All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of
the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US
government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
United
Kingdom Netherlands
Muenchen
Gladbach
Troyes
Mulhouse
France Switzerland
Bay
of
Biscay Lyon
Grenoble
Italy
Bordeaux
Arachon
Montpellier Marseille
Sete
Spain = CEA
J.C. Masterman, the chief of the The British machinations succeed- the X-2 office in London became the
British double-cross system, after the ed and, on 1 March 1943, Donovan center of American counterintelli-
war. In 1939, British intelligence— created the Counter Intelligence gence operations. This arrangement
using information provided by Polish Division. Three months later, Dono- also served British interests as it al-
cryptologists—broke the German van rescinded his order and created lowed British intelligence to maintain
Enigma cipher and was then able to instead a separate Counter-Espionage tight control over the ULTRA traffic
decrypt many German communica- branch within OSS known as X-2.5,6 shared with the United States and to
tions throughout the war. MI-5 and develop relationships with its Ameri-
MI-6 used these communications can counterparts.8
intercepts—designated ULTRA—to ULTRA
identify and apprehend Abwehr British authorities indoctrinated
A type of communications intelligence
agents in Britain. (COMINT) obtained by Britain and X-2 into the double-cross program
the United States during World War and provided training for handling
MI-5’s B1A Division then II, ULTRA consisted of the cryptanal- double agents in preparation for the
selected German agents to serve as ysis of all German radio communica- invasion of Europe. In the fall of
double agents who continued their tions employing the Enigma machine 1943, British intelligence helped X-2
and Japanese military communica-
communications with the Abwehr create Special Counter-Intelligence
tions employing enciphering ma-
under British direction. a The double chines...Japanese diplomatic commu- (SCI) detachments that would ac-
agents served two central purposes: nications were known as MAGIC. company the Allied invading forces
counterintelligence—to identify other in continental Europe and perform
From Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Es-
German spies and reveal Abwehr counterintelligence operations using
pionage by Norman Polmar and Thomas
plots—and deception, most notably Allen (Random House, 1998) ULTRA intercepts. In these early
in support of Operation Fortitude, the stages of preparation in 1943, MI-6
effort to mislead the German military remained reluctant to grant X-2 re-
about the location of the Normandy sponsibility for managing CEAs. An
landing in 1944. In order to expedite the develop- internal X-2 history of CEA opera-
ment of X-2’s counterintelligence tions in France and Germany written
After the US created the OSS in capacity, MI-5 and Section V of after the war described this ambiva-
1942, British intelligence set out to MI-6 shared their counterintelligence lence during fall of 1943: “Certainly
convince OSS head William Don- records and expertise. A declassified it was felt, more or less vaguely, that
ovan to form a counterintelligence US government history of counter- X-2 should logically have a hand in
division akin to MI-6’s counterintel- intelligence notes the significance of the [CEA] business; but CEA work
ligence section.3 British intelligence this collaboration in building X-2’s was seldom, if ever, discussed by
officials wanted a central counterin- capability: “The United States was the officers of MI-6 (V) who were
telligence office in the US that would given the opportunity of acquiring, helping to establish their American
serve as liaison with London on within a short period, extensive counterpart.”9
double-agent missions, on ULTRA counterintelligence records repre-
traffic about German intelligence, senting the fruits of many decades of The mission of the OSS SCI units,
and on the security of Allied intelli- counterintelligence experience. The however, included the operation of
gence abroad.4 British offered also to train Ameri- double agents and, in September
can personnel in properly using such 1943, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff
Given the highly sensitive nature approved a directive authorizing OSS
records and in conducting counterin-
of the ULTRA intercepts, British in- activities in the European Theater, to
telligence operations.”7
telligence sought to limit distribution include “the control, in collaboration
of ULTRA traffic to a single, secure As MI-6 (V) provided training with British Deception Service, of ac-
OSS counterintelligence division. to their new American counterparts, tion of double agents.”10 Additionally,
a. British military intelligence was and is divided between two agencies: MI-5 was responsible for domestic intelligence, while MI-6 was
responsible for foreign intelligence. MI-5’s B1A division was responsible for running double agents. MI-6’s Section V was MI-6’s counter-
intelligence division, which also carried out double agent missions abroad.
