SUCCESSION

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Definition and Concept, NCC 774, 776, 712, 1311

Butte v. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

G.R. No. L-15499, 18 February 1962

FACTS:

Jose V. Ramirez was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta Cruz, Manila. Upon the death of Jose V. Ramirez, all
his property including the 1/6 undivided share was bequeathed to his children and grandchildren and 1/3 of the
free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte. Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez sold the property to Manuel Uy and Sons,
Inc. including the undivided 1/6 share property in Sta Cruz, Manila. On the same day, a copy of letter regarding the
above-mentioned sell was sent to Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the property of Jose V.
Ramirez. Mrs. Angela M. Butte filed a case against Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc for legal redemption when the latter
refused Mrs. Butte to redeem the said sold property.

ISSUE:

Whether Mrs. Angela Butte has the right of succession to exercise legel redemption over the share sold by Mrs.
Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez.

HELD:

Yes, Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of succession to exercise legal redemption over the share sold by Mrs. Marie
Garnier Vda de Ramirez for being one of the co-owners of the heirs of the 1/6 undivided property of Jose V.
Ramirez.

According to Article 1620 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of
redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of
the alienation is gross expensive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right to redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the
share that may respectively have in the thing owned in common.

National Housing Authority v. Almeida

525 SCRA 383

FACTS:

Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land with her children as her
heirs. The first child, Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, predeceased her mother and left heirs. When the mother passes
away, the remaining child, Francisca Herrera, filed Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming to be the exclusive and
remaining heir of the deceased, which was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay of the latter. The heirs of the first child
filed an annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication which was declared null and void by the Court of First Instance.
On the other hand, the alive child of Herrera filed an application with National Housing Authority (NHA) to
purchase the same lots which was granted by the same. This was affirmed by the Office of the President. When
Francisca Herrera died, her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate, approved by NHA and directed
the heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado the leave the property. In RTC, they raised that the Deed of Self-Adjudication
was declared of nullity since the other heirs were disregarded. The heirs of Francisca Herrera countered that the
transfer of the purchase of the subject lots was valid since there was consideration paid. RTC set aside the decision
of NHA and Office of the President, declaring the Deeds of Sale to be null and void. This was affirmed by CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the NHA was correct in its resolution in granting the application of the purchase of lots by
Francisca Herrera.

RULING:

No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Margarita Herrera was in fact a will which effectivity commences at her time of
death which means that all her interests as a person should cease to be to hers and shall be in the possession of her
estate until transferred to the heirs by virtue of Art. 774:

“Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of
the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by
operation of law.”

Margarita Herrera is under a contract to sell with NHA such that upon her death, this obligation does not cease
since it is transmissible either by will or by operation of law. NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other
parties since the property was already initially paid for by the decedent. What NHA should have done was to
consider the estate of the decedent as the next person to fulfill the obligation to pay the remaining purchase price.
NHA should have been alert to note that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent who
may claim the property after testate or intestate proceedings.

Estate of Hemady v. Luzon Surety

G.R. No. L-8437, November 28, 1956

While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value
of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of
the deceased but also to his obligations.
FACTS:

The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different indemnity agreements, or
counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary
guarantor, in all of them, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.’s of having guaranteed, the various principals in
favor of different creditors.

The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the twenty bonds it had executed
in consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary
stamps affixed to the bonds.

The lower court, by order of September 23, 1953, dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co. against Hemady’s estate
., on two grounds: (1) that the premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were not contemplated under the
indemnity agreements to be a part of the undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady), since they were not liabilities
incurred after the execution of the counterbonds; and (2) that “whatever losses may occur after Hemady’s death,
are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor.”

ISSUE:

WON the contingent claims chargeable against the estate.

RULING:

YES. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as well as under the Civil Code of 1889 (Article 1257), the rule is
that — "Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law.
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the
value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the
rights of the deceased but also to his obligations.

The heirs of a deceased person cannot be held to be "third persons" in relation to any contracts touching the real
estate of their decedent which comes in to their hands by right of inheritance; they take such property subject to all
the obligations resting thereon in the hands of him from whom they derive their rights."

The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered
intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by
provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts,
therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under section 5, Rule 87.

Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante

80 Phil. 776 (1948)

FACTS:

Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install
and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed
service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the
deceased through its special or judicial administrator appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction to
maintain and operate the said plant.

Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Fragante for the latter as
party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a contravention of the law.

ISSUE:

WON the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial personality.

RULING:

Within the philosophy of the present legal system and within the framework of the constitution, the estate of
Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution
of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the
fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his
pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said
application to its final conclusion. An injustice would ensue from the opposite course.

Cabalu v. Tabu
G.R. No. 188417, September 24, 2012

Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void. The law applies
when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the contract forms
part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely
hereditary in nature.

FACTS:

Faustina Maslum died without children. She left behind large tract of land in Tarlac, which she gave by way of a
holographic will to her nephews and nieces. One of the nephews was Benjamin Laxamana, who later on died,
leaving behind his portion of the property to his son, Domingo. Domingo sold his portion of the property to
Laureano Cabalu in 1975. Domingo died, however, he purportedly sold his portion to Renato Tabu. Spouses Tabu,
along with the heirs of Domingo, demanded that Cabalu and others claiming rights under him to vacate the
property, to which the latter refused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale to Cabalu is valid.

HELD: NO.

In the said will, the name of Benjamin, father of Domingo, appeared as one of the heirs. Even if Benjamin died
sometime in 1960, Domingo in 1975 could not yet validly dispose of the whole or even a portion thereof for the
reason that he was not the sole heir of Benjamin, as his mother only died sometime in 1980.

Besides, under Article 1347 of the Civil Code, “No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in
cases expressly authorized by law.” Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered into upon future
inheritance as void. The law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been
opened; (2) the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the
object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.

In this case, at the time the deed was executed, Faustina’s will was not yet probated; the object of the contract, the
9,000 square meter property, still formed part of the inheritance of his father from the estate of Faustina; and
Domingo had a mere inchoate hereditary right therein. Domingo became the owner of the said property only on
August 1, 1994, the time of execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Succession with Partition by the heirs of Faustina,
when the 9,000 square meter lot was adjudicated to him.

B. Subjects of Succession, NCC 775, 902, 782, 887, 1003

1. Who are the subjects? – NCC 775, 782
2. Relationship, NCC 963-969
3. Capacity to succeed
a. Determination, NCC 1034, 1039, 16 (2)

Cayetano v. Leonides
129 SCRA 522

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and
1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.

FACTS:

Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent
Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the
only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership
of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.

Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly
executed in the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix. In
her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent
resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister; that
during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.;
that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the
Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the
appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the
Philippines.
The respondent judge admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, the Last Will and Testament of the late
Adoracion C. Campos, and Nenita Campos Paguia is appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent.

Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the will be set aside. Petitioner
Hermogenes Campos died and was substituted by Cayetano. Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that
the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when he ruled that the right of a forced heir to
his legitime can be divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced
heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession

ISSUE:

Whether or not Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime when the respondent judge allowed the
reprobate of Adoracion's will.

RULING:

No. This contention is without merit. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently
established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which
respectively provide:

Art. 16 par. (2). However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the
decedent. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by
Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.

b. Who may succeed? NCC 1024-26, 1029-30

Parish Priest of Victoria v. Rigor

G.R. No. L-22036, April 30, 1979

The bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of Fr. Rigor’s death and not to any
indefinite time thereafter. Further, in order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at
the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper.

FACTS:

Father Pascual Rigor, the Parish Priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died testate on August 9, 1935. He named devisees on
his will, consisting of his three sisters and cousin, and bequeathed forty-four hectares of rice lands located in Nueva
Ecija in favour of his nearest male relative who will study for priesthood. Said lands are to be administered by the
parish priest of Victoria, Tarlac at the interim or during the period wherein Fr. Rigor’s nephew has not yet entered
the seminary or after being ordained as a priest, has been excommunicated. Thirteen years after the approval of
the project of partition, the parish priest of Victoria filed a petition for the delivery of the rice lands, contending
that Edgardo Cunanan, Fr. Rigor’s nephew, is currently studying for priesthood. The intestate heirs of Fr. Rigor
contested the same, stating that since no nephew of Fr. Rigor took up ecclesiastical studies at the time of his death,
which was also admitted by the parish priest of Victoria and that the bequest be declared ineffective and
inoperative.
ISSUE:

Whether the parish priest of Victoria is entitled to the administration of the rice lands as a trustee.

RULING:

No, the parish priest of Victoria is not entitled to the administration of the rice lands. The parish priest of Victoria
could become a trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a
priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two
contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested
any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.

The Court found that the reasonable view to take is that in making said bequest, Fr. Rigor was referring to a
situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade
school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer
the rice lands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the
seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the rice lands and receive the fruits thereof. In that
event, the trusteeship would be terminated.

At the time Father Rigor died in 1935, he had no nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had
manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career and as such, said bequest is deemed inoperative and
ineffective. It shall be as if no disposition to the forty-four hectares of rice land has been made and the same shall
be delivered to his intestate heirs.

c. Who are incapable of succeeding? NCC 1027-28, 1031-33

d. Effect of alienations by the excluded heir, NCC 1038
e. Prescription of Action, NCC 1040
C. Object of Succession, NCC 776, 781, 1311, 1429, 1178, 1347
Art. 108, RPC

Recto v. Harden
100 Phil. 427, July 21, 1967

A charging lien established on the property in litigation to secure payment of attorney's fees partakes of the nature of
a collateral security or of a lien on real or personal property, the enforcement of which need not be made in the
administration proceedings.

FACTS:

Fred Harden, an American citizen, and Esperanza Perez were married in the Philippines. Mrs. Harden hired the late
Claro M. Recto as her counsel in the suit she was contemplating to file against her husband. In their contract, she
agreed, inter alia, to pay Recto 20% of her share in the conjugal partnership. Mrs. Harden, thru Recto, filed her
complaint for administration and/or accounting of the conjugal properties against Mr. Harden, and Jose
Salumbides, herein oppositor-appellant, as his attorney-in-fact. The war suspended the proceedings. After
liberation, the records of the case were reconstituted and the conjugal properties of the Harden spouses were
placed under receivership. The lower court rendered judgment for Mrs. Harden. Mr. Harden appealed to this Court
and then left the Philippines. Mrs. Harden must have followed her husband since an amicable settlement was
effected between them in Canada. As a consequence thereof, Recto was instructed by Mrs. Harden to discontinue
the proceedings.

Recto filed a motion in the Supreme Court to establish his attorney's charging lien. The Hardens opposed. Supreme
Court, remanded the case to the trial court to determine the amount of Recto's attorney's fees. But all the ancillary
writs and processes issued in the case were dissolved except the receivership on the conjugal properties, which
was maintained. Recto moved for execution of the judgment. This finally enabled the Recto to levy upon the stocks
and other properties of the Hardens, but the public of the same is insufficient to full satisfy his claim.
Recto moved ex parte to levy on other shares of stock owned by the Hardens but registered in the name of
Salumbides, including the shares in the Surigao Consolidated Mining Co. Salumbides filed an opposition claiming
that he owned said shares, the same being registered in his name. This was denied. The said shares were sold at
public auction however it still left an unsatisfied judgment balance in Recto's favor.

The next incident concerns the return to the receiver of the cash dividends received by Salumbides on the same
Surigao shares. Recto had already moved that Salumbides be ordered to deliver to the receiver all the dividends
from the said shares which were under receivership.

Recto died and his wife, as his administratrix, was substituted as claimant. Mrs. Recto moved for full compliance
with the order to satisfy the remaining judgment balance, relying upon a statements issued by the Surigao
Consolidated that Salumbides had received all the cash dividends.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the claim for attorney’s fees should be filed with the administrative proceedings of Mr. Harden’s
estate.

RULING:

No. Appellant insist that upon the death of Mr. Harden in Canada during the pendency of the proceedings, Recto's
claim should have been forthwith dismissed and filed in the administration proceedings of Mr. Harden's estate. But
appellant erroneously assumes that Recto's claim is a "money claim" under the Rules when it is neither a claim nor
a judgment for money directed against the decedent, Mr. Harden. Recto's claim is founded on a personal obligation
of Mr. Harden. But granting that Recto's claim is a money claim against Mr. Harden, that would not help appellant
any. A charging lien established on the property in litigation to secure payment of attorney's fees partakes of the
nature of a collateral security or of a lien on real or personal property, the enforcement of which need not be made
in the administration proceedings.

Reyes v. Dimagiba, L-5620, July 31, 1954 - UNPUBLISHED

Estate of Hemady v. Luzon Surety

G.R. No. L-8437, November 28, 1956

While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value
of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of
the deceased but also to his obligations.
FACTS:

The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different indemnity agreements, or
counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary
guarantor, in all of them, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.’s of having guaranteed, the various principals in
favor of different creditors.

The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the twenty bonds it had executed
in consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary
stamps affixed to the bonds.

The lower court, by order of September 23, 1953, dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co. against Hemady’s estate
., on two grounds: (1) that the premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were not contemplated under the
indemnity agreements to be a part of the undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady), since they were not liabilities
incurred after the execution of the counterbonds; and (2) that “whatever losses may occur after Hemady’s death,
are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor.”
ISSUE:

WON the contingent claims chargeable against the estate.

RULING:

YES. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as well as under the Civil Code of 1889 (Article 1257), the rule is
that — "Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law.

While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the
value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the
rights of the deceased but also to his obligations.

The heirs of a deceased person cannot be held to be "third persons" in relation to any contracts touching the real
estate of their decedent which comes in to their hands by right of inheritance; they take such property subject to all
the obligations resting thereon in the hands of him from whom they derive their rights."

The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered
intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by
provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts,
therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under section 5, Rule 87.

Guinto v Medina, 50 O.G.

Nazareno v. CA
G.R. No. 138842, 18 Oct 2000

FACTS:

Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970, while Maximino,
Sr. died on December 18, 1980.
They had five children, namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are
petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents.
After the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case and was appointed administrator of his father's
estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents had executed several deeds of sale
conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad.
One of the deeds involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedly sold by Maximino, Sr., with the consent of
Aurea, to Natividad on January 29, 1970. By virtue of these deeds, TCTs were issued to Natividad for lots 3-B, 3, 10,
11, 13 & 14.
Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B, w/c had been occupied by Romeo, his wife, & Maximino, Jr., to
Maximino, Jr.
Romeo filed the present case for annulment of sale w/ damages against Natividad & Maximino Jr. on the ground
that both sales were void for lack of consideration.
Romeo presented the Deed of Partition & Distribution executed by Maximino Sr. & Aurea in 1962 & duly signed by
all of their children, except Jose, who was then abroad. However, this deed was not carried out. In 1969, their
parents instead offered to sell to them the lots.
He testified that, although the deeds of sale executed by his parents in their favor stated that the sale was for a
consideration, they never really paid any amount for the supposed sale. The transfer was made in this manner in
order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.
Allegedly, it was only Natividad who bought the lots in question because she was the only one financially able to do
so.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring the nullity of the Deed of Sale dated January 29, 1970, except as to
Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third persons.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was modified in the sense that titles to Lot 3 (in
the name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name of Maximino Nazareno, Jr.), as well as to Lots 10 and 11
were cancelled and ordered restored to the estate of Maximino Nazareno, Sr. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the restoration of the titles to the lots in question to the estate of Maximino Sr. was proper.
2) Whether it was the intention of Maximino, Sr. to give the subject lots to Natividad.

HELD:

1) Yes. The Nazareno spouses transferred their properties to their children by fictitious sales in order to avoid
the payment of inheritance taxes. Facts & circumstances indicate badges of a simulated sale w/c make the Jan 29,
1970 sale void & of no effect. Natividad never acquired ownership over the property because the Deed of Sale in
her favor is also void for being w/o consideration.

2) Yes. It cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to give the six Quezon City lots to Natividad. As Romeo
testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad because the latter was the only "female and
the only unmarried member of the family." She was thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of her siblings.
As she herself admitted, she intended to convey Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in the event the latter returned from abroad.
There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor. Art. 1449 of the Civil Code states: There is also an implied
trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee,
he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part thereof. There being an implied trust, the lots
in question are therefore subject to collation in accordance with Art. 1061 which states: Every compulsory heir,
who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous
title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition. As held by the trial court, the sale of Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing, Corp. will have to be upheld
for it is an innocent purchaser for value which relied on the title of Natividad.

Heirs of Ureta v. Ureta

September 14, 2011

FACTS:

Alfonso Ureta was financially well-off and owned several properties. He begot fourteen children, including herein
petitioners and Policronio, father of respondents. For taxation purposes, Alfonso sold, without monetary
consideration, several parcels of land to four of his children, including Policronio. Alfonso continued to own,
possess and enjoy the lands and their produce. Upon his death, Liberato acted as the administrator. The Fernandez
Family rented the portion transferred to Policronio. But even after the fact, the tenants never turned over the
produce of the lands to Policronio or any of this heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the administrators of his estate.
When Policronio died, except for a portion of one of the parcels of land, neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took
possession of the subject lands. Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition,8 which included all the
lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation
purposes. Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition in behalf of his co-heirs. Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
involving Alfonso’s estate when it was published in the July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter. The Heirs of
Policronio averred that the extra-judicial partition is void because Conrado signed the same without written
authority form his siblings.

ISSUES:

1. (Partition) – Whether or not Conrado Ureta’s lack of capacity to give his co-heirs’ consent to the Extra-
Judicial Partition rendered the same voidable.
2. (Preterition) - Whether or not the preterited heirs be entitled to the share in the estate.

3. (Freedom of Disposition) – Whether or not Article 842 finds application in the instant case as posited by
the Heirs of Policronio.

RULING:

1. No. Article 1390 is not applicable in this case. Article 1390 (1) contemplates the incapacity of a party to
give consent to a contract. What is involved in the case at bench though is not Conrado’s incapacity to give consent
to the contract, but rather his lack of authority to do so. Instead, Articles 1403 (1), 1404, and 1317 of the Civil Code
find application to the circumstances prevailing in this case. The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is not a
voidable or an annullable contract under Article 1390 of the New Civil Code. Article 1390 renders a contract
voidable if one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the contracting party’s consent is
vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. Therefore, Conrado’s failure to obtain
authority from his co-heirs to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his incapacity
to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the contract valid but unenforceable
against Conrado’s co-heirs for having been entered into without their authority.

2. The Heirs of Alfonso also argued that all that remains to be adjudged is the right of the preterited heirs to
represent their father, Policronio, and be declared entitled to his share.

Their posited theory on preterition is no longer viable. It has already been determined that the Heirs of Policronio
gave their consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and they have not been excluded from it. Nonetheless,
even granting that the Heirs of Policronio were denied their lawful participation in the partition, the argument of
the Heirs of Alfonso would still fail.

Preterition has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir from the inheritance. It consists in the
silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning
him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if
he is mentioned in the will in the latter case.] Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary succession and requires
a will. In the case at bench, there is no will involved. Therefore, preterition cannot apply.

3. NO. The Heirs of Policronio further argued that even assuming that the Heirs of Alfonso have an interest in
the Deed of Sale, they would still be precluded from questioning its validity. They posited that the Heirs of Alfonso
must first prove that the sale of Alfonsos properties to Policronio substantially diminished their successional rights
or that their legitimes would be unduly prejudiced, considering that under Article 842 of the Civil Code, one who
has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided that he does not contravene the provisions of the Civil
Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. Having failed to do so, they argued that the Heirs of Alfonso should
be precluded from questioning the validity of the Deed of Sale.

Still, the Court disagrees.

Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in
favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.

This article refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will. What is involved in the case at bench is not a
disposition by will but by Deed of Sale. Hence, the Heirs of Alfonso need not first prove that the disposition
substantially diminished their successional rights or unduly prejudiced their legitimes.
 Natividad v. Natividad
G.R. No. 198434, February 29, 2016

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by will or by
operation of law.

Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his
death.

Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the transmissible rights and obligations
existing at the time of his death, but also those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.

FACTS:

Leandro and Juliana alleged that sometime in 1974, Sergio Natividad (Sergio), husband of Juana Mauricio-
Natividad (Juana) and father of Jean Natividad-Cruz (Jean), obtained a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, Sergio mortgaged two parcels of land, one of which is co-owned and
registered in his name and that of his siblings namely, Leandro, Domingo and Adoracion. Sergio's siblings executed
a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him to mortgage the said property. The other mortgaged parcel of land
was registered in the name of Sergio and Juana. Subsequently, Sergio died without being able to pay his obligations
with DBP. Since the loan was nearing its maturity and the mortgaged properties were in danger of being
foreclosed, Leandro paid Sergio's loan obligations. Considering that respondents were unable to reimburse
Leandro for the advances he made in Sergio's favor, respondents agreed that Sergio's share in the lot which he co-
owned with his siblings and the other parcel of land in the name of Sergio and Juana, shall be assigned in favor of
Leandro and Juliana. Leandro's and Sergio's brother, Domingo, was tasked to facilitate the transfer of ownership of
the subject properties in favor of Leandro and Juliana. However, Domingo died without being able to cause such
transfer. Subsequently, respondents failed and refused to honor their undertaking.

Respondents filed their Answer denying the allegations in the complaint and raising the following defenses: (1)
respondents are not parties to the contract between Sergio and DBP; (2) there is neither verbal nor written
agreement between petitioners and respondents that the latter shall reimburse whatever payment was made by
the former or their predecessor-in-interest; (3) Jean was only a minor during the execution of the alleged
agreement and is not a party thereto; (4) that whatever liability or obligation of respondents is already barred by
prescription, laches and estoppel; (5) that the complaint states no cause of action as respondents are not duty-
bound to reimburse whatever alleged payments were made by petitioners; and (6) there is no contract between
the parties to the effect that respondents are under obligation to transfer ownership in petitioners' favor as
reimbursement for the alleged payments made by petitioners to DBP.

ISSUE:

WON the respondents may evade liability.

HELD:

No. In the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, respondents clearly acknowledged Sergio's loan obligations with
the DBP. Being Sergio's heirs, they succeed not only to the rights of Sergio but also to his obligations.

The following provisions of the Civil Code are clear on this matter, to wit:

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of
the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by will or by
operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by
his death.

Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the transmissible rights and obligations
existing at the time of his death, but also those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.

In the present case, respondents, being heirs of Sergio, are now liable to settle his transmissible obligations, which
include the amount due to petitioners, prior to the distribution of the remainder of Sergio's estate to them, in
accordance with Section I, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.

D. Opening of Succession and Its Effects

NCC 777, 781, 2263, 2253, 533, 1347, 1461, 130, 132, 390, 391, FC 84, 86

Bonilla v Barcena, No. L-41715, 18 June 1976

Salvador v Sta. Maria, No. L-25952, 30 June 1967

Puno v. Puno
G.R. No. 177066, 11 September 2009

Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation and acquire
the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation - the stocks must be distributed first to the
heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation; During
such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly
appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the stock.

FACTS:

Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. Petitioner
Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos, initiated a complaint for specific performance against
respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the deceased with the latter’s common-law wife, Amelia Puno.
As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late father as stockholder of
respondent. The complaint prayed that respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an
accounting of all the transactions it entered into and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income
pertaining to the shares of Carlos.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal personality to sue
because his birth certificate names him as "Joselito Musni Muno." Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial
declaration that "Joselito Musni Puno" and "Joselito Musni Muno" were one and the same.

RTC ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that petitioner’s certificate of live birth was no
proof of his paternity and relation to Carlos.

Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name "Joselito M. Puno," certified by the Civil Registrar
of Manila, and the Certificate of Finality. RTC conditionally admitted the corrected birth certificate as genuine and
authentic.

RTC was in favor of Joselito Puno, ordering Jesusa Puno and/or Felicidad Fermin to allow Petitioner to inspect the
corporate books and records of the company including the financial statements of the corporation.

CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint and held that petitioner was not able to establish the paternity of and his
filiation to Carlos since his birth certificate was prepared without the intervention of and the participatory
acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos. CA said that petitioner had no right to demand that he be allowed to
examine respondent’s books. Moreover, petitioner was not a stockholder of the corporation but was merely
claiming rights as an heir of Carlos, an incorporator of the corporation.
ISSUE:

WON petitioner has a right to inspect respondent corporation’s books and receive dividends on the stocks owned
by Carlos, as the latter’s heir.

RULING: No.

Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased stockholder. However, SC agrees with CA that
petitioner was not able to prove satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot
claim to be an heir of the latter.

Only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by the corporation, a right inherent in the
ownership of the shares.

Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation and
acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed
first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the
corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as between the
parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation. During such interim period, the heirs stand as
the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the
legal title to the stock. Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by
the administrator or executor. Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled to
exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder.

Even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos, he would still not
be allowed to inspect respondent’s books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any
showing in its transfer book that some of the shares owned by Carlos were transferred to him. This would only be
possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased.

Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights over the
estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an
heir to a decedent’s estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in a case for the recovery of
property. The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific performance — to direct respondent
corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the deceased and his representatives.

Reyes v. RTC
G.R. No. 165744, 11 August 2008

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent were siblings together with two others, namely Pedro and Anastacia, in a family
business established as Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith), from which they owned shares of stocks. The Pedro
and Anastacia subsequently died. The former had his estate judicially partitioned among his heirs, but the latter
had not made the same in her shareholding in Zenith. Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) against petitioner (1) a derivative suit to obtain accounting of funds and assets of
Zenith, and (2) to determine the shares of stock of deceased Pedro and Anastacia that were arbitrarily and
fraudulently appropriated [by Oscar, and were unaccounted for]. In his answer with counterclaim, petitioner
denied the illegality of the acquisition of shares of Anastacia and questioned the jurisdiction of SEC to entertain the
complaint because it pertains to settlement of [Anastacia’s] estate. The case was transferred to. Petitioner filed
Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit and must be dismissed. RTC denied the motion. The
motion was elevated to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, but was
again denied.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Rodrigo may be considered a stockholder of Zenith with respect to the shareholdings originally
belonging to Anastacia.

RULING:

No. Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of
the decedent. Accordingly, upon Anastacias death, her children acquired legal title to her estate (which title
includes her shareholdings in Zenith), and they are, prior to the estates partition, deemed co-owners thereof. This
status as co-owners, however, does not immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of the
corporation. Unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation Code on the manner of
transferring shares, the heirs do not become registered stockholders of the corporation.

De Borja v. De Borja
G.R. No. L-28040, August 18, 1972

And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of
such causante or predecessor in interest (Art. 777), there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share
is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed
limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.

FACTS:

Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco, filed a petition for the probate of her will. The will was
probated. Francisco was appointed executor and administrator, while their son Jose was appointed co-
administrator. Francisco died and Jose became the sole administrator. Francisco in his lifetime as a widower had a
second wife named Tasiana Ongsingco. When Francisco died, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings and was
appointed special administratrix. The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana has been
plagued with several suits. To put an end to these, a compromise agreement was entered into between Jose and
Tasiana, which stipulated that “a sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana shall be considered as full settlement of her
hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.” Jose submitted the agreement to the court for approval,
which Tasiana opposed.

Tasiana’s contention as held in Guevara v. Guevara: the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the
settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when a decedent left a will, is against law and
public policy. (Revised Rules of Court)

Jose’s argument: Sec. 1 Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court allows extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased person regardless of whether or not he left a will.

ISSUE:

W/N the Guevara ruling applies; W/N probate is necessary.

RULING:

No. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto
before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana of any and all
her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco and Josefa. There is no stipulation as
to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Art. 777), there is no legal
bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after
such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.

It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco, Tasiana was his
compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid
disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of Francisco’s last will and testament and would
exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as
established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana.

Lee v. RTC, G. R. No. 146006, 23 February 2004

Heirs of Sps. Sandejas v. Lina

G.R. No. 141634, 5 February 2001

A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate court approval. The transaction
remains binding on the seller-heir, but not on the other heirs who have not given their consent to it.

FACTS:

Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed petition in the lower court praying that letters of administration be issued in his favor
for the settlement of the estate of his wife, Remedios R. Sandejas. Letters of Administration were issued by the
lower court ppointing Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. as administrator of the estate of the deceased. Unfortunately, the 4th
floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records burned were the records of the settlement of the
estate. As a result, a motion for reconstitution of the records of the case was filed. Alex Lina brought parcels of land
from Sandejas. for 1M pesos. Administrator Sandejas died and Lina was appointed as new administrator. The heirs
of Sandejas moved for motion for reconsideration on the appointment of Lina. Lina filed a motion to approve the
deed of conditional sale executed between him and deceased Sandejas.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not probate court have jurisdiction over the approval of the sale.
2. Whether or not Lina can apply to the Court for the approval of the sale.

RULING:

1. YES.
The Probate Court has jurisdiction over it since it covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates and the
probate of wills of deceased persons, including the appointment and removal of administrators and executors. It
also extends to incidental and collateral matters such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering real
property belonging to the estate.

2. YES.

Petitioners contend that only the executor or administrator is authorized to apply for the approval of a sale of
realty under administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in entertaining and granting respondents
Motion for Approval. The Court read no such limitation.

Section 8, Rule 89 should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically requiring only the
executor or administrator to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estate
for the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Section 2); or for authority to sell real or personal estate
beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and other interested persons, although such authority is not necessary
to pay debts, legacies or expenses of administration (Section 4). Section 8 mentions only an application to
authorize the conveyance of realty under a contract that the deceased entered into while still alive. While this Rule
does not specify who should file the application, it stands to reason that the proper party must be one who is to be
benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be entitled to the avails of the suit.
 Santos v. Lumbao
G.R. No. 169129, 28 March 2007

Whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of
succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of the heirs.

FACTS:

Rita Santos sold to Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased
mother Maria, who died intestate, through a document denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa.” After acquiring the
subject property, Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have
been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property, Spouses
Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a
separate title in favor of Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned.

Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to Rita’s death, she informed one of the spouses that she could not deliver the
title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet
been partitioned. Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one
another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the
other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondents Spouses
Lumbao.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of Rita are bound to the “Bilihan ng Lupa” executed by Rita in favor of Spouses Lumbao.

RULING:

YES. The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest applies in
the present case. Article 1311 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever
rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a
mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance
of the heirs. Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-
in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. Being
heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their
mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them. The death of a party
does not excuse non-performance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights and obligations
thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the
death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.

Thus, despite the death of the petitioners’ mother, they are still bound to comply with the provisions of the Bilihan
ng Lupa and must reconvey to Spouses Lumbao the property which they bought from Rita.

Requisites for the transmission of successional rights

1. Express will of the testator or provision of law
2. Death of the person whose property is the subject of succession
3. Acceptance of the inheritance – NCC 1041-1057

Uson v. del Rosario

G.R. No. L-4693, 29 January 1953

The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.
FACTS:

Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this
litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus
depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.

Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Maria Uson and her husband, executed a public document
whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation,she was given a
parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be
left by her husband upon his death.

ISSUE:

W/N the subject parcel of lands belongs to petitioner

RULING:

There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the
five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much
prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died
the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow
Maria Uson. As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor
as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death". From
that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.

The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she
expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the
deed of separation they had entered into, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance
cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.

Pacio v Billon, No. L-15088, 31 January 1961

Reganon v. Imperial
G.R. No. L-24434, 17 January 1968

NAME: Alyssa Paulina R. Senique

SHORT TITLE: Reganon vs Imperial
TOPIC: Acceptance of the Inheritance
DOCTRINE: When the heirs have already executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition — the end result of which is
that the property is no longer the property of the estate but of the individual heirs.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS: In 1963, the heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a complaint for recovery of ownership
and possession of about 1 hectare portion of a parcel of land in Miasi, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte with damages,
against Rufino Imperial. Since Imperial failed to answer within the reglementary period, the Reganons were
declared the lawful owners of the land in question and entitled to its peaceful possession and enjoyment; ordering
Imperial to vacate the portion occupied by him and to restore the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiffs; and to
pay the amount of P1,929.20 and the costs.

The Deputy Provincial Sheriff issued a notification for levy addressed to Imperial, giving notice of the garnishment
of the rights, interests, shares and participation that defendant may have over the residuary estate of the late
Eulogio Imperial, consisting of the money deposited in the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch.
Imperial argues that the property of an incompetent under guardianship is in custodia legis and therefore cannot
be attached; and that the residuary estate of Eulogio Imperial(U.S. veteran) having been set aside from the monthly
allowances given him by the United States Veterans Administration during his lifetime, is exempt from execution.

IV. ISSUES:
1) Whether the property of an incompetent can be attached;
2) Whether the pension of late Eulogio Imperial is exempt from execution.

V. RULING:
1) YES. The ward having died, the guardianship proceedings no longer subsist. The new Rules of Court now
specifically provides for the procedure in case what is attached is in custodia legis. The clear import of this new
provision is that property under custodia legis is now attachable, subject to the mode set forth in said rule. When
Eulogio Imperial died in 1962, the rights to his succession — from the moment of his death — were transmitted to
his heirs, one of whom is his son, def-Imperial.

2) NO. Any pension, annuity, or gratuity granted by a Government to its officers or employees in recognition of past
services rendered, is primordially aimed at tiding them over during their old age and/or disability. This is
therefore a right personalissima, purely personal because founded on necessity. It requires no argument to show
that where the recipient dies, the necessity motivating or underlying its grant necessarily ceases to be. Also, the
heirs of Eulogio Imperial have already executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition — the end result of which is that
the property is no longer the property of the estate but of the individual heirs.

Ramirez v. Baltazar
G.R. No. L-25049, 30 August 1968

While, as a rule, the formal declaration or recognition to such successional rights needs judicial confirmation, this
Court has, under special circumstances, protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted before the
judicial declaration.

FACTS:

Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar, defendants in this case. Upon demise of
Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of
Victoriana's estate, alleging further that plaintiffs Felimon and Monica Ramirez are heirs of the deceased. Felimon
was later appointed as adminstrator but did not qualify so that Artemio Diawan was appointed as judicial
administrator of the estate. The mortgagees then filed a foreclosure of the property in question and succeeded,
after Diawan failed to file an answer against the petition. The foreclosure sale ensued, the property was bought by
the mortgagees themselves and the sale was confirmed by the court. Felimon sued for the annulment of the entire
foreclosure proceedings, alleging among others the failure of the judicial administrator to protect their interests.
Defendants contended that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and hava no cause of action.

ISSUE:

Have plaintiffs the cause of action against the defendant?

HELD:

Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the heirs from the moment
of the death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration or recognition to such successional rights
needs judicial confirmation, this Court has, under special circumstances, protected these rights from
encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration. In Pascual vs. Pascual, it was ruled that although
heirs have no legal standing in court upon the commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits
of an exception as "when the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in his place."

Go Ong v Court of Appeals, No. L-75884, 24 September 1987

E. Kinds of succession, NCC 778
1. Testamentary, NCC 779
2. Legal or intestate, NCC 960
3. Mixed, NCC 780
4. Contractual, NCC 130, 1347, 752, FC 84

TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION
II. WILLS
A. Definition, NCC 783

Vitug v. CA
G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990

A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his
property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death."

FACTS:

Romarico Vitug, widower, filed a motion to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to his wife’s
estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate which he claimed were personal funds. Rowena Corona
opposed the motion on the ground that the same funds withdrawn were conjugal partnership properties and part
of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement.

Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a survivorship
agreement executed with his late wife and the bank. It provides that after the death of either of them, the fund shall
belong exclusively to the survivor.

The trial court upheld the validity of the agreement and granted Vitug’s motion. CA, however, held that agreement
constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by
Article 805 of the Civil Code."

ISSUE:

WON the survivorship agreement is a will.

RULING:

No. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes
of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death." In other words, the
bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case, the monies were in the nature of conjugal funds.

Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take effect after
the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a
spouse's own properties to the other.

The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality, that contract
imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death. Such agreements are permitted by the Civil Code.

There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such unlawful purposes, or,
as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and conjugal partnership.

The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired
upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America.
Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that
the court was in error. Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the
deceased.

B. Characteristics, NCC 783, 839 (3) and (4), 828, 796-798, 777, 818, 784 – 787

Seangio v. Reyes
G.R. No. 140372-72, 27 November 2006

The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities
of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself. An intent to
dispose mortis causa (Article 783) can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make
an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act of disposition in
itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of the eldest son.

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was denominated as “Kasulatan sa
pag-aalis ng mana.” The private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo did not contain any disposition of the
estate of the deceased and thus did not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According
to private respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son,
Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee,
hence there was preterition which would result to intestacy. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the
property of the decedent.

Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that disinheritance constitutes a disposition
of the estate of a decedent; and that the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as
its title clearly states,Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus,
there is no preterition in the decedent’s will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

HELD:

Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator
Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within
the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are
designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to
law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the
present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the
Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by
Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a
holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
 Baltazar v. Laxa
G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012

The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute
a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.

FACTS:

In 1981 Paciencia, 78, executed her will in the Kapampangan dialect in the house of retired Judge Limpin who
doubled as a notary public.
Childless, without any collateral family left. She left all of her properties to her nephew Antonio Laxa, his wife and
their children whom she treated as her own son.
She died in 1996 in the US whilst living with Antonio’s family. In 2000 Lorenzo filed for the probate of her will in
Pampanga.
Lorenzo Laxa opposed the same stating that one of the testator’s properties belongs to his predecessor and interest
and that she was already “forgetful” when she executed the will.
The RTC granted the opposition stating that the testator no longer had the sufficient mental faculties to execute the
said will.
The CA reversed the said ruling.

ISSUE:

Was the will sufficient in form, and substance as to the allegation of the testator’s forgetfulness?

RULING:

The court says yes. The will was sufficient in form as required by law.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the
shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not
equivalent to being of unsound mind.

Pascual v. De la Cruz
28 SCRA 421(1969)

It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the mere fact that a will was made in favor of a stranger is not in itself proof
that the same was obtained through fraud and undue pressure and influence.

FACTS:

Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or ascendant, died at the age of 89. Andres Pascual
filed a a petition for the probate of her alleged will. Andres was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of
Catalina. Catalina regarded Andres as her own son. Florentina Cruz, Catalina’s sister, also made him also her sole heir
to her property in her will. Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late
Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity of the will. They alleged that the formalities required by law were not
complied with and that the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its
execution, hence the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
petitioner.

The probate court rendered judgment upholding the due execution of the will. It appointed petitioner Andres Pascual
executor and administrator of the estate of the late Catalina de la Cruz without bond.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will should be disallowed because of undue and improper influence and fraud

RULING:

No.

It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the mere fact that a will was made in favor of a stranger is not in itself
proof that the same was obtained through fraud and undue pressure and influence, for we have numerous
instances where strangers are preferred to blood relatives in the institution of heirs. But in the case at bar, Andres
Pascual, although not related by blood to the deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the
latter for she considered him as her own son. As a matter of fact it was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and
cared for Andres Pascual but also her sisters held him with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina
Cruz, made him also her sole heir to her property in her will without any objection from Catalina and Valentina
Cruz.

Ozaeta v. Cuartero, No. L-5597, 31 May 1956

Coso v. Fernandez Deza

G.R. No. 16763, 22 December 1921

The rule as to what constitutes "undue influence" has been variously stated, but the substance of the different
statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and
subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make his express the will of another, rather than
his own.

