 FGU claims that the three had executed counter-guaranties
over bonds it executed for the subcontract w/ Magsalin and,
hence, should be held jointly and severally liable
 RTC admitted the third-party complaint and denied the motion
to serve summons by publication on the ground that the action
against respondent Magsalin was in personam.
 RTC issued a notice setting the case for hearing. FGU filed a
motion to cancel the hearing on the ground that the third-party
defendants had not yet filed their answer. The motion was
granted.
 Of the three third-party defendants, only Baetiong filed an
answer, the officer’s returns on the summons to the Garcias
state that both could not be located at their given addresses.
Petitioner was not served w/ Baetiong’s answer.
 For failure of petitioner to prosecute, RTC dismissed the case.
RTC denied the petitioner’s MR prompting the latter to elevate
its case to the CA via a Rule 41 petition for review.
 CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The appeal raised a pure question of law as it did not dispute
the proceedings before the issuance of the December 16, 2003
dismissal order.
 Petitioner thus filed the present petition for review
on certiorari.
Issues:
 W/N THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO PROSECUTE THE CASE
 W/N THE APPELLATE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO
DETERMINE THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL AS THE
MATTERS THEREIN INVOLVE BOTH QUESTIONS OF LAW
AND FACT.
 W/N IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE LOWER COURT’S
DISMISSAL OF THE CASE IS A CLEAR DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS.
The petition is granted.
 The Dismissal Order is Void
The December 16, 2003 dismissal order shows that it is an
unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal
with prejudice.
Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is
authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
Dismissal with prejudice means dismissal on adjudication of
merits.
It is imperative that the dismissal order conform with Section 1,
Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on the writing of valid judgments
and final orders.
(Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. — A
judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall
be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge,
stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.)
The December 16, 2003 dismissal order clearly violates this
rule for its failure to disclose how and why the petitioner failed
to prosecute its complaint. A trial court should always specify
the reasons for a complaint’s dismissal so that on appeal, the
reviewing court can readily determine the prima
facie justification for the dismissal
There was a denial of due process. Elementary due process
demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on
how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the
court. Where the reasons are absent, a decision has absolutely
nothing to support it and is thus a nullity.
 The appeal was properly filed under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court
In Olave vs. Mistas, among the critical factual
questions was whether, based on the records, there had
been factual basis for the dismissal of the subject complaint.
This same question is particularly significant in the present
case given that the order appealed does not even indicate the
factual basis for the dismissal of the case.
Due to the absence of any stated factual basis, and
despite the admissions of the parties, the CA still had to delve
into the records to check whether facts to justify the prejudicial
dismissal even exist. Since the dismissal of the case appears
to have been rendered motu proprio (as the December 16,
2003 dismissal order does not state if it was issued upon the
respondents’ or the trial court’s motion), the facts to be
determined by the CA should include the grounds specified
under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A court could
only issue a motu proprio dismissal pursuant to the grounds
mentioned in this rule and for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.[32] These grounds are matters of facts. Thus,
given that the dismissal order does not disclose its factual
basis, we are thus persuaded that the petitioner had properly
filed its appeal from the dismissal order under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court.
 The dismissal of the case is not supported by the
facts of the case
The following events were chronologically proximate to the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488: (a) the court admitted FGU
Insurance’s third-party complaint; (b) the trial court cancelled
hearing upon FGU Insurance’s motion; and (c) Baetiong filed
his Answer to the third-party complaint but did not serve it upon
the petitioner.
None of these events square with the grounds specified by
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for the motu proprio
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute.
This does not satisfy the standards of non
prosequitur. The fundamental test for non prosequitur is
whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable
with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the
plaintiff to prosecute.
In this case, the parties’ own narrations of facts
demonstrate the petitioner’s willingness to prosecute its
complaint. Indeed, neither respondents FGU Insurance nor
Baetiong was able to point to any specific act committed by the
petitioner to justify the dismissal of their case.
While it is discretionary on the trial court to dismiss cases,
dismissals of actions should be made with care. The sound
discretion demands vigilance in duly recognizing the
circumstances surrounding the case to the end that technicality
shall not prevail over substantial justice.
SHIMIZU PHILS. CONTRACTORS V MAGSALIN || GR NO
170026 || 20 JUNE 2012
Doctrine: Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules
of Court; Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed for
failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the
dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits.
Grounds for Dismissal of a Case Motu Proprio for Failure to
Prosecute (S3R17) -
(a) Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to appear
on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief;
(b) Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time; (c) Failure of the plaintiff to
comply with the Rules of Court; or
(d) Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.
Summary: Shimizu filed a complaint against both Magsalin
and FGU Insurance. The complaint sought Php 2,329,124.60
as actual damages for the breach of contract. Thereafter, the
RTC issued an Order of Dismissal for the case without citing
the basis nor the reasons therefor. The court held that when a
complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the
dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits. A trial court should always specify
the reasons for a complaints dismissal so that on appeal, the
reviewing court can readily determine the prima facie
justification for the dismissal. The dismissal order clearly
violates this rule for its failure to disclose how and why Shimizu
failed to prosecute its complaint. Where the reasons are
absent, a decision (such as the dismissal order) has absolutely
nothing to support it and is thus a nullity.
