EVOLUTION OF MAOISM IN NEPAL: “UNDERSTANDING MAOIST

INSURGENCY FROM WIDER PRESPECTIVES”

BY

MANISH THAPA
 Evolution of Maoism in Nepal:
Understanding Maoist Insurgency from Wider
Perspective
Manish Thapa

* Discussion Draft only not for circulation or publication

Abstract

This paper examines the root causes of Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. There has been a
lot of scholarly debates and analysis to find out the root cause of evolution of Maoist
insurgency in Nepal. But all of these debates, literatures and analysis are written from
various perspectives. So this article would review all these debates, literature and
analysis and provides an intensive framework to understand the root cause of evolution
of Maoist Insurgency in Nepal.

2
1. Introduction

Land-locked between India and China, The Kingdom of Nepal is renowned for her
spectacular natural beauty of her mountains and cultural of tolerance and peace
symbolized by Lumbini, the birthplace of Lord Buddha, the Apostle of peace. For this
very reason, Nepal had once declared itself a Zone of Peace.

Nepal is a poor developing country with various social and economic ills. Until about
twelve years ago, the country’s political system was not a multi-party democracy. The
prevailing political system was blamed for country’s socio-economic ills. Democracy
was seen as the panacea, and it became Nepal’s great hope. Although political parties
were banned, a pro-democracy movement was growing. From the outset, this was
centered at educational institutions of higher learning where the country’s rulers
tolerated it. Students and teachers were at the forefront of democratic struggle.

Pro-democratic movement gathered much strength in late 1989 and the Late King
Birendra finally acceded to their demands, giving the country a constitutional monarchy
and multi-party democratic system. After which Nepal had a democratic constitution
and multi-party elections. The Maoist communist party also contested in the first
election and held almost a third of the seats in Nepal’s Parliament.

People had expected that much development would follow democracy. However, it did
not come, Unemployment soared, and along with it, disillusionment and dissent.
Certain social ills such as corruption, also increased. In short, little of substance in
improving the living conditions of the people occurred even after the dawn of
democracy.

The Maoist seemed betrayed by the failed promise of democracy, and felt powerless
even though they were hardly a fringe political party represented in the national
parliament. In 1994, they abandoned their legislative seats and their leaders went
underground. Then in February 1996, they declared People’s War, claiming that only a
communist state could solve the country’s various social and economic ills, giving birth
to Maoist Insurgency in the country.

After 8 years of the rising tide of Maoist insurgency, peace has been destroyed giving
rise to widespread fear and creating a sense of insecurity. Likewise, the linchpin of the
democratic system: election of the local bodies, and the national parliament has been
stalled. Educational institutions are in shambles and the economy is on the path to ruin,
throttling badly needed development works in order to address widespread poverty,
which is likely fuel, more insurgency. The Country’s social and physical infrastructures,
which have been built over the years are also gradually destroyed, eroding the capacity
of the country to deliver much needed development.

Nepal is now in the midst of the most successful Maoist insurgency the world has
witnessed in recent decades. The Maoist, who appear to model themselves on Peru’s
Shining Path guerrillas, have shaken the country’s 14-years old, multiparty democracy

3
to its very foundation. On November 23, 2001 -- after four months of cease-fire and
peace talks -- the Maoists walked out of the dialogue blaming the government for not
responding to any of their conditions favorably. After the breakdown of talk the Maoists
launched armed attacks on army barracks, police stations and other government
establishments in Dang, Syangja, Surkhet and many other districts of Nepal. Finally on
November 25, the Maoists declared the formation of a 'People's Liberation Army' to
carry forward the people's war. It was then that the government realized that the police
failed to take control the insurgency, and the army was then mobilized.

The second round of peace talks between the Maoists and the king's government was
announced in early January 2003 and was followed by a cease-fire by both sides on
January 29, 2003. With talks continuing untill August. The cease-fire lasted for about
seven months. On the eve of the fourth round of talks, on August 17, 2003 the Royal
Nepal Army conducted a raid in Doramba village of Ramechap district where Maoist
cadres were reportedly holding cultural programs to spread the message of their
politics; 19 unarmed Maoist cadres who were engaged in a 'cultural' program in
Doramba were arrested by the army, taken outside the village, and shot at point blank
range in an execution style killing. The Maoists then walked out of the peace talks and
hostilities were resumed.

Several scholarly debates and analysis were conduced in the past to understand the
root causes of Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. Given the magnitude of the crisis, the
exploration of its causes, and continued successes has become a subject of interest to
commentators and scholars in Nepal and beyond. Popular wisdom holds that
insurgency is a direct result of the increasing despondency felt by the poor, and
socially marginalized in the country. While there is an element of truth in these
prevailing analyses, evidence suggests that the underlying causes of the insurgency
origins, rapid growth, and continuing success are far more complex1. Therefore the
following study has attempted to look into the origin of this conflict from a different
perspective including the socio-economic factors, Trans-boundary factors, internal
politics, etc. This study will look into the Maoist Insurgency and explore its causes from
a wider perspective. Thus, this study will provide an intensive overview of origin of the
Maoism in Nepal, and extrapolate the root causes of its evolution.

2. Timeline of events

Since 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist) has been waging a
“people’s war” to establish a communist republic in place of the constitutional
monarchy. This is a manifestation of ideology intertwined with age of grievances
resulting from inequalities embedded in the Nepali social structure. Such inequality was
stemmed from poverty, caste/ethnic/gender – based discrimination, political/ social
oppression and corruption in public office, all of which have contributed to the
deprivation and marginalization of people, specifically those in the lower rungs of the

1
Rabindra Mishra in ‘India’s Role in Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency’ : Asian Survey, Vol. 44, Issue 5, pp. 627 – 64,

4
socio-economic ladder.2 The insurgency was localized in the Mid-Western Region and
quite indolent until 2001. In July 2001, a cease-fire was declared, which held until
November 2001, when talks failed after which fighting resumed, and a State of
Emergency was declared. The fighting entered a new phase of much greater intensity,
then prior to November 2001, approximately 2700 people had been killed in the
previous five years; between November 2001 and October 2002, and about 4366
people were killed during the violence3.

In May 2002 Prime Minister Deuba dissolved Parliament when it did not extend
Emergency. In July 2002, the terms of all elected officials in Nepal ran out and the
Prime Minister did not extend their term. Then in October 2002, King Gyanendra
dismissed the Prime Minister and took over Executive Power. Since that time the
various political parties have refused to cooperate with the King’s government, and
instability has grown.

In January 2003 a cease-fire was brokered between the King and the Maoists. The
Maoist insurgency took a dark turn when rebel leaders walked out of peace talks with
the government. Violence has increased considerably since that time, and the country
is nearly in a state of civil war with killing going in between the Maoist insurgents and
the government security forces, with ordinary people often caught in the cross-fire. It
seems, both sides have realized the need for a negotiated settlement but peace talks
still seem unlikely to happen anytime soon.

On Feburary 1, 2005, King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev removed the Prime
Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba’s government, and decided to form a council of ministers
under his Chairmanship in order to “fulfill the people’s desire for the restoration of
peace and security and to activate the “democratic dispensation soon”. This change in
the government takes the conflict a new turn in a very different direction. King
Gyanendra's seizure of power and arrest of Democratic Party leaders on 1 February
2005 aided the Maoist insurgency, and intensified the civil war. Through this seizure of
power the King has alienated his people further from the monarchy by displaying
clearly that he has no intention of acting simply as a constitutional monarch. Although,
he has placed the blame on every aspect of the Nepalese political structure, the
question left to answer is whether the Nepalese people are willing to believe his actions
to be for the benefit of the Nepalese people. If the argument asserted by the King, that
action taken was required to reinvent democracy then the three year period for which
the King claimed power, and the promises to restore democracy are circumspect. As
well considering the kings statement that the dismissal of the government nominated
by him “ failed to make necessary arrangements to hold elections by April, and
continue to promote democracy, the sovereignty of the people and life and property”.
He has instead strengthened the hand of the Maoists who have been proclaiming a
new democratic socio-economic system, and state, on the ideology of removing
poverty, injustice and exploitation.

2
Karki and Bhattarai in ‘Whose War: economic and Socio-Cultural Impacts of Nepal’s Maoist –Government
Conflict’
3
Amnesty International Report, December 2002

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The king and his ministers have argued that only a strong, authoritarian government can
deliver peace. The Deputy Premier, Tulsi Giri, argued that Nepal is acting no differently
than the U.S. after 11 September 2001: "Every country has a problem which it is trying to
solve", he said, "but then it's not justice that you make comments on how Nepal is dealing
with it".4 How the king might achieve a lasting resolution of the conflict is unclear. One can
suppose that envisages three scenarios as below. It is unlikely that any of these will
succeed however.

