1 THE VANDEVELD LAW OFFICES, P.C.

Mr. Curtis C. Van de veld, Esq.

2 Attorney and Legal Counselor
Restored Historic Dungca House, Second Floor
3 123 Hernan Cortes Avenue
Hagåtña, Guam 96910
Telephone:
4 Hagåtña Office: 671.472.4396
Home Office: 671.477.2020
5 Cellular: 671.488.0888
Facsimile: 671.472.2561
6 Email: curtis@vandeveldlawguam.com or
curtisguamlawyer@hotmail.com
7
Attorney for Defendant:
8 GREGORIO B. CRUZ, Jr.

10
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
11

12

13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Criminal Case No. CR 16-00014

)
14 Plaintiff, )
)
15 vs. )
) MOTION TO SUPPRESS ALL EVIDENCE
16 )
GREGORIO B. CRUZ, Jr., )
17 )
Defendant. )
18 )

19 MOTION TO SUPPRESS ALL EVIDENCE

20 COMES NOW Defendant GREGORIO B. CRUZ, Jr., through Defendant’s counsel, THE

21 VANDEVELD LAW OFFICES, P.C., Mr. Curtis C. Van de veld, Esq., to move the court to suppress

22 all the evidence obtained by police in this matter on the grounds of illegal seizure of the

23 person of Defendant and that the evidence was obtained in violation of Defendant’s

24 constitutional rights. As remedy, Defendant asks the court to dismiss the charges and this

25 case.

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1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

2 STATEMENT OF FACTS

3 Defendant is charged with a single charge of POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO

4 DISTRIBUTE METHAMPHETAMINE [as a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and

5 (b)(1)(A)(viii).] See Indictment. The charge is based upon an arrest of Defendant by Guam

6 Police Department (“GPD”) Officers after contact with Defendant initiated by GPD Officer

7 Benny T. Babauta (hereinafter referred to as “Babauta”). Babauta has made conflicting

8 statements for Babauta’s initial contact with Defendant, but in Babauta’s report provided in

9 discovery, Babauta reports the events as follows,

10 At approximately 1:24am, 4-21-16, the undersigned was making a check of the

11 Palmridge Hotel (parking lot) in Barrigada, and while motoring towards the

12 end of the parking lot from Route 8, I observed the silhouette of a male

13 individual situated at the driver’s door area of the vehicle, later described as:

14 2005 Toyota Sienna (brown)

15 GLP:93/ MNG7801

16 RO: Gregorio B. Cruz, Jr.

17 parked at a stall located towards the middle of the parking lot. As I came closer

18 to the vehicle. I noticed the suspicious mail, shutting the driver’s door and

19 dodging towards the rear of the vehicle. While coming alongside the vehicle, I

20 noticed what appeared to be the driver’s window shattered, but still held in

21 place by the window tint. I immediately parked my patrol vehicle to make a

22 check of the suspicious male who walked from the rear towards the front

23 passenger side of the vehicle. I met then met with the individual at the front

24 passenger side of the parked vehicle where commented loudly, “Hey, is

25 everything okay”. He replied, “yes”. I immediately sensed the individual’s

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1 nervousness with his body trembling violently. I noticed that he exhibited the

2 telltale signs of being under the influence of some type of substance. He was

3 very animated with his hands and made in voluntary hand movements. He had

4 a lot of draw movement and grinding his teeth. I informed him that I noticed

5 the driver’s window to the vehicle to be cracked and asked if he own the

6 vehicle. He stated yes. I asked if I could see some sort of identification, to which

7 he took out his Guam Driver’s License from his wallet. He is identified to be:

8 Gregorio B. Cruz Jr

9 M/Gua/DOB: (redacted)-68

10 (Redacted) Barrigada (redacted)

11 Unemployed

12 I asked if he had ever been arrested before. He replied yes for possession. I

13 asked if he is currently under probation, to which he replied that he is. I asked if

14 he had possessed anything illegal, to which he replied that he didn’t. I asked if I

15 can search and, to which he agreed by saying yes.

