Tactical File: Blenheim 1704 • Rhodesia 1966-1980

Number 238

Marlborough
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Spanish Succession

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strategy & tactics 1

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strategy & tactics 3
 contents

Editor-in-Chief: Joseph Miranda

FYI Editor: Ty Bomba
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F E AT U R E S
Map Graphics: Meridian Mapping
Publisher: Christopher Cummins 6 Marlborough’s Art of War
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4 #238
 contents

Number 238
September 2006

F E AT U R E S

40 The Chimurenga War: departments

The Rhodesian Insurgency, 1966-80
Fourteen years of strike and counter-strike in southern 29 for your information
Africa.
The Skull of Sultan Mkwawa
by James Gordon by Brendan Whyte
Not Their Finest Hour—The Royal
Navy’s Efforts in the Pacific War
by Warren Robinson
Turkish Gettysburg—The Battle of
the Sakarya River
by John Osborn
American Ships of the Line
by Mark Lardas

35 The long tradition

38 works in progress
54 Civil War Submarine Operations
Everything you didn’t know about the how and why of
attack subs in the 1860s.
by Carl Otis Schuster

Rules

R1 Marlborough: War of the

Spanish Succession, 1701-04
by Joseph Miranda

strategy & tactics 5

 Marlborough’s Art of War
by Will Stroock

T he Duke of Marlborough fought almost

every kind of battle one can imagine.
At Schellenberg (2 July 1704), his army
stormed and took a heavily fortified hill. At
Blenheim (13 August 1704), he won a set
piece engagement. At Ramillies (23 May 1706), Marl-
borough occupied the central position and shifted his
forces against the enemy’s weak points. The Duke went
from the defensive to the offensive on the field at Oude-
narde (11 July 1708). At the Battle of Malplaquet (11
September 1709), Marlborough’s army smashed into and
triumphed over the French in a bloody frontal assault.
Though on the surface these battles seem different,
Marlborough’s formula for victory remained consistent.
After seizing the tactical initiative, he sought to draw en-
emy attention and infantry reserves away from the cen-
ter of the line by launching sustained attacks against the
flanks. Those attacks were maintained despite heavy ca-
sualties. Once the enemy’s reserves were thus engaged,
he attacked at a decisive point in the center. On breaching
6 #238
the enemy line, Marlborough sent squadrons of cavalry
into the enemy rear area and followed up with more in-
fantry to hold open the breach. That last maneuver would
split the enemy position in two and win the day.
The commanders Marlborough confronted and beat
tended toward caution, and were more concerned with
minimizing risk than winning the day. Marlborough usu-
ally attacked, and even when the enemy started the battle
with the initiative, they quickly lost it. What set Marlbor-
ough apart was his willingness to accept risk in order to
win a decisive victory, and that’s why his battles are so
interesting.
Marlborough Takes Command
The War of the Spanish Succession broke out in 1701,
though Britain did not declare war until the following
year. As usual, the issues were complex, but the basic
reason was France’s King Louis XIV was attempting to
make his kingdom the pre-eminent power on the con-
tinent. In particular, Louis claimed the throne of Spain
for his grandson. That move was opposed by Aus-
tria (sometimes known as the Holy Roman Empire),
which had its own candidate for the throne, and by
Britain and the Dutch United Provinces, who did not
want to see the balance of power upset. Thus was born
the Grand Alliance. The various minor states of Eu-
rope also got involved, with Prussia siding with the
Alliance and Bavaria marching in support of France.
In 1702, London dispatched John Churchill, Duke
of Marlborough, to the United Provinces as command-
er of Anglo-Dutch forces. He had two objectives: the
first was to prevent France from overwhelming the
United Provinces (a French conquest of the Nether-
lands would have been an intolerable threat along the
British Channel), and the second was to support Aus-
tria.
During the first two years of the war, Marlborough
probed south, capturing Cologne and Bonn. The plan
was to cooperate with the armies of Prince Louis of
Baden and Prince Eugene of Savoy. Marlborough was
stopped by the Dutch, who feared that, with the main
field army away to the south, the United Provinces
would be exposed to French attack. So Marlborough
was forced to stay close to the Maas and Scheldt when
he really needed to be campaigning down the Rhine
and along the Danube in support of his Austrian ally.
Realizing disaster awaited the Alliance if he stayed
put, Marlborough resolved to march on the Danube in
1704. Throughout the winter of 1703-1704 representa-
tives of Marlborough and Eugene met and correspond-
ed, settling on a plan for Marlborough to move down
the Rhine to the aid of Imperial forces under Eugene’s
command.
To placate the Dutch, Marlborough brought all
British troops in the Netherlands under his personal
command and detached 70,000 Dutch troops for the
defense of the United Provinces. He then gathered the
rest of his army at Bedberg, 20 miles west of Cologne.
In all, Marlborough’s army totaled 51 infantry battal-
ions (14 British), 90 cavalry squadrons (19 British),
and 38 guns.
Marlborough marched to the Danube, and by 1
July had reached Amerdingen, where he united with
Eugene and Louis of Baden to threaten Donauworth,
15 miles to the east. Taking Donauworth would allow
Marlborough to open a road to Nordlingen while also
threatening Munich and Augsburg.
Defending Amerdingen was the Bavarian Marshal
Count D’Arco with 14,000 men. An assault would be
bloody and a siege prolonged; however, overlooking
the town was the Schellenberg Hill. If it could be tak-
en, Donauworth would be neutralized. Marlborough
therefore resolved to attack. He ordered his army to
storm the Schellenberg, and storm it they did on the
2nd. Donauworth quickly capitulated and the road was
open to Marlborough’s most famous victory.
Blenheim: 13 August 1704
On 12 August 1704, Marlborough linked up with
Prince Eugene’s army. Seeking to keep Marlborough
from advancing farther, Count Camille de Tallard, the
French commander, approached from the west and
menaced Donauworth. Tallard then refused to actu-
ally offer battle; however, Marlborough crossed the
River Lech into Bavaria and ravaged the countryside.
In response, Tallard united with Marshal Marsin and
the Elector of Bavaria, keeping his army between the
Allies and the Danube. Tallard’s combined force num-
bered nearly 60,000 men.
Meanwhile on the 12th, Tallard marched to the vil-
lage of Blenheim, where he encamped. The Franco-
Bavarians took up a strong position with the River
Nebel to the front, the flanks anchored by the villages
of Lutzingen on the left and Blenheim on the right,
and Oberglau a bastion in the center. Marsin and the
Elector commanded the positions between Lutzingen
and Oberglau, Tallard everything to the east. He gar-
risoned Blenheim with nine battalions, supported its
flanks with seven more, and held 11 cavalry squad-
rons in reserve. The Blenheim-Oberglau line was held
by 44 cavalry squadrons with nine infantry battalions
in reserve. Fourteen infantry battalions held Ober-
glau proper. On the left flank, Tallard placed 32 more
squadrons of cavalry under Marsin and another 17 bat-
talion of infantry. In and around Lutzingen, under the
direct command of the Elector, were 51 squadrons of
cavalry. Twelve infantry battalions held the town.
On the morning of 13 August, Marlborough and Eu-
gene advanced south with 52,000 men and 66 guns to
attack the Franco-Bavarian position at Blenheim. The
plan was what was to become vintage Marlborough:
Eugene would assault and pin down enemy forces
west of Oberglau, while Marlborough himself would
attack the left from Oberglau to Blenheim. Marlbor-
ough formed his wing into four lines. Up front were17
infantry battalions to take the right bank of the Nebel,
35 battalions and 36 cavalry squadrons in the second
Marlborough at the Battle of Blenheim.
strategy & tactics 7
 The War of the Spanish Succession Opens
It was the age of kings and dynasties. Europe was domi-
nated in the west by the French Bourbons and in the east by
Austrian Habsburgs. Germany was divided into dozens of
petty monarchies, duchies, and protectorates such as Bavaria,
Baden, Brandenburg, Brunswick, Hanover, the Palatinate and
Württemberg. Prussia was on the northeastern fringe. In Paris,
Louis XIV plotted to dominate the continent; in Vienna, Em-
peror Leopold maintained his realm against the Bourbons in
the west and Ottoman incursions in the east. In London, Queen
Anne had just taken the throne.
When the childless King Charles II of Spain died in 1700,
he left a vacant throne, to which the primary claimant was
Phillip of Anjou, grandson of Louis II of France. Of course, a
Bourbon on the Spanish throne was unacceptable to Habsburg
Austria and France’s perpetual rival, Britain. When Britain de-
clared war on France on 15 May 1702, France and Spain were
aligned against the Grand Alliance: Britain, the United Prov-
inces, Austria, and most of the German states.
Marlborough’s military experience made him the obvious
choice to defend British interests on the continent. A real strug-
gle was expected. In the decades since the Treaty of Westphalia
(1648), French armies and generals had dominated Europe. The
roster of victorious French generals included great captains
such as Prince Louis Conde, Marshal Nicholas Catinat, Duc
Francois Luxembourg, and Viscount Henri Turenne. Under
Louis XIV, French power expanded into the Low Countries, to
the Rhine, and across northern Italy.
The Strategic Situation
As operations commenced in 1703, the French held the up-
per hand, not only in Italy, as Eugene left the area to join allied
forces in south Germany, but along the Danube as well. There
Louis Hector de Villars marched his French army down the riv-
er, linked up with the Elector of Bavaria’s forces and steadily
drove Louis, Prince of Baden, in front of him as he advanced
toward Vienna. Villars, despite his successful operations, was
8 #238
replaced by Marshal Marsin at the end of the year. The French
were now masters of the middle Rhine crossings. They could
threaten Austria and its German allies from Bavaria.
As 1704 began, Marlborough was confronted by Villars
at Antwerp with 10,000 men, Tallard with 30,000 men was at
Strasburg and Kehl, while the Elector of Bavaria and Marsin
had 45,000 men at Ulm. Unless action was taken, Vienna it-
self might fall to the French, freeing the Bourbons to turn their
attention toward the Low Countries, threatening the Channel
ports central to Britain’s defense.
Marlborough’s March to the Danube:
May-June 1704
One of Marlborough’s most astonishing feats was his march
from the Netherlands to the Danube. In three weeks, the Duke
moved his army over 250 miles and put it in position to aid
his German and Austrian allies or to strike at France. For most
of the march, Marlborough’s enemies did not know what he
intended. The march began on 20 May. Marlborough rapidly
moved south, reaching Bonn on the 23rd and Coblenz on the
25th, where he crossed over to the east bank, keeping the Rhine
between him and Tallard. On 7 June, Marlborough crossed the
River Neckar at the town of Ladensburg. From there he moved
south, making as if he were going march on Phillipsburg. In-
stead Marlborough re-crossed the Neckar and on June 10th
marched into Mondelsheim, where he was joined by Eugene
and Louis of Baden. Their combined forces amounted to 40,000
men.
On 27 June, the Allied army reached the Danube town of
Gingen. There it was decided Marlborough and Louis would
move up the Danube, while Eugene would remain in the Gin-
gen area with 30,000 men to prevent Villeroi and Tallard from
marching on Marlborough’s rear. On 2 July, Marlborough
fought the action at the Schellenberg, putting the Allied army in
position for its greatest victory—Blenheim.
strategy & tactics 9

The Siege of Lille: 1708
In a massive operation that involved more than 200,000 men and
took four months to conclude, Marlborough and Eugene invested the
French stronghold of Lille. Known as “Vauban’s masterpiece,” the for-
tress-city was the linchpin of France’s frontier defenses, defended by
Marshall Boufflers’ 16,000 man garrison. In mid-August 1708, Marlbor-
ough and Eugene set up lines of circumvallation and slowly dug trenches
closer and closer to the walls.
In late August, Burgundy and Vendome moved to relieve the French
garrison, but Marlborough brilliantly maneuvered to keep a strong force
between their army and Lille. Even after the city proper was taken on 23
October, Boufflers retreated to the citadel and continued his defiance.
French attempts to interdict Allied communications, and even a coun-
termove against Brussels, failed to divert Marlborough. Boufflers finally
capitulated on 10 December 1708. Over 15,000 Allied casualties were
sustained. Keeping with the spirit of the Age of Reason, Marlborough
and Eugene allowed Boufflers to dictate his own surrender terms.
10 #238
and third lines to press home the main assault, while
the fourth line was composed of 11 infantry battalions
as a reserve. To the left, Marlborough deployed a pow-
erful force under Lord John Cutts and tasked him with
containing the French forces in Blenheim.
Beginning at 8:30 a.m., both sides began pounding
one another with artillery fire. As Eugene moved his
troops forward, Cutts forced his way across the Ne-
bel and took a blocking position in front of Blenheim,
where his men endured heavy sniping and cannon fire.
At about 12:30 p.m., word arrived Eugene had attacked
and pinned down the Bavarian forces east of Ober-
glau. Marlborough sprang into action. To cover his
crossing of the Nebel, he ordered Cutts to send one of
his brigades against Blenheim. So Gen. Rowe person-
ally led his brigade into devastating French fire. Rowe
and a third of his men fell, but his brigade stubbornly
pressed ahead. French cavalry around Blenheim coun-
terattacked, but were driven back. Another effort by
the French horse was stopped by British cavalry north
of the village.
 Then a crisis developed in the Allied
center. The Prince of Holstein-Beck sent
10 infantry battalions in a frontal assault on
Oberglau, which was repulsed with heavy
losses, leaving Marlborough’s center-right
wide open. Marsin charged in with 32 cav-
alry squadrons. Marlborough reacted by or-
dering Eugene to send Fugger’s cuirassiers
to the area and counterattack. As Marsin’s
men attained the south bank of the Nebel,
Fugger cut into their left flank and pushed
them off the river. Holstein-Beck reformed
his infantry and drove the French infantry
back into Oberglau. By 3 p.m. most of the
Franco-Bavarian infantry was holed up in
their village bastions or pinned down by
Eugene. It was time to finish the job.
Marlborough brought his entire center
across the Nebel: 90 squadrons of cavalry
and 23 battalions of infantry. He formed
them into four lines, two of cavalry up front,
two of infantry in the rear. At 4:30 p.m.
Marlborough attacked with his main body.
Several times French volley fire threw back
Marlborough’s horse. Marlborough brought
up his guns and, at close range, they poured
grapeshot into the ranks of the French in-
fantry. This time, under cover of the guns,
Marlborough’s cavalry slammed into the
French cavalry and scattered them, the
French infantry yielding as well.
Believing all to be lost, Marsin and the
Elector withdrew, leaving Tallard to fend
for himself in Blenheim. After being heav-
ily reinforced, Cutts finally forced Tallard
to surrender. Thus ended the battle of Blen-
heim. In all, the allies suffered 4,500 dead and 7,500
wounded, 2,000 of them British. In killed, wounded, Ramillies: 23 May 1706
and missing, the French lost 15,000 men and another While Marlborough would have preferred to relieve
15,000 were taken prisoner. The Allies took 200 flags, pressure on Austria by defeating the French in north It-
50 guns, and the whole baggage train. Notes Phillip J. aly, which was always a campaigning ground, the year
Haythornthwaite: “For the first time in forty years a 1706 once again saw him in Flanders. In May 1706,
major French army had been routed, destroying their Duc Villeroi marched into that area with an army of
reputation of invincibility; Vienna was saved, and 62,000 men and 130 guns. Marlborough had with him
Marlborough’s reputation was assured.” in Maastricht county 60,000 British and Dutch troops
Marlborough triumphed because he split the en- and 130 guns. Not wanting to cede the initiative to Vil-
emy center, compelling the Franco-Bavarian army to leroi, Marlborough broke camp and sought him out.
withdraw or risk being destroyed piecemeal. That was Their vanguards encountered one another in the early
possible only because Eugene vigorously attacked the morning hours of 23 May and both sides deployed for
Franco-Bavarian left, convincing Tallard he was fac- battle.
ing the main thrust. Credit must also be given to Cutts, Facing east and taking the high ground, Villeroi
who endured and then attacked brilliantly on the right. assumed a defensive posture around the town of Ra-
That allowed Marlborough to strike the center. Even millies. He anchored his right flank on the village of
though the going was bloody, Marlborough proved Taviers and his left at the town of Autre-Egtise. Vil-
heedless of his own casualties. While the brunt of the leroi turned Ramillies into a bastion. He deployed his
fighting was born by the infantry, the final blow was cavalry between Taviers and Ramillies and his infan-
delivered by cavalry. try between Ramillies and Autre-Egtise. He placed his