Holding Talks: The new Council of Ministers has called for negotiations with the Maoists5
however there are no visible realistic prospects. The insurgents' chairman, Prachanda, their
spokesman, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, and other figures have reiterated their
unwillingness to deal with the king.6 Even if they were to come to the table, talks between
forces representing the extremes of the political spectrum would be unlikely to deliver a
stable long-term settlement. More likely, the Maoists would only use the talks as a tactical
diversion and a means for weakening the monarchy further.

Military Solution: Even if the generals recognise that a knock-out military victory is
impossible, many of them argue that a sustained offensive would weaken the Maoists
enough to force them into talks without any preconditions. Yet even the "bloody nose"
objective, Indian adviser previously recommended that this is an unlikely outcome. The
army has shown little capacity to hurt the rebels, and military experts have been
unimpressed by their progress in adapting to a counterinsurgency campaign. Since its
deployment in November 2001, the military position has progressively weakened, and
the RNA is now burdened with extra responsibilities, which distract it from frontline fighting.
State security forces, which now have to guard against unrest from the political
mainstream, will be even less likely to win support and develop improved intelligence
capabilities. Moreover, the royal coup will likely prove to have been a recruiting boon for
the Maoists, particularly from disaffected leftist party activists.

Maoist collapse: Ever since the Maoists' plenary meeting in August 2004, in Kathmandu
government and diplomatic circles have been buzzing with talk of serious splits within their
leadership. There were many gossips in the newspapers and among the people about the
possibility of split of the Maoist leadership between the Prachanda and Bhattarai. Many
analysts hope that such internal tensions will fatally divide the movement. But similar
speculation has frequently proved groundless. The Maoists do have differences over
strategy but they remain disciplined and united. Indeed, they encourage a "two-line

4
Interview with Reuters quoted in "Dr. Giri stands against int'l criticism", Kathmandu Post, 16 February 2005.
5
A senior minister of the newly formed cabinet has said that the government would soon form a team to hold peace
negotiations with the Maoist insurgents. According to reports, Minister for Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation Buddhi
Raj Bajracharya said that the team would discuss the insurgents' demands only after they agree to talks. "The Maoists
have repeatedly said that they would hold a dialogue with the King only. Now, it's the best time for them to come for
talks as the present government is formed under the chairmanship of His Majesty", reports quoted the Minister as saying.
Nepalnews.com, 7 February 2005.
6
Prachanda's press statement of 12 February 2005 stated unambiguously that "the possibility and rationality of
talks with Gyanendra Shahi has ended in the aftermath of [his] murdering of achievements of [the 1990
democracy movement]".

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struggle" within the party as a way of developing policy.7 As long as they feel they have
momentum, serious splits are not likely. Attempts to "decapitate" the insurgency by
arresting or killing key leaders would at best entrench local warlords and groups rather
than produce a total collapse. Moreover, a negotiated settlement -- the goal of any realistic
strategy -- would be far easier to reach with a unified Maoist leadership than a series of
regional splinter movements.

The immediate political impact of the royal coup is almost entirely negative in terms of
the state response to the Maoist challenge. While royalist claims that Nepal needs a
strong hand on the helm may sound reasonable from a distance, the reality is that the
king's actions have dramatically destabilized the ship of the state. An authoritarian grip on
the levers of power means little when the government's writ barely extends beyond
Kathmandu and a few other urban areas.

The assault on democratic parties and institutions strengthens the Maoists and increases
the likelihood that the mainstream parties will join the rebels in a loose alliance against the
king.8 However, the fact that such an alliance is structured, and the Maoists are not only
the best organized and most determined political force in the country but they are also
armed and violent and this gives them an excellent chance to control much of the country.
They will no doubt seek to co-opt other parties and use them to achieve their long-standing
goals, which could result in some form of Maoist victory, or at the very least increase the
chances of one in the very near future.

3. Root causes of conflict

Conflict is a universal and permanently recurring phenomenon within societies. But the
question to ask is, what triggers violence? Unfortunately no single general theory of
conflict exists. H.L. Nieburg has argued that violence is a natural form of political
behavior, that the threat of inflicting pain by restoring to violence will always be a useful
means of political bargaining within domestic and international society; that the threat
of resorting to force demonstrates the seriousness with which the dissatisfied party
sets forth its demands against the satisfied, the establishment. 9 Karl Marx is known for
his assertion that conflict arise inevitably out of socio-economic change.10 Moderate
political elements as to Marx; prove too weak to strike viable compromises between
those who agitate for rapid change.11

7
The "two-line struggle" is a term used by the Maoists to refer to internal debates. Mao regarded it as an inevitable
aspect of revolutionary work to be encouraged.
8
The Maoist press statement of 4 February called for "all the pro-people political forces, civil society, intellectual
community and all the level and sphere of people" to form a united front "to overthrow feudal autocracy". The
Maoists added, "We would also like to clarify to all those concerned that we are utterly ready for necessary
sacrifice and flexibility from our side for this purpose".
9
James E Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltgraft, Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations. A
Comprehensive survey. New York: Harper and Row Publishres, 1981, p. 183
10
Ibid. p. 317
11
Ibid. p. 315

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In a society such as Nepal, in transition from traditional to modern, active monarchy to
democracy, the causes of conflict are many. Conflict between forces seeking change
and those resisting it has been ongoing since the dawn of democratic awakening in the
1940s. After the declaration of the Peoples War by the Maoist, Nepal became a
country under siege with violence. What actually triggered that violence? Some see
social inequality and exclusion of a large section of the population from the structures
of political power and the sharing of resources by the traditional ruling elites as the
underlying causes. There have been a lot of similar debates put forward as to gauge
the root cause of Maoist Insurgency in Nepal.

”There is however widespread consensus as to the root causes of the conflict in Nepal.
The main grievances, all closely related to each other include inequitable socio-
economic and political access, bad governance/corruption and widespread poverty.
These issues are used by the Maoists to justify their challenges to the legitimacy of the
government, and all contribute to motivate certain sectors of the population to join or at
least support their movement and their cause.”12

The new political order set up after 1990 failed to include all sections of Nepali society,
and the nationalities and Dalits (untouchable caste) remained – and they felt they were
–outside both mainstream politics and the reach of development programs. Traditional
regional disparities continued and far flung areas like districts of Karnali Zone remained
under-represented in politics, planning and the development processes. Meantime, the
gap between the people in the villages and the cities and between the rich and the
poor continued to widen. Nepal in the 1990s experienced relative prosperity in the
urban areas, but the redistribution of wealth and opportunities remained skewed,
resulting in increased unemployment.

It did not take long for the insurgency launched simultaneously in three mid-western
mountain districts of Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, Gorkha in the West, and Sindhuli in the
East to spread. By the year 2000, Maoist violence had left no district unaffected and by
mid January 2001, the Maoists had declared the formation of a provisional
revolutionary district government in Rukum, Jajarkot, Sallyan and Rolpa districts. There
are many theories on why the influence spread as fast as it did. Some attribute the
spread of rebel influence to the involvement and support of the excluded groups –
mainly women, minorities and the Dalits – but there is not enough evidence to isolate
this as main reason. As noted by the Saubhagya Shah, the epicenter of the insurgency
- the Rapti Zone in the mid-western Nepal – is not the most backward region in the
country13. He argues that “if social and economic marginalization alone were
responsible for the emergence of the Maoist Movements, the hill districts of Karnali,
Seti and Mahakali zones would be far more likely candidates, not only because of their
grinding poverty and chronic food shortage, but also because of the nature of their

12
Nepal Country Study on Conflict Transformation and Peace Building. GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft fur
Technische Zuszammenarbeit 2002
13
Rabindra Mishra in ‘India’s Role in Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency’ : Asian Survey, Vol. 44, Issue 5, pp. 627 – 64,

8
terrain and their remoteness from the state centers14. Even though difficult to
generalize, what is almost clear now is that the spread of Maoist influence has strong
social and economic roots including the exclusion of the poor and the marginalized by
the State, as opposed to it being only and ideological and “law and order problem”, or
“terrorism”, which was the initial government response to this conflict15.

From one perspective, the Maoist insurgency in its mid-western stronghold areas can
be seen as a renewal of an age old confrontation between the Thakuri Raj and the
radical left. The Thakuris (descendants of the rulers of the old principalities) and their
clients had long dominated this area, and the nature of their rule at local level was
repressive. This was in accord with the authoritarian regime at the center during the
party less Panchayat system (1962-1990). Even after the restoration of democracy in
1990, the former Panchas survived, reviving their power base under a new guise by
responding to the Nepali Congress’s Policy of incorporating the traditional social and
political elites in its schemes of party building during the early 90s. However, the sense
of popular empowerment that spread after the successful 1990 jana andolan (People’s
Movement of 1990s) introduced a new power against the traditional forces. Both the
CPN (UML) and the CPN (Maoist, formerly the UPF) emerged as the most influential
left forces in the people’s fight against various forms of the Thakuri Raj in this region.
The equation among the left forces has changed in favor of the CPN (Maoist) as a
consequence of the UML’s movement from the left towards the center, while the
Congress Party is constantly heading towards the right from the center of the political
spectrum in the country. The local Thakuri –centrist alliances in the mainstream parties’
has never been strong under the democratic set-up, and it deteriorated during the
period of hung parliament (November 1994 to May 1999). Because politics was
concentrated at the center in the game of government making and unmaking, the
parliamentary parties grossly ignored the need for the party building at the grassroots
level. Having this as the most appropriate time for a long drawn-out people’s war16.