FACTS:

The testator in this case is a married man and a resident of the Philippines and was shown to have an existing illicit
relationship with Rosario Lopez for many years. Rosario Lopez remained in a close communication with him until
his death. There is no doubt that she exercised some influence over him. The testator executed a will in favor of his
illegitimate son with Rosario Lopez and also provides for her nineteen hundred Spanish duros by way the
reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking care of the testator in Barcelona during the years 1909 to
1916, when he is alleged to have suffered from a severe illness.

CFI of manila set aside the will on the ground of undue influence allegedly exerted over the mind of the testator by
Rosario Lopez.

ISSUE:

Whether the influence exerted by Rosario Lopez to the testator is such of a kind which the law contemplates as to
be undue influence so as to nullify the will?

HELD:

NO. The rule as to what constitutes "undue influence" has been variously stated, but the substance of the different
statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and
subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make his express the will of another, rather
than his own.

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence, in the sense above expressed,
existed at the time of its execution and we do not think that this burden has been carried in the present case. While
it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence
so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to "destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another
rather than his own."
Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as `undue,' if no imposition or fraud be practiced,
even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who
have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made. (Mackall vs.
Mackall, 135 U. S., 1677.)

Ortega v. Valmonte
G.R. No. 157451, 16 December 2005

The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it should not be
allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court
cannot attribute any reversible error on the part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will.

FACTS:

Placido Valmonte (Placido) toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement.
In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at San
Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names. Two
years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80, he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a
ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years of
wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.

Placido then executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and
dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary
dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator
and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause
and again on the left hand margin. In the said will, he appointed Josefina as as Executrix of his properties which
was opposed by the petitioner. It is the contention of the petitioner that Josefina should not inherit alone because
aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She
attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the
testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. The lower court disallowed the probate of the
will but the appellate court reversed said ruling and upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing
witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and
unhygienic, crude and impolite ways"6 did not make him a person of unsound mind. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte be disallowed on the grounds of fraud in the execution
of the will and testator’s state of mind at that time.

RULING:

NO. The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it should not
be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden satisfactorily. For this reason, the
Court cannot attribute any reversible error on the part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the
will.

Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:
"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some
other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of
affixing his signature thereto."

As to Existence of Fraud

We are not convinced. Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is
cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the
document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding
which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made."

We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its
execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible
evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of
fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. That the
testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who
was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were
the ones who had taken "the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years."

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not
invalidate the document, "because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and
acknowledged on the same occasion." More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by
three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public. In any event, we
agree with the CA that "the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was
satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses."

As to Capacity to Make a Will

"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause.

"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound
mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty,
and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court
was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.

De Guzman v. Intestate Estate of Francisco Benitez

G.R. Nos. 61167-68, 20 January 1989

The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the appellate court
because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by
convincingly credible evidence, shall not be disturbed on appeal

FACTS:

Francisco Benitez (Benitez) died single at the age of 61 years on November 6, 1970, without descendants, nor
ascendants, nor brothers and sisters. He left an estate consisting of fourteen (14) parcels of coconut land and a
small savings account. A petition for administration was filed by Dionisia Valenzuela who was the judicial guardian
of his person and property during the lifetime of the deceased. Such was granted.

The petition for administration was opposed by Emiterio de Guzman (De Guzman), substituted by his heirs, on the
ground that the deceased left a will bequeathing his entire estate to him. In support of the petition for probate, the
two attesting witnesses of the will were presented. In opposition to such probate, the respondents presented six
witnesses identifying the testimonial transcript of Dr Fernandez in proceedings for the guardianship of Benitez for
incompetence on account of insanity. The probate was disallowed.

ISSUE:

Did Benitez possess a sound and disposing mind when he executed his will?

RULING:

No, he did not. The evidence showed that Benitez was confined at the National Mental Hospital ten times from
January 18, 1929 up to March 12, 1941 before he executed his supposed will on August 18, 1945. The Court said:
“Plainly, the petition raises a purely factual issue, which we are not at liberty to review because in an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth, may be
raised. In any event, the decision of the Court of Appeals reveals that that Court carefully weighed the evidence on
the question of the testamentary capacity or lack of it, of the deceased Francisco Benitez and found ‘no compelling
reason to disturb the lower court's findings and conclusions.’ The resolution of that question hinged on the
credibility of the witnesses. The cardinal rule on that point is that the trial courts, assessment of the
credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior
advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly
credible evidence, shall not be disturbed on appeal (People vs. Dava, 149 SCRA 582)”.

Vda. De Perez v. Tolete

G.R. No. 76714, 2 June 1994

In the probate of wills, the courts should relax the rules on evidence, as the goal is to receive the best evidence of which
the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate.

FACTS:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and residents of New
York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event
that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his
wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in
Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.

Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud
was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New
York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs
and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.

For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance
with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court
already issued an order, disallowing the wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed.

RULING:
Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country
upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in
conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is
imperative.

Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the
Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has
his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such
country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure
and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95
Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner
submitted all the needed evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is
impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

De La Cerna v. Potot
G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964

A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world.

The decree of probate issued by a court of probate jurisdiction is conclusive upon the due execution of the testament.

Public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of courts should become final
at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis set litium.

FACTS:

Sps. Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament whereby they willed that
their 2 parcels of land acquired during their marriage shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece, Manuela
Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot and that "while each of the testators is yet living, he or she will continue to
enjoy the fruits of the two lands." Bernabe died and the will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia and
Manuela before the CFI of Cebu which, after due publication and there being no opposition, heard the evidence and
by Order of 1939. Upon the death of Gervasia on 1952, another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as
Gervasia was concerned was filed on the same Court but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela, and her attorney to
appear, the case was dismissed.

CFI ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the
prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines);
but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the CA reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was
issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the CFI of Cebu has conclusive effect despite the
invalidity of joint wills
RULING:

YES. Even though the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators,
reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code), the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the
CFI of Cebu has conclusive effect but only as to Bernabe’s last will. The error thus committed by the probate court
was an error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the
probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous.

But the CA should have taken into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1939
could only affect the share of Bernabe. It could not include the disposition of the share of Gervasia who was then
still alive and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction.

Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime. It
follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death,
reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.

Thus regarded, the holding of the CFI that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation
of the deceased Gervasia in the properties in question. Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia should pass
upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in
her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.

C. Interpretation of Wills, NCC 788, 789, 790-794, 930

De Roma v. CA
152 SCRA 205

Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor shouldhave so expressly provided.

FACTS:

Candelaria De Roma had 2 legally adopted daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda, when she died intestate. Buhay
instituted the administration by Buhay as the guardian of Rosalinda where she was appointed as administratix.
This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and
the fruits thereof, had not been included. The Parcels of Land totaled P10, 297.50 and the value is not disputed.

The TC issued an order in favor of Buhay because when Candelaria donated the properties to Buhay she said in the
Deed of Donation “…sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing
muli…” which the TC interpreted as a prohibition to collate and besides the legitimes of the two daughters were
not impaired. On appeal, it was reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable not an express
prohibition to collate.

ISSUES:

WON not these lands are subject to collation?

HELD:

The SC affirmed the appellate court’s decision and that it merely described the donation as irrevocable. The Fact
that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the donated properties from collation as required under
the provisions of the NCC. Given the precise language of the deed of donation the decedent donor would have
included an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor’s intention. Absent such indication of
that intention, the rule not the exemption should be applied.
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of
the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime
of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly provided, or
if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.

Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon
G.R. No. L-24561, 30 June 1970

The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation,
and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith,
following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words.

FACTS:

In the will left by the deceased Agripina Valdez, she divided, distributed and disposed of all her specific real
properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate appraised at P1,801,960.00 among her six children.
Upon appraisal of the properties, it was found that two (Marina and Tomas) of Agripina’s six children were
bequethed with properties valued more than their legitimes. On the other hand, the remaining children were
bequethed with properties valued lower than their legitimes.

Marina and Tomas then submitted a project of partition whereby the other children will receive the properties
respectively given to them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes, which
shall be deducted from the properties given to Marina and Tomas. The other children made a counter-project of
partition whereby all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half (1/2) of
the entire estate and the remaining half shall be divided among them equally. \

The lower court approved Marina and Tomas’ project of partition.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court erred in approving Marina and Tomas’ project of partition

RULING:

No. Under Articles 788 and 791 of the Civil Code, "If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations,
in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "The words
of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will
render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which
will prevent intestacy."

Notably, the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. This was a
valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code,
providing that "Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition
his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime.

To protect legitimes, the Civil Code contains Arts. 906 and 907. This was properly complied with in the Tomas' and
Marina’s project of partition, wherein the other children, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed
and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective legitimes each
were taken from the cash and/or properties of Marina and Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix
and received in the partition by will more than their respective legitimes.

Leonor Villaflor Vda. De Villanueva v. Delfin Juico

 G.R. No. L-15737, February 28, 1962

The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation,
and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith,
following the plain and literal meaning of the testator’s words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was
otherwise. (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233).

FACTS:

In 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish, instituting his wife, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno, and his
brother Don Fausto Villaflor as his heirs. Clause 8 of the will provides that Doña Fausta shall enjoy the use and
possession of the properties mentioned in Clause 7 while she lives and provided she does not contract a second
marriage; otherwise, the said properties shall belong to his niece granddaughter Leonor Villaflor, the plaintiff
herein. The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that the legacies made in favor of the instituted heirs would
be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta.

In 1922, Don Nicolas died, without begetting any child with Doña Fausta. The latter was appointed judicial
administratrix of Don Nicola’s estate. By virtue of the project of partition approved by the probate court, she
received the use and possession of all the real and personal properties referred to in Clause 7 of the will. The order
approving the project of partition, however, expressly provided that approval was “without prejudice to the
provisions of clause 8 of the will of Nicolas Villaflor."

In 1956, Doña Fausta died without having contracted a second marriage, and without having begotten any child
with the deceased Don Nicolas. Her estate is now being settled, with the defendant Delfin Juico as the duly
appointed and qualified judicial administrator. Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against
defendant, contending that upon Doña Fausta’s death, the plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real
and personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor in clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its 8th clause.
Defendant’s position, however, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the widow
upon her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.

ISSUE:

Whether plaintiff is entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the will, from the
date of the death of Doña Fausta Nepomuceno?

RULING:

YES. The plain desire and intent of the testator was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the
properties described in the 7th clause, subject to the further condition that if the widow remarried, her rights
would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no more than a life
interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the
deceased, "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and possession while alive), in which the first half of the phrase
("uso y posesion" instead of "dominio" or "propriedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator
plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their
possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime.

Solla v. Ascueta
49 Phil. 333

Where the language of the will is ambiguous or doubtful, the court should take into consideration the situation of the
testator and the facts and circumstances surrounding him at the time the will executed. Where the testator's intention
is manifest from the context of the will and surrounding circumstances, but is obscured by inapt and inaccurate modes
of expression, the language will be subordinated to the intention, and in order to give effect to such intention, the court
may depart from the strict wording and read word or phrase in a sense different from that which is ordinarily
attributed to it, and for such purpose may mould or change the language of the will. such as restricting its application
or supplying omitted words or phrases.

FACTS:

Maria Solla died leaving a will which included a distribution of the legacies to her brothers, nephew and protegees
and servants; the delivery of a sufficient sum of money to the parish priest for the annual novena, vigil, and bier on
the last day for the repose of her soul and her relatives (pious order and requests); and naming her grandson
Leandro Serrano as her universal heir to her property and ordered him to strictly comply with her orders and
requests and to make the same insistence upon his heirs to comply with all that she has ordered. Leandro Serrano,
for his part, named his son Simeon Serrano, as executor of his will and that all of the property of the deceased Solla
was given to Simeon with the order not to forget annually all the souls of the relatives of Maria Solla and and to
have a mass said on the first and ninth days (pious orders and requests).

ISSUE:

Whether or not trial court erred in interpreting that part of Leandro Serrano's will ordered the delivery of the
legacies left by Maria Solla in her will to the plaintiffs, and not merely the delivery of the pious requests

RULING:

YES. In the present case, it clearly appearing that it was Mari Solla's intention, in ordering her universal heir
Leandro Serrano in her will at the hour of his death, to insist upon the compliance of her orders by his heirs, that
the latter should comply with her pious orders and that she did not mean her orders concerning her legacies. Maria
Solla could not have referred to other than the pious orders and requests, because, by reason of their nature, they
were the only ones which Leandro Serrano could not wholly comply with during his lifetime, but that his heirs
would continue to do so. Thus, the Court are authorized to restrict the application of the words "all that I have here
ordered" used by the said Maria Solla and the words "all her orders" used by Leandro Serrano in their respective
wills limiting them to the pious orders and substituting the phrase "in regard to the annual masses" after the words
used by both testators, respectively. The trial court committed an error in interpreting the order to Leandro
Serrano mentioned in his will as applicable to the provisions of Maria Solla's will relative to the legacies and not to
pious bequests exclusively.

Balanay v. Martinez
64 SCRA 452 (1975)

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the
other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first
invalid disposition had not been made.

FACTS:

Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of 67. She
was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and 6 legitimate children: Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio,
Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court for the probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970
which is written in English where Leodegaria Julian declared (a) she was the owner of the "southern half of 9
conjugal lots (b) she was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land which she inherited from her father (c) it was her
desire that her properties should NOT be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their
legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (d) after her husband's death (age of 82 in 1973) her
paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part
of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her.
Although initially opposing, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed a Conformation of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary
Rights manifesting that out of respect for his wife's will he waived and renounced his hereditary rights in her
estate in favor of their 6 children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had
perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.

Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and conformation" of Felix Balanay,
Sr. were void for illegally claiming the conjugal lands.

David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and
Emilia B. Pabaonon filed a motion for leave of court to withdraw probate of the will and requesting authority to
proceed by intestate estate proceeding also referring to the provisions relating to the conjugal assets as
compromising the future legitimes.

Lower Court: Will was void and converted to intestate proceedings

Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's
order on the ground that Atty. Montaña had NO authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will.

Lower Court on motion for reconsideration: Denied and clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its
own independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.

ISSUE:

Whether the will should be void and interstate proceeding should follow?
HELD:

NO. Illegal declaration does NOT nullify the entire will and may be disregarded.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of
the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if
the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are
valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating
the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the
beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).

D. Law governing form

1. Time of execution, NCC 795
2. Place of execution, NCC 17, 810, 815-819

In Re: Will and Testament of the deceased Reverend Sancho Abadia (1954)
50 O.G. #9, p. 4185

Article 795 of the new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance
of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of
authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's
death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but
at the time the instrument was executed.

FACTS:

On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed his Last Will and Testament.
Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an
evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value.
On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed
opposition.

During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in
his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand, in Spanish, which the
testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the
three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and
finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page
after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any
evidence.

RTC: At the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law but still, because at the time of
the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, under a liberal view, and
to carry out the intention of the testator, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate the
Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia.

The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the
case was certified to the SC by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:

1. WON the New Civil Code governs the Will made by Rev. Abadia – NO.
2. WON the Will of Rev. Abadia be subject to probate proceedings – NO.

RULING:
1. At the time that the Will was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic
wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills,
requirements which were not complied with in the Will.

Article 795 of the new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the
observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the
weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the
testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided
by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will
operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate
among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality,
the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.

2. In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and the Will is denied probate.

We should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and
devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a
subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such
a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal
requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died
intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective
will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that
the Legislature cannot validate void wills.

Fluemer v. Hix
G.R. No. L-32636, March 17, 1930
FACTS:

The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the latters will was executed in
Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction and that the laws of
that state govern. To this end, the petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3836 of Acts 1882, as found in West
Virginia Code and as certified to by the Director of National Library. The Judge of the First Instance however denied
the probate of the will on the grounds that Sec 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not complied with.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether it is necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in West Virginia as a prerequisite to
the allowance and recording of said will.

HELD:

The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are
not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil.,
156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was printed or published under the authority
of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the
law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the
extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.

Estate of Giberson
48 O.G. #7, 2657

FACTS:

Lela G. Dalton presented on February 10, 1949 an application with the Court of First Instance of Cebu for the
probate of the holographic will of William R. Giberson, a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States, dated April 29,
1920 in San Francisco, California. Spring Giberson, legitimate son of William R. Giberson, presented an opposition
alleging that the will is apocrypha (with questionable authenticity), it does not represent the true will of the late
Giberson, and has not been granted according to the law.

ISSUE:

Whether the wills executed outside the Philippines may be probated without being first probated in the country of
its execution.

RULING:

YES. Section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating that “a will made out of the Philippine Islands… may be
proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to
the laws of these Islands” is still in force and has not been abrogated by Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. Here, the will
of William Giberson need not be probated first in the State of Illinois, USA before it may be probated here in the
Philippines. The Court opined that Section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure is substantive in nature and therefore
could not have been repealed by the Rules of Court which are only procedural in nature.

De La Cerna v. Potot
G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964

A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world.

The decree of probate issued by a court of probate jurisdiction is conclusive upon the due execution of the testament.
Public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of courts should become final
at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis set litium.

FACTS:

Sps. Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament whereby they willed that
their 2 parcels of land acquired during their marriage shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece, Manuela
Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot and that "while each of the testators is yet living, he or she will continue to
enjoy the fruits of the two lands." Bernabe died and the will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia and
Manuela before the CFI of Cebu which, after due publication and there being no opposition, heard the evidence and
by Order of 1939. Upon the death of Gervasia on 1952, another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as
Gervasia was concerned was filed on the same Court but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela, and her attorney to
appear, the case was dismissed.

CFI ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the
prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines);
but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the CA reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was
issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the CFI of Cebu has conclusive effect despite the
invalidity of joint wills

RULING:

YES. Even though the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators,
reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code), the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the
CFI of Cebu has conclusive effect but only as to Bernabe’s last will. The error thus committed by the probate court
was an error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the
probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous.

But the CA should have taken into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1939
could only affect the share of Bernabe. It could not include the disposition of the share of Gervasia who was then
still alive and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction.

Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime. It
follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death,
reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.

Thus regarded, the holding of the CFI that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation
of the deceased Gervasia in the properties in question. Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia should pass
upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in
her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.

Bellis v. Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678, 6 June 1967

Whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law.

FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, he had
five legitimate children; by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

Amos executed a will in the Philippines. Subsequently Amos died a resident of San Antonio, Texas. His will was
admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor, submitted and filed
its Project of Partition. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the testator's Last Will and
Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

Maria and Miriam filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. The lower court approved the executor's project of partition.
Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.

ISSUE:

WON Philippine law shall apply.

RULING:

NO.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, par 3, of the Civil Code prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of
the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. It must have been Congress’ purpose to make the second paragraph
of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity
to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

Whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. A
provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law
and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters
that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

E. Law governing content

1. Time – NC 2263
2. Successional rights, etc – NCC 16

Estate of Christensen
61 O.G. #46, p. 7302

FACTS:

Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and consequently was
considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death.
However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of
California.
In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as
his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been
declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that
under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is
ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional rights of
illegitimate children under Philippine law.

On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of
our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of
California on the matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could
dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being
entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.

ISSUE:

WON the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the successional rights oh his heirs.

RULING:

Philippine laws should apply. Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic validity of testamentary
dispositions are governed by the national law of the decedent, in this case, California law. The provision in the laws
of California giving a testator absolute freedom in disposing of his estate is the internal law which applies only to
persons domiciled within the said estate. On the other hand, the provision in the laws of California stating that
personal property is governed by the laws of the domicile of its owner is the conflict of laws rule that applies to
persons not domicile in the said state. Accordingly, the laws of the Philippines, in which the testator is domiciled
governs the succession and the regime of legitimes must be respected.

Bellis v. Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678, 6 June 1967

Whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law.