strategy & tactics 11

 Biographies
John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough (1650-1722).
John Churchill was born on or about 5 June 1650 in
Devonshire to a well connected family. Churchill’s mili-
tary apprenticeship came under the legendary Marshal
Turenne, and he was present at the Battles of Sinzheim
(16 June 1674) and Entzheim (4 October 1674). Turenne
is reported to have thought highly of the future gener-
al. Having cut his teeth on a campaign with one of the
military masters of his age, Churchill was deemed fit to
serve in the Duke of York’s regiment. In 1677 he was
appointed colonel.
Later, Churchill was involved in the dispute be-
tween James II and William of Orange, eventually siding
with William of Orange and helping him to seize power.
For his efforts on behalf of William, Churchill was cre-
ated the Earl of Marlborough. Marlborough proved his
loyalty to the new king by defeating the French at the
Battle of Walcourt (25 August 1689). In 1690, Marl-
borough participated in operations against James II in
Ireland, capturing Cork and Kinsale. But those conflicts
were minor compared to the conflict about to engulf Eu-
rope in the War of the Spanish Succession.
He was created a Duke for his handling of Anglo-
Dutch forces in 1702-03, but to his men he was “Cor-
poral John.” Marlborough ensured his troops were well
fed, well armed, and paid on time. They knew him to be
a great general who would not risk their lives without
reason or hope of victory, and they loved him for it.
Louis, Margrave of Baden (1655-1707). Though de-
feated by Villars at the Battle of Friedlingen (2 October
1702), Louis was an experienced and capable general.
He fought against the Turks at Vienna (12 September
1683) and the Siege of Belgrade (11 August-6 Septem-
ber 1688).
John William Friso, Prince of Orange (1686-1711).
After Eugene, the Prince of Orange was Marlborough’s
best ally. In fact, throughout the war, the Dutch Army
was bigger than the British, numbering 119,000 men at
its peak in 1708. William’s troops played a critical role at
Oudenarde, where they overran the French right, and at
Malplaquet they anchored the Allied left. When he was
not leading men in battle, Friso spent his time jockeying
for position to suceed his uncle, William III, as Stadjolder
of Holland. William drowned in July 1711. His son, born
six weeks after his death, became William IV.
Eugene, Prince of Savoy (1663-1736). The son of the
Prince of Savoy-Carignan, Eugene was born in Paris
on 18 October 1663. He was classically educated and
wished only to be a soldier. Unable to attain a military
posting in France, he enlisted in the service of the Aus-
trian Emperor Leopold. Eugene gained much experience
fighting the Turks, where he rode with Sobieski to the
relief of Vienna in 1683. From 1689-1690 he fought in
the Netherlands before getting his first independent com-
mand in Bosnia-Zenta campaign of 1697.
12 #238
When the War of the Spanish Succession broke
out, Eugene was in command of Habsburg forces in Italy
with about 30,000 men. The French sent Louis Joseph,
Duke de Vendome, into Italy with an army of 45,000. An
indecisive battle was fought and the two armies retired
into winter quarters. In 1702, Eugene sparred against
the forces of Vendome and Count Villeroi, culminating
in the Battle of Luzzara (15 August 1702), which was
a draw. Eugene was Marlborough’s most important and
most trusted ally, and he deserves a share of the credit for
all of the Duke’s major victories. [For more on Eugene of
Savoy, see S&T 234.]
Marshal Comte Camille, Duc de Tallard (1652-
1728). A diplomat and marshal of France, Tallard nego-
tiated the treaties that helped bring about the War of the
Spanish Succession. He also commanded French forces
at Blenheim. Had he supported Marsin’s desperate cav-
alry charge, he might have won the day for France. In
1726 he was appointed minister of state.
Louis Joseph, Duc de Vendome (1654-). Vendome
was born in France in 1654. As a youth he served in the
Netherlands, on the Rhine with Marshal Turenne, with
Prince Conde in Flanders, and fought in Catinat’s Ital-
ian campaigns. He had his first independent command
in Spain during the War of the League of Augsburg, and
he captured Barcelona in 1695. He commanded French
forces against Marlborough at Oudenarde, where he
wanted to maintain the initiative and attack, a move
that might have destroyed Marlborough’s forces as they
crossed the Scheldt.
Louis Hector, Duc de Villars (1653-1734). Born to a
French noble family, Villars was a career soldier and dip-
lomat. He participated in the siege of Maastricht (5-30
June 1673), and was on the field at the Battle of Senef (28
August 1674). He went on to become the French king’s
ambassador to Vienna, and then a marshal in France’s war
with the Netherlands. On 2 October 1702, he defeated
Prince Louis of Baden at the battle of Friedlingen. Only
massed British musketry kept French cavalry (valiantly
led by the Duke de Boufflers) from driving a wedge in
the Allied line. While the battle was not a French victory,
the Allies faired little better in its aftermath.
Francois de Neufville, Duc de Villeroi (1644-1730).
Villeroi was born to a noble family with good royal con-
nections. He was a confidante of King Louis XIV and
fought alongside Turenne in Alsace in the Battles of
Enzheim (4 October 1674), Muhlhausen (20 December
1674), and Turckheim (5 January 1675). He led French
forces in Italy at the outbreak of the War of the Spanish
Succession, where he sparred with Eugene. Villeroi may
have been a polished courtier, but he was also a valiant
and gallant solider. He commanded French forces at Ra-
millies.
cavalry reserve behind his line troops on the extreme
right flank. Marlborough took advantage of Villeroi’s
deployment, arraying his forces convexly, so that he
occupied a central position. This allowed him to eas-
ily transfer forces from one sector to another. Marl-
borough placed his cavalry opposite Villeroi’s, his
Dutch infantry in the center, opposite and overlapping
Ramillies, and his British troops on his right. Marl-
borough determined the French right (his own left) to
be the strongest position and therefore the key to the
battle. There is where Marlborough resolved to make
his main attack.
Around noon, the battle began with an artillery bar-
rage. Marlborough’s first move was to send in his Brit-
ish troops against Autre-Egtise, where began a furious
musketry exchange, but that push was just a feint. As
Villeroi sent reserve infantry battalions to shore up his
left flank, Marlborough used the smoke and confusion
to mask the movement of his reserves in support of
his cavalry opposite Taviers. Marlborough then sent
a Dutch force against Taviers and 12 more Dutch bat-
talions against Ramillies.
The Dutch took Taviers, but concentrated attacks
by French household cavalry (Maison du Roi’) opened
a gap. The French heavy horse drove deep into Marl-
borough’s flank and were soon threatening the Dutch
assault on Ramillies.
Once again, Marlborough saved the day. He per-
sonally led a counterattack by 17 squadrons against
the Maison du Roi’s flank and staved off their at-
tack. With the French drive in the center halted, Al-
lied troops worked around the Maison du Roi’s flanks.
Marlborough then pressed home his infantry attacks
and seized the high ground around Ramillies. But Vil-
leroi was not yet ready to concede defeat, and tried to
form a new line on Ramillies and Autre-Egtise. Marl-
borough gave the French no respite, taking Ramillies,
securing his left flank for a further assault. From there,
Marlborough ordered a general advance, which swept
into Autre-Egtise. With no bastions left to hold, the
French army disintegrated, losing 7,000 killed and
wounded and 6,000 prisoners. Marlborough’s casual-
ties amounted to 1,000 dead and 3,000 wounded.
Marlborough’s formula worked even better at Ra-
millies because Villeroi’s deployment allowed the
allies to occupy a central position. As a result, Marl-
borough could more easily transfer reserves from one
front to another. Careful but stalwart action was neces-
sary from Eugene, who never wavered on the Allied
right. Next, the cavalry blunted a French counterat-
tack, preparing the way for Marlborough’s final move.
Once again the enemy was drawn away from the cen-
ter; Marlborough’s infantry forced an opening, and the
cavalry tore into the breach.
Oudenarde: 11 July 1708
During the late spring of 1708, a surprise French
offensive into Flanders caught Marlborough off guard.
Nominally under the Duke of Burgundy, but in actual-
ity commanded by Duc Vendome, the French Army
numbered 100,000 men. When the French crossed the
border, Marlborough was near Brussels with a force of
65,000 British, Dutch, Danish, Hanoverian and Prus-
sian troops, and 113 guns. On hearing of the invasion,
and suspecting the loyalty of the garrison at Antwerp,
Marlborough wasted no time, broke camp and placed
his army between Vendome and Antwerp. The French
marched deeper into Flanders, arriving a few miles
east of Marlborough’s position at Hal. Little happened
because the Duke of Burgundy was overly cautious,
and Marlborough was waiting for Eugene, who was
hundreds of miles away having recently defeated the
French at Turin.
For once, Marlborough did not hold the initiative.
With Vendome threatening communications along the
Scheldt near Oudenarde, Marlborough had no choice
but to seek battle. The French probably could have
taken Oudenarde by storm, but Burgundy was unsure
about attacking. Instead, the French besieged the for-
tress. That gave Marlborough precious time. Eugene
rode ahead of his army, still several days away from
Marlborough, and joined the Duke outside Brussels.
Another great march was in order. Marlborough sent
a strong detachment of infantry and cavalry under
William Cadogan ahead of his main body. Cadogan’s
force scouted ahead, determined the army’s path, and
bridged the River Dender at Lessines, which Marlbor-
ough crossed 11 July. Marlborough had covered 60
miles in 48 hours and was in position to bridge the
Scheldt, cross it, and do battle with Vendome outside
of Oudenarde.
strategy & tactics 13
 Military Organization
Infantry
The basic tactical unit during the War of the Spanish
Succession was the regiment. British regiments rarely boast-
ed more than a single battalion. Battalions were divided
into companies. Companies were further broken down into
platoons for fire. Officially a British company had 60 men,
though that number varied greatly. A captain usually com-
manded a company, followed in the chain of command by a
lieutenant, an ensign, and two sergeants. Thirteen companies
combined to form a regiment of 780-930 men. One of the
companies was called the grenadiers. Originally, they were
troops trained to throw hand grenades, but by this time they
were made up of the picked men of the company and used as
elite infantry.
The French also made use of the regimental system,
though many of their regiments contained two battalions of
13 companies each. For instance, in 1716 a total of 98 French
regiments had between them 154 battalions. Exact numbers
for any given unit are difficult to pinpoint, but French battal-
ions tended to be weaker than their British counterparts. One
French document lists the official strength of one battalion
as 690 officers and men and, of those, only 550 were actually
present. That is not the only French variation. Swiss battal-
ions in the French Army (recruited from French speaking
districts) were divided into three companies of 200 men.
Cavalry
Cavalry was used by both sides in the war to scout,
screen advancing infantry, and deliver the decisive blow in
battle. General British practice was to trot toward the enemy,
gradually speed up until the last 20-30 paces, and then gallop
the rest of the distance. That preserved the horses’s energy
and maximized shock. French cavalry was still making use
of the caracole, whereby cavalry would gallop towards the
enemy, discharge their pistols and carbines, then ride away,
though they were quite capable of massed shock action.
Cavalry equipment during the War of the Spanish Suc-
cession varied from unit to
unit. Heavy cavalry, some-
times called cuirassiers, usu-
ally wore some kind of body
armor. The heavies carried
a combination of sword and
pistol, and maybe a carbine.
Light cavalry were used as
scouts and foragers, and thus
14 #238
had lighter equipment than their heavy counterparts. Dragoons start-
ed as mounted infantry, but by this time were becoming a form of
medium cavalry. Incidentally, the British army termed much of its
cavalry “dragoons,” on the grounds a dragoon was paid less than a
regular horseman.
British cavalry organization was ad hoc, differing greatly from
unit to unit. That held throughout the war but, as a general rule, one
can assume the strength of a squadron of British cavalry fell some-
where between 40-60 officers and men. Allied unit organization was
similarly chaotic. French cavalry was organized into regiments, and
deployed on the field in squadrons. Squadrons were generally com-
posed of four companies of about 40 officers and men.
Artillery
Artillery was usually deployed up front with the first line of in-
fantry, where they could engage enemy batteries, soften up enemy
positions, and repel enemy attacks. Guns tended to be scattered up
and down the line, rather then be massed in a grand battery. Solid
shot was used to engage enemy artillery and to bombard fortifi-
cations, usually at a range of 600 paces. Case shot was employed
against infantry and cavalry at 300 paces or less.
The size of British, Allied and French artillery trains varied from
battle to battle and campaign to campaign. During the War of the
Spanish Succession it was generally assumed an army of 50,000 men
ought to have four 34-pound guns, six 12-pounders, 20 four-pound-
ers, and 20 eight-pounders. That was about one gun for every 1,000
men. In 1708, Marlborough’s army had with it 80 heavy guns, 20
siege mortars, 3,000 wagons, and over 16,000 horses to pull it all. At
Ramillies, Marlborough had 120 guns of all types, and he possessed
similar numbers at Oudenarde and Malplaquet, while the French
brought to the field 70 and 60 guns at Ramillies and Malplaquet,
respectively, and had an unknown number at Oudenarde.
The Brown Bess Musket & the Socket Bayonet
Toward the end of the 17th century, the flintlock musket
began to replace the matchlock. The flintlock, or firelock,
used a cock that snapped onto a flint, causing sparks to show-
er over the priming pan. The flintlock was much lighter than
the matchlock, and needed no stand to hold up the barrel. The
most famous flintlock was the British “Brown Bess,” intro-
duced in 1682. Also called “Her Majesty’s Musket” and the
“Tower Musket,” the Brown Bess had a barrel from 42 to 46
inches long and fired a .76 caliber round.
The Brown Bess was not much more accurate and had
little more range than the matchlock. Said one historian: “At
forty yards it could hit a foot-square target almost every time,
but at three hundred yards only one bullet out of twenty would
hit a target eighteen feet square.” But it was easy to load and
fire, and massed fire with it proved deadly.
Most infantry still carried a sword. They was used on oc-
casion for melee actions, though at least one commentator
noted the blades were retained largely out of a sense of honor.
The real problem was how to prevent enemy cavalry from
breaking into infantry formations. Until the late 17th century,
most armies still maintained small contingents of pikemen
in their infantry battalions. They were used mainly to pro-
tect musketeers from cavalry charges, but the invention of the
bayonet caused the pike to fall into disuse.
At first, most bayonets were of the plug variety; that is,
they had to be inserted into the barrel of the musket, thereby
rendering it incapable of fire. But the socket bayonet had a
ring that could be placed around the barrel, and a socket that
fixed it in place. So the soldier could fix his bayonet and still
fire. The invention of the socket bayonet spelled the end of
pikemen. Now infantry could fire off a volley and then close
up with bayonets fixed to ward off charging cavalry.
Infantry Formations
British and Dutch troops deployed three ranks deep, pre-
senting a frontage of 810 feet, so 260 muskets were pointed
at the enemy. The regiment was divided into four divisions
which were then broken down into four platoons. The pla-
toons were divided into three “firings.” The firings alternated,
producing a rolling volley and maintaining pressure on the
enemy line. Platoon fire could take advantage of the gaps in
the prodigious amount of smoke produced by black powder
muskets and cannon, since the men could see the target at
which they were firing.
French battalions deployed four or five ranks deep, with
intervals of four paces between men, presenting a frontage of
about 486 feet, 20 paces deep. That allowed only 162 muskets
to be pointed at the enemy. When firing, the front rank would
kneel, the second rank crouched, and the third stood, leav-
ing the fourth and sometimes fifth, out of the fray. Muskets
were fired by ranks, so the first would fire then reload as the
second fired, and so on. The French system resulted in a more
dispersed impact on the enemy line, while the platoon system
concentrated more fire at a single point. In battle, the British
system usually seemed to work better.
North of the Scheldt, from west to east, lay the
towns of Oycke, Eyne, and Heurne. Oycke lay on high
ground, while Eyne and Heurne each occupied rough,
wooded terrain. North of the towns lay the River Nor-
ken behind which was a hill and a ridge extending to
the east. It was between the Scheldt and the Norken
the struggle for Oudenarde was waged.
As Marlborough’s vanguard crossed the Scheldt
and made for the high ground above the river, Bur-
gundy reacted indecisively, fearing a general engage-
ment. Marlborough used his reprieve to push as many
men across the river as possible. By noon, Cadogan
had gotten 12 infantry battalions and three regiments
of horse across and was feeling his way left when he
encountered a French contingent.
As the battle developed, Vendome deployed his
80,000 men on the high ground behind the River Nor-
ken. Again, Burgundy waited for Marlborough. The
French van encountered Cadogan’s battalions, who
prevailed in a swift firefight for the village of Eyne.
From Eyne, Cadogan pushed along the Scheldt toward
the village of Huerne, clearing the enemy out of the
woods and brush along the way. Following up Cado-
gan was the Prussian horse, which took up position on
the left. In the center, Marlborough placed 22 infantry
battalions in the town of Schaerken.
Before Marlborough could properly deploy his
army, 30 French and Swiss Guards battalions struck his
center at Groemvelde. That powerful thrust dispatched
opposing Allied forces and pushed toward the Scheldt.
Marlborough reinforced Eugene with 20 infantry bat-
talions, which the prince desperately needed to stem
the French tide between Groemvelde and Schaerken.
Then Marlborough led some Dutch and Hanoverian
battalions in a push west of Schaerken.
After Eugene threw in reinforcements his situation
stabilized, smashing two waves of French Infantry. To
the left of Schaerken, Marlborough drove his Dutch
and Hanoverian troops through the rough terrain and,
in savage hand to hand fighting, compelled the French
infantry to retreat. Spying open high ground on his left
around the town of Oycke, Marlborough dispatched
Overkirk’s cavalry with the task of turning the French
right. Marlborough backed him up with 20 battalions
of Dutch infantry. Overkirk gained the flank and the
Dutch, commanded by the Prince of Orange, steadily
gained ground and pushed into the French rear. On the
allied right, Eugene met with similar success, pushed
around Herlegem, and worked his way behind the
French left. The allies then swung forward into a huge
semicircle, driving the French before them at every
point.
Vendome tried to stop the unfolding catastrophe by
throwing all of his reserve infantry into an all-out at-
tack against Eugene, but the Prince held his ground.
By then the French were in no condition to continue
strategy & tactics 15
 the fight and so melted away in the darkness. They lost
3,000 killed, 4,000 wounded, and 9,000 prisoners. The
Allies lost 3,000 killed and 2,500 wounded, while cap-
turing 100 French standards.
At Oudenarde, Marlborough began on the defen-
sive. Once he ascertained Vendome’s intentions, he
gave Eugene the troops he needed to wear out and pin
the French attack. Then he took the initiative. That
time roles were reversed, as Orkney’s horse carved a
path around the flank and Marlborough used his Dutch
and Hanoverian infantry to collapse the French right.
That also shows Marlborough’s flexibility: rather than
press the center as usual, when he found weakness on
the enemy’s right, he exploited it.
Malplaquet: 11 September 1709
After Oudenarde the Allies took Lille, Ghent, and
Bruges, opening the way for an offensive against
France’s frontier fortifications. With a combined army
of 110,000 men, Marlborough and Eugene began of-
fensive operations in late June of 1709, with the ob-
ject of piercing France’s frontier fortifications, thereby
threatening a push into the interior. Marlborough and
Eugene took Tournai and then moved against Mons,
the right anchor of France’s frontier defenses. Fearing
the Allies would roll up the frontier, Villars, who now
commanded the French Army, decided to give battle.
He concentrated his army and marched against Marl-
16 #238
borough and Eugene, arriving in the vicinity of Mons
in early September. There he assumed a defensive pos-
ture on high ground to the southeast at Malplaquet.
Marlborough left a small force to blockade Mons and
marched south to engage.
Villars anchored his left flank on the town of La
Folie, in front of which was the Wood of Sars. The
Woods of Lainieres protected his right flank. In be-
tween the woods, Villars arrayed 130 infantry bat-
talions behind strong fortifications. His 260 cavalry
squadrons where deployed behind La Folie, and in
reserve behind the center, Eugene advanced on the
Allied right, commanding Habsburg and other Allied
forces. Marlborough commanded the left, his British
troops in the center. His Hanoverian battalions, and the
Dutch under William of Orange’s personal command,
held the extreme left. As usual, holding attacks were
launched against the flanks to pin down infantry and
draw in reserves while the main blow was delivered in
the center.
An artillery barrage began the battle at 7:30 a.m.
The Prince of Orange was to wait 30 minutes before
starting his attack against the French in the Wood of
Lanieres, but Eugene’s German commanders were ea-
ger and advanced prematurely against French forces in
the Wood of Taisnieres. After much seesaw fighting,
the French stopped the allied advance. Consequently,
Lord Orkney’s 15 battalions pressed ahead unsup- combination of pinning attacks and cavalry charges
ported and with their right flank dangerously exposed. were standard tactics in the British and French Armies.
Meanwhile the Prince of Orange engaged in a fero- Marlborough was flexible on the battlefield. He didn’t
cious struggle on the right and was stopped by Bouf- insist the infantry always clear the way for the cavalry;
flers. Marlborough stabilized the flank by sending his sometimes the horse did so for the foot. Nor were his
Hanoverian battalions into the fight. attacks thrown into chaos by enemy counterattacks. He
At the same time, Villars was determined to take dealt with the problem and moved on. If a flank was
the offensive on his left, believing the key to the battle not secured right away, Marlborough chipped away at
lay there. Villars reinforced his left at the expense of the enemy until it was.
the center and pushed hard against Eugene’s forces. It must be remembered a good deal of the credit
Marlborough and Eugene perceived Villars’s weak- for Marlborough’s victories goes to Prince Eugene.
ened center and acted. Eugene fought hard to hold the It’s also a credit to Marlborough that he knew how to
French and draw in even more troops. work alongside a great captain such as the Prince. Still,
Meanwhile, Marlborough sent forward Orkney’s Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet are
battalions and, after a fierce struggle, seized the battles that belong to the Duke. His formula, his flex-
center works. With the way open, Marlborough’s re- ibility, and his iron will make Marlborough one of the
maining cavalry charged into the breach and wrought greatest general of the age of battles.
havoc in the enemy rear. But the cavalry was eventu-
ally repulsed when Boufflers counterattacked from the
French right. Boufflers was un turn stopped dead in his
tracks when he ran afoul of Orkney’s battalions. Bouf-
flers reformed and hit Orkney again and again until
Marlborough brought up his reserve horse and finally
drove off the exhausted French. That last move ended
the battle, the bloodiest fight of Marlborough’s career.
The Allies took 20,000 casualties, the French 14,000.
Little happened in the aftermath of the battle.
French forces withdrew behind their fortifications,
leaving Marlborough and Eugene to besiege Mons.
Operations began on 25 September, and by 9 October
the Allies took Mons’s outworks. Mons proper capitu-
lated on 26 October, but the casualties sustained in the
campaign made it impossible to advance farther.
Malplaquet was the last of Marlborough’s great
battles. It was a bloody holocaust that required the use
of every resource at hand. After the initial setbacks,
Eugene struck the right and maintained his left through
combined infantry and cavalry counterattacks. Once
more Marlborough pinned the French right and then
pierced the center with infantry and cavalry. British
musketry stopped Boufflers from breaking Marlbor-
References
ough’s string of victories. Brodie, Bernard and Fawn F. From Crossbow to H Bomb. (Bloomington: Indiana
Endgame University Press, 1973)
Chandler, David. Atlas of Military Strategy: The Art, Theory and Practice of War
The events of the campaigns of 1710 and 1711 1618-1878. (London: Arms & Armour Press, 2000)
are minor in comparison to Marlborough’s previous Chandler, David. The Art of War in the Age of Marlborough. (Kent: Spellmount
deeds. During that time, Marlborough fell out of fa- Ltd, 1997)
vor with the queen and the Tory politicians who had Churchill, Winston. Marlborough, His Life and Times. (New York: Charles
gained power in the Parliamentary elections. The Scribner’s Sons, 1968)
Duke was cast aside at the end of 1711, and remained Dodge, Theodore Ayrault. Gustavus Adolphus. (New York: Da Capo, 1998)
embittered about his dismissal until the end of his life Fuller, JFC. A Military History of the Western World, Vol. II. (New York: Da
Capo, 1955)
in June 1722. In 1713 the Treaty of Utrecht concluded
Haythornthwaite, Philip J. Invincible Generals. (New York: Da Capo, 1994)
the War of the Spanish Succession and maintained the
Israel, Jonathan I. The Dutch Republic: Its Ride, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806.
balance of power against France. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998)
Not until Napoleon and Wellington would there Weigley, Russel F. The Age of Battles. (Bloomington &Indianapolis, Indiana
again be a general of the caliber of the Duke of Marl- University Press, 1991)
borough. By the Napoleonic Wars, Marlborough’s
strategy & tactics 17
 Der Weltkrieg Series
The Western Front: ITALIAN FRONT: 1915-1918
This wargame contains five separate scenarios, and can be linked
1914-1918 with East Front (and later West Front) games of the series for
The Western Front: 1914-1918, contains duration games.
six scenarios, each covering a major WWI
campaign fought in France or Belgium.
May 1915: 1st Isonzo
It can also be played as a start-to-finish The first battles along the Isonzo are a futile foreshadowing
simulation of the entire western front, or of what is to come.
linked with other games in the series into a May 1916: Strafexpedition
grand-campaign covering all the European   The Chief of Staff of the Austro Hungarian army, Conrad von
fronts. The scenarios are: “August 1914: Hotzendorff, feels the time is right to strike a blow against Italy.
The Schlieffen Plan;” “May 1915: Ypres;” He ignores the advice of German Chief of staff von Falkenhayn,
“February 1916: Verdun;” “July 1916: The Somme;” “April 1917: who sees the main threat coming from the Russian front.
Nivelle’s Offensive;” “March 1918: The Kaiser’s Battle.”
The Italians in the southern Tyrol have neglected their rear area
Components: one 22” x 34” mapsheet, 1,680 die-cut counters, standard and
scenario books, corps displays, and player aid cards.
defenses. That, and the fury of the Austro-Hungarian attack, puts
$69. 95 the Italian army in peril. Cadorna, its commanding general, rushes
The Schlieffen Plan reinforcements to the front. It is a dicey affair, but the Italian lines
This game covers the fluid warfare of the western front from 1 August hold; the threat along the Isonzo is checked.
to 15 November 1914. You assume the role of commander of either the May 1917: 10th Isonzo
German or Allied armies. The forces available to you are the same as those   In endless offensives, valiant Italian infantry go over the top
commanded by the historic participants, but it is up to you to make your and into the maelstrom of the Isonzo. Each battle differs from the
own strategic decisions and execute your own plans as you see fit. last only by its increasing intensity and skyrocketing casualty list.
Components: one 22 x 34 inch mapsheet, a rule book and player aid cards, 560 In the end, both armies are exhausted. The Italians have become
die-cut counters and one die. weary of the war, but the Austrians believe one more effort on the
$39.95 Isonzo can break through.
Tannenberg & Galicia October 1917: Caporreto
This is a division/brigade level WW1 game that covers the campaign in   When the Central Powers strike, they break through the Italian
East Prussia and southern Poland in 1914. You assume the role of the lines along the headwaters of the Isonzo. German and Austrian units
commander of either the German or Allied armies. The forces available pour through the mountain passes and into the Italian rear areas.
to you are the same ones commanded by Caporreto is an overwhelming victory for Germany and Austria;
the historic participants. but Italy is not fully defeated, and her citizens rally.
Components: 560 counters, two 22x 34” map- June 1918: Albrecht & Radetzky
sheets, player aid cards, standard and scenario Conrad’s attacks across the Piave are initially successful, but
rule books.
his divisions then bog down. The Austrians are unable to push their
$39.95 bridgeheads far enough forward to keep their pontoon bridges out
of range of Italian artillery. Unable to reinforce their spearheads
Serbia & Romania or maintain viable supply lines, the Austro-Hungarian armies fall
Covers the World War I campaigns in back, awaiting the inevitable Italian counterattack.
Serbia and Romania with links between Components: one 22” x 34” mapsheet, 560 die-cut counters, standard and
the two campaigns as well as to the previ- scenario books, player aid cards.
ous volumes. $39. 95
Components: two 22x 34” mapsheets, one
11x17” mapsheet, 560 die-cut counters, standard
and scenario rule books, player aid cards.

$39.95
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18 #238
 Relive the glory and
fight the campaigns of Marlborough.

Marlborough: War of the Spanish Succession (“Marby,”
for short), is a wargame of intermediate-to-high complexity,
designed by Joseph Miranda, simulating that critical conflict
of the early 18th century. The dynastic struggle began when
France’s Louis XIV attempted to place his grandson, Philip
IV, on the throne of Spain. The other major powers saw that
as a threat, and so supported their own candidate, Charles
III. That in turn began over a decade of fighting that grew
into a general struggle for domination over all of western
Europe
Marby is a two player game. One controls the forces of
France and its allies, known as the Bourbon coalition, af-
ter the ruling house of France. The other player controls the
forces opposing France, led by England and Austria and
known as the Grand Alliance. Each player has a variety of
military, diplomatic and economic instruments with which
he can attempt to win the game by controlling states and
economic centers.
The game includes several scenarios. Shorter scenarios
represent critical parts of the war, while the “Grand Design”
scenario covers the entire war. Each game turn represents
one year; each hex scales to 50 miles. Each army represents
10,000 to 20,000 soldiers and support personnel, camp fol-
lowers, etc. A leader represents that person plus his guards,
entourage, lackeys, wine cellars, etc. A fleet represents 60
warships and an indeterminate number of transports.

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strategy & tactics 19
 TACTICAL FILE:
The Famous Victory: Blenheim, 13 August 1704
by David R. Higgins

August 13, 1704 0800

Midnight
Marlborough’s and Eugene’s army advances toward Blenheim
in eight columns.
0600
Tallard idles, believing an outmaneuvered Marlborough will
avoid contact and veer north toward his Nördlingen supply base.
When the allied army continues forward French forward units set
fire to Unterglauheim, Weilheim, and Schwenenbach and with-
draw.
0700
The Allies push Tallard’s pickets behind the Nebel River and
establish fascine crossings and five pontoon bridges.
20 #238
The Allies arrange for battle and their surprised opponents
retain their disadvantageous deployment of cavalry in the center
flanked by infantry.
0830
French artillery opens fire, but receives no Allied reply until
0900.
1000
British general Cutts’ reinforcing ninth column drives enemy
pickets from the Nebel and establishes crossing points.
1230
With Eugène finally in position Marlborough initiates the bat-
tle by unleashing Cutts towards the fortified town of Blenheim.
1300
Cutts advances to within 300 meters of Blenheim, but
devastating musket and artillery fire halts his lead brigade.
Three French gendarmes squadrons counterattack and the
British vanguard hastily forms a square. The second British
brigade disperses the enemy cavalry while the third unsuc-
cessfully advances along the Danube.
To the north Eugène’s Imperial cavalry advance as part
of an overall attempt to keep the Elector’s and Marsin’s su-
perior forces occupied and unable to support Tallard. The
attack breaks through the first enemy cavalry line, but is re-
buffed by a second that leaves Eugène’s Prussian and Danish
infantry unsupported. As a Bavarian 16-gun battery pounds
Eugène’s units he enacts a relief force and pulls all his units
back to their initial positions.
1330
Marlborough attempts to control his southern flank and
orders Palmes’ squadrons across the Nebel to support Cutts.
The remaining gendarmes join their comrades and attempt
to encircle the British squadrons, but the French are instead
encircled and dispersed. Palmes pursues the French horse
behind the Weiherbrunn River, but is stopped by the French
Royal Regiment’s intervention. British artillery fires sup-
porting “partridge shot” and the sector stabilizes.
1430
Cutts’ aggressive posture unnerves his adversary,
Clérambault, who orders eleven battalions into an increas-
ingly crowded Blenheim. Tallard neglects to correct the mis-
judgment and his fragmented center is stripped of much vital
infantry support.
With Blenheim satisfactorily contained Marlborough
looks to his right flank at Oberglauheim. Holstein-Beck
rushes the reinforced town with ten battalions and is rudely
met by nine enemy battalions under De Rosel. French cav-
alry swoops in to smash Beynheim’s and Goor’s leading Al-
lied battalions and supporting squadrons and threatens to tear
open Eugène’s left flank. Marlborough personally intervenes
ordering three of Berendorff’s battalions, some of Averoch’s
squadrons, and an artillery battery into the threatened area.
Fugger’s Imperial Cuirassiers join the concentrated Allied
counterattack and the Franco-Bavarians withdraw toward
the town.
1600
With fourteen cannons Prussian and Danish infantry
advance 3.5 kilometers to Lutzingenheim’s outskirts and
overrun six enemy guns. French cavalry steadily outflanks
Eugène’s foray and he is repulsed for a third time.
1630
Tallard’s first line cavalry stymies Marlborough’s lead
cavalry, but Allied infantry soon alleviates the problem.
1700
Marlborough initiates his planned, decisive thrust into the
French center with his two fresh cavalry lines now forward
with the two infantry lines in support. The allied squadrons
advance at a cohesion-retaining trot and only withdraw be-
hind friendly infantry to better resist opposing cavalry. Tal-
lard’s position offers declining resistance as his infantry and
cavalry are steadily separated by devastating grapeshot and
disciplined British musketry. The French army soon breaks,
retreating toward Höchstädt and Sonderheim with thirty
squadrons under Hompesch and the remainder with Marl-
borough offering pursuit, respectively. Thirty French squad-
rons attempt to cross the Danube near a pontoon bridge and
many troopers drown amid the chaos.
Marsin and the Elector see the routed French forces and
abandon their artillery and flee ahead of a cavalry rearguard.
Eugène’s exhausted cavalry follows, but falters when Marl-
borough’s lead squadrons are mistaken for the enemy.
1900
The still-sizeable French force at Blenheim unsettles the
Allies who bolster the sector with cannon and howitzer-sup-
ported infantry. The French attempt several uncoordinated
breakouts, but the hopelessness of their situation eventually
prompts their surrender and an end to Louis XIV’s fifty year
run of military success.