Lund and Mehler divide the root causes of conflict into four main areas with sixteen
sub-areas. Nearly all of the causes mentioned are present in Nepal.

ROOT CAUSES OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS

#1: Imbalance of #2: Illegitimate, #3: Absence of #4: Absence of an
Political, Social, Undemocratic and Opportunities for the Active and
Economic and Inefficient Peaceful Organized Civil
Cultural Governance Reconciliation of Society
Opportunities Group Interests and
for Bridging Dividing
Lines between Groups

14
Saubhagya Shah, “A Himalayan Red Herring? Maoist Revolution in the Shadows of the Legacy Raj,” in
Himalayan “People’s War”: Maoist War in Nepal, ed. Michael Hutt (London: Christopher and Hurst Publication)
15
Karki and Bhattarai in ‘Whose War: economic and Socio-Cultural Impacts of Nepal’s Maoist –Government
Conflict’
16
Krishna Hachhethu in ‘Himalayan People’s War’: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion, Hutt M, ed., Hurst & Company,
London, pp 59-61.

9
 Socio-economic Legitimacy deficit of Absence of effective Weak institutions/
inequities government and dispute resolution civil society
Exclusive public institutions mechanisms Absence of
government elite Insufficient or Absence of plurality/ professional and
Violation of political declining public diversified debate independent media
group rights services Distrust amongst Lack of economic
Destabilization by Criminally, social identity groups “peace interests”
refugees and and political Weak or detrimental
internally displaced violence external engagement
people Biased
Demographic interpretation of the
pressure law by judiciary and
security services

Source: Michael Lund/Andreas Mehler: Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention in

Developing Countries: A Practical Guide. Brussels/Ebenhausen 1999, p47 as reported in
Peace-Building, Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management, GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft
fur Technische Zuszammenarbeit 2002

We will now look into the root cause of the Maoist Insurgency from a different angle
taking into account the framework provided by Lund and Mehler. In addition to this
framework other aspects are also considered which may have also been a cause
behind the spread of this insurgency.

3.1 Imbalance of Political, Social, Economic and Cultural Opportunities

“In terms of caste and ethnic break-up, the country is essentially a conglomeration of
minorities, with the two largest groups comprising 16 percent (Chhetri) and nearly 13
percent (Bahun) of the population. None of the other groups constitute more than 10
percent of the population. …Regardless of the reality on the ground, Nepal is usually
represented as a Hindu kingdom where different castes as well as ethnic, linguistic and
religious groups have co-existed peacefully. …However, the subordinate groups are
beginning to question this picture of tolerance and pluralism. Particularly since the
restoration of multi-party democracy in 1990, when the open political atmosphere
allowed the emergence of an energetic movement of ethnic assertion, whose
leadership might regard Nepal as a pluralistic society, but one that is characterized by
hierarchy, dominance and oppression.17”

“As early as 1992, British scholar Andrew Nichson had warned in an article entitled
‘Democratization and the Growth of communism in Nepal: A Peruvian Scenario in the
Making’: ‘The future prospects of Maoism in Nepal will…depend largely on the extent
to which the newly elected Nepali Congress government addresses the historic neglect
and discrimination of the small rural communities which still make up the overwhelming
majority of the population of the country…[which] means that a radical shake-up of the
17
Rajendra Pradhan in State of Nepal, Dixit KM and Ramachandaran S eds, Himal Books 2002, pp 3-5

10
public administration system is in order to make both more representative of the ethnic
diversity of the country and more responsive to the needs of peasant communities.’18”

Another notable characteristic of Maoist movement is the degree of women’s

participation in guerrilla ranks. Women’s political participation in the past had been
limited to electoral areas, especially in voting and occasional candidacy in elections. It
is a big surprise that Nepali women have now joined guerrilla organization taking up
arms. It is a subject of analysis and study that Why many rural women have been a
part of Maoist Movement? What specific life experiences convinced or compelled the
women to take part in Maoist activities? Although it is very difficult to verify the exact
number but it is reported that women constitute anywhere between thirty and forty
percent of Maoist military force, which according to conservative estimates, total at
least 10,000 people. Among female military personnel, it is reported that most come
from ethnic and Dalit groups, but there are also women from the Bahun-Chhetri
castes19. Ideologically, the Maoist claim to favor an end to the patriarchal organization
of the society. In Nepali context, it appears that this position is exemplified by their
demands for equal rights for women to inherit ancestral property. In the well-known
forty-point demand submitted to the government just before the declaration of people’s
war (Annex–I), one point deals exclusively with the’ patriarchal exploitation and
discrimination against women should be stopped. Daughters should be allowed access
to parental property’. However, the full liberation of women and gender equality is to
be achieved only in a classless or communist society. Such a position is widely
explained by the Maoist to women through political classes, cultural programs, and the
party media and mass print media. So women are another interest group which Maoist
have time and again addressed women needs to attract them to their activities, this
new phenomenon must not be taken lightly.

3.2 Nepal’s Geographical Condition and Unemployment Rate

Nepal’s rugged terrain (as similar to that of Afghanistan and Peru) is one of privilege for
the Maoist, and helps them to plant their roots in Nepal. The geological structure of
Nepal has been very much suitable for guerilla war operation. This is one of the
important factors, which have led to the growth of Maoism in Nepal. The inexperienced
and untrained Maoist Rebel has several times beaten the Nepal Police and
Government Army force taking advantage of the geographical factor.

Thousands of unemployed and ill-educated youths in the interior of Nepal have joined
the Maoist forces. The attraction to the rebels is particularly strong among ethnic
minorities and the dalit castes (the hindu “untouchable” castes). For typical rural youths
who are limited by caste/ethnic discrimination and facing a lack of educational and
employment, joining the Maoist armed movement provides a quick way to be counted
and belong to something.

18
Deepak Thapa in State of Nepal, Dixit KM and Ramachandaran S eds, Himal Books 2002, pp 86
19
Mandira Sharma & Dinesh Prasain in ‘Himalayan People’s War’: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion, Hutt M, ed., Hurst
& Company, London, pp 154.

11
There is also added the added attraction of becoming involved in the pervasive
networks of extortion and bank robbery operated by the Maoist to finance personal
consumption and the guerilla war that is said to have made th Nepali Maoist Movement
the richest rebel group in Asia.

After 10 years of conflict the rebel combatants have gotten so used to the spoils of war
and soldering – power, prestige, resources – that it has become an accepted way of
life and living among them. There is also the knowledge that re-entry into civilian life
may cost them their lives, either at the hands of the Maoists or by the state forces
scouring the countryside, for guerillas, staying and fighting is ironically the safer
alternative. This has bred a whole class of professional young guerillas who may or
may not understand or even agree with the full political implications of what they are
fighting for, yet fully understand the appreciate the sense of power, purpose and
resources that being a guerilla has placed at their disposal. This core group of young
Maoist fighting cadre is the driving force behind the guerilla war and is going to be the
hardest group to convince to return to or move towards a path of peace.

Similarly given the precarious economic situation in the country, joining the Maoist
Movement became an attractive option for young men and women in a growing
number of districts. The low level of societal development, especially economic
development, which could provide a venue for the capable young people into the labor,
market is not available. Whereas literacy rates have increased over the preceding
decades, more school leavers failed the School Leaving Certificate (SLC) examinations
(to be taken at the end of the tenth year of school). If the Maoist is a young people’s
movement, then they appear to be an alternative or ‘outfall’ option for those who
consider themselves unable to gain access to the formal system. The option to join
Maoist is most probably additionally supported by the very high degree of failure in the
SLC examination, so that the failed pupils cannot hope to enter positions within the
government or within (the very few) enterprises. This educated unemployment, which
is increasing at geometrical proportions every year have neither a job nor a school to
go where they could be kept busy. These unemployed youths, which are in between 15
to 18 years in age, are joining the ranks of armed guerrillas. So this is one of the
reasons why the Maoist has been able to recruit immensely in their so-called People’s
Army.