Facts: The petitioner Shimizu claims that Leticia Magsalin,
doing business as Karens Trading, had breached their
subcontract agreement for the supply, delivery, installation,
and finishing of parquet tiles for certain floors in the petitioners
Makati City condominium project called The Regency at
Salcedo. The breach triggered the agreements termination.
When Magsalin also refused to return the petitioners
unliquidated advance payment and to account for other
monetary liabilities despite demand, the petitioner sent a notice
to respondent FGU Insurance Corporation demanding
damages pursuant to the surety and performance bonds the
former had issued for the subcontract.
Shimizu filed a complaint against both Magsalin and FGU
Insurance at the RTC of Makati. The complaint sought
P2,329,124.60 as actual damages for the breach of contract.
FGU Insurance was duly served with summons. With respect
to Magsalin, however, the corresponding officers return
declared that both she and Karens Trading could not be
located at their given addresses, and that despite further
efforts, their new addresses could not be determined.
FGU Insurance filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The
Shimizu filed its opposition to the motion. The motion to
dismiss was denied as well as the ensuing motion for
reconsideration, and FGU Insurance was obliged to file an
answer. To assist the RTC in acquiring jurisdiction over
Magsalin, Shimizu filed a motion for leave to serve summons
on respondent Magsalin by way of publication. Shimizu then
filed its reply to FGU Insurances answer
FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a
third-party
complaint. Attached to the motion was the subject complaint,
with Reynaldo Baetiong, Godofredo Garcia and Concordia
Garcia named as third-party defendants. FGU Insurance
claims that the three had executed counter-guaranties over the
surety and performance bonds it executed for the subcontract
with Magsalin and, hence, should be held jointly and severally
liable in the event it is held liable in Civil Case No. 02-488.
RTC admitted the third-party complaint and denied the
motion to serve summons by publication on the ground that the
action against respondent Magsalin was in personam.
The TC issued a notice setting the case for hearing on June
20, 2003. FGU Insurance filed a motion to cancel the
hearing on the ground that the third-party defendants had
not yet filed their answer. The motion was granted.
Baetiong filed his answer to the third-party complaint. He
denied any personal knowledge about the surety and
performance bonds for the subcontract with Magsalin. Of the
(3) persons named as third-party defendants, only Baetiong
filed an answer to the third-party complaint; the officers returns
on the summons to the Garcias state that both could not be
located at their given addresses. Incidentally, Shimizu claims,
and Baetiong does not dispute, that it was not served with
a copy of Baetiongs answer.
Shimizu now argues before us that FGU Insurance, which is
the plaintiff in the third-party complaint, had failed to exert
efforts to serve summons on the Garcias. It suggests that a
motion to serve summons by publication should have been
filed for this purpose. The petitioner also asserts that the RTC
should have scheduled a hearing to determine the status of the
summons to the third-party defendants
On Dec 16, 2003, the RTC issued a worded Order Of
Dismissal, dismissing Civil Case No. 02-488: “For failure
of [petitioner] to prosecute, the case is hereby
DISMISSED”
The RTC denied Shimizu’s motion for reconsideration
prompting the latter to elevate its case to the CA via a Rule 41
petition for review
FGU Insurance moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. It argued that the appeal raised a
pure question of law as it did not dispute the proceedings
before the issuance of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order.
Shimizu, on the other hand, insisted that it had raised
questions of fact in the appeal stating that “While, the instant
appeal does not involve the merits of the case, the same
involves questions of fact based on the records of the
case. It must be emphasized that the lower courts dismissal of
the case based on alleged failure to prosecute on the part of
plaintiff-appellant was too sudden and precipitate.”
The CA agreed with FGU Insurance and dismissed the appeal,
and denied as well the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. The petitioner thus filed
the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the Order of Dismissal was valid and
proper – No.
Held: No, the dismissal order is void.
The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face. It simply
states its conclusion that the case should be dismissed
for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the
facts on which this conclusion is based.
Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is
authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A
plain examination of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order
shows that it is an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to
be a dismissal with prejudice. “Dismissals of actions (under
Section 3) which do not expressly state whether they are with
or without prejudice are held to be with prejudice.” As a
prejudicial dismissal, the dismissal order is also deemed to be
a judgment on the merits so that the petitioner’s complaint in
Civil Case No. 02-488 can no longer be refiled on the principle
of res judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed
for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified,
the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the
merits.
As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the
dismissal order conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of
Court on the writing of valid judgments and final orders. A trial
court should always specify the reasons for a complaints
dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily
determine the prima facie justification for the dismissal. The
dismissal order clearly violates this rule for its failure to
disclose how and why Shimizu failed to prosecute its
complaint. Thus, neither Shimizu nor the reviewing court is
able to know the particular facts that had prompted the
prejudicial dismissal.