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, he had
five legitimate children; by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

Amos executed a will in the Philippines. Subsequently Amos died a resident of San Antonio, Texas. His will was
admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor, submitted and filed
its Project of Partition. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the testator's Last Will and
Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

Maria and Miriam filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. The lower court approved the executor's project of partition.
Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.

ISSUE:

WON Philippine law shall apply.

RULING:

NO.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, par 3, of the Civil Code prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of
the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. It must have been Congress’ purpose to make the second paragraph
of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity
to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

Whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. A
provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law
and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters
that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

Cayetano v. Leonides
129 SCRA 522

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and
1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.

FACTS:

Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent
Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the
only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership
of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.

Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly
executed in the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix. In
her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent
resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister; that
during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.;
that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the
Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the
appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the
Philippines.

The respondent judge admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, the Last Will and Testament of the late
Adoracion C. Campos, and Nenita Campos Paguia is appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent.

Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the will be set aside. Petitioner
Hermogenes Campos died and was substituted by Cayetano. Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that
the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when he ruled that the right of a forced heir to
his legitime can be divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced
heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession
ISSUE:

Whether or not Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime when the respondent judge allowed the
reprobate of Adoracion's will.

RULING:

No. This contention is without merit. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently
established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which
respectively provide:

Art. 16 par. (2). However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the
decedent. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by
Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.

III. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND INTENT

A. Who may make a will? - NCC 796-803
B. Supervening incapacity – NCC 801

Torres v. Lopez
48 Phil., 77

The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly
established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document.

FACTS:

Tomas Rodriguez died, leaving a considerable estate. Shortly thereafter, Manuel Torres, one of the executors
named in the will, asked that the will of Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the
first cousin of the deceased, on the grounds: (1) That the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of
the execution of the supposed will he was suffering from senile dementia and was under guardianship; (2) that
undue influence had been exercised by the persons benefited in the document in conjunction with
others who acted in their behalf; and (3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the document was
obtained through fraud and deceit. After a prolonged trial, judgment was rendered denying the legalization of the
will.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tomas Rodriguez was of sound and disposing mind.

HELD: YES.

A "sound mind" is a "disposing mind." One of the grounds for disallowing a will is "If the testator was insane or
otherwise mentally incapable of the execution of such an instrument at the time of its execution."
Predicated on these statutory provisions, this court has adopted the following definition of
testamentary capacity: "Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in
which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would
naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument
will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.’ The mental capacity of the testator is determined as
of the date of the execution of his will. Various tests of testamentary capacity have been announced by the courts
only later to be rejected as incomplete. Of the specific tests of capacity, neither old age, physical infirmities,
feebleness of mind* weakness of the memory, the appointment of a guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly
or jointly to show testamentary incapacity. Each case rests on its own facts and must be decided by its own facts.

There is one particular test relative to the capacity to make a will which is of some practical utility. This rule
concerns the nature and rationality of the will. Is the will simple or complicated? Is it natural or unnatural? The
mere exclusion of heirs will not, however, in itself indicate that the will was the offspring of an unsound mind.

The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly
established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document.

Baltazar v. Laxa
G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012

The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute
a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.

FACTS:

In 1981 Paciencia, 78, executed her will in the Kapampangan dialect in the house of retired Judge Limpin who
doubled as a notary public.
Childless, without any collateral family left. She left all of her properties to her nephew Antonio Laxa, his wife and
their children whom she treated as her own son.
She died in 1996 in the US whilst living with Antonio’s family. In 2000 Lorenzo filed for the probate of her will in
Pampanga.
Lorenzo Laxa opposed the same stating that one of the testator’s properties belongs to his predecessor and interest
and that she was already “forgetful” when she executed the will.
The RTC granted the opposition stating that the testator no longer had the sufficient mental faculties to execute the
said will.
The CA reversed the said ruling.

ISSUE:

Was the will sufficient in form, and substance as to the allegation of the testator’s forgetfulness?

RULING:

The court says yes. The will was sufficient in form as required by law.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the
shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not
equivalent to being of unsound mind.

Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, et al.

GR. No. 185922, Jan. 15, 2014

FACTS:
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. (Dr. Favis) was married to Capitolina Aguilar (Capitolina) with whom he had seven children.
When Capitolina died in March 1994. Dr. Favis married Juana Gonzalez (Juana), his common-law wife with whom
he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis (Mariano). When Dr. Favis and Juana got married in 1974, he executed an
affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita D. Favis
(Larcelita), with whom he has four children.

Dr. Favis died intestate on July 29, 1995. On October 16, 1994, prior his death, he allegedly executed a Deed of
Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana. Claiming the said
donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis children with Capitolina, petitioners herein, filed an action for
annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory, liquidation and partition of property before the RTC against Juana,
Sps. Mariano and Larcelita and their grandchildren as respondents.

RTC nullified the Deed of Donation. The trial court found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illnesses,
could not have had full control of his mental capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. Holding that the
subsequent marriage of Dr. Favis and Juana legitimated the status of Mariano, the trial court also declared Juana
and Mariano as compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis and shall inherit in equal shares in the estate of the late Dr. Favis.

The CA motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC is correct in ruling that the Deed of Donation is void.

HELD:

Yes, the deed of donation is null and void. The correctness of the finding of RTC was not touched by the Court of
Appeals. Therefore, the trial court's factual finding, therefore, stands unreversed; and respondents did not provide
the court with any argument to have it reversed. At the time of the execution of the Deed of Donation, Dr. Mariano
Favis, Sr. was already at an advanced age of 92, afflicted with different illnesses like Hiatal hernia, Parkinsons’
disease and pneumonia, to name few, which illnesses had the effects of impairing his brain or mental faculties and
the deed being executed only when Dra. Mercedes Favis had already left his father’s residence when Dr. Mariano
Favis, Sr. could have done so earlier or even in the presence of Dra. Mercedes Favis, at the time he executed the
Deed of Donation was not in full control of his mental faculties. That although age of senility varies from one
person to another, to reach the age of 92 with all those medications and treatment one have received for those
illnesses, yet claim that his mind remains unimpaired, would be unusual. The fact that the Deed of Donation was
only executed after Dra. Mercedes Favis left his father's house necessarily indicates that they don't want the same
to be known by the first family, which is an indicia of bad faith on the part of the defendant, who at that time had
influence over the donor.

IV SOLEMNITIES OF WILLS
A. Kinds of Wills – NCC 804, 810
B. Notarial Wills
1. General requirements – NCC 804

Suroza v. Honrado
110 SCRA 388, December 19, 1981

A notarial will executed in a language unknown to the testatrix is void because of the mandatory provision of Art. 804
of the Civil Code which states that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.

FACTS:
Marcelina Salvador, the widow of Mauro Suroza, allegedly executed a will in English, bequeathing all of her estate
to her alleged granddaughter Marilyn. However, it is undisputed that Marcelina was illiterate and consequently, it
is impossible that she executed her will in English.

ISSUE:

Whether the will is null and void for being written in a language unknown by the testator.

RULING:

Yes, the will is null and void. The will was written in English and was thumbmarked by a Marceline, an illiterate
testatrix. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and known"
to the testatrix but in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated
into Filipino language” which could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate
testatrix and is therefore void.

The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina
Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the "testator" instead of "testatrix". Judge Honrado’s negligent is very
apparent for he had failed to notice not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that it is highly
improbable that the testatrix solely instituted Marilyn as sole heiress and totally depriving Agapito of his share,
which the testatrix and her husband treated as their own child.

Reyes v. Vda. De Vidal

G.R. No. L-2867, 21 April 1952

When there are two contradicting expert witness with regard to the signature of the testator, the closeness or
proximity of the time in which the standards used had been written to that of the suspected signature or document is
very important to bring about an accurate analysis and conclusion.

FACTS:

A petition for the probate of said will was filed in the CFI of Manila. Dolores Zuñiga Vda. de Vidal, sister of the
deceased, filed an opposition based on several grounds. And, after several days of trial, at which both parties
presented their respective evidence, the court rendered its decision disallowing the will on the ground that the
signatures of the deceased appearing therein are not genuine, that it was not proven that the deceased knew the
Spanish language in which it was written, and that even if the signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the
deceased was not of sound mind when she signed the will. From this decision petitioner appealed to this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is void for: 1) not bearing the genuine signature of the testatrix; 2) being in a language
unknown to the testatrix; and, 3) for the testatrix being of unsound mind.

RULING:

The will is valid. As to the genuineness of the signature, two contradicting expert witness are presented. The
closeness or proximity of the time in which the standards used had been written to that of the suspected signature
or document is very important to bring about an accurate analysis and conclusion. The selection of the proper
standards of comparison is of paramount importance especially if we consider the age and the state of the health of
the author of the questioned signatures. A signature affixed in 1941 may involve characteristics different from
those borne by a signature affixed in 1945. And this is because the passing of time and the increase in age may have
a decisive influence in the writing characteristics of a person. It for this reasons that the authorities of the opinion
that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standard of comparison must be as close as
possible in point of time to the suspected signature.
As to the language of the will, there is nothing in the testimony of the witnesses presented by the petitioner which
would indicate that the testatrix knew and spoke the Spanish language used in the preparation of the will in
question. However, this failure alone does not in itself suffice to conclude that this important requirement of the
law has not been complied with, it appearing that there is enough evidence on record which supplies this technical
omission. In the first place, it is an undisputed fact that the deceased was a mestiza española, was married to a
Spaniard, and made several trips to Spain. In the second place, the very letters submitted as evidence by the
oppositor is written in Spanish. These facts give rise to the presumption that the testatrix knew the language in
which the testament has been written, which presumption should stand unless the contrary is proven. And this
presumption has not been overcome.

As to the soundness of mind, witnesses give an idea of mental condition of the deceased in the will differ from each
other in certain respects, this is only due to her age and state of health rather than to a defective mental condition.
They do not reveal a condition of forgery or lack of genuineness. These differences or irregularities are common in
the writings of old people and, far from showing lack of genuineness, are indicative of the age, sickness, or weak
condition of the writer. A comparison of the three disputed signatures in the will readily give this impression.

Abangan v. Abangan
G.R. No. L-13431, November 12, 1919

FACTS:

On September 1917, the CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed on July 1916. The will is
described in the following manner: First sheet: Contains all the disposition of the testatrix, signed at the bottom by
Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of Ana Abangan) and signed by three witnesses. Second
sheet: contains only the attestation clause, duly signed by the same three witnesses at the bottom but was not
signed by the testatrix herself. Anastacia Abangan (different person) et al. appealed from the decision. She said that
the probate should have been denied on three grounds: (1)Neither of the sheets were signed on the left margin by
the testatrix and the three witnesses; (2) The pages were not numbered by letters; (3) It was written in a dialect
that the testatrix did not understand.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will was validly probated

RULING:

Yes. The trial court was correct in admitting the probate. The circumstance appearing on the will itself, that it was
executed in Cebu City and in the dialect of the place where the testarix is a resident is enough to presume that she
knew this dialect in the absence of any proof to the contrary. On the authority of this case and that of Gonzales v
Laurel, it seems that for the presumption to apply, the following must appear: 1) that the will must be in a language
or dialect generally spoken in the place of execution, and, 2) that the testator must be a native or resident of the
said locality. Moreover, the testator's signature is not necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name
implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator.

Lopez v Liboro, No. L-1787, 27 August 1948

2. Specific requirements – NCC 805, 806

Echavez v. Dozen
G.R. No. 192916, October 11, 2010

FACTS:

Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu City, which includes Lot No. 1956-A and
Lot No. 1959 (subject lots). On September 7, 1985, Vicente donated the subject lots to petitioner Manuel Echavez
(Manuel) through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. Manuel accepted the donation.
In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of Dozen Construction and
Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation). In October 1986, they executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale over
the same properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is valid.

HELD:

No. Donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by law for the validity of wills, “otherwise,
the donation is void and would produce no effect.” The Acknowledgment portion does not contain the number of
pages on which the deed was written. Also, there was no attestation clause in the will. That the requirements of
attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806,
respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve different purposes. An attestation
must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. An acknowledgment is made by one executing
a deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the
attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the
instrument before them and to the manner of its execution. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses
themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation
Mortis Causa.

Apolonio Taboada v. Judge Rosal

G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982

While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be
ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed.

FACTS:

In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged last will and
testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will consists of two pages. The
first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the
testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which
contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three
(3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix.

Since no opposition was filed after the petitioner's compliance with the requirement of publication, the trial court
commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive the petitioner's evidence. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted
his evidence and presented Vicente Timkang, one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, who testified on its
genuineness and due execution.

The trial court, then issued the questioned order denying the probate of the will for want of a formality in its
execution. In the same order, the petitioner was also required to submit the names of the intestate heirs with their
corresponding addresses so that they could be properly notified and could intervene in the summary settlement of
the estate.

Instead of complying with the order of the trial court, the petitioner filed a manifestation and/or motion, ex parte
praying for a thirty-day period within which to deliberate on any step to be taken as a result of the disallowance of
the will. He also asked that the ten-day period required by the court to submit the names of intestate heirs with
their addresses be held in abeyance.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the probate of the will. However, the said
motions or incidents were still pending resolution when respondent Judge Avelino S. Rosal assumed the position of
presiding judge of the respondent court.

Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of special administrator.

Subsequently, the new Judge denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the manifestation and/or motion
filed ex parte. The petitioner decided to file the present petition.

ISSUE:

For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that the testatrix and all the
three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one
another?

HELD:

YES. We find the petition meritorious.

Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists in witnessing the
testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are, done which the statute
requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand,
subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such
paper as the will which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).

Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was
subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.

The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the
genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation
clause.

While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be
ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449).

The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the
law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of
giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to
prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator.
This objective is in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will"

Payad v. Tolentino
G.R. No. L-42258, January 15, 1936

A statute requiring a will to be ‘signed’ is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator’s mark.

FACTS:

Victorio Payad filed a petition for the probate of the will of the decedent Leoncia Tolentino. This was opposed by
Aquilina Tolentino, averring that said Will was made only after the death of the testatrix. The lower court denied
the probate of the will on the ground that the attestation clause was not in conformity with the requirements of the
law since it was not stated therein that the testatrix caused Atty. Almario to write her name at her express
direction. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON it was necessary that the attestation clause state that the testatrix caused Atty. Almario to write her name at
her express direction?

HELD:

It was not necessary that the attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix requested Attorney
Almario to sign her name inasmuch as the testatrix signed the will in question in accordance with law.The evidence
of record establishes the fact the Leoncia Tolentino, assisted by Attorney Almario, placed her thumb mark on each
and every page of the questioned will and that said attorney merely wrote her name to indicate the place where
she placed said thumb mark. In other words Attorney Almario did not sign for the testatrix. She signed by placing
her thumb mark on each and every page thereof. “A statute requiring a will to be ‘signed’ is satisfied if the signature
is made by the testator’s mark.”

Matias v Salud, GR L-10907, Jan. 29, 1957

Balonan v Abellana, 109 Phil. 358

Icasiano v. Icasiano
G.R. No. L-18979, June 30, 1964

Inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his signature to one page of a will is not fatal.

FACTS:

Josefa Villacorte died in Manila. She executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter
Felisa Icasiano, published before and attested by 3 instrumental witnesses. The will was acknowledged by the
testatrix and by the said 3 instrumental witnesses on the same date before a Notary Public. The will was actually
prepared by Atty. Fermin Samson, who was also present during the execution and signing of the said will. Of the 3
instrumental witnesses, only 2 were in the Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both testified as to the due
execution and authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged by the
testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also Atty Samson, who actually prepared the document. The latter also
testified that he prepared 1 original and 2 copies of the last will and testament at his house but he brought only 1
original and 1 signed copy to Manila, retaining 1 unsigned copy at his house.

A petition was filed for the allowance and admission to probate of the original the alleged will of the deceased, and
for the appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor.

Natividad Icasiano & Enrique Icasiano, daughter and son of the testatrix, filed their opposition.

Petitioner commenced the introduction of his evidence, but he filed a motion for the admission of an amended and
supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements,
and that he was, on that date, submitting the signed duplicate which he allegedly found.

The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the filing of the petition
consists of 5 pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the
attesting witnesses on page 3 thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is
signed by the testatrix and her 3 attesting witnesses in each and every page.

The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that the original of the will and its duplicate
were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each and every page thereof by the testatrix herself and
attested and subscribed by the 3 witnesses in the testatrix's presence and in that of one another as witnesses
(except for the missing signature by on eof the witnesses on page 3 of the original); that pages of the original and
duplicate of said will were duly numbered; that the attestation clause contains all the facts required by law to be
recited therein and is signed by the aforesaid attesting witnesses; that the will is written in the language known to
and spoken by the testatrix; that the attestation clause is in a language also known to and spoken by the witnesses;
that the will was executed on one single occasion in duplicate copies; and that both the original and the duplicate
copies were duly acknowledged before Notary Public.

The witness, Atty. Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page 3 of the original, admits that he may have
lifted 2 pages instead of 1 when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3 was signed in his presence.

Natividad and Enrique filed their joint opposition to the admission of the amended and supplemental petition, but
by order of the court admitted said petition. Natividad filed her amended opposition. The parties presented their
respective evidence, and after several hearings the court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to
probate. From this order, the oppositors appealed directly to this Court.

Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the
duplicate are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original.

ISSUE:

WON failure of one of the witnesses to affix his signature to page 3 of the said will is sufficient to deny probate of
the will.

RULING: No.

SC are satisfied that the testatrix signed both original and duplicate copies of the will spontaneously, on the same in
the presence of the 3 attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will; and Atty. Samson, who
actually prepared the documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog, a language known to and
spoken by both the testator and the witnesses, and read to and by the testatrix and Atty. Samson, together before
they were actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and
the witnesses.

SC hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the
simultaneous lifting of 2 pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.
Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did
sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom
the testament was ratified by testatrix and all 3 witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally
interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she
had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is
sufficiently attained.

Nera v. Rimando
G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911

FACTS:

At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting with a smaller room by a doorway where a curtain
hangs across, one of the witnesses was in the outside room when the other witnesses were attaching their
signatures to the instrument.

The trial court did not consider the determination of the issue as to the position of the witness as of vital
importance in determining the case. It agreed with the ruling in the case of Jaboneta v. Gustillo that the alleged fact
being that one of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer room while the signing occurred in the inner room,
would not be sufficient to invalidate the execution of the will.
The CA deemed the will valid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subscribing witness was able to see the testator and other witnesses in the act of affixing their
signatures.

HELD:

YES.

The Court is unanimous in its opinion that had the witnesses been proven to be in the outer room when the
testator and other witnesses signed the will in the inner room, it would have invalidated the will since the
attaching of the signatures under the circumstances was not done 'in the presence' of the witnesses in the outer
room. The line of vision of the witness to the testator and other witnesses was blocked by the curtain separating
the rooms.

The position of the parties must be such that with relation to each other at the moment of the attaching the
signatures, they may see each other sign if they chose to.

In the Jaboneta case, the true test of presence is not whether or not they actualy saw each other sign but whether
they might have seen each other sign if they chose to doso considering their physical, mental condition and
position in relation to each other at the moment of the inscription of the signature.

Lopez v Liboro, No. L-1787, 27 August 1948

Samaniego v. Abena
G.R. No. 145545, June 30, 2008

The position of the court is in consonance with the doctrine of liberal interpretation enunciated in Art. 809 of the
Civil Code: In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved
that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

FACTS:

Margarita Mayores died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and
siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins and petitioner. Before her death, Margarita
executed a Last Will and Testament where she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property
located at Singalong, Manila and another property in San Antonio Village, Makati to respondent and four other
persons in equal shares. Margarita also left all her personal properties to respondent whom she likewise
designated as sole executor of her will. Respondent had the will probated. RTC declared the will probated and
respondent the executor. CA affirmed.