3.3 Illegitimate, Undemocratic and Inefficient Governance

The 1990 People’s Movement meant many things to many people. But for all people
alike it ignited a level of expectations for progress and positive change unheard of in
the aftermath of earlier political change in Nepal. With political parties, media, activists
and individual leaders joining the chorus, the belief that political freedoms and
democracy would rapidly and easily translate into progress and development reached
new heights.

The idealism of the movement soon gave way to Nepali realities – parties poorly
prepared to exercise democratic power, old patronage structures intact, limited scope

12
for sustained economic growth, a continuation of the antiquated centralized state, and
a government with no capacity, expertise or will to convert ideas into successful policy.
Add to this the rampantly corrupt leadership of the two major political parties Nepali
Congress (NC) and United Marxists Leninist (UML) took turns to occupy the abuse
government power and one has the makings of a national population the roughly
disappointment and disillusioned with the fruits of “democracy”.

The frustrations associated with the unfulfilled expectations of the people following the
replacement of the absolute monarchy with multiparty democracy provided fertile
ground for the Maoist movement. The lack of political and economic access has been
compounded by bad governance and corruption. Despite enormous amount of funds
being poured into Nepal for development, the proportion of Nepalis below the poverty
line are now greater than ever before20. The process of decentralization to improve
governance and increase people’s participation has been implemented but has not
been very effective. “The legitimacy of these structures has rested more on legal
requirements and the financial and organizational “support” of the central government
rather than on the stakeholding of the local voters.21”

“It remains Nepal’s singular misfortune that the political forces are always engrossed
with changing the regime, but never altering the substance of governance. … For the
political elites and counter-elites, establishing rule-based governance and institutional
procedures has so far proved less attractive than simply overthrowing the political
opposition and ruling through patronage and fiat.22”

When the movement oriented political groups of the Panchayat era turned themselves
into political parties, they failed to build their institutions in democratic manner. While
almost all of them mouthed democratic slogans, none built mechanisms through which
the small illegalities of party leaders, ideologues and members could be disciplined
through transparent, credible but decisive sets of intra-party rules and procedures.
Some political misdemeanors were allowed to occur with impunity in each of the big
parties – Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist –Leninist)
(CPM –UML) and Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) – were personal aggrandizement,
often in the name of helping the party, was overlooked. Although opposition parties
often indulged in moral posturing, they too failed to come up with effective laws to tame
excesses of the ruling party. The CPN (UML), which led the opposition for most of the
period, was unable to create a social environment in which the laws that would govern
party finances -said to be the single most important source of political corruption in
Nepal –could be passed. This kind of deceit on the part of the political parties
contributed directly to a widespread disenchantment with the multi-party democratic
set-up, and facilitated the political arrival and growth of the Maoist23.

20
Nepal Human Development Report. UNDP 2001 pp 19-21
21
Progress Report 202: Millennium Development Goals Nepal, United Nations Country Team of Nepal, February
2002
22
Saubhaghya Shah in State of Nepal, Dixit KM and Ramachandaran S eds, Himal Books 2002, pp 155
23
Pratyoush Onta in ‘Himalayan People’s War’: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion, Hutt M, ed., Hurst & Company,
London, pp 138.

13
The fact is that Nepal has suffered for the past 12 years from corrupt, visionless
leadership and rudderless and arbitrary state control, which has contributed in
countless ways to the longevity of the Maoist Insurgency. Large ecological areas of the
country have been sidelined in government measures to relieve poverty and encourage
economic growth. These are, in particular, the mountain areas of the west and far west,
where Maoist begun their activities and have taken the control.

Similarly, an entrenched elite of upper caste Nepalese from the central belt of Nepal
has monopolized government, including the two political parties who were in power
from 1990, and the bureaucracy. Large numbers of citizens have been excluded
socially, politically and economically by the hierarchical system of the nation. These are
the Janajati – the ethnic group, and the Dalit-the untouchable caste at the bottom of the
hindu caste system. Similarly women have also been excluded socially, politically and
economically by the prevailing patriarchy. Inevitably those women of ‘low caste’ status
have endured a double exclusion.

So this is the reason why the Maoists have constantly gained the strength exploiting
the weakness of its opponent, the state. The post-1990 politics have been
characterized by anarchy which is reflected in the major events that have occurred in
the past 12 years such as parliamentary elections being called 4 times,
recommendation for the dissolution of House of Representatives (HOR)) made 6 times;
special sessions of the HOR being summoned 7 times, and government was changed
14 times. All these events occurred because the political sphere was excessively
concentrated on power games. Beside, the political instability, frequent changes of
government, politicization, division in the police force, erosion of ideology and decline
in the credibility of political parties and their leaders, all these count for weakening the
state’s crisis management capacity vis-à-vis the Maoist. Since politics is concentrated
at the center, in of the game government making, parliamentary parties grossly ignored
the need of party building at the local level. This helped the Maoist to create their own
space and territory for their ‘long protracted people’s war’. The Maoist Insurgency was
started at the time when the state was heading towards instability, anarchy and crisis
owing to the unholy alliances, both in nature and purpose, among the parliamentary
parties.

3.4 Absence of Opportunities for the Peaceful Reconciliation of Group Interests

and for Bridging Dividing Lines between Groups.

The situation in Nepal is perhaps more complicated than most in that in addition to the
multiparty system; the monarchy is also a major player. This is especially true since
the removal of the Prime Minister by the King in October 2002. Since then, the various
political parties have refused to participate in the government. Of great concern is their
steadfast refusal to date to participate in Peace Talks with the Maoists. Since many
views the takeover by the King to be unconstitutional, the non-participation by the
political parties is thus viewed as a lack of input from the people.

14
 However, the current manifestation of the conflict is the result of the inability of the
political parties to co-operate sufficiently to make the new democratic system work.
The distrust between the monarchy and the various political parties reflects the high
level of organization ability shown by the Maoist leadership.

The institution of the monarchy has always been a central position throughout Nepal’s
history. But survival of such a central institution is now in question. King Gyanendra
reached to the throne in the background of the Royal Massacre of June 2001, in which
King Birendra along with his entire family was killed.

Unlike his predecessor, King Gyanendra has a problem of legitimacy problem. His
popularity was declined by his ambition to become a “Constructive Monarch”. The royal
take-over of power, which started since October 2002 invited a confrontation with all
the major political parties. So with this entry of monarchy in the power game has further
worsened the stability of Nepal and the conflict took a triangular shape.

Traditional
Power
(Monarchy)

STATE
CONTROL

Political Parties Maoist

(NC, UML)

Fig: The Triangular Contention

Similarly, the state capacity to use the armed forces was/is limited by the fact that the
Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) is not under the control of a civilian government. The
party-military hostility is compounded by the factors of historical legacy24, constitutional
ambiguity25 and non-cooperation. The exchange of heated words between civilian

24
SAAG Working papers February 2005.
25
SAAG Working Papers December2004

15
 leaders and military officials accusing one against another for the escalation of the
Maoist crisis surfaced publicly several times. The Government military reaction was
further complicated by the palace′s separate dealing with the Maoist. The army has
deliberately and consciously kept itself at a distance from the elected government and
multiparty democracy as if its primary duty is only to protect the palace. But after the
Royal Proclamation in February 1, 2005, RNA has been active in forefront against the
Maoist.

Therefore, the Maoists have cultivated internal contradictions and crisis among the
same actors – particularly the palace/army and the political parties – to enhance its
strengths and capacities. The possibility to take over by the Maoist through armed
insurgency however is unlikely.

3.5 Absence of an Active and Organized Civil Society

“In Nepal, where society is comprised of many castes, creeds and ethnic groups,
strong patrimonial and patriarchal systems have long existed to perpetuate the
domination of the elite. Subsidiary governance will be realized only when people
themselves become aware of their rights, and exercise them as citizens and members
of civil society to promote individual and collective well-being.26”

After the Feb 1, 2005 Royal Proclamation, Civil Society is being seen as more active
and influential than predicted. Though it unable to intervene decisively in conflict, it can
play a more important and critical role in mobilizing the Kathmandu middle class,
whose democratic aspiration tipped the balance in the 1990’s but who has become
dissatisfied with the party politics. Recent demonstrations led by the Citizens′
Movement for Peace and Democracy (CMPD) which is the collective network of the
civil society of Nepal, has made a powerful statement against Royal autocracy or
Maoist. They have attracted many participants who are scathing their criticisms of the
major parties failing but refuse to accept that as justification for denial of their
democratic rights27

Short Glance on the Root of Conflict in Nepal

STRUCTURAL CAUSE
Unification through Religion based Political Lack of Democratic Practice Bad Governance
conquest elitism Centralization

26
Nepal Human Development Report 2001 p 6
27
International Crisis Group Report: Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule, Sep 15, 2005.

