G.R. No.
L-5270 January 15, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court,
where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain
provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4)
that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was
then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which
vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other
animals from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N.
Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of December, 1908, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and
city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and
seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for
securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and there
fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means for trying and securing
said animals in a proper manner, and did then and there cause some of said animals to be tied
by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be transported
loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all
without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide
suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals
were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of
said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,
sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any
foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels
carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance
of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of
shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with
adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that
the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1 thereof the
following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,
sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any
foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for
securing such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to
the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other
animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported, without cruelty or
unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from
vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully
fails to comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay
a penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United
States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of
First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are
disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court was sitting
at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a vessel
registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any
provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is
nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the courts
of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain
offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the
waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This
jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which such ship or water
upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this
offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of
the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well
recognized and established public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that
it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the
question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on board a
foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense
continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States. No court of the
Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the
territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the
headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of
principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec
490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the
territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency. This offense was committed within
territorial waters. From the line which determines these waters the Standard must have traveled at least
25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued,
and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may
have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of
departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during
the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American waters,
and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the
offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to
the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the
nationality of the ship. Every. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters.
According to strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power without
permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as open
to the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while
within such waters was not established until within comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-
General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of
nations invest the commander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the
country into which he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by Lord
Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government as late as 1820. In the leading case of the
Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied
license under which such vessels enter a friendly port may reasonably be construed as "containing
exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights of
hospitality." The principle was accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the
priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted in the law of nations; not as an
absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference
between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip
de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local official exercise
but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by their own
officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general
principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its
justification in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws
and regulation which are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity and
convenience does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There
are two well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the
French theory and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the
tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to
which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed
on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another. (See
Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip.
de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or
claim by Great Britain as a right, although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law
(Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as a
fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading
English authority, says that —
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels
that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local
jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p.
263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign
port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of
acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op.
Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol.
II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that —
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convinient
and dangerous to society and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the
government to degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary and local
allegiance, and were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one country
visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the
ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by
treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of
commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827, which
concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The right to sit as judges and
arbitrators in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to
the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the local
authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order or tranquillity of
the country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to controversies between
the members of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law
Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are
affected by many events which do not amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by
one member of the crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the public may have no
knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the vessel
in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the United
States district attorney was instructed by the Government to take the necessary steps to have the
proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard against
a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian
charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature
as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for the Norwegian
bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault and battery
committed on board the ship while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in
the treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.),
363.) Representations were made through diplomatic channels to the State Department, and on July 30,
1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister,
as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in connection with
the views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty
of 1827 between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations contained in
the last clause of that article . . . are those under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction
is conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature
growing out of the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of
controversies resulting from personal violence involving offense for which the party may be
held amenable under the local criminal law.
 This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad
interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their
right to sit as judges or abitrators in such differences as may arise between captains and crews
of the vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of the captain or crew a
disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is made to
a local magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel, involving
the disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, it is competent for such magistrate
to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of the local laws, and under such
circumstances in the United States it becomes a public duty which the judge or magistrate is
not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it must necessarily be left to the local
judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take place in the United States or in Sweden
to determine if in fact there had been such disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and
if the complaint is supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the party accused,
to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined against the offense by the
municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a
merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which amount to a disturbance of the order
or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language requires un to hold
that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or traquillity of the country. The offense with which
the appellant is charged had nothing to so with any difference between the captain and the crew. It was
a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that
neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the offense, or the
prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the court of the Philippine Islands
deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the animals were
disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the
court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language of
the complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary
in order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the
statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are
then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation is
immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation of the
animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that the
defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals while in
transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act was
committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in
Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when
used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or intentionally;
that, with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of
Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not show, in the words of
the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I think, was fully
answered by the respondent's counsel — that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same
meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that it was done by design — done for a certain purpose; and I
think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the same effect is Johnson vs. The
People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests upon
the assertion that "according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in
the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven
that what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to
state the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and concise
language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must be in such
form as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and the court to
pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which complies with this requirement is good.
(U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to "provide
suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant
willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle "without providing suitable means for securing said
animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . .
that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing
said animals were cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of
said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him
with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and
"medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and that the
word "suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to
the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the
fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to
provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendment thereto
seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands. The
statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation of live stock between foreign
ports and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports
been enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have been in
violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R.
A., N. S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is controlled by
constitutional principles different from those which apply to States of the Union. The importance of the
question thus presented requires a statement of the principles which govern those relations, and
consideration of the nature and extent of the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the
Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain
applicable constitutional doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and treaties, and it has
the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired
belongs to the United States, and to guard against the possibility of the power of Congress to provide for
its government being questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that
Congress should have the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
territory and other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition
of the territory by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated into the Union, the duty of
providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern the territory by its direct acts,
or it may create a local government, and delegate thereto the ordinary powers required for local
government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has provided
such governments for territories which were within the Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet
incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a government with the ordinary separation of
powers into executive, legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain general
conditions in accordance with which the local government should act. The organic act thus became the
constitution of the government of the territory which had not been formally incorporated into the
Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature was determined by its conformity
with the requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the
legislative body of the local government Congress has delegated that portion of legislative power which
in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to
annul the action of the local legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been
exercised during the entire period of the history of the United States. The right of Congress to delegate
such legislative power can no longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U.
S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such territory, although
the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to create an
impression upon the minds of many people that it went there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182
U. S., 289.) In legislating with reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited only by those
prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its power to act at all, irrespective of time or
place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S.,
244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S.,
516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United States, and
legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular
possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "The Constitution and all laws of
the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the
organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United States."
When Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of
the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United States as a result of
the war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in conformity
with the principles above state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United States on August 13,
1898, and the military commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion
of a peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government of the Islands. The duty
then devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace and protect person and property within
the occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and on August 26 General Merritt
assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d
of December, 1898, the President announced that the destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender
of the city had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the
Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace the future control, disposition, and
government of the Islands had been ceded to the United States. During the periods of strict military
occupation, before the treaty of peace was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted
(Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was governed under the military authority of the
President as commander in chief. Long before Congress took any action, the President organized a civil
government which, however, had its legal justification, like the purely military government which it
gradually superseded, in the war power. The military power of the President embraced legislative,
executive personally, or through such military or civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary
Root in his report for 1901 —
The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes executive,
legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a
military commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different powers — the
exercise of the legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power
by determination of right; and the executive power by the enforcement of the rules
prescribed and the rights determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as conditions would
permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by the appointment of
a commission to which civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the
authority to exercise, subject to the approval of the President. "that part of the military power of the
President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred from the military
government to the Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as should be
prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil government should be established,
or congress otherwise provided. The legislative power thus conferred upon the Commission was
declared to include "the making of rules and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by
taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the
establishment of an educational system to secure an efficient civil service; the organization and
establishment of courts; the organization and establishment of municipal and departmental government,
and all other matters of a civil nature which the military governor is now competent to provide by rules
or orders of a legislative character." This grant of legislative power to the Commission was to be
exercised in conformity with certain declared general principles, and subject to certain specific
restrictions for the protection of individual rights. The Commission were to bear in mind that the
government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views,
but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Island, and the measures
adopted should be made to conforms to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the
fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective
government." The specific restrictions upon legislative power were found in the declarations that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person
shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that
no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the Spooner amendment to
the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil, and judicial powers
necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in
such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States
shall direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants
of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901,
the authority, which had been exercised previously by the military governor, was transferred to that
official. The government thus created by virtue of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy continued to administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the
President until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by the enactment of
a law which, in connection with the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the
Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government which the President had
erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and approved the action of the President
in organizing the government. Substantially all the limitations which had been imposed on the legislative
power by the President's instructions were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by
legislative act nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the rights and privileges of
individuals which were appropriate under the conditions. The action of the President in creating the
Commission with designated powers of government, in creating the office of the Governor-General and
Vice-Governor-General, and through the Commission establishing certain executive departments, was
expressly approved and ratified. Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and
after the ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of March 8,
1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise
provided by law the Islands were to continue to be governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the
future the enacting clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the United States" instead of "By
the authority of the President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all
parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a legislature
consisting of two houses — the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of
the Islands was thus assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired territory not
incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and organization
somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States
and Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the
Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not
directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting through the
President and Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For
its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the
President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are
derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the
popular sovereign constituency which lies upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in
Congress, and when it exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal
equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental organism
with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to such
departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor
State governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For
instance, in the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to some
extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the veto power enables him to exercise
much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the executive department in the
Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no veto
power. The President and Congress framed the government on the model with which Americans are
familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the
protection of individual rights and priviliges.
In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the general constitutional
doctrined which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws subject to
the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under the national Constitution, and the States
under the national and state constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally
enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments operating under written constitutions, must determine the
validity of legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private and official acts. In performing these
functions it acts with the same independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in the United States.
Under no other constitutional theory could there be that government of laws and not of men which is
essential for the protection of rights under a free and orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that the
courts must consider the question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State legislature. The Federal Government exercises
such powers only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United States,
while the States exercise all powers which have not been granted to the central government. The former
operates under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends upon
whether the Constitution of the United States contains a grant of express or implied authority to enact it.
An act of a State legislature is valid unless the Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly
prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative authority of the Philippines Government which has not
been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by
congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms subject to specific
limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the
legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is conferred upon the
Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated
upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as enactments on matters
wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local
legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the Government of the
Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government of the
Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation
was unusual. The new government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve
Congress from the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to grant
general legislative power to the new government, subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions,
and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was therefore
provided "that all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress,
which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec.
86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until approved by
Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make them the laws of Congress. They are
valid acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U.
S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the Legislature has been
expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United
States operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to the Government of the
Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its
power to govern the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce with
such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by it, to which its
power in this respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties which shall be
paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the Government of the
Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A few
other specific provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its
general regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to the reserved power of
Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with its approval. The express limitations upon the
power of the Commission and Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the
regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the
control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of March
2, 1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil government instituted by the President, had
the power, whether it be called legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign
nations and the ports of the territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21
Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other
action by Congress, and must be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with
the Commission had, and the Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is
regulation of commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act affirmed. So ordered.
No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can not be left
to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court from
the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and
city of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable
means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said
animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275.
The trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the evidence:

That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as
the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December,
1908, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese
ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.

That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain as
aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which
ship was anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in
front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court; and that
fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three others of said cattle were
dead, having broken legs; and also that said cattle were transported and carried upon said
ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without
suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to avoid danger and
risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle were so transported abroad said
ship by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into the city of Manila, without any
provisions being made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to
maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such transportation.

That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamship coming
into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such
cattle, providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear
thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are transported, of that in
case of storms, which are common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand
without slipping and pitching and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the
production of panics and hazard to the animals on account or cattle were transported in this
case. Captain Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced
seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated positively that
since the introduction in the ships with which he is acquainted of the stall system for the
transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss whatever during the last year.
The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that according to his experience
the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more
secure to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable,
either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for instance, three
hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for them
individually can safely and suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds
of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if he is
untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the wounding of half the animals
upon the ship if transported in the manner found in this case.
G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007 collected for the universal charge shall be distributed to the respective beneficiaries within a reasonable
period to be provided by the ERC.
ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK,
INC. (ECN), Petitioners, The Facts
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL POWER
Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect.7
CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.),
STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC.
(PECO),Respondents. On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group8 (NPC-SPUG)
filed with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the
Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-165.9
NACHURA, J.:

Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc.
(ECN) (petitioners), come before this Court in this original action praying that Section 34 of Republic Act
(RA) 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA), imposing the
Universal Charge,1and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) 2 which seeks to implement the said
imposition, be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge imposed upon
the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO)
be issued directing the respondents to refrain from implementing, charging, and collecting the said
charge.3 The assailed provision of law reads:
SECTION 34. Universal Charge. — Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, a universal charge
to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users for the
following purposes:
(a) Payment for the stranded debts in excess of the amount assumed by the National
4 December 20, 2002, thus:
Government and stranded contract costs of NPC5 and as well as qualified stranded contract
costs of distribution utilities resulting from the restructuring of the industry;
(b) Missionary electrification;6
(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or renewable sources of
energy vis-à-vis imported energy fuels;
On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-194, praying that
the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental charge of ₱0.0025 per kilowatt-
hour (/kWh), or a total of ₱119,488,847.59, be approved for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund
(STF) managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Group (PSALM)10 for the rehabilitation and management of watershed areas.11
On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order12 in ERC Case No. 2002-165 provisionally approving the
computed amount of ₱0.0168/kWh as the share of the NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for
Missionary Electrification and authorizing the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and
Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its end-users on a monthly basis.
On June 26, 2003, the ERC rendered its Decision13 (for ERC Case No. 2002-165) modifying its Order of
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the provisional authority granted to petitioner National
Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) in the Order dated December 20, 2002 is
hereby modified to the effect that an additional amount of ₱0.0205 per kilowatt-hour should be added
to the ₱0.0168 per kilowatt-hour provisionally authorized by the Commission in the said Order.
Accordingly, a total amount of ₱0.0373 per kilowatt-hour is hereby APPROVED for withdrawal from the
Special Trust Fund managed by PSALM as its share from the Universal Charge for Missionary
Electrification (UC-ME) effective on the following billing cycles:

(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo per kilowatt-hour

(a) June 26-July 25, 2003 for National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO); and
(₱0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to an environmental fund to be used solely for watershed
rehabilitation and management. Said fund shall be managed by NPC under existing
arrangements; and (b) July 2003 for Distribution Utilities (Dus).

(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding three (3) Relative thereto, TRANSCO and Dus are directed to collect the UC-ME in the amount of ₱0.0373 per
years. kilowatt-hour and remit the same to PSALM on or before the 15th day of the succeeding month.

The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which shall be passed on and collected from all
end-users on a monthly basis by the distribution utilities. Collections by the distribution utilities and the
TRANSCO in any given month shall be remitted to the PSALM Corp. on or before the fifteenth (15th) of
the succeeding month, net of any amount due to the distribution utility. Any end-user or self-generating
entity not connected to a distribution utility shall remit its corresponding universal charge directly to the
TRANSCO. The PSALM Corp., as administrator of the fund, shall create a Special Trust Fund which shall be
disbursed only for the purposes specified herein in an open and transparent manner. All amount
In the meantime, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit, not later than April 30, 2004, a detailed report to
include Audited Financial Statements and physical status (percentage of completion) of the projects
using the prescribed format.1avvphi1
Let copies of this Order be furnished petitioner NPC-SPUG and all distribution utilities (Dus).
SO ORDERED.
On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the ERC, among others,14 to set
aside the above-mentioned Decision, which the ERC granted in its Order dated October 7, 2003,
disposing:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the "Motion for Reconsideration" filed by petitioner
National Power Corporation-Small Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Decision dated June 26, 2003 is hereby modified accordingly.
Relative thereto, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit a quarterly report on the following:
1. Projects for CY 2002 undertaken;
2. Location
3. Actual amount utilized to complete the project;
4. Period of completion;
5. Start of Operation; and
6. Explanation of the reallocation of UC-ME funds, if any.
SO ORDERED.15
Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No. 2002-194, authorizing the NPC to draw up to
₱70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of
funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge. 16
On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged
petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their
respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.17
Hence, this original action.
Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to implement the same are
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be
implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected
from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative
function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive or administrative agency
like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed provision
clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by the
ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority.
2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected should be
used.
3) The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and
amounts to taxation without representation as the consumers were not given a chance to be
heard and represented.18
Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is collected to fund the
operations of the NPC. They argue that the cases 19 invoked by the respondents clearly show the
regulatory purpose of the charges imposed therein, which is not so in the case at bench. In said cases,
the respective funds20 were created in order to balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to
act as buffer to counteract the changes and adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and other variables
which cannot be adequately and timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a need to delegate
powers to administrative bodies.21 Petitioners posit that the Universal Charge is imposed not for a similar
purpose.
On the other hand, respondent PSALM through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)
contends that unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for public purposes, such as support of
the government, administration of the law, or payment of public expenses, the assailed Universal Charge
is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power
industry. Thus, it is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police power. On this premise,
PSALM submits that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the latter merely
exercises a limited authority or discretion as to the execution and implementation of the provisions of
the EPIRA.22
Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), share the same view that the Universal Charge is not a tax because it is levied for a specific
regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry, and is,
therefore, an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Respondents further contend that said
Universal Charge does not possess the essential characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would
redound to the benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public, and that its rate is uniformly
levied on electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's ability to
pay. Moreover, respondents deny that there is undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since
the EPIRA sets forth sufficient determinable standards which would guide the ERC in the exercise of the
powers granted to it. Lastly, respondents argue that the imposition of the Universal Charge is not
oppressive and confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power of the State and it complies with
the requirements of due process.23
On its part, respondent PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the amount pertaining to
the Missionary Electrification and Environmental Fund components of the Universal Charge, pursuant to
Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERC Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165. Otherwise, PECO could
be held liable under Sec. 4624 of the EPIRA, which imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its
provisions or its IRR.25
The Issues
The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:
1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax; and
2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the
ERC.26
Before we discuss the issues, the Court shall first deal with an obvious procedural lapse.
Petitioners filed before us an original action particularly denominated as a Complaint assailing the
constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA imposing the Universal Charge and Rule 18 of the EPIRA's IRR. No
doubt, petitioners havelocus standi. They impugn the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA because
they sustained a direct injury as a result of the imposition of the Universal Charge as reflected in their
electric bills.
However, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when they filed this "Complaint"
directly with us. Furthermore, the Complaint is bereft of any allegation of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the ERC or any of the public respondents, in order for the Court to consider it as a petition for
certiorari or prohibition.
Article VIII, Section 5(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution 27 categorically provides that:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the rules of
court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
But this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals, does
not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief. 28 It has long
been established that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment
of a remedy within and call for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. 29 This circumstance alone
warrants the outright dismissal of the present action.
This procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we opt to resolve the constitutional issue raised herein. We
are aware that if the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is not resolved now, the issue will certainly
resurface in the near future, resulting in a repeat of this litigation, and probably involving the same
parties. In the public interest and to avoid unnecessary delay, this Court renders its ruling now.
The instant complaint is bereft of merit.
The First Issue
To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to distinguish the State’s power of taxation from the police
power.
The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very
nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the
legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency that is to pay it. 30 It is based on the principle that
taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious
need.31 Thus, the theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes,
government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.32
On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property.33 It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most
demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in the Latin
maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent
attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of
instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory
powers.34 We have held that the power to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the
utility and of its patrons.35
The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose for which the
charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised
does not make the imposition a tax.36
In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's police power,
particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates
the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed 37 and which can be amply discerned as
regulatory in character. The EPIRA resonates such regulatory purposes, thus:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State:
(a) To ensure and accelerate the total electrification of the country;
(b) To ensure the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power;
(c) To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of electricity in a regime of free and fair
competition and full public accountability to achieve greater operational and economic
efficiency and enhance the competitiveness of Philippine products in the global market;
(d) To enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the ownership base of the power
generation, transmission and distribution sectors;
(e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of public and private sector entities in the
process of restructuring the electric power industry;
(f) To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates and services of electric utilities
and other providers of electric power;
(g) To assure socially and environmentally compatible energy sources and infrastructure;
(h) To promote the utilization of indigenous and new and renewable energy resources in
power generation in order to reduce dependence on imported energy;
 (i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of the assets and liabilities of the
National Power Corporation (NPC);
(j) To establish a strong and purely independent regulatory body and system to ensure
consumer protection and enhance the competitive operation of the electricity market; and
(k) To encourage the efficient use of energy and other modalities of demand side
management.
From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but
an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare is surely promoted.
Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an implement of police
power.38 In Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al.39 and in Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,40 this
Court held that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF) were
exactions made in the exercise of the police power. The doctrine was reiterated in Osmeña v.
Orbos41 with respect to the OPSF. Thus, we disagree with petitioners that the instant case is different
from the aforementioned cases. With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also created
under the administration of PSALM.42 The STF has some notable characteristics similar to the OPSF and
the SSF, viz.:
1) In the implementation of stranded cost recovery, the ERC shall conduct a review to
determine whether there is under-recovery or over recovery and adjust (true-up) the level of
the stranded cost recovery charge. In case of an over-recovery, the ERC shall ensure that any
excess amount shall be remitted to the STF. A separate account shall be created for these
amounts which shall be held in trust for any future claims of distribution utilities for stranded
cost recovery. At the end of the stranded cost recovery period, any remaining amount in this
account shall be used to reduce the electricity rates to the end-users.43
2) With respect to the assailed Universal Charge, if the total amount collected for the same is
greater than the actual availments against it, the PSALM shall retain the balance within the
STF to pay for periods where a shortfall occurs.44
3) Upon expiration of the term of PSALM, the administration of the STF shall be transferred to
the DOF or any of the DOF attached agencies as designated by the DOF Secretary.45
The OSG is in point when it asseverates:
Evidently, the establishment and maintenance of the Special Trust Fund, under the last paragraph of
Section 34, R.A. No. 9136, is well within the pervasive and non-waivable power and responsibility of the
government to secure the physical and economic survival and well-being of the community, that
comprehensive sovereign authority we designate as the police power of the State.46
This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an exaction imposed
primarily in pursuit of the State's police objectives. The STF reasonably serves and assures the attainment
and perpetuity of the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of
the country's electric power industry.
The Second Issue
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.
A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as
expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be
delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another. 47
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various
specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. 48 Given the volume and
variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal
adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to
administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields - the
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All
that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The
second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 49
The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is
complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.
Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that "within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a
Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity
end-users," and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the
amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself. For one,
Sec. 43(b)(ii) of the EPIRA provides:
SECTION 43. Functions of the ERC. — The ERC shall promote competition, encourage market
development, ensure customer choice and penalize abuse of market power in the restructured electricity
industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC is authorized to issue cease and desist order after due notice and
hearing. Towards this end, it shall be responsible for the following key functions in the restructured
industry:
xxxx
(b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate and enforce, in accordance with
law, a National Grid Code and a Distribution Code which shall include, but not limited to the following:
xxxx
(ii) Financial capability standards for the generating companies, the TRANSCO, distribution utilities and
suppliers: Provided, That in the formulation of the financial capability standards, the nature and function
of the entity shall be considered: Provided, further, That such standards are set to ensure that the
electric power industry participants meet the minimum financial standards to protect the public interest.
Determine, fix, and approve, after due notice and public hearings the universal charge, to be imposed on
all electricity end-users pursuant to Section 34 hereof;
Moreover, contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in
the determination of the Universal Charge. Sec. 51(d) and (e) of the EPIRA 50 clearly provides:
SECTION 51. Powers. — The PSALM Corp. shall, in the performance of its functions and for the
attainment of its objective, have the following powers:
xxxx
(d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded contract costs of NPC
which shall form the basis for ERC in the determination of the universal charge;
(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the proceeds from sales and other
property contributed to it, including the proceeds from the universal charge.
Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative power.
As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "interest
of law and order;"51 "adequate and efficient instruction;" 52 "public interest;"53 "justice and
equity;"54 "public convenience and welfare;"55 "simplicity, economy and efficiency;" 56 "standardization
and regulation of medical education;" 57 and "fair and equitable employment practices."58 Provisions of
the EPIRA such as, among others, "to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality,
reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power" 59 and "watershed rehabilitation and
management"60 meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERC’s
power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERC's conferred powers were challenged.
In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission, 61 the Court had occasion to say:
In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the provisions of the EPIRA must not be read
in separate parts. Rather, the law must be read in its entirety, because a statute is passed as a whole,
and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Its meaning cannot to be extracted from any single
part thereof but from a general consideration of the statute as a whole. Considering the intent of
Congress in enacting the EPIRA and reading the statute in its entirety, it is plain to see that the law has
expanded the jurisdiction of the regulatory body, the ERC in this case, to enable the latter to implement
the reforms sought to be accomplished by the EPIRA. When the legislators decided to broaden the
jurisdiction of the ERC, they did not intend to abolish or reduce the powers already conferred upon ERC's
predecessors. To sustain the view that the ERC possesses only the powers and functions listed under
Section 43 of the EPIRA is to frustrate the objectives of the law.
In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 62 in the same case, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice,
Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of police power in relation to the delegation of powers to the
ERC and its regulatory functions over electric power as a vital public utility, to wit:
Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer limited to the preservation of public
health, safety and morals, which used to be the primary social interests in earlier times. Police power
now requires the State to "assume an affirmative duty to eliminate the excesses and injustices that are
the concomitants of an unrestrained industrial economy." Police power is now exerted "to further the
public welfare — a concept as vast as the good of society itself." Hence, "police power is but another
name for the governmental authority to further the welfare of society that is the basic end of all
government." When police power is delegated to administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its
exercise should be given a wide latitude. Police power takes on an even broader dimension in developing
countries such as ours, where the State must take a more active role in balancing the many conflicting
interests in society. The Questioned Order was issued by the ERC, acting as an agent of the State in the
exercise of police power. We should have exceptionally good grounds to curtail its exercise. This
approach is more compelling in the field of rate-regulation of electric power rates. Electric power
generation and distribution is a traditional instrument of economic growth that affects not only a few but
the entire nation. It is an important factor in encouraging investment and promoting business. The
engines of progress may come to a screeching halt if the delivery of electric power is impaired. Billions of
pesos would be lost as a result of power outages or unreliable electric power services. The State thru the
ERC should be able to exercise its police power with great flexibility, when the need arises.
This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory
Commission63 where the Court held that the ERC, as regulator, should have sufficient power to respond
in real time to changes wrought by multifarious factors affecting public utilities.
From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of legislative
power to the ERC.
Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that the imposition of
the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without
representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived or abandoned per Resolution 64 of August 3,
2004.65 Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is
an issue which essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the
same.66
As a penultimate statement, it may be well to recall what this Court said of EPIRA:
One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in recent years is the EPIRA. It established
a new policy, legal structure and regulatory framework for the electric power industry. The new thrust is
to tap private capital for the expansion and improvement of the industry as the large government debt
and the highly capital-intensive character of the industry itself have long been acknowledged as the
critical constraints to the program. To attract private investment, largely foreign, the jaded structure of
the industry had to be addressed. While the generation and transmission sectors were centralized and
monopolistic, the distribution side was fragmented with over 130 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic.
The pervasive flaws have caused a low utilization of existing generation capacity; extremely high and
uncompetitive power rates; poor quality of service to consumers; dismal to forgettable performance of
the government power sector; high system losses; and an inability to develop a clear strategy for
overcoming these shortcomings.
Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry, including the privatization of
the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure, and the
delineation of the roles of various government agencies and the private entities. The law ordains the
division of the industry into four (4) distinct sectors, namely: generation, transmission, distribution and
supply.
Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and its transmission business spun off and
privatized thereafter.67
Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or
argumentative.68Indubitably, petitioners failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We
find no clear violation of the Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the
EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

FACTS:

On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Act of 2001. Petitioners Romeo
P. Gerochi and company assail the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law for being an undue delegation
of the power of taxation. Section 34 provides for the imposition of a “Universal Charge” to all electricity
end users after a period of (1) one year after the effectively of the EPIRA Law. The universal charge to be
collected would serve as payment for government debts, missionary electrification, equalization of taxes
and royalties applied to renewable energy and imported energy, environmental charge and for a charge
to account for all forms of cross subsidies for a period not exceeding three years. The universal charge
shall be collected by the ERC on a monthly basis from all end users and will then be managed by the
PSALM Corp. through the creation of a special trust fund.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the power to tax on the part of the ERC

HELD:

No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax but an exaction of the regulatory power
(police power) of the state. The universal charge under section 34 is incidental to the regulatory duties of
the ERC, hence the provision assailed is not for generation of revenue and therefore it cannot be
considered as tax, but an execution of the states police power thru regulation.

Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC, but by the legislative parameters
provided for in the law (RA 9136) itself, it therefore cannot be understood as a rule solely coming from
the ERC. The ERC in this case is only a specialized administrative agency which is tasked of executing a
subordinate legislation issued by congress; which before execution must pass both the completeness
test and the sufficiency of standard test. The court in appreciating Section 34 of RA 9136 in its entirety
finds the said law and the assailed portions free from any constitutional defect and thus deemed
complete and sufficient in form.
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for respondent Cu
Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review the
actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the
Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit
the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned
application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith
committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said
case (G. R. No. 41200). 1
Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation,
are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is
one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu
Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of
this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for
probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on
October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case
as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both
in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the
exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of
conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four
years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with
reservation of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon
appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five
years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision
mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for
reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on December 17, 1935, and
final judgment was accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The defendant thereupon sought to have
the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the
petition for certiorari in November, 1936. This court, on November 24, 1936, denied the
petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file a second alternative motion for
reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the
judgment.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No.
4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his
petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal
record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila,
Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office
which recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila,
seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the
herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937,
alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of
Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform
throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the
power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective
provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating
on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the
opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221.
On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a finding that
"las pruebas no han establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y que todos
los hechos probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su inocencia" and concludes that the
herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands
convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation for the reason
that:
. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia social
que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario acreedor de la
misma, una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las suspicacias, podria
levantarse indignada contra un sistema de probacion que permite atisbar en los
procedimientos ordinarios de una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia de las
decisiones ya recaidas al traer a la superficie conclusiones enteramente differentes, en
menoscabo del interes publico que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto judicial.
On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the
resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937. This was
supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The aforesaid
motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel
for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici
curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. Attorney
Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid motion subsequently filed a petition for leave to
withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the motion for leave to intervene as amici
curiae was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the evening of July 30,
1937, and that he signed the same "without mature deliberation and purely as a matter of courtesy to
the person who invited me (him)."
On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of
an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit the herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment.
On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to intervene
as amici curiae aforementioned, asking that a date be set for a hearing of the same and that, at all
events, said motion should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the same who were
members of the legal staff of the several counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On August 10, 1937, herein
respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for
intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on August 14, 1937. On the last-mentioned date,
the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in
preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for
Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The respondent
judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to
consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances
under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to
have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on
extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the
Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for
delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to
criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final
judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a
temporary restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937.
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein
petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction:
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under
probation for the following reason:
(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made
to apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be
made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect
that in the absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to
include the City of Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general
application, it is also true that Act No. 4221 is not a law of general application
because it is made to apply only to those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221
would not be applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a probation
officer as required by section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an
Insular Probation Officer willing to act for the City of Manila, said Probation Officer
provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and distinct from the
Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the same Act.
II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for
probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in excess
thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to commit Mariano Cu
Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying Mariano Cu
Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason that:
(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221
to the granting or denying of applications for probation.
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for
probation on June 28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment of its
rendition.
(3) No right on appeal exists in such cases.
(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to
modify or change the same.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the crime for
which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only presumptuous but
without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this court and a violation of the
respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became
imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to commit
his co-respondent to jail.
Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a system of
probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional
because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of its province
the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective provinces, because it
constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of the
legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution
(section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives the provincial boards,
in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the authority to
enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces without uniformity. In another
supplementary petition dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, in behalf of one of
the petitioners, the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for the first time with the issues raised by
other petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and on the oral argument held on
October 6, 1937, further elaborated on the theory that probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act.
No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and
reprieves. On October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums in which he contended that Act
No. 4221 not only encroaches upon the pardoning power to the executive, but also constitute an
unwarranted delegation of legislative power and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. On October
9, 1937, two memorandums, signed jointly by the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of
the People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel for the petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws and
the other contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power, were
presented. Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same day, October 9, 1937,
alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of the laws and
constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and, further, that the whole Act is void: that the
Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity of its laws; that the private prosecution
may intervene in probation proceedings and may attack the probation law as unconstitutional; and that
this court may pass upon the constitutional question in prohibition proceedings.
Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and
memorandums, challenge each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the petitioners.
As special defenses, respondents allege:
(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the
issuance of the writ of certiorari or of prohibition.
(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the
petitioners is the very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and
was still pending resolution before the trial court when the present petition was
filed with this court.
(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution
of judgment before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the same under the theory that its resolution denying
probation is unappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of First Instance to decide the question as to whether or not the execution
will lie, this court nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of
First Instance has assumed jurisdiction over the same upon motion of herein
petitioners themselves.
(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to
deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings
to this court, should not be tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity
of the trial court which court while sitting in the probation cases is "a court of
limited jurisdiction but of great dignity."
(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the
question submitted to and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action
would not lie because the resolution of the trial court denying probation is
appealable; for although the Probation Law does not specifically provide that an
applicant for probation may appeal from a resolution of the Court of First Instance
denying probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a final order,
resolution or decision of an inferior court is appealable to the superior court.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng being appealable, the same had not become final and
executory for the reason that the said respondent had filed an alternative motion
for reconsideration and new trial within the requisite period of fifteen days, which
motion the trial court was able to resolve in view of the restraining order
improvidently and erroneously issued by this court.lawphi1.net
(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the
resolution of the trial court denying probation is not final and unappealable when
he presented his answer to the motion for reconsideration and agreed to the
postponement of the hearing of the said motion.
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is
not appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance
of the writ of certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although
it believed that the accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied
probation for fear of criticism because the accused is a rich man; and that, before a
petition for certiorari grounded on an irregular exercise of jurisdiction by the trial
court could lie, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the trial court could have
an opportunity to correct or cure the same.
(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial
court retains its jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in
accordance with law and justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or
resolution is inherent in the courts and may be exercise either motu proprio or
upon petition of the proper party, the petition in the latter case taking the form of
a motion for reconsideration.
(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as
respondent allege, said court cannot order execution of the same while it is on
appeal, for then the appeal would not be availing because the doors of probation
will be closed from the moment the accused commences to serve his sentence
(Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs. Cook, 19 Fed. [2d], 827).
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No.
4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive. In an additional memorandum filed
on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is free
from constitutional objections and contend, in addition, that the private prosecution may not intervene
in probation proceedings, much less question the validity of Act No. 4221; that both the City Fiscal and
the Solicitor-General are estopped from questioning the validity of the Act; that the validity of Act cannot
be attacked for the first time before this court; that probation in unavailable; and that, in any event,
section 11 of the Act No. 4221 is separable from the rest of the Act. The last memorandum for the
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time but was admitted by
resolution of this court and filed anew on November 5, 1937. This memorandum elaborates on
some of the points raised by the respondents and refutes those brought up by the petitioners.
In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case, we noted
that the court below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng and in denying said application assumed the task not only of considering the merits of the
application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding the final
pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation implies guilt be final judgment. While a
probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not
authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially
wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of
the parties. As already observed by this court in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and
reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of
overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would
result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they
occupy in the interrelation and operation of the intergrated judicial system of the nation.
After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and the
respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two fundamental
questions presented, namely, (1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly
raised in these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional.
Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of certain incidental questions raised by the
parties.
To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is necessary. It
is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the
courts unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. (McGirr
vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.)
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions.
Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in
the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs.
Patstone ([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the question of the constitutionality of a statute
may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government
of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an act of the legislature
unconstitutional in an action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines.
It has also been held that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas
corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are
authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged
statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for
preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision
of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari.(Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court
[1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases
cited). The case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided by this court twelve years ago was, like the
present one, an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The constitutionality of Act No. 2972,
popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by the petitioners, and the
constitutional issue was not met squarely by the respondent in a demurrer. A point was raised "relating
to the propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in prohibition." This
court decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices dissenting, held that Act No.
2972 was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States which reversed the judgment of this court and held that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70
Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of jurisdiction, however, the Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief
Justice, said:
By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme
court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior
tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts
are exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that
court that the question of the validity of the criminal statute must usually be raised by a
defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court.
(Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192). But in this case where a new
act seriously affected numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to
cause a multiplicity of actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to
the act's validity promptly before it and decide in the interest of the orderly administration of
justice. The court relied by analogy upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S., 123;52 Law
ed., 714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 932; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U.
S., 33; 60 Law. ed., 131; L. R. A. 1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and
Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755; L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298;
Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer to the
petition, this is now disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and both parties ask a decision
on the merits. In view of the broad powers in prohibition granted to that court under the
Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of the parties.
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and
directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 705.) The general
rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the merit of prohibition will not lie whether the
inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is questioned,
because in such cases the interior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of
the statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the complainant in such cases
ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the
inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be
prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C. J., 670; Ex parte Round tree [1874,
51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384; 84 A., 799;
Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185; Arnold
vs. Shields [1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.)
Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No.
4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons after
their conviction has become final and before they have served their sentence. It is true that at common
law the authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the execution of the sentence is recognized and,
according to a number of state courts, including those of Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Ohio,
the power is inherent in the courts (Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874], 115 Mass., 133; People
vs. Stickel [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141
N. Y., 288; Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio St., 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United States
([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355),
the Supreme Court of the United States expressed the opinion that under the common law the power of
the court was limited to temporary suspension, and brushed aside the contention as to inherent judicial
power saying, through Chief Justice White:
Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal
laws and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is
equally to be conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts
inherently possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable
them to wisely exert their authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the
contention as to power here made, since it must rest upon the proposition that the power to
enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the
proposition urged upon the distribution of powers made by the Constitution will become
apparent when it is observed that indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fix
the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right in advance to bring within
judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute, elements of consideration which
would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve from
 the punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to the methods by it provided
belongs to the executive department.
Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First
Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached the conclusion that the
power to suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases is not inherent in the judicial
function. "All are agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory authority, it does not lie within the
power of the courts to grant such suspensions." (at p. 278.) Both petitioner and respondents are correct,
therefore, when they argue that a Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of
limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the
Philippine Legislature.
It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for
prohibition where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by objection
of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs. Kirby [1914], 260 Mo.,
120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been
squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by the
private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of the court below,
declined to pass upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose
rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex County
([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the proposition that a court will not consider
any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because
his rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may not motu
proprio take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power to declare a
legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will
shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official
oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded on the
assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore, the court a quo admits that the
constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the question solely because it was not
raised by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterates this view. The argument is advanced that the
private prosecution has no personality to appear in the hearing of the application for probation of
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case No. 42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
hence the issue of constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a general
rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a
judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is
void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of
the constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons
interested in the effect to be given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to
concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow
that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibitions. It is true that, as
a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not
raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it
will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario,
26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the
exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of
a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases,
although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first
time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil
cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised
for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision
of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer
vs. St. Louis Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co., [1905],
188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an
appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911],
175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for
the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case
of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional
question here — a point we do not now have to decide — we are of the opinion that the People of the
Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper
party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really
violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has
a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of grater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement
of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act
of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines.
In Attorney General vs. Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of
Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the
respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base
their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief
law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was though, as a general rule, only
those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial
decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction in void, where
the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of
constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons
interested in the effect to begin the statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede
that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the
issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general
rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by
the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be
considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil.,
192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of
sound discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute
should be presented. (In re Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is
a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any state
of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been
held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for first time on
appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case.
(McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis,
Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo. 685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo.,
572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate
court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala.,
561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the first
time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu
Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional
question here — a point we do not now have to decide — we are of the opinion that the People of the
Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper
party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really
violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has
a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement
of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act
of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines.
In Attorney General vs. Perkings([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N.W., 426, 428, 429), the State of
Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the
respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base
their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief
law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was itself questioned. Said the
Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin, J.:
. . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law
enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of
usurpation their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate
answer. The last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is
unconstitutional, it is statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving
effect to justify action under it than if it had never been enacted. The constitution is the
supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow . . . The
legislature and the respondents are not the only parties in interest upon such constitutional
questions. As was remarked by Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of an acquiescence by a party
affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature: "The people have a deep and vested
interest in maintaining all the constitutional limitations upon the exercise of legislative
powers." (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was brought by
the Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In disposing of the
question whether or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme Court of Kansas said:
. . . the state is a proper party — indeed, the proper party — to bring this action. The state is
always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.
"It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not
disregarded, and need not, as an individual plaintiff must, show
grounds of fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas City 60 Kan.,
518 [57 Pac., 118])." (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)
Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-
General, or county attorney, may exercise his bet judgment as to what sort of action he will
bring to have the matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity (State
vs. Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662), by mandamus to compel obedience
to its terms (State vs. Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain
proceedings under its questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App.,
319; 45 Pac., 122).
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197 S. W.,
1006; State vs. S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181 La., 597; 160 S., 91;
State vs. Board of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of Brooklyn vs. State [1917],
211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State {1918], 187 Ind., 339; 119 N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins
[1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last cited, the Supreme Court of Luisiana said:
It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the
duty of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of
the argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of
Tenth Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare,
Mayor of New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard,
Auditor (47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not forbid a
district attorney to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with one
which it is his duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling
was the judge should not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional
forbid the district attorney to file a bill of information charging a person with a violation of the
statute. In other words, a judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until
the question of constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in
order to determine the right of a party litigant. State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is
authority for the proposition merely that an officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of
enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers the statute
unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if the
statute be unconstitutional. State ex rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority for the proposition
merely that executive officers, e.g., the state auditor and state treasurer, should not decline
to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the ground that they
believe the statute is unconstitutional.
It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to
support the Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two statutes
in conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment, one of the
two statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is
compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is
unconstitutional. If it were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free from
constitutional limitations in the enactment of criminal laws.
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that the
state may impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in the
opposite direction. In fact, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the rule as stated is
sound but that it has no application in the present case, nor may it be invoked by the City Fiscal in behalf
of the People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the principal reasons being that the
validity before this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and, not
authorized challenge the validity of the Act in its application outside said city. (Additional memorandum
of respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8,. 10, 17 and 23.)
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not
been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly
regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped
from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional questions only when presented
before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before
is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in
relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to
the resolution of the instant case. For, ". . . while the court will meet the question with firmness, where
its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for the legislature, renders it
proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other points." (Ex parte Randolph
[1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide, also Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has
been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the
decision of the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev. Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398;
143 N. Y. Supp., 454 [aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U.S., 272];
Hesse vs. Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co.,
vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where the right of a party is founded solely
on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C.J., p. 782, citing Central Glass Co. vs. Niagrara F. Ins.
Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N.E., 306). There is no doubt that the
respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact that the
Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon
by the courts; that may persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for
probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people will likely take advantage of
the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a
period of about four years since his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and
to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act
No. 4221 be now resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.S., 500; 70 Law.
ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N.Y., 533; 101 N.E., 442, 444; Ann. Cas.
1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489;
Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an
analogous situation confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly
twelve thousand merchants are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new
law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and for the advancement of
public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may
decide the main issue. We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general
rule." Our ruling on this point was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. A more binding
authority in support of the view we have taken can not be found.
We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been
properly raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the
Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section
10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in
conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in
clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict
therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.
This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the
executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the
Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of
every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself." (U.S. vs. Ten Yu
[1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson
[1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the
executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the
Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and
sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but
cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments
of the governments. (6 R.C.L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the
judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective
Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the
Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of authorities.
One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called attention to the
fact that the President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the constitutionality
of the Probation Act, adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this question was a foregone
conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the integrity and independence of this court.
We take notice of the fact that the President in his message dated September 1, 1937, recommended to
the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the Probation Act (No. 4221); that this message resulted
in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the Nationality Assembly repealing the probation Act, subject to
certain conditions therein mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13,
1937, much against his wish, "to have stricken out from the statute books of the Commonwealth a law . .
. unfair and very likely unconstitutional." It is sufficient to observe in this connection that, in vetoing the
bill referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons which
he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination
of actual controversies submitted for our determination. Whether or not the Executive should express or
in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his broad constitutional power of
veto but which happens to be at the same time pending determination in this court is a question of
propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these
circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on way or another and prevent us from taking what
in our opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case. It if is ever necessary for us to make
any vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is that we are
independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government —
independent in the performance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics,
indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it
and as we understand it.
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act
encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in force at
the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in the Governor-
General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and
forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The
provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive" found
in the Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law,
pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction
(Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2; In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-
General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a
person before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought
this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can
only be exercised "after conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning power does not
extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally followed in the United States
(Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2). The rule in England is different. There, a royal
pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but," says Blackstone, "after the impeachment
has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not understood that the king's royal grace is further
restrained or abridged." (Vide, Ex parte Wells [1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421; Com. vs. Lockwood
[1872], 109 Mass., 323; 12 Am. Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio St., 457; 23 am. Rep., 762.)
The reason for the distinction is obvious. In England, Judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere
"removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to the whole punishment
attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may, by its sentence,
inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment,
depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from office and incapacity
to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also makes specific mention of
"commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant, such
conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be granted by the
President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National Assembly. We need not
dwell at length on the significance of these fundamental changes. It is sufficient for our purposes to state
that the pardoning power has remained essentially the same. The question is: Has the pardoning power
of the Chief Executive under the Jones Law been impaired by the Probation Act?
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. The
exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else.
". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any
legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or authority.
The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no
person properly belonging to one of the departments can exercise any powers appertaining to either of
the others except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution." (20 R.C.L., pp., , and cases cited.) "
. . . where the pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or implied limitations, the
grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere,
nor interfere with or control the proper exercise thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If
Act No. 4221, then, confers any pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional
and void. But does it?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the United States
ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. (Ex parte United States [1916],
242 U.S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L.R.A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief
Justice White, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, expressed the opinion of the court that
under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension and that the right to
suspend sentenced absolutely and permanently was vested in the executive branch of the government
and not in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded. Said
the court through its Chief Justice: ". . . and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the
imposition of penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or such other means as the
legislative mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to enable courts to meet by
the exercise of an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to them
for judgment, recourse must be had Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in the very
nature of things adequately complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This
decision led the National Probation Association and others to agitate for the enactment by Congress of a
federal probation law. Such action was finally taken on March 4, 1925 (chap. 521, 43 Stat. L. 159, U.S.C.
title 18, sec. 724). This was followed by an appropriation to defray the salaries and expenses of a certain
number of probation officers chosen by civil service. (Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.)
In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309), the Supreme
Court of the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person sentenced to
imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no power under the
Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term at which sentence was
imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of the probation Act was not
considered but was assumed. The court traced the history of the Act and quoted from the report of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th
Congress, 2 Session) the following statement:
Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised a
form of probation either, by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state
probation officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte United States, 242 U.S., 27;
61 L. Ed., 129; L.R.A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme
Court denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentenced. In the same opinion the
court pointed out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation
powers in the future . . .
Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation
legislation. In 1917, a bill was favorably reported by the Judiciary Committee and passed the
House. In 1920, the judiciary Committee again favorably reported a probation bill to the
House, but it was never reached for definite action.
If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with reference
to its treatment of those convicted of violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of
the states of the Union. At the present time every state has a probation law, and in all but
twelve states the law applies both to adult and juvenile offenders. (see, also, Johnson,
Probation for Juveniles and Adults [1928], Chap. I.)
The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal courts. In Riggs
vs. United States supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:
Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration
have been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and
the constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no manner to encroach
upon the pardoning power of the President. This case will be found to contain an able and
comprehensive review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we have to consider,
and to it and the authorities cited therein special reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d],
590, 594), as is also to a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (Kriebel
vs. U.S., 10 F. [2d], 762), likewise construing the Probation Act.
We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and unequivocal language,
pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws, that a federal probation
law as actually enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1928 and consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in a
number of earlier cases.
We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally
enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. This
conclusion is supported by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20 N. M., 542; L.R.A. 1916A, 1285;
151 Pac., 698, the court said: "It is clearly within the province of the Legislature to denominate and
define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for each a minimum and maximum punishment." And in
State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S.C., 466; 33 L.R.A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court
said: "The legislative power to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power
the general assembly may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to
be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be certain or
indeterminate or conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69.) Indeed, the
Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the
legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts — particularly the trial courts — large
discretion in imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice
can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to best determine the
penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are not
allowed to refrain from imposing a sentence merely because, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts
being allowed in such case to submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as it may deem proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where both mitigating and
aggravating circumstances are attendant in the commission of a crime and the law provides for a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such circumstances to offset one another in
consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according to the result of such
compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera and Asuategui [1921], 41 Phil., 506.)
Again, article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to determine, within the
limits of each periods, in case the penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the extent of the evil
produced by the crime. In the imposition of fines, the courts are allowed to fix any amount within the
limits established by law, considering not only the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more
particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph 1, of
the same Code provides that "a discretionary penalty shall be imposed" upon a person under fifteen but
over nine years of age, who has not acted without discernment, but always lower by two degrees at least
than that prescribed by law for the crime which he has committed. Article 69 of the same Code provides
that in case of "incomplete self-defense", i.e., when the crime committed is not wholly excusable by
reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal
liability in the several cases mentioned in article 11 and 12 of the Code, "the courts shall impose the
penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions
of exemption present or lacking." And, in case the commission of what are known as "impossible"
crimes, "the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the
offender," shall impose upon him either arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59,
Revised Penal Code.)
Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is deducted form
the entire term of imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned (art. 29); the death penalty
is not imposed when the guilty person is more than seventy years of age, or where upon appeal or
revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as
to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty (art. 47, see also, sec. 133, Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3); the death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman
within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any
person over seventy years of age (art. 83); and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after
final sentence has been pronounced, or while he is serving his sentenced, the execution of said sentence
shall be suspended with regard to the personal penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility
(art. 79).
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the penal laws is
more clearly demonstrated in various other enactments, including the probation Act. There is the
Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently amended by Act No.
4225, establishing a system of parole (secs. 5 to 100 and granting the courts large discretion in imposing
the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as amended provides; "hereafter, in imposing a prison
sentence for an offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to
a minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for
the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law
and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Certain classes of
convicts are, by section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof. The Legislature has also
enacted the Juvenile Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203) which was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559.
Section 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the amendatory Act have become article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117 of the Philippine Legislature and recently reamended by
Commonwealth Act No. 99 of the National Assembly. In this Act is again manifested the intention of the
legislature to "humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the modification in particular cases of the
penalties prescribed by law by permitting the suspension of the execution of the judgment in the
discretion of the trial court, after due hearing and after investigation of the particular circumstances of
the offenses, the criminal record, if any, of the convict, and his social history. The Legislature has in
reality decreed that in certain cases no punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the
conditions of probation are faithfully observed. It this be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation
Act comes in conflict with the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to
use the language of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, "the element of punishment or the penalty for
the commission of a wrong, while to be declared by the courts as a judicial function under and within the
limits of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and conduct of criminal
causes, with which the executive can have nothing to do." (Ex parteBates, supra.) In Williams vs. State
([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S.E., 843), the court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia probation
statute against the contention that it attempted to delegate to the courts the pardoning power lodged
by the constitution in the governor alone is vested with the power to pardon after final sentence has
been imposed by the courts, the power of the courts to imposed any penalty which may be from time to
time prescribed by law and in such manner as may be defined cannot be questioned."
We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it unlawful for the
legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a sentenced, by probation or
otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive. (In re Webb [1895],
89 Wis., 354; 27 L.R.A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N.W., 177; 9 Am. Crim., Rep., 702; State ex rel.
Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev., 150; 182 Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 108; 1
Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L.R.A. [N.S.], 1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650; People vs. Barrett
[1903], 202 Ill, 287; 67 N.E., 23; 63 L.R.A., 82; 95 Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex.
Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162; Ex parte Shelor [1910], 33 Nev., 361;111 Pac.,
291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep., 175; 30 S. E. 858; State ex rel.
Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630; 181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54 Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571;
States vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S. W., 456.)
Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590; Archer vs. Snook
[1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5; Murphy vs. States
[1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac.,
831; Re Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac., 392; Ex parte De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730;
300 Pac., 874; People vs. Patrick [1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425; Martin vs. People [1917], 69 Colo.,
60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo [1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State [1926],
162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843; People vs. Heise [1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893],
135 Ind., 534; 35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R. A., 859; St. Hillarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882;
People vs. Stickle [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs. Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529;
State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court [1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525; State vs. Everitt [1913],
164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; State ex rel. Buckley vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H., 402; 74
Atl., 875; State vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl. 424; Ex parte Bates [1915], 20 N. M., 542; L.
R. A., 1916 A. 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People vs. ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; 23
L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55 Misc., 639;
106 N. Y. Supp., 928; People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App.
Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex
parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275; 233 P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E.,
69; State vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults
vs. States [1854],34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State
[1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1913],70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998;
Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S. W., 573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep.,
394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State
[1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson
vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va., 802; 109 S.E., 460; State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42;
State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect
to follow this long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the
legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation however characterized.
State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393), deserved
particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921 which provided for the suspension of the
execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and required that the convicted person be
placed under the charge of a parole or peace officer during the term of such suspension, on such terms
as the court may determine, was held constitutional and as not giving the court a power in violation of
the constitutional provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the state. (Vide,
also, Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and
different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions
([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675), the Court of
Appeals of New York said:
. . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as
understood when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different in their
nature. The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of the
executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court
temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil
disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches both
the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases the
punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is
as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes the penalties and
disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and
gives him a new credit and capacity. (Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall., 333; 18 Law. ed., 366;
U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149; 24 Law.
ed., 442.)
The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the
principles governing the power to grant pardons, and it was conferred by these instruments
upon the executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the words of the
constitution were used to express the authority formerly exercised by the English crown, or
by its representatives in the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed.,
421.) As this power was understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions
to suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves and
pardons should abrogate, or in any degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its
own judgments, that criminal courts has so long maintained. The two powers, so distinct and
different in their nature and character, were still left separate and distinct, the one to be
exercised by the executive, and the other by the judicial department. We therefore conclude
that a statute which, in terms, authorizes courts of criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence
in certain cases after conviction, — a power inherent in such courts at common law, which
was understood when the constitution was adopted to be an ordinary judicial function, and
which, ever since its adoption, has been exercised of legislative power under the constitution.
It does not encroach, in any just sense, upon the powers of the executive, as they have been
understood and practiced from the earliest times. (Quoted with approval in Directors of
Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265, Carson, J., concurring, at pp.
294, 295.)
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and
completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the
Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation.
Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally
discharged from supervision only after the period of probation shall have been terminated and the
probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has
complied with the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation,
remains in legal custody — subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may
be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be
committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No.
4221.)
The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far
from it. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in
substitution of the imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws. For this reason its
application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed
applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal
law, which binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no
conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality of the Probation Act
for this cause. (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d], 567, 569.)
Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence. Snodgrass
vs. State ([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162), is relied upon most
strongly by the petitioners as authority in support of their contention that the power to grant pardons
and reprieves, having been vested exclusively upon the Chief Executive by the Jones Law, may not be
conferred by the legislature upon the courts by means of probation law authorizing the indefinite judicial
suspension of sentence. We have examined that case and found that although the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas held that the probation statute of the state in terms conferred on the district courts the
power to grant pardons to persons convicted of crime, it also distinguished between suspensions
sentence on the one hand, and reprieve and commutation of sentence on the other. Said the court,
through Harper, J.:
That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to
grant reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the
distinction between a "reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones
the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time.
(Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and
cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be hold in conflict with the
power confiding in the Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for a commutations
is not but to change the punishment assessed to a less punishment.
In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the Supreme Court of
Montana had under consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the state enacted in 1913,
now found in sections 12078-12086, Revised Codes of 1921. The court held the law valid as not
impinging upon the pardoning power of the executive. In a unanimous decision penned by Justice
Holloway, the court said:
. . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a well understood meaning
at the time our Constitution was adopted, and no one of them was intended to comprehend
the suspension of the execution of the judgment as that phrase is employed in sections
12078-12086. A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the
execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet.,
150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is a remission of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a
forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73
Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71). "Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a
substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.]
789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs. Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A "reprieve" or
"respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's
Commentaries, 394), a postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.],
272), a temporary suspension of execution (Butler vs. State, 97 Ind., 373).
Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our section
12078 has been determined; but the same objections have been urged against parole statutes
which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to whom the power of pardon is
granted, and these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a reference to the
 numerous cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W.,558,
reported in L. R. A., 1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.)
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The
pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete
as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus
place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States
[1926],
14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)
2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive and is not
for that reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as contended, an undue delegation of legislative
power?
Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and
substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these
departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest
expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere.
The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law
(sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the
Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and
responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the
power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This
principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law through a
misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the
English public law in decisions forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its way into
America as an enlightened principle of free government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the
principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66.) The classic statement of the
rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to
anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.)
Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-quoted language: "One of the settled maxims
in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated
by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the state has located
the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until
the Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high
prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibilities by choosing other agencies
upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of
any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley
on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11
Phil., 327.) This court posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own
judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of
another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It
admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative
body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39
Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32
Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes [1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our
system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the
central authorities; and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be
delegated, the creation of the municipalities exercising local self government has never been held to
trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but
rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to immemorial practice,
subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs.
Hennick, supra.) On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such
agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the same relation to
Congress as a municipality or city to the state government. (United States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S.,
370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr vs. United States [1904], 195 U.S., 138;
24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also sustained the delegation of
legislative power to the people at large. Some authorities maintain that this may not be done (12 C. J.,
pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442; Ann. Cas.,
1914C, 616). However, the question of whether or not a state has ceased to be republican in form
because of its adoption of the initiative and referendum has been held not to be a judicial but a political
question (Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32 Sup. Cet.
Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon with favor by certain
progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative courts has been pretty well
drawn. (Opinions of the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A., 113; Kiernan vs.
Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379; 1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 332; Pacific States Tel. &
Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself.
Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National
Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage
dues." And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other
national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a
declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine whether or not, in the
absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the President could be authorized to exercise the
powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been
removed by the Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and
shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
(6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the
foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to authorize the
Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make the sale
of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See and cf. Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Board of
Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil., 136.) The general rule, however, is limited by another rule
that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted
or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. (6 R. C. L., pp. 177-179.)
For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies
endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They
are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative
power to administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which
should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to administrative
bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale
revolves around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action — or the sufficiency thereof —
in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the
standard is sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule,
an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it. (See Schecter vs. United States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79 L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R., 947; People ex rel. Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co. [1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N. E. [2d], 847; 107
A.L.R., 1500 and cases cited. See also R. C. L., title "Constitutional Law", sec 174.) In the case at bar, what
rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine
whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by
the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act
does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or
guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice
Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial
boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its
own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire
matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the
various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their
provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the
hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its
province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation
officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is
a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.
"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no
valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77,
88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec 68.) To the same effect are the decision of this
court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial
Board of Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil., 660) and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these
cases, this court sustained the validity of the law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to
adjust provincial and municipal boundaries. In the second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature
to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied lands to be selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held proper for the
legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition
of the importation of the foreign cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of the country
make this advisable or if deceased among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture
and livestock of the lands."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference of
details of execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and regulations
to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own decisions would be
sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29 Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector
of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez
[1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.)
It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands
of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation
of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170-172;
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1;
6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United State ruled that the legislature may delegate a power
not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92
Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be
delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as
the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the
government. (Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; In re Village of North Milwaukee [1896], 93 Wis.,
616; 97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.W., 210; Field vs. Clark
[1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent tendency,
however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity
arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age (Pfiffner, Public
Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of Parliaments", foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No.
4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun Politics", in Harper's Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147,
152), the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds
restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States in the following
language — speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative agencies: "The principle which
permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances
are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is
granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the
legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under given
circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other
circumstances, different of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is
not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what
the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed."
(Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc.,
of New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228; 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of
an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of
the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate."
(See, also, 12 C.J., p. 864; State vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.)
The legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power
to determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not
made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be
ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or non-
operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute
and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the
happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule, — limited by no principle of expendiency
announced by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it
may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason whatsoever for
refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which
rest entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at some future time — we cannot say when — the provincial
boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers and thus put the law into operation in
the various provinces will not save the statute. The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet
be based solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain specified
contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than
legislature itself.
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the
operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions provided
that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its authority. Thus, section 28, article I of the
Constitution of Texas provides that "No power of suspending laws in this state shall be exercised except
by the legislature"; and section 26, article I of the Constitution of Indiana provides "That the operation of
the laws shall never be suspended, except by authority of the General Assembly." Yet, even provisions of
this sort do not confer absolute power of suspension upon the legislature. While it may be undoubted
that the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be
suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must
be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities. In Holden vs.
James ([1814], 11 Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was said:
By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this commonwealth,
it is declared that the power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never
to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such
particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that
declaration of rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and from the bill of
rights passed in the reign of William and Mary. The bill of rights contains an enumeration of
the oppressive acts of James II, tending to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and
the laws and liberties of the kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a
power of dispensing with and suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without
consent of parliament. The first article in the claim or declaration of rights contained in the
statute is, that the exercise of such power, by legal authority without consent of parliament, is
illegal. In the tenth section of the same statute it is further declared and enacted, that "No
dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or part thereof, should be allowed; but the
same should be held void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such
statute." There is an implied reservation of authority in the parliament to exercise the power
here mentioned; because, according to the theory of the English Constitution, "that absolute
despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere," is intrusted to the
parliament: 1 Bl. Com., 160.
The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign
and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is
delegated to them according to the constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of the power
in question would be equally oppressive to the subject, and subversive of his right to
protection, "according to standing laws," whether exercised by one man or by a number of
men. It cannot be supposed that the people when adopting this general principle from the
English bill of rights and inserting it in our constitution, intended to bestow by implication on
the general court one of the most odious and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient kings of
England. It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and
to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and
advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant one should be
subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like circumstances
are exempted.
court as an original question, to be decided by that tribunal, whether the act shall commence its
operation within the county; but it became by its own terms a law in every county not excepted by name
in the act. It did not, then, require the county court to do any act in order to give it effect. But being the
law in the county, and having by its provisions superseded and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of
previous laws, the county court is . . . empowered, to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions
of the former act. When the question is before the county court for that tribunal to determine which law
shall be in force, it is urge before us that the power then to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative
power, which under our constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men
in the state. In the present case, the question is not presented in the abstract; for the county court of
Saline county, after the act had been for several months in force in that county, did by order suspend its
operation; and during that suspension the offense was committed which is the subject of the present
indictment . . . ." (See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other
localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in may
jurisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote of the
people. (6 R.C.L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which
should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances. "They
relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the running at large of cattle in the
highways, may be differently regarded in different localities, and they are sustained on what seems to us
the impregnable ground, that the subject, though not embraced within the ordinary powers of
municipalities to make by-laws and ordinances, is nevertheless within the class of public regulations, in
respect to which it is proper that the local judgment should control." (Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.) So that, while we do not deny the right of local self-government and the
propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of
small communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that
which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not
be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. True, the statute does
not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in
particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the
necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to
determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their respective provinces, the
provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of the Probation
Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial boards should decide
otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been
done but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad
[1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)

To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog liable to the
It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression
owner of domestic animals wounded by it for the damages without proving a knowledge of it vicious
of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this
disposition. By a provision of the act, power was given to the board of supervisors to determine whether
power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has
or not during the current year their county should be governed by the provisions of the act of which that
been said that popular government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is
section constituted a part. It was held that the legislature could not confer that power. The court
unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people
observed that it could no more confer such a power than to authorize the board of supervisors of a
and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language
county to abolish in such county the days of grace on commercial paper, or to suspend the statute of
of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have
limitations. (Slinger vs. Henneman [1875], 38 Wis., 504.) A similar statute in Missouri was held void for
that effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Ga., 23; Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936],
the same reason in State vs. Field ([1853, 17 Mo., 529;59 Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general statute
35 Off. Gaz., 1317.) But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of
formulating a road system contained a provision that "if the county court of any county should be of
power and one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative power
opinion that the provisions of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their discretion, suspend the
shall not be delegated.
operation of the same for any specified length of time, and thereupon the act should become
inoperative in such county for the period specified in such order; and thereupon order the roads to be
opened and kept in good repair, under the laws theretofore in force." Said the court: ". . . this act, by its We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a former act, and yet it is left to the county court legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
to say which act shall be enforce in their county. The act does not submit the question to the county
3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits 543; Ex parte Virginia [1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25 Law. ed., 676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370;
the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1. Constitution of the 26 Law. ed., 567; Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U. S., 703; 28 Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo vs. Hopkins
Philippines.) [1886],118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
583; 42 Law. ed., 1012; Bailey vs. Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed.,
Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs. Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand departments of
other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation (General Oil
our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many
Co. vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed., 754; State vs. Clement Nat. Bank
constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of laws,
[1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If the law has the effect of denying the equal
sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal
protection of the law it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct.
laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs.
Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, supra; State vs. Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165;
North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what may be regarded
80 A. S. R., 386; State vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under
as a denial of the equal protection of the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that
section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be
will cover every case can be formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U. S., 540; 22
in force in other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a
Sup. Ct., Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in
given year — and have probation during that year — and thereafter decline to make further
prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted.
appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse
(Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13; Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs.
of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a
Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255; Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919],
situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to
40 Phil., 136.) The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions
make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis
which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
[1897], 165 U. S., 150 154; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255.)lawph!1.net
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co.
[1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353; 133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 489; State vs. Cooley, 56
Minn., 540; 530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.[1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79, 55 Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United States ([1914],
Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann. Cas., 1912C, 160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs. Clough 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the
[1917], 242 U.S., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Greene [1910], 216 U. decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that there was a denial of the
S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54 Law. ed., 536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247; Truax vs. Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., equal protection of the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman vs. Lewis) decided in 1880
312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.) (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the equality clause does not require territorial
uniformity. It should be observed, however, that this case concerns the right to preliminary
investigations in criminal cases originally granted by General Orders No. 58. No question of legislative
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
authority was involved and the alleged denial of the equal protection of the laws was the result of the
delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting
subsequent enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and
the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one
providing in section 2 thereof that "in cases triable only in the court of first instance of the City of Manila,
province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another
the defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the
province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the
prosecuting attorney, after a due investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an information
former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of
against him in proper form . . . ." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the arguments and the decision
the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly
indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney — although not in the form had in the
situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination.
provinces — was considered a reasonable substitute for the City of Manila, considering the peculiar
Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the
conditions of the city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.
salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result
for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the
affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to a situation
within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will where the constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state from final
there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any judgments of any circuit court, except those in certain counties for which counties the constitution
amount for the salary of the probation officer — which is the situation now — and, also, if we accept the establishes a separate court of appeals called St. Louis Court of Appeals. The provision complained of,
contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution that makes the apportionment of
province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of the territorial jurisdiction.
probation officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in
the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also
cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation
repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.
Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be
sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before court should
assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the next
considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided.
protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law which permits of
such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and
unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. (By analogy, Chy Lung vs. the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected
Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23 Law. ed., 550; Henderson vs. Mayor [1876], 92 U. S., 259; 23 Law. ed., into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave
 the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process.
(Riccio vs. Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted in Williams
vs. Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U.S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60
A. L. R., 596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well-
established rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language:
. . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to
do this, the valid portion must be in so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the Legislative would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they
could not constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N.
E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss.,
739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute,
which carries out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void
provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act,
in a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617,
642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794;
Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279,
300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The
language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any
purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will, independently of the
void part, since the court has no power to legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W.,
473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839; Vide, also,. U. S., vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs.
Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. [1895], 158 U. S., 601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L., 121.)
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those provinces
in which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers were inoperative
on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be valid and may be enforced. We should
be inclined to accept the suggestions but for the fact that said section is, in our opinion, is inseparably
linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left is
the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who may be
deserving of the intended beneficial result of that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned
from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent
entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the
salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such
action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no
argument to show that if not one of the provinces — and this is the actual situation now — appropriate
the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory.
There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without
the probation system.
Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the probationer. Every
probation officer is given, as to the person placed in probation under his care, the powers of the police
officer. It is the duty of the probation officer to see that the conditions which are imposed by the court
upon the probationer under his care are complied with. Among those conditions, the following are
enumerated in section 3 of the Act:
That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits;
(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character;
(c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers;
(d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode or
elsewhere;
(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer
concerning his conduct or condition; "(f) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly; "(g) Shall
remain or reside within a specified place or locality;
(f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or losses
caused by his offense;
(g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and
(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation,
promulgated in accordance with law.
The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of probation.
Under section 4, it is only after the period of probation, the submission of a report of the probation
officer and appropriate finding of the court that the probationer has complied with the conditions of
probation that probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from
supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there is non-compliance with said conditions, as
reported by the probation officer, it may issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer and said
probationer may be committed with or without bail. Upon arraignment and after an opportunity to be
heard, the court may revoke, continue or modify the probation, and if revoked, the court shall order the
execution of the sentence originally imposed. Section 6 prescribes the duties of probation officers: "It
shall be the duty of every probation officer to furnish to all persons placed on probation under his
supervision a statement of the period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct them concerning
the same; to keep informed concerning their conduct and condition; to aid and encourage them by
friendly advice and admonition, and by such other measures, not inconsistent with the conditions
imposed by court as may seem most suitable, to bring about improvement in their conduct and
condition; to report in writing to the court having jurisdiction over said probationers at least once every
two months concerning their conduct and condition; to keep records of their work; make such report as
are necessary for the information of the Secretary of Justice and as the latter may require; and to
perform such other duties as are consistent with the functions of the probation officer and as the court
or judge may direct. The probation officers provided for in this Act may act as parole officers for any
penal or reformatory institution for adults when so requested by the authorities thereof, and, when
designated by the Secretary of Justice shall act as parole officer of persons released on parole under Act
Number Forty-one Hundred and Three, without additional compensation."
It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe appointed in the provinces
under section 10 of Act which provides as follows:
There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and
control, a Probation Office under the direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be appointed by
the Governor-General with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall receive a salary of
four eight hundred pesos per annum. To carry out this Act there is hereby appropriated out of
any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand pesos
to be disbursed by the Secretary of Justice, who is hereby authorized to appoint probation
officers and the administrative personnel of the probation officer under civil service
regulations from among those who possess the qualifications, training and experience
 prescribed by the Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix the compensation of such probation
officers and administrative personnel until such positions shall have been included in the
Appropriation Act.
But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section are
clearly not those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under section 11. It may
be said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation officers referred to in section 10 above-quoted are
to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central office known as the Probation Office
established in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of the Chief Probation Officer. When the
law provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate and make reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4);
that "the probation officer" shall supervise and visit the probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par. d); that the
probationer shall report to the "probationer officer" (sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow "the probationer officer"
to visit him (sec. 3, par. d), shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation
officer" concerning his conduct or condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that the court shall notify "the probation
officer" in writing of the period and terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it means the probation officer
who is in charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have been intention of
the legislature, for instance, to require the probationer in Batanes, to report to a probationer officer in
the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said province
of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct him concerning the
conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned to him by law.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there are
provinces or groups of provinces is, of course possible. But this would be arguing on what the law may be
or should be and not on what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and
propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But
much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend
the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for
any purpose — not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.
Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular Government
defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them should
they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry out the
purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for the salaries of probation officers in the
central office at Manila. These probation officers are to receive such compensations as the Secretary of
Justice may fix "until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act". It was the
intention of the legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of the probation
officers in the provinces or later on to include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further,
that the sum of P50,000 appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries of the
administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount can hardly be said to
be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial notice
of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not think it is seriously contended
that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central office, there can be in each province, as
intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this a correct, the
contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an impracticable thing under
the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in our case there can be a system of probation in the
provinces without probation officers.
imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of reform. (United States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U.
S., 347 357, 358; 72 Law. ed., 309; 312, 313; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.)
The Welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental.
But while we believe that probation is commendable as a system and its implantation into the
Philippines should be welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside because of
the repugnancy to our fundamental law.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented by able
counsel for both parties, as well in their memorandums as in their oral argument. We have examined the
cases brought to our attention, and others we have been able to reach in the short time at our command
for the study and deliberation of this case. In the examination of the cases and in then analysis of the
legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt the line of action which in our opinion, is supported
better reasoned authorities and is more conducive to the general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs.
Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) Realizing the conflict of authorities, we have declined to be bound by
certain adjudicated cases brought to our attention, except where the point or principle is settled directly
or by clear implication by the more authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United
States. This line of approach is justified because:
(a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United
States and the dual character of the American Government is a situation which does not
obtain in the Philippines;
(b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of Columbia with reference to
the Federal Government of the United States is not the situation of the province with respect
to the Insular Government (Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th Amendment, Constitution of the
United States; Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d], 871),
(c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the United States do not
embrace the integrated judicial system of the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936],
35 Off. Gaz., p. 1317);
(d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New
York [1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law. ed., 937, 949) and, "to keep pace with . . . new
developments of times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co. vs.
Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX, No.
2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142), fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view existing
local conditions and environment.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly,
granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Villa-real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur in the result.

Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws have been
enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the "individualization of
the punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal and the circumstances
of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent
offender. It is believed that, in any cases, convicts may be reformed and their development into
hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids
 L-2756
Araneta and Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for petitioners.
Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for respondent.
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
Claro M. Recto as amici curiae.

J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner,

L-3054
vs.
Claro M. Recto, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera, Alejo Mabanag, Jose B. Laurel, Jr. and Antonio Barredo for
RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of
petitioner.
Manila,respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondent.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
x---------------------------------------------------------x Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill and Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.
Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico, and Francisco A. Rodrigo also as amici curiae.
G.R. No. L-2756 August 26, 1949
L-3055
J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners, Claro M. Recto and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
vs. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent. V. G. Bunuan, Administrator, Sugar Quota Office.
Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto M. Serrano, Enrique; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici
curiae.
x---------------------------------------------------------x

L-3056
G.R. No. L-3054 August 26, 1949 Claro M. Recto and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido Nacionalista, recurrente, Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
vs. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill, Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico and Francisco A.
EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido. Rodrigo; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.

x---------------------------------------------------------x TUASON, J.:

G.R. No. L-3055 August 26, 1949 Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on
other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is
decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the
LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner, personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G. R. No. L-3054 and case G. R. No. L-3056
vs. and the question whether prohibition lies in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756. No practical benefit can be
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE, DEPARTMENT gained from a discussion of the procedural matters since the decision in the cases wherein the
OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, respondents. petitioners' cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be
controlling authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
x---------------------------------------------------------x demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G. R. No. L-2821.) The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders
of the President avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044
G.R. No. L-3056 August 26, 1949
and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential
buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila
ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner, for violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of
vs. prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192, which
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR TREASURER OF THE aims to control exports from the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ
PHILIPPINES, respondents. of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs
to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both official refuse to issue the required export
L-2044 license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this Executive
Paredes, Diaz and Poblador, Jesus G. Barrera, Vicente Hilado, and Araneta and Araneta for petitioner. Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., the Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950,
Solicitor Martiniano P. Vico and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondents. and for other purposes. The petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of
Claro M. Recto and Padilla, Carlos and Fernando as amici curiae. the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from
disbursing this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which
appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the
national elections to be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer
and voter, asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing
of that amount or any part of it."
Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671, the petitioners
do not press the point in their oral argument and memorandum. They rest their case chiefly on the
proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to have any force
and effect. This is the basic question we have referred to, and it is to this question that we will presently
address ourselves and devote greater attention. For the purpose of this decision, only, the
constitutionality of Act No. 671 will be taken for granted, and any dictum or statement herein which may
appear contrary to that hypothesis should be understood as having been made merely in furtherance of
the main thesis.
Act No. 671 in full is as follows:
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE
PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS
TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe
and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
"SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President
is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1
hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the
Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or
instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the
determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to
create new subdivisions, branches, departments, agencies or instrumentalities of government
and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriations
which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation
or application of those of an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase,
reduce, suspend or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds
or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the
national, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he
may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payment of
debts; and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem to enable the Government to
fulfill its responsibities and to maintain and enforce the authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the
Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him
under the powers herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations promulgated
hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise
provide.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules
and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the
Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its
relation to the Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions offered will also be resorted
to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited
period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive
bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 669; Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question
intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency
powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." (First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank
of Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L. R., 937, 938.).
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The
opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that
the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion
that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If
a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has
been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was
intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912);
for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet the approval of
the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create
the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to
recall them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its
powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the law. Corwin,
President: Office and Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says:
It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not delegate its powers signifies
at the very least that the legislature may not abdicate its powers: Yet how, in view of the
scope that legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between delegation and
abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated powers recoverable
without the consent of the delegate; . . . .
Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that
"the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of
the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority
itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance
of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was no necessity to
provide for the former. It would be strange if having no idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act
was to be effective the National Assemble failed to make a provision for this termination in the same
way that it did for the termination of the effects and incidents of the delegation. There would be no
point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to
remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make new rules and regulations but he
could restore the ones already annulled by the legislature.
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the Executive when Congress is in the best comports with constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general context of the law and
unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies operating with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period
over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the conventing of that body.
Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in
session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a two-
It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when
third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and
Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226
the President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the
were issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress instead of the first special
latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and
session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think giving effect to the purpose and
inspired only by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation
executive order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress,
or only such as he (President) may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular
and the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export control after Congress had refused
session, the power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the
to approve the measure.
organic law.