Oakes traveled to Cherbourg on 14 cember 1944.30 Frutos was no longer received accolades from his German
July after learning of the case, and at risk of being exposed by other handlers, and he was rewarded with
Weismiller and Adams followed on German agents in the area. more in-depth questionnaires on
25 July.24 Oakes and Major Christo- Allied naval activities.34
pher Harmer of the British 104th SCI Through the fall of 1944, Frutos’s
Unit interrogated Frutos to determine X-2 handlers worked to build his Frutos’s role in Cherbourg
if his CEA status could be blown by credibility and status with his Abwehr increased in significance in Decem-
his mistress or by two other Abwehr handlers. Frutos had previously sent ber as the German offensive in the
agents believed to be in the area. terse messages and not more than Ardennes and the Battle of the Bulge
Though officials in London wanted to one at a time. Consequently, X-2 prompted new waves of Allied troops
send Frutos to England for further in- increased volume and detail of his to arrive there, and X-2 finally elect-
terrogation, Oakes and Harmer con- reporting slowly to avoid suspicion.31 ed to use Frutos for deception. At the
cluded that Frutos would be worth- In addition, the X-2 case officers had end of November, the Abwehr sent
while as a double agent and unlikely to gain approval from the so-called Frutos a questionnaire requesting in-
to work against them.25 Moreover, “212 Committee” for all the intelli- formation about the anti-torpedo nets
the need for expediency overrode gence (known as “foodstuff”) that that merchant ships used to protect
London’s concerns; Frutos had been Frutos relayed to the Germans. against German submarine attacks.
off the air since 20 June, and further British intelligence was already feed-
Formed in August 1944, the 212 ing deceptive statistics on anti-torpe-
delay would arouse suspicion. On 25
Committee was a coordinating body do nets to the Germans through their
July 1944, Frutos resumed contact
for authorities from X-2 and the 21st own CEAs, and so the 212 Commit-
with the Abwehr, this time as an
and 12th Army Groups to approve tee approved Frutos to participate in
American CEA assigned the cryp-
deception information for American the deception. He delivered the false
tonym DRAGOMAN.26
CEA’s in France and Germany. Not information on the anti-torpedo nets
Frutos’s position as a trusted Ger- only was this a slow process, but to the Germans on 27 and 28 Decem-
man agent stabilized in August 1944. the 212 Committee prohibited X-2 ber 1944, citing a fictional subsource
He retained a job at the Army Real from using Frutos for deception and on an American cargo vessel, and
Estate and Labor Office, a position denied foodstuff that could endanger continued to disseminate the decep-
that demonstrated to neighbors in Allied operations. As a result, the tive naval information through the
Cherbourg how he earned his living case officers complained that Frutos winter. After the war, X-2 praised
and that was closely related to the was “forced into equivocation, cir- Frutos’s role—passing false reports
fake job of interpreter at an American cumlocution, inference, explanation, from the fictional subagent—in the
port office that he presented to the avoidance to such an extent that his naval deception operation:
Abwehr.27 Weismiller and Adams also messages became longer and longer
located a secure house from which and throughout the month of October He [the fictional subagent] had
Frutos could broadcast his radio we faced with helpless alarm the fact passed a considerable amount
transmissions to the Abwehr.28 that, for all the reasons enumerated of important naval deception,
above, Frutos’s outgoing traffic was and all the data he had notion-
In late August, Frutos was con- reaching almost unmanageable pro- ally supplied, on the anti-tor-
tacted by Alfred Gabas, a German portions.“32 pedo nets, convoy routes and
agent in the Cherbourg area for protection, Antwerp traffic,
whom X-2 had been searching.29 X-2 Frutos struggled to explain to the V-bomb damage, etc., had been
arrested Gabas, who then led them to Abwehr why he could not provide carefully contrived and edited
a German agent in nearby Granville details on activities in plain sight at the highest level to dovetail
named Jean Senouque; X-2 later such as troop movements through perfectly with information the
recruited Senouque as a CEA. The Cherbourg harbor and blamed his Germans were already known
other supposed German agent in the deficient reporting constraints on to have, to support information
area fled Cherbourg for Paris after the his mobility, his subsources, and the supplied by other accepted
invasion and was arrested in De- local security.33 Nonetheless, Frutos agents, and to fill out and con-
v v v
Endnotes
1. John B. Oakes, Edward R. Weismiller, and Eugene Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Operation of Controlled Enemy Agents in France and
Germany, 1944-1945 Vol. I (Strategic Services Unit, War Department, 1946), 340-343.