16
Latent Conflict Socio-economic Regional Chronic Ethnic Gender Caste-based
Disparity Imbalances Poverty Discrimination Prejudice exclusion

PROXIMITY CAUSE
Failure of Exclusion of Bhattarai Operation Romeo (army Constitutional Monarch v/s Political
Democratic Fraction of the UPFN in Operation to suppress Contradictions parties Conflict
Leadership 1994 Election & people)
formation of the CPNM
in 1995

ECALATORY CAUSE
Operation Kilo Royal Palace Massacre and 9/11 Event and ‘War Activation of RNA in King External
Siera II (1998) change in the character of on Terror’ Nov 2001 Takeover – factors
the Monarchy Oct 2002

CONFLICT PROLONGING NEW CAUSE

Radicalization Increased Human Rights Increased numbers Monarch – Army Changing Foreign Policy –
of Conflict Violations of IDPs Coup in Feb 2005 Closeness to China and
Parties USSR

3.6 Regional Dynamics

Nepal is a landlocked country, surrounded by India on three sides. The remaining

northern one is separated from the economic might of China by the Himalayas. This
geo-political situation has forced Nepal to be completely dependent on India for trade,
commerce, and access to the sea. Without India’s cooperation, Nepal’s engagement
with the rest of the world and its quest for stability and economic development will not
bear much fruit. This power allows New Delhi to play a manipulative role in Nepal
Politics in a way, which serves its own interest.

It is also important to understand the Maoist movement in a historical context and

continuity, which has thrived due to the geopolitical situation of South Asia. It is also
important to understand the political crisis Nepal is currently facing within the historical
context of India’s role in Nepali politics, rather as a phenomenon nurtured at home by
political, social and economic factors. It is important to note here that the rulers in India
had supported the pro-democracy movement in Nepal in 1950-51 when the Rana
oligarchy collapsed. Again in 1990, Indian leaders arguably played a crucial role in
restoring multiparty system by using a yearlong Indo-Nepal transit impasse to
precipitate the collapse of the Panchayat regime. One can draw certain lessons from
this experience. In spite of the Nepali state’s apparent weaknesses, it is capable of
defusing domestic crises. However, whenever there is outside intervention/assistance,
Nepal has been forced to make concessions. After 1990, India forced Nepal into
signing several secret bilateral accords by manipulating the oppositional politics in
Nepal. According to this argument, the rebel leader Ram Raja Singh (during the
Panchayat days) and now the Maoists are prime examples of India’s “strategic

17
coercion” against the Nepali State. Without a base outside Nepal, the Maoists will find
it very hard to continue their guerilla war.

On February 4,1996, when the Maoist submitted the now – famous 40 point demands
(see Annex – 1) to the then Nepali Government, the top three demands were directly
related to India. The first demand proposed the removal of “all unequal stipulations and
agreements” from the 1950 Nepal – India Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The second
urged the Nepali Government to that the admit ‘anti-national’ Nepal India Tanakpur
(Hydroelectricity) Agreement was ‘wrong’, and together with the Mahakali River Treaty,
which was incorporated the former, should be nullified. The third demand stipulated
that the entire Nepal-India Border should be systematically controlled, and vehicles
with Indian number plates should not be allowed free entry. (See Annex I) all of these
were categorized as demands related Nepal’s nationalism. However, today they are
rarely been an issue for the Maoist and the anti-Indian rhetoric is practically non-
existent in their official documents.

Surprisingly the public, press and the politicians first began to suspect a link between
the Maoist and India after the Maoists’ lukewarm reaction to the Nepal India Kalapani
Dispute border dispute that grabbed national attention in 1998. During the height of the
controversy, in 1998, nationalists’ sentiments in Nepal was used as political capital by
the several political parties – but not by the Maoist. Until then, regarded as one of the
most vocal critics of India, the Maoists were conspicuously absent from the whole
sage. This fueled suspicion that the Maoist Leadership had taken shelter in India and
hence was not in a position to engage in any anti-Indian activities. 28

Then in August 2001, there was a dramatic report that the entire top rank of Nepali
communist leadership met the Maoist chairman, Prachanda, at small village, Siliguri, in
the Indian state of West Bengal. It was commented at that time that such a jamboree of
top-ranking aboveground and underground Nepali Communists in so called
strategically important chicken Neck could not have taken place without the knowledge
of Indian Security agencies.29

There are many instances after this where Maoist leaders were known to have been
freely moving around in Indian States, and the most shocking was the most recent
talks about the Indian Leadership meeting the Maoist Supreme Prachanda in New
Delhi and the recent ceasefire has been due to the agreement between the India and
Maoist. So following the Siliguri revelations, no one in Nepal, except perhaps Maoist
supporters, was ready to believe that New Delhi was unaware of Maoist Leaders’
whereabouts on Indian Territory.

Against this backdrop, the Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, labeled the Maoist
as terrorist and stated that India supported the Nepali Government in its fight against
them. For Nepal, this was certainly a welcome and surprising more than in India. At the

28
Cf. Kalyan Chaudhari , “A Spurt in Maoist attacks,” Frontline, April 28 – May 1, 2001, Dipak Mishra,
“Nepalese Extremists Being Trained in Bihar,” Times of India, April 16, 2001.
29
Times of India, November 27, 2001.

18
time of Mr. Singh’s Declaration, Nepal itself had not labeled the Maoist as terrorist, and
the Nepali Government and the Maoist were engaged in political negotiations.

After that time the Indian side reiterated the promise that India would allow its territory
to be used by those inimical to Nepalese interest. However, the top Maoist leaders
appeared to be able to function without restrictions in New Delhi, they issues frequent
statements and talked to the world media – from New Delhi.30

On the other side this relation has a different side. India has been supplying the
Nepalese government with military hardware and training assistance. The Arms
Assistance Agreement was signed in 1965, to assist in reorganization and
modernization of the Royal Nepal Army with the objective of strengthening the security
and independence of Nepal. The agreement was recognition of the military links
between the two countries and established India as the primary supplier of arms to
Nepal.

In 2004, India provided a grant of over 14 Million US$ to Nepal in order to enable it to
buy Indian defense equipment. Nepal wanted upgrades of India-designed INSAS rifles
and ammunition and an increase in the supply of advanced light helicopters and mine
protection vehicles. Nepal also bought arms from Belgium, Poland and the United
Kingdom.

Among the states offering this assistance India had a special interest in the curtailing
the activities of the Nepalese Maoists. In India the Naxalite movement that had begun
in 1967 had metamorphosed in three decades into a major movement affecting almost
159 districts in over 12 states. The merging of the People’s War Group, and the
Maoists Communist Center of India in 2004 to form the CPI- Maoist has become a
major cause for concern. What is even more disturbing to the Indian Government is the
evidence of linkages between the CPI Maoists and the Maoists of Nepal. This strategic
alliance has opened up their avenues for movement of persons and materials. It has
also led to the creation of safe havens and the extension of training facilities for each
other. The two groups seek to create a corridor called the Compact Revolutionary Zone
(CRZ) that would stretch from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh running through Bihar,
Jharkand, Chattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. The Indian Maoists have already
sufficient influence in these areas and using the infrastructure put up by them would be
a boon for the Nepal Maoists. The CRZ would ensure free and easy movement for both
groups.

4. Impact of the Conflict

All conflict shares certain features, though every particular situation is unique. They
reflect change and the clashes of interest, which will vary in each context, and which, if
not managed, will lead to escalating strife. Nepal’s conflict reflects political, cultural,

30
There are frequent interviews given to BBC Nepali Services and “The world Today” program by the Maoist
leaders from New

19
social and economic clashes of interest: access to and distribution of resources and
power, value systems, social norms, ethnic, caste, class and gender inequality.

The Himalayan Kingdom of 27 million people has been wracked by the Maoist
insurgency for the last ten years. Fourteen governments have taken office since the
restoration of democracy in 1990, and the great expectations of the Jana Andolan-that
it would usher in a new era of prosperity for all have yet to materialize due to continuing
political turmoil and social unrest. Furthermore, only a small segment of the society, i.e.
elites, those who were already rich to begin with, seemed to benefit disproportionately
during this period. Twelve years on, the country still finds itself in near complete
disarray as a result of the ongoing political, social, and economic turmoil.

The insurgency has affected every single Nepali’s life. Unfortunately, much of the
discourse on the conflict in Nepal is concentrated on political aspects while very little
attention has been given to the conflict’s socioeconomic cost. When the first and
second peace talks between the Maoists and the government took place in 2001 and
2003, the debate was exclusively on politics (See Annex – II)

Ten years of insurgency have weakened the Nepali state and society in numerous
ways. It was the Maoist who brought the ceremonial army out of the barrack to become
active countrywide for the first time in the modern era. The rebellion has retarded the
economy and hit development activities. It has also made India increasingly powerful in
national affairs as Kathmandu sought help from New Delhi to confront the rebels. In
order to entrenching the military, the impact on the economy has been significantly
declining and development activities are at standstill.