We thus agree with Shimizu that the dismissal constituted a
denial of due process. Elementary due process demands that
the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case
was decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. Where the
reasons are absent, a decision (such as the dismissal
order) has absolutely nothing to support it and is thus a
nullity.
Moreover, the Dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not
Supported by the Facts of the Case.
Based on available records and on the averments of the
parties, the following events were chronologically proximate to
the dismissal of the Civil Case: (a) on March 24, 2003, the
court admitted FGU Insurances third-party complaint; (b) the
trial court cancelled the June 20, 2003 hearing upon FGU
Insurances motion; and (c) on June 16, 2003, Baetiong filed
his Answer to the third-party complaint but did not serve it upon
the petitioner.
None of these events square with the grounds specified by
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for the motu proprio
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute. These grounds
are as follows:
(a) Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to appear
on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief;
(b) Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time; (c) Failure of the plaintiff to
comply with the Rules of Court; or
(d) Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.
The developments in the present case do not satisfy the
stringent standards set
in law and jurisprudence for a non prosequitur. The
fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the
circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due
diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.
There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to
prosecute.
In this case, the parties own narrations of facts demonstrate
Shimizu’s willingness to prosecute its complaint. Indeed,
neither FGU Insurance nor Baetiong was able to point to any
specific act committed by Shimizu to justify the dismissal of
their case.
While it is discretionary on the trial court to dismiss cases,
dismissals of actions should be made with care. The
repressive or restraining effect of the rule amounting to
adjudication upon the merits may cut short a case even before
it is fully litigated; a ruling of dismissal may forever bar a litigant
from pursuing judicial relief under the same cause of
action. This court is thus of the opinion that the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 02-488 is not warranted. Neither facts, law or
jurisprudence supports the RTCs finding of failure to prosecute
on the part of the petitioner. Hence, the petition is granted. The
order of dismissal is declared null and void.
DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL.

G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles
of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary
injunction before the RTC against the private respondents.
Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’
complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of
dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or
on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July
1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the
motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July
22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a
notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of
appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was
received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order
dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of
the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court,
petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice
of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the
day they received the final order of the trial court denying their
motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they
were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On
September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled
that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned
from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12,
1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the
appellate court, the order was the “final order” appealable
under the Rules.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of
the 15-day reglmentary period to appeal, the February 12,
1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.
HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration should be deemed as the final order. In the
case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court
declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his
complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an
omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was
filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing
his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this
was likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed
within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this
was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The
SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial
of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
complaint which constituted the final order as it was what
ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was
reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et
al. where the SC again considered the order denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which
finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on
the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners’ view
that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh
period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and
Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full
or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice
of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July
22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal
shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or”
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed
within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days
from notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to
refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new
trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section
39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days
to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original
period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and
the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh
period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts
to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In
this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed
decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in
the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment.
While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we
likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of
appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC’s decision or file
it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”)
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if
either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final
and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period
provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their
notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of
the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22,
1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh
appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
IMPORTANT NOTES:
The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” do not apply to Rule 64 (Review
of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit)
because Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution. It is likewise
doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.
IMPORTANT NOTES:
The Neypes Rule
STATEMENT OF THE RULE
The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the “Fresh
Period Rule,” states that “a party litigant may either file his
notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional
Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the
order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.” (Domingo Neypes versus Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005)
PURPOSE OF THE RULE
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration. (supra)
The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize
the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the
confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer
interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves
with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since
the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration
or any final order or resolution. (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa
Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)
THE RULE PRIOR TO NEYPES
Before the Supreme Court prmulgated Neypes, the rules
mandate that the filing of a motion for reconsideration
interrupts the running of the period to appeal; and that an
appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. While the period to file
an appeal is counted from the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, the appellant does not have the full fifteen (15)
days. The appellant only has the remaining time of the 15-day
appeal period to file the notice of appeal. Thus, some rules on
appeals are:
Sec. 39. [B.P. 129] Appeals. – The period for appeal from final
orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any
court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from
the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas
corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight
hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
SEC. 3. [Rule 41] Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall
be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal
and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice
of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for
new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to
file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
SEC. 6. [Rule 122] When appeal to be taken. — An appeal
must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the
judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This
period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the
time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice
of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the
accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period
begins to run.
IN WHAT CASES APPLICABLE
`Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of Appeals
and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court.32 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full
or partial) or any final order or resolution. (Neypes, supra)
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if
either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final
and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period
provided in Rule 41, Section 3. (Neypes, supra)
The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a
party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered
the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the
case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to
have judgments of courts become final at some definite time,
we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. (Neypes, supra)
APPLICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the
Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should
equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the
Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the
periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section
39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal
from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions
of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from
the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we
(this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.17
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently
worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial
difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results
are concerned – the appeal period stops running upon the
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to
run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for
new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes
addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in
criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary
appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a
purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the
Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of
which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, thus:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — x x x x
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
xxxx
Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule
124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the
RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in
civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists
why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should be treated differently.
Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes
and make it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil
cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd
situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right
to appeal than an accused in a criminal case – a situation that
gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates
against the accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard
of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests
are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be
prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and
unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time,
courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that
what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law – Quod est
inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in
lege.18 (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, G.R. No.
170979, 09 Feb. 2011)
RETROACTIVE EFFECT
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule
announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where
the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005
when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be
answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural
laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no
vested rights in the rules of procedure.17 Amendments to
procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as
they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights
already existing.18
Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically
warrants that Neypes bears the quested retroactive effect, to
wit:
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes
rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able
to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the
legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule
against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be
given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of
a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch
as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a
fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in
the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the
lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural
laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending
actions, such as the present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period
rule" will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject
notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later
or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and
final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be
incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of
judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the
benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the
lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.19
Notably, the subject incidents in Sps. De los Santos occurred
in August 2000, at the same month as the relevant incidents at
bar. There is no reason to adopt herein a rule that is divergent
from that in Sps. De los Santos. (Fil-Estate Properties, Inc.
versus Hon. Marietta Homena J. Valencia, G.R. No. 173942,
25 June 2008)
NOT INCONSISTENT WITH RULES OF COURT
This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3
of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within
15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation
and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.33
Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the
notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order,"
which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order
denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. (Neypes,
supra)
NEYPES RULE NOT APPLIED
Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 1
year, a period which is considered as a correctional penalty.
Under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, light felonies are
those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty
of arresto menor (one to thirty days of imprisonment) or a fine
not exceeding two hundred pesos (P200), or both are
imposable. Thus, perjury is not a light felony or offense
contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was therefore mandatory
for petitioner to be present at the promulgation of the judgment.
To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent when the
MTCC promulgated its judgment on 25 August 2009. Pursuant
to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only when the accused is convicted of
a light offense that a promulgation may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative. In case the accused
failed to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation despite
notice, and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause,
the accused shall lose all the remedies available in the Rules
against the judgment. One such remedy was the Motion for
Reconsideration of the judgment of the MTCC filed by
petitioner on 28 August 2009. Absent a motion for leave to
avail of the remedies against the judgment, the MTCC should
not have entertained petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, petitioner had only 15 days from 25 August 2009 or until
9 September 2009 to file his Motion for Probation. The MTCC
thus committed grave abuse of discretion when it entertained
the motion instead of immediately denying it. xxx
Petitioner, however, did not file a motion for leave to avail
himself of the remedies prior to filing his Motion for
Reconsideration. The hearing on the motion for leave would
have been the proper opportunity for the parties to allege and
contest whatever cause prevented petitioner from appearing
on 25 August 2009, and whether that cause was indeed
justifiable. If granted, petitioner would have been allowed to
avail himself of other remedies under the Rules of Court,
including a motion for reconsideration. xxx
As a final point, while we held in Yu v. Samson-Tatad that the
rule in Neypes is also applicable to criminal cases regarding
appeals from convictions in criminal cases under Rule 122 of
the Rules of Court, nevertheless, the doctrine is not applicable
to this case, considering that petitioner’s Motion for Probation
was filed out of time. (Anselmo de Leon Cuyo versus People
of the Phils, G.R. No. 192164 October 12, 2011)
A. RAFAEL C. DINGLASAN, JR.
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 145420 September 19, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Before this Court is a Petition for New Trial and, in the
alternative, for the Reopening of the Case1 on the ground of
newly discovered evidence filed by A. Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr.
(Dinglasan) who was found guilty2 of violating Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks
Law, by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 62,
in Criminal Case No. 21238.
 The alleged newly discovered evidence claimed by
Dinglasan are the affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan, in her
capacity as Executive Vice-President and Treasurer of Elmyra,
and Ma. Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan, the wife of Mariano
Dinglasan, who, during his lifetime, was the Cashier and
Liaison Officer of the same company. These affidavits,
together with the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985
attached to Solidbank Manager's Check No. 002969 dated 3
October 1985 sent by Ma. Elena Dinglasan to Antrom, tends to
prove that Dinglasan made good of the check within five
banking days from notice of dishonor. He could not, therefore,
be validly convicted of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for
one of the essential elements of the offense, that is, the drawer
failed and refused to make good the said check within five
banking days from the notice of dishonor, is absent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a new trial or reopening of the case
based on newly discovered evidence should be allowed.
HELD:
Explicit from the above stated rule that a Motion for
New Trial should be filed before the judgment of the appellate
court convicting the accused becomes final.
To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned
from the receipt of the resolution or order denying the second
motion for reconsideration would result to an absurd situation
whereby courts will be obliged to issue orders or resolutions
denying what is a prohibited motion in the first place, in order
that the period for the finality of judgments shall run, thereby,
prolonging the disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling
would allow a party to forestall the running of the period of
finality of judgments by virtue of filing a prohibited pleading;
such a situation is not only illogical but also unjust to the
winning party.