Petitioner argues that Margarita’s will failed to comply with the formalities required under Article 805[8] of the
Civil Code because the will was not signed by the testator in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and in the
presence of one another. She also argues that the signatures of the testator on pages A, B, and C of the will are not
the same or similar, indicating that they were not signed on the same day. She further argues that the will was
procured through undue influence and pressure because at the time of execution of the will, Margarita was weak,
sickly, jobless and entirely dependent upon respondent and her nephews for support, and these alleged handicaps
allegedly affected her freedom and willpower to decide on her own. Petitioner thus concludes that Margarita’s total
dependence on respondent and her nephews compelled her to sign the will. Petitioner likewise argues that CA
should have declared her and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita since they are her only living collateral
relatives in accordance with Articles 1009[9] and 1010[10] of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:

W/N the lower courts erred.

RULING:

No. All issues raised are questions of fact. As correctly held by the RTC: The oppositors failed to establish, by
preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict the presumption that the testator was of sound mind
(See Article 800 of the Civil Code); While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after
examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated
in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. The error must have been brought about by
the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation
clause and the acknowledgement; After examination of the signatures, the court does not share the same
observation as the oppositors. The picture (Exhibit H-3) shows that the testator was affixing her signature in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary; Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue
influence was exerted on the testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture reveals that the testator was in
a good mood and smiling with the other witnesses while executing the subject will.

Lopez v Lopez, G.R. No. 189984, Nov. 12, 2012

Estate of Abada v. Abaja

G.R. No. 147145, 31 January 2005

Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not imperative that a
parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the language employed it can reasonably be
deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.

FACTS:

Abada died sometime in May 1940. His widow Paula Toray ("Toray") died sometime in September 1943. Both died
without legitimate children. Alipio C. Abaja filed with the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (now
RTC-Kabankalan) a petition for the probate of the last will and testament ("will") of Abada. Abada allegedly named
as his testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova. Nicanor Caponong opposed the
petition on the ground that Abada left no will when he died in 1940. Alipio filed another petition before the RTC-
Kabankalan for the probate of the last will and testament of Toray. Caponong filed a petition before the RTC-
Kabankalan praying for the issuance in his name of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Abada and
Toray. RTC-Kabankalan designated Belinda Caponong-Noble ("Caponong- Noble") Special Administratrix of the
estate of Abada and Toray. RTC admitted and allowed the probate of the Last Will and Testament of Alipio Abada

ISSUE:

Whether or not the last will of Abada be admitted to probate.

RULING: YES.

The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the will must be acquainted with the testator, or, should
they not know him, he shall be identified by two witnesses who are acquainted with him and are known to the
notary and to the attesting witnesses. The notary and the witnesses shall also endeavor to assure themselves that
the testator has, in their judgment, the legal capacity required to make a will. However, the Code of Civil Procedure
repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not
necessary in the execution of any will. Therefore, Abada’s will does not require acknowledgement before a notary
public. Furthermore, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on substantial compliance in
determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close
inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it. We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate
of Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons.
 Garcia v. Lacuesta
90 Phil. 489 (1951)

The placing of a cross mark is the same as placing a thumb mark. It would have been different had it been proven that
the cross mark was the testator’s usual signature or was even one of the ways by which he signs his name. If this were
so, failure to state the writing by somebody else would have been immaterial, since he would be considered to have
signed the will himself.

FACTS:

Antero Mercado left a will dated January 3, 1943. The will is written in the Ilocano dialect which is spoken and
understood by the testator. The will also contained an attestation clause which is signed by three witnesses. The
attestation clause states:

“We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing testament of Antero Mercado was signed by
himself and also by us below his name and of this attestation clause and that of the left margin of the three pages
thereof. Page three the continuation of this attestation clause; this will is written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken
and understood by the testator, and it bears the corresponding number in letter which compose of three pages and
all them were signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the
testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses.”

The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero Mercado, followed
below by "A ruego del testador" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged also to have written a
cross mark immediately after his name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the attestation clause in the will is valid.

RULING:

NO. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier
to write the testator's name under his express direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
When the testator expressly caused another to sign the former’s name, this fact must be recited in the attestation
clause. Otherwise, the will is fatally defective.

Moreover, the cross mark appearing on the will is not the usual signature of Antero Mercado nor is it even one of
the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, the Court is not prepared to liken the mere sign of
the cross mark to a thumb mark, and the reason is obvious. The cross mark cannot and does not have the
trustworthiness of a thumb mark. Thus, the cross mark cannot be considered a valid signature.

Cagro v. Cagro
G.R. No, L-5826, April 29, 1953

The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.

FACTS:

The main objection insisted upon by the appellants is that the will is fatally defective, because its attestation clause
is not signed by the attesting witnesses. There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will
do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the
witnesses on the left-hand margin.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is "a memorandum
of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must
necessarily bear their signatures.

An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their
signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures
of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their
signatures to the attestation clause.

ISSUE:

W/N an unsigned attestation clause renders it void.

RULING:

In as much as the signature of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause,
although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left hand margin, the will is fatally
defective. The attestation clause is “ a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will” required by
law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessary bear their signatures. If an attestation clause not
signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause
to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.

Azuela v CA, G.R. No. 122880, 12 April 2006

Vda. De Ramos v. CA
G.R. No. L-40804, 31 January 1978

The attestation clause was signed by the instrumental witnesses. This serves as their admissions of the due execution
of the will and thus preventing them from prevaricating later on by testifying against the will’s due execution.

FACTS:

The late Eugenia Danila left a will wherein she instituted among others Adelaida Nista as one of the instituted heirs.
Nista petitioned before the court to admit the will to probate. It was opposed by Buenaventura Guerra and
Marcelina Guerra. The 2 oppositors claimed that they were the legally adopted children of Danila; that the said will
sought to be probated by Nista was obtained through fraud. The parties talked and came up with an agreement
which stated that Nista is admitting the invalidity of the will. It was approved by the court BUT Rosario de Ramos
et al – the other instituted heirs– intervened.

Rosario de Ramos et al alleged that the Guerras repudiated their shares when they abandoned Danila and
committed acts of ingratitude against her. Eventually, the probate court admitted the will to probate. Gueras
appealed before CA and it reversed and ruled that there was a failure to prove that Danila was in the presence of
the instrumental witnesses when she signed the will –because the instrumental witnesses testified in court that the
will was already signed when they affixed their signatures. HOWEVER, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas, the Notary Public
before whom the will was executed, affirmed Danila and the 3 instrumental witnesses were in each other’s
presence when the will was signed by them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA is correct in not allowing the will to probate.

RULING:

No. The attestation clause was signed by the instrumental witnesses. This serves as their admissions of the due
execution of the will and thus preventing them from prevaricating later on by testifying against the will’s due
execution. The execution of the same was evidently supervised by Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the
deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some intricacies
not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. There is a presumption in the regularity of the
performance of a lawyer with his duty as a notary public. There has been no evidence to show that Barcenas has
been remiss in his duty nor were there any allegations of fraud against him. In fact, the authenticity of Danila’s and
the witnesses’ signature was never questioned.

In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent attorney, with the
responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony
of a person casually called to participate in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should
induce the attorney to prevaricate.

Garcia v. Gatchalian
G.R. No. L-20357, 25 November 1967

FACTS:

On March 15, 1967, Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower 71 years of age, died in the municipality of Pasig, Province of
Rizal, leaving no forced heirs. On April 2 of the same year, appellant Garcia filed a petition for the probate of said
alleged will, wherein he was instituted as sole heir.

Felipe Gatchalian, and others opposed the petition on the ground that the will was procured by fraud; that the
deceased did not intend the instrument to be signed by him as his will; and that the deceased was physically and
mentally incapable of making a will at the time of the alleged execution of said will.

The court rendered the document to be the authentic last will of the deceased but disallowed it for failure to
comply with the mandatory requirement of Art. 806 of the Civil Code—that the will must be acknowledged before
a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.

ISSUE:

WON the will was executed in accordance of Art. 806 of the New Civil Code?

HELD: NO.

Art. 806 provides that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.

The SC held that compliance with the requirement contained in the legal provision to the effect that a will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and also by the witnesses is indispensable for its validity.

As the document under consideration does not comply with this requirement, it is obvious that the same may not
be probated.

Guerrero v. Bihis, G.R. No. 174144, 17 April 2007

Cruz v. Villasor
54 SCRA 31 (1973)

The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness
since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will.

FACTS:
Cruz, the surviving spouse of the deceased opposed the allowance of the will alleging the will was executed through
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was executed without the testator
having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the
supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law.

Of the three witnesses, one of them, is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to
have been acknowledged.

ISSUE:

Whether the will was executed in accordance with law?

RULING:

No. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental
witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to
avow; to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of.
Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his
having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so
that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a
situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.

To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have
the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of
Article 805 be requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the
testator and the required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The
result would be, as has been said, that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that purpose. In
the circumstances, the law would not be duly in observed.

Barut v. Cabacungan
G.R. No. L-6285, February 15, 1912

With respect to the validity of the will, it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs
his own or not. The important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express
direction in the presence of three witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the
presence of each other. That is all the statute requires. It may be wise as a practical matter that the one who signs the
testator's name signs also his own; but that it is not essential to the validity of the will. Whether one parson or another
signed the name of the testatrix in this case is absolutely unimportant so far as the validity of her will is concerned.

FACTS:

Barut applied for the probate of the will of deceased, Maria Salomon. The testatrix stated in the will that being
unable to read or write, the will was read to her by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda and that she had
instructed Severo Agayan to sign her name to it as testatrix. The probate was contested by a number of the
relatives of the deceased on various grounds.

The probate court found that the will was not entitled to probate because “the handwriting of the person who it is
alleged signed the name of the testatrix to the will for and on her behalf looked more like the handwriting of one of
the other witnesses to the will than to the person whose handwriting it was alleged to be” (i.e. The probate court
denied probate because the signature seemed to not have been by Severo Agayan but by another witness).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dissimilarity in handwriting sufficient to deny probate of the will?
HELD:

The SC found that the mere dissimilarity in writing is sufficient to overcome the uncontradicted testimony of all the
witnesses that the signature of the testatrix was written by Severo Agayan. It is also immaterial who writes the
name of the testatrix provided it is written at her request and in her presence and in the presence of all the
witnesses to the execution of the will.
Based on Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that with respect to the validity of the will, it is
unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is
that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the presence of 3
witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the presence of each other. It may be wise
that the one who signs the testator’s name signs also his own; but that is not essential to the validity of the will.
The court also held that the 3 cases cited by the lower court was not applicable. In those cases, the person who
signed the will for the testator wrote his own name instead of the testator’s, so that the testator’s name nowhere
appeared in the will, and were thus wills not duly executed.

Lee v. Tambago
A.C. No. 5281, 12 February 2008

The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object of solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.

FACTS:

● Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of
the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament.
● complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will.
Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the
purported witnesses to its execution.
● Respondent claims that the complainant was not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr., also it was was filed simply
to harass him because the criminal case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman did
not prosper.

ISSUE/S:

Can the said will be validly accepted based on the said irregularities?

RULING:

The court says no. The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The
object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.

The acknowledgment of the will in question shows it was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one,
there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses in the
acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testator’s old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment
was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.

Notaries public must observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.

Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This carelessness
cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering that the testator and the
witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to confirm its contents. Accordingly,
respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a
consequence of his breach of duty

Fernandez v. Vergel de Dios

G.R. No. L-2115, February 25, 1924

The law only requires the Attestation shall state the number of sheets used upon which the will was written and the
fact that the testator signed all or causes some other person to write his name, under his express direction in the
presence of 3 witnesses and signed the will on all pages in front of the witnesses, and the latter in front of the testator,
and before each other.

FACTS:

Ramon Fernandez propounded for the probate of the will of one Antonio de Dios to which Fernando Vergel De Dios
and Ricardo and Virgilio Rustia opposed, alleging that it was not sufficiently proven that the testator knew the
contents of the will and that he did not sign all the pages of the will. Moreover, that he did not request anybody to
attest the document as his last will. It was also alleged that he did not sign the will in the presence of any witness
and that the witnesses did not sign it in the presence of the testator, or of each other, nor with knowledge on the
part of the testator that they were signing his will.

ISSUE:

WON the will was probate was void for having failed to comply with the requirements under the law.

RULING:

No.

The Court held that the evidence sufficiently shows that Atty Lizo read the will to the testator and the latter’s mind
was perfectly sane and he understood it. That he signed all the pages of the will proper, although he did not sign
the annexed Attestation Clause (AC). The law does no require that the testator be precisely the person to request to
the witnesses to attest his will. It is sufficient that the will be signed by the testator in the presence of the witnesses
and the latter in turn signed it in the in the presence of the testator, and that of each other.

The Court cited the case of Abangan vs Abangan: Testator’s signature is not necessary in the attestation clause
because the name of which pertains only to the witnesses and not the testator. Said case cited Uy Coque case which
did not necessitate signature of testator.

The law only requires the Attestation shall state the number of sheets used upon which the will was written and
the fact that the testator signed all or causes some other person to write his name, under his express direction in
the presence of 3 witnesses and signed the will on all pages in front of the witnesses, and the latter in front of the
testator, and before each other.

Villaflor v Tobias, G.R. No. L-27440, December 24, 1927

Javellana v. Ledesma
97 Phil. 258

It is noteworthy that Article 806 of the new Civil Code does not contain words requiring that the testator and the
witnesses should acknowledge the testament on the same day or occasion that it was executed.

FACTS:

The case involves the execution of the late Da. Ledesma of a will and codicil which was admitted to probate by the
CFI. Both will and codicil have Ramon Tabiana, Gloria Montinola de Tabiana and Vicente Yap as witnesses.
The contestant of the probate of this will averred that the court below erred in giving credence to their witnesses
who are the cook and driver of the testator. They claimed that Yap (one of the witnesses in the will) insisted on the
signing of the will by the testator before the notary public however Testator Da. Ledesma was not feeling well that
time and for such reason, the latter signed it only in the presence of Yap alone. Accordingly, they alleged that the
will and codicil were not signed and acknowledged by the testator and the witnesses at the same time before the
notary public.

ISSUE:

Whether the signing and the acknowledgement of the will should be performed in one single act of both the
testator and the witnesses?

HELD:

No. At any rate, as observed by the Court below, whether or not the notary signed the certification of
acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses, does not affect the validity of the codicil. Unlike
the Code of 1889 (Art. 699), the new Civil Code does not require that the signing of the testator, witnesses and
notary should be accomplished in one single act. A comparison of Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code
reveals that while testator and witnesses sign in the presence of each other, all that is thereafter required is that
"every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" (Art. 806). The
subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly acknowledged by the
participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate
execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her witnesses can not be said to violate the rule that testaments
should be completed without interruption.
It is noteworthy that Article 806 of the new Civil Code does not contain words requiring that the testator and the
witnesses should acknowledge the testament on the same day or occasion that it was executed.

Gabucan v. Manta
95 SCRA 752 (1980)

Lower court manifestly erred in declaring that, because no documentary stamp was affixed to the will, there was "no
will and testament to probate" and, consequently, the alleged "action must of necessity be dismissed".

What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to affix the requisite thirty-
centavo documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will which is the taxable portion of that document.

FACTS:

This case is about the dismissal of a petition for the probate of a notarial will on the ground that it does not bear a
thirty-centavo documentary stamp.

In a decision of the Court of First Instance of Camiguin, the proceeding for the probate of the will of the late
Rogaciano Gabucan was dismissed, because the requisite documentary stamp was not affixed to the notarial
acknowledgment in the will and, hence, according to respondent Judge, it was not admissible in evidence, citing
section 238 of the Tax Code, now section 250 of the 1977 Tax Code, which reads:

SEC. 238. Effect of failure to stamp taxable document. — An instrument, document, or paper which is required
by law to be stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted, or transferred without being duly stamped,
shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used in
evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled.

No notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths shall add his jurat or acknowledgment to any
document subject to documentary stamp tax unless the proper documentary stamps are affixed thereto and
cancelled.
The probate court assumed that the notarial acknowledgment of the said will is subject to the thirty-centavo
documentary stamp tax. Respondent Judge refused to reconsider the dismissal in spite of petitioner's
manifestation that he had already attached the documentary stamp to the original of the will. Hence, a petition for
mandamus was filed to compel the lower court to allow petitioner's appeal from its decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the dismissal of a petition for probate of a notarial will on the ground of lack of thirty-centavo
documentary stamp is correct.

RULING:

NO. We hold that the lower court manifestly erred in declaring that, because no documentary stamp was affixed to
the will, there was "no will and testament to probate" and, consequently, the alleged "action must of necessity be
dismissed".

What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to affix the requisite thirty-
centavo documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will which is the taxable portion of that
document.

That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238 that the non-admissibility of the document,
which does not bear the requisite documentary stamp, subsists only "until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have
been affixed thereto and cancelled."

Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable document is presented in
evidence (Del Castillo vs. Madrilena 49 Phil. 749). If the promissory note does not bear a documentary stamp, the
court should have allowed plaintiff's tender of a stamp to supply the deficiency. (Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5 Phil. 67,
71. Note the holding in Azarraga vs. Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 637, that the lack of the documentary stamp on a document
does not invalidate such document. See Cia. General de Tabacos vs. Jeanjaquet 12 Phil. 195, 201-2 and Delgado and
Figueroa vs. Amenabar 16 Phil. 403, 405-6.)

a. Witnesses to a will
(i) Who are competent? – NCC 820, 821, 824

Gonzales v. CA
90 SCRA 183

Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept
what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but
may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony.

FACTS:

Isabel Gabriel died without issue. Lutgarda Santiago (respondent), niece of Isabel, filed a petition for probate of
Isabel’s will designating her as the principal beneficiary and executrix. The will was typewritten, in Tagalog and
was executed two months prior to death of Isabel. The will described the respondent as "aking mahal na
pamangkin na aking pinalaki, inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" and named as universal heir
and executor, were bequeathed all properties and estate, real or personal already acquired, or to be acquired, in
her testatrix name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and legacies. The petition was opposed by the petitioner on
the following grounds: that the same is not genuine, and in the alternative, that the same was not executed and
attested as required by law, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported will the decedent lacked
testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness and in the second alternative, such was procured through undue
and improper pressure and influence on the part of the principal beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her
benefit. The RTC disallowed the probate of the will but the CA reversed the said decision of the trial court. The
petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA erred in holding that the will of the decedent was
executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses are
credible.

ISSUES:

1. W/N the term "credible" is synonymous with "competent" (may a witness be competent under Article 820 and
821 and still not be credible as required by Article 805?)

2. W/N the witness is required to testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the
community, his reputation for trust-worthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his
testimony may be believed and accepted by the court

RULING:

1. Yes. Art 805 requires something more than just being competent and a witness in addition to being competent
under Art 820-821, must also be credible under Art 805. The competency of a person to be an instrumental witness
to a will is determined by the statute (Art. 820 and 821), whereas his credibility depends on the appreciation of his
testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. “Competency
as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he
says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may
thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony.”

2. No. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his
good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and for being reliable, his honesty and
uprightness (such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing
party) in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the
qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind
can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more)
is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind,
deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the
disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code.

(ii) Supervening incompetency – NCC 822

(iii) Competency of interested witnesses – 823
3. Special requirements for deaf, etc. – NCC 807-808

Garcia v. Vasquez
32 SCRA 489 (1970)

Where the testator is blind, the will must be read to him twice as required by Article 808 of the Civil Code. The reason
for this is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance
with his wishes. Failure to comply with this requirement makes the will invalid.