Over 14,000 Nepalese have lost their lives since violence began in 1996. Human rights
violations have reached crisis proportions with both the rebels and security forces
reported to be engaging in serious atrocities, torture, and disappearance and summary
executions.31 For a least developed country (LDC) like Nepal with a per capita income
of around US$ 238 and more than 42 % of people living below the poverty line32, the
development cost of the conflict, destruction of infrastructure, decline in economic
growth as well as delivery of even the basic services to the mostly needy have been
devastating.

It is believed that the insurgency has cost Nepal eight to ten percent of its GDP. Forty
percent of the Village Development Committee (VDC) buildings have been destroyed
and following the dissolution of local bodies by the Deuba government, local commerce
and development activities have come to a grinding halt. The inadequate rural
infrastructure remains in ruin, including power plants, electricity grid and
telecommunication towers, all prime Maoist targets. Nearly 2000 schools, mostly
private, have also been periodically closed. Health centers and schools, which depend
on government grants to VDCs, are without medicines and school supplies.

31
Amnesty International Report that Nepal has the highest number of disappearance in the world. Amnesty
International Annual Report 2004.
32
Nepal at Glance. The World Bank (WB)

20
 Widespread fears of Maoists and security forces, and lack of economic opportunities
have forced more than half a million people have been forced to leave their rural
homes and migrate to district headquarters, Kathmandu, and even India.

Estimated Cost of Conflict (in Billions of NRs)33

Typology of Category Costs

Cost
Direct Cost 1. Direct Government Security Expenditure 39.63 b
2. Maoist’s Military Expenditure (estimated from various
sources) 2.00 b
3. Government expenditure on relief services N/A
4. Cost of infrastructures, Bank Loss, Extortions 25.00 b

Indirect Cost 1. Business loses due to Maoist strikes and closures 100.00 b
2. Loss of income from reduced tourists arrival 11.50 b
3. Loss of income due to lost human capital 14.40 b
4. Loss of income due to lost FDI 6.50 b
5. Loss of income due to displacement both internal and
external displacement 8.00 b
6. Output foregone in the severely affected areas N/A
7. Forgone public investments 12.30 b
Total Cost >219.00 b

(Source: Adapted from D Kumar, Consequences of the Militarized Conflict and the
Cost of Violence in Nepal, 2003)

In areas most affected by the insurgency, there have been perceptible demographic
changes. Women now head most households in the absence of men and boys as
many have left homes due to fears of forced conscription by the Maoists and routine
harassment by the security forces. Evidence of increasing reliance on remittance
notwithstanding, many overseas Nepalis are shying away from sending money to their
families in villages due to fears of extortion.

At first, the Maoists were able to capture public imagination with strong opposition to
perceived inequality and injustices-such as patriarchy, polygamy, child marriage,
gambling and drinking. They also dealt harshly with individuals who they identified as
corrupt, which would often include village elites and the police. Much of this goodwill
was squandered when they resorted to indiscriminate violence.

Another area that has been affected dramatically is the rural healthcare sector. While
the Maoists have generally been supportive of immunization, these programs have
suffered greatly in recent years due to poor levels of social mobilization. Many
international donor agencies have completely withdrawn from Nepal due to the poor
security situation. One study revealed that in the Maoist affected districts; rates of
33
The current exchange rate is approximately 72 NRs fro 1 US$

21
malnutrition are exceptionally high-62 percent in Achham, 69 in Jajarkot, 78 in Jumla,
and 83 in Kalikot. These rates of malnutrition are worse than what is evident in the
current emergencies, which the world is paying attention to-63 percent in North Korea,
and 52 percent in Ethiopia and Afghanistan. According to the World Health
Organization, any region with 40 percent malnutrition rate is facing a serious public
health concern.

Politics, democracy and the democratic constitution have been the principal targets,
advocates of change through peaceful political competition have been the biggest
casualty. The emerging polarization signals further radicalize the political situation.
Forces of ”regression” consolidate around the monarchy, using the institutions to
resists the popular aspirations for change. Trying to re-establish legitimacy by using the
traditional Hindu image of the King as incarnation of Vishnu guardian, and symbol of
national identity are reminiscent of the Aristotelian doctrine of “Great Chain of Being” or
the idea of the doctrine right of kings by monarchists.

Advocates of radical change take the view that the monarchy is the root cause of all of
the misery and its removal is the ultimate remedy. Believers in the multiparty
democracy and the constitutional monarchy, who consider it possible to introduce
needed changes through possible to introduce needed changes through amendment of
the 1990 Constitution between “constructive” monarchy and the republic. The impact of
this polarization is the further militarization of the conflict as it seems difficult for the two
sides to come together politically and unrealistic to expect victory against the other side
militarily.

Mainstream political parties are agitating for the restoration of the derailed
constitutional process they themselves are partly responsible for distorting and hence
weakening the process of peaceful and positive change. As a result, the Democratic
Center has been considerably weakened and unable to significantly influence the
situation and force the warring sides to stop the violence and restore the constitutional
process.

Even though the country is facing a humanitarian crisis of massive proportion, the
political parties, the Maoists, and the royalists have paid scant attention to the pressing
needs of the people. If the poor socio-economic conditions drag on, and nothing is
done to alleviate poverty and suffering of the people, the good will toward the peace
process will evaporate.

22
 Short Glance on Impact of Conflict

IMPACTS OF THE CONFLICT34:

Positive Impacts
Pressure on local and national politicians
to introduce reform, and increased
awareness of existing social problems
Increased awareness of and actions
against corruption
Empowerment of lower castes, ethnic
groups and women
Less gambling and alcohol abuse;
lowered interest rates of money lenders
Active monitoring of government
development programs, making them
more transparent and efficient
Local conflict resolution through people’s
courts
Decrease in police harassment
Negative Impacts
Arbitrary law and order system: violent
punishment of non-supporters and
“enemies of the people”
Extortion of “donations”
Impediment of government services,
especially education
Demands of food and shelter without
payment
“Fake Maoists” appearing, who are
difficult to control
Forced participation in activities and
rallies
Spread sense of insecurity and fear

5. Emerging Scenario after Declaration of Ceasefire on September 3, 2005

In a surprise turnabout, Maoist in Nepal declared a unilateral three-month ceasefire on

September 3, 2005 and called for the restoration of political dialogue. Maoist Supremo
in the call for a Ceasefire Statement declared that his People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
will not launch any offensive during the ceasefire period. By declaring ceasefire, The
Maoist have placed both the King and the agitating political parties in a quandary. The
King and his Government cannot acquiesce in a ceasefire that will ignore the
government in power and the security forces conducting the counter insurgency
operations. At the same time, with the ceasefire covering the biggest festival of Hindu
celebration all over Nepal for about a month, the people are longing for peace and
nothing else cannot be antagonized by the King in rejecting the ceasefire. So, basically
one of the agenda for this ceasefire is to create international pressure on the King, who
launched a massive offensive against the Maoist ever since the Royal Coup of
February 1, 2005.

Similarly, the agitating political parties are also in a dilemma as both the leading
political parties, Nepali Congress and UML have not cleared their stance on whether
they prefer a Constitutional Monarchy or a Democratic Republic.

34
Adapted from Nepal Country Study on Conflict Transformation and Peace Building. GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft
fur Technische Zuszammenarbeit 2002 p31

23
Till now, there has been a lot of confusion as to how the Maoists will negotiate with the
agitating political parties and is they enter into the negotiation there is still doubts about
its implementation in a true spirit from the both sides? Where and how? How can the
ceasefire hold without a monitoring mechanism? Should the Unite Nations or other
International Mediators such as The Carter Center or any other Third Party would like
to intervene as Maoist want? What would be the response of the government? And
what would be the response of India, China, US, UK and European Union on this
development? These questions are still unanswered as the ceasefire deadline is
closing in.

Though Maoist declared the ceasefire, their intention as mentioned above was mainly
to embarrass the King who has either acquiesce or reject and incur the wrath of the
people and the international community confidence that the could override international
opinion and the feeling of the people who were looking forward to a peaceful festival,
the King apparently chose to reject the ceasefire

The government has time and again rejected to declare ceasefire as they view Maoist
ceasefire as a play and its only a strategy for them to recognize and restructure their
militants to strengthen their power in the future. The Royal Nepal army even clarified
that there has been a sharp rise in the abduction of civilian to recruit them as a Maoist
Combatants and their training activities have been escalated.

6 Conclusion

In my view the triangular balance of power of the King, the Maoist and the Political
Parties is leading the conflict more violent. So the best solution to resolve this conflict
would be holding the trilateral negotiations for a durable and sustainable solution. A
negotiated end to hostilities is dictated by the nature of the conflict itself. The issues
raised below are the major intrinsic dimensions of the political impasses in Nepal,
which together make the crisis highly resistant to non-negotiated solutions.