It should be emphasized that the applicant for new
trial has the burden of showing that the new evidence he seeks
to present has complied with the requisites to justify the
holding of a new trial.28
The threshold question in resolving a motion for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether the
proferred evidence is in fact a "newly discovered evidence
which could not have been discovered by due diligence." The
question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two
aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence
discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it
have been discovered.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194702 April 20, 2015
SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS
GROUP, INC. and OSCAR VIOLAGO, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG, Respondent.
TOPIC: Delegation of Powers
DOCTRINE/PROVISIONS:
 The "fresh period rule"—which allows a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration—applies only to judicial appeals and
not to administrative appeals.
FACTS:
 April 15, 2000: Petitioner SLR Builders as seller, and
respondent Cristina, as buyer, entered into a "contract
to sell" of a sixty (60)-square meter lot in Violago
Homes Parkwoods Subdivision, located in Barangay
Payatas, Quezon City.
 Upon full payment of the monthly amortizations on the
purchased lot, Cristina demanded from SLR Builders
the execution of the deed of absolute sale and the
lot’s certificate of title but the latter failed to deliver.
Cristina filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages against the petitioners before the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
 February 16, 2004: The Housing and Land Use
Arbiter ruled in Cristina’s favor.
 The petitioners appealed to the HLURB Board of
Commissioners. The Board dismissed and denied the
petitioners’ appeal and their subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
 April 27, 2006: The petitioners filed an appeal to the
Office of the President (OP).
 November 17, 2006: The OP dismissed the
petitioners’ appeal for having been filed out of time.
The HLURB Decision affirming the Arbiter’s decision
was received by them on July 27, 2005. On that date,
the 15-day prescriptive period within which to file an
appeal began to run. Instead of preparing an appeal,
SLR Builders opted to file a Motion for
Reconsideration on August 10, 2005. Their filing of
the said motion interrupted the period of appeal by
that time, however, 14 days had already elapsed.
April 18, 2006 was their last day left to appeal. When
they filed on April 27, 2006, they were already 9 days
late.
  The petitioners moved to reconsider and argued that
the "fresh period rule" in Domingo Neypes, et al. v.
Court of Appeals, et al. should be applied to their
case.
 July 26, 2007: The OP denied the petitioners’ motion
with finality, stating that the "fresh period rule" applies
only to judicial appeals and not to administrative
appeals.
 The CA denied the petitioners’ petition for review and
denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration;
hence, the filing of the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies to
administrative appeals, such as an appeal filed from a decision
of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office to the
President.
HELD: The "fresh period rule" applies only to judicial appeals
and not to administrative appeals. The "fresh period rule" in
Neypes declares:
To standardize the appeal periods provided
in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also
apply to Rule 40…, Rule 42…, Rule 43…,
Rule 45…The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.
Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, the appeal from a
decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP is
administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes
does not apply.
As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and regulations
governing appeals from decisions of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB
Resolution No. 765-20041 in relation to Paragraph 2, Section 1
of Administrative Order No. 18-1987.2
1Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765-2004, Section 2.
Appeal. - Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the
other party, appeal a decision rendered by the Board of
Commissioners to the Office of the President within fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344
and A.O. No. 18 Series of 1987. The pendency of the motion
RULING: DENY the present petition for review on certiorari
and AFFIRM the decision dated July 23, 2010 and resolution
dated December 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 100332.
De Leon vs. PEA; PEA vs. Judge Alaras G.R. No. 181970;
G.R. No. 182678. August 3, 2010 Ponente: Peralta, J.
FACTS
On January 15, 1993, petitioner Bernardo De Leon
(De Leon) filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Makati City, against
respondent PEA, as well as its officers. The suit for damages
hinged on the alleged unlawful destruction of De Leons fence
and houses constructed on Lot 5155 containing an area of
11,997 square meters, situated in San Dionisio, Paranaque,
which De Leon claimed has been in the possession of his
family for more than 50 years. Essentially, De Leon prayed
that one, lawful possession of the land in question be awarded
to him; two, PEA be ordered to pay damages for demolishing
the improvements constructed on Lot 5155; and, three, an
injunctive relief be issued to enjoin PEA from committing acts
which would violate his lawful and peaceful possession of the
subject premises.
RTC - The court a quo found merit in De Leons
application for writ of preliminary injunction and thus issued
the Order dated 8 February 1993.
PEA filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for a
Restraining Order, ascribing grave abuse of discretion against
the court a quo for issuing injunctive relief. On 30 September
1993, the Ninth Division of this Court rendered
a Decision discerning that the court a quo did not act in a
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power in issuing
the writ of preliminary injunction against PEA.
PEA appealed to the Supreme Court via a Petition for
Certiorari insisting that Lot 5155 was a salvage zone until it
was reclaimed through government efforts in 1982.