16 As I conducted my search of his pockets. I located a zip lock plastic baggie

17 having a substantial amount of crystalline substance (14.14 grams) of the

18 suspected drug ice inside a small “slit” pocket at the right side of his shorts. I

19 confiscated the item. I continued my search without finding anything else. I

20 asked if I can see his vehicle registration, to which he open the front passenger

21 door to the vehicle taking out the registration from the glove box. I noticed the

22 vehicle registration indicating the registered owner to be Gregorio Cruz. While

23 glancing from the open front passenger door, I noticed the drivers window to

24 the vehicle wasn’t cracked. I noticed the window tint was instead crumbling in

25 peeling. I told Gregorio that I was detaining him and asked if I can handcuff him.
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1 He agreed. I therefore placed him in handcuffs. I verbally advised him of his

2 Miranda rights via card, to which she understood and waved. I asked him if he

3 had any other drugs or firearms in his vehicle. He replied no. I asked if I can

4 search is vehicle, to which he agreed. I noticed a black backpack that was

5 situated atop the front passenger seat, so I asked if Gregorio own the backpack.

6 He replied yes. I asked if I can search the backpack and its contents. He agreed.

7 During my search of the backpack. I took out a brown color zipper pouch and

8 another black zippered pouch, upon searching the zipper pouches. I located too

9 large zip lock baggies filled with a Crystalline substance of the suspected drug

10 ice. Fearing that Gregorio might have accomplices around the area, I suspended

11 my search to call another unit as back-up to assist me. I contacted officer E. N.

12 Asanoma, telling him that I located a substantial amount of drugs at my location

13 and that I don’t know if anyone else might be around the area. He responded to

14 my location. …

15 Babauta has a history of claiming consent to search without witness and without any

16 written consent form papers to support a consent search. In several cases, courts have found

17 that Babauta was not truthful in his claim of having obtained consent.

18 Defendant states that he did not give consent to Babauta for any search.

19 LEGAL ARGUMENTS

20 1. The government is burdened to demonstrate that evidence seized without a

warrant was properly obtained by the government when the seizure is
21 challenged.
22
“A warrantless search by police is invalid unless it falls within one of the narrow and
23
well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S.
24
11, 13, 120 S. Ct. 7, 145 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1999). “[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption
25
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1 to show the need for it.” U.S. v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51, 72, S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 59 (1951). “The

2 government has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement
3 applies.” U.S. v. Edwards, 242 F.3d 928, 937 (10th Cir. 2001).
4
“The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated in this case because
5
stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a seizure within the meaning
6
of those amendments even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting
7
detention quite brief.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). “Temporary detention
8

9 of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period

10 and for a limited purpose, constitutes a seizure of persons within the meaning of this

11 provision (Fourth Amendment).” Whren and Brown v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10

12 (1996). “A traffic stop is analogous to a Terry stop in that, following the initial stop, the
13 subsequent detention cannot be excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related in
14
time to the investigation.” United States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651, 656 (6th Cir. 1999).
15
The United States’ Supreme Court recently made unquestionably clear the duty to
16
limit a seizure of a person without a warrant limited to the basis for the initial seizure and
17
not engage in general searches, saying,
18
[4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of
19
that violation. “[A] relatively brief encounter,” a routine traffic stop is “more
20 analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ ... than to a formal arrest.” Knowles v. Iowa,
525 U.S. 113, 117, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v.
21 McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), in turn
citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). See also
22 Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009).
Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop
23 context is determined by the seizure’s “mission”—to address the traffic
violation that warranted the stop, Caballes, 543 U.S., at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834
24
and attend to related safety concerns, infra, at 1619 – 1620. See also United
25 States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)
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1 (plurality opinion) (“The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to
its underlying justification.”). Because addressing the infraction is the
2 purpose of the stop, it may “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate
th[at] purpose.” Ibid. See also Caballes, 543 U.S., at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834.
3 Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction
4 are—or reasonably should have been—completed. See Sharpe, 470 U.S., at
686, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (in determining the reasonable duration of a stop, “it
5 [is] appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued [the]
investigation”). [Bold-Italics type style added here for emphasis.]
6
In Caballes, however, we cautioned that a traffic stop “can become unlawful
7 *1615 if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete
th[e] mission” of issuing a warning ticket. 543 U.S., at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834. And
8 we repeated that admonition in Johnson: The seizure remains lawful only
“so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of
9
the stop.” 555 U.S., at 333, 129 S.Ct. 781. See also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93,
10 101, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (because unrelated inquiries did
not “exten[d] the time [petitioner] was detained[,] ... no additional Fourth
11 Amendment justification ... was required”). An officer, in other words, may
conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop.
12 But contrary to Justice ALITO’s suggestion, post, at 1625, n. 2, he may not
do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion
13 ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.
14
We hold that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter
15 for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against
unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic
16 violation, therefore, “become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete th[e] mission” of issuing a ticket for the
17 violation. Id., at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834. The Court so recognized in Caballes, and
we adhere to the line drawn in that decision.
18
Rodriguez v. U.S., -- U.S. --, 135 S.Ct. 1609, at 1612, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (April 21, 2015)1.
19