Quiet apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the inference
Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the necessity of deciding the question as to which
that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the
department of government is authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the law is
Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the
predicated still exists. The right of one or another department to declare the emergency terminated is
war. Section 3 provides:
not in issue. As a matter of fact, we have endeavored to find the will of the National Assembly—call that
will, an exercise of the police power or the war power — and, once ascertained, to apply it. Of course,
The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the the function of interpreting statutes in proper cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts as their
Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him constitutional prerogative and duty. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive
under the powers herein granted. authority to say that war not ended, and may act on the strength of his opinion and findings in
contravention of the law as the courts have construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the
proposition. There is no pretense that the President has independent or inherent power to issue such
The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which the
executive orders as those under review. we take it that the respondents, in sustaining the validity of
President was to give an account of his trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it could
these executive orders rely on Act No. 600, Act No. 620, or Act No. 671 of the former Commonwealth
very well have said if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the report
and on no other source. To put it differently, the President's authority in this connection is purely
in section 3 was to be the first and last Congress Act No. 671 would lapsed, what reason could there be
statutory, in no sense political or directly derived from the Constitution.
for its failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent reports? Such reports,
if the President was expected to continue making laws in the forms of rules, regulations and executive
orders, were as important, of as unimportant, as the initial one. Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the opening of the regular session of
Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive indication that they
were self-liquidating. By express provision the rules and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance
As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is
of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good
enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of
only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless
the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the
sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this
enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very
provision is that in the mind of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse
President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No.
not latter than the rules and regulations. The design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules
671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases
and regulations necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous
connote automatical extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote
repeal of their source. Were not this the case, there would arise the curious spectacle, already painted,
that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that
and easily foreseen, of the Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations of the President while
period. They signify that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be
the latter was empowered to keep or return them into force and to issue new ones independently of the
prolonged.
National Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning heretofore adduced against the asserted indefinite
continuance of the operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos. 600 and 620.
What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography
furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly
The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the question whether war, in law or in fact,
"when it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most
continues, is irrelevant. If we were to that actual hostilities between the original belligerents are still
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1,
raging, the elusion would not be altered. After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be
1942." (Emphasis ours.) It can easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous
approved if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was desired. In the light of the
powers upon the President was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the National Assembly
conditions surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state
to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast
of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and
as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its authority. The enactment and continuation
occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization of the Government,
of a law so destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions could not have been conceived
principally the impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for
under any circumstance short of a complete disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of
immediate action and with which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The war itself
government. Anyway, if we are to uphold the constitutionality of the act on the basis of its duration, we
must start with the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. As we have indicated, the period that
and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the National
Assembly been in a position to operate.
After all the criticism that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of
powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects
and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino
people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other
democracy-loving people in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework
of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not expecting periods of crisis no
matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution
have been copied in ours, have the specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been
surrendered to another department — unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative
policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or
when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our
concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances
"the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called upon "to the
duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."
These observations, though beyond the issue as formulated in this decision, may, we trust, also serve to
answer the vehement plea that for the good of the Nation, the President should retain his extraordinary
powers as long asturmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to the late war harass the
Philippines.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In order to avoid any possible
disruption and interruption in the normal operation of the Government, we have deemed it best to
depart in these cases from the ordinary rule to the period for the effectivity of decisions, and to decree,
as it is hereby decreed, that this decision take effect fifteen days from the date of the entry of final
judgment provided in section 8 of Rule 53 of the Rules of Court in relation to section 2 of Rule 35. No
costs will be charged.
Ozaeta, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
MORAN, C. J., concurring:
I agree with the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Tuason, except on the points hereunder discussed.
I believe, on the one hand, that the emergency power of the President had ceased not in May 1946,
when Congress held its regular sessions, as Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria maintain, but on
June 9, 1945, when Congress convened in a special session to consider general legislation. The
emergency contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671, is "total emergency" which means the state of
actual war involving the Philippines, with the impending invasion and occupation of our country by the
enemy and the consequent total disorganization and paralyzation of the Government, principally, the
impossibility for the National Assembly to act. This was the only reason and justification for the total
relinquishment of legislative power by Congress in favor of the Chief Executive under Commonwealth Act
No. 671. Such relinquishment was total because the emergency was also total. Clearly, therefore, the
inability of Congress to act was the soul of the law, and the moment such inability ceased, the total
emergency also ceased and the law likewise ceased to validly exist. On June 9, 1945, the Congress of the
Philippines convened in a special session "to adopt such measures as may be necessary to meet the
existing emergency" and "for the purpose of considering general legislation." I hold that from that date,
June 9, 1945, Congress was able and ready to act on all matters, and the emergency powers delegated to
the President in Commonwealth Act No. 671, naturally ceased to exist.
Upon the other hand, while I believe that the emergency powers had ceased in June 1945, I am not
prepared to hold that all executive orders issued thereafter under Commonwealth Act No. 671, are per
se null and void. It must be borne in mind that these executive orders had been issued in good faith and
with the best of intentions of three successive Presidents, and some of them may have already produced
extensive effects in the life of the nation. We have, for instance, Executive Order No. 73, issued on
November 12, 1945, appropriating the sum of P6,750,000 for public works; Executive Order No. 86,
issued on January 7, 1946, amending a previous order regarding the organization of the Supreme Court;
Executive Order No. 89, issued on January 1, 1946, reorganizing the Courts of First Instance; Executive
Order No. 184, issued on November 19, 1948, controlling rice and palay to combat hunger; and other
executive orders appropriating funds for other purposes. The consequences of a blanket nullification of
these executive orders will be unquestionably serious and harmful. And I hold that before nullifying
them, other important circumstances should be inquired into, as for instance, whether or not they have
been ratified by the Congress expressly or impliedly, whether their purposes have already been
accomplished entirely or partially, and in last instance, to what extent; acquiescence of litigants; de
facto officers; acts and contrast of parties acting in good faith; etc. It is my opinion that each executive
order must be viewed in the lights of its peculiar circumstances, and, if necessary and possible, before
nullifying it, precautionary measures should be taken to avoid harm to public interest and innocent
parties.
To illustrate the foregoing proposition of individual consideration of specific cases, shall go into a brief
discussion of the executive orders involved in the cases now before this Court. With regard to Executive
No. 225 on general appropriation, I hold that the court should not declare it null and void till Congress
may have an opportunity to provide a substitute measure for the sustenance of government. This view is
predicated upon the principle of absolute necessity. Till Congress may pass a valid appropriation act our
government cannot survive without the executive order in question. It would be absurd for this court to
declare the cessation of an emergency, and by that same declaration permit, if not abet, the formation
of another emergency which would be inevitable if, by reason of lack of appropriation, government shall
cease to function. In such cases, when apparently the provisions of our laws and Constitution seem
inadequate, the courts must go deeper even than the very Magna Carta itself and find solution in the
basic principles of preservation of government and of national survival, which in the last analysis, are the
very reasons for the existence of a Constitution. In such extreme cases, as can come from the present
situation, it would be the height of judicial imprecision to preserve the form of the constitution, and at
the same time permit the disruption and cessation of the government which that same constitution so
intricately designed and firmly established. Thus, in the remedy of an evil, we shall cause a far greater
one.
It may be argued that the course of action I am taking is founded upon fear, fear that Congress will again
fail to act on the matter of appropriation, and it may be asserted that the members of the Congress are
presumed to be as patriotic as the members of this Court, if not more, and that, therefore, we may rest
assured that they will not fail to fulfill their duty. I admit this to be true, and accordingly, I ask what is
then the hurry and necessity for nullifying the executive order on appropriation which we are sure will
soon be substituted by a valid appropriation act? Why not defer judgment and wait until the special
session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it clearly sees it? I can find no reason against this
suggestion except, perhaps, a desire to assert judicial supremacy in a case where judicial statemanship is
more necessary.
It is also true that the possibility that Congress will again fail to provide funds for the operation of the
government is a remote possibility. But there is no harm in providing for all the possibilities, both near
and remote. If that remote possibility never comes, well and good, nothing is lost and the situation is
saved. However, if the remote possibility does come, and it is not impossible, and we had already
nullified the executive order on appropriation, how will the government function and survive? On the
other hand, if we defer judgment upon the nullity of such executive order, and that remote possibility
does come, we still have the saving lifeline of that executive order which may, perhaps, be tolerated to
save the country from chaos, until a more proper and adequate remedy can be secured.
With regard to the executive order appropriating funds for the conduct of the coming elections, I uphold
the same view as in the foregoing, namely, not in abdicating the power of this court to pass upon the
validity of an executive order, but to defer judgment upon such an order until the legislature may
provide a substitute measure. The reason for this is, likewise, absolute necessity. Without such Executive
Order we may have not elections in November. Elections are the very essence of popular government for
the establishment and preservation of which, our Constitution has been consecrated. To permit the
unwarranted abolition or even suspension of elections, will surely result either in the denial of popular
representation or in the perpetuation in power of those already in office. Either result is revolting to our
system of government. Briefly stated, I hold that this court should neither ratify nor nullify this executive
order, but should defer judgment in the same manner and for the same reasons stated above in
connection with the executive order on appropriations. The Court, in these cases, is confronted not only
with bare issues of law, but with actual anomalous situations pregnant with possible dangers to the
nation, and it is the duty of the Court, as a dispenser of justice, to find a solution that is both legal and
realistic.
With reference to Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses, and Executive Order No.
192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines, I agree that they must be held null and void
upon the reason stated by Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria and also upon those stated by Mr.
Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Alex Reyes.
My vote, therefore, is that the petitions must be granted in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, G. R. No. L-
2044; Araneta vs. Angeles, G. R. No. L-2756 and Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs, G. R. No. L-3055,
and that judgment must be deferred in Rodriguez vs. El Tesorero de Filipinas, G. R. No. L-3054
and Barredo vs. The Commission on Election, G. R. No. L-3056.
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Tuason. I wish to add, however the following observations: Even
assuming, for the sake of argument, that the legislative intent is to make Commonwealth Act No. 671,
effective during the existence of the emergency contemplated therein and that it is within the exclusive
province of the political departments to determine whether said emergency continues or has ceased to
exist, I am of the conviction that, in view of the formal and unmistakable declarations of both the
Congress and the President, said Act No. 671, should be held as having lost its force and effect.
It is important to remember that the kind of emergency expressly spoken of in the Act is a total
emergency resulting from war and that the Act was passed at a time (December 16, 1941) when there
was factually a state of war involving the Philippines.
In section 1 of Republic Act No. 342, approved on July 26, 1948, it was categorically declared by the
Congress that "since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, but not so with regard to
those who have suffered the ravages of war and who have not received any relief for the loss and
destruction resulting therefrom," and that "the emergency created by the last war as regards these was
sufferers being still existent, it is the declared policy of the state that as to them the debt moratorium
should be continued in force in a modified form." The President, in turn, in his speech delivered on July 4,
1949, plainly proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the Republic) faces today are incidental passing
pains artificially created by seasonal partisanship, very common among democracies but will disappear
with the rains that follow the thunderclaps not later than November 8 of this year."
We thus have a formal declaration on the part of the Congress that the emergency created by the last
war exists as regards only those debtors whose war damage claims have not been settled by the United
States Philippine War Damage Commission (section 2, Republic Act No. 342), patently meaning that said
emergency is, at most, a partial emergency. It is needless to point out that only a small portion of the
Philippine population are debtors and not all of those who are debtors are war damage claimants.
We also have the solemn declaration on the part of the President that the emergencies faced by the
Republic are incidental emergencies artificially created by seasonal partisanship, clearly meaning that
such emergencies not only are not total but are not the result of war.
If the emergency is, as admitted by the Congress, not total and, as admitted by the President, not the
result of the war, Commonwealth Act No. 671 has lost its basis and cannot legally give rise to the
executive orders herein involved. Indeed, it is not pretended that said orders are intended to meet any
emergency growing out of the last war. Lack of a budget, an appropriation for the elections, or an import
control law, has been brought about by the inaction of the Congress unaffected by the last war, and such
emergency, if it may be called so, is not of the kind contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671.
The government has for four years since liberation been normally functioning; election had been
regularly held; a national census had been taken; Congress had held regular and special session; "people
travel freely most everywhere and more quickly, by land, sea and air, to an extent that was not hitherto
enjoyed," and "business is more brisk than ever, goods are plentiful, our people even in the remotest
communities and barrios of the country are better dressed, their diet has been immensely improved, and
they look more healthy than they ever did" (President's fifth monthly radio chat, March 15, 1949); and
the sporadic depredations of the outlaws in isolated areas of the country are but the last paroxysms of a
dying movement (President's State-of-the-Nation Message, January 24, 1949), — all these certainly
negative the existence of any real (much less total) emergency.
That the Congress had heretofore recognized the cessation of the emergency is conclusively established
by the fact that it had assumed the task of directly enacting, during its past sessions, measures dealing
with all the matters covered by the specific legislative powers conceded to the President in
Commonwealth Act No. 671. This is in line with the fundamental reason for the approval of said Act, as
may be gathered from the following statement of President Quezon: "When it became evident that we
were completely helpless against air attack and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would
hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly passed into
history approving a resolution which reaffirmed the abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their
loyalty to, the United States. The assembly also enacted a law granting the President of the Philippines all
the powers that under the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to him in time of war." (The Good
Fight, pp. 204-205.) When President Quezon said "in time of war", he undoubtedly meant factual war, a
situation that existed at the time of the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 671.
Indeed, the dissenters admit that any delegated power directly exercised by the principal is considered
withdrawn from the agent. A cursory examination of Commonwealth Act No. 671 will show that the
legislative function therein specified had been discharged by the Congress. The following illustrates the
powers delegated in the Act and the measures enacted by the Congress itself covering each:
Republic Act No. 215 —
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 —
(a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices,
agencies or instrumentalities:
Republic Act No. 333 —
(e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence:
An Act to amend Section One of the Republic Act numbered eighty-one providing a new time
limit for the waiver of, and/or extension of the period, within which to perform, accomplish or
comply with, any term, condition, or stipulation required of locators, holders, lessees,
operators of mining claims or concessions, and of water rights and timber concessions with
the mining industry and the condonation of mining, specific and real estate taxes, under
certain terms and conditions. (Approved, June 1, 1948.)

An Act to establish the Capital of the Philippines and the permanent seat of the National
Ley No. 321 de la Republica —
Government, to create a capital city planning commission, to appropriate funds for the
acquisition of private estates within the boundary limits of said city, and to authorize the
issuance of bonds of the National Government for the acquisition of private estates, for the Ley que eleva los derechos de transferencia de ganado mayor, enmendado al efecto el
subdivision thereof, and for the construction of streets, bridges, waterworks, sewerage and articulo quinientos veintiochos del Codigo Administrativo Revisado. (Apobada, Junio 9, 1948.)
other municipal improvements in the capital City. (Approved, July 17, 1948.)
(f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of
(b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of proceeds thereof:
precedence of the heads of the Executive Departments:
Republic Act No. 265 —
Republic Act No. 51 —
An Act establishing the Central Bank of the Philippines . . . . (Section 87 [e] No. 7.) Approved,
Act authorizing the President of the Philippines to reorganize within one year the different June 15, 1948.)
Executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and their instrumentalities of the
government, including the corporations owned or controlled by it. (Approved, October 4,
Republic Act No. 266 —
1946.)

An Act appropriating such sums as may from time to time be released by the Central Bank
(c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of
representing excess monetary reserves, and authorizing the President of the Philippines to
government and to abolish any of those already existing:
issue bonds, certificates or other evidences of indebtedness covering such amounts.
(Approved, June 15, 1948.)
Commonwealth Act No. 732 —
Republic Act No. 85 —
An Act to create the Department of Foreign Affairs and to authorize the President of the
Philippines to organize said department as well as the foreign service of the Republic of the
An Act creating the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. (Section 2 [f].) (Approved, Oct. 29,
Philippines. (Approved, July 3, 1946.) 1946.)

(d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative,
(g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal government to incur in overdrafts for the
and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative character:
purposes that he may approve:

Commonwealth Act No. 709 —

Various Appropriation Acts.

An Act appropriating the sum of five million pesos to enable the national housing commission
(h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payments of debts:
to resume its functions" (Approved, November 1, 1945.)

Republic Act No. 342, approved, July 26, 1948.