Ruling squarely on the issue adduced before it, the
Supreme Court declared that Lot 5155 was a public land so
that De Leons occupation thereof, no matter how long ago,
could not confer ownership or possessory rights. Prescinding
therefrom, no writ of injunction may lie to protect De Leons
nebulous right of possession. Accordingly, in its Decision dated
20 November 2000.
SC – reversed the decision of the RTC.
for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period of
appeal to the Office of the President.
2 Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18-
1987 provides that in case the aggrieved party files a motion
for reconsideration from an adverse decision of any
agency/office, the said party has the only remaining balance of
the prescriptive period within which to appeal, reckoned from
receipt of notice of the decision denying his/her motion for
reconsideration.
 The aforesaid Decision of the SC became final and
executory as no motion for reconsideration was filed. In due
course, PEA moved for the issuance of a writ of execution
praying that De Leon and persons claiming rights under him be
ordered to vacate and peaceably surrender possession
of Lot 5155.
Acting on PEAs motion, the court a quo issued the
first assailed Order (writ of execution) dated 15 September
2004. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
De Leon then filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the CA assailing the September 15, 2004 and
April 29, 2005 Orders of the RTC of Makati City.
Subsequently, De Leon filed a second special civil
action for certiorari with the CA seeking to annul and set aside
the same RTC Orders dated September 15, 2004 and April 29,
2005, as well as the RTC Order of July 27, 2005.
De Leon insists that what this Court did in PEA v.
CA was to simply dismiss his complaint for damages and
nothing more, and that the RTC erred and committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of execution placing PEA in
possession of the disputed property. He insists that he can
only be removed from the disputed property through an
ejectment proceeding.
ISSUE
The issues raised in the present petitions boil down to the
question of whether PEA is really entitled to possess the
subject property and, if answered in the affirmative, whether
the RTC should proceed to hear PEAs Motion for the Issuance
of a Writ of Demolition.
RULING
YES. As a general rule, a writ of execution
should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be
executed; an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond
the original judgment or award. The settled general principle is
that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential
particular of the judgment promulgated,and may not vary the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond
the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.
However, it is equally settled that possession is an
essential attribute of ownership. Where the ownership of a
parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the
possession of the land should be considered included in the
decision, it appearing that the defeated partys claim to the
possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership.
Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the
delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any
right to possess the land independently of his claim of
ownership which was rejected. This is precisely what
happened in the present case. This Court had already declared
the disputed property as owned by the State and that De Leon
does not have any right to possess the land independent of his
claim of ownership.
In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of
property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party in
possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to
surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party,
the sheriff or other proper officer should oust him. No express
order to this effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor is a
categorical statement needed in the decision that in such event
the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to
remove the improvements on the property if the defendant fails
to do so within a reasonable period of time. The removal of the
improvements on the land under these circumstances is
deemed read into the decision, subject only to the issuance of
a special order by the court for the removal of the
improvements.
It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to
what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. In the
present case, it would be redundant for PEA to go back to
court and file an ejectment case simply to establish its right to
possess the subject property. Contrary to DeLeons claims, the
issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court did not
constitute an unwarranted modification of this Courts decision
in PEA v. CA, but rather, was a necessary complement
thereto. Such writ was but an essential consequence of this
Courts ruling affirming the nature of the subject parcel of land
as public and at the same time dismissing De Leons claims of
ownership and possession. To further require PEA to file an
ejectment suit to oust de Leon and his siblings from the
disputed property would, in effect, amount to encouraging
multiplicity of suits.
Spouses NOCEDA vs. DIRECTO G.R. No. 178495 July
26, 2010
FACTS:
Sometime in 1986, respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo filed a
complaint against her nephew, petitioner Rodolfo Noceda, for
"Recovery of Possession and Ownership and
Rescission/Annulment of Donation." She donated a portion of
her hereditary share to her nephew, but the latter occupied a
bigger area, claiming ownership thereof since September
1985. Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondent on
November 1991. On appeal, CA still ruled in favor of the
respondent. Spouses Noceda elevated the case to the
Supreme Court but their petition was denied. A writ of
execution was issued against the petitioners on March 2001.
Petitioners Noceda then instituted an action for quieting of title
against Directo. In the complaint, petitioners admitted that
previous case was decided in favor of respondent and a writ of
execution had been issued, ordering them to vacate the
property. However, petitioners claimed that the land, which
was the subject matter of the previous case, was the same
parcel of land owned by spouses Dahipon from whom they
purchased a portion; and that a title was issued in their name.
Respondent moved to dismiss the case on the ground of res
judicata but her motion was denied for lack of identity of
causes of action. During the trial, respondent filed a Demurrer
to Evidence, stating that the claim of ownership and
possession of petitioners on the basis of the title emanating
from that of Dahipon was already raised in the previous case.
The trial court granted the demurrer which was affirmed by the
CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable in this
case.
RULING:
Yes. Under Sec. 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, there are
two main rules mark the distinction between the principles
governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may
operate as evidence. The first general rule embodied in
paragraph (b) is referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while
the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of
the same section and rule, is known as "conclusiveness of
judgment." Bar by former judgment bars the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of
action, while conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation
of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the
same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
In the previous case, it has been established that petitioners
have no right of ownership or possession over the land in
question. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment,
such material fact becomes binding and conclusive on the
parties. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the
court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them.
