Gov’t of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, G.R. No.

153675, April 19,

2007
This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to
a prospective extradite in an extradition proceeding.

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of
Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It
took effect on June 20, 1997.

The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,

represented by the Philippine Department of Justice

The Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan Antonio Muñoz

Facts: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with
three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of
Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also
faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common
law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail
term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a
request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila
issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents
arrested and detained him.

Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing,
Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is
no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high
"flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then
raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by
respondent judge.

Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution
granting bail to a potential extraditee.

Held: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the
issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of
the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive
from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi
of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
Ratio:

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction
must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to
it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential

extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a
crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life,
liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a
certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno, proposed that a new
standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than
proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential
extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk
and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to

show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear
and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and
convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond
and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch.

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

Doctrine: Social Justice

LAUREL, J.:

Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to
the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of
theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are
not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not
only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues:

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions
of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or
trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people?

Held:

1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by
the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare
lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not
be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority
be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies
in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.