1530
With Oberglauheim and Blenheim unable to intervene,
Marlborough thrusts his first line infantry and second line
cavalry across the Nebel toward Tallard’s weakened center.
Determined infantry and artillery fire from Blenheim ham-
pers the steady Allied advance, but Bothmer, Viller, and one
squadron from Bülow peel off to deal with it.
Eugène attempts a second general assault, but is again
driven back with his cavalry refusing further action.

strategy & tactics 21

 The numbers in the left column correspond to the formations on
the map.
Battle Date: August 13, 1704
Result: Allied Victory
Weather: Morning fog, sunny
Sunrise: 0607 Sunset: 2037
Terrain: Flat plain of standing corn between Oberglauheim
and Blenheim while marshy north of Oberglauheim and near
Danube
ALLIED:
Marlborough: 48 Battalions (24,847), 8 six squadrons
(12,407)
Eugène: 18 Battalions (9,477), 9two squadrons (8,360)
Total: 55,091 in 6six squadrons (34,324)/178 Squadrons
(20,767)
Casualties: 6,000 KIA, 8,000 WIA
Artillery: 60 (Col. Holcroft Blood)
Left: Cutts support with three Batteries of ten Sakers and
one Howitzer Battery (4 Howitzers)
Center: Oberglauheim support with six Demi-Culverin
General: twenty-four x 3pounders
Right: Eugène support with sixteen x 3pounders
Capt-Gen. John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough, KG
(C-in-C) (48 battallions 8six squadrons)
Blenheim Column 17 squadrons (2,509)/20 battalions
(9,898)
Infantry: (Lt-Gen. John, 1st Baron Cutts of Gowran (3rd in
command) (20 battalions)
1. 1st Line: Rowe’s Brigade (Brig-Gen. Archibald Rowe)
(five battalions) (2,837)
Sir William Clifton’s Regiment of Foot (Lt-Gen. Hon. Em-
manuel Scrope Howe) (England) one battalion (584)
The Welch Regiment of Fusiliers (Lt-Gen. (General of Foot)
Richard Ingoldsby) (England) one battalion (520)
Sir Edward Dering’s Regiment of Foot (Capt-Gen. John
Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough) (England) one bat-
talion (524)
Scots Fusiliers (21st Foot) (Brig-Gen. Archibald Rowe)
(England) one battalion (629)
The Earl of Bath’s Regiment (of Foot) (Lt-Gen. William, 6th
Baron North & Grey) (England) one battalion (580)
2. 2nd Line: Wilkes’ Brigade (Maj-Gen. Wilkes) (five battal-
ions) (2,000)
Prinz Wilhelm Infantry Regiment (Hesse-Kassel) one bat-
talion (400)
Erbprinz von Hesse-Kassel Infantry Regiment (Prinz Fried-
rich Heiden von Hesse-Kassel (‘Alt Heiden’) TB (Hesse-
Kassel) one battalion (400)
Hessian Grenadier(s) Infantry Regiment (Hesse-Kassel) one
battalion (400)
Hessian Guard (Leibregiment) Infantry Regiment (Hesse-
Kassel) one battalion (400)
Wartensleben Infantry Regiment (Alexander Hermann, Graf
von Wartensleben) (Hesse-Kassel) one battalion (400)
3. 3rd Line Ferguson’s Brigade (Brig-Gen. James Ferguson)
(five battalions) (3,061)
22 #238
Archibald Douglas’ Regiment of Foot (Col. James (Stanley),
10th Earl of Derby) (England) one battalion (663)
Earl of Angus’s Regiment (of Foot) (Brig-Gen. James Fergu-
son) (England) one battalion (653)
Royal Regiment of Ireland (Maj-Gen. Frederick Hamilton)
(England) one battalion (579)
2/His Majesty’s Royal Regiment of Foot (Lt-Gen. Lord George
Hamilton, 1st Earl of Orkney) (England) one battalion (577)
1st Regiment of Foot Guards (Capt-Gen. John Churchill, 1st
Duke of Marlborough) (England) one battalion (589)
4. 4th Line: St. Paul’s Brigade (Maj-Gen. St. Paul) + Hulsen’s
Brigade (Brig-Gen. Hulsen) (five battalions) (2,000)
de Luc (Maj-Gen. de Luc) Infantry Regiment (Lüneburg-Celle)
one battalion (400)
de Breuil Infantry Regiment (Hanover) (Lüneburg-Celle) one
battalion (400)
Gauvin Infantry Regiment (Gauvin) (Hanover) one battalion
(400)
Hanoverian Guard Infantry Regiment (1/ Lüneburg-Celle, 2/
Hanover-Calenburg) two battalions (800) (Not committed)
Cavalry Support: (Lt-Gen. Hon. Henry Lumley) (17 squad-
rons) (2,509)
5. 1st Line: Palmes’ Brigade (Brig-Gen. Palmes) (5 squadrons)
(736)
2/Earl of Plymouth’s Regiment of Horse (4th Horse) (Maj-Gen.
Cornelius Wood) (England) one squadron (155)
The Queen Dowager’s Regiment of Horse (9th Horse) (Lt-Gen.
Hugh Wyndham) (England) two squadrons (311)
Lord Cavendish’s Regiment of Horse (8th Horse) (Meinhardt,
3rd Duke of Schomberg (Duke of Leinster)) (England) two
squadrons (270)
6. 1st Line: Wood’s Brigade (Maj-Gen. Cornelius Wood) (five
squadrons) (789)
The Queen’s Regiment of Horse (2nd Horse) (Lt-Gen. Henry
Lumley) (England) three squadrons (482)
1/Earl of Plymouth’s Regiment of Horse (4th Horse) (Maj-Gen.
Cornelius Wood) (England) one squadron (158)
Duke of Shrewsbury’s Regiment of Horse (7th Horse) (Col. Wil-
liam (Cadogan), 1st Earl of Cadogan (England) one squad-
ron (149)
7. 2nd Line: Ross’s Dragoon Brigade (Maj-Gen. Charles Ross)
+ Hay’s Brigade (Brig-Gen Hay) (seven squadrons) (984)
James Wynne’s Regiment of Dragoons (5th Dragoons) (Brig-
Gen. Hon. Charles Ross (England/Ireland) two squadrons
(324)
Grey Dragoons (2nd Dragoons) (Brig-Gen. Lord John Hay)
(England/Scotland) one squadron (340)
Erbprinz von Hesse-Kassel Dragoons (Erbprinz Friedrich
Heiden von Hesse-Kassel (‘Alt Heiden’)) (Hesse-Kassel)
four squadrons (320)
Center: (Lt-Gen. Charles Churchill (General of Foot)) (28
battalions) (14,949)
1st Line (Infantry): (Lt-Gen. (General of Foot) Richard In-
goldsby) (nine battalions) (3,977)
8. d’Herleville’s Brigade (Maj-Gen. d’Herleville) + Stückrad’s
Brigade (Brig-Gen. Stückrad) (five battalions) (2,000)
Schöpping Infantry Regiment (Schöpping) (Hesse-Kassel) one
battalion (400)
Stückrad Infantry Regiment (Brig-Gen. Stückrad) (Hesse-Kas-
 sel) one battalion (400)
d’Herleville Infantry Regiment (Maj-Gen. d’Herleville) (Ha-
nover-Calenburg) one battalion (400)
von Tozin Infantry Regiment (von Tozin) (Lüneburg-Celle) one
battalion (400)
Hulsen Infantry Regiment (Brig-Gen. Hulsen) (Hanover-Calen-
burg) one battalion (400)
9. Württemberg Brigade (Brig-Gen. Friedrich Heinrich, Graf
von Seckendorff) (four battalions) (1,977)
Württemberg Regiment Stenfels (Stenfels) (Württemberg/UP
auxiliary) one battalion (571)
Württemberg Regiment Hermann (Hermann) (Württemberg/UP
auxiliary) one battalion
Württemberg Grenadier Regiment (Leib-Grenadiers) (Württem-
berg/UP auxiliary) one battalion (with Hermann 833)
Seckendorff’s Infantry Regiment (Brig-Gen. Friedrich Heinrich,
Graf von Seckendorff) (Ansbach/UP auxiliary) one battalion
(573)
1st Line (Infantry): (Lt-Gen. Horn) (ten battalions) (5,522)
10. Holstein-Beck’s Brigade (Maj-Gen. the Prince of Holstein-
Beck) + Heidebrecht’s Brigade (Brig-Gen. Heidebrecht)
(five battalions) (2,812)
Heidebrecht Infantry Regiment (Brig-Gen. Heidebrecht) (Ans-
bach/UP auxiliary) one battalion (599)
Stürler Infantry Regiment (Stürler) (Swiss (Bern)/UP auxiliary)
one battalion (523)
Hirzel Infantry Regiment (Hirzel) (Swiss (Zurich)/UP auxiliary)
one battalion (561) (Not committed)
Rechteren Infantry Regiment (Rechteren) (UP) one battalion
(548)
Goor Infantry Regiment (UP) one battalion (581)
11. Dutch Mercenary Brigade (Maj-Gen. Pallandt) + Wulffen’s
Brigade (Wulffen) (five battalions) (2,710)
Beynheim Infantry Regiment (UP) one battalion (571)
Schwerin Infantry Regiment (Col. Kurt Christof, Graf von
Schwerin) (Mecklenburg- Prussian Meith Regiment) one
battalion (547)
de Varenne Infantry Regiment (Jacques l‘Aumonier, Marquis de
Varenne) (Prussia/UP auxiliary) one battalion (461)
Wulffen Infantry Regiment (Wulffen) (Prussia/UP auxiliary) one
battalion (591)
Erbprinz von Hesse-Kassel Infantry Regiment (Erbprinz von
Hesse-Kassel) (Prussia/UP auxiliary) one battalion (540)
Center: (Erbprinz von Hesse-Kassel (General of Horse)) (69
squadrons) (9,898) (Lt-Gen., the Prince of Württemberg-Neustadt) (21 squad-
12. (Left-center): (Lt-Gen. Bülow) (17 squadrons) (1,315)
2nd Line (Cavalry): Noyelles’ Brigade (Maj-Gen. Jacques-Louis,
comte de Noyelles en Falais) (six squadrons) (450)
Leib Horse (Cuirassier) Regiment (Hanover-Calenburg) two
squadrons (150)
Voigt’s Horse (Cuirassier) Regiment (Voigt) (Hanover-Calen-
burg) two squadrons (150)
Noyelles’ Horse (Cuirassier) Regiment (Maj-Gen. Jacques-
Louis comte de Noyelles en Falais) (Hanover-Calenburg-
Osnabrück/UP auxiliary) two squadrons (150)
13. 3rd Line (Cavalry): Viller’s Brigade (Maj-Gen. Viller) +
Bothmer’s Brigade (Brig-Gen. Bothmer) (eleven squadrons)
(865)
von Bülow’s Dragoons (Regiment) (Lt-Gen. von Bülow) (Ha-
nover-Calenburg) three squadrons (225)
Viller’s Dragoons (Viller) (Lüneburg-Celle) four squadrons
(320)
Bothmer’s Dragoons (Brig-Gen. Bothmer) (Lüneburg-Celle) four
squadrons (320)
2nd Line (Cavalry): (Lt-Gen. Graf von Hompesch) (15 squad-
rons) (1,330)
14. Hesse-Homberg’s Brigade (Maj-Gen., the Prince of Hesse-
Homberg) (four squadrons) (320)
Leib Horse Regiment (Hesse-Kassel/UP auxiliary) two squadrons
(160)
Spiegel’s Karabinere (Hesse-Kassel/UP auxiliary) two squadrons
(160)
15. 2nd Line (Cavalry): Schulenburg’s Brigade (Maj-Gen. Schul-
enburg) (four squadrons) (310)
Schulenburg’s Dragoons (Hanover-Calenburg) two squadrons
(150)
Breidenbach’s Horse Regiment (Hanover-Calenburg & Lüne-
burg-Celle) two squadrons (160)
16. 2nd Line (Cavalry) Erbach’s Brigade (Maj-Gen. Erbach) +
Baldwin’s Brigade (Brig-Gen. Baldwin) (seven squadrons)
(700)
Erbach’s Horse (Cuirassier) Regiment (Maj-Gen. Erbach) (UP)
two squadrons (200)
Baldwin’s Horse (Brig-Gen. Baldwin) (UP) one squadron (100)
Schmettau’s Dragoons (company - vacant:1703-1713) (Ansbach)
four squadrons (400)
3 Line (Cavalry): (Lt-Gen., comte de Oostfriese) (sixteen squad-
rd
rons) (1,310)
17. Vittinghoff’s Brigade (Lt-Gen. Vittinghoff) + Grevendorff’s
Brigade (Brig-Gen. Grevendorff) (ten squadrons) (830)
Grevendorff’s Dragoons (Brig-Gen. Grevendorff) (Saxe-Gotha)
three squadrons (240)
Hardenberg’s Dragoons (Saxe-Gotha) three squadrons (240)
Sachsen-Heilburg Horse Regiment (UP) two squadrons (200)
Bannier’s Horse Regiment (Hanover-Calenburg) two squadrons
(150)
18. 3rd Line (Cavalry): Auroch’s Brigade (Maj-Gen. Auroch) (six
squadrons) (480)
Erbach’s Horse Regiment (Maj-Gen Erbach) (Hesse-Kassel) two
squadrons (160)
Auroch’s Dragoons (Maj-Gen. Auroch) (Hesse-Kassel) four
squadrons (320)
rons) (5,943)
19. 3rd Line (Cavalry): Rantzau’s Brigade (Maj-Gen. Johann von
Rantzau) + Rantzau’s Brigade (Brig-Gen. Jürgen von Rant-
zau (1one squadron) (3,028)
2nd Sjællandske Horse Regiment (Maj-Gen. Johann von Rantzau)
(Denmark/UP auxiliary) (585) two squadrons
5th Jydske Regiment of Horse (Col. von Schmettau) (Denmark/
UP auxiliary) (440) two squadrons
4th Jydske Regiment of Horse (Brig-Gen. Jürgen von Rantzau)
(Denmark/UP auxiliary) (440) two squadrons
Livregimentet Rytter (Col. Reventlow) (Denmark/UP auxiliary)
(556) two squadrons of 6 companies
Württemberg-Öels Dragoons (Carl Friedrich, Herzog von Würt-
strategy & tactics 23
 temberg-Öels (Denmark/UP auxiliary) (1,007) three
squadrons of 10 companies
20. 3rd Line (Cavalry): Brockdorff’s Brigade (Brig-Gen.
Ditlev von Brockdorff) (ten squadrons) (2,915)
3rd Jydske Horse Regiment (Col. Ditlev von Brockdorff)
(Denmark/England auxiliary) (591) two squadrons
Ahlefeldt’s Horse (Cuirassier) Regiment (Denmark/England
auxiliary) two squadrons (589)
2nd Jydske Horse Regiment (Col. von Uterwick Prehn) (Den-
mark/England auxiliary) (568) two squadrons
Holstein’s Horse (Cuirassier) Regiment (Col. Dewitz) (Den-
mark/England auxiliary) two squadrons (578)
Württemberg-Öels Dragoons (Carl Friedrich, Herzog von
Württemberg-Öels (Denmark/UP auxiliary) (589) two
squadrons of 10 company
21. 4th Line (Infantry): (Lt-Gen. Lord Orkney) + (Maj-Gen.
de Luc) (nine battalions) (5,450)
Webb’s Brigade (Maj-Gen. John Richmond Webb) + Mere-
dith’s Brigade (Brig-Gen. Thomas Meredith) (four bat-
talions) (2,543)
Churchill’s Infantry Regiment (Winston Churchill) (Eng-
land) one battalion (590) (Not committed)
Thomas Meredith’s Regiment of Foot (Brig-Gen. Thomas
Meredith) (England) one battalion (575) (Not commit-
ted)
The Queen’s Regiment of Foot (Maj-Gen. John Richmond
Webb) (England) one battalion (739)
1/His Majesty’s Royal Regiment of Foot (George Hamilton,
1st Earl of Orkney (England) one battalion (639)
22. 4th Line (Infantry): von Rantzau’s Brigade (Maj-Gen.
Detlev von Rantzau) + Bernsdorff’s Brigade (Brig-Gen.
Bernsdorff) (five battalions) (2,907)
1/Rantzau (Maj-Gen. Detlev von Rantzau) (Lüneburg-Celle/
UP auxiliary) one battalion (588)
2/Rantzau (Maj-Gen. Detlev von Rantzau) (Lüneburg-Celle/
UP auxiliary) one battalion (636)
Bernsdorff Infantry Regiment (Brig-Gen. Bernsdorff) (Lüne-
burg-Celle /UP auxiliary) one battalion (531)
Teckelenberg Infantry Regiment (Hanover-Calenburg /UP
auxiliary) one battalion (532)
St. Paul Infantry Regiment (St. Paul des Estanges) (Hanover-
Calenburg/UP auxiliary) one battalion (620)
Right: Army of Imperial Austria (Feldmarshall, Prince
François Eugène von Savoy-Carignan)
1st Line (Cavalry): (General der imperialer Kavallerie,
Prince Maximillian von Hanover (General of the Im-
perial Horse) (40 squadrons) (3,500)
23. Natzmer’s Brigade (Generalmajor Dubislav Gneo-
mar von Natzmer auf Gannewitz) (fourteen squadrons)
(1,360)
Leib Dragoons (Prussia) three squadrons (300)
Margraf Philip’s Horse (Cuirassier) Regiment (Maj-Gen.
Philip Wilhelm, Margraf von Brandenburg-Schwedt)
(Prussia) three squadrons (300)
Wartensleben Horse Regiment (Wartensleben) (Prussia)
three squadrons (300)
Bayreuth-Kulmbach Horse (Cuirassier) Regiment (Col.
Christian Heinrich, Margraf von Bayreuth-Kulmbach)
(Prussia) three squadrons (300)
24 #238
von Krassow’s Dragoons (Ernst Detlev von Krassow)
(Mecklenburg) two squadrons (Not committed) (160)
24. Fugger’s Brigade (Generalmajor, Graf von Fugger)
(twelve squadrons) (1,000)
Alt-Hanover Cuirassiers (Austria) six squadrons (500)
Lobkowitz’s Cuirassiers (Austria) six squadrons (500)
25. Durlach’s Brigade (Feldmarshall-leutnant, Margraf
Frederick VII of Baden-Durlach) + Alexandre’s Bri-
gade (Generalmajor, Prinz Alexandre von Württemberg)
(1four squadrons) (1,140)
Limburg-Styrum’s Dragoons (Austria) six squadrons (500)
Württemberg Independent Cavalry (Leib Dragoon) (Helms-
taett) (Württemberg) three squadrons (240)
Fugger’s Cuirassiers (Generalmajor, Graf von
Fugger) (Swabia) three squadrons (240)
Ottingen’s Dragoons (Swabia) two squadrons (160)
2nd Line (Cavalry): (General der Kavallerie, Eberhard Lou-
is, Herzog von Württemberg–Teck) (3six squadrons)
(3,580)
26. l’Ostange’s Brigade (Generalmajor Charles Graf, de
l‘Ostange) (six squadrons) (600)
Sonsfeld’s Dragoons (Prussia) three squadrons (300)
l’Ostange Horse (Cuirassier) Regiment (Generalmajor
Charles, Graf de l‘Ostange) (Prussia) three squadrons
(300)
27. Bibra’s Brigade (Generalmajor Bibra) (8 squadrons)
(820)
Helmstaett Horse (Cuirassier) Regiment (Erbprinz Helms-
taett von Württemberg) (Swabia) three squadrons (240)
Nagel’s Karabinere (Nagel) (Münster/UP auxiliary) two
squadrons (200)
Venningen’s Karabinere (Georg Friedrich von Venningen)
(Palatine/UP auxiliary) two squadrons (three companies
each) (300)
Hachenberg’s Cuirassiers (Neiderrhein) one squadron (80)
28. Cusani’s Brigade (Feldmarshall-leutnant, the Marquis
de Cusani) (twelve squadrons) (1,200)
Darmstadt’s Imperial Cuirassiers (Darm-
stadt) (Austria) six squadrons (600)
Cusani’s Imperial Cuirassiers (Feldmarshall-lt., the Mar-
quis de Cusani) (Austria) six squadrons (600)
29. Caraffa’s Brigade (Generalmajor von Caraffa) (ten
squadrons) (960)
Fechenbach’s Dragoons (Freiherr von Fechenbach) (Würz-
burg/Mainz) four squadrons (400)
Württemberg Leibgarde (Württemberg) two squadrons
(160)
Bibra’s Dragoons (Generalmajor von Bibra) (Mainz/Aus-
trian auxiliary) four squadrons (400)
3rd Line (Cavalry Reserve): (General der Kavallerie,
Charles Maximilien, comte de la Tour et Valsassina)
(sixteen squadrons) (1,280)
30. Efferen’s Brigade (Efferen) (six squadrons) (480)
Moorheim’s Cuirassiers (Mecklenburg) two squadrons
(160)
Leutsch’s Cuirassiers (Saxe-Gotha) two squadrons (160)
(Not committed)
von der Ostheim’s Horse (Cuirassier) Regiment (Holstein-
Gottorf) two squadrons (160) (Not committed)
 Weapon Range, Range, Round Rate of Stats
Effective Maximum Fire

Carbine <5m Ball 2-3/min Must halt to reload

Flintlock <30m 250m Ball 2-3/min 20% misfire rate, socket
bayonet
Minion (3 pounder) <350m 2,000m Round shot, “Partridge” 2-3/min Anglo-Dutch and German
Saker (5 pounder) <360m 2,200m Round shot, “Partridge” 2-3/min Light
Demi-Culverin <400m 2,400m Round shot, “Partridge” 2-3/min Medium
(9 pounder)
12 pounder <450m 4,000m Round shot 1/min Medium
Culverin (16 pounder) <450m 5,000m Round shot 1/min Heavy
Demi-cannon <600m 6,000m Round shot 1/min Heavy
(24 pounder)
Howitzer (10”) <150m 1,300m Hollow, explosive 2-3/min Mobile mortars
“bomb”

31. Bayreuth’s Brigade (Feldmarshall-leutnant, the Prince
of Bayreuth) (ten squadrons) (800)
Auffess’ Dragoons (Franconia) 5 squadrons (400) (Not com-
mitted)
Bayreuth’s Cuirassiers (Bayreuth) (Franconia) 5 squadrons
(400) (Not committed)
(Feldzeugmeister, Prince Leopold von Anhalt-Dessau)
(eleven battalions) (4,400)
32. 1st Line (Infantry): Finck’s Brigade (Generalmajor Al-
brecht Conrad Graf Finck v. Finkenstein) (six squad-
rons) (2,400)
“Grenadier Garde” (Kurprinz Friedrich Wilhelm I) (Prus-
sian) two battalions (800)
Margraf Ludwig’s Infantry Regi-
ment (Christian Ludwig, Margraf von
Brandenburg) (Prussia) two battalions (800)
Anhalt-Dessau Infantry Regiment (Leopold von Anhalt-
Dessau) (Prussia) two battalions (800)
33. 2nd Line (Infantry): Canitz’s Brigade (Generalmajor
Christoph Albrecht v. Canitz) (five battalions) (2,000)
Margraf Phillip’s Infantry Regiment (Mar-
graf Phillip Wilhelm von Brandenburg
Schwedt) (Prussia) two battalions (800)
Leibgarde (Col. Carl Philipp Freiherr von Wylich zu Lot-
tum) (Prussia) one battalion (400)
Canitz’s Infantry Regiment (Generalmajor Christoph Albre-
cht von Canitz) (Prussia) two battalions (800)
(Lt-Gen. Scholten) (7 battalions) (5,077)
34. 1st Line (Infantry): Bielke’s Brigade (Brig-Gen. Bielke)
(Denmark/Austria auxiliary) (four battalions) (2,895)
1/ (one grenadier and six fusilier companies) from Regiment
of Foot Prince George (Carl Rudolph von Württemberg)
(Denmark/Austria auxiliary) one battalion (824)
2/ (six musketeer companies) from Regiment of Foot Prince
Carl (Lt-Gen. Scholten) (Denmark/Austria auxiliary)
one battalion (627)
Regiment Dansk Den Kongelige Livgarde til fods (Den-
mark/Austria auxiliary) one battalion (740)
2/ (six fusilier companies) from Regiment of Foot Prince
George (Carl Rudolph von Württemberg) (Denmark/Austria
auxiliary) one battalion (704)
35. 2nd Line (Infantry): Rebsdorff’s Brigade (Brig-Gen. Rebs-
dorff) (three battalions) (2,182)
1/Fynske Regiment of Foot (Brig-Gen. Schonenfeldt) (Den-
mark/England and UP auxiliary) one battalion (860)
2/Sjællandske Regiment of Foot (Denmark/England and UP
auxiliary) one battalion (620)
Regiment of Foot Christian Ulrich I, Herzog von Württemberg-
Öels (Col. Bonart) (Denmark/England and UP auxiliary)
one battalion (702 in 10 company)
Infantry battalion (Allied)
• United Provinces: 10-12 musketeer companies
• Austria: 16 musketeer + 1 grenadier company (can form
into 4 tactical battalions of 4 company each + grenadier detach-
ment)
• Prussia: 5 musketeer + 1 grenadier company
• Swiss: 4 musketeer companies
• Imperial (Austrian): 6 musketeer companies + 1 grenadier
company
• English battalion: 12 musketeer + 1 grenadier company
“Platoon fire”- 1/3 of battalion fires a steady stream at a time
(suited for fire and movement)
Anglo-Dutch- 3 ranks of 18 platoons in 3 staggered “firings”
with 1/3 of the battalion firing at a time (3 pounders often at
each flank)
Austria- 4-5 ranks deep resulting in a smaller frontage
Cavalry squadron
• United Provinces: 3 companies
• English: Sword charge at a fast trot (loss of control at gallop)
in close, two-rank formation followed by pistols for pursuit
• Imperial: 3 companies