20 The facts as stated by Officer Babauta, though the truthfulness of those assertions is

21 contested, demonstrate that no warrant existed at the time of the actions reported by Officer

22 Babauta. Therefore the government is bound to demonstrate that an exception to the

23 warrant requirement exists. The facts asserted by Babauta, even if true indicate that
24

25 1
The Opinion in Rodriguez was decided and published before the events of this matter occurred.
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1 Babauta lacked any reasonable basis for his initial seizure of Defendant at the vehicle. Any

2 seizure of a person, even temporary in nature must have sufficient legal support. There was
3 no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity afoot that served as the basis for the stop of
4
Defendant by Babauta. All the observations reported by Babauta are completely consistent
5
with legal conduct. Only to support his wrongful behavior does Babauta refer to Defendant
6
as “suspicious person.” As the initial seizure was wrongful, the evidence that flows from it is
7
likewise wrongful.
8
Not only did Babauta lack a legal basis for the seizure of Defendant, his concocted
9

10 reasons fail to meet the standard of reasonable suspicion. Even it the court determines that

11 Babauta had reasonable suspicion, Babauta engaged in general search activity rather than

12 pursue an inquiry into his asserted appropriate investigation and instead began a general
13 search on the basis of hunches. This the United States’ Constitution does not allow.
14
The U.S. Supreme Court established the basic requirements for detaining a driver
15
after a traffic stop in its decision in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, (United States v.
16
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)) … holding that any questioning must relate to the
17
purpose of the vehicle stop, and in Florida v. Royer, (Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983))
18
… holding that the detention must be temporary and unintrusive.” U.S. v. Rojas-Milan, 234
19

20 F.3d 464, 469-70 (9th Cir. 2000). In Illinois v. Caballes, while predicting the holding in U.S.

21 v. Rodriguez, supra, the court addressed the limits of a temporary stop saying,

22 “Here, the initial seizure of respondent when he was stopped on the highway was
based on probable cause, and was concededly lawful. It is nevertheless clear that a
23 seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its
manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the
24
Constitution. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984). A seizure that is
25 justified solely by the interest of issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that
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1 mission. In an earlier case involving a dog sniff that occurred during an
unreasonably prolonged traffic stop, the Illinois Supreme Court held that use of
2 the dog and the subsequent discovery of contraband were the product of an
unconstitutional seizure. People v. Cox, 202 Ill.2d 462, 782 N.E.2d 275 (2002). We
3 may assume that a similar result would be warranted in this case if the dog sniff
4 had been conducted while respondent was being unlawfully detained. … A dog
sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information
5 other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
6
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
7

8 Babauta never acted to investigate any grounds of his suspicion, if any, until after
9
having engaged in a general search. He didn’t ask for proof of identification or registration
10
until after he engaged in a general search, which Babauta claims was based on consent.
11
Babauta cannot be trusted in his assertions of being granted consent. Too many times,
12
Officer Babauta has been the subject of numerous motions to suppress based on contests
13
that he obtained consent to search by Defendants who assert that Babauta simply ignored
14

15 their rights to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Babauta’s lack of

16 truthfulness will be proven at the evidentiary hearing on this motion.

17 2. Defendant denies consent to search was granted.