Adelaida Infante vs. Aran Builders Inc.
August 24, 2007 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Facts:
Before the RTC of Muntinlupa City, presided over by Judge
Perello was an action for revival of judgment filed on June 6,
2001 by Aran Builders, Inc. against Adelaida Infante.
The judgment sought to be revived was rendered by
the RTC of Makati City in an action for specific performance
and damages, where it ruled in favor of R and ordered P to
execute a deed of sale of a lot in Ayala Alabang, to register the
said deed and deliver title to R, and to pay the taxes of the said
lot. The same judgment ordered R to pay P the sum
of P321,918.25 upon P's compliance with the aforementioned
order. R sought to revive the judgment since P refused to
comply to the court’s order.
P filed a motion to dismiss the action for revival of judgment on
the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over
the persons of the parties and that venue was improperly
laid. R opposed the motion.
Muntinlupa RTC denied P’s MTD. Stating that the reason that
the case to be revived was heard in the Makati RTC was only
because there was still no RTC in Muntinlupa City. With the
creation of the RTCs of Muntinlupa City, matters involving
properties located in this City, and cases
involving Muntinlupa City residents were all ordered to be
litigated before these Courts. Since the subject lot of the case
to be revived is located in Muntinlupa City, RTC of Muntinlupa
is the correct venue.
P appealed to the CA and asserts that the complaint for
specific performance and damages before the Makati RTC is
an action in personam and, therefore, the suit to revive the
judgment therein is also personal in nature; and that,
consequently, the venue of the action for revival of judgment is
either Makati City or Parañaque City where private respondent
and petitioner respectively reside, at the election of private
respondent.
CA held that since the judgment sought to be revived was
rendered in an action involving title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, the action for revival of
judgment is then an action in rem which should be filed with
the RTC of the place where the real property is located.
Issues/Held:
WoN the revival of judgment is a real action- YES
WoN Muntinlupa RTC is the correct venue for the revival of
judgment rendered by Makati RTC- YES
Ratio:
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that after the lapse of 5 years from entry of judgment
and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a final
and executory judgment or order may be enforced by
action. The Rule does not specify in which court the action
for revival of judgment should be filed.
In Aldeguer v. Gemelo,[3] the Court held that:
x x x an action upon a judgment
must be brought either in the same court
where said judgment was rendered or in the
place where the plaintiff or defendant
resides, or in any other place designated
by the statutes which treat of the venue
of actions in general.
It must be noted that other provisions in the rules of
procedure which fix the venue of actions in general must be
considered.
Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4
provide:
Section 1. Venue of real actions. -
Actions affecting title to or possession of
real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court
 which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.
xxxx
Section 2. Venue of personal
actions. - All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff
or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,
or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where
he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.
Thus, the proper venue depends on the determination of
whether the present action for revival of judgment is a real
action or a personal action.
P cites the case of Aldeguer to support her claim but
misunderstood the doctrine to mean that any action for revival
of judgment should be considered as a personal one. The
Court specified that the judgment sought to be revived in said
case was a judgment for damages. The judgment subject of
the action for revival did not involve or affect any title to or
possession of real property or any interest therein. P also cited
the case of Donnelly, but the judgment to be revived in the said
case was for a collection of a sum money which is a personal
action. Clearly, the Court's classification
in Aldeguer and Donnelly of the actions for revival of judgment
as being personal in character does not apply to the present
case.
The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment
determine whether it is a real action or a personal action.
The previous judgment has conclusively declared private
respondent's right to have the title over the disputed property
conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that R has an
established interest over the lot in question; and to protect
such right or interest, private respondent brought suit to revive
the previous judgment. The sole reason for the present
action to revive is the enforcement of private respondent's
adjudged rights over a piece of realty. Verily, the action
falls under the category of a real action, for it affects
private respondent's interest over real property.
The present case for revival of judgment being a real action,
the complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the place where the realty is located.
According to Sec.18 of BP129, the Supreme Court shall define
the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court
shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be
deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for
purposes of determining the venue of all suits.
Originally, Muntinlupa City was under the territorial jurisdiction
of the Makati Courts. However, Section 4 of RA No. 7154,
entitled An Act to Amend Section Fourteen of BP 129,
Otherwise Known As The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1981, took effect on September 4, 1991. Said law provided for
the creation of a branch of the RTC in Muntinlupa. Thus, it is
now the RTC in Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction
or authority to validly issue orders and processes concerning
real property within Muntinlupa City.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated August 12, 2002 and Resolution dated January
7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
ARTURO FLORES VS SPOUSES ENRICO AND EDNA
LINDO 648 SCRA 772
FACTS: In October 1995, Edna Lindo obtained a loan
amounting to P400k from Arturo Flores. To secure the loan,
Edna executed a deed of real estate mortgage on a property
which is however part of the conjugal property (it was both in
her name and her husband’s name Enrico Lindo). Only Edna
signed the deed. But in November 1995, Enrico executed a
special power of attorney authorizing Edna to mortgage the
property.