Commonwealth Act No. 710 —

(i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its
An Act to appropriate funds to continue the payment of Retirement gratuities or pensions
responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.
under existing laws. (Approved, November 1, 1945.)
The powers included in this subdivision (i) are of course covered by hundreds of other acts approved by
the Congress which, it cannot be denied, all tend to "enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities
and to maintain and enforce its authority." Moreover, the withdrawal of the greater and more important
powers may be presumed to have carried the accessory and less important powers.
There is no merit in the contention that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted by virtue of the war
powers of the Congress. As the Act itself expressly states, its basis is section 26 of Article VI of the
Constitution which merely authorizes delegation of legislative powers to the President in times of war or
other national emergency. The phrase "in times of war or other national emergency" is solely indicative
or descriptive of the occasions during which the delegation may be extended and does not classify the
act of delegating legislative functions as a war power. It must be borne in mind that said section 26 is
peculiar to our Constitution, with the result that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
cited on behalf of the respondents, expounding the theory that the exercise by the President of his war
powers granted by the Congress cannot be interfered with by the courts, are not controlling. Particularly,
the case of Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883, in which the opinion of the United States Supreme Court
was written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, cannot apply, for the further reason that it merely involved the
power of deportation which, even in our jurisdiction, is recognized, it being the rule here that the courts
cannot control the right of the Chief Executive to determine the existence or sufficiency of the facts
justifying an order of deportation. Upon the other hand, the war power of the President is separately
covered by section 10, paragraph (2), of Article VII, and that of the Congress by section 25.
Article VI, of the Constitution, which are not invoked for the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 671.
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:.
The majority opinion holds that Executive Order No. 62 dated June 21, 1947; Executive Order No. 192
dated December 24, 1948; and Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 both dated June 15, 1949 were issued
without authority of law and therefore illegal and of no legal force and effect. I concur only in the result.
Ordinarily, such concurrence without comment or explanation would be sufficient and satisfactory.
However, in view of the radical difference between the reasons had and given by the majority in arriving
at the result and those entertained by me, and considering the transcendental importance of these
cases, not only because of the vast amounts of public funds and the rights of citizens affected but also of
the principles of law involved, and the fact that not only the force and the effect of a law
(Commonwealth Act No. 671) but also the legality and the force and effect of numerous executive orders
issued by several Presidents during a period of about three years, affecting as they do not only citizens,
their interest and their properties but also the different departments and offices of the Government, I
deem it my duty to set forth my views and the reasons in support of the same.
There is a claim made about lack of personality of some of the parties-petitioners particularly, the
petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056. Much could be said for and against that claim, but I am
willing to brush aside all defenses and technicalities on this point in order to be able to consider and
decide the more important question of the legality of the executive orders involved and whether or not
Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force.
The aforementioned executive orders were issued on the straight of and by virtue of Commonwealth Act
No. 671. The majority holds that Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to have any force and effect on May
25, 1946 when Congress first convened in regular session after liberation. In This, I disagree for I believe
and hold that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and in effect. But despite this view, I am not of
the opinion that the executive orders under consideration were issued without authority.
Starting with Executive Order No. 62, we find that it deals with and regulates houses and lot rentals. If
the legislature had not already acted and legislated on this matter since the promulgation of
Commonwealth Act No. 671, this would be a proper field for Presidential action. However, the legislature
had already promulgated Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66, regulating house rentals
and, as late as the month of May, 1947, Congress passed House Bill No. 978 further amending
Commonwealth Act No. 689. In other words, in thus acting, the Legislature had already shown its
readiness and ability to legislate on this matter, and had withdrawn it from the realm of presidential
legislation or regulation under the powers delegated by Commonwealth Act No. 671. Not only this, but in
issuing rules and regulations in the form of executive orders under his delegated powers, the Chief
Executive merely acts as an agent of the legislature, his principal which made the delegation. As such
agent, he cannot go against the policy and expressed desire of his principal.
There are radical differences between Commonwealth Act No. 689, Republic Act No. 66, and House Bill
No. 978 on one side and Executive Order No. 62 on the other. That was the reason why President Roxas
vetoed House Bill No. 978, believing in good faith that it would not solve and remedy the problem of
house rentals as explained by him in his communication to the House of Representatives of June 21,
1947, setting forth his views on the bill. The President may not and could not substitute his opinion
however excellent or superior for that of the legislature on matters of legislation when Congress has
already acted and expressed its opinion and desire on the matter.
With respect to Executive Order No. 192, it will be remembered that Congress passed Commonwealth
Act No. 728, approved on July 2, 1946, authorizing the President to regulate, curtail, control, and prohibit
the exportation of certain products, merchandise and materials. Under said authority the President
issued Executive Order No. 3 dated July 10, 1946, later amending section 2 of said Executive Order by
issuing Executive Order No. 23 dated November 1, 1946, regulating the exportation of certain products,
materials and merchandise. The important thing to consider is that section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
728 provided that the authority it granted to the President shall terminate on December 31, 1948, that is
to say, that after said date the Executive could no longer validly regulate exports under said law. The
President, however, overlooked or ignored said injunction and invoking his emergency powers under
Commonwealth Act No. 671, promulgated Executive Order No. 192 regulating exports, to take effect on
January 1, 1949. What was said with regard to Executive Order No. 62 is applicable to the lack of
authority of the Executive to promulgate Executive Order No. 192, namely, that on this matter of export
control, the legislature had already withdrawn it from the jurisdiction of the Executive under his
emergency powers after the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 728. Any Presidential power or
authority on the subject of export control was derived from said Act. Not only this, but when in section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 728 the legislature terminated the authority given the President to regulate
and control exports on December 31, 1948 and failed or refused to renew said authority, the inference
or conclusion and that after said date Congress deemed any presidential regulation on exports
unnecessary and inadvisable. Therefore, in promulgating Executive Order No. 192 the Chief Executive
acted not only without legislative authority but also against the wishes and policy of Congress. This he
may not validly do.
With respect to Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the considerations made with regard to Executive
Orders Nos. 62 and 192 are equally applicable. By previously enacting necessary legislation on the yearly
Government appropriation and on the appropriation of funds for the expenses incurred in national
elections, Congress has shown its readiness and ability to cope with the financial problems of the
Government on this point. Republic Act No. 80, approved October 22, 1946, appropriating funds for the
operation of National Government from July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947; Republic Act No. 156
appropriating funds for the fiscal year 1947-48 and Republic Act No. 320, the appropriation law for the
fiscal year 1948-49 show that Congress was in a position and able to provide for the yearly expenditures
of the Government. And Republic Act No. 73 appropriating P1,000,000 to defray election expenses on
March 11, 1947; Republic Act No. 147 appropriating P1,000,000 to defray expenses for the election of
provincial city and municipal officials and eight senators held on November 11, 1947, and Republic Act
No. 235 appropriating P100,000 for the special elections held on March 23, 1948, to fill vacancies in
Representative District No. 4 of Iloilo and No. 1 of Leyte, demonstrated the ability of the Congress to
appropriate money for election purposes. By so doing Congress had tacitly and impliedly withdrawn this
portion of the field where the President may under his emergency power legislate or promulgate rules
and regulations.
In this connection, it may be stated that in my opinion, the theory underlying the delegation of
emergency powers to the under Commonwealth Act No. 671 and the similar laws is that the legislature
because of the emergency resulting from the war, would be unable to meet in order to legislate or
although able to meet, because of the emergency, the ordinary process of legislation would be too slow
and inadequate and could not cope with the emergency. So, as a remedy, the power and authority of
legislation are vested temporarily in the hands of one man, the Chief Executive. But as regards Executive
Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the legislature has demonstrated that not only it could meet but also it could
legislate on this point of appropriations by approving general appropriation laws for the different fiscal
years since liberation as well as appropriations for the necessary funds for the different national and
provincial elections. Consequently, there no longer was any necessity for Presidential legislation in this
regard. Moreover, and this is not unimportant, the failure of the Legislature to pass an appropriation law
for the fiscal year 1949-50 and a law appropriating funds for the elections in November, 1949 was not
due to any emergency resulting from the war, contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 671, but rather
and possibly due to lack of time and because of the rather abrupt and adjourning of the last session of
the Legislature last May.
As already stated, the majority holds that Act No. 671 ceased to have force and effect on May 25, 1946.
The other view is that it is still in force. To me this is the main and the more important issue involved in
these cases. In fact the argument of the parties centered on this point. The importance of this issue may
readily be appreciated when it is realized that on its determination is based, not only the validity or
nullity (according to the theory of the majority opinion), of the four Executive Orders now under
consideration, but also of all the Executive Orders promulgated under authority of Commonwealth Act
No. 671 after May 25, 1946, up to the present time. Its determination will also decide whether or not the
President may still exercise his emergency powers in the future on matters and subjects not heretofore
withdrawn by the Legislature. Because of my disagreement with the majority on this point, I deem it
necessary to explain and elaborate on my reasons for my disagreement.
For purposes of reference and to facilitate the same, I am reproducing Commonwealth Act No. 671 in full
as well as section 26, Article VI of the Constitution on which said Act is based:
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE
PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS
TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe
and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President is
hereby authorize, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1
hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the
Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or
instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the
determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the heads of Executive
Departments; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or
instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue
in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to
modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative character; (e) to
impose new taxes to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds
through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds
thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in
overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection
of credits or the payments of debts; and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem
necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce
the authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the
Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him
under the powers herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations promulgated
hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise
provide.
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules
and regulations to carry our a declared national policy. (Section 26, Article VI, Constitution.)
I fully agree with the majority when in its opinion it says:
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The
intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplished, the
purpose to be sub-served, and its relation to the Constitution. (Page 5, majority opinion.)
The main thesis of the majority is that the only reason for the delegation of legislative powers to the
Chief Executive under the Constitution, such as was done under Commonwealth Act No. 671 was
because due to the emergency resulting from the war, the Legislature could not meet to enact
legislation; that the moment of Legislature could convene there would no longer be any reason for the
exercise by the President of emergency powers delegated to him; that if, when the Legislature could
meet and actually is in session, the President is allowed to exercise his delegated legislative powers,
there would be the serious anomaly of two legislative bodies acting at the same time, namely, the
Legislature and the Executive, "mutually nullifying each other's action" ; that the limited period fixed in
Commonwealth Act No. 671 for its life and effectiveness as required by the Constitution is the interval
from the passage of said Act and the moment that Congress could convene, not in special session where
its power of legislation is limited by the Chief Executive in his call for special session, but in regular
session where it could be free to enact general legislation; and that unless this automatic ending or
cessation of Act No. 671 is so held, there would be need of another Act or legislation by the Congress to
repeal Act No. 671 in which case, the Chief Executive may by his veto power effectively block any effort
in this direction.
I beg to differ with the foregoing thesis. I believe that, as I already had occasion to state though
incidentally, the real reason for the delegation of legislative powers to the Chief Executive is not only
because the Legislature is unable to meet due to a national emergency but also because although it
could and does actually meet, whether in regular or special session, it is not in a position and able to
cope with the problems brought about by and arising from the emergency, problems which require
urgent and immediate action. Certainly, one man can act more quickly and expeditiously than about one
hundred members of the Legislature, especially when they are divided into legislative chambers. That is
why in times of emergency, much as we in democratic countries dislike the system or idea of
dictatorship, we hear of food dictator, fuel dictator, transportation dictator, civilian evacuation dictator,
etc., where the functions which ordinarily belong to a council or board or to a legislative body, are
entrusted under certain limitations to one single official or individual.
Supposing that during a national emergency and while the Legislature is in session, the legislators woke
up one morning to find that there was extreme scarcity of imported food, fuel, building materials,
equipment required in agriculture and industry, etc., because of a monopoly, hoarding, injurious
speculation, manipulation, private controls and profiteering, or that there were wide-spread lockouts
and strikes paralyzing transportation, commerce and industry, or rampant espionage or sabotage
endangering the very life and security of the nation. How much time would it take the legislature to
enact the necessary legislation in order to cope with the situation and pass the necessary emergency
measures?
We are familiar with the practice and routine of enacting laws. A bill is introduced in the Legislature; it is
referred to the corresponding committee, it is studied by said committee, which in some cases holds
public hearings; the committee discusses the bill and sometimes introduces amendments; if the bill is
not killed in the committee or shelved, it is submitted to the chamber for study, discussion and possible
amendment by all the members; it is finally voted and if approved, it is sent to the other house where it
undergoes the same process; and if it is finally approved by both houses of Congress, it is submitted to
the Chief Executive for his study and approval or veto. All these may consume weeks or months as a
result of which, ordinarily, many bills finally approved by the Congress could be sent to the President for
approval or veto only after adjournment of the legislative session. And we should not overlook the fact
that in some cases for lack of time of due to disagreement among the legislators or between the two
houses of Congress, important pieces of legislations like the annual appropriation law for the fiscal year
1949-50, appropriation of funds for the election to be held in November, 1949, contained in Executive
Orders Nos. 225 and 226, involved in the present cases, and the proposed amendment to the Election
Code etc. have not been passed by Congress in its last session ending last May, 1949, which session
lasted one hundred days. If we were to rely on the ordinary process of legislation to meet a national
emergency, by the time the necessary and needed law is passed, the situation sought to be remedied, or
the problem sought to be solved may have become disastrous or ended in calamity or gone beyond
legislation or any remedy. It would be too late. It would be like locking the stable door after the horse
had been stolen.
Now, for some retrospect. The Philippine National Assembly delegated its legislative powers because of
the existence of a state of national emergency as early as the year 1939. During its second special session
of that year, it promulgated the following laws:
(a) Commonwealth Act No. 494, authorizing the President of the Philippines to suspend until
the time of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, either
wholly or partially and under such conditions as he may deem proper, the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444, commonly known as the Eight Hour Labor Law;
(b) Commonwealth Act No. 496, authorizing the President to take over, for use or operation
by the Government, any public service or enterprise and to pay just compensation in the
manner to be determined by him and to prescribe and promulgate regulations he may deem
essential to carry out the purposes of the Act;
(c) Commonwealth Act No. 498 declaring a state of national emergency due to a state of war
among several nations and as a measure to prevent scarcity, monopolization, hoarding,
injurious speculations, profiteering, etc. affecting the supply, distribution movement of foods,
clothing, fuel, building materials, agricultural equiptments etc. authorized the President to
purchase any of the articles or commodities available for storage, for re-sale or distribution,
to fix the maximum selling price of said articles or commodities and to promulgated such
rules and regulations as he may deem necessary; and
(d) Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President in view of the existence of a state of
national emergency to reduce the expenditures of the executive departments of the
Government by the suspension or abandonment of service, activities, or operations of no
immediate importance.
At the time, September, 1939 the second world war was only in Europe, quite far from the Philippines
and had just begun. There was then no likelihood of the Philippines being involved in the war until more
than two years later, in December, 1941. The National Assembly was then free to meet either in regular
or special session to enact legislation to meet the emergency. In fact, it met in regular session in January,
1941 lasting 100 days and in January, 1941 for another regular session of 100 days, excluding the several
special session held during those two years. And yet the Assembly delegated legislative powers to the
President under section 26, Article II of the Constitution. This is clear proof that, contrary to the theory of
the majority opinion, the Legislature delegated legislative powers to the President even when it could
meet and it actually met several times.
After passing the Acts just mentioned delegating legislative powers to the President, the Assembly in its
fourthly special session on August 19, 1940 repeated and reiterated this practice and policy by passing
Commonwealth Act No. 600 delegating additional and more extensive powers to the President in spite of
the fact that the war was still far away in Europe and there was no danger or prospect of involving the
Philippines, and the Legislature was still free to meet as in fact it met again in regular session in January,
1941. During its regular session begun that month and year, instead of stopping or ending the legislative
powers delegated to the President, because according to the theory of the majority opinion, the
Legislature was able to meet, the Assembly allowed them to continue by passing Commonwealth Act No.
620 which merely amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 600. I repeat that all this, far from
supporting the view of the majority that the Legislature delegated legislative powers to the President
only because it could not meet, fairly and squarely refutes said view.
Now, let us consider the theory of the majority that it would be a great anomaly to have two legislative
bodies, the Legislature and the President to be acting at the same time, each nullifying the acts of the
other. I fail to see the suggested anomaly. In fact, under the view and interpretation given by the
majority of the delegation of contemplated the simultaneous functioning of the Legislature and the
President, both exercising legislative powers. And it is a fact that there were several instances of the
legislature and the President both validly and simultaneously exercising legislative powers.
Under section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 496 already referred to, approved on September 30, 1939,
the power delegated to the President to prescribe rules and regulations he may deem essential to carry
out the purposes of the Act, namely, the taking over of and operation by the Government of any public
service or enterprise and to pay for the same, was to last until the date of the adjournment of the next
regular session of the National Assembly. This means that, during the regular session of the Assembly
which begun in January, 1940 and lasted 100 days, the President could exercise the emergency powers
delegated to him. Again, under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 the President could and indeed he
exercised his emergency powers during the regular session of the Assembly which began in January,
1941, when President Quezon issued at least nine Executive Orders numbered 321, 333, 335, 337, 339,
340, 342, 344 and 345.
The same thing obtains under Commonwealth Act 671. Since under the view of the majority the
emergency power of the President granted him in Commonwealth Act No. 671 ended only on May 25,
1946, then the extensive legislative powers delegated to the President under that Act could be exercised
and in fact they were exercised during the five special session of Congress in the year 1945, which lasted
a total of 84 days. During those special session of 1945, President Osmeña issued several Executive
Orders in the exercise of his emergency powers.
Is there further proof needed to show that the suggested and feared anomaly and impropriety of the
Legislature and the Executive both exercising legislative functions simultaneously, is more fancied than
real? The situation was contemplated and expressly intended by the Legislature itself, evidently believing
that said condition or state of affairs was neither anomalous nor improper. There is to my mind really no
incompatibility. At such a time and during the period of their simultaneous functioning, the Legislature
may perform its ordinary legislative duties taking its time to study, consider, amend and pass bills,
reserving to the President matters requiring and demanding immediate action.
After all, it is for the Legislature to say whether it wants the President to exercise his emergency powers
at the same time that it is in session. It may validly and properly stipulate in its grant of emergency
powers that they be exercised when the Legislature is not in session. In fact, in one instance, in
Commonwealth Act No. 500, section 2, the Notional Assembly expressly provided "that the authority
herein given shall be exercised only when the National Assembly is not in session." When in its other acts
of delegation, like Commonwealth Act 671, the Legislature not only fails to stipulate this condition, but
on the contrary, contemplates Presidential exercise of legislative powers simultaneously with the
Legislature, it is to be presumed that the Legislature intended it and saw nothing improper or anomalous
in it, and it is not for the Court to pass upon the supposed impropriety or anomaly.
As to the possibility of the Chief Executive validly and successfully nullifying the acts of the Legislature, to
me that is quite remote, if not impossible. As already stated at the beginning of this opinion, the Chief
Executive acting as an agent of the Legislative under his emergency powers, may not go against the
wishes and policies of his principal. He can only carry out its wishes and policies, and where his acts and
orders run counter to those of the Legislature, or operate on a field already withdrawn because the
Legislature had already acted therein, his acts or Executive Orders must give way and will be declared
void and of no effect, by the Courts, as we are doing with the Executive Orders involved in these cases.
With respect to the claim of the majority opinion that unless the emergency powers were made to end
at the time the President made his report to Congress when it convened, it would be necessary to enact
new legislation to repeal the act of delegation, in which case the period for the delegation would be
unlimited, indefinite, and uncertain, contrary to the constitutional provision, I may say that the President
was authorized by Act 671 to exercise emergency powers "during the existence of the emergency," and
not a day longer. To me that is a limited period in contemplation of the Constitution. There would be no
need for a new law to repeal the Act of delegation, for said Act is self-liquidating. The moment the
emergency ceases, the law itself automatically ceases to have force and effect, and the Presidential
emergency powers also end with it.
Under my view, had the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, which we feared and
expected in December, 1941 failed to materialize either because the invasion was repelled or because
the Japanese high command at the last moment decided to by-pass the Philippines and divert his forces
further south to invade, say Australia, or if the Pacific war had ended as we all or most of us then
expected it to end sooner within weeks or months after its commencement and that the emergency
resulting therefrom had also ceased soon thereafter, Commonwealth Act No. 671 would have
automatically ceased to have force and effect right in the year 1942 without any affirmative act or law of
the Legislature. There would be no point or reason for the President to continue exercising emergency
powers when there no longer was any emergency. But under the view of the majority, emergency or no
emergency even if Congress could meet in special session to enact general legislation, the country must
continue to be ruled by the Presidential decree until the next regular session of Congress which may not
come till may months later. In my opinion this is not logical. To me the real and only reason and test for
the continuance of the exercise of emergency powers is the continued existence of the emergency, not
the inability of the Congress to meet in regular session.
The majority, and the parties who initiated these proceedings in court fear that the President may
promulgate rules and regulations contrary in purpose and effect to legislation enacted by the Legislature;
that he may reenact his rules and regulations after being repealed by the legislature, and that he may
even veto a bill passed by Congress repealing the Act of delegation and ending his emergency powers. It
is a fear not well founded. It runs counter to the presumption that the Chief Executive like any other
public official would perform his functions and conduct himself in every respect for the good and welfare
of the people and in accordance with the Constitution. It is fear based on the presumption that the
Legislature and the Chief Executive are at loggerheads, working at cross purposes and that the President
though acting as a mere agent of his principal, the legislature, would brazenly repudiate his principal and
even challenge its authority, and that the Chief Executive is so much in love with his emergency powers
that he would perpetuate them by going as far as vetoing an act of Congress ending said emergency
powers. Let it be said to the credit of and in justice to the different Chief Executives who have wielded
these emergency powers, President Quezon, Osmeña, Roxas and the present incumbent President
Quirino, that no accusing finger has ever been pointed at them, accusing or even insinuating that they
have abused their emergency powers or exercised them for any purpose other than the welfare of the
country, or that they had maliciously acted contrary to the wishes of the Legislatures. Even after
liberation there has been no claim not even from the Legislatures itself, to the knowledge of this Court,
at least to that of the undersigned, that any Chief Executive exercised his delegated powers, knowing
that they had ended or had abused the same.
There is no charge or insinuation that any of the Executive Orders which we are now holding to be invalid
were issued from the ulterior motives or to further and favor the political interest of the President
issuing them. It is admitted in the majority opinion that Executive Order No. 62, seeking to regulate
house and lot rentals was issued in good faith by President Roxas. Executive Order No. 192 was issued to
regulate exports, President Quirino presumably believing that exports at this time still needed regulation
and control as was formerly provided by Congress in its Act No. 728, and that the matter was still within
the field of his emergency powers as was also mistakenly believed by President Roxas in issuing
Executive Order No. 52. As to Executive Order No. 226, it merely appropriated funds to defray the
expenses in connection with the holding of the national elections in November, 1949, without which,
said election could not be held. With respect to Executive Order No. 225, it merely continues in force
Republic Act 320 which appropriated funds for the last fiscal year inasmuch as Congress had failed to
pass a General Appropriation Act for the operation of the National Government for the period beginning
July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950. There is no insinuation that any political motives or purposes are involved
in these Executive Orders.
I agree with the majority that since the Constitution provides that the delegation of legislative powers by
the Legislature should be done for a limited period, it is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671
was approved with this limitation in view. I even agree to its definition of the word "limited." But I
submit that Commonwealth Act No. 671 itself, limited its operation and effectiveness to and make it
coextensive with the duration of the emergency resulting from the war and that furthermore, that
duration is a limited period within the meaning and contemplation of the Constitution. Surely the
emergency resulting from the war contemplated by the National Assembly when it acted Act No. 671 is
not permanent or indefinite. It is of limited duration. It may be long or it may be short; but it cannot be
for always. It has an end. Presumably the members of the National Assembly thought that the
emergency would not last as long as it did. The belief entertained at the time by not a few, in fact by a
great portion of the people here not excluding the legislators, was that the war with Japan would be of
short duration, a question of months at the longest; that American reinforcements would come at the
beginning of the year 1942 and drive away the invading Japanese armies if they ever were able to occupy
the Philippines and that, consequently, the war as far as these islands were concerned and the resulting
emergency would soon pass away. The wisdom or lack of wisdom of the National Assembly in limiting or
rather making the life and effectiveness of Commonwealth Act No. 671 coextensive with the resulting
emergency, viewed in the light of what had actually happened, cannot be passed upon this Court. So, as I
see it, so long as the emergency resulting from the War continues, Commonwealth Act No. 671 subsists
and so long the Chief Executive retains his emergency powers.
The majority believes that as already stated, Act No. 671 was in force only until Congress could meet
resume its legislatives functions. Naturally, this view is based on the theory that legislative functions in
times of emergency are delegated only because of the inability of the Legislative Department to meet
and exercise its functions. I believe I have successfully demonstrated the flaw in this theory, not only by
showing that the real reason underlying the delegation of legislative powers is not inability of Legislature
to meet but rather it inability to consider and pass legislation in time to meet an emergency which
requires as it does urgent and immediate action and can be solved only by the exercise of legislative
functions by one single responsible individual, unhamppered by study and prolonged discussion by many
members of the legislative body, but also by the fact that although since 1939 when the second world
war broke out in Europe and for a period of more than two years thereafter, when the National
Assembly could still meet and in fact convened on several occasions and for hundreds of days in regular
and special session, nevertheless, it had been delegating legislative powers to the President.
The majority view finds no support in the law. Section 26, Article VI of the Constitution does not impose
this condition or requirement. The only important conditions imposed by the Constitution are that there
be a national emergency and delegation be for a limited period. The same thing is true with Act No. 671
which makes the delegation. The only condition imposed by section 2 of said Act is that the delegated
powers be exercised during the emergency. Neither in the Constitution nor in Commonwealth Act No.
671 is there any hint or insinuation, much less express mention about the inability of the Legislature to
meet. When every consideration for clearness and for Executive and Judicial guidance loudly called for
and demanded an unequivocal and clear expression of Constitutional and legislative intent, both laws,
the source and basis of the emergency powers are conspicuously silent on this point. The only conclusion
is that neither the framers of the Constitution nor the members of the National Assembly had thought of
much less intended to impose this condition. To sustain the majority view would require reading into the
law what is not there. In further support of its view that emergency powers may be exercised by the
President only until the Legislature could meet, the majority finds comfort in and cites section 3 of Act
671 which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the
Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation promulgated by him
under the powers herein granted.
I fail to see anything in said section that warrants a holding that upon filing his report with Congress,
about the rules and regulation promulgated by him under his emergency powers under Commonwealth
Act 671, his emergency powers automatically ceased. I could well imagine that under an act of
delegation of legislative powers where the President is authorized to perform one single act such as the
suspension of the eight-hour labor law under Commonwealth Act No. 494, or the reduction of the
expenditures of the executive departments of the National Government by the suspension or
abandonment of services, activities or operations of no immediate necessity under Commonwealth Act
No. 500, when the President has exercised his delegated authority and made his report to the Assembly
as required by said laws, the latter, as well as his delegated authority thereunder automatically ceased,
for the simple reason that nothing remains to be performed or done. However, treating of the grant of
extensive emergency powers as was done under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671 where said
laws contemplated many different acts, rules and regulations of varied categories and objectives and to
be performed not at one at time or instance but at different times during the existence of the
emergency, as the need or occasion arose, there is no reason for the belief or the holding that upon
submitting a partial report, the whole law making the delegation including his powers under it
automatically ended. The legislature during the emergency might be able to convene and naturally, the
President will immediately make his report to it of the rules and regulations promulgated by him up to
that time; but if the emergency continued or even became more serious, would it be reasonable to hold
that his emergency powers ended right then and there? Would it not be more logical and reasonable to
believe that inasmuch as the grant and the exercise of his emergency powers were motivated by and
based upon the existence of the emergency and since the emergency continued his work and
responsibility were not ended and that his partial report could not possibly affect the continuance of his
emergency powers?
Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 provides for the filing of a report with Congress by the
President as soon as that body convened. According to the majority opinion on that date the whole Act
No. 671 ceased to have force and effect. Under that theory, as soon as the Congress convened in June,
1945, and it is to be presumed that President Osmeña, complying with his duty, must have made his
report of all the numerous Executive Orders he had issued so far, perhaps including those issued by his
predecessor President Quezon who because of his premature death was unable to report his acts to
Congress, the President automatically lost his emergency powers. But the majority opinion qualifies this
convening of the Congress, for it says that it must be a regular session and not a special session, thereby
extending the life of Commonwealth act No. 671 one year longer, to May, 1946 when Congress held its
first regular session after liberation. I do not quite see the necessity or the reason for the distinction
made between the special and regular session, for at both sessions Congress could well receive the
report of the President. The reason given is that "in a special session Congress may consider general
legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate." But as a matter of fact, the first two
special sessions called by President Osmeña in 1945, after liberation, each for a period of thirty days
were both to consider general legislation. So, actually there is no reason for the distinction.
Furthermore, if it were the intention of the Legislature to fix the time at which Commonwealth Act No.
671 would cease in its operation as of the date when the President could file his report before Congress
when it first convened not in special session but in regular session, it would have expressly and
unequivocally said so. In its other acts of delegation of powers when the legislature wanted to have the
report of the President at its regular session, it expressly and explicitly said so. In section 3 of
Commonwealth Act 494, in section 5 of Commonwealth Act 496, in section 6 of Commonwealth Act 498,
in section 3 of Commonwealth Act 500 and in section 4 of Commonwealth Act 600, the National
Assembly provided that the President shall report to the National Assembly within ten days after the
opening of the next regular session of the said Assembly of whatever acts have been taken by him under
the authority of those Acts. The Assembly left nothing for interpretation or speculation. In section 3 of
Commonwealth Act 671, however, the same Assembly has not specified the kind of session before which
the President should make his report. It merely said that upon the convening of the Congress the
President shall report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him. We should make no
distinction where the law makes or calls for none. Here again, to support the majority opinion would
require reading into the law, section 3 of Act 671, something that is not there.
In case like the present where there is room for doubt as to whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 671
has ceased to operate, one view (of the majority) being that it automatically ceased to have any force
and effect on May 25, 1946, the other view being that the law operated as long as the emergency
resulting from the war existed, the opinion of and the obvious interpretation given by the legislature
which enacted the law and made the delegation of powers and the President to whom the delegation
was made and who exercised said powers, should have much if not decisive weight. We must bear in
mind that we are not passing upon the validity or constitutionality of a law enacted by the Legislature, in
which case, the Court may find the act invalid and unconstitutional if it is in violation of the basic law,
regardless of the opinion or interpretation given by the Legislature that passed it or of the Executive
Department which may be trying to enforce it. We assume that Act No. 671 is valid and constitutional.
Here, we are merely trying to ascertain the intention of the National Assembly as to the life and period of
effectiveness of Commonwealth Act No. 671.
Do the study and analysis of other acts of the Legislature similar to Commonwealth Act 671, favor the Then, let us see what was the attitude and conduct of the Chief Executive and of Congress after May 25,
view of the majority? The answer in my opinion is clearly and decidedly in the negative. The majority 1946, when according to the majority opinion Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to operate. After May
cites the Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 to support the theory that Commonwealth Act 671 25, 1946, two Presidents, Roxas and Quirino had issued numerous Executive Orders based upon and
automatically ceased to operate Congress met at its next regular session. But the logical inference or invoking Commonwealth Act No. 671. Like President Quezon, they also evidently were of the opinion
conclusion to be drawn from these two acts is, in my opinion, just the reverse. It is even fatal to the view that despite the meeting of the Legislature in regular session the act delegating legislative powers to
of the majority as I shall attempt to show. Let us consider Commonwealth Act 600 delegating extensive them (in the case of Roxas and Quirino—Commonwealth Act No. 671) was still in force, that they still
legislative powers to the President, approved on August 19, 1940, which like Act 671 is silent as to any retained their emergency powers and so proceeded to exercise them in good faith.
express provision regarding its life or period of effectiveness, and as to how long the emergency powers
granted the President by it will last. Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 600 like section 3 of Act Congress also, evidently, believed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was still in force and effect after said
671 provides that "the President shall within the first ten days from the date of the opening of the
date, May 25, 1946. In spite of the several legislative sessions, regular and special since then and up to
Assembly's next regular session report to said Assembly whatever action he had taken under the
and including the year 1949, Congress has not by law or resolution said anything questioning or doubting
authority therein granted." Said section 4 of Act 600 is clearly and more specific than section 3 of Act 671
the validity of said Executive Order on the score of having been promulgated after Commonwealth Act
in that it clearly specifies the next regular session whereas the latter refers merely to the convening of
No. 671 had supposedly ceased to operate. Not only this, but at least in one instance, Congress had by a
Congress. But let us assume arguendo as contended by the majority that "the convening of the
law promulgated by it, considered one of those supposed illegal Executive Orders promulgated after May
Congress" mentioned in section 3 of Commonwealth Act 671, referred to regular session. According to
25, 1946, to be valid. I refer to Republic Act No. 224 approved on June 5, 1948, creating the National
the majority opinion, under section 4 of the Commonwealth Act No. 600, as soon as the President made
Airport Corporation which considered and treated as valid Executive Order No. 100, dated October 21,
the report of the National Assembly at its "next regular session" which was to be and was actually held in
1947, by providing in section 7 of said Republic Act No. 224 for the abolishment of the Office of the
January, 1941, Commonwealth Act 600 automatically ceased to operate and the President automatically
Administrator of the Manila International Airport established under the provisions of said Executive
lost his delegated legislative powers. But this contrary to the very view of the National Assembly which
Order No. 100 and the transfer of the personnel and funds created under the same Executive Order to
passed said Act 600. Commonwealth Act No. 620 of the National Assembly passed during that "next
the National Airport Corporation. This Executive Order No. 100 which appropriated public funds and
regular session" and approved on June 6, 1941 merely amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act 600,
therefore, was of a legislative nature must have been issued under Commonwealth Act No. 671. It
which enumerated the powers delegated to the Chief Executive. It left the rest of the provisions and
cannot possibly be regarded as having been promulgated by authority of Republic Act No. 51, for said Act
sections of Commonwealth Act 600 intact. So that, under section 4 (which was left intact) of Act 600, the
approved on October 4, 1946, gave the President only one year within which to reorganize the different
President was still required to report to National Assembly within the first 10 days from the date of the
executive departments, offices, agencies, etc. and Executive Order No. 100 was promulgated on October
opening of its next regular session which should have begun in January, 1942, despite the fact that he 23, 1947, after the expiration of the one year period. Furthermore, it is a matter of common knowledge
had already made a report to the Legislature in January, 1941. Incidentally, this answer and refutes the
that during the last session of Congress which ended in May, 1949, there was talk if not a movement in
contention of the majority that the law of delegation of powers contemplated only one meeting of the
the Congress to end the emergency powers of the President. Nothing concrete in the form of legislation
Congress at which the President was to report his acts of emergency, and that said report was to be the
or resolution was done, for if we are to accept newspaper reports and comment, the members of
first and the last.
Congress or at least a majority of them were willing and satisfied to have the Chief Executive continue in
the exercise of his emergency powers until the end of 1949. All this leads to no other conclusion but that
Now, what inference may be drawn from this amending of section 1 only of Commonwealth Act No. 600 Congress believed all along that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and effect.
by Commonwealth Act No. 620? The logical conclusion is that in promulgating Commonwealth Act 620
on June 6, 1941, the National Assembly all along regarded Commonwealth Act No. 600 which delegated
If Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and effect the question arises: how long and for what
legislative powers to the President as still in force and effect despite the report filed with the Assembly
period will said Act continue to operate? As I have already stated, I believe that the delegation of
by the President at the beginning of its regular session in January, 1941. When the Legislature merely
emergency powers was made coextensive with the emergency resulting from the war, as long as that
amends a section of a law, leaving the rest of said law intact and unchanged, the logical inference and
emergency continues and unless the Legislature provides otherwise, Act 671 will continue to operate
conclusion is that the amended law was still in force because you cannot amend a law which is no longer
and the President may continue exercising his emergency powers.
in force. The only thing that could be done with a law that has ceased to operate is to reenact it. But in
passing Commonwealth Act 620 in July, 1941, the Assembly did not reenacted Commonwealth Act No.
600. By merely amending one of its sections, the Assembly, as late as June 1941, considered said Act 600 The last and logical question that one will naturally ask is: has the emergency resulting from the war
as still effective and in operation and consequently, the emergency powers of the President continued passed or does it still exist? This is a fair and decisive question inasmuch as the existence of the
and subsisted despite his previously having made a report of his actions in January 1941. This squarely emergency is, my opinion, the test and the only basis of the operation or cessation of Act 671. The
refutes the theory that as soon as the President filed his report on the exercise of his emergency powers existence or non-existence of the emergency resulting from the war is a question of fact. It is based on
with the Legislature, the Act making the delegation ceased to operate and the President lost his conditions obtaining among the people and in the country and perhaps even near and around it. It is
emergency powers. highly controversial question on which people may honestly differ. There are those who in all good faith
believe and claim that conditions have returned to normal; that the people have now enough to eat,
sometimes even more than they had before the war; that people nowadays especially in the cities are
As I have already stated in the course of this opinion, in connection with another phrase of this case from
better nourished and clothed and transported and better compensated for their labor, and that the
January to June, 1941, President Quezon had issued at least eight Executive Orders in the exercise of his
President himself in his speeches, chats and messages had assured the public that normal times have
emergency powers, by authority of Commonwealth Act 600. From this it is evident that he did not share
returned, that the problem of peace and order had been solved, that the finances of the Government
the majority view, because despite his having made his report to the Assembly in January, 1941, and
and the national economy are sound, and that there is an adequate food supply. It is therefore, claimed
even before the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 620, he believed and considered Commonwealth
that there is no longer any emergency resulting from the war.
Act No. 600 as still in force after that date and that he still retained his emergency powers.
On the other hand, it is asserted with equal vehemence in the opposite camp that conditions are still far country. They are supposed to be in close contact with their constituents and know at first hand their
from normal; that the picture painted by the President in cheerful and reassuring colors is based on over needs, the way they live, etc. Congress therefore should know. Moreover, it is the legislature that must
optimism and, as to be expected, calculated to show in bold relief the achievements of the first determine as to whether or not there is a national emergency as a condition precedent to the
administration, and so should be considered with some allowance; that we are now importing more rice delegation of its legislative powers. Naturally, it is the one that is called upon to say when that
than before the war for the reason that many rice farms are idle because of the farmer's fear of or emergency ceases.
interference by dissidents; that the problem of peace and order is far from solved as shown by the
frequent hold-ups, kidnapping, loothing and killings and organized banditry not only in Luzon but also in
Now, one will ask, what does Congress think about the emergency? Does it believe that it still exists? To
the Visayas and Mindanao; that whereas before the war, the Constabulary force consisting of only about
me the answer is YES. What has been said about the acts, conduct and attitude of the legislature as to its
6,000 officers and men could provide complete protection to life and property and was adequate in all belief that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force, are all applicable and may be repeated to show
respects to enforce peace and order, now this Constabulary enlarged to about 20,000 men, provided
that the Congress believes that the emergency resulting from the war still exist. Under the theory that I
with modern weapons and equipment and with the aid of thousands of civilians guards and of the
maintain, Congress must be of the opinion that the emergency still exists for the reason that as I have
Philippine Army and Air Force cannot solve the peace and order problem; that the dissidents who are
shown Congress believes that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and the life and the operation
well organized, armed and disciplined even attack and sack towns and sometimes openly defy and
of said Act depends upon and is coextensive with the existence of the emergency. To this may be added
engage the armed Government forces; that as long as more than 100,000 firearms are loose and in the
the attitude and the belief of the President as to the continued existence of the emergency. It must be
hands of irresponsible parties, not excluding the seemingly regular mysterious supply to them of
borne in mind that Commonwealth Act No. 671 authorizes the President to exercise his emergency
additional firearms and ammunitions, there can be no peace and order; and as to the barrio folks in
powers only during the existence of the emergency. The inference is that before exercising his emergency
central Luzon and now, even in provinces bordering central Luzon whose parents and relatives had been
powers by promulgating an Executive Order he must first determine and decide that the state of
killed by dissidents, whose women folk had been outraged by the same elements, whose homes had
emergency still exists, for that is the condition precedent to the exercise of his delegated powers. In
been looted and burned and whose very lives had been subjected to constant terror and peril,
other words, the two departments of the Government, the Legislative and the Executive Departments,
compelling them to leave their homes and their farms and evacuate to and be concentrated in the
best qualified and called upon to determine whether or not the emergency resulting from the war still
poblaciones to live there in utter discomfort and privation, it is said that it would be difficult to convince
exists have made manifest in their acts and attitude that they believe that such emergency still exists. I
these unfortunate people that normalcy has returned and that there is no longer any emergency
may here state that on this question of emergency, I entertain no personal opinion either way lacking as I
resulting from the war. To further support the claim of the existence of an emergency, the menace of
do the means of deciding fairly and justly. Neither has the Court. If the decision of the courts on question
communism not only at home, particularly in central Luzon but from abroad, especially China, is invoked.
of fact involved in a controversy are given due respect and weight and are binding, it is because such
And it is asserted that all this is a result of the war. decisions are based on evidence adduced and received after a hearing. No such hearing was held for the
purpose and no evidence been received. In other words, we have nothing in which to decide a question
I repeat that this question of the existence of an emergency is a controversial one, the decision on which of fact which is the existence or non-existence of emergency.
must be based on the ascertainment of facts, circumstances and conditions and the situation obtaining
in the country. This Court is not in a position to decide that controversy. It does not have the facilities to
In view of the conclusion we have arrived at, finding these Executive Orders to be void and of no effect,
obtain and acquire the necessary facts and data on which to base a valid and just decision. Neither did it
particularly Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 with the evident result that no funds are appropriated for
have the opportunity to receive the necessary evidence as in a hearing or trial at which evidence, oral or
the operation of the Government for the fiscal year beginning July of this year and for the expenses in
documentary, is introduced. We cannot invoked and resort to judicial notice because this refers to things
the coming national election next November, one may inquire as to what will happen or what is to be
of public knowledge, and not controverted, whereas things, facts and conditions necessary for the
done. The answer or answers to this question lie with the Chief Executive. Congress will not meet in
determination of whether or not there is still an emergency, are often not of public knowledge but
regular session until next year. It is not for the court, not even the undersigned to suggest the calling of a
require investigation, accurate reporting and close contact with the people to be able to ascertain their
special legislative session to cope with the perilous situation thus created, altho one may regard that as a
living conditions, their needs, their fears, etc.
logical remedy. But, should the President call a special session and Congress for one reason or another
fails to meet or though it meets, for one reason or another it fails to pass an appropriation law, then a
To me, the department of the Government equipped and in a position to decide this question of real crisis will have ensued. I am confident that the Chief Executive, conscious of his responsibility as the
emergency are the Chief Executive and the Legislature. The first has at his command and beck and call all Chief of the nation would not just stand supine and idle and see the Government of the Republic of the
the executive officials and departments. He has the Army, the Constabulary, Naval Patrol, the Police of Philippines disintegrate and die. He would know what to do and he would do something according to his
the cities and towns and the barrio lieutenants to inform him of the state of peace and order and sound discretion and in accordance with the law, statutory or otherwise and in the discharge of his high
the security of the states. He has the Secretary of Education and all the subordinates officers and the executive powers, express or implied.
school officials under him to inform him as to whether or not there is a school crisis or emergency as a
result of the war. He has the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and his men to advise him as
TORRES, J., concurring:
to the agricultural needs and the food supply of the country. He has the Secretary of Finance and all the
officials under him to inform him of the finances of the Government and the economy of the country as
well as the officials to advise him of the land shipping transportation situation. In other words, the I concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor on the existence of the emergency powers. I
President is in a position to determine whether or not there is still an emergency as a result of the war. reserve my opinion on the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226.