FACTS:

This is a petition for appeal from the CFI of Manila admitting to probate the will of Gliceria Avelino del
Rosario (“Gliceria”) executed in 1960. Likewise, this is also an appeal to remove the current
administrator, Consuelo Gonzales-Precilla( “Consuelo”) as special administratrix of the estate on the ground
of Consuelo possesses interest adverse to the estate and to order the RD of Manila to annotate on the registered
lands a notice of Lis Pendens.

When Gliceria died she had no descendants, ascendants, bros or sisses and 90 yrs old. After which, her
niece, Consuelo petitioned the court to be the administratrix of the properties. The court approved this
because Consuelo has been was already managing the properties of the deceased during her lifetime. What the
respondents allege is that in the last years of the deceased, Consuelo sought the transfer of certain parcels of land
valued at 300k for a sale price of 30k to her husband Alfonso through fraud and intimidation. In addition, the
oppositors presented evidence that Consuelo asked the court to issue new Certificates of Titles to certain parcels of
land for the purpose of preparing the inventory to be used in the probate. Also shown was that NEW TCTs were
issued by the RD for certain lands of the deceased after Consuelo asked for the old TCTs.

At the end of the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Counsuelo should be made the administrator, and that
the will was duly executed because of these reasons: NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRESENTED to establish that
the deceased was not of sound mind, that eventough the allegations state that the deceased prepared another will
in 1956 (12pages), the latter is not prevented from executing another will in 1960 (1page), and that
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses prove their truthfulness.

ISSUE:

Was the will in 1960 (1 page) duly/properly executed?

RULING:

NO. Provision of Article 808 mandatory. Therefore, For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the
testatrix was like a blind testator, and the due execution of her will would have required observance of Article 808.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the
will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to
object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. Likewise, the 1970 will was done in Tagalog which
the deceased is not well versed but in Spanish. This creates doubt as to the due execution of the will and as well as
the typographical errors contain therein which show the haste in preparing the 1 page will as compared to the 12
page will created in 1956 written in Spanish. ALSO, as to the blindness, there was proof given by the testimony of
the doctor that the deceased could not read at near distances because of cataracts. (Testatrix’s vision was mainly
for viewing distant objects and not for reading print.) Since there is no proof that it was read to the deceased twice,
the will was NOT duly executed.

ALSO, Consuelo should be removed as administrator because she is not expected to sue her own husband to
reconvey the lands to the estate alleged to have been transferred by the deceased to her own husband.

The notice of lis pendens is also not proper where the issue is not an action in rem, affecting real property or the
title thereto.

Alvarado v. Gaviola
G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993

Art. 808 apply not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are "incapable of reading
their wills”.

FACTS:

The 79-yr old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an
illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting
probate before RTC of Laguna. Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on Dec
1977. On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil was executed changing some dispositions to generate cash for
the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory
clauses were unchanged. Same as in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft
of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the 3
instrumental witnesses and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.

A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death by private respondent
as executor with the RTC of Laguna. Appeal was made by petitioner that the deceased was blind within the
meaning of the law at the time his will and the codicil was executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of
the Civil Code was not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied.

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not Brigido Alvarado would qualify as a “blind” testator blind under Art. 808

II. If so, whether or not the double-reading requirement of Art. 808 have been complied with?

RULING:

I. YES. Art. 808 states that: If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing
witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.

Regardless of respondent's contention that the testator was still capable of reading at the time his will and codicil
were prepared, the fact remains that Brigido did not do so because of his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision
making it necessary for private respondent to do the actual reading for him.

The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez provides an insight into the scope of the term "blindness" as
used in Art. 808, to wit:

The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the
will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to
object if they are not in accordance with his wishes . . .

Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 apply not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or
another, are "incapable of reading their wills." Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of
his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution, there can be no other course for us but to conclude
that Brigido comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808.

II. YES. That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.

This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the
law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to
protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to
destroy the testamentary privilege.

4. Substantial compliance – NCC 809

Gil v Murciano, No. L-3362, 1 March 1951

Caneda v. CA
G.R. No. 103554, 28 May 1993

Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not pertain to the form or language of the will.
This is because there is not substantial compliance with Article 805.

FACTS:

On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, executed a last will and testament at his
residence before 3 witnesses. He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad. In the will, he left by way of
legacies and devises his real and personal properties to several people all of whom do not appear to be related to
the testator.
4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the probate of his last will and testament, but
numerous postponements pushed back the initial hearing of the probate court regarding the will. On May 29, 1980,
the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. Thereafter one of the
legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his appointment as special administrator of the testator’s estate.

Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition for
intestate proceedings. They also opposed the probate of the testator’s will and the appointment of a special
administrator for his estate. In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of the testator’s
will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in poor state of health such
that he could not have possibly executed the same. Also the genuineness of the signature of the testator is in doubt.

Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament of the late
Mateo Caballero. On appeal, petitioners asserted that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its
attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will
witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof
in the presence of the testator and of one another.

Nevertheless, CA affirmed the probate court’s decision stating that it substantially complies with Article 805. Hence
this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally defective

RULING:

Yes. Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The attestation clause need not be written in a
language known to the testator or even to the attesting witnesses.It is a separate memorandum or record of the
facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses it gives affirmation to the fact that
compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. The attestation clause, therefore,
provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof.

The Court agrees that the attestation clause in the will failed to specifically state the fact that the attesting
witnesses witnessed the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses,
likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. Clearly lacking is
the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. That the absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily
result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be probated.

Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the
attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
defect in this case is not only with respect to the form or the language of the attestation clause. The defects must be
remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself which is clearly lacking in this case. Therefore, the
probate of the will is set aside and the case for the intestate proceedings shall be revived.

Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not pertain to the form or language of the
will. This is because there is not substantial compliance with Article 805.

C. Holographic Wills
1. General requirements – NCC 804
2. Specific requirements – NCC 810, 812, 813

Intestate Estate of Andres De Jesus and Bibiana Roxas De Jesus v. Andres De Jesus, Jr.
G.R. No. 38338, January 28, 1985
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However,
when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the
authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the
holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be
allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

FACTS:

After the death of spouses Andres de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, a special proceeding for the settlement of
their estate was filed by petitioner Simeon Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana. Simeon was then appointed
administrator and accordingly, he delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic Will of
the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. The will is dated "FEB./61" and states: "This is my will which I want to be
respected altho it is not written by a lawyer. . ." Respondent Luz Henson, another compulsory heir filed an
"opposition to probate" assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana de Jesus because it was not dated as
required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law requires that the Will should contain the day,
month, and year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with.

ISSUE:

Whether the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid
compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code?

RULING:

YES. We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its
execution nor was there any substitution of Wills and Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of
the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a
language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due execution. All the children of the
testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of said Will.

Labrador v. Court of Appeals

G.R. Nos. 83843-44, April 5, 1990

The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are
that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the
subject will.

FACTS:

In 1972, Melecio Labrador died, leaving behind a parcel of land and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica,
Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will.

Sagrado, Enrica and Cristobal filed a petition for the probate of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio
Labrador. The first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will, provides:

"And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective
assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this
decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other
than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father."

Respondents Jesus and Gaudencio opposed the petition on the ground that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was
when the Melencio and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about "the partitioning and
assigning the respective assignments of the said fishpond," and was not the date of execution of the holographic
will; hence, the will is more of an "agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice of
other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply with Article 783 which defines a
will as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree
the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death."

ISSUE:

Whether the alleged holographic will of Melecio Labrador is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of the New Civil
Code?

RULING:

YES. The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself, in perfect compliance with Article 810. The law
does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that
the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject
will.

The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the second
paragraph of the will. The will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew
that what he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the
testator’s instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the
estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition
of his estate.

3. Probate – NCC 811, 814

Azaola v. Singson
G.R. No. L-14003, August 5, 1960

Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present, and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must
be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided…The first paragraph of Article 811 is merely directory
and not mandatory.

FACTS:

Petitioner herein for probate of the holographic will submitted the said will whereby Maria Azaola was made the
sole heir as against the nephew of deceased Singson. That witness Francisco Azaola testified that he saw the
holographic will one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, he testified also that he recognized all
the signatures appearing in the holographic will as the handwriting of the testatrix and to reinforce said statement,
he presented the mortgage, the SPA, and the general power of attorney, and other documents to show the
signatures of the testatrix, for comparison purposes. Oppositor contended that the execution of the will was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife and that the
testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will. CFI Manila denied the probate on the ground
that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the
will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 811 is mandatory requiring petitioner to present at least 3 witnesses

RULING:

NO. The Court held that rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely directory and is not
mandatory. Moreover, since the authenticity of the will was not contested, petitioner was not required to produce
more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, the Court is of the
opinion that Article 811 of the present Civil Code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation
of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no
witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new
Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter
beyond the control of the petitioner. In addition, the requirement can be considered mandatory only in the case of
ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is
made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805).

Codoy v. Calugay
G.R. No. 123486. August 12, 1999

"Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a
statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute is mandatory.

FACTS:

On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They
attested to the genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August 1978.

Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that
the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the will after every disposition,
calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured.

Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence.

The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records of the case
bearing the signature of the deceased.

The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed to
as the same was already destroyed and no longer available.

The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceased’s signature and
handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings
and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely
written, dated and signed by said deceased.

The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said
that the signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he cannot be sure.

The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the deceased
which appeared in the latter’s application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed
that she had lived with the deceased since birth where she had become familiar with her signature and that the one
appearing on the will was genuine.

Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the
Court of Appeals which granted the probate.

ISSUE:

Whether Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in a
contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory?

HELD:
YES. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.

In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be
prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the
wishes of the testator.

The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased.

Rivera v. IAC
G.R. No. L-75005-06, 15 February 1990

Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he
had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three
witnesses.

FACTS:

On May 30, 1975, Venancio Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate
son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate. This
petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred
that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic wills.

On November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the RTC Angeles City a petition for the probate of the
holographic wills. This petition was in turn opposed by Jose Rivera, who reiterated that he was the sole heir of
Venancio's intestate estate.

On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J. Rivera was later appointed special
administrator.

RTC: found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera who was married to
Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had
seven children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no claim to this estate because the decedent was not his father.
The holographic wills were also admitted to probate.

CA affirmed RTC.

Jose Rivera’s contention: He sought to show that Venancio was married in 1928 to Maria Vital, who was his mother.
He submitted for this purpose the marriage certificate of the couple, and his own baptismal certificate where the
couple was indicated as his parents. The petitioner also presented Domingo Santos, who testified that Jose was
indeed the son of the couple and that he saw Venancio and Jose together several times. Jose himself stressed that
Adelaido considered him a half-brother. He insisted that Adelaido and his brothers and sisters were illegitimate
children, sired by Venancio with Maria Jocson.

Adelaido Rivera’s contention: To prove that there were in fact two persons by the same name of Venancio Rivera,
Adelaido offered Venancio Rivera's baptismal certificate showing that his parents were Magno Rivera and
Gertrudes de los Reyes, as contrasted with the marriage certificate submitted by Jose, which indicated that the
Venancio Rivera subject thereof was the son of Florencio Rivera and Estrudez Reyes. He also denied recognizing
Jose as a brother.

ISSUE:

WON the Venancio Rivera assailed by petitioner is the same Venancio Rivera who died (said to be the father of
Adelaido Rivera) – NO.
RULING:

We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err in holding that the Venancio Rivera who
married Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the same person who married Maria Vital, Jose's legitimate mother, in 1928.
Jose belonged to a humbler family which had no relation whatsoever with the family of Venancio Rivera and Maria
Vital. This was more prosperous and prominent. Except for the curious Identity of names of the head of each, there
is no evidence linking the two families or showing that the deceased Venancio Rivera was the head of both.

Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid because it found them to have been
written, dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held there
was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811 because the authenticity of the wills
had not been questioned.

The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose Rivera. In both
proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed that they were
spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent court should have applied Article 811 of the Civil Code,
providing as follows:

In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and
signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If
the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.

The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased
Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the
wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of
Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father,
was sufficient.

Gan v. Yap
G.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958

FACTS:

Gan filed a petition for the probate of a holographic will. The surviving husband opposed contending that the
deceased did not leave any will nor executed any testament. The will itself was not presented. Judge San Jose
refused to probate the alleged holographic will executed by the deceased Felicidad Yap.

ISSUE:

Whether a holographic will may be probated upon testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who
declared that it was in the handwriting of the testator.

HELD:

No. The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the testimony of
witnesses who have read or seen it. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof.
Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence
submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to
that “clear and distinct” proof required by Rule 77, Sec. 6.

Rodelas v. Aranza
119 SCRA 16

FACTS:
The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo Bonilla in 1977. The petition was
opposed by the appellees on the ground that the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise. The
lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original will was lost, a photostatic copy
cannot stand in the place of the original.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy.

RULING:

Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.

Kalaw v. Relova
132 SCRA 237

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will
litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects
the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.

FACTS:

Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her holographic Will. The holographic
Will, as first written, named Rosa K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971,
petitioner Rosa opposed probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will contained alterations,
corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by
Article 814 of the Civil Code. ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect
and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.

ISSUE:

WON the will, as first written, should be given effect.

RULING: NO

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will
litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as
respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.

However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was
altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full
authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for
the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first
written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of
mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her
full signature.

Ajero v. CA
G.R. No. 106720, 15 September 1994

FACTS:
The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate. Private respondent opposed the petition on the
grounds that: neither the testament’s body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by
petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence.

The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the disposition in the will of a house and lot. He
claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.

However, the trial court still admitted the decedent’s holographic will to probate.
The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the identity of the will, its due execution and the
testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply
with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.

On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the decedent did not comply with Articles 313 and 314 of the
NCC. It found that certain dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed by not dated. It also
found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made had not been authenticated by decedent.

ISSUE:

WON the non-compliance with Articles 813 and 814 will result in the disallowance of the probate proceedings.

RULING:

No. A Holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Art.
814.

In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or
handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Art. 810 Of the NCC. Failure to strictly observe other
formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that in unquestionably handwritten by the
testator. A reading of Art. 813 of the NCC shows that its requirement affects the validity of dispositions contained
in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the results
is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.

V. INCORPORATION OF DOCUMENTS BY REFERENCE – NCC 827

VI. CODICILS
A, Definition – NCC 825
B. Solemnities – NCC 826

VII. REVOCATION OF WILLS AND TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS

A. Definition of revocation
B. When may revocation be effected, NCC 828
C. Law governing revocation, NCC 829
D. Modes of revocation, NCC 830
E. Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation

Molo v. Molo
90 Phil. 37

The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-
fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make
at some time a will in place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the
revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will.

FACTS:
Mariano Molo died without any forced heir and was survived by his wife, nephews and nieces. Mariano executed 2
wills, one in 17 August 1918, and another in 20 June 1939. The latter contained a provision revoking the former
will. The surviving spouse, Juana, filed an action seeking probate of the 1939 will, however, it was disallowed for
not being executed in accordance with law. She sought probate of the 1918 will, which was granted. The nephews
and nieces of Mariano opposed the probate of the 1918 will.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 1918 will was validly revoked.

HELD: NO.

It is universally agreed that where the second will is invalid on account of not being executed in accordance ' with
the provisions of the statute, or where the testator has not sufficient mental capacity to make a will or the will is
procured through undue influence or the such, in other words, where the second will is really no will, it does not
revoke the first will or affect it in any manner."

It is true that our law on the matter provides that a will may be revoked "by some will, codicil, or other writing
executed as provided in case of wills"; but it cannot be said that the 1939 will should be regarded, not as a will
within the meaning ot said word, but as "other writing executed as provided in the case of wills", simply because it
was denied probate. And even if it be regarded as any other writing within the meaning of said clause, there is
authority for holding that unless said writing is admitted to probate, it cannot have the effect of revocation.

Whatever may be the conclusion we may draw from this chain of circumstances, the stubborn fact is that there is
no direct evidence of voluntary or deliberate destruction of the first will by the testator. This matter cannot be left
to mere inference or conjecture.

Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily destroyed by the testator after the execution
of the second will, which revoked the first, could there be any doubt, under this theory, that said earlier will was
destroyed by the testator in the honest belief that it was no longer necessary because he had expressly revoked it
in his will of 1939? In other words, can we not say that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary
consequence of the testator's belief that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and the
latter would be given effect? If such is the case, then it is our opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to
probate under the principle of "dependent relative revocation".

The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon Whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the
non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent
to make at some time a will in place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear
that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will."

We hold, therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be
presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of
defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has
been validly executed and would be given due effect. The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the
testator did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two
different occasions and instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his
intention of dying testate.

Maloto v. CA
G.R. No. L-76464, 29 February 1988

FACTS:

Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio
Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave
behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their
aunt's estate.

However, while the case was still in progress, the parties executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of
Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The
Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did.

Atty. Sulpicio Palma discovered a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Thus, Aldina
and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a
MR and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will. When the trial court denied their
motion, the petitioner came to the SC. The SC dismissed that petition and advised that a separate proceeding for
the probate of the alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters raised by the petitioners.

Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not the document or
papers allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the
testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked. The respondent court
stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently
proven.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana.

RULING:

No. It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an
effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not
imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person
but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the
document destroyed must be the will itself.

In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that
requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective
revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence
and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For
one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at
all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the
express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio,
were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen)
was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned. Nowhere in the records before us does it appear
that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive
that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will.

Gago v. Mamuyac
49 Phil. 902, January 29, 1927

In a proceeding to probate a will, the burden of proof is upon the proponent to clearly establish not only its execution
but its due existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that it
has been revoked.

FACTS:

Sometime in July 1918, Miguel Mamuyac executed a will which was presented by Francisco Gago for probate.
Cornelio Mamuyac et al. (respondents) opposed the petition, alleging a) that the said will is a copy of the second
will and testament executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac; b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during
the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and c) that the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel
Mamuyac. That will presented for probate by Francisco Gago was a mere carbon of its original which remained in
the possession of the deceased testator Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it before his death as per testimony of
witness Jose Fenoy, who typed the will of the testator sometime in 1919, and Carlos Bejar, who saw in 1920, that
the last will and testament being presented for probate by Gago was actually cancelled by the testator Miguel
Mamuyac, who assured Carlos Bejar that inasmuch as he had sold him a house and the land where the house was
built, he had to cancel it (will being probated), executing thereby a new testament.

ISSUE:

Whether the revocation of the will has been established.

RULING:

Yes. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. If it can be
established that a will which can no longer be found was last seen in the possession of the testator, the
presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his
death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or
authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying
greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof
that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.

Diaz v. de Leon
G.R. No. 17714, May 31, 1922

A will having been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot be probated.

FACTS:

The only question raised in this case is whether or to the will executed by Jesus de Leon, now, was revoked by him.
The petitioner denies such revocation, while the contestant affirms the same by alleging that the testator revoked
his will by destroying it, and by executing another will expressly revoking the former. It appears that the testator,
shortly after the execution of the first will in question, asked that the same be returned to him. The instrument was
returned to the testator who ordered his servant to tear the document. This was done in his presence and before a
nurse who testified to this effect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a valid revocation.

RULING:

Yes. The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the testator was anxious to
withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first will. This fact is disclosed by the testator's own
statements to the witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was confined.

The original will presented for probate having been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot now be probated as
the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon.

F. Effect of revocation, NCC 831-834

VIII. REPUBLICATION AND REVIVAL OF WILLS – NCC 835-837

IX. ALLOWANCE OF WILLS – NCC 838
A. Concept of probate

Guevara v. Guevara
December 29, 1943

The presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy.

FACTS:

Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife, stepchildren, wife in the
2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario
as his natural daughter. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any
settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to
himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the
devise given to her. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of
a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption that the
decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto
should be disregarded. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with.