strategy & tactics 25

 FRANCO-BAVARIAN:
Tallard: 36 battalions (18,200)/58 squadrons (6,750)
Marsin & the Elector: 4three battalions (21,500)/85 squad-
rons (10,200)
Total: 56,650 in 7nine battalions (39,500)/14three squad-
rons (16,950)
Casualties: 14,150 KIA/WIA, 38,609 POW
Artillery:
Tallard:
Royal Artillery (Marquis de Frézelière)
Blenheim support (1 battery of eight x 8-pounders)
North of Blenheim (2 batteries of four x 4-pounders)
Along the Münster- Höchstädt road (four x 24-pounders)
Evenly distributed between Blenheim and Oberglauheim (3
batteries of four x 4-pounders)
Elector & Marsin:
Royal Artillery (Marquis de Houville)
Right of Oberglauheim (battery of two x 24-pounders)
Before Lutzingenheim (battery of six x 16-pounders, four
batteries of four x 8-pounders, three batteries of four x
12-pounders)
Even front distribution (22 x 4-pounders)
Camille d’Hostun de la Baume, Duc de Tallard, Marshall
of France (36 battalions, 58 squadrons)
Blenheim Wing Command (Lt-Gen. Philippe, Marquis de
Clérambault) (27 battalions) (8,003) (twelve squadrons)
(1,226)
Maréchal de Camp, the Marquis de Blansac (sixteen
squadrons twelve squadrons)
Dismounted Dragoons (Between Blenheim and the Dan-
ube)
1. Hautefeulle’s Brigade (12 squadrons) (1,226)
Mestre de Camp Général three squadrons (338)
La Reine’s Dragoons three squadrons (231)
Rohan-Chabot’s Dragoons three squadrons (330)
Vasse’s Dragoons three squadrons (327)
2. Blenheim Garrison (nine battalions) (4,500)
de Maulevrier’s Brigade (Marquis de Maulevrier)
Régiment de Navarre three battalions (1,500)
Balincourt’s Brigade (Marquis de Balincourt)
Régiment d’Artois two battalions (1,000)
1/Provence one battalion (500)
Greder’s Brigade (Marquis de Greder)
Régiment de Greder Allemande (German) two battalions
(1,000)
Régiment de Lassay one battalion (500)
Blenheim Reserve (7 battalions) (3,500)
3. d’Argelos’ Brigade (Baron d’Argelos)
Régiment de Languedoc two battalions (1,000)
Régiment de Santerre two battalions (1,000)
4. St. Segond’s Brigade (Marquis de St. Segond)
Zurlauben (Walloon) two battalions (1,000)
St. Segond (Marquis de St. Segond) (Italy) one battalion
(500)
Infantry Reserve (Lt-Gen., the Marquis de Marinvaux) (11
26 #238
battalions) (5,500)
5. Montroux’s Brigade (Marquis de Montroux)
Régiment de Montroux (Italy) one battalion (500)
Régiment de Aunis two battalions (1,000)
6. Monfort’s Brigade (Marquis de Montfort)
Régiment de Montfort (Marquis de Montfort) (Walloon/
Spanish auxiliary) two battalions (1,200)
Blaisois one battalion (500)
7. d’Enonville’s Brigade (Comte d’Enonville)
Royal three battalions (1,500)
Régiment de Boulonnais two battalions (1,000)
Between Blenheim and Oberglauheim (Marquis de Mont-
peyroux (Commander of Tallard’s Horse)) (nine battal-
ions) (1,064) (46 squadrons) (5,524)
1st Line (Cavalry): (Lt-Gen., le Comte de Zurlauben) (one
squadron) (2,956)
8. Vertilly’s Brigade (Marquis de Vertilly)
Gendarmerie de France eight squadrons (1,500)
9. Broglie’s Brigade (Marquis de Broglie)
Régiment de le Roi three squadrons (423)
Régiment de Tarneau two squadrons (184)
Régiment de la Baume two squadrons (282)
10. Grignan’s Brigade (Marquis de Grignan)
Mestre de Camp Général three squadrons (255)
Régiment de Grignan (Marquis de Grignan) three squadrons
(312)
2 Line (Cavalry): Maréchal de Camp, the Duc
nd
d’Humeries) (25 squadrons) (2,568)
11. Merode-Westerloo’s Brigade (Comte de Merode-Wester-
loo)
Regimiento de Gaetano (Spain) two squadrons (214)
Regimiento de Acosta (Spain) two squadrons (200)
Regimiento de Heider (Spain) two squadrons (200)
12. la Valliere’s Brigade (Marquis de la Valliere)
Régiment de Bougogne three squadrons (360)
Régiment de la Valliere two squadrons (136)
Régiment de Noailles two squadrons (200)
Régiment de Beringhen three squadrons (783)
13. Silly’s Brigade (Marquis de Silly)
Régiment de Orléans three squadrons (165)
Régiment de Montreval two squadrons (110)
Régiment de St. Pouanges two squadrons (100)
Régiment de Ligonday two squadrons (100)
3rd Line (Infantry): (Maréchal de Camp, the Marquis de St.
Pierre) (nine battalions) (4,500)
14. Treçesson’s Brigade (Marquis de Treçesson)
Régiment de Robecque (Walloon) two battalions (1,000)
Régiment de d’Albaret one battalion (500)
15. Breuil’s Brigade (Marquis de Breuil)
Régiment de Auxerrois two battalions (1,000)
Régiment de Chabrillant one battalion (500)
16. Belleisle’s Brigade (Marquis de Belleisle)
Régiment de Nice one battalion (500)
Régiment de Tavannes one battalion (500)
Régiment de Bandeville one battalion (500)
The Army of the Elector of Bavaria Prince Maximillian
II Emmanuel Wittelsbach, Elector of Bavaria & Mar-
shal Marsin (Second in command)
(Lt-Gen., the Marquis du Bourg) (twenty squadrons)
(2,400) (Part of Marsin’s Army, but under Tallard’s
command)
1st Line (Cavalry):
17. Massenbach’s Brigade
Régiment de Royal three squadrons (360)
Régiment de La Ferronnaye two squadrons (240)
Régiment de Levy two squadrons (240)
18. Prince Charles de Lorraine’s Brigade
Régiment de Prince Charles de Lorraine (Prince Charles de
Lorraine) two squadrons (240)
Régiment de Choiseul two squadrons (240)
2nd Line (Cavalry):
19. d’Anlezy’s Brigade
Régiment d’Anlezy two squadrons (240)
Régiment de Livry two squadrons (240)
Régiment de Heudincourt two squadrons (240)
Régiment de Dauphin Étranger three squadrons (360)
(Lt-Gen., the Marquis de Blainville) (12 battalions)
(11,000)
In Oberglauheim: (Maréchal de Camp Dorrington) (eight
battalions) (4,000)
20. Blingy’s Brigade (Marquis de Bligny)
Régiment de Champagne three battalions (1,500)
1/Saintonge one battalion (500)
21. Nangis’ Brigade (Marquis de Nangis)
Bourbonnais two battalions (1,000)
1/Foix one battalion (500)
1/Agénois one battalion (500)
(Lt-Gen., The Marquis de Rosel)
Oberglauheim support- right/rear (nine battalions)
(4,500)
22. Buzançois’s Brigade (Marquis de Buzançois)
Régiment de la Reine three battalions (1,500)
23. Clare’s Brigade (Viscount Clare)
Dorrington’s Regiment (Ireland) one battalion (500)
Clare’s Regiment (Ireland) one battalion (500)
Lee’s Regiment (Ireland) one battalion (500)
24. Coëtquen’s Brigade
Régiment de Coëtquen two battalions (1,000)
1/Chartres one battalion (500)
25. Oberglauheim support- left (Prince d’Isenghien) (five
battalions) (2,500)
1/Poitou one battalion (500)
1/Guyenne one battalion (500)
Régiment d’Isenghien (Walloon) one battalion (500)
Régiment de Beaufermé two battalions (1,000)
Oberglauheim to Lutzingenheim (Field Marshal, Johann
Baptist, Count d’Arco) (65 squadrons) (7,800)
1st Line (Cavalry): (Lt-Gen., the Marquis de Mag-
nac) + (Maréchal de Camp Vivans) (12 squadrons)
(1,440)
26. Montmain’s Brigade
Régiment de Condé two squadrons (240)
Régiment de Montmain two squadrons (240)
Régiment de Bourck (Ireland) two squadrons (240)
27. Vivans’ Brigade
Régiment de Abusson two squadrons (240)
Régiment de Vivans two squadrons (240)
Régiment de Fourquevaux two squadrons (240)
2nd Line (Cavalry): (Lt-Gen, the Marquis de Legall) (13
squadrons) (1,560)
28. Barentin’s Brigade
Régiment de Barentin two squadrons (240)
Régiment de la Billarderie two squadrons (240)
Régiment de Bissy two squadrons (240)
29. Vigiers Brigade (l’Isle du Vigier)
Régiment de Royal Piédmont three squadrons (360)
Régiment du Vigier two squadrons (240)
Régiment de Merinville two squadrons (240)
Bavarian Horse (27 squadrons) (3,240)
30. 1st Line (Cavalry): von Weickel’s Brigade (Feldmarshall-
leutnant von Weickel)
d’Arco’s Cuirassiers (Johann Baptist, Count d’Arco) six
squadrons (720)
Weickel’s Cuirassiers (von Weickel) four squadrons (480)
Garde Karabinere one squadron (120)
Grenadiers à Cheval (Horse Grenadiers) one squadron (120)
Locatelli’s Hussars (Leib Company) one squadron (120)
31. 2nd Line (Cavalry): von Wolframsdorff’s Brigade (Gener-
almajor von Wolframsdorff)
Törring-Seefeld’s Dragoons two squadrons (240)
von Wolframsdorff’s Cuirassiers (Generalmajor von Wolframs-
dorff) six squadrons (720)
de Costa’s Cuirassiers six squadrons (720)
Lutzingenheim (Generalmajor, the Marquis de Maffei) (nine
battalions) (4,500)
32. de Maffei’s Brigade
Régiment de Maffei one battalion (500)
Kurprinz Regiment one battalion of seven companies (500)
Leibgarde Fusiliers Regiment two battalions (1,000)
Leibgarde Grenadiers Regiment one battalion (500)
Régiment d’Ocfort one battalion (500)
33. Mercy’s Brigade (Generalmajor, the Marquis de Mercy)
Régiment de Mercy two battalions (1,000)
Régiment de Tattenbach one battalion of 7 company (500)
(Lt-Gen., the Comte de Dreux) (13 squadrons) (1,560)
34. Fontbeausard’s Dragoon Brigade
Régiment de Listenois three squadrons (360)
Régiment de la Vrillière three squadrons (360)
Régiment de Fontbeausard three squadrons (360)
35. Conflans’ Brigade
Régiment de Conflans two squadrons (240)
Régiment de Rouvray two squadrons (240)
North of Lutzingenheim (Lt-Gen., the Marquis de Sauffrey) +
(Maréchal de Camp de Lee) (12 battalions) (6,000)
strategy & tactics 27
 36. Montbron’s Brigade (Marquis de Montbron) (five battal-
ions)
Régiment de Dauphin three battalions (1,500)
1/Condé one battalion (500)
Régiment de Montboissier one battalion (500)
37. Tourouvre’s Brigade (Chevalier de Tourouvre) (three
battalions)
Régiment de Lorraine one battalion (500)
Régiment de Toulouse two battalions (1,000)
38. Montmorency’s Brigade (Chevalier de Montmorency)
(four battalions)
1/Bearn one battalion (500)
1/Bourbon one battalion (500)
1/Nivernais one battalion (500)
1/Vermandois one battalion (500)
Infantry battalion (Franco-Bavarian)
• France (generally understrength)- 13 companies (5 ranks
with only 3 able to fire at once)
• Bavaria- 5 companies
• Spain- 12 companies
"Volley fire"- Platoons form a deeper, narrower formation
Initial fire is formidable, but fire control is quickly lost
Cavalry squadron (Franco-Bavarian)
• France/Bavaria- 4-6 companies
• Slow, controlled advance
• All three squadron ranks fire pistols simultaneously to
disorganize the enemy before charging with swords (mo-
mentum interrupted)
Bibliography:
Chandler, Dr. David G. Blenheim Preparation: The English Army On
The March To The Danube Collected Essays. Great Britain, 2004.
-Marlborough as Military Commander. London, 2000.
Chartrand, René and Back, Francis. Louis XIV’s Army (203). London,
1996.
Deane, John Marshall. A Journal of Marlborough’s Campaigns During
the War of the Spanish Succession 1704-1711. Society for Army
Historical Research. London, 1984
Falkner, James. Blenheim 1704: Marlborough’s Greatest Victory. Great
Britain, 2004.
Fitzroy, James, Duke of Monmouth. An Abridgement of the English
military discipline. Boston: Samuel Green, 1690. (American Anti-
quarian Society (Readex Microprint) Worcester, Mass. 1955.)
Green, David. Blenheim. N.Y., N.Y., 1974.
Hall, A. R. Ballistics in the Seventeenth Century: A Study in the Rela-
tions of Science and War with Reference Principally to England.
Cambridge, 1952.
Hughes, B. P. Open Fire: Artillery Tactics from Marlborough to Wel-
lington. Great Britain, 1983.
Hussey, John. Marlborough: The Hero Of Blenheim (Great Command-
ers). London, 2005.
Erichsen, Johannes and Katharina Heinemann. Brennpunkt Europas
1704: Die Schlacht von Höchstädt/The Battle of Blenheim. Ost-
fildern, 2004.
Kemp, Anthony. Weapons & Equipment of the Marlborough Wars.
Great Britain, 1980.
Spencer, Charles. Blenheim: Battle for Europe. London, 2004.
Stanford, Iain. Marlborough Goes to War. A Pike & Shot Society Pub-
lication.
Susane, Louis. Historie de l’Infantrie française. Paris, 1874-1876 (re-
printed 1984).
Historie de l’Artillerie française (1 vol.).
Historie de la Cavalerie française (3 vol.).
Tincey, John. Blenheim 1704. The Duke of Marlborough’s master-
piece: Campaign (141). London, 2004
- The British Army, 1660-1704. London, 1994.
Trevelyan, George Macaulay, O.M. England under Queen Anne (vol.
1): Blenheim. Longmans, London, 1930.