As to Congress, it is equally in a position and in fact it is the first to called upon to decide as to the REYES, J., concurring and dissenting:
existence or non-existence of an emergency. According to the Constitution, section 24, Article VI, either
House of Congress may call upon the head of any department of the Government on any matter The main issue in these cases is whether the emergency which on December 16, 1941 prompted the
pertaining to his departure. The members of Congress come from all parts and the far corners of the approval of Commonwealth Act No. 671, delegating extraordinary powers to the President, still existed
at the time the Chief Executive exercised those powers by promulgating the executive orders whose
validity is now challenged.
On issue similar to the one just formulated there is a diversity of opinions. While some courts would
rather leave the determination of such issues to the political department of the Government, others are
for making the determination subject to judicial review. But the latest ruling of the United States
Supreme Court on the point accords with first view and declares that "these are matters of political
judgment for which judges have neither technical competence nor official responsibility."
(Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883.)
In any event the existence or non-existence of an emergency is a question of facts which may not always
be determine without the evidence by mere reference to facts within the judicial notice. In the present
cases, there has been no trial for the reception of proof, and I am not aware that enough facts have been
shown to justify the conclusion that the emergency in question has already ceased. On the other hand,
since the exercise of the emergency powers by the President presupposes a determination of the
existence of the emergency, the President must be presumed to have satisfied himself in some
appropriate manner that the emergency existed when he issued his executive orders. Under the theory
of separation of powers and in accord with the latest ruling of the United States Supreme Court, it is not
for the judiciary to review the finding of the Executive in this regard. Judicial review would in such case
amount to control of executive discretion and place the judicial branch above a co-equal department of
the Government. Only in case of a manifest abuse of the exercise of powers by a political branch of the
Government is judicial interference allowable in order to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
But with the cold war still going on though the shooting war has already ended; with the world still in
turmoil so much so that the American Secretary of the State has declared that "the world has never
before in peace time been as troubled or hazardous as it is right now;" with most of the industries of the
country still unrihabilitated, so that a large proportion of our food and other necessaries have to be
imported; with a great portion of the population still living in temporary quarters; with most of the war
damage claims still unpaid; and with peace and other conditions in the country far from normal, it would
be presumptuous for this Court, without proof of the actual condition obtaining in all parts of the
Archipelago, to declare that the President clearly abused his discretion when he considered the
emergency not ended at the time he promulgated the executive orders now questioned.
The majority opinion has skirted the issue of whether or not the question of the existence or
continuance of the emergency is one for the political department of the Government to determine by
restricting "the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented
from holding session due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war." I cannot subscribe to
this narrow interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 671, for in my opinion it is contrary to both the
plain language and manifest purpose of that enactment. The law invests the President with extraordinary
powers in order to meet the emergency resulting from the war and it expressly says that the President is
to exercise those powers "during the existence of the emergency." The Act does not say that the
President may exercise the powers only when the Legislature is not session. Much less does it say that
the emergency powers shall cease as soon as the Legislature has convened in regular session. An
emergency resulting from a global war cannot end with the mere meeting of the Legislature. Neither
may be legislated out of existence. The Legislature, once it was convened, may, if it so desire, revoked
the emergency powers of the President, but it cannot by any form of legislative action put an immediate
end to the emergency itself. Well known is a fact that a deliverative body, such as the Legislature,
because of the time consumed in the study and discussion of a measure, may not always act with the
promptness which the situation requires so that in an emergency there is really need for the
concentration of power in one man. This may well be the reason why Act No. 671 in express terms
authorizes the President to exercise the emergency powers "during the existence of the emergency" and
not merely during the time that the Legislature could be in session. For one thing to make the life of the
emergency powers depend upon the inability of the Legislature to meet is the same as to declare those
emergency powers automatically ended the moment they were conferred, for at that very moment of
the Legislature that conferred them was in session.
The argument that, unless the emergency powers of the President were made to cease the moment
Congress convened in regular session, we should be having two legislatures which could mutually annul
each other, will not stand analysis. In supposing that the President, in the exercise of the emergency
powers could "repeal or modify a bill passed by the Legislature," the argument overlooks the fact that
the emergency powers delegated to the President under Article VI, section 26 of the Constitution could
only authorize him "to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Only the
Legislature (with the concurrence of the President of course) may declare the President may not, under
the Constitution, depart from it. Moreover, unless the Presidential veto could be overriden, no bill
approved by Congress could become a law if the President did not want it. And if the President approves
a bill and allows it to become a law, surely he can have no reason for repealing it; while, on the other
hand, there is no point in his repealing that bill, because if there are enough votes to override his veto
there must also be enough votes to repeal his emergency powers.
The majority opinion has I think placed a rather forced construction upon section 3 of Commonwealth
Act No. 671, which provides that —
The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the
Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him
under the powers herein granted.
As may be seen, the above provision does not say that the President has to report only once, that is, the
first time Congress is convened, and never again. But the majority opinion wants to read that thought
into the law in order to bolster up the theory that the emergency powers of the President would end as
soon as Congress could convene in a regular session.
Invoking the rule of contemporary construction, the majority opinion makes reference to a passage in
President Quezon's book. "The Good Fight," to the effect that, according to the author, Act No. 671, was
only "for a certain period" and "would become valid unless re-enacted." But I see nothing in the quoted
phrases any suggestion that the emergency powers of the President were to end the moment Congress
was convened in regular session regardless of the continuance of the emergency which gave birth to
those powers. A more valid application of the rule of contemporary construction may, I think, be made
by citing the executive orders promulgated by President Roxas by Commonwealth Act No. 671. Many of
those executive orders were issued after May 25, 1946 when Congress convened in regular session, an
event which, according to the majority opinion, automatically put an end to the emergency powers.
While we have adopted the republican form of government with its three co-equal departments, each
acting within its separate sphere, it would be well to remember that we have not accepted the American
theory of separation of powers to its full extent. For, profiting from the experience of America when her
Supreme Court, by the application many a New Deal measure which her Congress had approved to meet
a national crisis, our Constitutional Convention in 1935, despite the warning of those who feared a
dictatorship in his country, decided to depart from the strict theory of separation of powers by
embodying a provision in our Constitution, authorizing the delegation of legislative powers to the
President "in times of war or other national emergency." It is my surmise that this provision was
intended to guard not only against the inability to meet but also against its usual tardiness and inaction.
We have proof of this last in the last regular session of Congress, when this body failed to pass measures
of pressing necessity, especially the annual appropriation law and the appropriation for the expenses of
the coming elections.
It is said that the need for an appropriation law for the fiscal year 1949-1950 as well for the coming
elections is not an emergency resulting from the war. But I say that if the emergency resulting from the
war as contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671 still exists, as the President believes it exists or he
would not have issued the executive orders in question (and it is not for the Court to change that belief
in the absence of proof that the President was clearly wrong) would it not be a dereliction of duty on his
part to fall to provide, during the emergency, for the continuance of the functions of government, which
is only possible with an appropriation law? What would be gained by issuing rules and regulations to
meet the emergency if there is no Government to enforce and carry them out? The mere calling of a
special is no guaranty that an appropriation law will be passed or that one will be passed before the
thousands of officials and employees who work for the Government have starved. It is, probably,
because of these considerations that the National Assembly, in approving Commonwealth Act No. 671,
specifically empowered the President, during the existence of the emergency, "to continue in force laws
and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative." And that Act has authorized
the President during the existence of the same emergency "to exercise such other powers as he may
deem necessary to enable the government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain in force this
authority." Under this specific provision, the appropriation for the expenses of the coming elections
would, naturally, come, for, without doubt, it is a measure to enable the Government "to fulfill its
responsibilities."
Consistently with the views above express, I am of the opinion that Executive Order No. 225,
appropriating funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic for the fiscal year 1949-50, and
Executive Order No. 226, appropriating funds for the expenses of the coming national elections in
November, 1949, are valid so that the petition in G.R. No. L-3054, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. vs. Treasurer of
the Philippines, and the petition in G.R. No. L-3056, Antonio Barredo, etc., vs. Commissioner on Election,
et al., in which the said two executive orders are respectively challenged, should be denied.
But Executive Order No. 62 (regulating rents) and Executive Order No. 192 (controlling exports) stand on
a different footing. The validity of Executive Order No. 62 can no longer be maintained because of the
approval by the Legislature of Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66, which regulate the
same subject matter and which, as an expression of the national policy, can not be deviated from by the
President in the exercise of the emergency powers delegated to him by Commonwealth Act No. 671. The
same is true with respect to Executive Order No. 192 (controlling exports) in view of the passage of
Commonwealth Act No. 728, regulating the same subject matter, especially because section 4 of said Act
terminates the power of the President thereunder on December 31, 1948, if not sooner. Consequently,
since the validity of these executive orders (Nos. 62 and 192) can no longer be upheld, the petitions in
G.R. Nos. L-2044, L-2756 and L-3055, which seek to prohibit their enforcement, should be granted.
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join in this opinion of Mr. Justice Reyes. I wish to add that I agree with Mr. Justice Bengzon that
petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 have no personality to institute the proceedings.
BENGZON, J., dissenting:
The majority feels that it has to decide the question whether the President still has emergency powers;
but unable to determine in which of the above cases the issue may properly be decided, it grouped them
together. When the eye or the hand is unsure, it is best to shoot at five birds in a group: firing at one
after another may mean as many misses.
It does not matter that the first two cases had been submitted and voted before the submission of the
last three. Neither does it matter that, of these last, two should be thrown out in accordance with our
previous rulings. The target must be large.
These cases could be, and should be decided separately. If they are, they may be disposed of without
ruling on the general question whether the President still has emergency powers under Commonwealth
Act No. 7671. How? This way, which is my vote.
1. L-2044, Araneta vs. Dinglasan; L-2756, Araneta vs. Angeles. The President has presently no power to
regulate rents, because his power to do so is granted by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 which
have lapsed. Under Commonwealth Act No. 671 he has no power to regulate rents.
2. L-3056, Barredo vs. Commission, etc. Dismissed because petitioner has no personality to
sue. According to Custodio vs. President of the Senate et al., 42 Off. Gaz., 1243, a citizen and taxpayer, as
such, has no legal standing to institute proceedings for the annulment of a statute.
3. L-3054, Rodriguez vs. Treasurer. Dismissed, like the Barredo case. The private rights of petitioner and
of his partymen are affected only as taxpayers.
4. L-3055, Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs. Supposing that the President still has emergency
powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671, and that they include regulation of exportation, inasmuch as
the Congress has chosen to legislate on exports (Commonwealth Act No. 728), it has thereby pro
tanto withdrawn the power delegated to the President along that field.
It is a sound rule, I believe, for the Court to determine only those questions which are necessary to
decide a case.
Although I am favorably impressed by the considerations set forth by Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr.
Justice Reyes on the existence of emergency powers, I prefer to vote as herein indicated.
I reserve the right subsequently to elaborate on the above propositions.
For lack of the required number of votes, judgment was not obtained. However, after rehearing, the
required number of votes was had, by resolution of September 16, 1949, which follows.
RESOLUTION
MORAN, C. J.:
Petitioners filed motions asking (1) that Mr. Justice Padilla be qualified to act in these cases; (2) that the
vote cast by the late Mr. Justice Perpecto before his death be counted in their favor; and (3) that the
opinion of the Chief Justice be counted as a vote for the nullity of Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226.
 I And this is practically what we have said in the contempt case against Abelardo Subido, 1 promulgated on
As regards the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, the Court is of the opinion that it must not be
considered, it having been presented after Mr. Justice Padilla had given his opinion on the merits of
these cases. As we have once said "a litigant . . . cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the
court and raise an objection of this sort after decision has been rendered." (Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil., 374.)
Furthermore, the fact that Justice Padilla, while Secretary of Justice, had advised the President on the
question of emergency powers, does not disqualify him to act in these cases, for he cannot be
considered as having acted previously in these actions as counsel of any of the parties. The President is
not here a party.
All the members of this Court concur in the denial of the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, with the
exception of Mr. Justice Ozaeta and Mr. Justice Feria who reserve their vote.
II
With respect to the motion to include the vote and opinion of the late Mr. Justice Perfecto in the
decision of these cases, it appears that Mr. Justice Perfecto died and ceased to be a member of this
Court on August 17, 1949, and our decision in these cases was released for publication on August 26,
1949. Rule 53, section 1, in connection with Rule 58, section 1, of the Rules of Court, is as follows:
SECTION 1. Judges: who may take part. — All matters submitted to the court for its
consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and
adjudication by any and all of the justices who are members of the court at the time when
such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such justices were or
not members of the court and whether they were or were not present at the date of
submission; . . . .
Under this provision, one who is not a member of the court at the time an adjudication is made cannot
take part in the adjudication. The word "adjudication" means decision. A case can be adjudicated only by
means of a decision. And a decision of this Court, to be of value and binding force, must be in writing
duly signed and promulgated (Article VIII, sections 11 and 12, of the Constitution; Republic Act No. 296,
section 21; Rule 53, section 7, of the Rules of Court). Promulgated means the delivery of the decision to
the Clerk of Court for filing and publication.
Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of this Court at the time a decision is signed and
promulgated, cannot validly take part in that decision. As above indicated, the true decision of the Court
is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that decision is so signed and
promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote cast by a member of the Court after
deliberation is always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has to sign the decision
that is to be promulgated. That vote is of no value if it is not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it. The
purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their vote, wish to
preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that they
may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and
deliberation. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions
and conclusions stated during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breast of the
Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve for
determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare
the decision binding unless and until duly signed and promulgated.
September 28, 1948:
que un asunto o causa pendiente en esta Corte Suprema solo se considera decidido una vez
registrada, promulgada y publicada la sentencia en la escribania, y que hasta entonces el
resultado de la votacion se estima como una materia absolutamente reservada y confidencial,
perteneciente exclusivamente a las camaras interiores de la Corte.
In an earlier case we had occasion to state that the decisive point is the date of promulgation of
judgment. In that case a judge rendered his decision on January 14; qualified himself as Secretary of
Finance on January 16; and his decision was promulgated on January 17. We held that the decision was
void because at the time of its promulgation the judge who prepared it was no longer a judge. (Lino
Luna vs. Rodriquez, 37 Phil., 186.)
Another reason why the vote and opinion of the Mr. Justice Perfecto can not be considered in these
cases is that his successor, Mr. Justice Torres, has been allowed by this Court to take part in the decision
on the question of emergency powers because of lack of majority on that question. And Mr. Justice
Torres is not bound to follow any opinion previously held by Mr. Justice Perfecto on that matter. There is
no law or rule providing that a successor is a mere executor of his predecessor's will. On the contrary,
the successor must act according to his own opinion for the simple reason that the responsibility for his
action is his and of no one else. Of course, where a valid and recorded act has been executed by the
predecessor and only a ministerial duty remains to be performed for its completion, the act must be
completed accordingly. For instance, where the predecessor had rendered a valid judgment duly filed
and promulgated, the entry of that judgment which is a ministerial duty, may be ordered by the
successor as a matter of course. But even in that case, if the successor is moved to reconsider the
decision, and he still may do so within the period provided by the rules, he is not bound to follow the
opinion of his predecessor, which he may set aside according to what he may believe to be for the best
interests of justice.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the motion to include the vote and opinion of the late Justice
Perfecto in the decision of these cases must be denied.
Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla, Mr. Justice Montemayor, Mr. Justice Alex.
Reyes, and Mr. Justice Torres concur in this denial. Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice
Tuason dissent.
III
In connection with the motion to consider the opinion of the Chief Justice as a vote in favor of
petitioners, the writer has the following to say:
In my previous concurring opinion, I expressed the view that the emergency powers vested in
Commonwealth Act No. 671 had ceased in June 1945, but I voted for a deferment of judgment in these
two cases because of two circumstances then present, namely, (1) the need of sustaining the two
executive orders on appropriations as the life-line of government and (2) the fact that a special session of
Congress was to be held in a few days. I then asked, "Why not defer judgment and wait until the special
session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it clearly sees it?"
It seemed then to me unwise and inexpedient to force the Government into imminent disruption by
allowing the nullity of the executive orders to follow its reglementary consequences when Congress was
soon to be convened for the very purpose of passing, among other urgent measures, a valid
appropriations act. Considering the facility with which Congress could remedy the existing anomaly, I
deemed it a slavish submission to a constitutional formula for this Court to seize upon its power under
the fundamental law to nullify the executive orders in question. A deferment of judgment struck me then
as wise. I reasoned that judicial statesmanship, not judicial supremacy, was needed.
However, now that the holding of a special session of Congress for the purpose of remedying the nullity
of the executive orders in question appears remote and uncertain, I am compelled to, and do hereby,
give my unqualified concurrence in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Tuason declaring that these two
executive orders were issued without authority of law.
While in voting for a temporary deferment of the judgment I was moved by the belief that the positive
compliance with the Constitution by the other branches of the Government, which is our prime concern
in all these cases, would be effected, and indefinite deferment will produce the opposite result because
it would legitimize a prolonged or permanent evasion of our organic law. Executive orders which are, in
our opinion, repugnant to the Constitution, would be given permanent life, opening the way to practices
which may undermine our constitutional structure.
The harmful consequences which, as I envisioned in my concurring opinion, would come to pass should
the said executive orders be immediately declared null and void, are still real. They have not disappeared
by reason of the fact that a special session of the Congress is not now forthcoming. However, the remedy
now lies in the hands of the Chief Executive and of Congress, for the Constitution vests in the former the
power to call a special session should the need for one arise, and in the latter, the power to pass a valid
appropriation act.
That Congress may again fall to pass a valid appropriations act is a remote possibility, for under the
circumstances it fully realizes its great responsibility of saving the nation from breaking down; and
furthermore, the President in the exercise of his constitutional powers may, if he so desires, compel
Congress to remain in special session till it approves the legislative measures most needed by the
country.
Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will emerge victorious as a permanent way of life in
this country, if each of the great branches of the Government, within its own allocated spear, complies
with its own constitutional duty, uncompromisingly and regardless of difficulties.
Our Republic is still young, and the vital principle underlying its organic structure should be maintained
firm and strong, hard as the best of steel, so as to insure its growth and development along solid lines of
a stable and vigorous democracy.
With my declaration that Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 are null and void, and with the vote to the
effect of Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice
Montemayor, there is a sufficient majority to pronounce a valid judgment on that matter.
It is maintained by the Solicitor General and the amicus curiae that eight Justices are necessary to
pronounce a judgment on the nullity of the executive orders in question, under section 9 of Republic Act
No. 296 and Article VIII, section 10 of the Constitution. This theory is made to rest on the ground that
said executive orders must be considered as laws, they having been issued by the Chief Executive in the
exercise of the legislative powers delegated to him.
It is the opinion of the Court that the executive orders in question, even if issued within the powers
validly vested in the Chief Executive, are not laws, although they may have the force of law, in exactly the
same manner as the judgments of this Court, municipal ordinances and ordinary executive orders cannot
be considered as laws, even if they have the force of law.
Under Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the only power which, in times of war or other national
emergency, may be vested by Congress in the President, is the power "to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Consequently, the executive orders issued by the
President in pursuance of the power delegated to him under that provision of the Constitution, may be
considered only as rules and regulations. There is nothing either in the Constitution or in the Judiciary
Act requiring the vote of eight Justices to nullify a rule or regulation or an executive order issued by the
President. It is very significant that in the previous drafts of section 10, Article VII of the Constitution,
"executive order" and "regulation" were included among those that required for their nullification the
vote of two thirds of all of the members of the Court. But "executive order" and "regulations" were later
deleted from the final draft (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 495, 496), and
thus a mere majority of six members of this Court is enough to nullify them.
All the members of the Court concur in this view.
For all the foregoing, the Court denies the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, and the motion to
include the vote of the late Mr. Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases. And it is the judgment of
this Court to declare Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, null and void, with the dissent of Mr. Justice
Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Reyes, upon the grounds already stated in their respective
opinions, and with Mr. Justice Torres abstaining.
But in order to avoid a possible disruption or interruption in a normal operation of the Government, it is
decreed, by the majority, of course, that this judgment take effect upon the expiration of fifteen days
from the date of its entry. No costs to be charged.
Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
FERIA, J., concurring:
The respondent in the cases G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 contend that the petitioners in said cases can
not institute an action to invalidate the Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 promulgated by the
President, because they have no interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by
taxation, and can not therefore question the validity of said executive orders requiring expenditures of
public money.
Although the Supreme Court, in the case of Custodio vs. President of the Senate, G. R. No. L-117 (42 Off.
Gaz., 1243) held in a minute resolution "That the constitutionality of a legislative act is open to attack
only by person whose rights are affected thereby, that one who invokes the power of the court to
declare an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional must be able to show not only that the statute is
invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result
of its enforcement," that ruling was laid down without a careful consideration and is contrary to the
ruling laid down in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States that "In the determination of the
degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the
general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also have taxpayers, have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of money raised by taxation and may therefore question
the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditures of public moneys." (Am. Jur., Vol. 11, p. 761) All
the members of this Court, except two, in taking cognizance of those cases, rejected the respondents'
contention, reversed the ruling in said case and adopted the general rule above mentioned; and we
believe the latter is better than the one adopted in said case of Custodio, which was based on a doctrine
adhered to only in few jurisdiction in the United States; because if a taxpayer can not attack the validity
of the executive orders in question or a law requiring the expenditure of public moneys, one under our
laws could question the validity of such laws or executive orders.
After laying down the fundamental principles involved in the case at bar, we shall discuss and show that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was no longer in force at the time the Executive Orders under consideration
were promulgated, because even the respondents in the cases G. R. Nos. L-2044 and L-2756, in
sustaining the validity of the Executive Order No. 62 rely not only on Commonwealth Act No. 600 as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, but on Commonwealth Act No. 671; and afterwards we shall
refute the arguments in support of the contrary proposition that said Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still
in force and, therefore, the President may exercise now the legislative powers therein delegated to him.
PRELIMINARY
The Constitution of the Philippines, drafted by the duly elected representatives of the Filipino people,
provides in its section 1, Article II, that "The Philippines is a republican states, sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them." The people have delegated the government
authority to three different and separate Departments: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. In section 1,
Article VI, the legislative power to make laws is conferred upon Congress; the executive power to
faithfully executed the laws is vested by sections 1 and 10 of Article VII, in the President; and the judicial
power is vested by section 1, Article VII, in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law, the Supreme Court having the supremacy to pass upon "the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulations."
The distribution by the Constitution of the powers of government to the Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial Departments operates, by implication, as an inhibition against the exercise by one department of
the powers which belong to another, and imposes upon each of the three departments the duty of
exercising its own peculiar powers by itself, and prohibits the delegation of any of those powers except
in cases expressly permitted by the Constitution. The principle of the separation of the powers of
government is fundamental to the very existence of a constitutional government as established in the
Philippines patterned after that of the United States of America. The division of governmental powers
into legislative, executive, and judicial represents the most important principle of government that
guarantees the liberties of the people, for it prevents a concentration of powers in the hands of one
person or class of persons.
Under the doctrine of separation of the powers of government, the law-making functions is assigned
exclusively to the legislative, and the legislative branch cannot delegate the power to make laws to any
other authority. But it must be borne in mind that what cannot be delegated is that which is purely
legislative in nature, not administrative. There are powers so far legislative that may properly be
exercised by the legislature, but which may nevertheless be delegated because they may be
advantageously exercised in proper cases by persons belonging to the other departments of the
government, such as the authority to make rules and regulations of administrative character to carry out
an legislative purposes or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law. As illustrations of the proper
exercise of the power of Congress to delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations with the
necessary details to carry into effect a law, are Act No. 3155 empowering the Governor General then,
now the President, to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of foreign
cattle (Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234; Act No. 3106 authorizing the Commissioner of the Public Service
Commission to regulate those engaged in various occupations or business affected with a public interest,
and to prescribe what the charges shall be for services rendered in the conduct of such business (Cebu
Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446); and the National Industrial Recovery Act enacted by the
Congress of the United States authorizing the President to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations to carry out the emergency measure enacted by Congress, though a part thereof was
declared unconstitutional for producing a delegation of legislative authority which is unconfined, "and
not canalized within banks to keep it from ever flowing."
Athough, in principle, the power of the Legislature to make laws or perform acts purely legislative in
nature may only be delegated by Congress to another authority or officers of either the executive or
judicial department when expressly permitted by the Constitution, no such delegation is authorized by
the State constitution or Federal Constitution of the Untied States. It is a fact admitted by the attorneys
and amici curiae for the petitioners and respondents in these case that section 26, Article VI, our
Constitution is unique and has no counterpart in said constitutions, and for that reason not a single case
involving a question similar to the one herein involved has never been submitted to and passed upon by
the courts of last resort in the United States. The provision of our Constitution reads as follows:
SEC. 26. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
It is important to observe that what the above-quoted constitutional provision empowers Congress to
delegate to the President, is not the power to promulgate rules and regulations of administrative nature,
for this may also be delegated at any time without necessity of an express authority by the Constitution,
but the power to promulgate rules and regulations purely legislative in nature, leaving to the discretion
of the President the determination of what rules or regulations shall be or what acts are necessary to
effectuate the so-called declared national policy, for otherwise it would not have been necessary for the
Constitution to authorize Congress to make such delegation.
DEMONSTRATION
The Constitution permits Congress to authorize the President of the Philippines to promulgate rules and
regulations of legislative nature only (1) in times of war or (2) other national emergency, such as
rebellion, flood, earthquake, pestilence, economic depression, famine or any other emergency different
from war itself affecting the nation.
It is obvious that it is Congress and not a particular emergency and to authorize the President to
promulgate rules and regulations to cope with it. Therefore, if Congress declares that there exist a war as
a national emergency and empowers the President to promulgate rules and regulations to tide over the
emergency, the latter could not, because he believes that there is an economic emergency or depression
or any emergency other than war itself, exercise the legislative power delegated to meet such economic
or other emergency.
The Constitution requires also that the delegation be for a limited period or other authority so delegated
shall ceaseipso facto at the expiration of the period, because to require an express legislation to repel or
terminate the delegated legislative authority of the President might be subversive to the constitutional
separation of powers in out democratic form of government, for the President my prevent indefinitely
the repeal of his delegated authority by the exercise of his veto power, since the veto could be
overridden only by two-thirds vote and it would be extremely difficult to repeal it in subservient
Congress dominated by the Chief Executive. Besides, to provide that the delegated legislative powers
shall continue to exist until repealed by the Congress, would be delegation not for limited, but for an
unlimited period or rather without any limitation at all, because all acts enacted are always subjects to
repeal by the Congress, without necessity to providing so.
No question is raised as to the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 671 under which Executive
Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were promulgated by the President of the Philippines according to the
contention of the respondents. The question involved is the validity (not constitutionality) of said
executive orders, that is, whether or not the President had authority to promulgate them under
Commonwealth Act No. 671; and therefore the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of this
Court required by section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution to declare a treaty or law unconstitutional is
not required for adjudging the executive orders in question invalid or not authorized by Commonwealth
Act No. 671, which read as follows:
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671
AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE
PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS
TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries of
Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the
President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution, the
President is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to
promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the
national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly he is, among other things,
empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions,
branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the
government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of
procedure of the heads of the Executive Departments; (c) to create new
subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of
Government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force
laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and
to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative
character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish
those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise,
and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof (g) to authorize the
National, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for
purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of
credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may
deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to
maintain and enforce its authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the
convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and
regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take upon its approval, and the rules and regulations
promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the
Philippines shall otherwise provide.
Approved, December 16, 1941.
Taking into consideration the presumption that Congress was familiar with the well-known limits of its
powers under section 26, Article VI, of the Constitution and did not intend to exceed said powers in
enacting Commonwealth Act No. 671, the express provisions of Commonwealth Acts. Nos. 494, 496, 498,
499, 500, 600 as amended by 620 and 671, and those of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended by
Republic Act No. 66 and Republic Acts Nos. 51 and 728, we are of the opinion, and therefore so hold,
that the actual war in the Philippine territory and not any other national emergency is contemplated in
Commonwealth Act No. 671, and that the period of time during which the President was empowered by
said Commonwealth Act No. 671 to promulgate rules and regulations was limited to the existence of
such war or invasion of the Philippines by the enemy, which prevented the Congress to meet in a regular
session. Such emergency having ceased to exist upon the complete liberation of the Philippines from the
enemy's occupation, Commonwealth Act No. 671 had ceased to be in force and effect at the date of the
adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress in 1946, before the promulgation of said
executive orders, and hence they are null and void.
In view of the existence of a state of national emergency caused by the last world war among several
nations of the world, the second National Assembly during its second special session passed the
following acts: (a) Commonwealth Act No. 494 authorizing the President until the adjournment of the
next regular session of the National Assembly, to suspend the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444,
commonly known as the "Eight-Hour Labor-Law," when in his judgment the public interest so required, in
order to prevent a dislocation of the productive forces of the country; (b) Commonwealth Act No. 496
delegating to the President the power expressly granted by section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution to
the State "until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, to take
over solely for use or operation by the Government during the existence of the emergency any public
service or enterprise and to operate the same," upon payment of just compensation; (c) Commonwealth
Act No. 498, authorizing the President, among others, to fix the maximum selling prices of foods,
clothing, fuel, fertilizers, chemicals, building materials, implements, machinery, and equipment required
in agriculture and industry, and other articles or commodities of prime necessity, and to promulgate such
rules and regulations as he may deem necessary in the public interest, which rules and regulations shall
have the force and effect of law until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the
National Assembly; (d) Commonwealth Act No. 499 providing that until the date of the adjournment of
the next regular session of the National Assembly, any sale, mortgage, lease, charter, delivery, transfer of
vessels owned in whole or in part by a citizen of the Philippines or by a corporation organizes under the
laws of the Philippines, to any person not a citizen of the United States or of the Philippines, shall be null
and void, without the approval of the President of the Philippines; and Commonwealth Act No. 500
authorizing the President to reduce the expenditure of the Executive Department of the National
Government by the suspension or abandonment of services, activities or operations of no immediate
necessity, which authority shall be exercised only when the National Assembly is not in session. All these
Commonwealth Acts took effect upon their approval on September 30, 1939, a short time after the
invasion of Poland by Germany.
During the fourth special session of the second National Assembly, Commonwealth Act No. 600, which
superseded the above-mentioned emergency power acts, was passed and took effect on its approval on
August 19, 1940. This Act No. 600 expressly declared that the existence of war in many parts of the world
had created a national emergency which made it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
powers in order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to insure the tranquility of its
inhabitants, by suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and all supervise activities, by preventing or relieving
unemployment, by insuring to the people adequate shelter and clothing and sufficient food supply, etc.
To carry out this policy the President was "authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall
have the force and effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the National
Assembly," which rules and regulations may embrace the objects therein enumerated. And the National
Assembly in its regular session commencing in January, 1941, in view of the fact that the delegated
authority granted to the President by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498, 500, and 600 was to
terminate at the date of the adjournment of that regular session of the National Assembly, passed Act
No. 620 which took effect upon its approval on June 6, 1941, amending section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 600 by extending the delegated legislative authority of the President until the date of the
adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress of the Philippines, instead of the National
Assembly, the Constitution having been amended by substituting the Congress of the Philippines for the
National Assembly..
Although Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, provides that "the
President is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the force and effect of law
until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress of the Philippines," it is evident
that this limitation was intended to apply, not only to the effectivity of the rules and regulations already
promulgated, but specially to the authority granted to the President to promulgated them, for the
following reasons: First, because Commonwealth Act Nos. 494, 496, 498, 499, and 500 had expressly
limited the authority of the President to exercise the delegated power while the Assembly was not in
session until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of then National Assembly, and
there was absolutely no reason whatsoever why the National Assembly, in enacting Commonwealth Act
No. 600 as amended, which superseded said Act, would not impose the same limitation on the authority
delegated in Commonwealth Act No. 600 as amended in compliance with the requirement of the
Constitution; secondly, because it would have been useless to give the rules and regulations the effect
and force of law only until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress, if the
President might, after said adjournment, continue exercising his delegated legislative powers to
promulgate again the same and other rules and regulations; and lastly, because to construe
Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Act No. 620, otherwise would be to make the delegation
not for a limited but for an indefinite period of time, in violation of the express provision of section 26,
Article VI of the Constitution.
All the above-mentioned Acts Nos. 494, 496, 499, 500, and 600 before its amendment show that it was
the intention or policy of the National Assembly, in delegating legislative functions to the President, to
limit the exercise of the latter's authority to the interregnum while the National Assembly or Congress of
the Philippines was not in session until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session thereof,
which interregnum might have extended over a long period of time had the war in Europe involved and
made the Philippines a battle ground before the next regular session of the Congress had convened. And
the authority granted to the President of Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended, had to be extended
over a long period of time during the occupation because, before the meeting of the next regular session
of the Congress, the Philippines was involved in the war of the United States and invaded and occupied
by the Japanese forces. And the President was authorized to exercise his delegated powers until the date
of the adjournment of the next regular session of the Congress, for the reason that although during the
next regular session a bill may be passed, by the Congress, it would not become a law until it was
approved, expressly or impliedly, by the President during the period of twenty days after it shall have
been presented to him.
The reason of the limitation is that if Congress were in position to act it would not be necessary for it to
make such legislative delegation to the President, for Congress may in all cases act, declare its will and,
after fixing a primary standard or yardstick, authorize the President to fill up the details by prescribing
administrative rules and regulations to cope with the actual conditions of any emergency; and it is
inconceivable that there may arise an emergency of such a nature that would require immediate action
and can not wait, without irreparable or great injury to the public interest, and action of the legislative in
regular or special session called by the Chief Executive for the purpose of meeting it. If in the United
States they could withstand and have withstood all kinds of emergency without resorting to the
delegation by the legislative body of legislative power to the Executive except those of administrative
nature, because no such delegation is permitted by the States and Federal constitution, as above stated,
there is no reason why the same can not be done in the Philippines. The frames of our Constitution and
the national Assembly that enacted Commonwealth Act No. 671 are presumed to be aware of the
inconvenience and chaotical consequences of having two legislative bodies acting at one and the same
time.
It is true that Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not expressly say that the President is authorized to
promulgates rules and regulations until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the
National Assembly or Congress as the above-quoted Commonwealth Acts; but it is also true that it clearly
provides that "pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President is
hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as
he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared"; and that the definite and specific
emergency therein referred to is no other that the "state of total emergency as a result of war involving
the Philippines", declared in the title of said Act No. 671, that was the reason for which the President was
"authorize to promulgate rules and regulations to meet resulting emergency." It is obvious that what Act
No. 671 calls "total emergency" was the invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy or
Japanese forces which, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, had already landed in
Philippine soil and was expected to paralyze the functioning of the Congress during the invasion and
enemy occupation of the Philippines.
The mere existence of the last world war in many parts of the world which had created a national
emergency made it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers was not called total
emergency by Commonwealth Act Nos. 600 and 620, because it had not yet actually involved and
engulfed the Philippines in the maelstrom of war. It does not stand to reason that the authority given to
the President to promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494,
496, 498, 499, 500, 600 and 620 was to terminate at the date of the adjournment of the next regular
session of the Congress of the Philippines in 1946, but those granted to the President by Commonwealth
Act No. 671 under the same war emergency should continue to exist indefinitely even after the Congress
of the Philippines had regularly convened, acted, and adjourned in the year 1946 and subsequent years.
Besides to give such construction to Act No. 671 would make it violative of the express provision of
section 26, Article VIII, of the Constitution, under which said Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted, as
expressly stated in said Act, and which permits the Congress to authorize the President, only for a limited
period during a war emergency, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry into effect a declared
national policy.
By the special session of the first Congress of the Philippines commencing on the 9th day of June, 1945,
called by the President for the purpose of considering general legislation, Commonwealth Act No. 671
did not cease to operate. As we have already said, the emergency which prompted the second National
Assembly to enact Commonwealth Act No. 671 delegating legislative powers to the President, was the
inability of Congress to convene in regular session in January of every during the invasion of the
Philippines by the Japanese Imperial forces. The National Assembly could not have in mind any special
session which might have been called by the President immediately after liberation, because the calling
of a special session as well as the matters which may be submitted by the President to Congress for
consideration is a contingent event which depend upon the possibility of convening it and the discretion
of the President to call it, and the matters he will submit to it for consideration; because it is to be
presumed, in order to comply with the provision of section 26, Article VI of the Constitution, that it was
the intention of the National Assembly to fix a limited period, independent of the President's will, during
which he is authorized to exercise his delegated legislative power.
The object of section 3 of Act No. 671 in requiring the President to report "as soon as practicable upon
the convening of the Congress of the Philippines all rules and regulations promulgated by him under the
powers therein granted" is to inform the Congress of the contents of said rules and regulations so that
the latter may modify or repeal them if it sees fit to do so, inasmuch as, according to section 4 of the
same Act, "the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the
Congress shall otherwise provide." And although said section 3 does not specify whether in regular or
special session, it is evident that it refers to the next regular and not to the special session of the
Congress, because as a rule a special session is called to consider only specific matters submitted by the
President to Congress for consideration, and it would be useless to submit such report to the Congress in
special session if the latter can not either modify or repeal such rules and regulations; and besides, it is to
be presumed that it was the intention of the National Assembly in enacting section 3 of Commonwealth
Act No. 671 to require the submission of a report to the next regular session of the Assembly or
Congress, as provided in section 4 Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
620, which required a similar report, for there was absolutely no plausible reason to provide otherwise.
Our conclusion is corroborated by the fact that section 3 of Act No. 671 only requires the President to
submit the report, "as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress" and not to submit a
report to the Congress every time it convenes, in order to inform the Congress thereof so that the latter
may modify or repeal any or all of them, for under section 4 of the same Act "such rules and regulations
shall continue in force and effect until the Congress shall otherwise provide." It is obvious that the
convening of the Congress referred to in said section 3 is the next regular session of the Congress after
the passage of Act No. 671, and not any other subsequent session; because, otherwise, it would not have
required that it shall be submitted to the Congress as soon as practicable and the purpose of the law
already stated in requiring the submission of the report would be defeated; and if it were the intention
of said Commonwealth Act No. 671 to authorize the President to continue promulgating rules and
regulations after the next regular session of the Congress, it would have required the President to submit
to the Congress each and every time it convenes a report of the rules and regulations promulgated after
his previous reports had been submitted.
Furthermore, our conclusion is confirmed by the legislative interpretation give to Commonwealth Act
No. 671 by the same Congress in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 728 which took effect on July 2, 1946,
authorizing the President to regulate, control, curtail, and prohibit the exploration of agricultural or
industrial products, merchandise, articles, materials and supplies without the permit of the President
until December 31, 1948 as expressly provided in section 4 thereof, because it would not have been
necessary for the Congress to promulgate said Act No. 728 if the President had authority to promulgate
Executive Order No. 62 in question on January 1, 1949, under Commonwealth Act No. 671 as contended
by the respondents; and Republic Act No. 51, approved on October 4, 1946, authorizing within one year
the different executive departments, business, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of the
government, including corporations controlled by it, would not have been passed by the Congress if
Commonwealth Act No. 671 under consideration was then still in force, for section 2 (b) and (c) of said
Act No. 671 authorizes the President to reorganize the Government and to create new subdivisions,
branches, department offices, agencies or instrumentalities of government, and to abolish any of those
already existing.
REPUTATION
There is no force in the argument that the executive orders in question are not valid, not because the
promulgation of the acts above mentioned and of Commonwealth Act No. 689 as amended by the
Republic Act No. 66 on rentals, the appropriation acts or Republic Act Nos. 1, 156, and 320 for the years
1946-47, 1947-48 and 1948-49, and of the Republic Acts Nos. 73, 147, and 235 appropriating public finds
to defray the expenses for the elections held in 1947 and 1948, shows that the emergency powers
granted by Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already ceased to exist, but because Congress "has shown by
their enactment its readiness and ability to legislate on those matters, and had withdrawn it from the
realm of presidential legislation or regulations under the powers delegated by Commonwealth Act No.
671." If the Congress was ready and able to legislate on those matters since 1946 and for that reason the
executive orders herein involved are null and void, there is no valid reason for not concluding that the
emergency powers of the President has ceased to exist it did not, legislate on all matters on which the
President was granted and delegated power to legislate by the Commonwealth Act No. 671. And if
Commonwealth Act No. 671 continues to be in force and effect in so far as it grants delegated legislative
powers to the President and declares the national policy to be carried out by the rules and regulations
the President is authorize to promulgate, the mere promulgation of the acts above described can not be
considered as an implied repeal or withdrawal of the authority of the President to promulgates rules and
regulations only on those matters, and the adoption of a contrary policy by the Congress, because
implied repeal is not favored in statutory construction, and the national policy referred to in section 26,
Article VIII of the Constitution is to be declared by the Congress in delegating the legislative powers to
the President, in order to establish the standard to be carried out by him in exercising his delegated
functions, and not in repealing said powers.
As we have already said, section 26, Article VI of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress, in times
of war and other national emergency, to authorize the President to promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out a declared national policy, and therefore it is for the National Assembly to determine the
existence of a particular emergency declare the national policy, and authorize the President to
promulgate rules and regulations of legislative nature to carry out that policy. As the Commonwealth Act
No. 671 that the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia
which involves the Philippines is the emergency which made it necessary for the National Assembly to
invest the President with extraordinary powers to promulgate rules and regulations to meet the resulting
emergency from the actual existence of that war which involved the Philippines, the President cannot,
under said Act No. 671, determine the existence of any other emergency, such as the state of cold war,
the continued military occupation of the enemy country, and the economic and political instability
throughout the world, cited by the respondents, and promulgate rules and regulations to meet the
emergency; because obviously it is not for the delegate but for the delegation to say when and under
what circumstances the former may act in behalf of the latter, and not vice-versa.
The theory of those who are of the opinion that the President may determine "whether the emergency
which on December 16, 1941, prompted the approval of Commonwealth Act No. 671 delegating
extraordinary powers to the President, still existed at the time the Chief Executive exercised those
powers," is predicated upon the erroneous assumption that said Commonwealth Act No. 671
contemplated any other emergency not expressly mentioned in said Commonwealth Act. This
assumption or premise is obviously wrong. Section 1 of said Act No. 671 expressly states that "the
existence of the war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia which involves
the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary power in order to meet the
resulting emergency." That is the war emergency. Ant it is evident, and therefore no evidence is requires
to prove, that the existence of the war which involved the Philippines had already ceased before the
promulgation of the executive orders in question, or at least, if the last war has not yet technically
terminated in so far as the United States is concerned, it did no longer involve the Republic of the
Philippines since the inauguration of our Republic or independence from the sovereignty of the United
States.
It is untenable to contend that the words "resulting emergency from the existence of the war" as used in
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 should be construed to mean any emergency resulting from or
that is the effect of the last war, and not the war emergency itself, and that therefore it is for the
President to determine whether at the time of the promulgation of the executive orders under
consideration such emergency still existed, because such contention would make Act No. 671
unconstitutional or violative of the provisions of section 26, Article VI of the Constitution. This
constitutional precept distinguishes war emergency from any other national emergency, such as an
economic depression and others which may be the effect of a war, and empowers the Congress in times
of war and other national emergency, to be determined by Congress itself as we have already said and
shown, to authorize the President, for a limited period that may short or of the same duration but not
longer than that of the emergency, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the policy declared
by the Congress in order to meet the emergency. To construe Commonwealth Act No. 671 as contended
would be to leave the determination of the existence of the emergency to the discretion of the
President, because the effects of the war such as those enumerated by the respondents are not
determined or stated in said Act and could not have been foreseen by the Assembly in enacting said Act;
and because it would make the delegation of powers for an in definite period, since such an emergency
may or may not become depression, effect of the first world war, took place in the year 1929, or about
ten years after the cessation of hostilities in the year 1919; and by no stretch of imagination or
intellectual gymnastics may the failure of the Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of the
Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and to defray the expenses in
connection with the holding of the national election on the second Tuesday of November, 1949, be
considered as an emergency resulting from the last war.

In the enactment of emergency police measures, the questions as to whether an emergency

exists is primarily for the legislature to determine. Such determination, although entitled to
great respect, is not conclusive because the courts, in such cases, posses the final authority to
determine whether an emergency in fact exists. (American Jurisprudence, Vol. XI, page 980.).

No case decided by the courts of last resort in the United States may be cited in support of the
proposition that it is for the President to determine whether there exist an emergency in order to
exercise his emergency powers, and "it is not for the judiciary to review the finding of the Executive in
this regard." There is none and there cannot be any. Because, as we have already stated at the beginning
of this opinion, and we are supported by the above quotation from American Jurisprudence, the power
to pass emergency police legislation in the United States may be exercised only by the legislature in the
exercise of the police power of the State, and it can not be delegated to the Executive because there is
no provision in the State and Federal constitutions authorizing such delegation as we have in section 26,
Article VI, of our Constitution. As we have already said before, the only legislative power which may be
delegated to the Executive and other administrative bodies or officers in the United States is the power
to promulgate rules and regulations of administrative nature, which does not include the exercise of the
police power of the State.

The ruling laid down by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 Law ed.,
1883, quoted by the respondents and dissenters in support of the proposition that "only in case of a
manifest abuse of the exercise of powers by a political branch of the government is judicial interference
allowable in order to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution," has no application to the present
case; because the question involved in the present case is not a political but a justiciable question, while
the question in issue in said Ludecke case was the power of the court to review "the determination of
the President in the postwar period that an alien enemy should be deported, even though active
hostilities have ceased," and it was held that it was a political question and, therefore, was not subject to
judicial review.

CONCLUSION

In view of all the foregoing, we have to conclude and declare that the executive orders promulgated by
the President under Commonwealth Act 671 before the date of the adjournment of the regular session
of the Congress on the Philippines in 1946 are valid, because said Commonwealth Act was then still in
force; but the executive orders promulgated after the said date are null and void, because
Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already ceased to be in force in so far as the delegation of powers was
concerned. Therefore, are null and void the Executive Order No. 192 promulgated on December 24,
1948, on the control of exports from the Philippines; the Executive Order No. 225 dated June 15, 1949,
appropriating funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the
period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950; and the Executive Order No. 226 promulgated on June 15,
1949, appropriating the sum of six million pesos to defray the expenses in connection with, and
incidental to, the holding of the national election to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1949.
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953 the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be
fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the
President.
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ETC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE GELLA, ETC., ET AL., respondents. Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby become a regular
statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally declaring the
termination of the emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., Lorenzo M. Tañada, Claro M. Recto, Jose P. Laurel, Jesus Barrera and Leon Ma.
produce effect, would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while Congress might
Guerrero for petitioner.
delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for respondents.
other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not
right and is not, and ought not to be the law."2
PARAS, C.J.:
Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is
As a fitting foreword, it may be recalled that on a previous occasion, on August 26, 1949 to be exact, this necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the
court had already passed upon the status of Commonwealth Act No. 671, approved on December 16, principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be
1941, "declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Philippines and authorizing suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency." Five members held that the
Act ceased to be operative in its totality, on May 25, 1946 (when the Congress convened in special
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the powers lasted only during the
session) according to Chief Justice Moran. Justice Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres in
emergency resulting from the last world war which factually involved the Philippines when Act No. 671
effect concluded that the powers delegated to the President had been withdrawn as to matters already
was passed on December 16, 1941. That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the
legislated upon by the Congress or on which the latter had demonstrated its readiness or ability to act.
last world war, was contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on the foresight that the
Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated
actual state of war could prevent it from holding its next regular session. This is confirmed by the
December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation
following statement of President Quezon: "When it became evident that we were completely helpless
funds for the operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second
against air attack and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular
appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for
session which was to open on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly passed into history approving a
having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the
resolution which reaffirmed the abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United
same subjects.1
States. The Assembly also enacted a law granting the President of the Philippines all the powers that
under the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to him in time of war." 3 When President Quezon said
More or less the same considerations that influenced our pronouncement of August 26, 1949 are and "in time of war", he an doubtedly meant such factual war as that then raging.
should be controlling in the case now before us, wherein the petitioners seek to invalidate Executive
Orders Nos. 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500
As early as July 26, 1948, the Congress categorically declared that "since liberation conditions have
for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in
gradually returned to normal, but not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and
the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other
who have not received any relief for the loss and destruction resulting therefrom," and that "the
calamities.
emergency created by the last war as regards these war sufferers being still existent, it is the declared
policy of the state that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force in a modified
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national emergency, form."4 It is important to remember that Republic Act No. 342 in which this declaration was made bore
the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as the approval of the President. Indeed, the latter in his speech delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly
it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the Republic) faces today are incidental passing rains artificially
Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the created by seasonal partisanship, very common among democracies but will disappear with the rains
national policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and that follow the thunderclaps not later than November 8 of this year," — an admission, that such
Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers emergencies not only are not total but are not the result of the last war as envisaged in Act No. 671.
in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the
existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to
If more is necessary to demonstrate the unmistakable stand of the legislative department on the alleged
carry out the national policy declared in section 1."
existence of emergency, reference may be had to House Bill No. 727, hereinbefore referred to, repealing
all Emergency Powers Acts.
As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the
National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet
Moreover, section 26 of Article VI of the constitution, in virtue of which Act No. 671 was passed,
been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the
authorizes the delegation of powers by the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other national emergency.
President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the
The emergency expressly spoken of in the title and in section 1 of the Act is one "in time of war," as
Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. This eventuality has in
distinguished from "other national emergency" that may arise as an after-effect of war or from natural
fact taken place when the President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency Powers
causes such as widespread earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the like. Certainly the typhoons that hit
Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the President or either as the principal authority to
some provinces and cities in 1952 not only did not result from the last world war but were and could not
determine the indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, — in palpable repugnance to
have been contemplated by the legislators. At any rate, the Congress is available for necessary special Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise emergency
sessions, and it cannot let the people down without somehow being answerable thereover. powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people, because
we have the Constitution, designed to establish a government under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy. In line with such primordial objective, our Government is democratic in form and based on
As a matter of fact, the President, in returning to the Congress without his signature House Bill No. 727,
the system of separation of powers. Unless and until changed or amended, we shall have to abide by the
did not invoke any emergency resulting from the last world war, but only called attention to an
letter and spirit of the Constitution and be prepared to accept the consequences resulting from or
impending emergency that may be brought about by present complicated and troubled world
inherent in disagreements between, inaction or even refusal of the legislative and executive
conditions, and to the fact that our own soldiers are fighting and dying in Korea in defense of democracy
departments. Much as it is imperative in some cases to have prompt official action, deadlocks in and
and freedom and for the preservation of our Republic. The emergency thus feared cannot, however, be
slowness of democratic processes must be preferred to concentration of powers in any one man or
attributed to the war mentioned in Act No. 671 and fought between Germany and Japan on one side and
group of men for obvious reasons. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were
the Allied Powers on the other; and indications are that in the next world war, if any, the communist
careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war
countries will be aligned against the democracies. No departure can be made from the national policy
or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty
declared in section 1 of Act No. 671. New powers may be granted as often as emergencies contemplated
of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because
in the Constitution arise.
emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the
nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the
There is no point in the argument that the Philippines is still technically at war with Japan pending the Constitution.
ratification of the peace treaty. In the first place, Act No. 671 referred to a factual war. In the second
place, the last world war was between the United States and Japan, the Philippines being involved only
Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared null and void, and the respondents
because it was then under American sovereignty. In the third place, the United States had already signed
are ordered to desist from appropriating, releasing, allotting, and expending the public funds set aside
the peace treaty with Japan, and the Philippines has become an independent country since July 4, 1946.
therein. So ordered, without costs.

It is pointed out that the passage of House Bill No. 727 is inconsistent with the claim that the emergency
Feria, Pablo and Tuason, JJ., concur.
powers are non-existent. But, from the debates in the House, it is patent that the Bill had to be approved
Bengzon, J., concur in the result.
merely to remove all doubts, especially because this Court had heretofore failed, for lack of necessary
majority, to declare Act No. 671 entirely inoperative.

Reliance is placed on the petition of about seventy Congressmen and Senators and on House Resolution
No. 99, urging the President to release and appropriate funds for essential and urgent public works and
for relief in the typhoon-stricken areas. It is enough to state, in reply, that the said petition and Separate Opinions
resolution cannot prevail over the force and effect of House Bill No. 727 formally passed by two
chambers of the Congress. If faith can be accorded to the resolution of one house, there is more reason
PADILLA, J., concurring:
for accepting the solemn declarations of two houses.