1. Triangular Conflict:

Most known internal conflicts involve two parties – typically the state and armed
rebels. But in case of Nepal, it is no longer a two way (State v/s Maoist) conflict but
now it turned into three way or Triangular Contest between – the Monarchy, the
Political parties, and the Maoisst. If unilateral victories are hard to come by in pro-
acted two-way contests, they are near impossibilities in triangular conflict there is
no “solution” other than to seek a “resolution”.

2. Constitutional Crisis:

The present constitution is moribund. In the current climate, it is not only the Maoist
but also the mainstream political parties and the member of the civil societies that

24
 see a need to revisit fundamental constitutional issues. Thus, the current dilemma
goes well beyond the Maoist Insurgency and has converted into a full-blown
constitutional crisis. Redesigning the nature of the Nepali polity must not be
conducted in the battlefield rather, it is a task best tackled through talks. Once again
as stated above, there is no “solution” other than seek a “resolution”.

3. Advanced Stage of Insurgency

Guerilla insurgencies are said to progress in four steps. The movement enters the
third stage when it is able to replicate state-like structures and functions in areas
under its sway. The fourth and final stage of the guerilla insurgency is reached
when entire regions come under the active control of rebels. By all accounts,
Nepal’s Maoist insurgency has crossed the third stage and is entering the fourth
stage, making it a politically “dug in” insurgency. The “people’s war” has also found
ways to become economically “dug-in” through a countrywide network that
systematically “mines” public and private assets yielding tens of millions of rupees
each month in unaccounted and discretionary income to the managers of the
“people’s war.” As politically and economically “dug-in” as the Maoist insurgency is,
it is most difficult to foresee any “solution” other than to seek a resolution.

4. External Factors

Internal wars usually have external linkages. Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the
United States were active in Central America and contributed in their own ways to
the intractability of the domestic wars in the region. It is clear by now that although
“Maoists” by name, Nepal’s rebels have deeper and more extensive ties with India
than they have with the Beijing regime. What is not clear is exactly what role official
India plays or does not play in either condoning or curtailing the Maoist insurgency
in Nepal. Complicating this further is the documented alliances that Nepali Maoists
have forged with numerous communist movements in India, making official India’s
involvement or lack thereof somewhat moot. In brief, the “India factor” throws in a
number of imponderables into the mix that together heighten the need to generate a
domestic consensus for a peaceful end to hostilities. Precisely because Nepalis do
not and cannot fully know India’s position, there is no “solution” other than to seek
an internal resolution.

Thus prolonged conflicts have a tendency to create dynamics of various actors own
vested interests which thrive on violence and hence further fuel the conflict while
ordinary people are overwhelmed by a sense of apathy, indifference and helplessness.
Today, Nepalese citizens see their house under fire but are helpless to do anything
about it. Some are busy decorating their drawing rooms, which will perish if the blaze is
not bought under control. The question is how? Can conflict be resolved by force?
Without dialogue, it is difficult to persuade one household, so how can the fire of the
conflict engulfing the whole nation be brought under control by force? Yet, how to
convince those who are used to monopoly over power to share it without the use of

25
violence? How to contain those who are bent on violence, without the use of the force?
These are the complex questions. Only a leadership of wisdom and understanding will
be able to address them. The leadership dilemma and trauma of the people are
complicated by force of globalization and accelerated by the dynamics of time and
technology. In the meantime, Nepal falls deeper into quagmire of conflict and chaos in
which Nepalese only suffer.

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 APPENDIX I

THE 40-POINT DEMAND35

DEMANDS RELATED TO NATIONALISM

1) Regarding the 1950 Treaty between India and Nepal, all unequal stipulations and
agreements should be removed.
2) HMG [His Majesty's Government] should admit that the anti-nationalist Tanakpur
agreement was wrong, and the Mahakali Treaty, incorporating same, should be
nullified.
3) The entire Nepal-Indian border should be controlled and systematised. Cars with
Indian number plates, which are plying the roads of Nepal, should not be allowed.
4) Gurkha recruiting centers should be closed and decent jobs should be arranged
for the recruits.
5) In several areas of Nepal, where foreign technicians are given precedence over
Nepali technicians for certain local jobs, a system of work permits should be
instituted for the foreigners.
6) The monopoly of foreign capital in Nepal's industry, trade and economic sector
should be stopped.
7) Sufficient income should be generated from customs duties for the country's
economic development.
8) The cultural pollution of imperialists and expansionists should be stopped. Hindi
video, cinema, and all kinds of such newspapers and magazines should be
completely stopped. Inside Nepal, import and distribution of vulgar Hindi films, video
cassettes and magazines should be stopped.
9) Regarding NGOs and INGOs: Bribing by imperialists and expansionists in the
name of NGOs and INGOs should be stopped.

DEMANDS RELATED TO THE PUBLIC AND ITS WELL-BEING

1) A new Constitution has to be drafted by the people's elected representatives.
2) All the special rights and privileges of the King and his family should be ended.
3) Army, police and administration should be under the people's control.
4) The Security Act and all other repressive acts should be abolished.

35
Submitted to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba on 4 February 1996 by Dr Baburam Bhattarai on behalf of the
United People's Front Nepal. Available at http://www.insof.org/politics/130299_40demands_Maoist.htm.

27
 5) All the false charges against the people of Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Gorkha,
Kavre, Sindhuphalchowk, Sindhuli, Dhanusha and Ramechap should be
withdrawn and all the people falsely charged should be released.
6) Armed police operations in the different districts should immediately be stopped.
7) Regarding Dilip Chaudhary, Bhuvan Thapa Magar, Prabhakar Subedi and other
people who disappeared from police custody at different times, the government
should constitute a special investigating committee to look into these crimes and
the culprits should be punished and appropriate compensation given to their
families.
8) People who died during the time of the movement should be declared as martyrs
and their families and those who have been wounded and disabled should be given
proper compensation. Strong action should be taken against the killers.
9) Nepal should be declared a secular state.
10) Girls should be given equal property rights to those of their brothers.
1) All kinds of exploitation and prejudice based on caste should be ended. In areas
having a majority of one ethnic group, that group should have autonomy over that
area.
2) The status of dalits as untouchables should be ended and the system of
untouchability should be ended once and for all.
3) All languages should be given equal status. Up until middle-high school level
(uccha-madyamic) arrangements should be made for education to be given in the
children's mother tongue.
4) There should be guarantee of free speech and free press. The
communications media should be completely autonomous.
5) Intellectuals, historians, artists and academicians engaged in other cultural activities
should be guaranteed intellectual freedom.
6) In both the tarai and hilly regions there is prejudice and misunderstanding in
backward areas. This should be ended and the backward areas should be assisted.
Good relations should be established between the villages and the city.
7) Decentralisation in real terms should be applied to local areas, which should
have local rights, autonomy and control over their own resources.

DEMANDS RELATED TO THE PEOPLE'S LIVES

1) Those who cultivate the land should own it. (The tiller should have right to the soil
he/she tills.) The land of rich landlords should be confiscated and distributed to the
homeless and others who have no land.
2) Brokers and commission agents should have their property confiscated and that
money should be invested in industry.

28
3) All should be guaranteed work and should be given a stipend until jobs are
found for them.
4) HMG [His Majesty's Government] should pass strong laws ensuring that people
involved in industry and agriculture should receive minimum wages.
5) The homeless should be given suitable accommodation. Until HMG [His
Majesty's Government] can provide such accommodation they should not be
removed from where they are squatting.
6) Poor farmers should be completely freed from debt. Loans from the Agricultural
Development Bank by poor farmers should be completely written off. Small
industries should be given loans.
7) Fertiliser and seeds should be easily and cheaply available, and the farmers should
be given a proper market price for their production.
8) Flood and drought victims should be given all necessary help
9) All should be given free and scientific medical service and education and education
for profit should be completely stopped.
10) Inflation should be controlled and labourers salaries should be raised in direct
ratio with the rise in prices. Daily essential goods should be made cheap and
easily available.
11) Arrangements should be made for drinking water, good roads, and electricity in
the villages.
12) Cottage and other small industries should be granted special facilities and
protection.
13) Corruption, black marketing, smuggling, bribing, the taking of commissions, etc.
should all be stopped.
14) Orphans, the disabled, the elderly and children should be given help and
protection.

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 APPENDIX II

THE CPN(M) 2003 NEGOTIATING AGENDA36

I. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The goals and objectives of the negotiation between representatives of the old state and
the new state are as follows:
1. To end the present state of conflict through a forward-looking political solution and
establish a lasting peace in the country.
2. To solve the existing class, nationalities, regional, gender and other contradictions
through political, economic and cultural changes. To solve the problems of
nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood and to build a democratic and
prosperous Nepal.
3. To establish a new, strong and democratic national unity and to defend national
independence and sovereignty by upholding democracy and nationalism as
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated ensembles.
4. To ensure the broad human and civic rights of all, particularly the underprivileged
and oppressed groups, and to provide appropriate compensation and
rehabilitation to the victims of the civil war.