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28 #238
 For Your Information
Did You Know
• A recently declassified cache of
Al Qaida documents captured
in Afghanistan has revealed that
organization’s standard enlist-
ment contract for new recruits.
Among its terms: men’s salaries
are boosted by 700 rupees per
month for each wife beyond their
first, and everyone gets five days
paid vacation each month.
• In AD 60, Celtic rebels in
Britain, under the leadership of
their Queen Boudicca, captured
the Roman provincial capital
of Londinium (London). They
massacred all its residents and
burned the place to the ground.
So total was the destruction, to
this day a three foot thick strata
of the ash left behind by the
carnage can be found underlying
parts of the modern city.
• At present, 61 percent of all US
military personnel are Cauca-
sian. At the same time, fully
75 percent of the US military
members so far killed in Iraq
have been Caucasian.
• Torsion powered catapults came
into general use among better
provisioned armies of the West-
ern world starting about 340 BC.
Their propulsive power, range,
rate of fire, and serviceability
were not surpassed by gunpow-
der artillery until around the year
AD 1600.
• During World War II, exclud-
ing those of Japanese, German
or Italian ancestry, some 6,000
native-born Americans were
imprisoned as “war resisters.”
• Julius Caesar’s eight-year
campaign in Gaul is estimated to
have made him one of the richest
men in the world at that time.
At the same time, though, it also
cost the residents there a total of
a million dead, another million
enslaved, and some 800 of their
settlements taken by storm.
• Early in 2006, approximately a
quarter of all military combat
operations in Iraq were being
carried out solely by Iraqi army
and/or police units. Some 50
percent were carried out by joint
US/Iraqi task-groups, and the re-
maining 25 percent were carried
out by troops from the US, UK
and/or other Coalition nations.
• Some 10 million people died in
the Thirty Years War (1618-48).
That number is estimated to have
represented slightly more than
25 percent of the total popula-
tion of Central Europe, the war’s
theater of operations.
• Early in the 1300s, Chinese
military engineers focused their
efforts on devising powerful
gunpowder explosive rounds
delivered by catapults. Two of
the more widely used types were
catalogued under the names
“Dropping From Heaven Bomb”
and “Bandit-Burning Vision-
Confusing Magic-Fireball.”
• More data have come in con-
cerning the Stryker Brigades first
mentioned in this column back
in issue 236. These units’ table
of organization and equipment
looks like this:
The Skull of Sultan
Mkwawa
The 1919 Treaty of Versailles,
which officially brought an end to
World War I, contained among its rep-
arations clauses the following article:
Article 246. Within six months
from the coming into force of
the present treaty, Germany
will restore to His Majesty the
King of the Hejaz the original
Koran of the Caliph Othman,
which was removed from
Medina by the Turkish authori-
ties and is stated to have been
presented to the ex-Emperor
William II. Within the same
period Germany will hand over
to His Britannic Majesty’s Gov-
ernment the skull of the Sultan
Mkwawa, which was removed
from the Protectorate of Ger-
man East Africa and taken to
Germany. The delivery of the
articles above referred to will
be effected in such place and in
such conditions as may be laid
down by the governments to
which they are to be restored.
Sultan Mkwawa (pronounced
“em-KWA-wuh”) was born sometime
in 1855. By about 1870 his father
Munyigumba had united the Hehe
people, an inland tribe of southern
Tanganyika who numbered about
50,000. Mkwawa succeeded his father
in 1880, and the Hehe began to ex-
pand eastward, where they came into
contact with the Germans, who were
then pushing their trade and adminis-
tration inland from the coast. Initially
both sides were happy to negotiate,
the Germans being particularly desir-
ous to avoid confrontation due to the
paucity of their resources and the ef-
fect conflict would have on trade and
development.
However, upon hearing reports
of native raiding by the Hehe and
other tribes, the Germans sent out a
punitive column under a Commander
Zelewski in August 1891. Several
villages were burned, the inhabitants
strategy & tactics 29
 “A neutral is bound to be hated by those who lose and
despised by those who win.”
having fled. A party of spear-armed
Hehe were also fired on. Then the
column moved toward Mkwawa’s
capital, Kalenga, which the Germans
had heard to be a fortified town.
At 7 a.m. on 16 August, with
Zelewski riding a donkey at the front
of his column, the Germans walked
into an ambush launched by perhaps
3,000 Hehe. Accounts differ, but it
appears the Hehe signal to attack
was an imitated birdcall, or perhaps
a single gunshot. Either a real bird
called out, or one of the Germans shot
at some nearby game. At any rate,
the Hehe assumed it was their signal
and charged out of the bush at the
column. That first charge shattered the
column, but German survivors under
a Lt. Tettenborn managed to reach
a nearby hill where they defended
themselves for the next night and
Plan of Kalenga, reproduced from a reproduction [and translation] of von Schele’s plan,
in “Mitteilungen von Forschungsreisenden aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten” 1896
30 #238
—Niccolo
day. The Hehe then withdrew, after
burning the grass to kill any wounded
unable to flee. Tettenborn estimated
Hehe dead at 700, while the Germans
lost 10 of their number including
Zelewski, 200 native troops, 96 por-
ters, 200 rifles, three cannon and most
of their baggage. Mkwawa had won
the day, but he forbade mourning the
dead to avoid further depressing the
survivors.
The Germans were unable to
respond immediately to this defeat
as they had other restless tribes to
deal with. In the meantime, the Hehe
attacked trade caravans and made
raids against tribes who had submit-
ted to the Germans. But Berlin was
not pleased. By late 1894 the colonial
German Governor, Freiherr von
Schele, and built up his armed forces.
He marched inland with a large expe-
dition, bound again for Kalenga.
Machiavelli, 1514
Mkwawa had spent several years
rebuilding his capital with stone forti-
fications after seeing similar fortifica-
tions built both by other tribes and
Arabs near the coast. Its walls were
almost four kilometers in circumfer-
ence, fronted by thorn-filled ditches
and guard towers for added protec-
tion. Avoiding the route of Zelewski’s
doomed expedition had taken three
years prior, the Germans approached
Kalenga from uplands above the town
and encamped only 400 meters from
it.
The Germans attacked before
dawn on 30 October, led by Capt.
Tom von Prince and, after breach-
ing the walls of the fortified town,
engaged in close combat among the
houses and inner fortifications. One
German and many native troops were
killed, but the place was in German
hands by the end of the day. Many
Hehe, including Mkwawa, fled. Von
Prince discovered 30,000 pounds of
gunpowder and much ivory in the
town.
The Germans were amazed the
Hehe had defended their town in a
set-piece battle rather than using his
usual guerilla tactics to attack the
column on its march inland. Perhaps
Mkwawa thought his citadel impreg-
nable. It was reported that, when the
walls were breached, he attempted
suicide, but was persuaded to instead
flee by his men.
Despite the loss of his capital,
Mkwawa still didn’t come to terms
with the Germans. He continued to
ambush German forces and attack
tribes that had submitted to the colo-
nial authorities. In 1896 the Germans
again returned to the interior and this
time built a substantial fort of their
own at Iringa, seven miles from Ka-
lenga. The balance of power had not
shifted. Mkwawa ordered four of his
subordinates, including his youngest
brother Mpangile, to surrender to von
Prince. The Germans then installed
Mpangile as the new Sultan of the
Hehe in an attempt to rule through
 For Your Information
him. Mkwawa’s raids continued,
though, and believing Mpangile was
partly responsible for continuing
attacks on his troops, von Prince had
him tried and convicted, executing
their hapless client on 21 February
1897.
Hehe resistance began to weaken
as the continuing unrest brought
hunger and disease in its wake. In
mid-1898 the Germans received re-
ports of the whereabouts of Mkwawa.
An expedition pursued him, and on
19 July came across his body in a
cave alongside those of two of his
companions. Mkwawa had this time
committed suicide to avoid capture.
Staff Sgt. Maj. Merkl, who dis-
covered the bodies, shot Mkwawa’s
corpse through the head, not believing
he was actually dead. Merkl then
persuaded one of his native troopers
to decapitate Mkwawa, and the head
was exhibited in Iringa. The death of
Mkwawa ended Hehe resistance to
German colonial domination. When
other tribes subsequently rebelled, the
Hehe remained neutral or sometimes
even supported the Germans against
longstanding enemies.
Mkwawa’s head was dried and
taken to Dar es Salaam by Merkl to
be shipped to Germany. The collect-
ing of skulls formed an important part
of colonial anthropological studies
of the time, and hundreds of native
skulls were shipped to Europe for sci-
entific and pseudo-scientific research.
After World War I, such artifacts
became one of the mainstays of Nazi
racial theories. Additionally, heads
and skulls provided popular souvenirs
for colonial officials and tourists,
even being used as ashtrays.
During World War I, the Brit-
ish Empire conquered German East
Africa, though not without difficulty.
The Hehe supported the British,
and the post-war British administra-
tor (and later governor) of former
German East Africa, Horace Byatt,
suggested the return of Mkwawa’s
skull be one of the stipulations in the
Treaty of Versailles. His intention was
to “allow the Hehe to bury it with due
ceremony in the grave of Mkwawa,
thereby giving the Hehe full satisfac-
tion as they have been constantly
helpful during the war. In their eyes
this would be a tangible proof that
German power has been completely
broken.”
The Colonial Office agreed with
the suggestion, and the clause was
duly inserted in the treaty as Article
246, alongside a claim for an ancient
Koran manuscript supposedly passed
to Germany by the Turkish authorities
who had removed it from Medina.
The Germans were perplexed by
the demand for the skull, which had
nothing to do with the World War.
They declared the skull had never
been taken to Germany, and had
probably been buried somewhere near
Iringa. As the Germans had protested
almost every article of the treaty, the
British were not convinced by that ar-
gument and, after further probing, the
German Foreign Ministry submitted
a report to the British Foreign Office
dated 6 May 1920. In that report, Col.
Ernst Nigmann claimed he had ex-
changed Mkwawa’s skull for another
with Mkwawa’s family.
Another explanation was also
offered, this one affirmed by Merkl
himself, that he had preserved the
head in alcohol, but that Hehe war-
riors had later broken into the German
fort and removed the head and the
alcohol, leaving a substitute freshly
severed head behind. The theft was
only discovered, he wrote, when
the replacement head “came to the
olfactory attention of the German gar-
rison.”
In Tanganyika, Gov. Byatt scorned
all those explanations, concluding
that “to pretend the skull had been
returned is a travesty of facts in an at-
tempt to empty a further clause of the
peace treaty.”
Finally, though, on 22 August
1921, Colonial Secretary Winston
Churchill told Byatt that, “in the cir-
cumstances I do not propose to take
further action in this matter”.
There things rested until 1931,
when German author Rudolf Frank
published an anti-war novel titled The
Skull of the Negro Chieftain Mkwawa,
in which the skull was used a totem to
lead the tribe to war. When the Nazis
came to power in early 1933 the
book was banned, and it was publicly
burned on 10 May that year along-
side works by authors such as Freud,
Einstein and Jack London. On 24
May, Stanley Baldwin, British foreign
affairs secretary, was asked in the
House of Commons the whereabouts
of the skull and the government’s
intentions regarding it. He could
only reply it had not yet been traced,
and another MP suggested, to much
laughter, that Churchill and Lloyd
George, as the main authors of the
treaty, should form a Royal Commis-
sion to investigate.
On 7 June 1933, a Berlin news-
paper followed up the parliamentary
debate, claiming the story of the skull
was myth, and had only been used
by British intelligence agents to stir
up the tribes of Tanganyika against
the German authorities. The skull
story was thus used to disparage the
Versailles Treaty as a whole.
On 17 March 1936, the where-
abouts of the skull was again
discussed in the House of Commons.
Again to much laughter, the colonial
secretary replied that, despite the best
efforts of the German government, it
had not been traced, and would not be
pursued further.
World War II then intervened,
but in 1951 Hehe Chief Adam Sepi,
Mkwawa’s grandson, approached Sir
Edward Twining, governor of Tang-
anyika, once more inquiring as to the
return of the skull. Twining made new
inquiries, and received information
the skull might be at the Bremen’s
Overseas Museum. Twining and the
local British consul visited there,
where the director revealed cupboards
containing 2,000 human skulls while
informing the visitors only 84 were
from German East Africa. He also
claimed no other institution in Ger-
many had skulls from that region.
The skulls were arranged accord-
ing to their “cephalic indices.” For
once the outmoded theories of head
measurement proved useful. Mea-
surements of the heads of Adam Sapi
and his family all fell into Group 71
and, among the skulls belonging to
that group, one was discovered with
strategy & tactics 31
 For Your Information
a bullet hole in the temple and signs
of injury by a sharp object. Forensic
study suggested the hole was caused
by a bullet of the type used by Ger-
man colonial forces in the 1890s. The
sheen of the skull accorded with the
story of the head having been dried
and preserved in alcohol, and the con-
dition of the teeth appeared to match
what was known about Mkwawa. A
report and photos were sent to Sapi,
who deemed the skull to be that of his
grandfather.
Not Their Finest Hour
The Royal Navy’s Efforts in the Pacific War
The British Pacific Fleet in World
War II represented the most powerful
single naval striking force assembled
by Britain in the course of that war
and was, in fact, likely as powerful
as any force assembled by the Royal
Navy (RN) at any time in its history.
By early 1945 the British Pacific Fleet
consisted of six modern battleships,
six new fleet aircraft carriers, 10 light
carriers, 20 cruisers and nearly 100
destroyers and other escort vessels,
along with scores of lighter craft and
supply ships. Yet one searches in vain
in most histories of the Pacific War
for even a mention of that formidable
armada. The truth is, while elements
of that British force were present
in the late battles in the Central and
North Pacific, they played at best a
marginal role there. And why that was
true makes an interesting footnote to
World War II naval history.
In December-February of 1941
the British suffered several major
defeats at the hands of the Japanese,
losing the Repulse and Prince of
Wales along with their great base of
Singapore. In response, London sent
naval reinforcements from the Medi-
terranean and the Home Fleets. These
amounted to several older battleships
and aircraft carriers, eight cruisers
32 #238
On 19 June 1954 the skull was
formally returned to the Hehe, in a
dramatic ceremony in front of 30,000
people, some of whom had walked
100 miles to take part. The skull was
placed in a mausoleum in Kalenga,
and the Hehe sent several tribal
artifacts to the Bremen museum in
gratitude. Today the skull has been re-
moved by the Hehe to a more secure
location, but a museum to Mkwawa
remains, documenting the campaigns
of the African tribal chief and the
strange story of his skull, which fea-
tured in the unlikeliest of places—the
Treaty of Versailles.
—Brendan Whyte
and some destroyers, all under the
command of Adm. James Somerville
and forming the Far East Fleet based
in Ceylon. The Japanese battleship-
carrier strike force under Adm. Na-
gumo sortied into the Indian Ocean in
April 1942, but Somerville declined
battle. When Japanese airstrikes on
Ceylon and India did substantial dam-
age and sank a carrier and two cruis-
ers, Somerville withdrew farther west
to Mombassa on the coast of West
Africa, conceding to the Japanese the
East Indian Ocean. Instead of engag-
ing the Japanese at a disadvantage, he
concentrated on protecting the Allied
supply route to the Middle East.
In mid-1942 the Japanese turned
their attention to the Southwest Pa-
cific and, with the threat to the Indian
Ocean substantially reduced, many of
the British capital ships in the Indian
Ocean returned to the Mediterranean.
For the next two years, Japan contin-
ued to threaten much of the Indian
Ocean with light forces and subma-
rines, including a flotilla of German
U-boats based in Penang.
In early 1944 the situation again
changed. The war in the Atlantic was
going so well the British were able
to reinforce their Far East Fleet to a
strength of three battleships (Queen
Skull of Chief Mkwawa on display
at the Mkwawa Memorial Museum,
Kalenga, near Iringa.
Elizabeth, Valiant and Renown),
a fleet carrier (Illustrious), eight
cruisers and other supporting units.
Several new state of the art battle-
ships and fleet carriers were ticketed
for future assignment to the growing
Far East Fleet. Churchill pushed hard
for early offensive action against
the Andaman Islands in the eastern
Indian Ocean (Operation Buccaneer),
Burma (Operation Bullfrog) and
Sumatra (Operation Culverin), but
those plans also required substantial
ground forces, sea-lift capacity for
amphibious invasion, and enormous
stockpiles of supplies, none of which
were available in India.
In February 1944 the Japanese
shifted much their remaining surface
fleet—seven battleships, two fleet
carriers, four heavy cruisers and ac-
companying destroyers—to Singa-
pore from Truk to avoid American
air attacks. That worried Somerville,
and he requested and got an American
carrier, Saratoga, to reinforce his na-
val airpower. Still, the Japanese made
no offensive move, nor did the Royal
Navy.
The new British fleet was slow to
assemble. Most of the veteran units
had seen heavy duty in other theaters.
They required refits before beginning
 For Your Information
a new campaign, while the newer
units were still training. Nearly all the
British carrier aircraft were replaced
by new American models—Corsair
and Hellcat fighters and Avenger
torpedo bombers—and that involved
retraining RN pilots.
By late 1944 the British finally
felt strong enough to move offensive-
ly. In January 1945 the Far East Fleet
was split into two commands. Left
at Ceylon was the East Indies Fleet,
built around two older battleships,
Queen Elizabeth and Renown, four
escort carriers, nine cruisers, and two
dozen destroyers under Adm. Arthur
Power. The bulk of the force went to
a second new command, the British
Pacific Fleet (or BPF), under Adm.
Bruce Fraser, which was to home-port
in Australia with an intermediate sup-
port base at Manus in the Admiralty
Islands.
Initially the BPF was composed
of the battleship King George V,
fleet carriers Indomitable, Victorious,
Indefatigable and Illustrious, three
cruisers and 10 destroyers. Admiralty
plans called for the BPF to be rein-
forced over time with two more new
fleet carriers, Implacable and Glori-
ous, and five more battleships, Anson,
Howe, Duke of York (all new), Nelson
and the French Richelieu, along with
several score light carriers, cruisers,
destroyers and numerous other craft,
amounting to over 200 ships.
It had become clear the closing
battles of the war would be fought
in waters near the home islands of
Japan. Churchill was intent on dem-
onstrating Britain was still a major
power in the Pacific by having the
Royal Navy play an important role in
that final campaign. London intended
the BPF to be a full partner with the
Americans in the Pacific naval cam-
paigns in 1945 if for no other reason
than to restore the British Empire’s
prestige in the Far East. After refuel-
ing and re-supplying the BPF in
Australia, on 15 March 1945, second-
in-command Adm. Phillip Rawlings
formally reported his command of
two battleships, four fleet carriers,
five cruisers and nine destroyers to
Adm. Nimitz as ready for duty. On
the 23 March he sailed north to join
the action off Okinawa as Task Force
57 within the US Navy’s (USN) Third
Fleet.
The RN task force participated
in the invasion of Okinawa and in
air and surface gunfire attacks on the
Japanese home islands in the remain-
ing six months of the war. The BPF
lost no ships but did suffer numerous
Kamikaze hits. British carriers had
steel decks and so were better pro-
tected against the suicide airplanes.
The BPF never exceeded four fleet
carriers and two battleships on station
at any one time, and maintaining even
that force level proved difficult owing
to logistics and other missions. The
BPF did all US Adm. Halsey asked
of it, but mostly performed support
tasks. The official history of the BPF
states its most important contribution
to the Pacific War might well have
been the destruction by its carrier
planes of the major Japanese oil
refinery and depot at Palembang in
the East Indies, carried out while the
fleet was still enroute from the Indian
Ocean to Australia.
That official history also illus-
trates the difference in scale of the
two naval wars—the Pacific and
everywhere else. Powerful as the BPF
would have been in any other theater
of the war, it amounted to just one
of four tasks forces in Halsey’s fleet,
which itself was but one of several
US Pacific fleets. Even accepting the
BPF could never have been anything
like an equal partner with the USN in
terms of numbers, the official history
also notes its performance left much
to be desired. the much larger BPF the British had
The BPF was responsible for its
own logistical support, and the offi-
cial history attributes many of its dif-
ficulties to that fact: “It is impossible
to escape the obvious conclusion...
the resources of the British Empire
were incapable of providing the ships,
bases and facilities necessary to
maintain adequately the Pacific Fleet
operating as it was...at great distances
from the main base.”
A supply and support train, such
as the US Navy had created to sup-
port fleet units on station, could not
be put together quickly, if indeed at
all, given Britain’s depleted resources.
The official US Navy history says
the British squadrons were “short-
legged,” meaning they were unsuited
to long cruises with no re-supply or
refits for months. The Royal Navy
had operated primarily in the North
Atlantic and Mediterranean, where
distances from bases didn’t begin
to match the vastness of the Pacific.
It hadn’t been necessary for the RN
to develop an extensive fleet supply
train, or master the tricky technol-
ogy of refueling while underway at
15 knots, and its ships lacked the
personnel and equipment needed to
make major repairs at sea. The BPF
could stay on station for three to four
weeks at most, and individual ships
were constantly dropping out sooner
than that. It’s therefore inconceivable
planned could have been supported
logistically.
There was an even more serious
problem concerning BPF—carrier
aviation. US carrier groups planned
for a monthly loss of 20 percent of
their planes when heavily engaged,
with the losses quickly made up with
replacements flown in from support-
ing escort carriers. The BPF’s losses
in the 24 strike days off Okinawa
(March-April 1945) amounted to
over 80 percent of its entire aircraft
establishment. Those heavy losses
continued in later operations. For
example, Implacable lost 28 percent
strategy & tactics 33
 For Your Information
of her strike force on July 24-25, TURKISH GETTYSBURG
and some 20 percent conducting
her last action on 10 August. Taken THE BATTLE OF THE SAKARYA RIVER
altogether, British aircraft losses were
Some battles decide not simply persons died of this monkey’s bite.”
50 percent higher than comparable
the outcome of wars but the existence With ambitions for a new Hel-
American ones.
of nations, such as Hastings, Wa- lenic empire in Asia Minor, the king
The official history of the BPF terloo, Gettysburg and the Battle of escalated Greece’s occupation role
attributes he loss rates partly to their Britain. One of the least known such into an invasion of Anatolia. After
lack of “electronic counter-measures, battles was fought from 23 August two failed offensives, some 126,000
stand-off weapons and fragmentation to 14 September 1921, along the Greeks—with superiorities of 410 to
bombs,” which the Americans used Sakarya River in west-central Turkey. 160 cannon and 4,000 machineguns
successfully to suppress Japanese
Turkey was prostrate from its to 700—broke through Turkish lines
radar and anti-aircraft defenses. It was
defeat in World War I, bankrupt, on 10 July 1921 to capture the strate-
also true many BPF pilots were new
dismembered and with a quarter of its gic rail center of Eskishehir.
and lacked experience in attacking
population dead from fighting, famine In reaction, Kemal shot hundreds
well defended ground targets. They
and disease. The capital city of of deserters, ruthlessly requisitioned
had the bad luck to get their on-the-
Constantinople was Allied-occupied. supplies from the civil population,
job-training when the Japanese were
The victorious Allies imposed on the and ordered his troops to dig in along
fighting desperately in defense of
Sultan and his client government a the Sakarya River to make a final
their home islands. More, the relative
treaty that stripped Turkey itself of 75 stand just 50 miles from his capital
unfamiliarity of the British pilots
percent of its territory and effectively of Ankara. Halide Edip, who served
and crews with their new Corsairs,
left the remainder under foreign con- in his headquarters during the battle,
Hellcats and Avengers made for
trol. later said Kemal “was not quite sure
frequent crashes on landing. The
overarching truth probably is that the “But,” as Winston Churchill that this would lead to victory, and he
BPF was rushed into combat without would later write of this episode, saw that he had to die with the rest if
an adequate training and shake-down “among the stern hills and valleys of the disaster took place.”
period. the Turkish homeland in Anatolia, For 22 days the Greeks battled
there dwelt the company of poor 90,000 Turks in ridges and hills 60
In sum, the official history of the
men…who would not see it settled so; miles along the Sakarya River. “The
Royal Navy in World War II man-
and at their bivouac fires at this mo- fighting was fierce and murderous,”
ages a positive ending note: “The
ment sat in the rags of a refugee the wrote Kemal’s biographer Lord
renewal and strengthening of mutual
august Spirit of Fair Play.” Embody- Kinross. Kemal ordered: “Not one
confidence between the sea services
ing that spirit was the man Churchill inch of Turkish soil will be surren-
of the two principle maritime nations
said, “ranks with the four or five dered until it is drenched in Turkish
will stand as the greatest of the ac-
outstanding figures of the cataclysm”: blood!” Bleeding most profusely was
complishments of the British Pacific
Mustafa Kemal, later known as the 5,000-man officer corps Kemal
Fleet.”
Ataturk (Father of the Turks, 1881- had created. Of them, 300 were killed
That’s probably a fair claim, and 1938). and more than another 1,000 were
the experience was also important for
A combination of patriot, soldier, wounded. Kemal would later say it
another reason: it marked the clear
statesman and libertine, Kemal was indeed “an officer’s battle.”
transition in global naval supremacy.
organized a resistance movement and The Greeks crossed the river,
The best fleet Britain could contribute
rival government in Anatolia, routed taking the important heights of Mount
to the Pacific War was only a support-
the Sultan’s forces in a brief civil war, Mangal the first night, then advanced
ing player to American naval power.
and attacked British positions near foot by bloody foot up the hills and
The future of naval warfare would
Constantinople. The French and Ital- ridge lines along the Sakarya a mile a
henceforth be dominated by the ap-
ians were prepared to withdraw, but day for 10 days toward the key Mount
plication of large-scale, expensive,
British Prime Minister David Lloyd Chal. “Until they occupy the Mount
high-technologies that were beyond
George was determined to persevere, Chal there is nothing to worry about,”
Britain’s resource. So it was in 1945,
and found an ironic enforcer for said Kemal, “but if they do that, we
and so it remained through the long
Imperial policy in the King of Greece, had better look out.”
decades of the next global struggle,
Constantine I. Constantine had been When the Greeks did take it,
the Cold War with the Soviet Union.
ousted by the Allies during the war Halide Edip wrote: “There was grim
 Warren C. Robinson as pro-German, then returned when silence everywhere, and the ugliest
his son and successor died of blood sort of fate seemed to hang over ev-
poisoning after being bit by his pet eryone in the headquarters…[Kemal]
monkey. Churchill was to observe of tormented himself with indecision as
that: “It is perhaps no exaggeration to whether he should order the retreat
to remark that a quarter of a million or not.”
34 #238
 In a speech a few weeks later, Kemal claimed: “For
an army that keeps its head, a single position is of no
importance…Accordingly, our army was not worried by
The Long Tradition:
the loss of Mount Chal.” Still, he ordered a counterattack.
And so Chal Dag [“dag” = mountain. Ed.] was taken back
50 issues ago, S&T 188:
six days later, and Kemal continued the counteroffensive. Army Group South. The issue game
He later described how the hills were “lively with the was a reprint of two scenarios from the
lugubrious intonation of artillery and the nervous tic-tac halcyon days of SPI, Kiev and Ros-
of machineguns. Through the field glass I could see men tov, with the lead article being Joseph
coming nearer and nearer and even the fall of the men in
Miranda’s analysis of the Eastern Front.
the front line, leaving it indented and broken, and the final
onslaught with bayonets. Thus the ants take their exercises Elsewhere in the Big One, Arnold Blum-
around the small yellow mounds of their nests.” berg wrote about Anvil-Dragoon, the
The Greeks were by that time short of food, water and invasion of southern France. Britain Train
ammunition. Their supply lines, overextended and other- made the long march with the Chinese
wise inadequate, were repeatedly cut by Turkish cavalry civil wars, and Michael Holmes looked
raiders. Kemal’s deputy, Ismet, had fought the Greek com- at German defensive doctrine in the 20th
mander, Gen. Anastasios Papoulas, in an earlier offensive century.
and knew the latter was prone to lose his nerve: “Papoulas
avoided disaster. But he never won a battle.”
And the Greek commander chose in the end to continue
100 Issues Ago, S&T 138:
that record. He recommended withdrawal the day after he Eylau. Ken Broadhurst designed a quick and
had taken Chal Dag. Turkish losses were 3,700 dead and dirty wargame of Napoleon’s winter battle
18,000 wounded, against 4,000 Greek dead and 19,000 with the Russians that turned into the
wounded. Traveling with the Greeks as a correspondent, Emperor’s first stalemate, while Raymond
historian Arnold Toynbee wondered: “Would a Greek army Bell wrote the article on the same topic.
penetrate that distance into Anatolia again?”
Then Stephen B. Patrick plunged into a
The answer was “no.” After several more defeats, the
millennia of war, treachery and civiliza-
Greek army entirely evacuated Anatolia via the port of
Smyrna a year later. Kemal’s forces either torched, or let
tion with the Byzantine Empire.
fires consume, the Greek and Armenian quarters of the
town and slaughtered thousands of its inhabitants. The
debacle brought down Lloyd George in Britain. It also led
150 Issues Ago, S&T 88:
to a revolution in Athens that sent the king into final exile British Army of the Rhine. The
while his prime minister and other officials faced a firing redoubtable Chuck Kamps contributed to
squad. In Lausanne, Switzerland, Ismet negotiated a new S&T’s NATO series with the British sec-
peace treaty, no doubt one of the best ever secured by a tor in that great World War III that never
defeated nation, which restored Turkey’s independence and quite broke out. The prolific Al Nofi then
secured its modern boundaries.
stood with Prince Hal and Joan of Arc in
Years later, when he was President of Turkey, Kemal his article on the Hundred Years War. And
was presented a heroic-scale painting of the Battle of the
FYI continued the tradition of military
Sakarya River, but angrily rejected it: “All those who took
part in the battle know very well that our horses were all trivia.
skin and bone and that we were hardly any better our-
selves. Skeletons all of us. In painting those fine warriors 200 Issues Ago, S&T 38:
and sleek horses, you dishonor Sakarya, my friend.”
 John W. Osborn, Jr.
CA. “CA” stands for heavy cruiser, and the
issue game was Dave Isby’s design of the
same name covering tactical level ship
DATA FILE: to ship combat in the Pacific Theater of
American Ships of the Line Operations, WWII. It was sort of like
For two centuries—from 1650 to 1850—a nation’s Panzerblitz on the high seas. Then Al Nofi
naval prestige was measured by its ships-of-the-line. wrote about the Gettysburg campaign,
Ships-of-the-line were wooden sailing vessels with at least putting the big battle into the bigger
two full gun decks and mounting a total of 64 or more picture, while Sid Sackson reviewed non-
cannon. They were capable of standing in a line-of-battle wargame games out of the wrapper.
and contending for command of the sea. The United States
became an independent country only in the latter half of
this era, and had a real navy only in the last half-century of
the age of fighting sail.
Still, between 1776 and 1850 various US administra-
tions authorized construction of 23 ships-of-the line, and
continues next page
strategy & tactics 35
 For Your Information
built 15. Some proved little more than
“nice tries,” useful only as learning
experiences in naval architecture.
Others were examples of their type’s
finest designs: heavily armed yet fast
and maneuverable. All but two of the
US ships-of-the line, those two built
on the Great Lakes, were designed by
three men: Joshua Humphries, a self-
taught naval architect who designed
the frigates Constitution and Constel-
lation, his son, Samuel Humphries,
and John Doughty, a protégé of
Humphries. The American ships-of-
the-line were as follows.
America Class: three authorized, one
built
Designer: Joshua Humphries
Tonnage: 1,982
Dimensions: 183’6” x 50’6” x 23’
Rating: 74 guns
Intended Armament: 30 x 18-pound
guns, 32 x 12-pound long guns,
and 14 x 9-pound long guns.
The Continental Congress authorized
construction of three ships-of-
the-line in November 1776, to be
built in Portsmouth, Boston and
Philadelphia. Only the Portsmouth
ship was built.
America
Keel Laid: May 1777
Launched: 5 November 1782
John Paul Jones superintended con-
struction. The ship was given to
France to replace the Magnifique
(74) wrecked at Boston. The ship
sailed to France in 1783. Lighter
than French 74s, built of inferior
wood and a poor sailer, America
was laid up at Brest until broken
up in 1786.
1799 Class: six authorized
Designers: Joshua & Samuel
Humphries
Tonnage: 1,859
Dimensions: 183 ’x 48’6” x 19’6”
Rating: 74 guns
Intended Armament: 74 x 32-pound
long guns
The quasi-war with France motivated
Congress to authorize funding
for six 74-gun ships-of-the-line
on 25 February 1799. Materials
36 #238
were assembled, but the war‘s end
also ended the need to build these
ships. They were never begun.
Their materials were eventually
used in the Independence class
ships.
Independence Class: four authorized
and built
Designer: Samuel Humphries
Tonnage: 2,243
Dimensions: 190’10” x 54’7.5” x 25’
Rating: 74 guns
Intended Armament: 30 x long
32-pound cannon, 33 x medium
32-pound cannon, 24 x 32-pound
carronades.
Authorized: 2 January 1813, as a re-
sult of the War of 1812. Only one
completed before war’s end. Ships
of the class were as follows.
Independence
Keel Laid: August 1813
Launched & Commissioned: 22 June
1814
Service as a ship-of-the-line: 1814-22
Converted 1836, thereafter a 54-gun
frigate. Then a receiving ship:
1854-1912. Disposed: 1913. The
first ship-of-the-line finished for
the US Navy, a design flaw put
its lower gun ports only three feet
above the water. The lower deck
had to be caulked shut when cruis-
ing. It was converted to a success-
ful large frigate by removing the
upper gun deck.
Washington
Keel Laid: May 1813
Launched: 1 October 1814
Commissioned: 26 August 1815
Service as ship-of-the-line: August
1815-20
Broken Up: 1843
Served as the Mediterranean flagship
1816-18.
Franklin
Keel Laid: 1814
Launched: 21 August 1815
Commissioned: 20 October 1817
Service as ship-of-the-line: 1817-24
A Receiving Ship: 1843-53
Broken Up: 1853
Franklin served on two foreign
cruises: the Mediterranean, 1818-
20; and the Pacific 1821-24.
Columbus
Keel Laid: May 1816
Launched: 1 March 1819
Commissioned: 29 November 1819
Service as ship-of-the-line: 1819-21 &
1845-48
Burned: April 1861.
Delayed due to the destruction of the
Washington Navy Yard in 1814,
Columbus’s design was then
modified to improve its buoy-
ancy. Initial armament was 68 x
long 32-pound cannon and 24 x
42-pound carronades. Served as
Mediterranean flagship 1820-21
and on the 1846 expedition to
Japan. Supported naval operations
along the Pacific coast during the
Mexican-American War. Burned in
Norfolk to prevent capture by the
Confederates during the Civil War.
Great Lakes Class: two authorized and
built
Designers: Henry Eckford, Adam &
Noah Brown
Tonnage: 2,805
Dimensions: 204’ x 56’ x 24’
Rating: 74 guns
Intended Armament: 63 x long 32-
pound cannon, 24 x 32-pound
carronades.
Congress authorized construction of
ships-of-the-line for the Great
Lakes on 3 March 1813. Construc-
tion started in January 1815, and
was completed in 42 days. The war
then ended, and neither ship was
launched. Both sat on the stocks
for many years.
New Orleans
Keel Laid: January 1815
Hull Completed: March 1815
Sold: 24 September 1883
Chippewa
Keel Laid: January 1815
Hull Completed: March 1815
Sold: 1 November 1833
North Carolina Class: seven autho-
rized and built
Designer: William Doughty
Tonnage: 2,633 (Ohio 2,757)
Dimensions: 196’3 ”x 53’ x 21’6”
(Ohio 197’ x 2”)
 For Your Information
Rating: 74 guns
Intended Armament: 32 x 42-pound
long guns, 32 x 32-pound long
guns, 30 x 42-pound carronades.
(In practice, each ship carried a
different battery.)
These were among “nine ships to rate
not less than 74 guns” authorized
by Congress on 29 April 1816
(including reauthorizing the
Columbus). The Navy intended to
complete the hulls and leave them
on the stocks as a reserve to be
drawn on in the event of war. All
hulls were completed before 1825,
but some were not launched until
the Civil War, and then as store
ships. Only three saw service as
ships-of-the-line.
North Carolina
Keel Laid: February 1818
Launched: 7 September 1821
Commissioned: 24 June 1824
Service as ship-of-the-line: 1824-27
& 1836-39.
Receiving ship: 1839-65
Sold: October 1867.
The North Carolina served as Medi-
terranean flagship in the 1820s and
Pacific Squadron flagship in the
1830s, then became the receiving
ship of the New York Naval Yard.
Ohio
Keel Laid: November 1817
Launched: 30 May 1820
Commissioned: 11 October 1838
Service as a ship-of-the-line: 1838-41
& 1847-50
Receiving Ship: 1850-75
Sold: October 1883
Served as Mediterranean flagship on
first cruise; supported naval opera-
tions in the Gulf during the Mexi-
can-American War, and flagship
of the Brazil station on second
cruise. Receiving ship at Boston
Navy Yard thereafter. In 1847 the
armament was amended to 12 x
8” shell guns (four per deck), 28 x
long 42-pounders, 32 x 32-pound
guns and a dozen x 32-pound
gunnades (carronades mounted on
rotating platforms).
Delaware
Keel Laid: August 1817
Launched: 21 October 1820
Commissioned: 27 March 1827
Service as ship-of-the-line: 1827-30
& 1833-36 & 1841-44.
Burned: Norfolk, 1861.
Delaware served its first two cruises
in the Mediterranean Squadron,
and the third as flagship of the
Brazil Squadron.
Vermont
Keel Laid: September 1818
Hull completed 1825
Launched: 15 September 1848
Recommissioned: 30 January 1862 as
depot ship.
Struck from Navy list 19 December
1901.
Vermont was commissioned to serve
as the depot for the Union squad-
ron at Port Royal, SC. Relieved
July 1864, it then served as a
receiving ship at New York until
October 1865, and again from
1884 to 1901.
Alabama (renamed New Hampshire
1863, Granite State 1904)
Keel Laid: June 1819
Hull completed 1825
Launched: 24 April 24 1864
Commissioned: 13 May 1864 as a
depot ship.
Training Ship: 1866-1921
Burned: 23 May 1921
Relieved Vermont as depot ship off
Port Royal. After the Civil War
served as a navy depot a train-
ing ship until 1892, when it was
assigned to the New York State
Naval Militia, where it served as a
training ship thereafter.
New York
Keel Laid: March 1820
Hull Completed 1825
Never launched. Burned on stocks,
Norfolk Navy Yard, April 1861.
Virginia
Keel Laid: May 1822
Hull Completed 1825
Never launched. Broken-up on stocks,
Boston Navy Yard, April 1884.
Pennsylvania Class: one authorized
and built
Designer: Samuel Humphries
Tonnage: 3,105
Dimensions: 210’ x 56’9” x 24’
Rating: 120
Intended Armament: 16 x 8” shell
guns and 80 x 32-pound long
guns, 24 x 32-pound gunnades.
Keel Laid: September 1821
Launched: 18 July 18 1837
Commissioned: 28 November 1837
Service as ship-of-the-line: 1837-38
Receiving ship Norfolk Navy Yard
1842-61
Burned, Norfolk, 1861
Built in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
was intended as a four-deck “su-
per” ship-of-the-line, but proved
too expensive to operate and man.
After a cruise from Philadelphia
to Norfolk, the ship used only as a
receiving ship thereafter.
Of the 15 ships-of-the-line com-
pleted, 11 were launched, and only
eight served as ships-of-the-line in the
United States Navy. Except for a brief
period in 1819-20, when the USN
had four ships-of-the-line in commis-
sion, rarely were more than two at sea
at any one time. The last cruise of a
ship-of-the-line as a warship ended in
1850. Thereafter they served as depot
ships.
Had a maritime war broken out
between 1824 and 1836, the US Navy
could have fielded a squadron of one
120-gun and eleven 74-gun ships.
Eight of these could have individu-
ally matched any other warship in the
world. For those interested in what-if
scenarios, a squadron action between
the US and a European power during
those years offers tantalizing pos-
sibilities. After 1836, scrapping and
conversion of the older ships, com-
bined with the rise of steam powered
vessels, made the appearance of an
American ship-of-the-line squadron
problematical.
 Mark N. Lardas
strategy & tactics 37
 Works In Progress
Cold War Battles II:
Battle for Kabul, 1979
Cold War Battles II is the sequel to Cold War Bat-
tles, which appeared in S&T 235. CWB II will include two
games, one of which will be a hypothetical US vs Warsaw
Pact title. I’m currently working on the other design: Battle
for Kabul, 1979. It covers the Soviet seizure of the Afghan
capital in December of that year, and it presents an interest-
ing study in the Soviet army’s rapid deployment capabilities.
The Soviets launched a coup in the Afghan capital as the first
stage of their invasion of the whole country. Things gener-
ally went off as planned, but there was resistance. Quick ac-
tion by Soviet commanders, and some skullduggery on the
part of their advisers, neutralized much of the Afghan op-
position. Even so, there was some hard fighting and things
could have gone radically different.
The Soviets have an interesting mix of forces. Lead-
ing the assault are elements of the 103rd and 105th Guards
Airborne Divisions. They were actually quasi-mechanized
formations; so the Soviets have some real offensive power.
Also in the fray are several special operations units, includ-
ing the super-secret KGB Alpha Group. The Soviets have to
seize critical government buildings and airfields within the
city of Kabul, then hold them until arrival of their overland
relief force.
The Afghans have a variety of units, ranging from some
effective Presidential Guard armored and airborne forma-
tions to totally ineffective line troops. If the Afghans can
hold long enough, additional reinforcements march in from
off map. There are a couple divisions within range of Ka-
bul that Soviet forces must block before they get involved.
To make life more difficult for Moscow, Afghan “uprising”
units may be generated by random events, and they can ham-
per Soviet lines of communication.
The map will show all of Kabul, including an inset show-
ing the critical Salang Tunnel north of the city. The Soviets
have to seize the tunnel and hold it until the 108th Motorized
Rifle Division drives in from the USSR (the 108th is also
known as the 360th MRD).
S&T Upcoming Features
#239 Winged Horse: US airmobile forces take on the Viet Cong and NVA in Vietnam, 1965-66.
#240 1066: Multi-player struggle for England in the turning point of the Middle Ages.
#241 Twilight of the Ottomans: The entire Great War in the Middle East.
#242 They Died With Their Boots On 2: Pershing versus Pancho Villa and Mad Anthony Wayne
against the Indians of the Ohio Valley.
#243 Manila ‘45: Stalingrad of the Pacific, as the Japanese make a last stand in the Philippine capital.
#244 Drive on Moscow: Special double-sized game.
Visit www.decisiongames.com for previews of these issues.
38 #238
Units are Soviet battalions, with the Afghans shown as
regiments and brigades. Artillery can fire at range. There are
some special rules for engineers and Spetsnaz troops; plus
the Soviets get some airpower and helicopters.
The game uses unknown unit strengths. All units are de-
ployed face down with only their type and movement fac-
tor showing. Players don’t know their units’ actual combat
strengths until the first time they’re committed to combat.
The Soviets have a good idea as to their unit strengths: the
airborne are generally effective, while the mechanized in-
fantry are low quality reservists. The Afghans have a more
extreme order or battle. Some of their units have combat
strengths of “0,” meaning they’re removed from play when
revealed. Others fight fiercely.
An optional rule brings in US intervention forces: any-
thing from Delta Force to a brigade of the 82nd Airborne can
drop in.
All in all, Kabul ‘79 is a new look at the much wargamed
Soviet army in action.
—Joseph Miranda
Correction for Best Articles of 2005:
The second best article was: The Russian Navy in
World War I by Stephen Thomas (not James Gordon as
originally listed) that appeared in #229. We apologize
for the error.
Next Issue
Winged Horse: The Vietnam War, 1965-66. The first 20 weeks of
the era of massive US intervention into the Second Indo-China War.
This hobby edition wargame is a theater-wide simulation of the time
in which the US 1st Air Cavalry Division first arrived. Refight the Ia
Drang and A Shau Valley campaigns, and much more.
Future articles: Hannibal’s last stand at Zama; Taranto 1940, the air
raid that laid the groundwork for Pearl Harbor; and the Israeli attack on
Iraq’s nuclear plant in 1981.