"All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills . . . shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
Even under the theory of some members of this court that insofar as the Congress had shown its
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." 1 "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
readiness or ability to act on a given matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."2 The authority or power to appropriate
been pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal
government funds to be spent for public purposes is lodged exclusively in the Congress because it is
anchorage. We can take judicial notice of the fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly been
purely and essentially a legislative function. The legislative power to appropriate government funds for
approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others
public purposes lodged exclusively in the Congress may, however, be delegated to the President "in
purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long
times of war or other national emergency," "for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President. If the
may prescribe," "to carry out a declared national policy."3 This constitutional provision has no
President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none can remain in respect
counterpart in the Constitution of the United States of America and in those patterned after it. Under
of special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it
this provision of the Constitution several emergency powers acts, notably Com. Acts Nos. 600 and 671,
is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing "in force"
were passed.4 Being a deviation from the principle of separation of powers the delegation of legislative
appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act
powers authorized by the Constitution may validly be made only by adhering strictly to its spirit and
is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new appropriations.
letter. Pursuant thereto the legislative authority or power to be granted or delegated to the President by
The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise
the Congress must be "in times of war or other national emergency" and "for a limited period and
become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as he may subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe," and the Congress has to pass a law for that purpose. The
deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its
reason why the Constitution is silent on or does not provide for the manner the delegation of legislative
authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been
powers may be withdrawn, revoked or ended, is because if it is for a limited period it lapses at the end of
normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any residuary
the period and because if the war or other national emergency which prompted it ceases the delegation
powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
of legislative powers ceases also ipso facto. A law which delegates such powers to the President for an
indefinite period would be unconstitutional because it is against the express provision of the
Constitution. It would be an abdication of legislative powers. If the law which delegates legislative
powers does not fix or provide for a period of time within or during which the President may exercise For this reasons I am of the opinion that Executive Orders No. 545 and 546 which appropriate
them and there is dispute or doubt as to whether the national emergency which prompted the Congress government funds for public works and relief for the victims of typhoons in some provinces of the
to pass the law delegating legislative powers to the President continues or has ceased, such dispute or Republic are of no validity and legal effect because the President no longer had the authority to issue
doubt may be determined in an appropriate case by the courts. Another way of terminating such such executive orders under the Emergency Powers Act which had been withdrawn or revoked by the
delegation is by the Congress itself which made the delegation. To withdraw, terminate or revoke the Congress. The writ of prohibition prayed for should be granted.
delegation of legislative powers to the President a concurrent resolution would be sufficient. 5 The
concurrence of the President is superfluous and unnecessary, for if it be required then the law which
delegated legislative powers to him would suffer from a fatal defect, vice, or infirmity which would
render such delegation unconstitutional for lack of time limitation prescribed and ordained by the
Constitution.
BENGZON, J., concurring:
It is claimed that just as the delegation of legislative powers to the President is to be made by means of a
law which requires the concurrence of the President, so the withdrawal, termination or revocation of the I have signed the majority opinion. But I also agree to the above views of Mr. Justice Padilla.
legislative powers delegated to him must also be with his concurrence and approval. The reason for the
requirements that a law be passed to make the delegation of legislative powers valid and effective is the Labrador, J., concurs.
fact that whereas the Congress may deem it wise and expedient to make the delegation, the President
may hold a different view. In other words, he has to concur and accept the powers delegated to him by
the Congress. But when it comes to withdrawal, termination or revocation of the legislative powers
delegated to him his concurrence or consent is not necessary. The absence of constitutional provision on
how it should be done and carried out is not due to an oversight or to an intention of the members of
the Constitutional Convention to require the concurrence of the President to make there vocation valid REYES, J., concurring:
and effective, because, as heretofore stated, if such concurrence be required to make the revocation
valid and effective, the law which delegated legislative powers to the President would or might offend
against the very provision of the Constitution which requires and ordains that such delegation be for a It being repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution to let Commonwealth Act No. 671 degenerate into a
limited period of time only, and because the refusal to concur in by a President bent on or inclined to grant in perpetuity of legislative powers to the Executive, and taking House Bill No. 727, approved by the
Congress but vetoed by the President, as a for-the-record pronouncement on the part of the legislative
continue exercising legislative powers delegated to him would result in a delegation of legislative
branch of the Government that the emergency which impelled it to delegate, through the said
powers, at least during his incumbency or tenure of office, regardless of whether the reason or reasons
Commonwealth Act, legislative powers to the President had already ceased, so that there was no longer
for the grant of the authority to exercise such legislative powers have ceased to exist.
any need for the exercise of those delegated powers, and, lastly, considering that said Act does not have
to be repealed by another Act because, as an emergency measure, it repeals itself with the cessation of
It is contended, however, that in withdrawing, terminating or revoking the legislative powers delegated the emergency, I concur in this opinion of Mr. Justice Padilla.
to the President the Congress did so by passing a bill evincing its intention to have his assent, which he
refused to give, and for that reason the revocation of the legislative powers delegated to him was
ineffective for lack of such concurrence. To determine what the Congress intended when it passed the
bill repealing the Emergency Powers Acts — the Senate approved it unanimously — form must give way
to substance. If the contention that in passing the bill repealing the Emergency Powers Acts the Congress
intended to have the concurrence of the President be upheld, such a construction would render the bill JUGO, J., concurring:
contradictory in itself, because in the explanatory notes of H. No. 692 introduced by Congressman Roy
and H. No. 727 by Congressman Zosa, upon which the consolidated bill passed is based, it is declared
In addition to the reasons set forth by Chief Justice Paras and Associate Justice Padilla, I would like to
"that war had long ended," that "the need for the grant of such unusual powers to the President has
make a few brief remarks:
disappeared," and that for that reason the Congress repealed all Emergency Powers Acts. The congress
could not have meant or intended to subordinate its opinion or judgment that the war had ended and
that the national emergency had ceased to exist to that of the President, the legislative and not the Section 26 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution provides as follows:
executive being the department of the Government exclusively clothed or vested with the authority and
power to make such a declaration. In passing the bill the Congress committed a mistake in the matter of In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
form but not of substance because the latter is there in the explanatory note of the bill passed by both President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to
houses, to wit: "that war had long ended," that "the need for the grant of such unusual powers to the promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
President has disappeared," and that for that reason it repealed all the Emergency Powers Acts. After the
Congress had made that declaration the President could no longer exercise the legislative powers
delegated to him. It was a complete and absolute revocation of the delegation of such powers. His veto Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 671, which is entitled "An Act Declaring a State of Total Emergency
of the bill could not and did not have the effect of reviving or continuing the delegation of legislative as a Result of War Involving the Philippines and Authorizing the President to Promulgate Rules and
powers which had been revoked by the Congress, the only constitutional body empowered and Regulations to Meet such Emergency," reads as follows:
authorized to make the revocation.
 The existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia,
which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
Section 2 of said Commonwealth Act No. 671 invoking section 26, Article VI, of the Constitution above-
quoted, authorized the President during the existence of the emergency caused by said war to
promulgate rules and regulations, etc.
Executive Order No. 545, dated November 10, 1952, appropriating funds for urgent and essential public
works, states in its preamble, in justification of said order, that the Congress in its last special session had
failed to appraise funds for the immediate repairs and reconstruction of certain public buildings and
public works, damages by the recent typhoons, floods, and other calamities.
Executive Order No. 564, dated November 10, 1952, also declared as its cause that the Congress had
failed in its last special session to provide funds for relief to the victims of the recent typhoons, floods,
draughts, earthquakes, etc.
It will be seen that the authority given by the Constitution to the Congress to delegate certain legislative
powers to the President was for a limited time. This was naturally so, because an emergency cannot be
of a long, unlimited or indefinite duration, for otherwise it would not be an emergency.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was passed on December 16, 1941. Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 were
issued on November 10, 1952; that is, almost eleven years from the date Commonwealth Act No. 671
was enacted. It is hard to conceive of an emergency which has lasted almost eleven years.
The emergency contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 671 was not same emergency invoked in said
executive orders, for, whereas Commonwealth Act No. 671 refers to the emergency created by the
existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe involving the Philippines, the
executive order above-mentioned deal with the damages wrought by the recent typhoons, earthquakes,
volcanic eruptions, etc., and the failure of the Congress to provide funds for the repair and
reconstruction of damaged buildings and public works and the relief of the victims. The recent typhoons,
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc. and the failure of the Congress to provide for them have nothing to
do with the war mentioned in said Commonwealth Act No. 671 and are not the consequences of said
war.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion.
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
With the majority I agree that Executive Order Nos. 545 and 546, — the first appropriating P37,850,500
for urgent and essential public works, the second appropriating P11,367,600 for relief — are invalid, for
the same reasons given by me in dissenting opinion in cases G.R. No. L-2044,* L-2756,* and L-3054-
56* commonly called the "Emergency Cases of 1949", namely, that the legislature had already withdrawn
from the realm of presidential legislation or regulation under the emergency powers to delegate by
Commonwealth Act No. 671, the power to appropriate funds for the expenses of the Government and
for other purposes.
To me, however, the more important point involved in the present case is not the validity of the two
executive orders but rather the question of whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still has
emergency powers under said Act. And the parties herein, not excluding the Chief Executive and the
Legislature, it is to be presumed, want this point definitely settled. So, I proposed to devote the
considerations in this modest dissenting opinion to this matter. The majority opinion states that in the
emergency cases of 1949, five members of this tribunal held that Commonwealth Act 671 was still in
force. Mr. Justice Padilla concurred in that opinion. With the concurrence of Mr. Justice Torres in my
concurring and dissenting opinion I also held that Commonwealth Act. 671 was still in force. Mr. Justice
Bengzon in his dissenting opinion in those emergency cases said that although he was favorably
impressed by the reasons set forth by Mr. Justice Reyes and particular point — the existence or non-
existence of the emergency powers of the President. So that even if we do not include Mr. Justice
Bengzon, we can correctly say that four justices voted in those emergency cases in favor of the existence
of emergency powers of the President.
In those emergency cases of 1949 I prepared a more or less extensive opinion in support of the theory
that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was still in force. I wish to embody said opinion in the present opinion
by reference, without prejudice to reproducing portions of the same.
I agree with the majority that Commonwealth Act 671 was to be in force only for a limited period of
time, otherwise be unconstitutional; and that limited period was co-extensive with the existence of the
emergency. But I emphatically disagree with the majority when it says:
That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was
contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on the foresight that the actual state
of war would prevent it from holding its next regular session.
As regards the majority's view that emergency Act 671 because due to war delegated by Commonwealth
Act 671 because due to emergency the National Assembly would be unable to hold its regular session, I
discussed and I hope I refused this theory in my dissenting opinion in the 1949 emergency cases and I
take the liberty of quoting a pertinent portion thereof:
I believe that, as I already had occasion to state though incidentally, the real reason for the
delegation of legislative powers to the Chief Executive is not only because the Legislature is
unable to meet due to a national emergency but also because although it could and does
actually meet, whether in regular or special session, it is not in a position and able to cope
with the problems brought about by and raising from the emergency, problems which require
urgent and immediate action. Certainly, one man can act more quickly and expeditiously than
about one hundred members of the Legislature, especially when they are divided into
Legislative chambers. That is why in times of emergency, much as we in democratic countries
dislike the system or idea of dictatorship, we hear of food dictator, fuel dictator,
transportations which ordinarily belong to a council or board or to a legislative body, are
entrusted under certain limitations to one single official or individual.
Supposing that during a national emergency and while the legislature is in session, the
legislature woke up one morning to find that there was extreme scarcity of imported foods,
fuel, building materials, equipment required in agriculture and industry, etc., because of a
monopoly, hoarding, injurious speculations, manipulations, private controls and profiteering,
or that there were widespread lockouts and strikes paralyzing transportation, commerce and
industry, or rampant espionage or sabotage endangering the very life security of the
necessary legislation in order to cope with the situation and pass the necessary emergency
measures?
 We are all familiar with the practice and routine of enacting laws. A bill is introduced in the
Legislature; it is referred to the corresponding committee, it is studied by said committee,
which in some cases holds public hearings; the committee discusses the bill and sometimes
introduces amendments; if the bill is not killed in the committee or shelved, it is submitted to
the chamber for study, discussion, and possible amendment by all the members; it is finally
voted and if approved, it is sent to the other house where it undergoes the same process; and
if it is finally approved by both houses of Congress, it is submitted to the Chief Executive for
his study and approval or veto. All this may consume weeks or months as a result of which,
ordinarily, many bills finally approved by Congress could be sent to the President for approval
or veto only after adjournment of the legislative session. And we should not overlook the fact
that in some cases for lack of time or due to disagreement among the legislators or between
the two houses of Congress, important pieces of legislations like the annual appropriation law
for the fiscal year 1949-50, appropriation founds for the elections to be held in November,
1949, contained in Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, involved in the present cases, and the
proposed amendment to the Election Code etc., have not been passed by Congress in its last
session ending last May, 1949, which session lasted one hundred days. If we were to rely on
the ordinary process of legislation to meet a national emergency, by the time the necessary
and needed law is passed, the situation sought to be remedied, or the problem sought to be
solved may have become disastrous or ended in calamity or gone beyond legislations or any
remedy. It would be too late. It would be like locking the stable door after the horse had been
stolen.
Now, for some retrospect, The Philippine National Assembly delegated its legislative powers
because of the existence of a state of national emergency as early as the year 1939. During it
second special session of that year, it promulgated the following laws: (Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 494, 496, 498 and 500).
At that time, September, 1939, the second world war was only in Europe, quite far from the
Philippines and had just begun. There was then no likelihood of the Philippines being involved
in the war. In fact, the Philippines did not get involved in the war until more than two years, in
December, 1941. The National Assembly was then free to meet either in regular or special
sessions to enact legislation to meet the emergency. In fact, it met in regular session in
January, 1940 lasting 100 days, excluding the several special sessions held during those two
years. And yet the Assembly delegated legislative powers to the President under section 26,
Article VI of the Constitution. This is clear proof that, contrary to the theory of the majority
opinion, the legislature delegated legislative powers to the President even when it could meet
and it actually met several times.
After passing the Acts just mentioned delegating legislative powers to the President, the
Assembly in its fourth special session on August 19, 1940 repeated and reiterated this practice
and policy by passing Commonwealth Act No. 600 delegating additional and more extensive
legislative powers to the President in spite of the fact that the war was still far away in Europe
and there was no danger or prospect of involving the Philippines, and the legislature was still
free to meet as in fact it met again in regular session in January, 1941. During its regular
session begun that month and year, instead of stopping or ending the legislative powers
delegated to the President, because according to the theory of the majority opinion, the
Legislature was able to meet, the Assembly allowed them to continue by passing
Commonwealth Act No. 620 which merely amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 600.
I repeat that all this, far from supporting the view of the President only because it could not
meet, fairly and squarely refutes said view.
As to the proposition in the majority opinion that the emergency terminated with the war. I am afraid
the majority confuses war with emergency. They are two different and separate things and events. Even
the Constitution (Article VI, section 26) which for purposes of reference is reproduced below, considers
war and emergency as separate and distinct:
SEC. 26. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
There maybe a national emergency without war. And so, when on the occasion of a war, a national
emergency ensues and is recognized and declared by Congress, said emergency may continue even if and
when the war that started it is ended. War may and generally create an emergency, but the emergency
thus created does not necessarily end with the war. A war may last only several weeks or months but
with the use of the modern weapons of warfare it may cause such devastation, desolation and national
suffering and collapse not only economically but socially and morally that the resulting emergency may
last for years. A destructive flood, tornado, tidal wave or volcanic eruption may last only minutes or
hours but the destruction that it leaves in its wake may take weeks, months or years to repair, and the
emergency thereby created may last that long.
To bolster its contention the majority cites President Quezon's book "The Good Fight" pp. 204-205,
wherein he speaks in time of war. I am afraid the citation proves nothing. He merely said that the
delegation was made in time of war. He did not say or mean that the powers thus delegated were to be
exercised only during the war. The main thing to be considered and which calls for the exercise of the
powers delegated is the emergency, not the war that merely started or caused it. Commonwealth Act
671 itself in its section 2 says that the President will exercise his emergency powers during the existence
of the emergency. It does not say during the existence of the war.
President Quezon is hardly the authority that the majority should quote to support its theory that
emergency powers are given to the Chief Executive just because due to the emergency, the Legislature is
unable to meet. It was President Quezon who was given emergency powers as early as 1939 under
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 494, 496, 498 and 500 when the war was still far away in Europe and we were
not yet involved and the National Assembly could still meet and actually did meet several times in two
years, 1940 and 1941, in regular and special sessions, and during those two years when the National
Assembly was holding its sessions, he was exercising his emergency powers and enacting legislation by
means of Executive Orders. Evidently, he did not see any incompatibility in the grant and exercise of
emergency powers with the ability of the Legislature to meet and in actually holding session, this, all
contrary to the majority's contention.
Hostilities incident to the last Pacific war have long ended since 1945; it does not however necessarily
mean that the emergency resulting from said war has ceased and that the disruption of trade dislocation
of the economy of the country, the destruction of public and private property, the breakdown in honesty
and morality and the collapse of peace and order, all resulting from that war have disappeared, and that
everything has returned to normalcy. In support of its theory that the emergency has ceased the
majority makes reference to Republic Act 342 wherein it is stated that conditions have gradually
returned to normal. But this same law clearly says that the emergency created by the last war as regards
war sufferers who have not received any relief for the loss or destruction resulting from the war, still
exists and so postpones payment of their debts or monetary obligations contracted before the war, for a
period of eight (8) years from and after the settlement of their war damage claims by the United States-
Philippine War Damage Commission. In other words, the Congress of the Philippines believes that at
least as regards war sufferers, the emergency resulting from the last war still exists, and will exists not
only up to the time that their war damage claims are paid but for a period of eight years thereafter. This
hardly supports the majority's theory that everything is normal, and that there no longer is any
emergency because the war has long ended.
In connection with this question of whether or not there is still an emergency resulting from the last war
and whether or not things and conditions have returned to normal, I permit myself to reproduce a
portion of my dissenting opinion in the 1949 emergency cases:
The last logical question that one will naturally ask is: has the emergency resulting from the
war passed or does it still exists? This is a fair and decisive question inasmuch as the existence
of the emergency is, in my opinion, the test and the only basis of the operation or cessation of
Act 671. The existence or non-existence of the emergency resulting from the war is question
of fact. It is based on conditions obtaining among the people and in the country and perhaps
even near and around it. It is a highly controversial question on which people may honestly
differ. There are those who in all good faith believe and claim that conditions have returned
to normal; that the people have now enough to eat, sometime even more than they had
before the war; that people nowadays especially in the cities are better nourished and
clothed and transported and better compensated for their labor, and that the President
himself in his speeches, chats and messages had assured the public that normal times have
returned, that the problem of peace and order had been solved, that the finances of the
Government and the national economy are sound, and that there is an adequate food supply.
It is, therefore, claimed that there is no longer any emergency resulting from the war.
On the other hand, it is asserted with equal vehemence in the opposite camp that conditions
are still far from normal; that the picture painted by the President in cheerful and reassuring
colors is based on over optimism and, as to be expected, calculated to show in bold relief the
achievements of the administration, and so should be considered with some allowance; that
we are now importing more rice than before the war for the reason that many rice farms are
idle because of the farmers fear of or interference by dissidents; that the problem of peace
and order is far from solved as shown by the frequent hold-ups, kidnappings, lootings and
killing and organized banditry not only in Luzon but also in the Visayas and Mindanao; that
whereas before the war, the Constabulary force consisting of only about 6,000 officers and
men could provide complete protection to life and property was adequate in all respects to
enforce peace and order, now this Constabulary enlarged to about 20,000 men, provided with
modern weapons and equipment and with the aid of thousands of civilian guards and of the
Philippine Army and Air Force cannot solve the peace and order problem; that the dissidents
who are well-organized, armed and disciplined even attack and sack towns and sometimes
openly defy and engage the armed Government forces; that as long as more than 100,000
firearms are loose and in the hands of irresponsible parties, not excluding the seemingly
regular mysterious supply to them of additional firearms and ammunitions, there can be no
peace and order; and as to the barrio folk in Central Luzon and now, even in provinces
bordering Central Luzon whose parents and relatives had been killed by dissidents, whose
women folk had been outraged by the same elements, whose homes had been looted and
burned and whose very lives had been subjected to constant terror and peril, compelling
them to leave their homes and their farms and evacuate to and be concentrated in the
poblaciones to live there in utter discomfort and privation, it is said that it would be difficult
to convince these unfortunate people that normalcy has returned and that there is no longer
emergency resulting from the war. To further support the claim of the existence of an
emergency, the menace of communism not only at home, particularly in Central Luzon but
from abroad, especially China, is invoked. And it is asserted that all this is a result of the war.
To the above are those who claim and will add that since 1949 up to the present time, although
rehabilitation progressed substantially, there are still many people who have not achieved rehabilitation.
The economy of the country is still far from what it was before the war. It is being bolstered temporarily
by the millions of pesos being received by war veterans, their widows and children in the form of
pensions or insurance; by the millions being spent by the Mutual Security Agent (MSA) in the Philippines
to rehabilitate agriculture, industry, commerce, etc.; by the millions being sent here by the United States
in war materials, equipment, etc. in relation with the United States military aid to the Philippines, and
with the enforcement of the Import Control, Exchange Control and other laws all of a temporary nature
intended to temper and minimize the financial and economic crisis which otherwise would overwhelm
the country. The coastwise trade is being maintained with ships originally built for and used during the
war, converted provisionally into inter-island freight and passenger boats; and land transportation
specially in the centers of population like Manila is operated in great measure with vehicles (used jeeps)
obtained from the Surplus Property Commission. Everything is on a provisional basis. What will happen
after these boats and motor vehicles wear out and become junk? Could they be readily replaced by their
owners or operators? Sunken boats will clutter the harbors of the country particularly Manila Bay,
constituting a menace to navigation. Squatters in great number are still a problem, claiming that they
have nowhere to go to live. Government and private buildings, and churches are still ruins, tenanted by
squatters. Intramuros, the Walled City, in the very City of Manila is a living example of non-rehabilitation,
with the hundreds and thousands of owners of lots therein either financially unable to reconstruct or
prohibited from rebuilding until the Government has completed its plan about its reconstruction.
The War Damage Commission has paid war damage claims, it is true, but only a portion of the amounts
of the claims; and with prices as they are and the low purchasing power of the peso, complete
rehabilitation of war sufferers and substantial repair of the war damage is impossible. The country is
claiming reparations from Japan in the amount of eight (8) billion dollars. It is not known if Japan can or
will ever pay them and when. That is why the legislature in Republic Act 342 wisely postponed payment
of debts and monetary obligations of sufferers, not up to the payment of their war damage claims, but
eight years thereafter, realizing perhaps that the amounts paid for war damage claims are inadequate to
achieve complete rehabilitation. So the Legislature says that as to these war sufferers, the emergency
still exists. And who has not suffered damage during the last war?
We have not yet completely risen from the low level into which we had sunk during and immediately
after the war, in public and private morality, decency, honesty and personal integrity as witnessed by the
more or less rampant misappropriations and defalcations by public officials, corruption and malfeasance,
bribery, ten percentage, guerrilla recognition and veterans benefits rackets, dynamite fishing, etc.
When the President makes his inspections, especially in the troubled area, he is escorted by contingents
of fully armed soldiers, sometimes with machine guns and tanks. High officials of the Government using
low plate numbers of their cars, use high plate numbers called "security plate numbers" when travelling
in the provinces to minimize the danger hold-ups and attacks by dissidents who are said to be after the
high government officials. People are advised not to travel at night over certain provincial highways even
national roads.
Peace and order still leaves much to be desired. In 1949 when the emergency cases were decided, five
justices held the opinion that there no longer was any emergency. But conditions of peace and order
actually worsened thereafter. There was an uprising or rebellion in Batangas by Medrano and his men
after November, 1949, and it is said that unable to cope with the uprising and bring the rebels to justice
the Government was compelled to offer them amnesty. Since 1949 the HUKS and the communists
became stronger, in fact became so strong that they actually threatened the existence of the
Government which was forced to increase its army and wage campaigns not only in the field but also in
centers of population where it was able to arrest and prosecute those whom it claims to be high officials
of the POLITBURO. In Sulu, the Government waged an intensive campaign against Kamlon and his men
spending several million pesos and losing quite a number of soldiers and officers, with no decisive result,
and it was only after Kamlon and his men had been promised executive clemency that they surrendered
to the authorities, stood trial, were convicted and promptly pardoned. Some of Kamlon's relatives with
their followers are said to be still in the mountains and forests and refuse to surrender unless offered the
same conditions. Not long ago several hundred Chinese said to be dangerous communists were rounded
up in several towns and cities in the Philippines. About two or three weeks ago, according to the papers
the army authorities said that up to that time they had through confiscation, capture, surrender and
purchase, been able to collect about 40,000 loose firearms but that there still remained about 100,000 theory that the emergency has ceased. To end and definitely settle this disagreement, we are called
more to be accounted for. The other day the Provincial Commander of Lanao said that he is faced with upon to render decision.
the problem of eliminating or capturing ten outlaw bands in the province with about 700 followers, The
hold-ups, massacres, raids and ambushes in different provinces, even near Manila have not ceased. As
In my dissenting opinion in the 1949 emergency cases I held that the President still had the emergency
long as over 100,000 loose firearms are still in the hands of lawless or irresponsible persons, there can be
powers delegated to him under Commonwealth Act 671. Three justices of this court held that same view
no complete peace and order in the country. Before the war about 5,000 Constabulary soldiers and
as I did excluding one Justice who was favorably impressed with that view though he preferred not to
officers with an appropriation of about three million pesos was able to maintain peace and order
vote directly upon it. Today, tho it seems in the tribunal, I am the lone dissenter on this proposition and
throughout the country. The Armed Forces of the Philippines including the Constabulary of the country in
so mine is reduced so to speak to the "voice in the wilderness," I still maintain the same view, and there
1949 numbered 37,000. Realizing that this number was unable to maintain peace and order it was is reason to believe that there are many others who subscribe to the same opinion. The Legislature in
increased substantially so that in 1952, it went up to 56,000 men and officers with an appropriation of
passing during its last session House Bill No. 727 repealing the latest Commonwealth Acts including
over P151,000,000, an amount by far larger than the appropriation for the Department of Public Schools
Commonwealth Act No. 671, delegating emergency powers to the Chief Executive, must have believed
which gives instruction and education to school children and students. With the help of thousands of
and been satisfied that the President still had those emergency powers otherwise, there would have
temporary and special policemen, civilian guards and commandos the army and the constabulary are still
been no need of going to all the trouble and the tedious process of approving a bill withdrawing said
battling dissidents, communists and bandits. Hundreds and thousands of families from Central Luzon,
powers from him. There would have been no necessity for the Legislature to repeal a law which it
particularly Pampanga are still marooned in Manila, Baguio and other centers of population, unable and
believed to be no longer operative. There is no reason or point in withdrawing something that is not
afraid to return to their homes, and a number of them more fearless and optimistic, who thought that
there or that no longer exists.
peace and order in Central Luzon had been restored, returned to their homes there but were kidnapped
and liquidate. Farmers harvesting rice in some barrios in Central Luzon have to be guarded by the armed
forces so as not to be molested by the dissidents. Only yesterday the papers carried the news that In previous sessions of the Legislature after Liberation there had been talk or move to enact legislation
14,000 soldiers and officers have started an intensive campaign in Central and Southern Luzon against withdrawing said emergency powers by presumably the atmosphere was not favorable or the necessary
lawless elements. All this, many people still honestly believe. votes to pass the corresponding measure was not available. It was in the last session of the Legislature
that a bill was finally approved by both House of Congress. The Chief Executive, however, vetoed it and it
was not repassed over his veto. In spite of this, did the Legislature succeed in withdrawing his emergency
Considering all this, one may well doubt that peace and order in the country has gone back to normal,
powers? The majority through a process of interpretation which to me, is strained and unwarranted,
and that there is no longer any emergency. And this emergency clearly is the result of the last war. The
voted in the affirmative. I disagree. We should not forget that in House Bill No. 727 the Legislature was
HUKS movement was born during that war and the hundreds of thousands of loose firearms were also
not only expressing its wish and desire to withdraw the emergency powers of the President. It wanted to
released and distributed indiscriminately during that war. Lawlessness and banditry always follow a war, repeal the law or laws delegating said emergency powers. A law can be repealed only by another law.
and it takes several years thereafter to restore peace and order. In the face of all the foregoing which
Consequently, since House Bill No 727 did not become a law because of the veto of the President, it
may regard as facts and realities, the majority without any data in the form of evidence received at a
could not repeal the law or laws which it sought to abrogate.
hearing or trial, but based perhaps on judicial notice and personal knowledge and observation holds that
everything has gone back to normal and that no longer is any emergency.
I agree with the majority and also with Mr. Justice Padilla that the emergency powers delegated to the
President could be withdrawn by means of a mere concurrent resolution. It is true that to delegate
Personally, I cannot say that the emergency resulting from the last war still exists, but neither am I
emergency powers under section 26, Art. VI of the Constitution, a law is necessary. It is because the
prepared to say that it no longer exists. It is such a controversial question upon which people may not
Constitution expressly says so. Moreover, it is not only convenient but equally necessary that a law
and could honestly differ. There are authorities to the effect that the existence or non-existence of an
should be passed for that purpose in whose approval the Chief Executive takes part, because after all he
emergency calling for the exercise of emergency powers is a political question which can be decided only
is the one to whom the delegation is made and who would later exercise the powers so delegated. If he
by the political department, and that the courts are not called upon, neither are they authorized to pass
believes that there is no emergency or that even if there were, it is not of sufficient magnitude and
upon the question. This was one of the views maintained in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr.
seriousness as to call for the delegation and the exercise of emergency powers, he may veto the bill of
Justice Alex. Reyes concurred in by Mr. Justice Padilla in the 1949 emergency cases. But assuming for a
delegation and that would be the end of it. It is far from likely that the bill would be repassed over his
moment that this court had the authority to pass upon this point and to bind the executive and
veto because it would be futile and pointless to make delegation of powers to an unwilling delegate who
legislative department with is finding, I believe that we have no data or evidence on which to base our
later would decline and refuse to exercise them. But if he approves the bill of delegation and it becomes
finding. If the findings of courts on questions of facts are given authority or binding effect it is because
a law then the delegation is complete, successful and effective for the exercise of the powers by the
those findings are based on facts established during the hearing by means of evidence adduced by both
President would be assured. Not so with the withdrawal of the powers delegated. The Constitution does
parties who given the right to present, cross-examine and impeach witnesses, object to questions and
not say or require a law for such withdrawal and it may be withdrawn at any time even when the
object to the admission of evidence in general. In the present case no such hearing or trial for the
emergency which motivated said delegation still exists. In such a case, the Legislature is the sole judge as
reception of evidence was ever had. Consequently, in my opinion we are not warranted in finding that
to the necessity and advisability of the continuance or cessation of the exercise of emergency powers by
there still exist or there no longer exists any emergency resulting from the last Pacific War.
its delegate, the President.

It is the Legislature that granted or delegated the emergency powers or the Chief Executive to whom the
But how did the Legislature go about his attempt to withdraw the President's emergency powers? It had
delegation was made that decide whether or not the emergency continues. There has been lack of
the choice of approving a mere concurrent resolution or passing a bill. Both houses of the Legislature are
agreement between the two departments on this point since the last session of the Legislature. While
graced with the presence of constitutional lawyers and legal luminaries for whom I have great respect.
the President up to a few weeks ago has been exercising his emergency still existed, because
They must have known that a concurrent resolution was sufficient for the purpose. Atty. Recto, counsel
Commonwealth Act 671 provides that he may exercise those powers only during the emergency, the
for the petitioners and member of the Senate knew it and in his oral argument before this Tribunal, he
Legislature has passed House Bill No. 727 in an attempt to withdraw said emergency powers on the
said that the Legislature merely made a mistake because it could have just as well approved a concurrent for the latter what it failed or perhaps did not want to do, namely, to withdraw the emergency powers
resolution instead of passing a regular bill. by means of a concurrent resolution. I repeat that both houses of Congress with the legal talent and
constitutional authorities, not only among its distinguished members but also among its legal experts
and assistants, did neither wish nor intend to approve a mere concurrent resolution but deliberately and
But to me, it is highly possible and not improbable that the Legislature knowing that it could withdraw
intentionally chose to pass a bill, — House Bill No. 727 with full realization of the possibilities and
the President's emergency powers by means of a concurrent resolution or by means of a law,
chances of its approval or rejection by the Chief Executive to whom it was submitted. Under these
deliberately and intentionally chose the latter for reasons of its own. The mistake committed by the
circumstances, the action of the majority is practically telling the Legislature what it should have one and
Legislature if any was that perhaps it believed that the Chief Executive would not veto the bill; but veto
in finally doing it for said Legislature in order to most easily achieve its purpose or wish might be
it, he did and I am afraid the Legislature has to abide by the consequences. The Legislature knew that in
regarded by some as not only unwarranted but officious and uncalled for.
passing the bill and in submitting it to the Chief Executive as required by the Constitution, it had to be
approved by him either with his signature or by letting it become a law without any action on his part. He
may also veto it. This was a hazard and a risk which the Legislature assumed and of which it must have In view of the foregoing reasons, I beg to disagree with the majority.
been perfectly aware. But they are willing to take the risk. Another possible reason why the Legislature
chose to pass a bill instead of a mere concurrent resolution was that it sought and wanted the
intervention and participation of the Chief Executive himself in the withdrawal of the emergency powers
so that he would also share in the credit and the responsibility for said withdrawal. If he approved the bill
there would be complete understanding between the two departments of the Government, and no hard
feelings. Another reason not entirely improbable is that the decision to withdraw the emergency powers
from the Chief Executive was a compromise arrangement between the two parties in the Legislature. We
must remember that our government is run on the basis of the party system. The President at present
happens to be the head of one of the two major parties in the Legislature. His party is in the minority in
the Senate by two or three votes but is in the majority by quite a number of votes in the lower house. It
is not conceivable that his party men in the two houses consented and agreed to have the emergency
powers withdrawn provided that the Chief Executive consented to and approved of it. And so, they
agreed to pass the bill for this purpose, but that they would not agree to concurrent resolution where
the Chief Executive would be ignored and his emergency powers summarily withdrawn without
consultation and without his approval. This last view is in some measure supported and borne out by the
attitude of the Legislature when the House bill No. 727 was vetoed. The members of Congress knew that
the remedy was to override his veto if they wanted to. The Senate approved the bill unanimously and
judging from that unanimity, at least in the upper house the 2/3 votes necessary to override the veto
was available. But the fact is that the Legislature did not only fail to override the veto but it did not even
make any attempt whatsoever to repass it over the President's veto. Added to this, it was a fact that, and
this is by no means unimportant, in the month of September, 1952, that is, about two months after the
veto of the bill, about sixty-seven Congressman and two Senators filed a petition addressed to the
President in which they not only recognized the existence of his emergency powers but even asked him
to exercise the same for the purpose of releasing funds for public works projects. Excluding the two
Senators, the signers constituted more than the majority of the membership of the lower house. In other
words, after the veto of the bill and after a failure whether intentionally or otherwise of the Legislative to
override the veto, the majority of all the members of the lower house believed that Congress failed to
withdraw the President's emergency powers and consequently, believed that he still had those powers,
and was even requested to exercise the same. And on November 8, 1952, the lower house of the
Legislature passed Resolution No. 99 strongly urging the President to exercise his emergency powers and
authorize the expenditure of funds for the relief to provinces visited by typhoons and floods and other
calamities and for other urgent essential public works projects. This official action of the Lower House
shows that one of the two Houses of Congress officially believes that the emergency powers of the
President had not been withdrawn. One view of this action or inaction of the Legislature on the veto was
that it could not get the 2/3 votes in both houses to override the veto because some members who
voted in favor of the House Bill No. 727, particularly members of the party of the Chief Executive vetoing
the bill and so either approved the stand taken by him or acquiesced in it and took it in good grace and
let the matter rest, at least for the time being.

In the foregoing considerations on this point are true or could have been true, then there would
absolutely be no reason or warrant for the majority's interpreting and considering House Bill No. 727 as a
concurrent resolution sufficient to repeal the several laws mentioned in the bill and withdraw the
emergency powers of the President. In effect, the majority decided to think for the Legislature and to do
G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,
vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia
[1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his
opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be
made to introduce the present opinion — This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is
of the deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and
laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are
all involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to
introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to
compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the
constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which
is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of
the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is
taken for the Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be obtained
toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to
make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in
the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation
on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake
Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be
it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing
that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved
by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No.
2 which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a
site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary
of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to
the provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct
that all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east
of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later
than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be
imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the
revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the
executive order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary
measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public
forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No.
2711.
 6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the
sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles
Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected
by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance
with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the
Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon
the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With
the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in
the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code,
which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. — Any non-Christian
who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor,
pursuant to section two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up
habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for
a period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical
tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077,
Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws,
notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be
disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase
in its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands
with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton
history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard
for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in
Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at
Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial
on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20,
1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law,
and in order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the
end that they may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored,
with great care and special attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment
of these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other
religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of
Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six —
all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these
meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in places
divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived
of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our
ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to
give one another. Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our
predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and
governors to execute with great care and moderation the concentration of
the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance and
gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who would not presently settle and
who would see the good treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would,
of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required to pay
taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the greater part of
our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining
parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and
form prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of
waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league
long, wherein the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of
the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
 With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones.
Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the
places left by them. We hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that
they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them
and profit therefrom.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to
remove thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express
order or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that
the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or
giving information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private interests
and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with,
otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one thousand
pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the
same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two
aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more
than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty,
there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine
others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards
and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581.
At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid,
on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4,
Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND
MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in
the reduccionesand towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some
Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature,
of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the
wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the
negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services,
contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and vices
which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their
salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon
the commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and
that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the law
within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly
honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are
children of indiasand born among them, and who are to inherit their houses and haciendas,
they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from
their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of
the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the
Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized
as an integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on
other hand, it is the duty to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those
backward races that might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance,
lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that
may be acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the
same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and
isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to
allow any longer the commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is
located the seat of the representative of the Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this
most important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and
self-denial of the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those
degenerate races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the
preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken.
Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which
have not been guarded against, thus giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking
into account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every
government has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all
who reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving
the most careful study of this serious question which involves important interests for
civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the
illustrious opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces
of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with
the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the
orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the
meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an
intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the
submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the only form of engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of
accomplishing such a task. which shall be punished with deportation.

For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby 7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the
promulgate the following: rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be
detained and assigned governmentally wherever convenient.
DECREE.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the
Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed
labor.
by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon
the differences of instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan
races which occupy a part of its territory. 9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and
mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live
in towns; unity among their families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races — which may be
in the manner they wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year,
divided into three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about
and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the
without forming a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have
same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether
not as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious
they want to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized
pagans — shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and
honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase
missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of
or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten
having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning
years and from the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are
with the first day of next April, and, as to their compliance, they must be observed in the
governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge
manner prescribed below.
of the authorities of the province or district.