2. J.C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939-1945 (Yale University Press, 1972), 3.
3. Timothy Naftali, “X-2 and the Apprenticeship of American Counterespionage, 1942-1944” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1993), 13,
80.
4. Ibid., 13, 80.
5. History of United States Counterintelligence, Vol. I, 32. (Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Record Group 226, Entry 117, Box
2, National Archives College Park (NACP).
6. Ibid., 37-38.
7. Ibid., 34.
8. Naftali, “X2”, 7.
9. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. I, 61.
10. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. II, Appendix A, 3.
11. Ibid., Appendix A, 13.
12. Ibid., 62.
13. Ibid., Appendix A, 19–23.
14. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. I, 63-64.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 66.
17. Ibid., i.
18. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. II, Appendix C, 77.
19. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. I, 94–95.
20. Ibid., 95.
21. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. II, Appendix C, 66–72. Also see Naftali, “X-2” 633-634, for further discus-
sion of the Eitel case.
22. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. I, 95-96.
23. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. II, Appendix C, 57.
24. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. I, 70.
25. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. II, Appendix C, 80.
26. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. I, 97-101.
27. Ibid., 104.
28. Ibid., 105-106.
29. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. II, Appendix C, 129–139.
30. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. I, 109.
31. Ibid., 115-116.
32. Ibid., 117.
33. Ibid., 118.
34. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. II, Appendix C, 141.
35. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. I, 135.
36. Ibid., 73-74.
37. Ibid., 344–348.
38. Ibid., 330.
39. Ibid., 158–159.
40. Ibid., 160.
41. Ibid., 178.
42. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. II, Appendix G, 358–359.
43. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. I, 221–225.
44. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. II, Appendix G, 323.
45. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. I, 225.
46. Ibid., 227.
47. Ibid., 251.
48. Ibid., 258.
49. Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers, 661.
50. Naftali, “X-2”, 613.
51. “CEAs in Italy in 1944,” (Unsigned British document, but Timothy Naftali assesses it as MI-6, Section V). 226/119/23 NACP.
52. Naftali, “X-2”, 627-628, and “CEAs in Italy in 1944,” 226/119/23 NACP.
53. National Archives College Park, Record Group 226 Entry (UD) 116 Records of the Office of Strategic Services. London Files Relating
to German Intelligence Service Personalities, 1943 – 1946, Box 23, Folder 177b.
54. Ibid.
55. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. I, i.
56. Ibid., 327.
57. Ibid., 331.
58. Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 5: Strategic Deception (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary
Office, 1990), 197-198.
59. Stephen Engelberg, “James Angleton, Counterintelligence Figure Dies,” New York Times, May 12, 1987, http://www.nytimes.
com/1987/05/12/obituaries/james-angleton-counterintelligence-figure-dies.html.
60. Naftali, “X-2”, 611–616.
61. Oakes, Weismiller, and Waith, A History of OSS/X-2 Vol. I, 198.
62. Robert D. McFadden, “John B. Oakes, Impassioned Editorial Page Voice of The Times, Dies at 87,” New York Times, April 6, 2001,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/06/nyregion/john-b-oakes-impassioned-editorial-page-voice-of-the-times-dies-at-87.html?pagewant-
ed=all&src=pm.
63. “Celebrating the Life of Professor Emeritus Edward R. Weismiller,” GW English News, September 16, 2010, http://gwenglish.blogspot.
com/2010/09/celebrating-life-of-professor-emeritus.html.
64. “In Memoriam: Eugene M. Waith, Professor of English Literature,” Yale News, November 8, 2007, http://news.yale.edu/2007/11/08/
memoriam-eugene-m-waith-professor-english-literature.
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