Edna was not able to pay the loan despite repeated demands
from Flores. Flores then filed an action to foreclose the
mortgage.
The trial court (RTC Manila, Branch 33) ruled that the action for
foreclosure cannot prosper because it appears that there was
no valid mortgage between Edna and Flores. Edna mortgaged
the property without the consent of her husband and the
special power of attorney executed by Enrico a month after the
execution of the deed did not cure the defect. The trial court
however ruled that Flores can instead file a personal action
(collection suit) against Edna.
Eventually, Flores filed a suit for collection of sum of money
against Edna and Enrico (raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 42).
The Lindo spouses filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
res judicata. The trial court denied the motion. The spouses
then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The CA ruled in favor of the spouses. It ruled that when Flores
filed an action for the foreclosure of the mortgage, he had
abandoned the remedy of filing a personal action to collect the
indebtedness. These remedies are mutually exclusive.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. It is true that as a rule, a mortgagee-creditor has a
single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to
recover the debt; and that he has the option of either filing a
personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a
real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. These
remedies are indeed mutually exclusive. However, in this case,
the Supreme Court made a pro hac vice decision (applicable
only to this case and as an exception to the rule) which allows
Flores to recover via a personal action despite his prior filing of
a real action to recover the indebtedness. This procedural rule
cannot be outweighed by the rule on unjust enrichment. Here,
Edna admitted her liability of indebtedness.
Further, the ruling of the Manila RTC Branch 33 is erroneous
when it ruled that the mortgage between Edna and Flores is
invalid. It is true that a disposition (or in this case a mortgage,
which is an act of strict dominion) of a conjugal property by one
spouse without the consent of the other spouse is VOID.
However, under the second paragraph of Article 124 of the
Family Code:
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus it is clear, the mortgage was void at the outset but it was
ratified when a month later, Enrico executed a special power of
attorney authorizing Edna to mortgage the subject property.
(So I guess this is an exception to the rule that “no void act can
be ratified”.)
FGU Insurance Corporation vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 66
G.R. No. 161282; February 23, 2011
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
On June 18, 1994, G. P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation
(GPS) agreed to transport 30 units of Condura S.D. white
refrigerators in one of its Isuzu trucks, driven by Lambert
Eroles, from the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc. (CII)
in Alabang, to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City.
On its way to its destination, however, the Isuzu truck collided
with another truck resulting in the damage of said appliances.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU) paid P204,450.00 to CII,
the insured. As subrogee of the insured’s rights and interests,
FGU sought reimbursement of the amount it paid from GPS.
RTC, CA, and SC ruled that GPS was not a common carrier
but nevertheless held it liable under the doctrine of culpa
contractual. In due course, an entry of judgment was issued
certifying that the August 6, 2002 decision of the SC became
final and executor on October 3, 2002.
On October 14, 2002 ,FGU filed a motion for execution with the
RTC praying that a writ of execution be issued to enforce the
August 6, 2002 judgment award of this Court in the amount of
P204,450.00. On November 5, 2002, GPS filed its Opposition
to Motion for Execution praying that the latter’s claim was
unlawful, illegal, against public policy and good morals, and
constituted unjust enrichment. GPS alleged that it was
discovered, upon verification from the insured, that after the
insured’s claim was compensated in full, the insured
transferred the ownership of the subject appliances to FGU. In
turn, FGU sold the same to third parties thereby receiving and
appropriating the consideration and proceeds of the sale. GPS
believed that FGU should not be allowed to “doubly recover”
the losses it suffered.
On July 1, 2003, the RTC issued an order granting GPS’
motion to set case for hearing, ordering both parties to present
evidence in support of their respective positions regarding the
alleged turnover of 30 refrigerators to FGU. FGU brought the
case to the Supreme Court, contending that the RTC
unlawfully neglected the performance of its ministerial duty
when it denied the issuance of a writ of execution.
ISSUE:
Did the RTC err in denying the issuance of a writ of execution?
HELD:
NO. Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of
judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made
by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the
land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be
struck down.
But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1) the
correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void
judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable. The exception to the doctrine of immutability of
judgment has been applied in several cases in order to serve
substantial justice.
In the case at bench, the Court agrees with the RTC that there
is indeed a need to find out the whereabouts of the subject
refrigerators. For this purpose, a hearing is necessary to
determine the issue of whether or not there was an actual
turnover of the subject refrigerators to FGU by the assured CII.
If there was an actual turnover, it is very important to find out
whether FGU sold the subject refrigerators to third parties and
profited from such sale.
If, indeed, there was an actual delivery of the refrigerators and
FGU profited from the sale after the delivery, there would be an
unjust enrichment if the realized profit would not be deducted
from the judgment amount. “The Court is not precluded from
rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to
the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the
sacrifice of justice for technicality.”