18 “[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the state has the burden of proving
19
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a
20
burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.”
21
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). “Consent that is
22
the product of official intimidation or harassment is not consent at all. Citizens do not forfeit
23
their constitutional rights when they are coerced to comply with a request that they would
24

25 prefer to refuse.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115, L. E. 2d 389

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1 (1991). “The existence of consent to a search is not likely to be inferred and the government

2 always bears the burden of proof to establish the existence of effective consent.” U.S. v. Reid,
3 226 F. 3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000). “The question of whether consent to search is
4
voluntary and knowing is a question of fact could be determined from the totality of the
5
circumstances. … Moreover, the burden of establishing the validity of the consent is upon
6
the government.” U.S. v. Abdullah, 162 F.3d 897, 902(6th Cir. 1998). “Because the
7
government often asserts that a defendant consented in cases where police have some
8

9 evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search … We carefully

10 examine the government’s claim that a defendant consented. Moreover, we note that not

11 any type of consent will suffice, but instead, only consent that is, unequivocally, specifically,

12 and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.” U.S. v. Worley, 193 F.3d
13 380, 386 (6th Cir. 1999). “Consent must be proved by clear and positive testimony, and, to
14
be voluntary, it must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by
15
any duress or coercion. … The defendant’s knowledge of his right to refuse to consent is a
16
factor, but the government need not prove that the defendant had such knowledge to
17
establish the consent was voluntary.” U.S. v. Ervin, 155 F.3d 818, 823 (6ht Cir. 1998). “This
18
court considers the following five factors in determining whether a person has freely
19

20 consented to a search: (1) whether the defendant was in custody2; (2) whether the arresting

21

22 2
Consistent with the higher authority of the United States’ Supreme Court, the Guam
23 Supreme Court has said in relation to seizure/detention by arrest,
A. Lawful Arrest.
24 1. Definition of “arrested”
25 [18] We first examine whether Cundiff was arrested at N. Perino St.. Guam
law defines an arrest as follows: “An arrest is made by an actual restraint of
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1

2
the person, or by submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
3 The person arrested may be subjected to such restraint as is reasonable for
4 his arrest and detention.” 8 GCA § 20.10 (2005). Both Officer Atoigue and
Officer Ascura testified that Cundiff was not arrested until he was at the
5 police precinct, and they repeatedly characterized their control over
Cundiff as merely detention for questioning. The testimony they gave at the
6
suppression hearing, however, contradict their assertions.
7 a. “Actual restraint”
[19] Despite the officers’ testimony and belief that they had only detained
8 Cundiff, a review of their actions at North Perino Street shows that there
9 was “actual restraint” of Cundiff, as defined by 8 GCA § 20.10. Officer
Ascura testified that after “August ... was instructed to lay on the ground,
10 [Office Ascura] quickly replaced him in hand restraints (sic).”2 Tr. at 18
11 (Cont’d Mot. to Suppress, May 27, 2006). Similarly, Officer Atoigue testified
that when the man who came out of the bedroom of the North Perino Street
12 residence “said he was August,” then another officer “secured him in
handcuffs.” Tr. at 28 (Mot. to Suppress, May 26, 2006). The officers’
13
testimonies concur that Cundiff had been placed in handcuffs at the North
14 Perino Street residence. Their testimony reveals that Cundiff was actually
restrained and thus, was indeed arrested in accordance with the definition
15
set forth in 8 GCA § 20.10.
16 b. A person’s belief that he is “not free to leave”
*5 [20] As discussed above, physical restraint has been interpreted as an
17 arrest. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). “When the policeman grabbed
18 [the suspect] by the collar,” [the officer] abruptly ‘seized’ him and curtailed
his freedom of movement....” Id. at 67. Testimony that Cundiff was not
19 under arrest is belied by the fact that he was handcuffed at North Perino
Street; this physical restraint of Cundiff “curtailed his freedom of
20
movement.” Id.
21 [21] An arrest may also occur even if police have not formally arrested the
person, or if there is no physical restraint. The United States Supreme Court
22
has long held that “[a] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the
23 Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free
24 to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
25 [22] The facts of instant case parallel the facts in Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200 (1979), where police, without probable cause, took the defendant
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1