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strategy & tactics 39
 The Chimurenga War:
The Rhodesian Insurgency 1966-1980
By James C. Gordon

40 #238
 The insurgency of Zimbabwean nationalist forces
against the Rhodesian government began with the
struggle for power between a black majority and a
white minority, the latter with disproportionate access
to land, resources and political power. The Rhodesian
insurgency proved to be one of the more enduring con-
flicts of the Cold War, though it didn’t directly pit the
communist powers against the West.
Rhodesia itself had been established as a Brit-
ish colony by none other than imperial magnate Ce-
cil Rhodes in the 1890s. It became a self-governing
colony in 1923, and supported the British Empire in
two world wars. In 1953 the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland was formed to include the territory that
now makes up the countries of Zimbabwe, Zambia
and Malawi. In the wake of the nationalism that swept
Africa following World War II, the British government
favored a transition to majority rule in all of its colo-
nies. De-colonization didn’t sit well with Rhodesia’s The last colonial rebellion: Rhodesian police waiting for the
white minority, who saw it as an invitation to chaos. announcement of UDI.
After considerable debate and disagreement over the
future governance of Rhodesia, Ian Smith, leader of gave support to the rebels, but it was not nearby. Only
the ruling conservative Rhodesian Front Party, pub- Zambia, to Rhodesia’s north and bordering directly on
lished the Unilateral Declaration of Independence the country, was ruled by an African government sym-
(UDI) on 11 November 1965. With Salisbury as its pathetic to the insurgents.
capital, Rhodesia would go it alone. Militarily the Rhodesians had armed forces that
were well suited to the task ahead. Among other things,
UDI
Rhodesians had served with distinction alongside Brit-
UDI was the first open rebellion by a British co- ish forces in the successful counter-insurgency in Ma-
lonial administration since the American Revolution. laya. So there was a pool of veterans with experience
Given the international opposition to the continuation in small unit operations in the “bush.”
of European imperialism in the 1960s, Rhodesia in ef-
Two Nationalist organizations confronted the Salis-
fect became an outlaw nation. For a brief period Salis-
bury government. Joshua Nkomo formed the Zimba-
bury was concerned about the possibility of British
bwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) after his National
military intervention. Instead, Britain imposed eco-
Democratic Party had been banned for rejecting the
nomic sanctions, with the United Nations doing the
1961 Rhodesian Constitution. ZAPU was supported
same. Only the Republic of South Africa supported
mainly by the Ndebele and Kalanga peoples. Dis-
Rhodesia, mainly as a buffer against African nation-
satisfaction with Nkomo’s leadership led Reverend
alism—and even that support wavered whenever it
Ndabaningi Sithole to split from ZAPU and form the
suited South Africa’s interests. The success or failure
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in August
of an independent Rhodesia therefore depended on the
1963, with Robert Mugabe as secretary. ZANU sup-
commitment to fight on by 7,000 white farmers and
port was based on the Shona people.
270,000 urban whites and Asians, plus a number of
foreign volunteers. Throughout the insurgency, personal, tribal and
ideological differences prevented a unified libera-
Between 3 and 4 million Africans lived by farming
tion front being formed against Smith’s government.
in the Tribal Trust Lands, and over 500,000 resided
in townships abutting the urban areas. The African ZAPU and ZANU mainly fought each other until July
population supplied a majority of the active duty po- 1964, when the first white farmer was killed. Soon
lice force, but those same tribesmen also presented the after, Nkomo, Sithole and Mugabe were arrested and
greatest source of recruits for the insurgency. sent to jail. Other leaders fled to Zambia, where the
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZAN-
While Rhodesia was largely isolated, there were
LA) was created as the military branch of ZANU. The
also several factors working for Salisbury. The flanks
Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) be-
of the country were well-covered: white-ruled South
came the armed wing of ZAPU.
Africa was to the south; the Portuguese colony of
Mozambique lay to the east; and Botswana was to “Chimurenga Day,” 28 April 1966, is commemo-
the west. The latter was sparsely populated and under rated by the nationalists as the official beginning of the
domination by South Africa, and was therefore not an insurgency. In a small skirmish know as the “Battle of
effective base for guerrillas. Julius Nyere’s Tanzania Sinoia,” seven insurgents were killed by Rhodesia’s
strategy & tactics 41
 British South African Police (BSAP). While a Rhode-
sian institution, the BSAP maintained its title from the
colonial period. The Nationalists called the new insur-
gency the “Chimurenga War” in order to associate the
conflict with the anti-British uprisings of the 1890s.
Line-up
Salisbury realized an armed insurgency would
overburden even a well established police force, and
so formed the Rhodesian Security Force (RSF) to co-
ordinate all military, police and paramilitary units. The
Rhodesian field forces included the all-white Rhode-
sia Light Infantry (RLI) and Special Air Service (SAS)
regiments, the mixed race Rhodesian African Rifles
(RAR), plus engineers, artillery and armored cars.
Most white reservists joined the mixed-race Rhodesia
Regiment. As in British Army tradition, the Rhodesia
Regiment consisted of several battalions that could be
fielded at any time. The air force had an assortment of
planes and helicopters, and the BSAP was supported
by additional paramilitary and volunteer police units.
The white government couldn’t win the hearts and
minds of the Africans without conceding the major-
ity rule that contradicted the premise of the UDI. The
counter-insurgency (or COIN) operations relied on
well trained, highly motivated, mobile field forces, plus
rural militias, to both suppress infiltration from outside
the borders and deal with guerillas internally. The tar-
get of a global embargo, the Rhodesians didn’t have
much in the way of armored fighting vehicles (AFVs),
heavy artillery or an air force, but all that worked in
their favor in one respect: a counter-insurgency is to a
large degree a light infantryman’s war. The RSF, then,
wasn’t burdened with heavy equipment that would
prove inefficient in fighting guerrillas. If nothing else,
Rhodesian police reservists waiting to escort a convoy.
42 #238
reliance on infantry over massed artillery and aerial
strikes avoided large-scale collateral damage to the ci-
vilian sector.
Rhodesia had to purchase weapons and ammuni-
tion illegally through third parties, such as South Af-
rica, or capture ordnance from the insurgents. It was
imperative the RSF make efficient use of all its limited
resources. Their best hope was a vigorous containment
strategy would inflict enough losses on the insurgents
they would prove too much for them to continue the
struggle. More, by holding out long enough, the Salis-
bury government could conceivably attain interna-
tional recognition, and that would end the economic
sanctions.
ZANU received support from the People’s Repub-
lic of China, and focused on political indoctrination,
infiltration and occupation of territory as the prerequi-
sites for mounting a direct uprising. ZAPU was spon-
sored by the Soviet Union, and aimed at building a
conventional army for a final assault after the Rhode-
sian Security Forces had been worn down.
While the balance of numbers seemed to favor
the insurgents, throughout the war the anti-govern-
ment forces were plagued by the competition between
ZANU and ZAPU. Both groups lacked logistic sup-
port, communications equipment and medical sup-
plies, which really they lacked the wherewithal for
protracted warfare. The Rhodesians could easily lo-
cate large rebel bands, while the smaller groups that
infiltrated the rural areas achieved little.
In one typical campaign, insurgents operated in the
farming area of Sipolilo for three months in 1968 until
the RSF discovered their camps and then killed or cap-
tured over 100 of their combatants. In July 1968, 91
insurgents in three groups crossed the frontier, heading
for Hartley and Lupane. The RSF carried out a series
of mobile ambushes that killed or captured 80 of those
invaders.
On 15 August 1967, ZAPU announced a military
alliance with the South African National Congress
(SAANC). That alliance brought about the deployment
of paramilitary police and reconnaissance (“Recce”)
units from the South African Defense Force (SADF)
into Rhodesia. The war seemed to be escalating, but
the RSF’s mobile ambushes proved effective and, by
1969, Salisbury believed the insurgents were defeated.
Consequently, Salisbury didn’t mobilize additional
African battalions, even though recruits were avail-
able and the call-ups could have lessened the burden
on the whites.
Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda pressured
ZAPU and ZANU to settle their differences or leave
his country. In 1971 he also deported 129 ZAPU
members to Rhodesia in order to pre-empt a possible
coup. James Chikerema, vice-president of ZAPU, es-
tablished the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
(FROLIZI) in 1971 and attempted to unify the other
Fire Forces, Selous Scouts & Mercs
In the early 1970s the RSF developed a tactic for vertical
envelopment called “Fire Force.” Mobile formations were
based in camps and used Alouette III helicopters as trans-
ports and gunships. The basic unit was a four-man “stick”
or half-section including a junior NCO, two riflemen (armed
with FN 7.62 mm rifles) and a machinegunner (with a MAG
7.62 mm machinegun). For the Rhodesians it was a “cor-
poral’s war,” because junior NCOs exercised considerable
responsibility in the bush.
Typically, troopers from the RLI, RAR, Selous Scouts
and SAS rotated through two-week or three-week tours with
Fire Force. They were constantly on call and could expect
almost daily action. Fire Force teams used rapid deployment
and quick strikes for maximum impact. Often a group of he-
licopters deployed with one aircraft as an airborne command
post, one or two more equipped as gunships, and others car-
rying troopers to track down the insurgents. Even against
superior numbers Fire Force was never defeated in battle, a
record of success attributable to their superior training, mo-
bility and firepower.
During that same period the RSF created two new spe-
cialized units. The Selous Scouts (named after a famous
game hunter, Frederick Courtney Selous) began as the
Tracker Combat Unit, and was then expanded to a full battal-
ion of volunteers. It was raised from combat veterans, most
of whom were black. Only one in seven applicants passed
the demanding indoctrination program. The unit conducted
a successful clandestine war by operating disguised as in-
surgents. Small teams of troopers would live off the land
while they located and stalked guerrillas, then attacked at an
opportune time. The Selous Scouts accounted for 68 percent
of the insurgents killed in Rhodesia.
The other new outfit was the Grey Scouts, a horse cavalry
formation that could pursue insurgents into less accessible ar-
eas. While cavalry might be considered anachronistic, the ani-
mals had advantages off-road and, if nothing else, they were
good for the troopers’ morale.
A steady stream of foreigners traveled to Rhodesia to join
its armed forces. The Rhodesian Light Infantry included up to
30 percent foreigners, primarily from Britain, South Africa and
the US. To avoid the indiscipline sometimes associated with
mercenaries (or “mercs,” to use the then-popular term), the
RSF required all foreigners to enlist formally in the Rhodesian
Army. Many received commissions as officers, but they were
all subordinate to the same training and discipline as Rhode-
sian citizens.
Throughout the Chimurenga war, the Rhodesian Security
Forces maintained a high kill ratio against the insurgents (or
“terrs” as the Rhodesians termed them, slang for “terrorists”).
That was in large part due to superior RSF training and plan-
ning. For example, insurgent guerillas were often not trained
to employ aimed fire with their weapons. Unprepared guerril-
las were no match for veteran RSF bush fighters. There were
also unquantifiable morale factors, with the RSF having the
edge owing to the sense of superiority originally engendered
during colonial rule. While the Rhodesians may have held the
tactical edge, the insurgents could outlast them on the political
front and, in the end, that was what mattered.
Bush warfare: Selous Scouts patrol
ford a stream.
strategy & tactics 43
 groups. Meanwhile, Bishop Abel Muzorewa created
the Zimbabwean African National Council (ZANC)
inside Rhodesia to try to unite the disparate elements
within the overall nationalist cause under one mod-
erate leadership. Muzorewa was relatively favored
by the white regime, but he lacked any real strength
among the dissidents.
Hearts & Minds
A more intense phase of the Chimurenga War be-
gan on 23 December 1972, when ZANLA forces at-
tacked Altena Farm from bases in the Tribal Trust
Lands. The Rhodesian government responded by
implementing a new strategy to deny support for the
insurgents. Salisbury began moving the rural populace
into protected villages (PV), reminiscent of the strate-
gic hamlet program attempted in Vietnam by the US.
The PV program, though, only inconvenienced the
African population without providing much protec-
tion, and the government lacked sufficient resources
to fulfill the promise of economic aid to the more than
500,000 civilians who were relocated. ZANLA forces
also infiltrated the PVs and used them as impromptu
bases.
The standard insurgent tactic was a quick hit-and-
run strike, which ZANLA insurgents used to launch
several attacks against farms in the Mangula, Cente-
nary and Shamva areas. White casualties were rare,
though, and the primary victims were the Africans who
lived near white-owned farms, particularly those who
didn’t support the insurgency. Most black Rhodesians
never took up arms, but neither were they strong sup-
44 #238
porters of the white government. They were caught in
the middle. Mistreatment by the insurgents increased
sympathy for the government, but it also demonstrat-
ed the RSF couldn’t protect the general populace. At
times during the conflict, the African populace was
also terrorized by government forces for aiding the na-
tionalists.
On 23 March 1973, ZAPU and ZANU estab-
lished a joint military command. Both insurgent or-
ganizations recognized the folly of confronting well
equipped Rhodesian and South African troops. Ac-
cordingly, ZIPRA resorted to a strategy of laying land-
mines along the border with Zambia. Between 1972
and 1980 the Rhodesians suffered 2,504 vehicle deto-
nations of landmines that killed 632 and injured 4,410.
The Rhodesians and South Africans also developed
ingenious ways to protect vehicles. Tires were filled
with water to absorb the blast and reduce the heat.
Steel deflector plates, sandbags, mine conveyor belt-
ing, and “V” shaped vehicle bodies deflected explo-
sions. Before long, the Rhodesian Army began laying
its own minefields to deter insurgent infiltration. Af-
ter the war, ZANLA estimated its forces had suffered
8,000 casualties from mines alone.
In December 1974, Nkomo, Sithole and Mugabe
were released after a decade in detention. Nkomo
wanted to talk with the Smith government; Sithole
maintained that negotiations were hopeless. There
were then only about 400 insurgents in Rhodesia with
another 5,500 outside the country. Most of the armed
guerillas followed Mugabe, who claimed he was the
“true leader” of ZANU. In fact, he was the only insur-
gent leader who lived in the field with his troops.
In 1974 a coup in Portugal led to the dissolution of
that nation’s centuries-old African empire. The Front
for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) then
quickly seized power in that neighboring country.
Rhodesia’s eastern border was suddenly open to infil-
tration. Then, after failed peace talks and a cease-fire
in December, South Africa bowed to pressure from
the US and withdrew its forces from Rhodesia. With
greater Chinese and Soviet support, company sized
insurgent units began to enter the northern and east-
ern regions. The Rhodesians were forced to institute
greater mobilization, which disrupted the economy
and undermined the morale of the white population.
Talk & Fight
Early in 1975 there were secret talks among Smith,
Muzorewa, Sithole and Nkomo. Later, Sithole was
arrested for plotting to kill his rivals. After being re-
leased, Sithole formed an another wing of the Zim-
babwean African National Council (ANC) called the
Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC). Muzorewa then
formed yet another wing of the ANC outside Rhode-
sia. Then Sithole returned to Rhodesia and announced
he had become a moderate and was opposed to further
terrorism. Muzorewa also returned and renamed his
faction the United African National Council (UANC).
Mugabe denounced both of them and formed the Zim-
babwe Reformed African National Council. Indirectly,
through all the shifting of names and alliances, the idea
of compromise between the forces of nationalism and
the Salisbury government began to emerge.
In June 1976, Rhodesian intelligence determined
insurgents would concentrate around a village near the
Mozambique border. Twelve infantry companies from
the Rhodesia Regiment, two engineer squadrons, a
mortar platoon, and 16 helicopters carried out Opera-
tion Newton. They cordoned off the area and, in a se-
ries of ambushes, killed or captured 39 insurgents. The
operational area proved too large to keep contained,
however; so most of the insurgents escaped.
By 1976, insurgent attacks, now from Botswana,
threatened the main railway from Rhodesia to South
Africa and prompted the construction of the Beit
Bridge-Rutenga Railway, which became Rhodesia’s
only outside transportation artery. Responding to the
threat from all sides, the security forces divided the
country into five primary Joint Operational Com-
mands (JOC), named Hurricane (northeast), Thrasher
(east), Repulse (south), Tangent (west), and Grapple in
the center. In addition, there were 17 smaller sub-JOC
commands, such as Splinter along Lake Kariba and
Salops in the Salisbury area. Operations by the RSF
were aimed at reducing the insurgent forces already
inside Rhodesia while also limiting the arrival of new
forces into the country.
White emigration began to work to counter suc-
cesses in the field, draining the country of is man-
power pool. Among other things, the government was
forced to increase the term of active duty from nine to
12 months in order to sustain the ranks of the security
forces.
Still, all was not well on the insurgent side. The
persistent rivalry between the guerrilla factions led
to open fighting in their training camps in Tanzania,
with over 600 deaths being the result. Then ZAPU,
ZANU and FROLIZI formed the Patriotic Front, fi-
nally creating the first semblance of a truly unified na-
tionalist movement. Angola, Botswana, Mozambique,
Tanzania and Zambia voiced their support for the co-
alition. Nkomo, Mugabe and Muzorewa were invited
by the British government to London for talks. Sithole
demanded to be included, claiming he, not Mugabe,
headed ZANU. Back in Rhodesia, Smith negotiated
with Sithole, Muzorewa and some tribal chiefs to join
the government, but the Patriotic Front accused those
leaders of collaboration and the effort was futile.
The Rhodesian Security Forces could still claim
they were winning in the field. The guerrillas had yet
to score anything resembling a major military victory,
nor was there had there been the equivalent of a “Tet”
style general offensive. By mid-1976 there were but
1,000 insurgents operating in Rhodesia. The bulk of
Great Zimbabwe?
While “Rhodesia” comes from the British colonial empire
builder Cecil Rhodes, “Zimbabwe” had its origins in the name for
the remains of an ancient city located within the country. This city
was the center of the Monomotapa Empire which dominated much
of southern Africa during the European Middle Ages. The city was
a center for trade, gold-working and civilization, though it later
was abandoned. European explorers marveled at the complexity
of Zimbabwe’s ruins, and to a generation of African nationalists,
“Zimbabwe” became a symbol of national pride.
the guerrillas, some 6,000 to 10,000, were in training
or base camps in Mozambique and Tanzania. And the
RSF was determined to keep them there.
Border War
Operation Long John began a campaign by the
security forces to take the offensive and disrupt the
insurgents before they entered Rhodesia. The “flying
column” attack became the standard tactic for cross-
border operations against the camps. Fifty-five soldiers
in armored cars, trucks and buses crossed the border
and hit an arsenal at Mapai. Several Rhodesians were
killed, but a large quantity of arms was captured. On
the return trip the column attacked the insurgent camp
at Chicualacuala and killed or wounded 37 more. For
Operation Eland, in August, another flying-column of
85 men from the RLI, RAC, SAS, Selous Scouts, and
Territorial units in 10 trucks and four armored cars at-
tacked the Nyadzonya camp in Mozambique. There
were 4,000 insurgents in the camp, and the RSF’s
surprise attack inflicted an estimated 2,000 casualties,
including non-combatants.
In March 1977 the Ministry of Combined Opera-
tions was created under Lt. Gen. Peter Walls to control
all aspects of the war effort. Operation Aztec, in May,
demonstrated how Rhodesia coped with the shortage
of military resources. Over 700 men crossed into Mo-
zambique at Gona-Re-Zhou. The 2nd Battalion, Rho-
desia Regiment, struck a ZANLA camp as a diversion,
while two RLI companies assaulted bases at Rio and
Madulo Pan. On 28 May a flying-column with 110
men and an 81 mm mortar group entered Mozambique.
That force was commanded by Capt. John Murphy, a
US Marine Corps Vietnam veteran. The Rhodesians
destroyed ZANLA camps at Jorge Do Limpopo before
advancing to Mapai. There they captured the airport as
well as arms, ammunition and vehicles.
Dakota aircraft were flown in to carry out the
weapons and bring in mechanics and drivers to recov-
er the vehicles and drive them back to Rhodesia. One
departing Dakota was shot down by an RPG-7 rocket,
and the column halted until the next morning when a
salvage team arrived by helicopter to retrieve all ser-
viceable equipment. Before retreating, Murphy led his
force 125 miles to Mabalane and there destroyed rail-
road bridges and stations.
strategy & tactics 45
 The negative publicity and the private protests
made by South Africa—which feared provoking a
wider war—curtailed further strikes across the border.
Among other things, South Africa withdrew its 50 he-
licopter pilots that had been flying for the Rhodesians.
Despite all the victories, then, Rhodesia’s military
edge was slipping.
The Balance Turns
By the late 1970s, the Rhodesian intelligence ser-
vice determined the kill ratio inside Rhodesia was
significantly less than the level of infiltration. Con-
sequently the guerrillas were on the way to gradually
building up a force that could openly challenge the
government. So Salisbury developed a new strategy
with four components: 1) protect mines, factories, key
farming areas, bridges and railways; 2) deny the Tribal
Lands to the insurgents by deploying auxiliaries and
using Fire Force, the latter now also using Dakota air
transports to parachute in teams; 3) increase border
control; and 4) raid Mozambique and Zambia to dis-
rupt insurgent bases, supplies and troop movements.
To make matters worse, whites were emigrating at
the rate of 2,000 per month. Belatedly, additional Af-
46 #238
rican battalions were mobilized by Salisbury, but they
were not put into the field fast enough nor trained well
enough to meet the growing need. Despite renewed
South African support, the RSF was becoming out-
numbered and ineffective. Large areas of the country
could still be patrolled but could no longer actually be
controlled. Fire Force paratroopers often had to jump
into combat on a daily basis. Some units were con-
ducting up to three operational jumps in a single day, a
record unequalled by any other airborne force.
Another new development was the creation of
the Security Force Auxiliaries (SFA) by the Special
Branch of the BSAP. In that arrangement, the govern-
ment offered amnesty to former insurgents, and 3,000
men enlisted in the SFA. There was one European ju-
nior NCO liaison for every 150 auxiliaries, but training
was minimal and leadership was lax. The SFA oper-
ated as a self-defense militia, living with the locals and
denying the Tribal Trust Lands as safe haven for the
insurgents. The Rhodesian security establishment re-
mained skeptical about the auxiliaries, seeing them as
unreliable and ill-disciplined. Nevertheless, the force
continued on page 48
Leaders of the Chimurenga War
The Nationalists
Robert Mugabe (1924-): After teaching at several schools Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole (1920-): Remembered as one of
and two colleges in Zambia and Ghana, Mugabe co-founded the founding fathers of the Zimbabwean nation, Reverend
the Zimbabwe African People’s Union in 1961. Later, he and Sithole, a Methodist minister, formed the Zimbabwe Af-
Reverend Sithole broke with Nkomo and formed the Zim- rican National Union and became the first president. As a
babwe African National Union, with Mugabe becaming its parliamentarian and political moderate, Sithole came close
secretary general. He to achieving the democratic hopes of many Zimbabweans.
spent 1964 to 1974 in jail, In the mid-1970s he lost control of ZANU to the more radi-
imprisoned by the white cal Mugabe. Sithole was branded a political sell-out for re-
government, and during pudiating armed struggle and accepting the 1978 Internal
that time he earned BA, Settlement with the white regime.
BS and LLB degrees by
correspondence from the
University of London. The Government
After his release, Mugabe
fled to Mozambique and Lt. Gen. Peter Walls (?-): After service in World War II, Walls
became the most active received a commission in the Black Watch. He resigned to
leader of the insurgency enlist as a corporal in the Rhodesia Army, was re-commis-
against white minority sioned and given command of C Squadron of the SAS in
rule. Among the national- Malaya. In November 1964 he assumed command of the
ist leaders, Mugabe was 1st Rhodesia Light Infantry. He was given command of the
the only one who lived in entire Rhodesian Army in 1972. He became commander of
the field with his troops combined operations in 1977, holding the rank of lieutenant
for any length of time. general and with responsibility for all Rhodesian military,
By 1977 he was president police, air and intelligence services.
of ZANU. Returning to Ian Smith (1919-): A hero to some for confronting the British
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in labor government, Smith was a villain to others for delaying
late 1979, he was elected majority rule. Educated at Chaplin High School, Gwelo, and
prime minister in 1980. Rhodes University, South Africa, he served with 237 Squadron
An avowed Marxist of the RAF during World War II. Afterward he entered Parlia-
with a dictatorial style, ment, moved from the Liberal Party to the United Federal
Mugabe has retained tight Party, and then helped found the Rhodesian Front Party. He
control over the government to this day. became Prime Minister in April 1964, and issued the Unilateral
Bishop Abel Muzorewa (1925-): A high ranking official in Declaration of Independence in 1965. He reached an agree-
the Rhodesian Methodist Church, Muzorewa was favored ment with the African nationalists for democratic elections
by Rhodesian whites as a moderate alternative to the radical in April 1979. He remained as minister without portfolio in
nationalists. He lacked the charisma of Nkomo and Mugabe Muzorewa’s government and served the Mugabe administra-
and, more importantly, he also lacked an army during the tion until being expelled from office in 1986.
final scramble for power. The African National Council was
created in October 1971 with Muzorewa as leader. He at-
tempted to organize centrist opposition inside Rhodesia, but
leaders of the insurgent forces were disaffected by his efforts
at compromise.
Joshua Nkomo (1917-1999): As a young man, Nkomo trav-
eled to South Africa where he met the leaders of the African
National Congress. In 1947, as a social worker employed by
Rhodesia Railways, he campaigned for better pay and work-
ing conditions. He studied for a BA degree in economics and
sociology from the University of South Africa. Nkomo be-
came president of the African National Congress in South-
ern Rhodesia in 1952. A state of emergency was declared
there in 1959, and Nkomo then had to operate in exile for
18 months. Soon after, he helped form and lead the National
Democratic Party and, later, the Zimbabwe African People’s
Union. Nkomo was arrested in April 1964 and spent 10 years
in detention. On his release he went to Zambia from where
he continued the struggle for Zimbabwean independence.
Nkomo was included in the Mugabe government in 1980,
but their differences led to his exile. Later he returned and
rejoined the government, remaining an important political Last of the colonials: Ian Smith.
figure until his death.