3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages
all the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the
offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing
inhabitants of the towns or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary
their town hall, schools, and country roads which place them in communication with one
regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the
another and with the Christians; provided, the location of these towns be distant from their
construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of
actual residences, when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and
communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said towns or
cultivations, and provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be
settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of
authorized in the towns already constituted.
the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the remaining
towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years they shall not be
obliged to render personal services other than those previously indicated. 11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that,
disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious
attitude on the first of next April, committing from now on the crimes and vexations against
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for
the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with
cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and
the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards
only in case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this
(cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term,
purpose the place most convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest;
they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their
and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach
products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for
of the sound of the bell.
this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military
staff to study the zones where such operations shall take place and everything conducive to
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed the successful accomplishment of the same.
force composed precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be
determined in a regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates
the Guardia Civil).
to my authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as
military authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they
shall till their lands and sell the products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the
which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other
southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall
producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from
conveniently be applied to them.
 14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a
council or permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative
to the application of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by
the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in
brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official
centers within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la
Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best
method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly
approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of
these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of
particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same
course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to
maintain their tribal organization and government and under which many of these tribes are
now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or
unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and
firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should
be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the
Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with
this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The
Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have
jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive
jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August
29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and
authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It
divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the
Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives for the territory
which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that
is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are
represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian
tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of
Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act
No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and
government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397,
the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963,
the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The
major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples.
Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine
Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548,
549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique,
Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan,
Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the
Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. — AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL
GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government, the provincial governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix
their designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided,
That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon
township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act
providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements
of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is
further authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order,
to direct such Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to
be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply
with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty
days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to
acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government,
and his supervision and control over them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that
law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
 SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes
has advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the
provisions of sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and
eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the
provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is
hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of
procedure by the Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth,
nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397.
The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397
was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions
in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and
consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to
be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in
Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No.
2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of
1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned
Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite
nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized
legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916;
sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444,
2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans
and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from
Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to
it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion, and
non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this
view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known
authorities, as Zuñiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine
Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson,
"The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to
1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its
true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions
of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was
recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again,
the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the
"territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and
again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited
by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of
this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially
organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya,
Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never
seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the
portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a
geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are
Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422,
Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise
inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their
religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n
the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the
term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so
many years had these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact
designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."'
(See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third
session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United States as to the future
political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the Islands,
pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive
Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by
reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq, and
sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau
of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . .
with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in
civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United
States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal
marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife
in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage
of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province
without compliance with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also
that the fact that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order
of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second
marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to
interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much
of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his authority, was
the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all
governor of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later
received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as
follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were
originally non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who
have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered
Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are
not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The
number of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of
them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most
satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people
having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they
could, to their own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the
Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to
which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For
practical purposes, therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your
province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the
jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be
afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are
requested to govern yourself accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the
opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors
of the provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual,
p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the
following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other
better classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to
stand . . . I believe the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the
Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of
civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious
denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious
freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal
Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas.
Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return
indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of
the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of
cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean
not that persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula
tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons
preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula
tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject
to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In
other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that
decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is
living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member
thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not come up as to whether a Christian,
maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe,
would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of
Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not
a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East
Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes
paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs
and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that
which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are
therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that
civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal
relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by
the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
 In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula
taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the
purposes of settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine
Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings
thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact
that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low
state of development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-
Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned .
..
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life,
severs whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community,
belonging a member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the
same law that governs the other members of that community and from and after the date
when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from
him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency
period the same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or
reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class
A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without
requiring him to pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not
a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not
profess Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with
some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization
and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this reason so called
"Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian
tribes in so far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even
though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement
and so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other
recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No.
1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16,
1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is
practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request
the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a
minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled
to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the
law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The
opinion of Attorney-General Avanceña, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out,
concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the
person in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he
and the person selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions
of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the
law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions
of the Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have
its natural meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether
Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of
the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam
in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common
Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction
based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which
later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish
legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act
No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of
uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law,
but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as
making distinctions base the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows,
then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized
Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq).
The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used
in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and
Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War
Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of
the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials,
specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a
way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903
divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de
Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It
may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless
it has been applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without
doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in
three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day
forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can
deduce that the name was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that
these men were pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language
they were called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced
beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They
number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as
indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it
practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of the Philippine
(Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the
United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands
in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical
with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable
lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of
pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be
described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United
States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the
Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring
Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on — "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation
of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this object by
civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886],
118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives
Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the
United States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion in
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before
and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous
one and of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the
Indians who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the
United States since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which
they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate
title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other
nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to
dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a
treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could be done. The United States
recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty
or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. They
were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they
preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal
and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State
within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian
tribes are the wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United States.
dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no
allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling,
the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their
very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of
protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by
Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the General
Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and diminished in
numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they
dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because
the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has
never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was
whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the
introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to
statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendent charged with guarding their
interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the
government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish
dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, where
subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not
the following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with
the Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial
decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty
of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders,
whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without
the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts
to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed
political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter
of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra;
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall,
616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs.Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone
Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger
[1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S..,
598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States
sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize
such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and
property. (U.S. vs.Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial
decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance
of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing
upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of
Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in
substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now
located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and
completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites,
and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance
from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating
any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the
respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual
members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a
reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory — had departed therefrom
without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the
General of the Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators
to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to
be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas
corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to
arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from
which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the
Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court
said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and
intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited
power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an
extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be
questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the
power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has,
therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal
judge, in all cases where he may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the
United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the
United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department
of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States,
and in violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian
Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate
white race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so
long as they obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of
the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine
that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within
the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts.
(See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But
even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United
States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservation,
without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have
been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If
any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this
policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so decided
upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as
may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian
tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power
to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its
authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously
protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in
his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since
followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs.
Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate
official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to
the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section
21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial
governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as
to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the
Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the
relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section
463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may
prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian
relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long
established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to
warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The power
of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision
was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it would be
exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge
Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court:
U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general
rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative
powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province,
are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants,
who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown
clients, says that — "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as
plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and
none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to
discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently,
unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable — the Legislature must be
understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious
equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E.
D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given
to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the
court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term "non-Christian"
refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious
differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the
Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said
Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution — and these provisions, it has been said "are
universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The
protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the
possession of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a
refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never
can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on
others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected
from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do
what one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's
own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment
of the same right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every
person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized society
could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law
unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could
not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual
person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the
injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual
may asserts the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human
government — especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution — to
interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society
charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual in
respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such
restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may
demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright
and honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has
been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare.
As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways;
to live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for
that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out
these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract,
the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily
done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland
[1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578;
State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this:
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term
is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of
society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce
unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law
for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises without
restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must
yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public
health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See
Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the
course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a
classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall
hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always
necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true
where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular
cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel
of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs,
or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which
regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs.California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there
shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to
all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on
appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It
varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S.,
82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute
which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely
arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United
States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That
slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth
Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in
the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary
modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the
punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all
denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203
U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any
servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised.
(Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom.
Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be
held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is
the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among
its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and
good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its
resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we
are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and
is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of
legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided
the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare
or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the
sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be
not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature
and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at
the foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil.,
580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding
whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative
Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally
possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao (e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of
former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the
successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement.
fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the
public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes. The Secretary adds:

The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection, To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-
the following: Christian people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions
in order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still
given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao,
organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the
the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found
Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus
that the site selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of
bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect
forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the
them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children, and show them the
boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with
advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being
enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for
impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic,
children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the
social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the
impression that the results obtained during the period of less than one year since the
country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and development.

The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally
non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development
to be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the
and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the
following statement to the press:
Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in
the following unequivocal terms:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live
a nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for
its policy to organize them into political communities and to educate their children
advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster
with the object of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit them to by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material,
live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of
economic, social, and political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of
their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or if not they will
rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the
be subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)

The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the
people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration — "the advancement of the non-Christian
Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the
elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants."
"habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully
This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these people?

(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are
induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the
regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their
development and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to
promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and
with the Christian people.
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident. Here,
we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their
more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the
advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a
reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and
morals — was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish times,
"bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with
reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be
improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in some
cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really
constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the
axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and
they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but
not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the
Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress
of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in
enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must
have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no
argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed
after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the
resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be
in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and
thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod
on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the
manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction — burning and destroying the forests
and making illegal caiñgins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring
and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of
liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will
ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will
commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary
servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not
practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will
— going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and
making illegal caiñgins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege
that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx xxx xxx
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty
is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of
persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not
adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in
question. It will mean that this people should be let along in the mountains and in a
permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty
in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been
placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of
civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and
with national conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more
towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The
progress of those people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and
the signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when they will become useful
citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the
gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a
certain element, believing that their personal interests would be injured by such a measure
has come forward and challenged the authority of the Government to lead this people in the
pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem
this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there
has been erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall
be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke
that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to
pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left in a
permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt,
nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are
being taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to
understand that they object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and
permanent communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are being
educated in a school especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from
them in order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be assured.
Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition
compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves.
There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places
under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this
people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They
move from one place to another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space
where they are roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of
public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why can not the
government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands,
instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary
both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for
the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the government. For as people
accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the mountains and follow a
wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not make them live together and
the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a
general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases.
Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian
legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens
certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the
apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and
followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people
confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of
any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given
the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the
presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and
patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the power of
removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a redress of grievances.
When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression
is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily
hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and
liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a
question which has assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now purely an
ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful
forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of
government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of
course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which
the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a
along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and
political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest
possible demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to
trial after the other two branches of the government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a
great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to
our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to
be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies
alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the
determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards the
settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord,
Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question
that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by
differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such
prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court
believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But
public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible
contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice
may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has
been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the
Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they
may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be
approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must
be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in
order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good
and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a
coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward non-
interference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice
Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other
mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs.Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final
decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it should
be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy,
and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad
conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments
of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive
a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the
laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery
and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is
a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not
issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusions of Justice Malcolm as set forth in the prevailing,
opinion.
The words "non-Christian' have a clear, definite and well settled signification when used in the Philippine non-Christian head men and chiefs in the Philippines have no lawful authority to bind their acts or their
statute-book as a descriptive adjective, applied to "tribes," "people," or "inhabitants," dwelling in more consent, the objection based on lack of a hearing, would have the same force whether the issuance of a
or less remote districts and provinces throughout the Islands. reconcentration order was or was not preceded by a pow-wow of this kind.

Justice Malcolm, as I think, correctly finds that these words, as used in this connection in our statute-
book, denote the 'low grace of civilization" of the individuals included in the class to which they are
applied. To this I would add that the tests for the determination of the fact that an individual or tribes is,
or is not of the "non-Christian" are, and throughout the period of American occupation always have
been, "the mode of life, the degree of advancement in civilization, and connection or lack of connection
with some civilized community." (Cf. letter of Collector of Internal Revenue dated September 17, 1910,
and set out in the principal opinion.)
The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the standard of
civilization to which a specific tribe must be found to have advanced, to justify its removal from the class
embraces with the descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term is used in the Philippine statute-book,
is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life within the tribe, such that it is feasible and
practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its membership the general laws and regulations,
administrative, legislative, and judicial, which control the conduct of the admitted civilized inhabitants of
the Islands; a made of life, furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices
which tend to brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to
expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may be brought in contact with members of the
tribe.
The truth of the mater is that the power to provide for the issuance of such orders rests upon analogous
principles to those upon which the liberty and freedom or action of children and persons of unsound
minds is restrained, without consulting their wishes, but for their own good and the general welfare. The
power rests upon necessity, that "great master of all things," and is properly exercised only where
certain individuals or groups of individual are found to be of such a low grade of civilization that their
own wishes cannot be permitted to determine their mode of life or place of residence.
The status of the non-Christian inhabitants of these Islands, and the special and necessarily paternal
attitude assume toward them by the Insular Government is well illustrated by the following provisions
found in the Administrative Code of 1917:
SEC. 705. Special duties and purposes of Bureau (of non-Christian tribes). — It shall be the
duty of the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty
in favor of the regions inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and to foster by all adequate
means and in a systematic, rapid, and completely manner the moral, material, economic,
social and political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering
permanent the mutual intelligence between and complete fusion of all the Christian and non-
Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago.

So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of inhabitants of particular province in
SEC. 2116. Township and settlement fund. — There shall be maintained in the provincial
these Islands, or any individual member of such a group, must be found to have advanced, in order to
treasuries of the respective specially organized provinces a special fund to be known as the
remove such group or individual from the class embraced within the statutory description of "non-
township and settlement fund, which shall be available, exclusively, for expenditures for the
Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and normally result in the withdrawal by
benefit of the townships and settlements of the province, and non-Christian inhabitants of
such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe, had they at any time the province, upon approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
adhered to or maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify them whether they reside
within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a mode of life independent
of a apart from that maintain by such tribe, but a mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or As I understand it, the case at bar does not raise any real question as to the jurisdiction of the courts of
property or general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are brought in these Islands in habeas corpus proceedings, to review the action of the administrative authorities in the
contact. enforcement of reconcentration orders issued, under authority of section 2145 of the Administrative
Code, against a petitioner challenging the alleged fact that he is a "non-Christian" as that term is used in
the statute. I, therefore, express no opinion on that question at this time.
The contention that, in this particular case, and without challenging the validity of the statute, the writ
should issue because of the failure to give these petitioners, as well as the rest of the fifteen thousand
Manguianes affected by the reconcentration order, an opportunity to be heard before any attempt was
made to enforce it, begs the question and is, of course, tantamount to a contention that there is no
authority in law for the issuance of such an order.
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
If the fifteen thousand manguianes affected by the order complained of had attained that degree of
civilization which would have made it practicable to serve notice upon, and give an opportunity for a real I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. That fact is not denied. I
hearing, to all the members of the tribe affected by the order, it may well be doubted whether the cannot give my consent to any act which deprives the humblest citizen of his just liberty without a
provincial board and the Secretary of the Interior would have been justified in its enforcement By what hearing, whether he be a Christian or non-Christian. All persons in the Philippine Islands are entitled to a
proceeding known to the law, or to be specially adopted in a particular case, could the offices of any hearing, at least, before they are deprived of their liberty.
province provide for a genuine hearing upon a proposal to issue a reconcentration order upon a head-
hunting tribe in the north of the Island of Luzon; or upon one of the nomadic tribes whose habitat is in
the mountain fastnesses of Mindanao, and whose individual members have no fixed or known place of
residence, or upon the fifteen thousand Manguianes roaming in the wilds of Mindoro.

Of course, friendly headmen or chief might and, as a rule, should be consulted, after the practice in the MOIR, J., dissenting:
United States when tribes or groups of American Indians have been placed upon reservations; but since
I dissent. in the majority opinion, are in violation of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, which reads as follows:
I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but may sense of justice will not permit me to let
this decision go on record without expressing may strong dissent from the opinion of Justice Malcolm, That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
concurred in by a majority of the court. I shall not attempt to analyze the opinion or to go into the property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the
question in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may be, the legal and human side of the case as it laws.
presents itself to my mind.
It is not necessary to argue that a Mangyan is one of the persons protected by that provision.
The facts are that one Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro were ordered by
the Provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to establish
The Attorney-General argues that the treatment provided for the Manguianes is similar to that accorded
themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by the Indians in the United States, and reference is made all through the court's decision to the decisions
imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears from the resolution of the provincial board,
of the United States Supreme Court with reference to the Indians. It is not considered necessary to go
extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2,000 acres, on which about three
into these cases for the simple reason that all the Indians nations in the United States were considered
hundred manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and
as separate nations and all acts taken in regard to them were the result of separate treaties made by the
was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prision at Calapan, solely because he escaped
United States Government with the Indian nations, and, incompliance with these treaties, reservations
from the reservation. The Manguianes used out a writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they
were set apart for them on which they lived and were protected form intrusion and molestation by white
are deprived of their liberty in violation of law.
men. Some these reservations were larger than the Islands of Luzon, and they were not measured in
hectares but in thousands of square miles.
The Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands makes return to the writ copied in the majority opinion
which states that the provincial governor of Mindoro with the prior approval of his act by the
The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the Government of the Philippine
Department Secretary ordered the placing of the petitioners and others on a reservation.
Islands by which they have agreed to live within a certain district where they are accorded exclusive
rights. They are citizens of the Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all the
The manguianes, it is stated on page 694 of the majority opinion, "are very low in culture. They have rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. And when the provincial governor of the
considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are peaceful, Province of Mindoro attempted to take them from their native habitat and to hold them on the little
timid, primitive, seminomadic people. They number approximately 15,000 (?). The manguianes have reservation of about 800 hectares, he deprived them of their rights and their liberty without due process
shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have no of law, and they were denied the equal protection of the law.
progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any for of municipal
government."
The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines."
It may be well to add that the last P.I. Census (1903) shows that the Island of Mindoro (not including
smaller islands which together make the Province of Mindoro) has an area of 3,851 square miles and a
They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos whether they want it or
populations of 28, 361 of which 7, 369 are wild or uncivilized tribes (Manguianes). This appears to be the
not. They are backward and deficient in culture and must be moved from their homes, however humble
total Mangyan population of the province. The total population was less than seven to the mile (Vol. 2,
they may be and "bought under the bells" and made to stay on a reservation.
P.I. Census, pp. 30 and 407).

Are these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the return of the Solicitor-General
The Island is fertile, heavily wooded and well watered.
of the Philippine Islands of any crime having been committed by these "peacefully, timid, primitive, semi-
nomadic people."
It has no savage population, but it is sparsely settled by Christian Filipinos along the coast and by
Manguianes.
A memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands is copied in extenso in the
majority opinion, and from it I gather the nature of their offense which is that —
The Manguianes roamed its mountains and valleys, fishing and hunting at will long before Magallanes
[Magellan] anchored his boats in the water of Cebu. They have made little or no progress in the ways of
Living a nomadic and wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the
civilization. "They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people," whom the Government of the
manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction — burning and destroying the forests
Philippines Islands would bring under the beneficient influence of civilization and progress.
and making illegal caiñgins thereon. No bringing any benefit to the State but, instead, injuring
and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of those people with the sort of
The law provides for it in section 2145 of the Administrative Code, and for those who like Dadalos do not liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are not fighting in court? They will ultimately
take kindly to the ways provided for civilizing them section 2759 provides the punishment. become a heavy burden to the State and, on account of their ignorance, they will commit
crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by
those who may want to abuse them.
The attorney for the petitioners has raised various constitutional questions, but only the fundamental
one will be considered by me. It is that the sections of the Administrative Code, 2145 and 2759, quoted
 There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty and does
not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they
will — going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and
making illegal caiñgins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they are
being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx xxx xxx
But does the constitutional guaranty that "no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
due process of law" apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty
is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of
persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not
adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in
question. It will mean that this people be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state
of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and
noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been
placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of
civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and
with national conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more
towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens.
There appear to be two intimations or charges in this memorandum; one is that the Manguianes destroy
the forest by making a caiñgin. What is a "caiñgin?" Simply this. These people move their camp or place
of abode frequently and when they do move to a new place, it is necessary to clear the land in order to
plant corn and camotes (sweet potatoes) and they cut down the smaller trees and burn these around the
larger ones, killing them, so that they can plant their crops. The fires never spread in the tropical
undergrowth of an island like Mindoro, but the trees within the caiñgin are killed and crops are planted
and harvested. This land may be abandoned later on — due to superstition, to a lack of game in the
neighborhood, to poor crops from exhausted fertility, or to a natural desire to move on.
Granting that the Manguianes do make caiñgins or clear lands in spots and then abandon them for the
more fertile lands, which every man knows to be just over the hills, we cannot see that they are
committing such a great abuse as to justify incarcerating them on a small tract of land — for
incarceration it is and nothing less.
The second intimation or charge is that "they will become a heavy burden to the state and on account of
their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those who want to abuse them." They have never been a burden to the state and
never will be. They have not committed crimes and, when they do, let the law punish them." The
authorities are anticipating too much from these "peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."
Their history does not demonstrate that we must expect them to commit crimes and jail them to prevent
the possibility. But the Secretary says "they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those want to
abuse them." Are they more liable to be subjected to involuntary servitude when left free to roam their
native hills and gain a livelihood as they have been accustomed to for hundreds of years, than they will
be if closely confined on a narrow reservation from which they may not escape without facing a term in
jail? Is not more likely that they will be glad to exchange their "freedom" on a small reservation for the
great boon of binding themselves and their children to the more fortunate Christian Filipinos who will
feed them and clothe them in return of their services.?
It think it not only probable but almost a certainty that they will be all be subjected to involuntary
personal servitude if their freedom is limited as it has been. How will they live? There may be persons
who are willing to lend them money with which to buy food on the promise that they will work for them.
And if they accept the loan and do not work for the lender we have another law on the statute books,
Act No. 2098, into whose noose they run their necks, and they may be fined not more than two hundred
pesos or imprisonment for not exceeding six months or both, and when the sentence expires they must
again go into debt or starve, and if they do not work will again go to jail, and this maybe repeated till
they are too old to work and are cast adrift.
The manguianes have committed no offenses and are charged with none. It does not appear they were
ever consulted about their reconcentration. It does not appear that they had any hearing or were
allowed to make any defense. It seems they were gathered here and there whenever found by the
authorities of the law and forcibly placed upon the reservation, because they are "non-Christian," and
because the provincial governor ordered it. Let it be clear there is no discrimination because of religion.
The term "non-Christian" means one who is not a Christian Filipino, but it also means any of the so-called
"wild" or backward tribes of the Philippines. These non-Christian tribes are Moros, Igorrotes, Bukidnons,
Ifugaos, Manguianes and various others, about one millions souls all together. Some of them, like the
Moros, Tinguianes and Ifugaos, have made great progress in civilization. The have beautiful fields
reclaimed by hard labor — they have herds of cattle and horses and some few of them are well
educated. Some of the non-Christians, like the Aetas and the Negritos, are very low in the scale of
civilization, but they are one and all "non-Christians," as the term is used and understood in law and in
fact.
All of them, according to the court's opinion under the present law, may be taken from their homes and
herded on a reservation at the instance of the provincial governor, with the prior approval of the
department head. To state such a monstrous proposition is to show the wickedness and illegality of the
section of the law under which these people are restrained of their liberty. But it is argued that there is
no probability of the department head ever giving his approval to such a crime, but the fact that
he can do it and has done it in the present case in what makes the law unconstitutional. The arbitrary
and unrestricted power to do harm should be the measure by which a law's legality is tested and not the
probability of doing harm.
It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that there is no arbitrary
body of individuals; that the constitutional principles upon which our government and its
institutions rest do not leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary
power, but that all in authority are guided and limited by these provisions which the people
have, the through the organic law, declared shall be the measure and scope of all control
exercised over them. In particular the fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal
protection clause, thereof, forbids that the individual shall be subjected to any arbitrary
exercise of the powers of government; it was intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any
arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property.
As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or unreasonable classification, or
which singles out any particular individuals or class as the subject of hostile and discriminating
 legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as being opposed to the fourteenth amendment and
especially to the equal protection clause thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no further
discussion. (Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U.S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.)
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles
upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are
constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of
purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for its
is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to
the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for
whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. It
is, indeed, quite true, that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or
body, the authority of final decision; and, in many cases of mere administration the
responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public
judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the
fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual
possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments
showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization
under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of Massachusetts Bill
of Rights, the Government of Commonwealth "may be a government of law and not of men."
For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or
any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself. (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S., 374.)
It is said that the present law is an old Act being substance Act No. 547 of the Philippine Commission. But
it has never been brought before this court for determination of its constitutionality. No matter how
beneficient the motives of the lawmakers if the lawmakers if the law tends to deprive any man of life,
liberty, or property without due process law, it is void.
In may opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code not only deprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without due process of law, but
will in all probability deprive them of their life, without due process of law. History teaches that to take a
semi-nomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow confines of a
reservation is to invite disease an suffering and death. From my long experience in the Islands, I should
say that it would be a crime of title less magnitude to take the Ifugaos from their mountain homes where
they have reclaimed a wilderness and made it a land of beauty and fruitfulness and to transfer them to
the more fertile, unoccupied, malaria infested valleys which they look down upon from their fields —
than it would be to order their decapitation en masse.
There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in exactly the same
category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their native habitat and
reconcentrated on a reservation — in effect an open air jail — then so may the Ifugaos, so may the
Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros.
There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands. All of the thirty-nine
governors upon the prior approval of the head of the department, have the power under this law to take
the non-Christian inhabitants of their different provinces form their homes and put them on a
reservation for "their own good and the general good of the Philippines," and the court will grant them
no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the Philippine Islands would hold their liberty, and their lives, may
be, subject to the unregulated discretion of the provincial governor.
And who would be safe?
After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor decide that some political
enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would be safer on the reservation. No matter what his education
and culture, he could have no trial, he could make no defense, the judge of the court might be in a
distant province and not within reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is final.
The case of the United States vs. Crook (Federal Cases 14891), cited in the majority opinion, should be
quoted at length. District Judge Dundy said:
During the fifteen years in which I have been engaged in administering the laws of my
country, I have never been called upon to hear or decide a case that appealed so strongly to
my sympathy as the one now under consideration. On the one side, we have a few of the
remnants of a once numerous and powerful, but now weak, insignificant, unlettered, and
generally despised race; and the other, we have the representative of one of the most
powerful, most enlightened, and most christianized nations of modern times. On the one
side, we have the representatives of this wasted race coming into this national tribunal of
ours, asking for justice and liberty to enable them to adopt our boasted civilization, and to
pursue the arts of peace, which have made us great and happy as a nation; on the other side,
we have this magnificent, if not magnanimous, government, resisting this application with the
determination of sending these people back to the country which is to them less desirable
perpetual imprisonment in their own native land. But I think it is creditable to the heart and
mind of the brave and distinguished officer who is made respondent herein to say that he has
no sort of sympathy in the business in which he is forced by his position to bear a part so
conspicuous; and, so far as I am individually concerned, I think it not improper to say that, if
the strongest possible sympathy could give the relators title to freedom, they would have
been restored to liberty the moment the arguments in their behalf were closed. no
examination or further thought would then have been necessary or expedient. But in a
country where liberty is regulated by law, something more satisfactory and enduring than
mere sympathy must furnish and constitute the rule and basis of judicial action. It follows that
this case must be examined and decided on principles of law, and that unless the relators are
entitled to their discharge under the constitution or laws of the United States, or some treaty,
they must be remanded to the custody of the officer who caused their arrest, to be returned
to the Indian Territory which they left without the consent of the government.
On the 8th of April, 1879, the relators Standing Bear and twenty-five others, during the
session of the court held at that time of Lincoln, presented their petition, duly verified,
praying for the allowance of a writ of habeas corpus and their final discharged from custody
thereunder.
The petition alleges, in substance, that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged
to the Ponca tribe of Indians now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time
previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith,
and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain
themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general
government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of
the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of
the respondent, George Crook.
The writ was issued and served on the respondent on the 8th day of April, and, the distance
between the place where the writ was made returnable and the place where the relators
were confined being more than twenty miles, ten days were alloted in which to make return.
On the 18th of April the writ was returned, and the authority for the arrest and detention is
therein shown. The substance of the return to the writ, and the additional statement since
filed, is that the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca Tribe of
Indians; that they had fled or escaped from a reservation situated in some place within the
limits of the indian Territory — had departed therefrom without permission from the
government; and, at the request of the secretary of the interior, the general of the army had
issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe
in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be
arrested on the Omaha Indian reservation, and that they were in his custody for the purpose
of being returned to the Indian Territory.
It is claimed upon the one side, and denied upon the other, that the relators had withdrawn
and severed, for all time, their connection with the tribe to which they belonged; and upon
this point alone was there any testimony produced by either party hereto. The other matter
stated in the petition and the return to the writ are conceded to be true; so that the
questions to be determined are purely questions of law.
On the 8th of Mar, 1859, a treaty was made by the United States with the Ponca tribe of
Indians, by which a certain tract of country, north of the Niobrara river and west of the
Missouri, was set apart for the permanent home of the aid Indians, in which the government
agreed to protect them during their good behaviour. But just when or how, or why, or under
what circumstances, the Indians left their reservation in Dakota and went to the Indian
Territory does not appear.
sick and disabled, caused, in a great measure, no doubt, from change of climate; and to save
himself and the survivors of his wasted family, and the feeble remnant of his little band of
followers, he determined to leave the Indian Territory and return to his old home, where, to
use his own language, "he might live and die in peace, and be buried with his fathers." He also
stated that he informed the agent of their final purpose to leave, never to return, and that he
and his followers had finally, fully, and forever severed his and their connection with the
Ponca tribe of Indians, and had resolved to disband as a tribe, or band of Indians, and to cut
loose from the government, go to work, become self-sustaining, and adopt the habits and
customs of a higher civilization. To accomplish what would seem to be a desirable and
laudable purpose, all who were able to do so went to work to earn a living. The Omaha
Indians, who speak the same language, and with whom many of the Poncas have long
continued to intermarry, gave them employment and ground to cultivate, so as to make them
self-sustaining. And it was when at the Omaha reservation, and when thus employed, that
they were arrested by order of the government, for the purpose of being taken back to the
Indian Territory. They claim to be unable to see the justice, or reason, or wisdom, or
necessity, of removing them by force from their own native plains and blood relations to a
far-off country, in which they can see little but new-made graves opening for their reception.
The land from which they fled in fear has no attractions for them. The love of home and
native land was strong enough in the minds of these people to induce them to brave every
peril to return and live and die where they had been reared. The bones of the dead son of
Standing Bear were not to repose in the land they hoped to be leaving forever, but were
carefully preserved and protected and formed a part of what was to them melancholy
procession homeward. Such instances of parental affections, and such love home and native
land, may be heathen in origin, but it seems to that they are not unlike Christian in principle.

xxx xxx xxx And the court declared that the Indians were illegally held by authority of the United States and in
violation of their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and ordered their release from
A question of much greater importance remains for consideration, which, when determined, custody.
will be decisive of this whole controversy. This relates to the right of the government to arrest
and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to a point in the Indian This case is very similarly to the case of Standing Bear and others.
Territory from which it is alleged the Indians escaped. I am not vain enough to think that I can
do full justice to a question like the one under consideration. But, as the mater furnishes so
I think this Court should declare that section 2145 and 2759 of the Administrative Code of 1917 are
much valuable material for discussion, and so much food for reflection, I shall try to present it
unconstitutional, null and void, and that the petitioners are illegally restrained of their liberty, and that
as viewed from my own standpoint, without reference to consequences or criticisms, which,
they have been denied the equal protection of the law, and order the respondents immediately to
though not specially invited, will be sure to follow.
liberate all of the petitioners.

xxx xxx xxx

On the 15th day of August, 1876, congress passed the general Indian appropriation bill, and in
it we find a provision authorizing the secretary of the interior to use $25,000 for the removal
of the Poncas to the Indian Territory, and providing them a home therein, with consent of the
tribe. (19 Sta., 192.)

xxx xxx xxx

The Poncas lived upon their reservation in southern Dakota, and cultivated a portion of the
same, until two or three years ago, when they removed therefrom, but whether by force or
otherwise does not appear. At all event, we find a portion of them, including the relators,
located at some point in the Indian Territory. There, the testimony seems to show, is where
the trouble commenced. Standing Bear, the principal witness, states that out of five hundred
and eighty-one Indians who went from the reservation in Dakota to the Indian Territory, one
hundred and fifty-eight died within a year or so, and a great proportion of the others were
G.R. No. L-10202 March 29, 1916
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS Ex Rel. THE MUNICIPALITY OF CARDONA, plaintiff,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN, ET AL., defendants.
Modesto Reyes and Eliseo Ymzon for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus and Roberto Moreno for defendants.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an action by the municipality of Cardona to prohibit perpetually the municipality of Binangonan
from exercising municipal authority over the barrios of Tatala, Balatik, Nambug, Tutulo, Mahabang
Parang, Nagsulo, and Bonot.
The complaint alleges that the municipality of Binangonan is now exercising governmental authority over
the barrios named, to the exclusion of the municipality of Cardona; that such authority is exercised by
the municipality of Binangonan by reason of Executive Order No. 66, series of 1914, issued by the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands on the 1st day of July, 1914, which reads as follows:
The defendant municipality demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action. The question before us is that presented by the demurrer.
We do not think that plaintiff's objections are well founded. No reason has been given why the Act is
unconstitutional and no argument or citation of authorities has been presented on that subject. Every
Act of the legislature is presumed to be constituted until the contrary is clearly shown; and no showing of
unconstitutionality having been made in this case, the objection to the order of the Governor-General
based on that ground must be overruled. The other two objections are frivolous. Although it be
admitted, for the sake of argument, that the Governor-General ought not to make such an order unless
the public good requires it, that fact need not be stated in the order. The same may be said with regard
to its urgency. The Governor-General having full authority to promulgate such an order this court will
assume, if it should act on the matter at all, that there was public necessity therefor and that the matter
was of such urgency as properly to evoke action by the Chief Executive.
The demurrer to the complaint is sustained and unless an amendment thereof is made within five days
from the service of a copy of this order eliminating the objections stated in this decision, the action will
be dismissed on the merits. So ordered.
Torres, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

Pursuant to the provisions of section one of Act Numbered seventeen hundred and forty-
eight, the boundary line between the municipalities of Binangonan and Cardona, in the
Province of Rizal, is hereby defined and fixed as follows, viz:

On the mainland, beginning on the north at the intersection of the Morong River
and the existing Binangonan boundary, thence in a southerly and westerly
direction to Mapulanglupa (otherwise called Santol), where a partially destroyed
monument now exists; thence in a direct southeasterly line to the summit of
Mountain Tutulo; and thence to the Laguna de Bay; thus embracing within the
limits of the municipality of Binangonan the barrios or sitios of Tatala, Balatik,
Nambug, Tutulo, Mahabang Parang, Nagsulo, Sampad, and Bonot.

On the Island of Talim, that portion of the island embraced within points known as
Kaymaralina and Virgen-Bato, on the eastern coast and extending to the summits
of the range of hills geographically dividing the land, is hereby confirmed as being
embraced within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Cardona; and the
remainder of the island, including the small off-lying islands of Bunga, Olahipan,
and Malake, as being embrace within the jurisdiction of the municipality of
Binangonan.

Action will at once be taken to survey the boundary line herein fixed and to
establish monuments demarcating same.

The plaintiff further alleges that the executive order referred to and above quoted and the Act under
which it was issued are "unconstitutional" in that said Act confers on the Governor-General legislative
authority; and that the Governor-General in promulgating said order usurped legislative functions.
Plaintiff also claims that the order is void because it does not contain a statement that the change in the
division line between the said municipalities was required by the public good; and that it does not
appear in said order itself that there was a present urgency requiring the promulgation of such an order.
G.R. No. 47065 June 26, 1940 the Legislature of its functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so far as those
powers are concerned, is unconstitutional and void.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., petitioner,
vs. 2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, is valid delegation
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent. of legislative powers, the Public Service Commission has exceeded its authority because: (a)
The Act applies only to future certificates and not to valid and subsisting certificates issued
prior to June 8, 1939, when said Act took effect, and (b) the Act, as applied by the
C. de G. Alvear for petitioner.
Commission, violates constitutional guarantees.
Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.

Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454,
LAUREL, J.:
invoked by the respondent Public Service Commission in the decision complained of in the present
proceedings, reads as follows:
The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in
the Province of Pangasinan and Tarlac and, to a certain extent, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and
With the exception to those enumerated in the preceding section, no public service shall
Zambales, by means of motor vehicles commonly known as TPU buses, in accordance with the terms and
operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public
conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued in its favor by the former Public Utility
Service Commission, known as "certificate of public convenience," or "certificate of
Commission in cases Nos. 24948, 30973, 36830, 32014 and 53090. On August 26, 1939, the petitioner
convenience and public necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the operation of said
filed with the Public Service Commission an application for authorization to operate ten additional new
service and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and
Brockway trucks (case No. 56641), on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and
suitable manner.
conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. In the
decision of September 26, 1939, granting the petitioner's application for increase of equipment, the
Public Service Commission ordered: The Commission may prescribed as a condition for the issuance of the certificate provided in
the preceding paragraph that the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the
Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful
Y de acuerdo con que se provee por el articulo 15 de la ley No. 146 del Commonwealth, tal
equipment, less reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the certificate shall valid only for
como ha sido enmendada por el articulo 1 de la Ley No. 454, por la presente se enmienda las
a definite period of time; and that the violation of any of these conditions shall produce the
condiciones de los certificados de convenciencia publica expedidos en los expedientes Nos.
immediate cancellation of the certificate without the necessity of any express action on the
24948, 30973, 36831, 32014 y la authorizacion el el expediente No. 53090, asi que se
part of the Commission.
consideran incorporadas en los mismos las dos siguientes condiciones:

In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the equipment, its actual condition,
Que los certificados de conveniencia publica y authorizacion arriba mencionados seran validos
the age of the model, or other circumstances affecting its value in the market shall be taken
y subsistentes solamente durante de veinticinco (25) anos, contados desde la fecha de la
into consideration.
promulgacion de esta decision.

The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or amendment of certificates actually

Que la empresa de la solicitante porda ser adquirida por el Commonwealth de Filipinas o por
force and to those which may hereafter be issued, to permits to modify itineraries and time
alguna dependencia del mismo en cualquier tiempo que lo deseare previo pago del precio d
schedules of public services and to authorization to renew and increase equipment and
costo de su equipo util, menos una depreciacion razonable que se ha fijar por la Comision al
properties.
tiempo de su adquisicion.