RULING:

No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the last will and
testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is
essential and indispensable to its efficacy. Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without
probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

De La Cerna v. Potot
G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964

A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world.

The decree of probate issued by a court of probate jurisdiction is conclusive upon the due execution of the testament.

Public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of courts should become final
at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis set litium.

FACTS:

Sps. Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament whereby they willed that
their 2 parcels of land acquired during their marriage shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece, Manuela
Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot and that "while each of the testators is yet living, he or she will continue to
enjoy the fruits of the two lands." Bernabe died and the will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia and
Manuela before the CFI of Cebu which, after due publication and there being no opposition, heard the evidence and
by Order of 1939. Upon the death of Gervasia on 1952, another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as
Gervasia was concerned was filed on the same Court but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela, and her attorney to
appear, the case was dismissed.

CFI ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the
prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines);
but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the CA reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was
issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the CFI of Cebu has conclusive effect despite the
invalidity of joint wills

RULING:

YES. Even though the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators,
reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code), the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the
CFI of Cebu has conclusive effect but only as to Bernabe’s last will. The error thus committed by the probate court
was an error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the
probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous.

But the CA should have taken into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1939
could only affect the share of Bernabe. It could not include the disposition of the share of Gervasia who was then
still alive and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction.

Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime. It
follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death,
reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.

Thus regarded, the holding of the CFI that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation
of the deceased Gervasia in the properties in question. Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia should pass
upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in
her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.

Gallonosa v Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676

Nepomuceno v. CA
139 SCRA 206

FACTS:

Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before he died. Petitioner was named as
sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had
two legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the
petitioner were married despite the subsisting first marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to
petitioner. On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her
children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of
the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator.

The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting
with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid
except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void.

ISSUE:

W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased
Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision.
HELD:

No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on
to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The
general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution
of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the Will.

The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)

The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between persons who
were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in
Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his
Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

Rodriguez v. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 175720, 11 September 2007

Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of
public policy. Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that [n]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. As the will was not probated, the Partition Agreement
which was executed pursuant thereto can not be given effect.

FACTS:

Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment located at San Jose Street, Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City. On
October 27, 1983, he executed a Huling Habilin at Testamento giving a petitioner Cresenciana Tubo Rodriguez, his
live-in partner, aparatments D and E, and his children Benjamin Rodriguez (deceased husband of respondent
Evangeline Rodgriguez), apartment A, respondent Buenaventura Rodriguez, apartment B, and respondent Belen
Rodriguez, apartment C.

Junaito later on executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of petitioner who registered it in her
name. Cresenciana then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent who, without her knowledge
and conent, leased the units to some other persons who failed to vacate the premises and pay the rentals thereof.

Respondents in their answer claimed ownership over the property by succession, and alleged that petitioner is
only the registered owner, not the lawful owner of the property because the Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated
and void. They filed an action to assail the validity of the sale arguing that petitioner exerted undue influence over
JUnaito, who at the time was seriously ill, to agree to thesale of the property for only P20,000 after knowing that
only two apartments were given to her in the Huling Habilin at Testamento. The MTC in the unlawful detainer case
rules in respondents favor. On appeal, the RTC reversed the MTC decision, in that petitioners certificate of title is
conclusive evidence of ownership of the property. The RTC also held that the MTC erred in relying heavily on
Juanitos last will and testament which was not probated hence has no effect and no right can be claimed therein.
Respondents filed a petition for review before he Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the RTC decision
and reinstated that of MTC. Petitioners MR was denied hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a will which was not probated has effect or can confer a right.
RULING:

NO. Based on the foregoing documentary evidence, we find that there is preponderance of evidence in favor of the
petitioners claim. Respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as the Huling Habilin at Testamento and the
Partition Agreement have no legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have force or
validity it must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. Article 838 of the Civil
Code mandates that [n]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court. As the will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto
can not be given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial in the
determination of the issue of possession.

Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor of the petitioner, Juanito Rodriguez remained the
owner thereof since ownership would only pass to his heirs at the time of his death. Thus, as owner of the
property, he had the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime.

Heirs Lasam v. Umengan

G.R. No. 168156, 6 December 2006

The Last Will and Testament cannot be relied upon to establish the right of possession without having been probated,
the said last will and testament could not be the source of any right.

FACTS:

there was a complaint for unlawful detainer alleging that the plaintiffs were the owners of the property. The
defendants were allegedly possessing the property by mere tolerance. In their defense, they alleged that they have
a better right because they inherited it from their father, showing a Last Will and Testament which has not yet
been probated. The lower courts (MTC and RTC) ruled that with the will they have a better right, but the CA
reversed on the ground that the will has not yet been probated, hence, it has no passed any right.

In this case, both parties were claiming to have better right of possession due to ownership. One party claiming
that there was conveyance; the other, having inherited it, hence, claiming a better right of possession following the
law on succession.

ISSUE:

WON the defendants have a better right of possession.

HELD:

Yes, the defendants have a better right of possession.

The Last Will and Testament cannot be relied upon to establish the right of possession without having been
probated, the said last will and testament could not be the source of any right.

Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:

Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will.
In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator’s death
shall govern.

The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of
wills on petitioner of the testator.
 Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his
death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107 (1997) it was ruled that: “a will is essentially ambulatory; at any time
prior to the testator’s death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever
and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: ‘No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.’”

Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to prove before some officer
or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last will
and testament of the deceased person whose testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been executed,
attested and published as required by law, and that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a
proceedings to establish the validity of the will. Moreover, the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory
and is a matter of public policy. (Guevara v. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Baluyot v. Paño, 163 Phil. 81 (1976); Roberts v.
Leonilas, 214 Phil. 30 (1984)).

Since the will has not yet been probated, it has no effect whatsoever and it cannot be the basis of any claim of any
right of possession. The defendants have a better right of possession based on the deed of conveyances executed by
the owner in favor of the children, the defendants herein.

Dorotheo v CA, G.R. No. 108581, 8 December 1999

Pastor, Jr. v CA, No. L-56340, 24 June 1983

Jimenez v. IAC
G.R. No. L-75773, 17 April 1990

Probate court has no jurisdiction over question of ownership.

FACTS:

Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson were married and were blessed to have 5 children. During the
existence of their marriage, Lino Jimenez acquired 5 parcels of land in Pangasinan.

After the death of Consolacion, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy with whom he begot 7 children, the petitioners
herein. Lino died on Aug. 11, 1951 while Genoveva Caolboy died on Nov. 21, 1978.

Virginia Jimenez filed a petition before CFI Pangasinan praying to be appointed as administratrix of the properties
of sps. Lino and Genoveva. Enumerated in her petition were the supposed heirs of the deceased spouses and the 4
children of Lino by Consolacion.

Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., son of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr., filed a motion for the exclusion of his father's name and those
of Alberto, Alejandra, and Angeles from the petition, inasmuch as they are children of Lino and Consolacion and
because they have already received their inheritance consisting of the said 5 parcels of lands in Pangasinan.

Virginia filed an inventory of the estate of sps. Lino and Genoveva wherein she included the 5 parcels of land. As a
consequence, Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from the inventory on the ground
that these had already been adjudicated to Leonardo Sr., Alberto, Alejandra and Angeles by their deceased father
Lino Jimenez. Leonardo Jr. presented evidence in support of his motion while Virginia presented no evidence of her
own.

The probate court ordered the exclusion of the 5 parcels of land from the inventory on the basis of the evidence of
Leonardo Jr. which consisted: (1) Tax Dec showing that the subject properties were acquired during the conjugal
partnership of Lino and Consolacion; and, (2) Deed of Sale wherein Genoveva stated, that the subject properties
had been adjudicated by Lino to his children by a previous marriage. MR of said order was denied.
On appeal by Virginia to CA, the latter dismissed the petition.

2 years after, petitioners filed an amended complaint to recover possession/ownership of the 5 parcels of land as
part of the estate of Lino and Genoveva. PRs moved for the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioners opposed the
MTD.
Trial court resolved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Petition for certiorari and mandamus
filed by petitioners before CA was likewise denied. Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE:

Whether in a settlement proceeding RTC has jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership.

RULING: No.

SC reverse. Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed because as a
general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. Since the probate court's findings
are not conclusive being prima facie, a separate proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership of the 5 parcels
of land.

The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership,
which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.

All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the
ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate
proceeding as in the case at bar.

Agtarap v. Agtarap
G.R. No. 177099, June 8, 2011

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.

FACTS:

Eduardo Agtarap (Eduardo) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 114, Pasay City, a verified petition for
the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin). The petition alleged that
Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without any known debts or obligations. During his
lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia), and second with Caridad Garcia
(Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin and Lucia had three childrenJesus (died without issue), Milagros,
and Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9,
1926. They also had three childrenEduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). At the time
of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City.

RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular administrator of Joaquin’s estate. After which, the estate
was ripe for distribution to the heirs of Joaquin. Eduardo then rendered a true and just accounting of his
administration from his date of assumption. However, some of the heirs filed for the respective motions for
reconsideration in the decision of the court in the partition of the estate. The RTC then denied the motions. The
case was then appealed to the Court of Appeals who dismissed the petition.
Eduardo now comes before the Supreme Court, assailing the decisions rendered by the lower court. One of the
errors he posited is the RTC’s jurisdiction to determine questions of ownership. According to him, the power and
authority properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to rule on the ownership of the subject real properties.

RULING:

No. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only
to matters having to do with the probate of the will and /or settlement of the estate of the deceased persons, but
does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent
rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a
probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased
but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties
is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator and
the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for final
determination of the conflicting claims of title.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. First, the probate
court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion
from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate
action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.

The Court holds that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all heirs of
Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More
importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate
court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.

Maninang v. CA, No. L-57848, 19 June 1982

B. Necessity of probate

De Borja v. De Borja
G.R. No. L-28040, August 18, 1972

And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of
such causante or predecessor in interest (Art. 777), there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share
is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed
limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.

FACTS:

Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco, filed a petition for the probate of her will. The will was
probated. Francisco was appointed executor and administrator, while their son Jose was appointed co-
administrator. Francisco died and Jose became the sole administrator. Francisco in his lifetime as a widower had a
second wife named Tasiana Ongsingco. When Francisco died, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings and was
appointed special administratrix. The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana has been
plagued with several suits. To put an end to these, a compromise agreement was entered into between Jose and
Tasiana, which stipulated that “a sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana shall be considered as full settlement of her
hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.” Jose submitted the agreement to the court for approval,
which Tasiana opposed.

Tasiana’s contention as held in Guevara v. Guevara: the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the
settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when a decedent left a will, is against law and
public policy. (Revised Rules of Court)

Jose’s argument: Sec. 1 Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court allows extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased person regardless of whether or not he left a will.

ISSUE:

W/N the Guevara ruling applies; W/N probate is necessary.

RULING:

No. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto
before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana of any and all
her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco and Josefa. There is no stipulation as
to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Art. 777), there is no legal
bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after
such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.

It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco, Tasiana was his
compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or
valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of Francisco’s last will and testament
and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of
the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana.

Roberts v. Leonides
129 SCRA 33

It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding.

FACTS:

Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate
Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm; and by Juanita Grimm
Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce. He
executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. The two wills and a codicil were presented for
probate. It was admitted to probate the two wills and the codicil. But his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, filed
intestate proceeding for the settlement of his estate. She was named special administratix. Two weeks later,
Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother
Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a
compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed petition praying for the probate
of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set
aside and the letters of administration revoked. Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were
defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses. Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Ethel then
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or
alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah
compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate.

ISSUE:

Whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch
20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district
court).

RULING: YES.

We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
denying Ethel's motion to dismiss. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills
and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838). The probate of
the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate
proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge
assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

Guevara v. Guevara
December 29, 1943

The presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy.

FACTS:

Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife, stepchildren, wife in the
2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario
as his natural daughter. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any
settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to
himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the
devise given to her. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of
a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption that the
decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto
should be disregarded. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with.

RULING:

No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the last will and
testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is
essential and indispensable to its efficacy. Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without
probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

Palaganas v. Palaganas
GR No. 169144, January 26, 2011

Reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that
probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by
Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. This rule applies only to reprobate of a will. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges
as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
FACTS:

Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she
executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio, as the executor of her will for she had left properties in
the Philippines and in the US. Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC, a petition for the probate of
Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. However, Manuel and Benjamin,
nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the
Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could
be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the
testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been
previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

RULING:

Yes. Philippine laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not
yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or
decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom
letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of
it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province
where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.
The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.

In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners
Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But,
reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that
probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed
by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a
will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the
findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

C. Modes of probate 49

Gan v. Yap
G.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958

FACTS:

Gan filed a petition for the probate of a holographic will. The surviving husband opposed contending that the
deceased did not leave any will nor executed any testament. The will itself was not presented. Judge San Jose
refused to probate the alleged holographic will executed by the deceased Felicidad Yap.

ISSUE:
Whether a holographic will may be probated upon testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who
declared that it was in the handwriting of the testator.

HELD:

No. The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the testimony of
witnesses who have read or seen it. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof.
Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence
submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to
that “clear and distinct” proof required by Rule 77, Sec. 6.

Rodelas v. Aranza
119 SCRA 16

FACTS:

The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo Bonilla in 1977. The petition was
opposed by the appellees on the ground that the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise. The
lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original will was lost, a photostatic copy
cannot stand in the place of the original.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy.

RULING:

Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.

D. Requirements for probate of a holographic will – NCC 811

Azaola v. Singson
G.R. No. L-14003, August 5, 1960

Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present, and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must
be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided…The first paragraph of Article 811 is merely directory
and not mandatory.

FACTS:

Petitioner herein for probate of the holographic will submitted the said will whereby Maria Azaola was made the
sole heir as against the nephew of deceased Singson. That witness Francisco Azaola testified that he saw the
holographic will one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, he testified also that he recognized all
the signatures appearing in the holographic will as the handwriting of the testatrix and to reinforce said statement,
he presented the mortgage, the SPA, and the general power of attorney, and other documents to show the
signatures of the testatrix, for comparison purposes. Oppositor contended that the execution of the will was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife and that the
testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will. CFI Manila denied the probate on the ground
that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the
will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 811 is mandatory requiring petitioner to present at least 3 witnesses
RULING:

NO. The Court held that rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely directory and is not
mandatory. Moreover, since the authenticity of the will was not contested, petitioner was not required to produce
more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, the Court is of the
opinion that Article 811 of the present Civil Code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation
of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no
witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new
Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter
beyond the control of the petitioner. In addition, the requirement can be considered mandatory only in the case of
ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is
made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805).

Codoy v. Calugay
G.R. No. 123486. August 12, 1999

"Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a
statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute is mandatory.

FACTS:

On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They
attested to the genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August 1978.

Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that
the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the will after every disposition,
calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured.

Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence.

The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records of the case
bearing the signature of the deceased.

The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed to
as the same was already destroyed and no longer available.

The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceased’s signature and
handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings
and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely
written, dated and signed by said deceased.

The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said
that the signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he cannot be sure.

The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the deceased
which appeared in the latter’s application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed
that she had lived with the deceased since birth where she had become familiar with her signature and that the one
appearing on the will was genuine.

Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the
Court of Appeals which granted the probate.
ISSUE:

Whether Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in a
contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory?

HELD:

YES. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.

In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be
prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the
wishes of the testator.

The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased.

E. Effect of allowance of wills

Gallonosa v Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676

X. DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS – NCC 839, 1335, 1337, 1338

Baltazar v. Laxa
G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012

The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute
a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.

FACTS:

In 1981 Paciencia, 78, executed her will in the Kapampangan dialect in the house of retired Judge Limpin who
doubled as a notary public.
Childless, without any collateral family left. She left all of her properties to her nephew Antonio Laxa, his wife and
their children whom she treated as her own son.
She died in 1996 in the US whilst living with Antonio’s family. In 2000 Lorenzo filed for the probate of her will in
Pampanga.
Lorenzo Laxa opposed the same stating that one of the testator’s properties belongs to his predecessor and interest
and that she was already “forgetful” when she executed the will.
The RTC granted the opposition stating that the testator no longer had the sufficient mental faculties to execute the
said will.
The CA reversed the said ruling.

ISSUE:

Was the will sufficient in form, and substance as to the allegation of the testator’s forgetfulness?

RULING:

The court says yes. The will was sufficient in form as required by law.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the
shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not
equivalent to being of unsound mind.
 Pascual v. De la Cruz
28 SCRA 421(1969)

It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the mere fact that a will was made in favor of a stranger is not in itself proof
that the same was obtained through fraud and undue pressure and influence.

FACTS:

Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or ascendant, died at the age of 89. Andres Pascual
filed a a petition for the probate of her alleged will. Andres was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of
Catalina. Catalina regarded Andres as her own son. Florentina Cruz, Catalina’s sister, also made him also her sole heir
to her property in her will. Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late
Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity of the will. They alleged that the formalities required by law were not
complied with and that the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its
execution, hence the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
petitioner.

The probate court rendered judgment upholding the due execution of the will. It appointed petitioner Andres Pascual
executor and administrator of the estate of the late Catalina de la Cruz without bond.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will should be disallowed because of undue and improper influence and fraud

RULING:

No.

It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the mere fact that a will was made in favor of a stranger is not in itself
proof that the same was obtained through fraud and undue pressure and influence, for we have numerous
instances where strangers are preferred to blood relatives in the institution of heirs. But in the case at bar, Andres
Pascual, although not related by blood to the deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the
latter for she considered him as her own son. As a matter of fact it was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and
cared for Andres Pascual but also her sisters held him with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina
Cruz, made him also her sole heir to her property in her will without any objection from Catalina and Valentina
Cruz.

Ozaeta v. Cuartero, No. L-5597, 31 May 1956

Coso v. Fernandez Deza

G.R. No. 16763, 22 December 1921

The rule as to what constitutes "undue influence" has been variously stated, but the substance of the different
statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and
subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make his express the will of another, rather than
his own.

FACTS:

The testator in this case is a married man and a resident of the Philippines and was shown to have an existing illicit
relationship with Rosario Lopez for many years. Rosario Lopez remained in a close communication with him until
his death. There is no doubt that she exercised some influence over him. The testator executed a will in favor of his
illegitimate son with Rosario Lopez and also provides for her nineteen hundred Spanish duros by way the
reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking care of the testator in Barcelona during the years 1909 to
1916, when he is alleged to have suffered from a severe illness.
CFI of manila set aside the will on the ground of undue influence allegedly exerted over the mind of the testator by
Rosario Lopez.

ISSUE:

Whether the influence exerted by Rosario Lopez to the testator is such of a kind which the law contemplates as to
be undue influence so as to nullify the will?

HELD:

NO. The rule as to what constitutes "undue influence" has been variously stated, but the substance of the different
statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and
subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make his express the will of another, rather
than his own.

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence, in the sense above expressed,
existed at the time of its execution and we do not think that this burden has been carried in the present case. While
it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence
so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to "destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another
rather than his own."

Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as `undue,' if no imposition or fraud be practiced,
even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who
have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made. (Mackall vs.
Mackall, 135 U. S., 1677.)

Ortega v. Valmonte
G.R. No. 157451, 16 December 2005

The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it should not be
allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court
cannot attribute any reversible error on the part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will.

FACTS:

Placido Valmonte (Placido) toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement.
In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at San
Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names. Two
years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80, he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a
ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years of
wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.

Placido then executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and
dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary
dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator
and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause
and again on the left hand margin. In the said will, he appointed Josefina as as Executrix of his properties which
was opposed by the petitioner. It is the contention of the petitioner that Josefina should not inherit alone because
aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She
attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the
testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. The lower court disallowed the probate of the
will but the appellate court reversed said ruling and upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing
witnesses who had acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and
unhygienic, crude and impolite ways"6 did not make him a person of unsound mind. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte be disallowed on the grounds of fraud in the execution
of the will and testator’s state of mind at that time.