strategy & tactics 47

 had grown to 10,000 by the time of the 1979 election
and to 16,000 by the time of full majority rule. SFA
provided the ground troops to occupy territory after
Fire Force teams cleared an area of insurgents.
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
Two of the most sensational episodes of the
Chimurenga War took place in 1979. On 9 February
a SAM-7 missile shot down a Rhodesian airliner car-
rying 54 passengers, and 18 survived the crash. Then
ZIPRA insurgents slaughtered 10 of those survivors.
In retaliation, 25 SAS troopers undertook Operation
Assassination, in which they drove to Lusaka and at-
tacked Nkomo’s home. They killed numerous insur-
gents in a brief firefight there, but Nkomo himself
turned out not to be present.
In April 1979, the Smith government allowed free
elections in order to pacify its critics in the West and to
try to relieve some pressure from the insurgents. The
security forces mobilized over 60,000 men to protect
the voters. About 650 insurgents were killed, and many
more either surrendered or went into hiding. With 62
percent of the African population voting, Bishop Mu-
zorewa was elected prime minister of newly named
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. If Britain had acknowledged
the new government and lifted sanctions, Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia might have held out against the insurgents.
The international community refused to recognize the
election, however, because Mugabe and Nkomo had
been excluded. Muzorewa offered amnesty for all in-
surgents and invited Mugabe and Nkomo to form a
coalition government. His offer was rejected, and the
war continued, as did the negotiations, the Lancaster
House Peace Talks, with Britain’s involvement.
By then there were 11,000 ZANLA fighters in Rho-
desia, primarily in the southeast region known as the
“Russian Front.” Another 15,000 were in training. And
ZANLA was backed by 1,000 FRELIMO regulars of
the Mozambique 2nd Brigade at Mapai. They posed a
threat to the Beit Bridge-Rutenga rail line.
48 #238
Operation Uric was a heliborne assault intended
to disrupt the ZANLA/FRELIMO line of communi-
cation as far as Aldeia De Barragem, 200 miles from
the Rhodesian border. URIC involved 360 troops from
the SAS, RLI and engineers, plus numerous aircraft
and helicopters. On 5 September 1979, four Hunters
hit Barragem with golf bombs, a Rhodesian invention
that burst into 80,000 fragments and were lethal out to
50 yards. Helicopters deployed 48 SAS troopers along
with demolition teams to destroy the Aldeia De Bar-
ragem bridges and four other targets. The remaining
18 helicopters flew to Mapai, where one of them was
shot down with all 14 on board killed. The remaining
178 troopers met strong FPLM resistance. For the first
time the Rhodesians had to abandon an objective. Uric
tallied over 300 enemy dead, but the Rhodesians were
also unable to recover the bodies of their fallen com-
rades for the first time.
In Zambia, ZIPRA was assembling 20,000 men
along with 200 armored vehicles, including Soviet T-
34, T-54 and T-62 tanks, BTR-152 armored personnel
carries plus bridging equipment, artillery and mortars.
Nkomo’s Soviet and Cuban advisors developed a plan
to train and equip five ZIPRA battalions modeled on
Soviet motorized infantry battalions. ZIPRA insur-
gents would create bridgeheads for the mechanized
forces to cross the Zambezi River and capture the air-
fields at Kariba and Wankie. Libyan transport aircraft
would then bring the remainder of ZIPRA troops into
Rhodesia. The attack would be covered from the air by
MiG-17, MiG-19, and MiG-21 fighters. From Wankie
and Kariba, one armored column would move directly
to Salisbury. A second column would attack via the
city of Que Que. A third element would consolidate
the northern area before also advancing on the capital.
Five mechanized battalions were considered the mini-
mum force needed to defeat the RSF and ZANLA by
delivering a maximum effort at the decisive moment.
Nkomo’s grand strategy to use most of his Soviet
arms to equip his conventional forces left the ZIPRA
and SAANC guerillas fighting on a shoestring against
both the Rhodesian Security Forces and elements
of ZANLA inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The 3,000
ZIPRA insurgents resented their role as an expend-
able vanguard for the main forces in Zambia. It was
supposed to be a war of liberation, not an open inva-
sion. Many disenchanted guerillas deserted, and some
joined the SFA. Realizing his error, Nkomo sent some
conventional formations to operate under the com-
mand of disgruntled insurgent leaders. He had few
other options. If the Lancaster Talks failed, he needed
to bolster his mechanized battalions for conventional
assault. If the talks produced a settlement, Nkomo
needed as many fighters as possible inside the country
in order to certify his political presence.
continued on page 51
RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES SELOUS SCOUTS
(10,800 regulars; 15,000 active reservists) 1 Battalion
(1,800 men, often deployed in small teams)
3 Troops
Lt. Gen. Peter Walls, Combined Operations HQ
Support Troop
RHODESIAN AIR FORCE (2,300 men, 150 pilots)
RHODESIA REGIMENT (Bn nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10)
one light bomber squadron
4 Territorial Force battalions
6 B2 “Canberra”
4 Territorial Reserve battalions
two fighter-attack squadrons
Six Independent Companies (for local patrols in remote areas)
9 FGA9 “Hunter”
Four Engineer Squadrons
12 RB9 “Vampire”
BRITISH SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE*
4 OV-10 “Bronco”
(8,000 active, 19,000 reserve)
one reconnaissance squadron
Regular Police: two-thirds of the police force was black.
8 T-52 “Provost”
Police Support Units (“Blackboots”): an integrated unit with perma-
11 T-55 “Vampire”
nent black troops and temporary service by white police or service-
one counter-insurgency squadron men. Each troop of 5 to 7 men was assigned to a particular area.
12 AL-60 “Trojan” Special Reserve: paramilitary volunteers in “Dad’s Army” (average
18 Ce-337 “Lynx” age was 55 to 65 years) provided security in European and Asian
one transport squadron residential areas.
1 Be-55 “Baron” Police Anti-Terrorist Units: security for municipal infrastructure and
6 BN-2 “Islanders” population centers.
10 C-47 “Dakotas” Urban Emergency Unit: SWAT team used in urban areas.
two helicopter squadrons Police Mounted Unit: small unit, used with limited effectiveness.
66 SA-316/-318 “Alouette III” Special Branch: for investigation, intelligence and interrogation.
11 Bell 205 “Huey” (aka “Cheetah”) * “British South African Police” was the formal name for the Rhode-
sian national police, which also had a paramilitary role. It was, of
RHODESIAN LIGHT INFANTRY (1,000 men)
course, manned by Rhodesians, both white and black.
3 Commando Companies (100 to 150 men each)
SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES (3,000 to 16,000)
Support Commando (heavy weapons)
SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCES
Base Group (HQ and Support)
From 1967-1974 the South Africans deployed the equivalent of
Note: unit members generally were parachute qualified a battalion of paramilitary police as well as helicopters and pilots to
RHODESIAN AFRICAN RIFLES Rhodesia. SADF “Recce” commandos and paratroopers also conduct-
4 Battalions (700 men each) of 3 Rifle companies each ed operations.
RHODESIAN ARTILLERY REGIMENT
1 Battery (active duty) six M101 105mm Howitzers
1 Battery (reservists) six 25 pounders
10 ZPU-4/20mm anti-aircraft guns (captured from
ZANLA/FPLM)
RHODESIAN ARMOURED CAR REGIMENT
4 Armored Car Squadrons (1 regular, 3 reservists) of 4
troops each
60 Eland, 54 S/90 Scout Cars
50 UR-416 Armored Personnel Carriers
20 Ferret Armored Cars
1 Tank Squadron
8 T-55 Tanks (obtained through South Africa)
SPECIAL AIR SERVICE
1 Regiment of 4 Squadrons (several hundred men)
GREY’S SCOUTS
3 Combat Squadrons (160 men)
3 Troops of four sections
Support Squadron
60mm and 81mm mortar section
Reconnaissance troop
Tracking Troop (with trained dogs)

strategy & tactics 49

 Making Do
Due to their isolation from the rest of the world, the Rhodesians became masters of improvisation. One threat
they had to deal with was anti-vehicular mines, which the guerrillas planted on roads and spread liberally around
the countryside. Vehicles were modified by adding various types of armor and filling the tires with water, which
would better absorb the shock of detonations. Bizarre looking vehicles were built using “V” shapes to deflect blast
effects. Civilian traffic near the borders would be escorted by anti-mine vehicles and gun-trucks. There was also
the “Pookie” mine detection vehicle, which used electronic metal detectors. As a result, casualties from mines
were few and far between.
An example of how the Rhodesian Security Forces circumvented the international embargo is the circuitous
route by which they came to possess eight Soviet-designed tanks. In 1979 a French ship was carrying weapons
that had been sold by Libya to Uganda. The vessel docked in Mombasa, Kenya. Then Idi Amin’s regime collapsed
and the ship was redirected to Angola, stopping along the way in Durban, South Africa. South Africa was then
conducting military operations in Angola, so authorities seized the 10 Polish-built T-55 tanks on board as contra-
band. The SADF retained two of the tanks for evaluation and eventually gave the other eight to Rhodesia.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY

The Rhodesian Army had its origins in October of 1889 when a British Royal Charter authorized the British South Africa
CoThe Rhodesian Army had its origins in October 1889, when a royal charter authorized the British South Africa Company to
raise a police force for the territories north of the Limpopo River. That force was called the British South Africa Company Police
(BSACP), and it accompanied the pioneer column that established a colony in what later became Rhodesia. The police had a
paramilitary role from the start. Aside from enforcing the law, they battled the local tribes, who proved less than pleased with the
European intrusion. They also performed a range of what today would be considered government services.
An influx of British settlers as well administrators led to an expansion of those forces. The BSACP was soon supplemented
by several other colonial formations, such as the Salisbury Horse and Victoria Rangers. In 1909 various colonial formations were
consolidated into the British South Africa Police (BSAP), a name retained up until 1980.
Meanwhile, in 1898, a regular military unit was formed called the Southern Rhodesia Volunteers (SRV). The SRV served in
the Boer War, taking part in the relief of Mafeking. The Rhodesia Regiment was also formed for service in the Boer War. It was
expanded and fought in the grueling campaigns against the Germans in Africa during World War I.
The Defence Act of 1927 created a Permanent Force (regular) and a Territorial Force (reserves). World War II saw the further
expansion of the Rhodesian military, including the formation of the 1st Battalion RAR, composed mainly of black Africans. Rho-
desians also provided three squadrons to the Royal Air Force. Following World War II, many British Army veterans were given
land in Rhodesia as a reward for service, a move that caused resentment on the part of many Africans.
In the 1950s units of the Rhodesian Army served with the Commonwealth troops in Malaya, participating in the successful
counterinsurgency against Communist guerrillas there. In 1961 the 1st Battalion of the Rhodesian Light Infantry was formed,
along with C Squadron of the Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment. The SAS was patterned after the elite British un-
conventional warfare unit.
The Lancaster accords called for the integration of the former nationalist guerrillas into the regular army. That was accom-
plished, but not without friction between the former ZANU and ZAPU forces. Mugabe dismissed Lt. Gen. Walls, and in the 1980s
many units were disbanded or suffered from lack of discipline. Many of the soldiers of the old Rhodesian Army, both white and
black, emigrated to South Africa and joined the SADF—and continued their own struggle.

50 #238
 While the Muzorewa government anticipated a
transfer of power to the nationalists, the security force
strategy was to delay the insurgents long enough to
persuade Nkomo and Mugabe to accept moderate
terms with some future for the white minority. To dis-
rupt the ZIPRA invasion plan, the SAS, RLI and Sel-
ous Scouts carried out Operation Dice, during which
they destroyed the bridges in Zambia leading to the
border and linking Zambia to Tanzania. The dam-
age to the Zambian economy and infrastructure was
monumental, and caused President Kaunda to pressure
Nkomo into working toward an agreement.
In mid-1979, Mozambique’s government actively
supported ZANLA by sending 300 FRELIMO troops
into Rhodesia. The Rhodesians responded with more
cross-border attacks to destroy armories, mine roads
and interrupt the flow of supplies and reinforcements.
By September the external raids had projected the
war into Mozambique and caused friction between
Mugabe’s faction and his FRELIMO host. Fire Force
operations were killing his leaders and trained fighters
faster than he could replace them. And the SFA forces
were sometimes displacing the ZANLA forces in the
tribal territories.
At Lancaster House an agreement was finally
reached for a ceasefire. The insurgents were to gather
at assembly points, and the British would appoint a
governor to oversee the transition from colonial rule.
(London had still not officially recognized Rhodesia
as an independent state.) ZIPRA used the ceasefire as
cover to establish bridgeheads for its planned assault.
ZANLA kept a large proportion of its forces outside
the assembly points while infiltrating another 8,000
insurgents into the country. The ceasefire forced the
Rhodesians to suspend their cross-border raids, which
were the only things still working to keep insurgent
forces at bay.
On 12 December 1979, Lord Christopher Soames
entered Salisbury as British governor, thereby certify-
ing the political return of Rhodesia to colonial status.
Nkomo overruled his Soviet and Cuban advisors, who
wanted him to continue the fight for more favorable
concessions, and signed the Lancaster Peace Settle-
ment. Smith predicted Mugabe would win the election,
though most whites hoped for a coalition of Nkomo,
Muzorewa and Smith. The general belief was that if
Mugabe lost he might attempt a coup. To forestall such
a power grab, the RSF planned two more operations.
Operation Quartz was to be a pre-emptive strike
against insurgent assembly points with the RLI and
Selous Scouts in the lead. At the same time, Opera-
tion Hectic was to be an attack by the SAS to kill
Mugabe and his key subordinates. The South Afri-
cans would support the attack with some of the 1,000
troops who’d taken up positions in southern Rhodesia
to secure an escape route for the whites if the situation
warranted evacuation. Those final actions never took
place. Quartz and Hectic were cancelled three hours
before the code word launching them was to have been
given.
Zimbabwe at Last
Through 15 years of intermittent and at times in-
tensive fighting, the Rhodesian Army established itself
as a well trained, integrated and efficient armed force.
The white population endured taxation and conscrip-
tion in the vain hope of maintaining its political power,
but that cause was doomed from the beginning. The
RSF could strike quickly over significant distances,
but the war couldn’t really be won by holding terrain
and running up kill ratios.
As usual, politics dominated. Given the anti-colo-
nial feeling common in that era, it was impossible for
the Rhodesian government to gain recognition from
the international community and, without that support,
their options were increasingly limited. While Rhode-
sia could conceivably have operated within a greater
framework of a white-ruled southern Africa, alongside
the Portuguese empire and South Africa, that possibil-
ity was scotched with the independence of Mozam-
bique and Angola.
Rising white emigration then depleted the pool of
manpower available for call-up, leaving some infan-
try companies with fewer than 30 white soldiers. As
the insurgents increased in numbers, the Rhodesians
retrenched to more defensive operations punctuated
by fierce cross-border attacks. By the late 1970s, Rho-
desian losses were increasing, eventually reaching a
total of 1,735 dead. In contrast, insurgent losses were
estimated at 40,000, but their supply of recruits and
equipment was endless. The RSF couldn’t bring the
war to an end even though their troops were won virtu-
ally every fight.
In the elections of 14-29 February 1980, Mugabe’s
party won 57 seats in the new government, Nkomo
took 20, Muzorewa three, and Sithole none. Thus the
struggle ended, and Mugabe became the elected prime
minister of the new nation of Zimbabwe. Within a few
years, most whites had left the country. The 15-year-
long Chimurenga War was over. A new struggle, this
time in South Africa, was about to begin.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bond, Geoffrey. The Incredibles: the story of the 1st Battalion, the Rhodesian
Light Infantry. Salisbury: Sarum Imprint, 1977.
Cilliers, J. K. Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia. London: C. Helm, c1985.
Cocks, C. J. Fireforce: One Man’s War in the Rhodesian Light Infantry. Roode-
poort, South Africa: Covos Books, 1997.
Ellert, H. The Rhodesian front war: Counter-insurgency & guerrilla war in
Rhodesia, 1962-1980. Gweru: Mambo Press, c1989.
Martin, David. The struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War. London:
Faber and Faber, 1981.
Moorcraft, Paul L. Chimurenga! The war in Rhodesia, 1965-1980: A military
history. Marshalltown: Sygma/Collins, c1982
Nesbit, Roy Conyers. Britain’s rebel air force: The War from the air in Rhode-
sia, 1965-1980. London: Grub Street, c1998.
strategy & tactics 51
 SPI Classic Games

Wacht Am Rhein
The Battle of the Bulge, 16 Dec 44 – 2 Jan 45

On 16 December 16 1944, Hitler’s armies suddenly seemed to regain

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effectively spot for artillery, as well as constricted terrain, which represents
steep gullies and ravines.
The order of battle has also been revamped to provide an accurate depic-
tion of the armies. Units are in the organizations within which they actually
fought, not the administrative formations that were quickly discarded due to
the demands of battle.
Contents: (4) 22x34 inch maps, 2,380 die-cut counters, rule booklet, scenario
booklet, player aid cards and displays, dice and storage bags.

QTY Title Price TOTAL
$150.00*
*ships as 3 units on ship chart.

SUB Total

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52 #238
 from Decision Games

Empires of the Middle Ages

Between the glories of Rome and the rise of national states came an age in which
each land was defined by the virtue and failings of its monarch. Empires of the Middle
Ages is a multi-player game of diplomacy in which up to six may act as dynasts and
attempt to build their historic kingdoms into vast realms. The period covered in the
game spans from AD 771, the time of Charlemagne’s reign, to 1465, the time of the
final collapse of the Byzantine Empire. The game is played on a map of medieval
Europe on which the players record the power of their kingdoms. Playing cards
resolve the basic actions
of the game, while random
event cards add period
flavor, such as plagues, crusades and
heresy. Six scenarios are included,
from a solitaire game to a grand sce-
nario covering the entire Middle Ages.

Components: 1,120 counters,

(2) 22" x 34" mapsheets, 220 full
color playing cards, 40-page rule book,
and player aid cards.
$100.00* *ships as 3 units on ship chart.

War Between the States, 1861-1865

War Between the States, 1861-1865, simulates the American Civil War from the
opening shot at Fort Sumter to Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, using three maps to
cover the major theaters of operation from Galveston, Texas, to St. Joseph, Missouri,
and from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Jacksonville, Florida.
Game turns represent the passage of a week, with intervening “cycles” during which
players carry out such routines as production, blockade, construction and politics. Each
game turn is divided into two player turns,
during which one player or the other may
move his ground and naval units on the
map and attack his opponent.
The game can be played as a
campaign using all three maps and simulating the entire war from beginning to end. Alter-
natively, six scenarios are also offered, covering the eastern campaigns of 1862, 1863 and
1864, along with three others covering the western campaigns of those same years. The
scenarios vary in length from eight to 24 game turns. The scenarios are played on just one
or two maps. Expanded and optional rules have been added to this new edition of the game,
which work to enhance the role of headquarters, allow for variable
Name leader entry into play, give more detail to naval and riverine combat,
as well as more fully integrating the era’s politics into play.
Address more accurate representation of the actual terrain fought over and
the addition of more counters including set of counters for the
City, State Zip
variant leaders.
Phone email Contents: 3 22x34 inch maps, 1400 die-cut counters, rule book

VISA/Mc (ONLY)#
and player aid cards. $110.00*
Expiration Date
*ships as 3 units on ship chart.
Signature