II. THE AGENDA OF THE NEGOTIATION

Fundamental Political Agenda

Since the question of state power or the political question is key to all the other problems,
the main agenda of the negotiation must be political, and all the focus has to be placed on
this. For a political solution out of the present crisis, a forward-looking new state system
and a new constitution conforming to it is necessary, and it is so also because the 1990
constitution remains practically dead in the present situation, and there is a constitutional
vacuum in the country. Taking into consideration this ground reality, the procedure of new
constitution formation and the minimum substance for the new constitution must be the
main agenda of the negotiation.

Although the 1990 constitution has some democratic positive features (e.g. multi-party
competition, periodic elections, rule of law, freedom of speech and press, etc.), it has a

36
Extracted from "An Executive Summary of the Proposal Put Forward by CPN (Maoist) for the Negotiations", 27
April 2003, Kathmandu. Available at http://www.insof.org/cpnm/id_cpnm/doc8.html.

30
number of serious faults and inadequacies (e.g. the so-called "unchangeable" features,
the contradiction between the sovereignty and state power, dissolution of "real democracy"
of oppressed classes, nationalities, regions, gender and others in the Anglo-Saxon "formal
democracy", etc.), which have been proved in the last twelve years.
Hence the process of formulation and content of the new constitution has to be definitely
more progressive than this one. In the present context of new balance of political power
created by the new consciousness of the twenty-first century and the seven-year-long
intense civil war, the regressive idea to go back to the system of pre-1990 and the status
quo idea of sticking to the 1990 achievements will not fulfill the new needs of the people
and the country and solve the present crisis. Thus the process of formulation and the
minimum content of the new constitution should be as follows:

(a) The Process or Procedure for the Formulation of a New Constitution

1. A broad round table conference should be organized with the consent of the
revolutionary force and major political parties of the country so as to include all
democratic, patriotic and leftist forces that are recognized among the masses through
struggle.
2. The round table conference should formulate an interim constitution, which will not
curtail the democratic rights guaranteed in the 1990 constitution and will reflect the
new balance of political forces, and an interim government should be formed under
the leadership of the revolutionary force.
3. Elections to a Constituent Assembly with proper representations for various classes,
nationalities, regions, gender and communities should be held within six months
under the leadership of the interim government and the Assembly should formulate
and promulgate the new constitution.

(b) The Minimum Content of the New Constitution

1. The people should be fully sovereign, and state power must be solely in the
hands of the people.
2. There shall be an elected people's representative assembly as the highest
representative institution with proper representation of all classes, nationalities, dalits,
women, linguistic and religious groups, regions and distinguished personalities. All
the bodies of the state will be accountable to this people's representative assembly.
The government will be formed accordingly with proper representation of all.
3. Any provision of the constitution may be amended with either a two-thirds majority
in the people's representative assembly or through a referendum.
4. A unified national army should be created with appropriate structural changes in the
Royal Nepalese Army and the People's Liberation Army, and the army should be
placed under the command of the people's elected representatives.

31
 5. Universal democratic and civic rights including multiparty competition, periodic
elections, universal suffrage, rule of law, freedom of speech and press, fundamental
and human rights, etc. should be guaranteed.
6. All the oppressed nationalities, Madhesis (i.e. plains people) and oppressed
regions of the country should be guaranteed national and regional autonomy
with the right of self-determination.
7. The country should be made fully secular.
8. Education, health and employment should be made fundamental rights of the
people, and free and universal basic education and health services should be
ensured to all.
9. New land relations should be created on the principle of "land to the tiller", and a
judicious redistribution and advanced management of land should be carried out. A
policy of self-reliant national industrialization and protection to national capital and
resources should be followed.
10. All the unequal treaties, including the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty, should be
cancelled and an independent foreign policy on the basis of panchsheel (i.e. five
principles of peaceful co-existence) and nonalignment should be followed. A two-
thirds majority in the house of people's representatives should endorse all the
treaties and agreements with foreign countries.

(c) It is our understanding that all the political forces desirous of finding a solution to the
present crisis through a forward-looking political solution can and must have an agreement
and understanding on the above minimum content of a new constitution. However, since an
unconditional constituent assembly will formulate the new constitution, it won't be
appropriate both theoretically and practically to determine all the features and provisions of
that constitution right now. It is obvious that in addition to the above minimum content of the
new constitution different political forces can go to the people with their own views on
monarchy and other progressive issues and the final verdict of the people would be
acceptable to everybody concerned.

III. NATIONAL AND ECONOMIC/SOCIAL QUESTIONS

1. All the agreements, military assistance, presence and activities of foreign armies etc.,
that are initiated in the pretext of containing terrorism but which will vitiate the
environment for negotiation and which are against the interest of the nation, should
be stopped.
2. Open borders between Nepal and India should be regulated and properly
managed. All forms of intrusions, violations, etc. in the border areas should be
contained. Work permit system should be introduced for foreign employees.
3. The Gurkha recruitment center, which has remained a blot on the nation, should
be abolished and employment should be provided to all the Nepalese within the
country itself.

32
4. Foreign monopoly in the field of industry, commerce and finance should to be
ended. National industries and indigenous entrepreneurs should be protected and
promoted. The country should be totally freed from the vicious circle of foreign debt
within a stipulated time frame.
5. Foreign infiltration and sabotage in the name of NGOs/INGOs should be
stopped. Conditions imposed by the international financial institutions that are
against the national interests should be invalidated.
6. An integrated national water resources policy should be formulated to harness the
immense water resource potential of the country. While according priority to small
and medium hydroelectric projects, the entire country should be electrified within a
stipulated time frame.
7. The landless and poor peasants should be freed of all debts, and employment
should be guaranteed to them.
8. All types of bonded labor system, including kamaiya, harwa, charwa, etc., should
be abolished with a guarantee of employment and settlement. All homeless
persons should be provided with proper housing.
9. There should be cheap and easy access to agricultural inputs like fertilizers,
seeds, etc. and proper extension of irrigation facilities. Appropriate prices and
markets should be provided for agricultural products.
10. Price hikes on petroleum products and other daily necessities should be controlled.
There should be wage hikes of workers and civil servants in proportion to the price
rise.
11. A proper mechanism should be built to award swift and harsh punishment to
those indulging in corruption, smuggling, brokering and profiteering.
12. A national and scientific education system should be introduced. Education should
be employment-oriented. The privatization and commercialization in education
should be stopped forthwith.
13. Universal and free health services should be provided and extended especially
in the rural areas.
14. Rights of the visually impaired, disabled, old, destitute and children should be
guaranteed and special provisions made for their care.
15. All forms of exploitation of women should be ended, and women should be given
equal rights in all fields including parental property. Trafficking of women should be
strictly checked.
16. All types of exploitation and oppression on the dalits including untouchability
should be eliminated, and they should be fully ensured equal rights to live like
others.
17. For the workers, a working time of 40 hours a week and minimum wages should
be fixed, and they should be strictly implemented.

33
 18. For an all-round development of youths, concrete policies should be formulated
and implemented in a planned manner.
19. Academic freedom and professional security of the writers, cultural activists,
intellectuals, doctors, lawyers, media persons, engineers, teachers and others
should be ensured in order to make them dedicated to the country and the people.
20. Import and distribution of vulgar cinemas, videos and printed matter within the
country as a medium of regressive foreign cultural pollution and invasion should be
prohibited.
21. Special plans for the development and extension of infrastructure like drinking
water, bridges, electricity and others in the rural areas should be formulated and
implemented speedily. A national plan for balanced development should be
implemented to eliminate the existing imbalances between rural and urban
areas and between different geographical regions.
22. The rights of the Nepalese working abroad should be protected.
23. Those killed in the course of the people's movement at different times and the
People's War for the cause of the country and people's liberation, should to be
declared martyrs, and the killers must be punished.
24. The just demands put forward by different strata of the people and different class
and mass organizations should be fulfilled forthwith.

IV. THE ISSUES CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS AND IMMEDIATE RELIEF AND REHABILITATION
1. A high level and authoritative commission, with representatives from human rights
organizations, should be constituted to investigate the violation of human rights in
the course of the civil war in an impartial manner, and all the violators must be duly
punished.
2. The families of the martyrs should be provided with immediate relief and proper
compensation.
3. All those wounded in the course of the civil war should be provided free
treatment.
4. All the displaced families during the course of the civil war should be
rehabilitated in their old place or other appropriate places.

V. IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING

All the subject matters agreed between the two parties should be implemented within the
stipulated time, and an impartial monitoring team should be formed to monitor the
implementation of the agreements.

34