RULING:

NO. The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it should not
be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden satisfactorily. For this reason, the
Court cannot attribute any reversible error on the part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the
will.

Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:
"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some
other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of
affixing his signature thereto."

As to Existence of Fraud

We are not convinced. Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is
cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the
document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding
which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made."

We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its
execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible
evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of
fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. That the
testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who
was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were
the ones who had taken "the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years."

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not
invalidate the document, "because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and
acknowledged on the same occasion." More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by
three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public. In any event, we
agree with the CA that "the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was
satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses."

As to Capacity to Make a Will

"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause.
"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound
mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty,
and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court
was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.

XI. LEGITIME
A. Concept - NCC 886

Francisco v. Francisco-Alfonso
G.R. No. 138774, March 8, 2001

A compulsory heir of the decedent can not be deprived of his or her share in the estate save by disinheritance as
prescribed by law.

FACTS:

Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who
are now both deceased. Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his
common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children.

Gregorio Francisco owned two parcels of residential land. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital, he confided
to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and
Zenaida Pascual. After Gregorio died, Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half sisters. They
informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed
of absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.

ISSUE:

W/N respondent has been deprived of her legitime.

RULING:

Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property
left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her father’s estate. By law, she is
entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child. The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco
must be determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can
not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.

Spouses Joaquin v CA, G.R. No. 126376. November 20, 2003

Maononsong v. Estimo
G. R. No. 136773, June 25, 2003

As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not
diminish the estate of the seller.

FACTS:

Allegedly, Agatona Guevarra inherited a property from Justina Navarro, which is now under possession of the heirs
of Guevarra. Guevarra had 6 children, one of them is Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez-
Manongsong. The respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez claimed that the property was actually sold to
them by Justina Navarro prior to her death. The respondents presented deed of sale dated October 11, 1957.
Petitioners filed a Complaint praying for the partition and for the award of an area equivalent to 1/5 by right
of representation. The RTC ruled that the conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the
property conveyed had a conjugal character and that Agatona Guevarra as her compulsory heir should have the
legal right to participate with the distribution of the estate under question to the exclusion of others. The Deed
of Sale did not at all provide for the reserved legitimes or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against
Agatona Guevarra and should be declared a nullity ab initio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by the alleged sale of the property by Justina.

RULING:

No. The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document and prima facie
evidence of its authenticity and due execution. There is no basis for the trial court’s declaration that the sale
embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a
disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the
estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but
merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration. The
Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00.

The trial court’s conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the sale is void ab initio was not based on
evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.” The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that
the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. There was no evidence presented to
establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage.

B. Who are entitled to legitimes: Compulsory heirs – NCC 782, 887, 902

Estate of Rosales v. Rosales

G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987

A widow/widower cannot inherit from the parent-in-law by right of representation. Article 971 explicitly declares that
the representative is called to succession by law because of blood relationship. A widow of the person represented
cannot assert the same right of representation as there is no filiation by blood.

FACTS:

On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato Rosales and
their two children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her,
leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. Magna
Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The trial court ordered
that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio be entitled each to ¼ share in the estate of decedent. Irenea, on
the other hand, insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late
Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.

RULING:
No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups, namely, those who inherit by their own
right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that
a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The law has already meticulously
enumerated the intestate heirs of a decedent. The Court held that Irenea misinterpreted the provision of Article
887 because the provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a
third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.

Ining v Vega, G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013

Uson v. del Rosario

G.R. No. L-4693, 29 January 1953

The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.

FACTS:

Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this
litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus
depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.

Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Maria Uson and her husband, executed a public document
whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation,she was given a
parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be
left by her husband upon his death.

ISSUE:

W/N the subject parcel of lands belongs to petitioner

RULING:

There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the
five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much
prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died
the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow
Maria Uson. As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor
as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death". From
that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.

The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she
expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the
deed of separation they had entered into, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance
cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.

Castro v. CA
G.R. Nos. 50974-75, 31 May 1989

For an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit, she must first be recognized voluntarily or by court action.

FACTS:
Petitioners Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro are the brother and sister of the late Eustaquio Castro while
respondent Benita Castro Naval is the only child of Eustaquio.

In Civil Case No. 3762, the plaintiffs filed an action for partition of properties against the defendant alleging that
they are the forced heirs of Pedro Castro. In Civil Case No. 3763, plaintiff Marcelina Bautista also filed an action for
partition of properties against defendant Benita Castro Naval alleging that they are also compulsory heirs of
Eustaquio Castro and that they are entitled to the partition of the properties of said deceased.

The defendants in their amended answer in both cases allege that Benita Castro Naval is the only child of the
deceased Eustaquio and that said Eustaquio Castro is the son of Pedro Castro, therefore, the complaint for partition
has no cause of action

ISSUE/S:

Whether the Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio Castro?

RULING:

Yes. First, Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of the late Eustaquio Castro who was qualified to
legally marry when she was conceived and born. From her birth until the father's death, Benita lived with her
father and enjoyed the love and care that a parent bestows on an only child.

Second, the rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family is of no special relevance because Benita
and her mother were the only immediate family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate children born of a legitimate
wife contesting the inheritance of Benita.

Third, it was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and registered

Fourth, it was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano Naval.

Fifth, the certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for Eustaquio may not be
sufficient proof of recognition under the Civil Code busst they add to the equities of this case favoring the
petitioner.

Under the Civil Code, for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit, she must first be recognized voluntarily
or by court action. This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has
no rights from her parents or to their estate because her rights spring not from the filiation or blood relationship
but from the child's acknowledgment by the parent. In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not
because she was the true or real child of her parents but because under the law, she had been recognized or
acknowledged as such a child.

Tayag v. CA
G.R. No. 95229, 9 June 1992

Although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad
Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein
the same may be considered as one to compel recognition.

FACTS:

Private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a
complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the
late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo.
Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the defendant, the late
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; and the defendant is the known administratrix of the real and personal properties left by
her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on September 28, 1983; Plaintiff has
been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child
who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo

Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private respondent in behalf of the
minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint states no cause of action, she submits that the
recognition of the minor child, either voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father must first be
established before the former can invoke his right to succeed and participate in the estate of the latter. Petitioner
asseverates that since there is no allegation of such recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for
Inheritance," then there exists no basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim and, consequently, the complaint
should be dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a child who has yet to claim recognition petition for a claim for inheritance.

HELD:

The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., 11 wherein the petitioner, as plaintiff, brought an
action against the private respondents, as defendants, to compel them to give her share of inheritance in the estate
of the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter alia, that she is the illegitimate child of the deceased; that no
proceedings for the settlement of the deceased's estate had been commenced in court; and that the defendants had
refused and failed to deliver her share in the estate of the deceased. She accordingly prayed that the defendants
therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the dismissal of her complaint on the
ground that it states no cause of action and that, even if it does, the same is barred by prescription.

The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time of the filing of the complaint
therein, the petitioner in that case had already reached the age of majority, whereas the claimant in the present
case is still a minor. In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights
from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to
allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because
such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the
putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the
petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.

Although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor
Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations
therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition.

C. Concurrence of compulsory heirs and their corresponding legitimes

NCC 888-890, 892-901, 903, Article 39, P.D. 603, Sec. 18, Rep. Act 8552, FC 189-190

Sayson v. CA
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same rights as the latter,
these rights do not include the right of representation.

FACTS:

● Eleno and Rafaela Sayson spawned five children. The said spouses died in 1952, and 1976 respectively.
● One of their children, Teodoro who was married to Isabel Bautista died in 1972, and whose properties were
left to Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson.
● In 1983, the four remaining children of Eleno,and Rafela together with Isabel’s mother Juana filed a complaint
for partition of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel. Delia, Edmundo who were the legally adopted
children of Teodoro, and Doribel the legitimate daughter opposed the same.
● The trial court declared them entitled to inherit by right of representation.
● The CA reverses disqualifying the adopted children.

ISSUE/S:

Are the adopted children allowed to inherit by right of representation?

RULING:

The Court says no. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same
right as the latter, those rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption
is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either
party.

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Garcia

G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005

“It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right
and justice to prevail.

This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice
when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law. “

FACTS:

Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed
that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be
changed to Catindig, his surname.

Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of
the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname Garcia as her middle name.

The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains
to be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name.

RULING:

Yes. There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use
the Surname of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely
provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right
to bear the surname of her father and her mother.

Reyes v. Sotero
G.R. No. 167405, February 16, 2006

The adoption decree cannot be assailed collaterally in the proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate.

FACTS:

Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate claiming that she is
the niece and heir of the late Elena Lising who died intestate. Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator
of the estate, upon payment of a bond, pending settlement and distribution of Lising’s properties to the legal heirs.
She alleges that the deceased left real properties as well as assorted pieces of jewelry and cash which was
supposedly in the possession of Reyes.

In her Opposition, Reyes asks that the case be dismissed since she is the adopted child of the Sps. Delos Santos and
thus the rightful heir. She presented the certification issued by the Municipal Registrar where her adoption decree
was registered as well as a judicial form and certification from the Clerk of Court of the RTC which decreed her
adoption.

ISSUE:

WON the adoption decree can be assailed in a proceeding for the settlement of the decedent’s estate.

RULING:

NO. The presentation of contrary proof to nullify the adoption decree should be presented in a separate action. The
adoption decree cannot be assailed collaterally in the proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate.
Respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s
claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding
that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated therein,
should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioner’s status as an adopted child of the decedent remains
unrebutted and no serious challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as long as
petitioner’s adoption is considered valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedent’s estate.

In re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim

G.R. No. 1689921, May 21, 2009

Adoptive parents and children enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and
successional rights.
FACTS:

Petitioner married Primo Lim and were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to
them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the
children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim and
Michael Jude P. Lim. After Primo died petitioner married Angel Olario, an American citizen. Thereafter, petitioner
decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated
the birth of a child. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle, Michael and Angel gave their consent
through an Affidavit of Consent. RTC denied the petition for adoption.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the consent of the emancipated child is necessary.

RULING:

Yes, it is necessary. It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age of
majority or 18 years of age emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child,
who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one
of the effects of legal adoption.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee,
except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if
emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with
all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive
support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the
adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are
entitled such as support and successional rights.

In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Suntay, 183053, June 16, 2010
Suntay vs. Suntay, GR 183053, October 10, 2012

Bartolome v. SSS
G.R. No. 19253, November 12, 2014

FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was covered by the government’s
Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, he met an accident on board the vessel, wherein steel
plates fell on him resulting in his death. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Bernardina
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and gave him up for adoption, initiated a claim for death benefits under P.D.
626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union, alleging that she was the sole remaining
beneficiary of John. The SSS denied the claiim stating that she was no longer the parent of John as he was legally
adopted by Cornelio Colocol based on the documentary evidence submitted by Bartolome herself. On appeal, the
Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the SSS ruling citing, stating that the adoption decree
severed the relation between John and Bartolome, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and,
consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.

ISSUE:
Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus,
entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?

RULING:

YES. Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise
parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. In addition, assuming arguendo that the ECC
properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, Bartolome can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.

When the Cornelio (the adoptive parent) died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a
minor, at about four (4) years of age. John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor. Under
such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.

Reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section
20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of
the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the
adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee
to each other shall be extinguished.

The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned. The
manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the
retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration
of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a
minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death.
Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the
factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies
behind RA 855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to
justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his
welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent
at a time the adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the
adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee’s
biological one.

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption,
the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. In accordance with Art. 190 of
the FC, the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of
adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of
the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of
the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.

D. Restrictions regarding the legitime – NCC 904, 872, 905-907, 1347

E. Determination or computation – NCC 908-913

Vda. De Tupas v. RTC

144 SCRA 622

The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at the time
of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition that
collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos.

FACTS:
Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his
only surviving compulsory heir. He also left a win dated May 18, 1976, which was admitted to probate on
September 30, 1980 in Special Proceedings No. 13994 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Among
the assets listed in his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private capital.
However, at the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having donated them the year before
(on August 2, 1977) to the Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had thereafter obtained title to said lots.

Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any inheritance, Tupas' widow brought suit against
Tupas Foundation, Inc. in the same Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (docketed as Civil Case No. 16089)
to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible " ... by one-half or
such proportion as ... (might be deemed) justified ... and " ... the resulting deduction ... " restored and conveyed or
delivered to her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a donation inter vivos by a donor now deceased is inofficious and should be reduced at the instance
of the donor's widow.

HELD:

A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by
donation more than he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). 3 If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds
what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess, though
without prejudice to its taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing
donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such a donation is, moreover, collationable that is, its value is imputable into the
hereditary estate of the donor at the tune of his death for the purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or
compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the estate.

The further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment,
because a claim of inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more than
what was within his power to give.

The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at the time
of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition that
collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos.

Mateo vs Lagua, 29 SCRA 864

Natcher v. CA
G.R. No. 133000, 2 October 2001

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive
province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is
necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable
obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all
donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the
compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had
prejudiced the legitimes.

FACTS:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land located in Manila
and covered by TCT No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children,
namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's
estate adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property. Under the agreement, Graciano received
8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the six children.

In 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver
of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots.
Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to
4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT
No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where
the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a
land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to
a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the
land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 186059 4 was issued in the latter's
name. On 07 October 1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage,
as heirs.

Private respondents filed a complaint before the RTC Manila, alleging that upon Graciano's death, petitioner
Natcher, acquired TCT No. 107443 by virtue of Deed of Sale through fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, As a
consequence of such fraudulent sale, the former contended that their legitimes have been impaired. In her answer,
petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano and thus, under the law, she was likewise
considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano
already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore
claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.

RTC Manila ruled that the deed of sale between late Graciano and Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete
nullity and be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the
deceased. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision, ratiocinating:

“It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The
court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when
it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX

"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the court
should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be
resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"

ISSUE:

Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction to validly pass upon question of advancement as regards the
settlement of deceased estate.

RULING:

YES. We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition. Clearly, matters which involve
settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in
the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been
made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on
the heir.While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same provision
contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".

This Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although generally, a probate court may not
decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it
is necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all
payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death;
then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime
of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a
donation had prejudiced the legitimes.

COLLATION – NCC 1061-1077

De Roma v. CA
152 SCRA 205

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general
rule announced in Article 1062.

FACTS:

Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate
and Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by
Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had
not been included. The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land and the parties cannot
agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private respondent rigorously argues that it is,
conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation
to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious. Such contention was
based on the provision of the deed of donation stating that: “sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob
kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at
tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na
sinasabi sa itaas”.

ISSUE/S:

W/N there was an express prohibition to collate

RULING:

No, there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the
said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely
described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation.
Such does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required under Art 1061. The use of such
terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation implies that it was prepared by a lawyer, and we may
also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. He would have included therein
an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's intention. Anything less than such express prohibition
will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition
because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little
consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the
general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception
but the rule, which is categorical enough.

Vizconde v. CA
G.R. No. 118449, Feb. 11, 1998

Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance
of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they received from him, so that the division may be
made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with
other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of
the decedent. The purpose is to attain equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as possible for it is presumed that
the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is
to give him something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessor’s will is to treat all his
heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary. Collation does not impose any lien on the property or
the subject matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather
the value of such property at the time it was donated, the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which
conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the
account of the heir or donee.

FACTS:

Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer.
Petitioner’s wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The
other children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo
Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their
four children.

On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110 sq. m. located at
Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property) covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty
Five Thousand Pesos(P135,000.00), evidenced by a “Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng
Titulo TCT No. T-36734”. In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property was issued
to Estrellita. On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar
Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00). In June of
the same year, Estrellita bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon
St., BF Homes, Parañaque (hereafter Parañaque property) using a portion of the proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela
property. The remaining amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a
bank.

On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafael’s estate, Teresita instituted an intestate estate
proceeding docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, with Branch 120 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City
listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo, and the wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be
appointed Special Administratrix of Rafael’s estate. Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of
Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother Herein private respondent Ramon filed an opposition
dated March 24, 1993, praying to be appointed instead as Salud and Ricardo’s guardian. Barely three weeks
passed, Ramon filed another opposition alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property
by Rafael which she sold for not less than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon
pleaded for the court’s intervention “to determine the legality and validity of the intervivos distribution made
by deceased Rafael to his children,” Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled “In The Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas” and
averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his
children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafael’s children “by right of
representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita.”

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioner is a proper party in the proceedings of which properties are allegedly subject to
collation.
RULING:

The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-
in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael’s compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children
and ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287. Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved. The father or mother of illegitimate children
of the three classes mentioned shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code.

With respect to Rafael’s estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is
considered a third person or a stranger. As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate
proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said
proceeding, which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation.

Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible
error in ordering collation of the Parañaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way
of deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Parañaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds
of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of
the Parañaque property has no statutory basis.

The order of the probate court presupposes that the Parañaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael
to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Parañaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of
P900,000.00, by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner
who inherited and is now the present owner of the Parañaque property is not one of Rafael’s heirs. Thus, the
probate court’s order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged
with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafael’s estate.

As it stands, collation of the Parañaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties
gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the
transfer of the Parañaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any
“claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir” in the Parañaque property.

Imperial v. CA
G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999

It is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the property itself, which is brought to collation.

FACTS:

Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land. Leoncio sold the said lot for
P1.00 to petitioner, who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner
and private respondents admit that despite the contracts designation as one of Absolute Sale, the transaction was
in fact a donation. Barely 2 years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for annulment of the said Deed of
Absolute Sale in the then CFI of Albay on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner into signing the said
document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement. Pending execution of the
judgment, Leoncio died on 1962, leaving only 2 heirs - petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an
adopted son, Victor Imperial. 15 years after, Victor died single.

Petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision of the CA in affirming the Decision of the RTC, which rendered inofficious
the donation made by Leoncio in favor of herein petitioner, to the extent that it impairs the legitime of Victor, and
ordering petitioner to convey to herein private respondents, heirs of Victor, that portion of the donated land
proportionate to Victor’s legitime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in awarding a portion of the property to private respondents as Victor’s legitime.

RULING:

YES. Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share due to a compulsory heir may
be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1) the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting
all the payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his
death; (2) the value of all donations subject to collation would be added to it.

Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the property itself, which is brought to
collation. Consequently, even when the donation is found inofficious and reduced to the extent that it impaired
Victor’s legitime, private respondents will not receive a corresponding share in the property donated.

Thus, in this case where the collatable property is an immovable, what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as
much as possible, in property of the same nature, class and quality; (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value
of the impaired legitime in cash or marketable securities; or (3) in the absence of cash or securities in the estate, so
much of such other property as may be necessary, to be sold in public auction. We believe this worth mentioning,
even as we grant the petition on grounds of prescription and laches.

Arellano v. Pascual
G.R. No. 189776, Dec. 15, 2010

FACTS:

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia
P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents
Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition for “Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance
of Letters of Administration” filed by respondents on April 28, 2000, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of
land (the donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the
decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, “may be considered as an advance
legitime” of petitioner. Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which respondents assailed but which
they, in any event, posited that it “may be considered as an advance legitime” to petitioner, the trial court, acting as
probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation.

ISSUE:

WON the property is subject of collation.

HELD:

NO. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to
determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes
place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free
portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. The records do not show that the
decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who
are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime – that part of the testator’s property
which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his
properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner,
assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a “stranger,” chargeable against the free portion of the
estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

F. Freedom to dispose free portion – NCC 914 51