strategy & tactics 53

 Civil War Submarine Operations
By Carl Otis Schuster
Well-known painting of the CSS Hunley.
At 8:45 p.m. on 17 February 1864, lookouts on the Union
sloop of war USS Housatonic spotted a dark shape approach-
ing their ship’s starboard side. Calling the officer of the deck,
who sent the ship to action stations, they opened fire with
their rifles. They were engaging the Confederate “screw sub-
marine” CSS Hunley, which had surfaced 300 yards away.
Almost invisible, with only a few inches of deck and its two
hatches showing and its black hull blending into the dark wa-
ter, it had covered half the distance to the ship before it was
detected. Moving at its top speed of four knots, it reached the
Housatonic less than two minutes later, drove its explosive
“torpedo” into the ship’s hull and pulled away. The torpedo
detonated, blowing a 15-foot hole and making the Housatonic
the first surface ship to be sunk by a submarine.
The Hunley survived long enough to signal its success
ashore, and then went down with all hands. Though its wreck
was recovered in 2001, the cause of its loss remains a subject
of debate to this day. Despite is place in history, however, the
Hunley was neither the first nor the only submarine to see
service in the Civil War. The Union commissioned at least
one, the USS Alligator while three, possibly more, Confed-
erate submarines preceded the Hunley in service. The Civil
War, then, was the first conflict in which both sides planned,
built and employed submarines.
The war’s start generated ideas on both sides of the Ma-
son-Dixon line. Submarine advocates and inventors sent their
schemes to their respective capitols and argued their case in
the newspapers. The two navies’ significantly different mis-
sions and strategic circumstances gave them divergent ideas
on submarines employment. For the South, submarines of-
fered a potential solution to the Union naval threat to the
southern coast and the forming blockade. Facing the need
54 #238
to seize Confederate ports, Northern naval leaders believed
submarines offered the best means for removing underwa-
ter obstacles and penetrating southern coastal defenses to
gather intelligence. Political and economic considerations
also drove how the two sides’ funded, built and manned their
subs.
With limited financial resources, the South decided to
rely on private enterprise, offering a $500 bounty for every
Union warship sunk by submarine. The policy made eco-
nomic sense: it saved the expense of funding research, de-
velopment and manning an unproven weapon system. The
only fiscal outlays would come when the submarines suc-
cessfully sank Union warships. The bounty offer generated
tremendous interest. Several disparate efforts were begun in
order to build submarines throughout the South, but investors
in Norfolk, New Orleans, and later Mobile, Alabama, were
the only ones known to have completed operating models.
Claims of submarines built and then somehow sabotaged in
Tennessee remain unproven.
Enjoying far greater financial and industrial resources, as
well as a much larger shipbuilding capacity, Union leaders
could finance their entire submarine development effort and
had strong geo-political reasons for not relying on private
efforts for their operations: the 1856 Declaration of Paris.
That little known convention prohibited privately owned
warships from conducting attacks on a belligerent’s behalf
as well as the “collection of prize monies” by ships’ cap-
tains and crews (essentially government-sponsored piracy).
Traditionally, the US had employed privateering to raid en-
emy shipping in its conflicts with larger powers (Britain and
France).
Washington had therefore refused both the invitation to
attend the negotiations for the treaty and to sign it. Wanting
to prevent Confederate privateering, US leaders suddenly
saw the declaration’s benefits. They therefore announced
we would comply with the treaty and asked the European
countries to enforce its provisions against Confederate pri-
vateers. As part of that larger effort, the Union Navy placed
all submarine construction under the control of its Bureau of
Construction, Equipment and Repair.
Ironically, then, the Union gained an early lead in the
submarine development effort. A Frenchman, Brutus de Vil-
leroi, demonstrated a 33-foot, man-powered screw-propelled
vessel in the Delaware River near Philadelphia on 16 May
1861. Initially intended for underwater salvage work and ex-
ploration, the boat had a “divers lock” to enable swimmers
to enter and depart safely underwater. The Philadelphia Na-
val Shipyard Commander, Capt. (later Rear Adm.) Samuel
Du Pont recommended further study of the vessel and its po-
tential for employment in the war. The Navy Department ac-
cepted his recommendation and awarded de Villeroi $14,000
to construct a submarine “for offensive operations.” It took
six months to build and was commissioned on 1 May 1862
as the USS Alligator, under command of Lt. Thomas O. Sel-
fridge, Jr. He holds the distinction of being the first US naval
officer to command a submarine and the only one to do so
during the Civil War.
 Unfortunately, for reasons still unexplained, de Villeroi
modified the submarine he built for the navy in ways that
both delayed its construction and negatively affected its per-
formance. The worst of the changes was the shift in propul-
sion. His initial plan had been good. Enlarging the subma-
rine to 45 feet to accommodate eight extra men should have
raised its speed and endurance. He hoped having 18 men
propel the submarine would more than double its cruising
and maximum speeds of one and two knots, respectively.
He defeated his own purpose, however, by replacing the
simple crankshaft-to-propeller system with a complex series
of gears that drove oars outside the hull. The submarine’s
speed remained unchanged, and the oars created turbulence
underwater that made the submarine difficult to control sub-
merged. It proved nearly impossible to maintain trim under-
water, and its internal air supply was insufficient to support
submerged operations of more than 10 minutes.
Despite those problems, Secretary of the Navy Welles
pushed hard to have the USS Alligator employed in combat.
They deployed it to Fort Monroe in Hampton Roads in early
June 1862 in hopes of using it to: 1) remove obstructions
blocking the James River; 2) destroy the Confederate bridg-
es over the Appamattox River; and 3) sink the Confederate
ironclad CSS Virginia. The first two attacks were cancelled
when those rivers proved too shallow for the Alligator to
dive. Attention then shifted to the Virginia. The plan was to
have the Alligator towed to within a few miles of the target’s
position and then release the submarine make a submerged
approach. Once within 20-40 yards of the ironclad, a swim-
mer was to leave the submarine via the diving lock and plant
explosives against or under its hull. The submarine would
then withdraw, detonating the “torpedo” once it was a safe
distance away. The river currents in and around Hampton
Roads, combined with the Alligator’s limited speed and poor
handling characteristics, defeated the mission.
The sub was withdrawn to Fort Monroe and underwent
a major modification that replaced the oars with screw pro-
Union Anti-Submarine Operations
Forewarned by his spies of Confederate submarine develop-
ments, Comm. Louis Goldsborough, commander of the North At-
lantic Blockading Squadron in Hampton Roads, ordered his ships
to be alert to potential attacks by those “infernal machines.” He
realized submarines posed a threat only to ships at anchor, but coal
consumption considerations precluded his keeping his ships un-
derway at all times. The spies’ reports also convinced him sub-
marines would have difficulty operating in windy conditions or
rough seas. Reasoning their tactics from the available information,
he also decided dusk and dawn were the most likely periods for a
submarine attack provided wind and tidal conditions were optimal.
His September 1861 directive to his squadron were history’s first
anti-submarine warfare tactics and led to its first anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) prosecution.
He directed ships take several precautions when at anchor.
First, they were to deploy netting from their fenders. The netting
was to be weighted with shot, extend the full length of the ship,
and reach to the harbor bottom. The intent was to prevent a subma-
rine passing under the ship with a towed torpedo or getting close
enough to have swimmers attach explosives to the hull. Ships were
to double their lookouts, particularly at dusk and before dawn, with
at least a portion of those men specifically designated to search for
low-lying objects moving toward the ship. Carronades loaded with
canister were to be manned for instant action in case a submarine
Period engraving of USS Alligator.
pulsion. That kept it out of service until late 1862. In late
February 1863, it was ordered to join the force preparing to
attack Charleston harbor, but sank under tow in a gale on 31
March. No lives were lost, but the Alligator’s loss eliminated
the Union Navy’s submarine force.
Facing the greater need, and inspired by the prospects
of bounty money, the Confederacy ultimately created a
broader and more aggressive submarine development pro-
gram, which compensated in part for its later start and fewer
resources. All were private ventures. As with many of the
South’s ‘private’ naval activities, historians have only the
Union naval logs, newspaper articles and spy reports to de-
scribe submarine developments and operations. (The spon-
sors destroyed their records to avoid post-war prosecution
as pirates – a hanging offense.) Reliable records exist only
for those projects military authorities took over, usually out
of frustration with the civilian designers’ lack of progress.
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, it’s apparent private in-
ventors in New Orleans, Mobile, Savannah, Norfolk and
other places had submarine projects under development by
the summer of 1861.
A Rev. Franklin Smith of Tennessee reportedly built
a four-man submarine in the fall of 1861, but records are
was spotted. He modified his directive after the failed 1861 submarine
attack on the USS Minnesota; ships were thereafter ordered to main-
tain picket boats in and around their anchorages whenever seas were
calm.
The Minnesota had all those precautions in place on 19 October,
when the a submarine made its second attack on the squadron flag-
ship. A picket-boat spotted the submarine’s “India rubber” snorkel
when the sub was still about 400 yards from the flagship. Rowing
quickly, they closed on the snorkel. Seeing the futility of trying to
damage the submarine’s hull by firing into the water, the boat officer
directed his coxswain to come alongside the snorkel. The boatswain
reached out, grabbed the snorkel hose just below the surface and cut
through it. They watched the bubbles trailing out of the sinking hose
for a few minutes, and then signaled the flagship they had engaged a
Confederate underwater craft. They believed they had sunk it, but ac-
curately reported they weren’t sure. History’s first ASW prosecution
was thus at least partially successful. News of the engagement was
reported in Harper’s Gazette on 21 October 1861.
Adm. Dahlgren directed his Southern Blockading Squadron to
take similar precautions off Charleston Harbor shortly after he took
command there in July 1863. He modified the guidance on 7 Janu-
ary 1864, shortly after receiving reports the Confederates were pre-
paring to make another attack on one of his ironclads. That effort,
against the USS New Ironsides, was conducted by a semi-submersible
strategy & tactics 55
 sparse. The reverend claimed his vessel was sabotaged and
destroyed shortly after its first trial. A second Confeder-
ate submersible was built and tested in Norfolk, Virginia,
in September 1861. Designed by the acclaimed Confeder-
ate engineer William Cheeney, it had a three-man crew who
turned a single propeller and used a compass to navigate. A
primitive rubber snorkel enabled operating submerged until
crew exhaustion forced it to surface. Like all submarines of
that era, it was to deliver an underwater explosive against its
target’s hull. Cheeney’s idea was to pass under the target and
deploy a swimmer who used a hand drill and small “grap-
pling hooks” to attach an explosive to the hull. The subma-
rine would then withdraw a safe distance and detonate the
torpedo electronically. Union spies regularly reported on its
progress, including its sea trials off Sewell’s Point, the loca-
tion of the present-day Norfolk Naval Base.
Cheeney’s unnamed submarine attempted two attacks
on the Union’s Hampton Roads flagship, USS Minnesota;
however, its primitive snorkel and reliance on attaching
its explosives to the target proved its undoing. Warned by
Union spies, the naval squadron quickly developed and
deployed anti-submarine nets. It became tangled in one of
those nets during its first attack against the USS Minnesota
on 12 October 1861. After struggling for nearly a quarter of
an hour, the submarine withdrew. Three weeks later, Union
lookouts again spotted the submarine’s air hose, and an alert
picket-boat crew rowed alongside and cut its, nearly sinking
it. The submarine’s fate is not clear: there’s disagreement
on whether it was lost in early November 1861 or simply
broken up for scrap. What is known, however, is that another
three years passed before Virginia’s Confederate authorities
employed another submarine. Two months later, the sub-
marine built in Savannah sank during trials and, though the
crew was saved, the sub wasn’t recovered and its builders
gave up on the idea. The prospects for a Southern submarine
force appeared bleak.
steam-driven boat. Though it didn’t sink the ironclad, it inflicted
enough damage to force its temporary withdrawal for repairs. A
Confederate deserter also informed Union authorities Charles-
ton’s “diver” (the CSS Hunley) was operationally ready, and its
captain was only waiting for the right sea and light conditions to
attack.
Dahlgren also ordered each ironclad to rig additional light-
ing (calcium lights) and make them available to lookouts and
gunners to illuminate any craft or objects approaching the
ship. He also directed his ironclads space out their anchorages
so they could engage any approaching craft, both surface and
submerged, without concern about hitting a friendly unit. He
further ordered his units not to anchor in the deepest parts of
the channel, as those areas offered the greatest potential for the
submarine to pass below the nets and the ships’ hulls. Ironclads
were to deploy picket-boats around their anchorages any time
seas were calm, regardless of rain or visibility conditions.
Alerted by the squadron flagship of the possibility of “tor-
pedo boat attack,” the USS Housatonic had the requisite number
of armed lookouts posted and her cannon crews were also ready.
Unfortunately the Hunley didn’t have a snorkel to give away its
presence, and it surfaced inside the picket boat line, prevent-
ing its early detection and engagement. The cannon couldn’t
56 #238
The impetus that finally led to the CSS Hunley’s con-
struction and employment began in New Orleans in October
1861, when several entrepreneurs starting building subma-
rines to attack the Union squadron blockading that port. One
team built a 20 foot, two-man sub that Union spies first sight-
ed in February 1862. The most significant of those private
ventures was launched by two local businessmen, Baxter
Watson and James McClintock, in partnership with Horace
Lawson Hunley, They successfully test-dived and operated
the 34 foot long, two-man Pioneer on Lake Pontchartrain in
April 1862. Adm. Farragut’s capture of New Orleans then
forced Hunley and his team to destroy that boat and move
to Mobile, Alabama, where they built the 36 foot Pioneer II
(later renamed American Diver).
The Pioneer II sank during its first trial when a wave
flooded an open hatch. Its four-man crew weren’t able to
maintain movement in rough seas or a fast current. Recog-
nizing the limitations of “hand-powered” propulsion, and
seeing no practical means of using steam propulsion, Hunley
and his team tried unsuccessfully to buy an electric motor
using batteries from a broker in New York.
Forced to abandon electric motors for propulsion, Hun-
ley next settled on a design that used eight men turning a
screw propeller when he built the 40 foot long Hunley in
July 1862. Using “boiler plate iron” for its hull, he deepened
the interior, adding tapered bow and stern sections to make
for a roomier and more streamlined design. It had a four foot
beam and an interior height of five feet. Two small 10-inch
viewing mounts with hatches, and eight one inch circumfer-
ence glass ports, provided light and visibility for the captain,
who steered the submarine forward. The second-in-com-
mand was stationed aft and was responsible for maintaining
trim, operating the ballast tanks, and air distribution. All but
the captain turned the hand cranks that drove a single 34 inch
propeller. Ten small glass viewing ports were installed along
the hull to provide interior lighting.
be depressed enough to fire on it. Three other factors prevent-
ed the Housatonic defending itself successfully: 1) the Hunley
was a more powerful craft than the earlier submarine of 1861;
2) Charleston’s ebb tide had pushed the ship’s nets several feet
closer to its hull; and 3) perhaps most importantly, the Hunley’s
33 foot spar enabled it to deliver its torpedo without becoming in
any way entangled in those nets.
Thus two simple improvements and the local environ-
ment come together to ensure the Hunley’s success against a
forewarned ship that was prepared, at least nominally, for the
submarine’s attack. As later wars also demonstrated, command-
ers can’t defeat a determined submarine unless they detect and
engage it before it reaches its attack position. Though not men-
tioned specifically in their directives, Union commanders had
recognized that requirement in their instructions to the fleet.
Given the conditions on 17 February 1864, and the limitations
of their equipment, the Housatonic’s crew lacked the capacity
to defend their vessel successfully. Their quick response to the
attack did, however, limit Union casualties to the five killed by
the torpedo’s explosion. The detection-to-engagement cycle re-
mains the dominant factor governing the outcome of submarine
versus anti-submarine engagements today.
 A trained crew could propel it through the water at four
knots in a calm sea, and it handled better in rough seas than
did either of its predecessors. It had fore and aft ballast
tanks, which were emptied by hand pumps and, like all Civil
War submarines, it had iron ballast weights that theoretically
could be released via screw bolts during an emergency. (In
reality, they never worked as intended.) Using a water-level
to determine depth, the captain filled the ballast tanks until
the submarine was submerged to a depth of one to three feet.
Occasionally they went deeper during the tests, but they de-
cided early on not to go below 15 feet. The normal operating
depth employed was held to three feet, so they could main-
tain visual contact with the surface and regain it quickly.
Bow planes mounted along the hull were used to control trim
while submerged and facilitate depth changes.
Hunley conducted two successful trials in Mobile that
year as the Confederate Army took over sponsorship of his
effort. Lt. George Dixon, of the 23rd Alabama Volunteers,
became the project manager. Initially, the Hunley was to
tow its torpedo behind it and drag it under the target to be
detonated by contact. It successfully sank a coal barge that
way during a test on 30 July 1863. They discovered in later
tests, however, that towing the torpedo was impractical and
dangerous if there was any current, wind, or wave action.
They therefore decided to go with a spar torpedo, which had
proven successful when used by surface craft. That change
was made in August 1863. With Union forces building up off
Charleston Harbor, the Hunley was loaded aboard rail cars
and shipped there in late September 1863.
While in Charleston the Hunley suffered three deadly
dives during training operations that claimed 15 lives, in-
cluding that of its designer and namesake. Despite those
setbacks, Dixon retained his faith in the boat and got permis-
sion to employ it against the blockade.
Originally he’d planned to attack the ironclad New Iron-
sides, but he had to settle on the sloop of war Housatonic
after an attack by a semi-submersible vessel damaged the
ironclad, forcing its withdrawal for repairs.
He’d also hoped to conduct his first operation on a moon-
less night, but the submarine’s speed and endurance limits
necessitated near perfect sea and tide conditions. Those con-
ditions proved so rare he made them the key determinants in
his decision to attack.
Visibility was outstanding that night as the Hunley sur-
faced to make its attack, and the rest is history. The Housa-
tonic sank with little loss of life, but the Hunley and its entire
crew were lost some time after it pulled away. It survived
just long enough to signal its success. It was recovered a
few years ago by a team of marine archeologists, and is now
preserved at the Confederate Museum in Charleston South
Carolina.
In 1864 the South commissioned the Singer Construc-
tion Company to build submarines along the Arkansas River,
but it isn’t clear if any were completed or employed. If so,
they and any records of them were destroyed to prevent their
capture by Union forces advancing into that area.
The South’s final submarine project was the dual-pro-
pulsion CSS Saint Patrick, which was built in Selma, Ala-
bama. Using steam when surfaced, it shifted to manpower
once submerged. Given the problems of shutting down the
steam plant before submerging, diving must have been a
time consuming and daunting experience. The 30 foot ves-
sel reportedly had just a six-man crew. Little is known of its
Union Civil War torpedo boat at dock.
operations, except its one attack, against the USS Octorora on 27
January 1865, was conducted on the surface. Its spar torpedo failed
to detonate, but still forced the St. Patrick to withdraw. The Saint
Patrick finished out the war ferrying supplies to isolated Confeder-
ate garrisons offshore.
Perhaps as many as 30 submarines were built and tested dur-
ing the Civil War, and such vessels were employed operationally
at least four times. The primitive technology of those times all but
precluded submarines playing a significant role in the war’s naval
operations. The typical submarine of the Civil War measured 34 to
50 feet in length and had a beam of four to eight feet. Steam propul-
sion was considered for surface propulsion, and both sides consid-
ered electric-powered motors for underwater propulsion. In the end,
though, steam power proved impractical, and the electric motors
and the batteries of the time brought with them other engineering
challenges the builders couldn’t meet. So all Civil War submarines
used men turning hand cranks to rotate screw propellers, effectively
limited their range and speed to a few miles and knots, respective-
ly.
With manpower as the only reliable propulsion, and possess-
ing only spar or towed explosive charges to strike their targets, the
Civil War’s submersibles were incapable of achieving the signifi-
cant role submarines would eventually come to have in 20th century
naval operations. Nonetheless, naval leaders on both sides saw the
potential use of submersibles in operations. Union Adms. Du Pont
and Dahlgren both believed submarines would be essential to any
attack on Charleston’s defenses, while Confederate leaders saw the
submersibles’ stealth as the only solution to the Union blockade.
Civil War submarine operations had little impact on Europe-
an naval leaders. The nature of Civil War naval operations, with
their focus on coastal blockade and rivers, ensured European na-
val observers saw little potential for submarine operations in the
open ocean. Only navies with a significant coastal defense mission
– those of Austria, Germany, and France – saw utility in a type of
naval combatant that couldn’t operate far from shore.
Private research dominated submarine development over the
next 40 years but, as torpedoes and propulsion systems improved,
so too did naval interest in submarines return. The American Civil
War had demonstrated the submarine’s utility in coastal operations,
and those lessons would dominate naval visions of the submarine’s
primary mission until well into the First World War.
strategy & tactics 57
 Games for publication in late 2006:The
Conquerors, A Mighty Fortress, Ancient
Conquest, and Battle for Stalingrad.

Kaiserschlacht 1918
15
3 XX 4 1 XX 1 6 XX 6
1 0
$85.00
2 15Co 1 2 5 2 3 2 10 1

Game components include four original 6 XX 6 5 5 4 XX 4

XX

style maps, over 500 die cut counters, a rules 2 77 1 2 5A 1 2 3 1

book and player aid card; ziplock.
6 XX 4 6 XX 4 6 XX 4
This classic game covers the climactic 2 6 2 2 23 2 2 25 2
campaigns of 1918 on World War I’s western
front, and was designed by Richard Spence.
After the surrender of Russia, Germany massed its elite assault Stoss
(shock) divisions in the west in order to seek a final, decisive victory. The
question therefore became: could the Allies hold until fresh American units
Trajan: Ancient Wars Series expansion and the new tank weapon turned the tide in their favor?
Prepare to march with a special edition of the Ancient Wars series:
The game includes the campaign scenario along with three shorter
Trajan, Roman Civil War, Caesar in Gallia and Germania, which
ones. Special rules cover morale, air superiority, artillery, tanks, cavalry,
appeared in various issues of Strategy & Tactics over the years. Trajan:
trenches, rail nets, supply, replacement pools and much more.
Ancient Wars Series Expansion includes special rules to combine all
four maps into campaigns covering the entire Roman Empire. There
is also a set of additional counters which provides every legion of the To the Green Fields Beyond
early Empire, plus assorted foes such as Spartacus and Boadicea. New
scenarios include the Crisis of the Republic, Year of the Four Emper-
Contents: Rules booklet, 400 Die cut counters, (1) 34” x 22”
ors, Marcus Aurelius versus the Germans, Septimus Severus versus Map.
everyone, and “what if” Julius Caesar had not been assassinated? The To the Green Fields Beyond
game includes the campaign scenario along with three shorter ones. is an operational level simulation
of the Battle of Cambrai which
This requires the player to have the original map/counter sets that
lasted from 20 November to 7
appeared in S&T.
December, 1917. There are two
The Expansion Kit includes 180 new counters, new standard rules & players, one commanding the
scenario booklets, and 20 assorted player aid cards plus one map/counter British and the other the German
set (Gallia or Germania); in a beautifully illustrated box. $50 forces. The game consists of three
scenarios and a campaign game.
The players should start with a
scenario- the British Breakthrough is best- before attempting the full 17
turns of the campaign game. The campaign game provides opportunities
for both sides to attack. The British Breakthrough and Battle for Bourlon
QTY Title Price TOTAL scenarios have the British attacking, while the German Counterattack
scenario obviously has them as defenders, although they can still often
mount attacks as well.
Each hex on the mapsheet represents 1250 yards from side to
side. Each Game Turn is equivalent to 24 hours. $44

SUB Total

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• In-depth analysis
• Detailed maps
• Orders of Battle
Future issues will feature articles on:
Caesar in Gaul
Battle of Long Tan
Up Front at Zama
Asante War — 1873
China Rules the Seas
Sioux Uprising
Conquest of Florida
and much, much more!

Visit our website for more

information and subscription rates.

PO Box 21598, Bakersfield CA 93390-1598

(661) 587-9633 •fax 661/587-5031
www.decisiongames.com
strategy & tactics 59
 A Place to Start
Rebels & Redcoats,
Complete Set of
vol. 1, 2 and 3
American Revolutionary battles. The game
system simply but accurately recreates the
battlefield conditions with a move-fight-rally
play sequence to simulate the grand tactics of the American Revolution.
Additional rules cover command control, morale, artillery, light infantry
and dragoons. Each battle is represented by its own units and map along
with exclusive rules to recreate the unique conditions of each battle. Units
are generally regiments rated for combat strength, morale and march ca-
pabilities.
Rebels & Redcoats, Vol. I
Battles of Bunker Hill, Brandywine, Germantown and Monmouth.
Components: 440 counters, (2) 22" x 34" mapsheets, 2 player aid cards,
16-page rule book.
Rebels & Redcoats, Vol. II
Battles of Bennington, Freeman’s Farm, Bemis Heights, Camdn, Cowpens,
Guilford Courthouse, Hobkirk’s Hill and Eutaw Springs. Components: 360
counters, (2) 22" x 34" mapsheets, 2 player aid cards, 16-page rule book.
Rebels & Redcoats, Vol. III
Battles from the New York Campaign: Brooklyn, Harlem Heights and White
Plains; from the New Jersey campaign: Trenton, Princeton plus two bonus
scenarios, Stony Point and King's Mountain. Components: 560 counters,
(2) 22" x 34" mapsheets, player aid cards, 16-page rule book. $80.
00
Battle Cry of Freedom
This two-player card game represents the American Civil War, 1861-65,
in the theaters of war east of the Mississippi
River. Each player has his own Play Deck that
he will use to draw from in order to play cards.
In the game, each player will go through his
Play Deck twice, with each deck representing
roughly two years of the war. Command Points
in the game represent the economic, military,
political and social factors that influenced the
campaigns of the war.
Components: 300 full color playing cards,
player aid card, rule book. $39.95
The Alamo
This two-player tactical game simulates the assault made at dawn, 6
March 1836, by 2,200 Mexican soldiers against a garrison of 183 frontiers-
men inside the Alamo mission in what is now San Antonio, Texas. Each
Fire Strength Point of a Texas unit represents one man, and each Mexican
battalion represents between 45 and 55 men. A hexagon represents 10 yards
from hexside to hexside, and each game turn represents five minutes. In
the game, the players take turn moving their forces and conducting attacks.
The game ends when the Texas player has eliminated a decisive number of
Mexican troops or when the Mexicans have eliminated the entire Texan
force. Components: 100 counters, 22" x 34" mapsheet, 8-page rule book.
$15.00
The Sun Never Sets
The Sun Never Sets covers the campaigns of March to Peking, Zulu
War and Sudan: The River War. Players can march to the far flung frontiers
of British civilization, engage vast hordes WOLSELEY EMPEROR HSIEN
FENG
KHARTOUM

of “natives,” and plant the British flag in 32 10

0 R
0 10 (4)n - 4
Khartoum, Peking and Ulundi. The game
emphasizes leadership, with commanders C HUNAN 1/CC
having a major role in marches and battles V l l

(Gordon, Kitchener, Wolseley, and the Mahdi

1F- 6 4 M -6 1 F -10

are included). Battles are resolved through ANSAR USMC CETSHWAYO

a multi-phase system with units (regiment/ F l
1
battalion/battery) rated for strength, type of 10 S - 6 3R-6 2 8

weapon and elan. Leader counters will influ- NGWEKWE

QTY Title Price TOTAL ence tactical and strategic situations. There are rules for relief Vforces being
dispatched, riverine gunboats and the building of railroads. 5S-8

Components: 620 counters, (2) 22" x 34" mapsheets, 16-page rule book,
and player aid cards. $40.00

SUB Total

TAX (CA. RES.)

Shipping Charges
$
1st item Adt’l Units Type of Service S&H
$8 $2 UPS Ground/US Mail Domestic Priority
15(20) 4 UPS 2nd Day Air (Metro AK & HI)
$
14(10) 2(7) Canada, Mexico (Express) TOTAL ORDER PO Box 21598, Bakersfield CA 93390-1598
17(25) 7(10) Europe (Express) • (661) 587-9633 •fax 661/587-5031
$
20(25) 9(10) Asia, Africa, Australia (Express)
60 #238 www.decisiongames.com
 22 18

ii 2 (6) 7
20

25 (4) 6
An Evening of Fun!
5th Air Grp

uSAAF

Napoleon’s Last Battles Over The Top! XX 2

June 1815 finds a triumphant, but be-
leaguered Napoleon again on the throne.
Napoleon is outnumbered and virtually
surrounded; his only chance to maintain
the throne and the position of France is
to gain a significant military victory. To
succeed against these overwhelming odds,
Napoleon boldly decides on an offensive
designed to destroy two of his opponents
and drive the English from the continent. The games include Ligny, Quatre
Bras, Wavre, and La Belle Alliance. The game system uses leaders and
brigade level units, with cavalry, infantry and artillery. There are three
new scenarios in addition to the four scenarios and the campaign game
published in the SPI original.
Components: 340 counters, 24-page rule book, (2) 22" x 34" mapsheets.
$35.00
Emperor’s First Battles &
Napoleon’s First Battles
Includes Austerlitz and Jena-Auerstadt,
in which the French Emperor, Napoleon
Bonaparte, won smashing victories
against the armies of the old regime of
Europe. Emperor’s First Battles game
system is based on the Decision Games’
release Napoleon’s First Battles which
is now included in this special combo
pack. It includes rules for elan, com-
mand control, and functional differences between
infantry, cavalry, artillery and field engineers. The
game also includes updated cavalry rules, allow-
ing it to perform historical screening functions.
Units are regiments and brigades, with historical
leaders. Napoleon’s First Battles covers four
of Napoleon’s earliest battles—Montenotte, The
Pyramids, Arcola, and Marengo. Advanced rules
include Command, Friction, and Fog of War.
Components EFB: 480 counters, 16-page rule
book, 1 player aid card, (2) 22" x 34" mapsheets.
Components NFB: 400 counters, (2) 22" x 34" mapsheets, player aid
card, 16-page rule book. $40.00
Over The Top! includes four great battles
HQ 1(Brusilov Offensive, 1916;
Riga 1917; St. Mihiel, 1918 and Damascus,
5 (4) 121918) from the First iWorld
War. These battles simulate WW1 warfare from attritional trench fighting
i
1A 1
to maneuver, tank assaults, and infiltration tactics. Units are regimental-
2 (3) 10
brigade level with corps level headquarters and support. Rules account for
1 mar
command control, air support, poison gas, fog of war, and much more.
Components: 560 counters, (2) 34" x 22"
3 mapsheets, 16-page rule book
and player aid cards. $38.21200
Pacific Battles, volume 1:
mAW
1
The Rising Sun 3 (3) 0
iii
21 21
Pacific Battles is a wargame series covering the great land 2 (3) 6
battles of the Pacific theater in WWII. Units are battalions,
with companies and regiments. Most games in the series have ii
players commanding anywhere from a division to a corps worth 92
CA
of forces, and employment of combined arms tactics becomes 38 (3) 8
critical. The system shows the evolution of XXtactical doctrine
in both the Japanese and Allied armies withHQBanzai
21 charges,
2 (2) 6
superior U.S. fire coordination, naval bombardment, airpower, SPA
ii
amphibious landings, and engineer operations. Games in this B
volume include: The Fall of Singapore, Struggle for Bataan 37 (4) 12
and Guadalcanal.
Components: 2 22 x 34 inch mapsheet, 460 die cut counters, rules booklet,
player aid cards, storage bags and 1 die. $48.00
Battles for the Ardennes
Battles for the Ardennes simulates the cam-
paigns that marked the first breath and last gasp
of the Nazi war machine in the west on four
comprehensively illustrated maps, used separately
for individual battles, or linked together to re-enact
the entire campaigns of 1940 to 1944. Colorful
cardboard playing pieces accurately reflect the size
and strength of military units actually involved
in these battles. These counters also represent
march modes, blown bridges, improved positions,
air power and supply. Their movement, positioning and engagement for
battle are regulated by a superimposed hexagonal grid. These four games
(St. Vith, Clervaux, Celles and Sedan 1940) can be played individually or
as two campaign games (1940 Blitzkrieg to the Meuse and 1944 Battle of
the Bulge).Components: 600 counters, (4) 17" x 22" mapsheets, player
aid card, 32-page rule book. $38.
00

Drive on Stalingrad
Name
This two-player strategic-level simu-
Address lation of Fall Blau (Operation Blue), the
German attempt to conquer Stalingrad
City, State Zip and the Caucasus area of the southwest
Soviet Union in 1942. Each hex repre-
Phone email sents approximately 16 miles and units
are primarily division along with Soviet
VISA/Mc (ONLY)# tank and mechanized corps. Each game
turn represents one week.
Expiration Date Components: 420 counters, (2) 22" x 34" mapsheets, rule book, die and

Signature storage bags. $48.00

strategy & tactics 61
 Another Classic Game from Decision Games

War in the Pacific

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, the US naval
base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, was attacked by
Japanese aircraft. For the next four years, Allied
task forces engaged elements of the Imperial
Japanese fleet throughout the ocean. Marines
and army units began their program of island-
hopping, wresting from the Japanese the empire
that they had expanded in every direction.

War in the Pacific is a multi-level simula-

tion of the Pacific theater of operations during
World War II. The game enables players to rec-
reate the entire course of the war, form the open-
ing Japanese attack on 7 December, 1941 to the
climatic Allied assaults in the closing days of 1945. Representing some 30%
of the globe, the strategic maps let players move and engage in combat on all
levels: air, ground and naval. War in the Pacific is the most detailed board
game of the Pacific Theater ever created. There are a number of rules and
concepts that will, at first, be unfamiliar to a majority of players. But play-
ing through smaller map sections and scenarios enables the player to become
familiar with the mechanincs of the game.

Components: 7 full size strategic maps in full color, new tactical maps with
nearly 340 individual islands for new ground units to fight over, 32 die-cut
counter sheets, nearly 9,000 counters showing all types of units from the
Pacific Theater, rule books and assorted displays and player aid charts. Pro-
jected release date is Fall 2006. Ships as 10 units.
$420.00

Name

Address PO Box 21598

Bakersfield CA 93390
City, State Zip 661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com

Phone email Shipping Charges

VISA/Mc (ONLY)# 1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
$8 $2 UPS Ground/US Mail Domestic Priority
15(20) 4 UPS 2nd Day Air (Metro AK & HI)
Expiration Date
14(10) 2(7) Canada, Mexico (Express)
17(25) 7(10) Europe (Express)
Signature 20(25) 9(10) Asia, Africa, Australia (Express)
62 #238
 A game so big—it’s a tsunami in a box.

Tactical
Map

Strategic Map

strategy & tactics 63

 New Miniatures Rules from Decision Games

Battles Stations! Battle Stations!

Simulate major fleet actions during WWII using these miniatures rules. The swift-
ness of the combat resolution ensures a game of 30 ships will take no longer than three
hours. The intense game system keeps you focused on the battle. The streamlined and
intuitive game system is player friendly, allowing players to concentrate on tactics rather
than minutia. While designed for 1/2400 scale miniatures, players using a larger scale
can easily modify ranges. Ship statistics are included for eight nations: Britain, France,
Germany, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union and the United States, and
cover everything from battleships to torpedo boats. Markers track each ship’s damage,
speed, torpedoes fired, aircraft and submarine depth levels to eliminate the necessity of
bookkeeping. Ten scenarios featuring WWII fleet actions from the Barents Sea to Pacific
Ocean are included as well as instructions for creating your own scenarios. Includes this
80 page rule book, player aid cards and 120 die cut markers.
$29.95
Scenarios include the following battles:
River Plate, 13 December 1939
Montevideo, 17 December 1939
Punta Stilo, 9 July 1940
Cape Spartivento, 27 November 1940
Sinking of the Hood, 24 May 1941
Sinking of the Bismarck, 24 May 1941
Java Sea , 27 February 1942
Cape Esperance, 11 October 1942
Guadalcanal, 13 November 1942
The Komandorski Islands, 26 March 1943
Surigao Strait, 25 October1944

Name

Address PO Box 21598

Bakersfield CA 93390
City, State Zip 661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com

Phone email Shipping Charges

VISA/Mc (ONLY)# 1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
$8 $2 UPS Ground/US Mail Domestic Priority
15(20) 4 UPS 2nd Day Air (Metro AK & HI)
Expiration Date
14(10) 2(7) Canada, Mexico (Express)
17(25) 7(10) Europe (Express)
Signature 20(25) 9(10) Asia, Africa, Australia (Express)
64 #238