2
into custody, transported him to the police station and detained him for
3 interrogation. Id. at 216. The Court held that the police officers’ actions were
4 unconstitutional, and held that “detention for custodial interrogation-
regardless of its label-intrudes so severely on interests protected by the
5 Fourth Amendment ... [that such] trigger[s] the traditional safeguards
against illegal arrest.” Id .
6
[23] Here, Officers Atoigue and Ascura testified that Cundiff was not
7 arrested until he was at the police precinct. However, Officer Ascura
testified that once Cundiff was handcuffed, Cundiff was not free to leave.
8 See Tr. at 18 (Cont’d Mot. to Suppress). Officer Atoigue also testified that:
9 “Ever since [Cundiff] was secured and identified, he was not allowed to go
anywhere. He was detained.” Tr. at 17 (Mot to Suppress). It is undisputed
10 that Cundiff was placed in handcuffs, placed in a police vehicle, and
11 escorted to the police station, where he was interrogated by Officer
Atoigue. From the officers’ testimonies, a reasonable person in Cundiff’s
12 position would believe that he was not free to leave, either from the North
Perino Street residence or from the police station.
13
[24] We agree with the trial court that the arrest in this case occurred at the
14 moment Cundiff was physically restrained when placed in handcuffs at the
North Perino Street residence. The prosecutor even conceded this during
15
the hearing on the motion to suppress, stating that Cundiff “was basically
16 arrested because he was restrained.” Tr. at 37 (Cont’d Mot to Suppress). It is
undisputed that the officers did not obtain a warrant to arrest Cundiff.
17 2. Probable Cause
18 [25] Having determined that Cundiff was arrested at North Perino Street,
we must next examine whether there was probable cause to support the
19 arrest. Without probable cause, the officers’ conduct is unconstitutional. See
Dunaway, 442 U.S. 200.
20
*6 [26] It is undisputed that the police officers did not obtain a warrant to
21 arrest Cundiff. A search or seizure made without a warrant is per se
unreasonable unless it falls within the specifically established and well
22
delineated exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The
23 Court has articulated the following rule when examining the
constitutionality of the police officers’ search or arrest in a situation as here:
24 The constitutional validity of the search in this case, then, must depend
25 upon the constitutional validity of the [defendant’s] arrest. Whether that
arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the
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1 officers had their guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings were given; (4) whether the

2 defendant was told he had the right not consent; and (5) whether the defendant was told
3 that a search warrant could be obtained.” U.S. v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir.
4
2001). “Consent by a defendant or a third party is tainted with the evidence indicates that it
5
stemmed from the prior illegal government action. … [W]here, as here, the police confront a
6
person with contraband that they have illegally found, the subsequent consent to search his
7
fruit of the government action.” U.S. v. Oaxaca, 233 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2000).
8
3. Suppression is the only appropriate remedy.
9

10 “In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional guarantees of sanctity of the

11 home and in violability of the person … this Court held nearly half a century ago that evidence

12 seized during an unlawful search, could not constitute proof against the victim of the search. The

13 exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such invasions.”
14 Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83, S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). “[T]estimony as to
15
matters observed during an unlawful invasion has been excluded in order to enforce the basic
16

17

18 arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it-whether at that moment
the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had
19
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
20 believing that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an offense.
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (emphasis added).
21
[27] Determining the existence of probable cause requires determining
22 whether officers had “reasonably trustworthy information.” We do not
believe, based on the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, that the
23 People have satisfied its burden to prove that the officers had probable
24 cause to arrest Cundiff.
People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12.
25
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1 constitutional policies. [the aims are] deterring lawless conduct by federal officers, [and] closing

2 the doors of the federal courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained.” Wong Sun,
3 supra, at 485-86. “[T]he exclusionary rule also prohibits the introduction of derivative evidence,
4
both tangible and testimonial, that is the product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise
5
acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search, up to the point at which the connection with
6
the unlawful search becomes so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” Murray v. U.S., 487 U.S.
7
533, 536-37, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988).
8
CONCLISION
9
The evidence in this matter should be suppressed and the case dismissed.
10

11 Respectfully submitted: this 8th day of June 2016.

12 Signed for electronic filing

13 Mr. Curtis C. Van de veld, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant
14 GREGORIO B. CRUZ, Jr.
15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I, counsel for Defendant GREGORIO B. CRUZ Jr. hereby certify that I caused the
17
foregoing to be served on Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA through Assistant United
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States’ Attorney for the District of Guam, Mr. Clyde Lemons, Jr. by electronic service through
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the court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Filing system.
20

21 Respectfully submitted: this 8th day of June 2016.

22 Signed for electronic filing

23 Mr. Curtis C. Van de veld, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant
24 GREGORIO B. CRUZ, Jr.
25
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, Plaintiff v. GREGORIO B. CRUZ, Jr., Defendant Page 13
Criminal Case No. CR 16-00014
MOTION TO SUPPRESS ALL EVIDENCE

Case 1:16-cr-00014 Document 11 Filed 06/08/16 Page 13 of 13