Not being agreeable to the two new conditions thus incorporated in its existing certificates, the
petitioner filed on October 9, 1939 a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Public Service
Commission on November 14, 1939. Whereupon, on November 20, 1939, the present petition for a writ
of certiorari was instituted in this court praying that an order be issued directing the secretary of the
Public Service Commission to certify forthwith to this court the records of all proceedings in case No.
56641; that this court, after hearing, render a decision declaring section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454
unconstitutional and void; that, if this court should be of the opinion that section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 454 is constitutional, a decision be rendered declaring that the provisions thereof are not
applicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939. Stated in the language of the
petitioner, it is contended:
1. That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454, without limitation, guide or rule except the unfettered
discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total abdication by
Under the first paragraph of the aforequoted section 15 of Act No. 146, as amended, no public service
can operate without a certificate of public convenience or certificate of convenience and public necessity
to the effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business will "public interests
in a proper and suitable manner." Under the second paragraph, one of the conditions which the Public
Service Commission may prescribed the issuance of the certificate provided for in the first paragraph is
that "the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumental
thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation," a
condition which is virtually a restatement of the principle already embodied in the Constitution, section 6
of Article XII, which provides that "the State may, in the interest of national welfare and defense,
establish and operate industries and means of transportation and communication, and, upon payment of
just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by
the Government. "Another condition which the Commission may prescribed, and which is assailed by the
petitioner, is that the certificate "shall be valid only for a definite period of time." As there is a relation
between the first and second paragraphs of said section 15, the two provisions must be read and
interpreted together. That is to say, in issuing a certificate, the Commission must necessarily be satisfied
that the operation of the service under said certificate during a definite period fixed therein "will
promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner." Under section 16 (a) of Commonwealth
Act. No. 146 which is a complement of section 15, the Commission is empowered to issue certificates of
public convenience whenever it "finds that the operation of the public service proposed and the
authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner."
Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under section 15 is inseparable from the
certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the Commission in determining the question
whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner.
Conversely, in determining "a definite period of time," the Commission will be guided by "public
interests," the only limitation to its power being that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a),
Commonwealth Act No. 146; Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) We have already ruled that "public interest"
furnishes a sufficient standard. (People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated June
15, 1938; People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939,
citing New York Central Securities Corporation vs. U.S.A., 287 U.S. 12, 24, 25, 77 Law. ed. 138, 145, 146;
Schenchter Poultry Corporation vs. I.S., 295, 540, 79 Law. ed. 1570, 1585; Ferrazzini vs. Gsell, 34 Phil.,
697, 711-712.)
Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that no franchise, certificate, or
any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be "for a longer period than fifty
years," and when it was ordained, in section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 454, that the Public Service Commission may prescribed as a condition for the
issuance of a certificate that it "shall be valid only for a definite period of time" and, in section 16 (a) that
"no such certificates shall be issued for a period of more than fifty years," the National Assembly meant
to give effect to the aforesaid constitutional mandate. More than this, it has thereby also declared its will
that the period to be fixed by the Public Service Commission shall not be longer than fifty years. All that
has been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is the administrative function, involving the use
discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of
"public interests in a proper and suitable manner." The fact that the National Assembly may itself
exercise the function and authority thus conferred upon the Public Service Commission does not make
the provision in question constitutionally objectionable.
The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same
time to forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby
obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which narrows the
range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain devices. As a corollary, we find
the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest time American legal
authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be exercised by the legislature
alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into the mass of judicial pronouncement, he
finds a great deal of confusion. One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of
separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegari or delegata potestas
non potest delegari, attributed to Bracton (De Legius et Consuetedinious Angliae, edited by G. E.
Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the
Roman Law (D. 17.18.3), has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments,
giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in
the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and
Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939.) Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the court.
(Dillon Catfish Drainage Dist, v. Bank of Dillon, 141 S. E. 274, 275, 143 S. Ct. 178; State vs. Knox County,
54 S. W. 2d. 973, 976, 165 Tenn. 319.) In harmony with such growing tendency, this Court, since the
decision in the case of Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility
Commissioner (34 Phil., 136), relied upon by the petitioner, has, in instances, extended its seal of
approval to the "delegation of greater powers by the legislature." (Inchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public
Utility Commissioner, 44 Phil., Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446; People vs. Fernandez & Trinidad, G.
R. No. 45655, promulgated June 15, 1938; People vs. Rosenthal & Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076, 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939; and Robb and Hilscher vs. People, G. R. No. 45866, promulgated June 12,
1939.).
Under the fourth paragraph of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 454, the power of the Public Service Commission to prescribed the conditions
"that the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality
thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable," and "that the
certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time" is expressly made applicable "to any extension
or amendment of certificates actually in force" and "to authorizations to renew and increase equipment
and properties." We have examined the legislative proceedings on the subject and have found that these
conditions were purposely made applicable to existing certificates of public convenience. The history of
Commonwealth Act No. 454 reveals that there was an attempt to suppress, by way of amendment, the
sentence "and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time," but the
attempt failed:
xxx xxx xxx
Sr. CUENCO. Señor Presidente, para otra enmienda. En la misma pagina, lineas 23 y 24, pido
que se supriman las palabras 'and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite
period time.' Esta disposicion del proyecto autoriza a la Comision de Servicios Publicos a fijar
un plazo de vigencia certificado de conveniencia publica. Todo el mundo sabe que bo se
puede determinar cuando los intereses del servicio publico requiren la explotacion de un
servicio publico y ha de saber la Comision de Servisios, si en un tiempo determinado, la
explotacion de algunos buses en cierta ruta ya no tiene de ser, sobre todo, si tiene en cuenta;
que la explotacion de los servicios publicos depende de condiciones flutuantes, asi como del
volumen como trafico y de otras condiciones. Ademas, el servicio publico se concede por la
Comision de Servicios Publicos el interes publico asi lo exige. El interes publico no tiene
duracion fija, no es permanente; es un proceso mas o menos indefinido en cuanto al tiempo.
Se ha acordado eso en el caucus de anoche.
EL PRESIDENTE PRO TEMPORE. ¿Que dice el Comite?
Sr. ALANO. El Comite siente tener que rechazar esa enmienda, en vista de que esto
certificados de conveniencia publica es igual que la franquicia: sepuede extender. Si los
servicios presentados por la compañia durante el tiempo de su certificado lo require, puede
pedir la extension y se le extendera; pero no creo conveniente el que nosotros demos un
certificado de conveniencia publica de una manera que podria pasar de cincuenta anos,
porque seria anticonstitucional.
xxx xxx xxx
By a majority vote the proposed amendment was defeated. (Sesion de 17 de mayo de 1939, Asamblea
Nacional.)
The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its existing certificates had been
granted before June 8, 1939, the date when Commonwealth Act No. 454, amendatory of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, was approved, it must be deemed to have the right of holding them in
perpetuity. Section 74 of the Philippine Bill provided that "no franchise, privilege, or concession shall be
granted to any corporation except under the conditions that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United States." The Jones Law, incorporating a similar
mandate, provided, in section 28, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or
corporation except under the conditions that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by
the Congress of the United States." Lastly, the Constitution of the Philippines provided, in section 8 of
Article XIII, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except
under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly
when the public interest so requires." The National Assembly, by virtue of the Constitution, logically
succeeded to the Congress of the United States in the power to amend, alter or repeal any franchise or
right granted prior to or after the approval of the Constitution; and when Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146
and 454 were enacted, the National Assembly, to the extent therein provided, has declared its will and
purpose to amend or alter existing certificates of public convenience.
the public as well as of the utilities themselves. Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional, either
impairing the obligation of contracts, taking property without due process, or denying the equal
protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question whether or not private property shall be
devoted to a public and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the owner to decide; and if he
voluntarily places his property in public service he cannot complain that it becomes subject to the
regulatory powers of the state. (51 C. J., sec. 21, pp. 9-10.) in the light of authorities which hold that a
certificate of public convenience constitutes neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property right,
and is mere license or privilege. (Burgess vs. Mayor & Alderman of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 100, 126 N. E.
456; Roberto vs. Commisioners of Department of Public Utilities, 262 Mass. 583, 160 N. E. 321;
Scheible vs. Hogan, 113 Ohio St. 83, 148 N. E. 581; Martz vs. Curtis [J. L.] Cartage Co. [1937], 132 Ohio St.
271, 7 N. E. [d] 220; Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. vs. Sabellano, 59 Phil., 773.)

Upon the other hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional, we are,
the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after however, of the opinion that the decision of the Public Service Commission should be reversed and the
its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation. case remanded thereto for further proceedings for the reason now to be stated. The Public Service
Commission has power, upon proper notice and hearing, "to amend, modify or revoke at any time any
certificate issued under the provisions of this Act, whenever the facts and circumstances on the strength
Nor is there any merit in petitioner's contention, that, because of the establishment of
of which said certificate was issued have been misrepresented or materially changed." (Section 16, par.
petitioner's operations prior to May 1, 1917, they are not subject to the regulations of the
[m], Commonwealth Act No. 146.) The petitioner's application here was for an increase of its equipment
Commission. Statutes for the regulation of public utilities are a proper exercise by the state of
to enable it to comply with the conditions of its certificates of public convenience. On the matter of
its police power. As soon as the power is exercised, all phases of operation of established
limitation to twenty five (25) years of the life of its certificates of public convenience, there had been
utilities, become at once subject to the police power thus called into operation. Procedures'
neither notice nor opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or present evidence. The Commission
Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 228, 40 Sup. Ct. 131, 64 Law. ed. 239,
appears to have taken advantage of the petitioner to augment petitioner's equipment in imposing the
Law v. Railroad Commission, 184 Cal. 737, 195 Pac. 423, 14 A. L. R. 249. The statute is
limitation of twenty-five (25) years which might as well be twenty or fifteen or any number of years. This
applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but
is, to say the least, irregular and should not be sanctioned. There are cardinal primary rights which must
likewise to those already established and in operation. The 'Auto Stage and Truck
be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing,
Transportation Act' (Stats. 1917, c. 213) is a statute passed in pursuance of the police power.
which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence
The only distinction recognized in the statute between those established before and those
in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., (304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773,
established after the passage of the act is in the method of the creation of their operative
999, 82 Law. ed. 1129), "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
rights. A certificate of public convenience and necessity it required for any new operation, but
requirements of fair play." Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
no such certificate is required of any transportation company for the operation which was
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
actually carried on in good faith on May 1, 1917, This distinction in the creation of their
evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan vs. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 :Law. ed.
operative rights in no way affects the power of the Commission to supervise and regulate
1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy (22 Phil., 598), "the right to adduce evidence,
them. Obviously the power of the Commission to hear and dispose of complaints is as
without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
effective against companies securing their operative rights prior to May 1, 1917, as against
conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside
those subsequently securing such right under a certificate of public convenience and
without or consideration." While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
necessity. (Motor Transit Co. et al. v. Railroad Commission of California et al., 209 Pac. 586.)
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, at least when directly attacked.
Moreover, Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the Public Service (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the
Commission but are "a part of the charter of every utility company operating or seeking to operate a genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both
franchise" in the Philippines. (Streator Aqueduct Co. v. et al., 295 Fed. 385.) The business of a common a grant and a limitation upon power.
carrier holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of
public regulation. When private property is "affected with a public interest it ceased to be juris
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the Public Service Commission
privati only." When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he,
for further proceedings in accordance with law and this decision, without any pronouncement regarding
in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for
costs. So ordered.
the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by
discounting the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must submit to control. Indeed, this right of
regulation is so far beyond question that it is well settled that the power of the state to exercise Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
legislative control over public utilities may be exercised through boards of commissioners.
(Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Company, 31 Phil., 1, citing Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113; Georgia R. & Bkg.
Co. vs. Smith, 128 U.S. 174; Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S. 517; New York etc. R. Co. vs. Bristol 151 U.S.
556, 571; Connecticut etc. R. Co. vs. Woodruff, 153 U.S. 689; Louisville etc. Ry Co. vs. Kentucky, 161 U.S.
677, 695.) This right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon the police power, and
statutes for the control and regulation of utilities are a legitimate exercise thereof, for the protection of
 [ G.R. No. 47800, December 02, 1940 ]
MAXIMO CALALANG, PETITIONER, VS. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this
court this petition for a writ of prohibition, against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and
Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending
from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas Street, from 7:30 a. m. to 12:30 p. m. and from 1:30 p. m.
to 5:30 p. m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to' Echague
Street, from 7 a. m. to 11 p.m., for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940, recommended
to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resokjfeion
aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions orCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads^fiiat on
August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal
Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved
the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-
drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting
Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus
adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not now allowed to
pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners
but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate
rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets
is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is
untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The
rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since
followed in a multitude of cases, namely: 'The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.' (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs.
Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard (10
Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature
may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has
committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U. S. vs. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The
growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the 'necessity' of the case."
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:
"Section 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may
contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a
reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all
classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications."
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative pOwer upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under
which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public
policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said
Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the
road or the trafh'c makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest."-/
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely
the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when
and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As
was said in Locke's Appeal (72 Pa. 491) : "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to
depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare
whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and
impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot
delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or
state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would
be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must
depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry
and determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeiia, G. it. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12,
1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public Service Commission, G. R. No. 47065, promulgated
June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been
made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but
in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been
relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of
discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the
promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant
to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate
business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth
Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the
state. Writ denied.

Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations icomplained of were promulgated, aims to promote
safe 'transit upon_and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the
least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at_ the bottom of the enactment of said law,
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity.,piJlje_state (U. S. vs. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from
the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent
curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.

The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins
vs. Los Angeles (195 U. S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power is a continuing
one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of
population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield
to the public good." And in People vs. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization
is bringing within the police power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within
such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of
public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after
and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many
questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered."

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-bring and economic security of all the
people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of ill the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of rowers underlying the existence of all governments on th$ time-
honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to
all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-4043 May 26, 1952
CENON S. CERVANTES, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Cenon Cervantes in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for respondent.
REYES, J.:
This is a petition to review a decision of the Auditor General denying petitioner's claim for quarters
allowance as manager of the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation, otherwise known as the
NAFCO.
It appears that petitioner was in 1949 the manager of the NAFCO with a salary of P15,000 a year. By a
resolution of the Board of Directors of this corporation approved on January 19 of that year, he was
granted quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of that month. Submitted
the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises Council for approval, the said resolution was on
August 3, 1949, disapproved by the said Committee on strenght of the recommendation of the NAFCO
auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General, (1) that quarters allowance constituted additional
compensation prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general manager
thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the
corporation did not warrant the granting of such allowance.
On March 16, 1949, the petitioner asked the Control Committee to reconsider its action and approve his
claim for allowance for January to June 15, 1949, amounting to P1,650. The claim was again referred by
the Control Committee to the auditor General for comment. The latter, in turn referred it to the NAFCO
auditor, who reaffirmed his previous recommendation and emphasized that the fact that the
corporation's finances had not improved. In view of this, the auditor General also reiterated his previous
opinion against the granting of the petitioner's claim and so informed both the Control Committee and
the petitioner. But as the petitioner insisted on his claim the Auditor General Informed him on June 19,
1950, of his refusal to modify his decision. Hence this petition for review.
The NAFCO was created by the Commonwealth Act No. 332, approved on June 18, 1939, with a capital
stock of P20,000,000, 51 per cent of which was to be able to be subscribed by the National Government
and the remainder to be offered to provincial, municipal, and the city governments and to the general
public. The management the corporation was vested in a board of directors of not more than 5 members
appointed by the president of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. But
the corporation was made subject to the provisions of the corporation law in so far as they were
compatible with the provisions of its charter and the purposes of which it was created and was to enjoy
the general powers mentioned in the corporation law in addition to those granted in its charter. The
members of the board were to receive each a per diem of not to exceed P30 for each day of meeting
actually attended, except the chairman of the board, who was to be at the same time the general
manager of the corporation and to receive a salary not to exceed P15,000 per annum.
On October 4, 1946, Republic Act No. 51 was approved authorizing the President of the Philippines,
among other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled
corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation Pursuant
to this authority, the President on October 4, 1947, promulgated Executive Order No. 93 creating the
Government Enterprises Council to be composed of the President of the Philippines as chairman, the
Secretary of Commerce and Industry as vice-chairman, the chairman of the board of directors and
managing heads of all such corporations as ex-officio members, and such additional members as the
President might appoint from time to time with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The
council was to advise the President in the excercise of his power of supervision and control over these
corporations and to formulate and adopt such policy and measures as might be necessary to coordinate
their functions and activities. The Executive Order also provided that the council was to have a Control
Committee composed of the Secretary of Commerce and Industry as chairman, a member to be
designated by the President from among the members of the council as vice-chairman and the secretary
as ex-officio member, and with the power, among others —
(1) To supervise, for and under the direction of the President, all the corporations owned or
controlled by the Government for the purpose of insuring efficiency and economy in their
operations;
(2) To pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by
the respective Boards of Directors of the said corporations; and
(3) To carry out the policies and measures formulated by the Government Enterprises Council
with the approval of the President. (Sec. 3, Executive Order No. 93.)
With its controlling stock owned by the Government and the power of appointing its directors vested in
the President of the Philippines, there can be no question that the NAFCO is Government controlled
corporation subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 51 and the executive order (No. 93)
promulgated in accordance therewith. Consequently, it was also subject to the powers of the Control
Committee created in said executive order, among which is the power of supervision for the purpose of
insuring efficiency and economy in the operations of the corporation and also the power to pass upon
the program of activities and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by the board of directors. It
can hardly be questioned that under these powers the Control Committee had the right to pass upon,
and consequently to approve or disapprove, the resolution of the NAFCO board of directors granting
quarters allowance to the petitioners as such allowance necessarily constitute an item of expenditure in
the corporation's budget. That the Control Committee had good grounds for disapproving the resolution
is also clear, for, as pointed out by the Auditor General and the NAFCO auditor, the granting of the
allowance amounted to an illegal increase of petitioner's salary beyond the limit fixed in the corporate
charter and was furthermore not justified by the precarious financial condition of the corporation.
It is argued, however, that Executive Order No. 93 is null and void, not only because it is based on a law
that is unconstitutional as an illegal delegation of legislature power to executive, but also because it was
promulgated beyond the period of one year limited in said law.
The second ground ignores the rule that in the computation of the time for doing an act, the first day is
excluded and the last day included (Section 13 Rev. Ad. Code.) As the act was approved on October 4,
1946, and the President was given a period of one year within which to promulgate his executive order
and that the order was in fact promulgated on October 4, 1947, it is obvious that under the above rule
the said executive order was promulgated within the period given.
As to the first ground, the rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is
established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in
authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in government-
controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the
exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines
and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the
policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in
question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative
power.

It is also contended that the quarters allowance is not compensation and so the granting of it to the
petitioner by the NAFCO board of directors does not contravene the provisions of the NAFCO charter
that the salary of the chairman of said board who is also to be general manager shall not exceed P15,000
per anum. But regardless of whether quarters allowance should be considered as compensation or not,
the resolution of the board of the directors authorizing payment thereof to the petitioner cannot be
given effect since it was disapproved by the Control Committee in the exercise of powers granted to it by
Executive Order No. 93. And in any event, petitioner's contention that quarters allowance is not
compensation, a proposition on which American authorities appear divided, cannot be insisted on behalf
of officers and employees working for the Government of the Philippines and its Instrumentalities,
including, naturally, government-controlled corporations. This is so because Executive Order No. 332 of
1941, which prohibits the payment of additional compensation to those working for the Government
and its Instrumentalities, including government-controlled corporations, was in 1945 amended by
Executive Order No. 77 by expressly exempting from the prohibition the payment of quarters allowance
"in favor of local government officials and employees entitled to this under existing law." The
amendment is a clear indication that quarters allowance was meant to be included in the term
"additional compensation", for otherwise the amendment would not have expressly excepted it from the
prohibition. This being so, we hold that, for the purpose of the executive order just mentioned, quarters
allowance is considered additional compensation and, therefore, prohibited.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for review is dismissed, with costs.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to
act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121,
124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.1 Soon after the
date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders
and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has
been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that
not all proper parties — referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question — have
been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the
aforementioned executive orders — because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios
composing the new political subdivisions — intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M.
Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except
under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions
hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created
or the name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon
recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed
barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a
resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council:
Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five
hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created
or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a
barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without
creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. This
theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's argument, which is that the statutory
denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to
create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is
too obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset
except by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation,
subsequent to the passage of Republic Act No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are
based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the
boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal
district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised
therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political
division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such
subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change
the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the
Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to
be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by
the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary
a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial
officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and
advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict
the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so
formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority,
an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall
be made in such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General
and approved by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not
amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs.
Municipality of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for
said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from
an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the
time of and prior to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of
Binañgonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) — in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No.
1748, of the common boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature —
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said
municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the
language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425,
January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29,
1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs.
Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of
statutes."
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in
the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate
upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by
adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus
nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and,
consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to
be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the
last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may
require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of
the government may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said
Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748, 3 which provided that, "whenever in the judgment of
the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect the changes
enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the seat of the government "to
such place ... as the public interest requires." The opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 —
which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code — governed the time at which,
or the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of
the first sentence of said section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government
was to be transferred.
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe
transitupon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the
authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the
sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to
the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation of
municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in
character. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power
is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislativequestion "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal
Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-
349). As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the question as to whether
incorporation is for the best interest of the community in any case is emphatically a question of public
policy and statecraft" (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative powers,
state laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine whether certain territories should
be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-359); or vesting in a Commission the
right to determine the plan and frame of government of proposed villages and what functions shall be
exercised by the same, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by statute
(In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given
town or village incorporated, and designate its metes and bounds, upon petition of a majority of the
taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel
Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and
population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on
certain determination by a court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the
court is allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be included
in the village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to
enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may require" (In re Villages of
North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine
whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the "public interest" and
whether the requirements of the law had been complied with, in which case the board shall enter an
order creating a municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal
Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the case
of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The
Schechter case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act
authorizing the President of the United States to approve "codes of fair competition" submitted to him
by one or more trade or industrial associations or corporations which "impose no inequitable restrictions
on admission to membership therein and are truly representative," provided that such codes are not
designed "to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to
discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court
held:

To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we
It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe
assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other
rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate
clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil.
administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of
328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards
codes to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside
for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases — as
from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described
all judicial pronouncements — must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved
in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few
therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect. 4 The law
restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing
construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
 codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the
country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code making authority thus conferred is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually
unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that
"public welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of
the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal
impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may
be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of
the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the
democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court
to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for
the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the
fact that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can
hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.
authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or
offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply
with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local
governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the
process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations
than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section
68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed
by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent
with said statutory enactment.7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a) that "not all the
proper parties" — referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities — "have been impleaded
in this case," and (b) that "the present petition is premature."
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not claim, that
the officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed office. At any rate,
the Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the officer
authorized by law "to act and represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any
official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised
Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the aforementioned municipalities, which
involves a political, not proprietary, function, said local officials, if any, are mere agents or
representatives of the national government. Their interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in
effect, duly represented.8

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the executive
such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices
order & in question and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is, however, a
of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the
matter of common, public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the President has, for many
Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations and that the same have been organized
fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local
and in actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures incidental
governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence,
thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General Auditing Office and its
the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the
officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that respondent would adopt a different policy as
scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or
regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and
refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it
none has been made by him.
that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he
vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter
how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
board.5 implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It
is so ordered.
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its
officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a
new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the
Constitution.

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices
implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the
exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to Separate Opinions
abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power
of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring and dissenting:
A sign of progress in a developing nation is the rise of new municipalities. Fostering their rapid growth
has long been the aim pursued by all three branches of our Government.
So it was that the Governor-General during the time of the Jones Law was given authority by the
Legislature (Act No. 1748) to act upon certain details with respect to said local governments, such as
fixing of boundaries, subdivisions and mergers. And the Supreme Court, within the framework of the
Jones Law, ruled in 1917 that the execution or implementation of such details, did not entail abdication
of legislative power (Government vs. Municipality of Binañgonan, 34 Phil. 518; Municipality of Cardona
vs. Municipality of Binañgonan, 36 Phil. 547). Subsequently, Act No. 1748's aforesaid statutory
authorization was embodied in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. And Chief Executives since
then up to the present continued to avail of said provision, time and again invoking it to issue executive
orders providing for the creation of municipalities.
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to
create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds
thereby stood to be disbursed in implementation of said executive orders.
Suing as private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed in this Court a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain the respondent
or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.
Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality by executive order. It is
argued that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, so far as it purports to grant any such
power, is invalid or, at the least, already repealed, in light of the Philippine Constitution and Republic Act
2370 (The Barrio Charter).
Section 68 is again reproduced hereunder for convenience:
SEC. 68. General authority of [Governor-General) President of the Philippines to fix boundaries
and make new subdivisions. — The [Governor-General] President of the Philippines may by
executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince,
municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or
diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more
subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may
be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new
subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the
[Philippine Legislature] Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the
boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into
one or more subprovinces. When action by the [Governor-General] President of the
Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the
jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the [Governor-General]
President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the
Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the
several officers to the new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority,
an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall
be made in such manner as may be recommended by the [Insular Auditor] Auditor General
and approved by the [Governor-General] President of the Philippines.
From such working I believe that power to create a municipality is included: to "separate any political
division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any such subdivisions or
portions with another, name any new subdivision so created." The issue, however, is whether the
legislature can validly delegate to the Executive such power.
The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American authorities have therefore
favored the view that it cannot be delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to create
municipalities but only the power to determine the existence of facts under which creation of a
municipality will result (37 Am. Jur. 628).
The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the delegate as to whether the
municipal corporation should be created. If so, there is an attempted delegation of legislative power and
the statute is invalid (Ibid.). Now Section 68 no doubt gives the President such discretion, since it says
that the President "may by executive order" exercise the powers therein granted. Furthermore, Section 5
of the same Code states:
SEC. 5. Exercise of administrative discretion — The exercise of the permissive powers of all
executive or administrative officers and bodies is based upon discretion, and when such
officer or body is given authority to do any act but not required to do such act, the doing of
the same shall be dependent on a sound discretion to be exercised for the good of the service
and benefit of the public, whether so expressed in the statute giving the authority or not.
Under the prevailing rule in the United States — and Section 68 is of American origin — the provision in
question would be an invalid attempt to delegate purely legislative powers, contrary to the principle of
separation of powers.
It is very pertinent that Section 68 should be considered with the stream of history in mind. A proper
knowledge of the past is the only adequate background for the present. Section 68 was adopted half a
century ago. Political change, two world wars, the recognition of our independence and rightful place in
the family of nations, have since taken place. In 1917 the Philippines had for its Organic Act the Jones
Law. And under the setup ordained therein no strict separation of powers was adhered to. Consequently,
Section 68 was not constitutionally objectionable at the time of its enactment.
The advent of the Philippine Constitution in 1935 however altered the situation. For not only was
separation of powers strictly ordained, except only in specific instances therein provided, but the power
of the Chief Executive over local governments suffered an explicit reduction.
Formerly, Section 21 of the Jones Law provided that the Governor-General "shall have general
supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government in the Philippine Islands."
Now Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Philippine Constitution provides: "The President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
In short, the power of control over local governments had now been taken away from the Chief
Executive. Again, to fully understand the significance of this provision, one must trace its development
and growth.
As early as April 7, 1900 President McKinley of the United States, in his Instructions to the Second It is my view, therefore, that the Constitution, and not Republic Act 2370, repealed Section 68 of the
Philippine Commission, laid down the policy that our municipal governments should be "subject to the Revised Administrative Code's provision giving the President authority to create local governments. And
least degree of supervision and control" on the part of the national government. Said supervision and for this reason I agree with the ruling in the majority opinion that the executive orders in question are
control was to be confined within the "narrowest limits" or so much only as "may be necessary to secure null and void.
and enforce faithful and efficient administration by local officers." And the national government "shall
have no direct administration except of matters of purely general concern." (See Hebron v. Reyes, L-
In thus ruling, the Court is but sustaining the fulfillment of our historic desire to be free and independent
9158, July 28, 1958.)
under a republican form of government, and exercising a function derived from the very sovereignty that
it upholds. Executive orders declared null and void.
All this had one aim, to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in the art of self-government, with the
end in view of later allowing them to assume complete management and control of the administration of Makalintal and Regala, JJ., concur.
their local affairs. Such aim is the policy now embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Constitution
(Rodriguez v. Montinola, 50 O.G. 4820).
Footnotes
It is the evident decree of the Constitution, therefore, that the President shall have no power of control
1
over local governments. Accordingly, Congress cannot by law grant him such power (Hebron v. Reyes,
supra). And any such power formerly granted under the Jones Law thereby became unavoidably
inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution.
Executive Order Municipality Province Date Annex
No. Promulgated
It remains to examine the relation of the power to create and the power to control local governments.
Said relationship has already been passed upon by this Court in Hebron v. Reyes, supra. In said case, it
was ruled that the power to control is an incident of the power to create or abolish municipalities. 93 Nilo Zamboanga del Sept. 4, 1964 A (Original
Respondent's view, therefore, that creating municipalities and controlling their local governments are Sur Petition)
"two worlds apart," is untenable. And since as stated, the power to control local governments can no
longer be conferred on or exercised by the President, it follows a fortiori that the power to create them, 94 Midsalip " " " " " "B "
all the more cannot be so conferred or exercised.
95 Pitogo " " " " " "C "
I am compelled to conclude, therefore, that Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Constitution has repealed
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code as far as the latter empowers the President to create local 96 Maruing " " " " " "D "
governments. Repeal by the Constitution of prior statutes inconsistent with it has already been sustained
in De los Santos v. MaIlare, 87 Phil. 289. And it was there held that such repeal differs from a declaration 97 Naga " " " " " "E "
of unconstitutionality of a posterior legislation, so much so that only a majority vote of the Court is
needed to sustain a finding of repeal. 99 Sebaste Antique " 26 "F "

Since the Constitution repealed Section 68 as far back as 1935, it is academic to ask whether Republic Act 100 Molugan Misamis " " "G "
2370 likewise has provisions in conflict with Section 68 so as to repeal it. Suffice it to state, at any rate, Oriental
that statutory prohibition on the President from creating a barrio does not, in my opinion, warrant the
inference of statutory prohibition for creating a municipality. For although municipalities consist of 101 Malixi Surigao del Sur " 28 "H "
barrios, there is nothing in the statute that would preclude creation of new municipalities out of pre-
existing barrios. 102 Roxas Davao " " "I "

It is not contrary to the logic of local autonomy to be able to create larger political units and unable to 103 Magsaysay " " " "J "
create smaller ones. For as long ago observed in President McKinley's Instructions to the Second
Philippine Commission, greater autonomy is to be imparted to the smaller of the two political units. The 104 Sta. Maria " " " "K "
smaller the unit of local government, the lesser is the need for the national government's intervention in
its political affairs. Furthermore, for practical reasons, local autonomy cannot be given from the top 105 Badiangan Iloilo " " "L "
downwards. The national government, in such a case, could still exercise power over the supposedly
autonomous unit, e.g., municipalities, by exercising it over the smaller units that comprise them, e.g., the
106 Mina " Oct. 1, "M "
barrios. A realistic program of decentralization therefore calls for autonomy from the bottom upwards,
so that it is not surprising for Congress to deny the national government some power over barrios
without denying it over municipalities. For this reason, I disagree with the majority view that because the 107 Andong Lanao del Sur " " "N "
President could not create a barrio under Republic Act 2370, a fortiori he cannot create a municipality.
108 San Alonto " " " " " "O "
 2aPeople vs. Lim Ho, L-12091-2, January 28, 1960; People vs. Jolliffe, L-9553, May 13, 1959;
109 Maguing " " " " " "P " People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56; U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1; Compania General de Tabacos vs.
Board of Public Utility, 34 Phil. 136; Mutual Film Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 247,
110 Dianaton " " " " " "Q " 59 L. Ed. 561; Mutual Film Corp. vs. Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230, 59 L. Ed. 552;
Pamana Refining Co. vs. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 79 L. Ed. 446; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. vs.
111 Elpidio Quirino Mt. Province " " "R " U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 79 L Ed. 1570; U.S. vs. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 83 L. Ed. 1446;
Bowles vs. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 88 L. Ed. 892; Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, L-8895, April 30,
112 Bayog Zamboanga del " " "S " 1957; Cervantes vs. Auditor General, L-4043, May 26, 1952; Phil. Association of Colleges vs.
Sur Sec. of Education, 51 Off. Gaz. 6230; People vs. Arnault, 48 Off. Gaz. 4805; Antamok Gold
Fields vs. CIR, 68 Phil. 340; U.S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327; Yakus vs. White, 321 U.S. 414;
117 Gloria Oriental " " "GG (Attached Ammann vs. Mailonce, 332 U.S. 245.
Mindoro hereto)
2bVigan Electric Light Company, Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission, L-19850, January 30,
113 Maasin Cotabato " " "T 1964.

114 Siayan Zamboanga del " " "LC 3 Whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by
Norte executive order, enlarge, contract, or otherwise change the boundary of any province,
subprovince, municipality, or township or other political subdivision, or separate any such
115 Roxas " " " " " "V subdivision into such portions as may be required as aforesaid, merge any of such
subdivisions or portions with another, divide any province into one or more subprovinces as
116P Panganuran " " " " " "W may be required as aforesaid, any new subdivision so created, change the seat of government
within any subdivision, existing or created hereunder, to such place therein as the public
interests require, and shall fix in such executive order the date when the change, merger,
118 Kalilangan Bukidnon " " "X
separation, or other action shall take effect. Whenever such action as aforesaid creates a new
political subdivision the Governor-General shall appoint such officers for the new subdivision
119 Lantapan " " " "Y with such powers and duties as may be required by the existing provisions of law applicable
to the case and fix their salaries; such appointees shall hold office until their successors are
120 Libertad Zamboanga del " " "Z elected or appointed and qualified. Successors to the elective offices shall be elected at the
Sur next general election following such appointment. Such equitable distribution of the funds of
changed subdivisions between the subdivisions affected shall be as is recommended by the
121 General Aguinaldo " " " " " "AA Insular Auditor and approved by the Governor-General.

124 Rizal Surigao del " 3 "BB 4McGirr vs. Hamilton, 30 Phil. 563; Hebron vs. Reyes, L-9124. July 28, 1958; U. S. vs. More, 3
Norte Cranch 159, 172; U. S vs. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 319; Cross vs. Burke, 146 U.S. 82; Louisville
Trust Co. vs. Knott, 191 U.S. 225. See also, 15 C.J. 929-940; 21 C.J.S. 297, 299; 14 Am. Jur. 345.
126 Tigno Surigao del Sur " 23 "CC
5Hebron vs. Reyes, L-9124, July 28, 1958; Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz. 2884; Rodriguez
127 Tampakan Cotabato " 26 "DD vs. Montinola, 50 Off. Gaz. 4820; Querubin vs. Castro, L-9779, July 31, 1958.

128 Maco Davao " 29 "EE 6 Pursuant to Section 2179 of the Revised Administrative Code:
129 New Corella " " " "FF
"When a part of a barrio is detached from a municipality to form a new
municipality or to be added to an existing municipality, any officer of the old
1AExcept to local governments, to which legislative powers, with respect to matters of local municipality living in the detached territory may continue to hold his office and
concern, may be delegated. exert the functions thereof for the remainder of his term; but if he is resident of a
barrio the whole of which is detached, his office shall be deemed to be vacated."
2
Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; Pangasinan Transp Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 70
Phil. 221; Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil. 394;
7 De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289, 298-299.
Mulford vs. Smith, 307 U.S. 38.
8Mangubat vs. Osmeña, Jr., L-12837, April 20, 1959; City of Cebu vs. Judge Piccio, L-13012 &
L-14876, December 31, 1960.
G.R. No. L-19850 January 30, 1964
VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.
Federico S. Arlos and P. H. del Pilar for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an original action for certiorari to annul an order of respondent Public Service Commission. Upon
the filing of the petition and the submission and approval of the corresponding bond, we issued a writ of
injunction restraining said respondent from enforcing the order complained of Republic Act No. 316,
approved on June 19, 1948, granted petitioner Vigan Electric Light Company, Inc., a franchise to
construct, maintain and operate an electric light, heat and/or power plant for the purpose of generating
and distributing light, heat and/or power, for sale within the limits of several municipalities of the
province of Ilocos Sur. Accordingly, petitioner secured from respondent on May 31, 1950, a certificate of
public convenience to render electric light, heat and/or power services in said municipalities and to
charge its customers and/or consumers the following rates:
FLAT RATE
1 — 20 watt bulb per month ............................................................ P2.30
1 — 25 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 3.00
1 — 40 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 4.50
1 — 50 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 5.50
1 — 60 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 6.50
1 — 75 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 7.50
1 — 80 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 8.00
1 — 100 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 9.00
1 — 150 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 13.00
1 — 200 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 17.00
METER RATE
For the first 15
For the first 15 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ P0.40
For the next 35 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ .30
For the next 50 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ .25
For all over 100 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ .20
Minimum Charge: P6.00 per month for connection of 200 watts
or less; plus P0.01 per watt per month for connection in excess
of 200 watts.
TEMPORARY RATE
P0.01 per watt per night.
On May 22, 1957, petitioner, acting with respondent's approval, entered into a contract for the purchase
of electric power and energy from the National Power Corporation, for resale, in the course of the
business of said petitioner, to its customers, to whom, in fact, petitioner resold said electric power and
energy, in accordance with the above schedule of rates. About five (5) years later, or on January 16,
1962, respondent advised petitioner of a conference to be held on February 12, 1962 for the purpose of
revising its authorized rates. Soon thereafter, petitioner received a letter of respondent informing the
former of an alleged letter-petition of "Congressman Floro Crisologo and 107 alleged residents of Vigan
Ilocos Sur", charging the following:
We also denounce the sale of TWO THOUSAND (2,000) ELECTRIC METERS in blackmarket by
the Vigan Electric Light Company to Avegon Co., as anomalous and illegal. Said electric meters
were imported from Japan by the Vigan Electric Light Company in behalf of the consumers of
electric current from said electric company. The Vigan Electric Light Company has
commercialized these privilege which property belong to the people.
We also report that the electric meters in Vigan used by the consumers had been installed in
bad faith and they register excessive rates much more than the actual
consumption.1äwphï1.ñët
and directing the petitioner to comment on these charges. In reply to said communications, petitioner's
counsel wrote to respondent, on February 1, 1962, a letter asking that the conference scheduled for
February 12 be postponed to March 12, and another letter stating inter alia:
In connection therewith, please be informed that my client, the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc.,
has not had any dealing with the Avegon Co., Inc., relative to the 2,000 electric meter
mentioned in the petition. Attached hereto as Annex "1" and made an integral part thereof is
a certification to that effect by Avegon Co., Inc.
Furthermore, as counsel for Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc., I wish to inform this Honorable
Commission that the charge that said company installed the electric meters in bad faith and
that said meters registered excessive rates could have no valid basis because all of these
meters have been inspected checked, tested and sealed by your office.
On March 15, 1962, petitioner received a communication form the General Auditing Office notifying him
that one Mr. Cesar A. Damole had "been instructed to make an audit and examination of the books and
other records of account" of said petitioner, "under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 325 and in
accordance with the request of the Public Service Commission contained in its letter dated March 12,
1962", and directing petitioner to cooperate with said Mr. Damole "for the successful accomplishment of
his work". Subsequently, respondent issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioner to produce
before the former, during a conference scheduled for April 10, 1962, certain books of account and
financial statements specified in said process. On the date last mentioned petitioner moved to quash
the subpoena duces tecum. The motion was not acted upon in said conference of April 10, 1962.
However, it was then decided that the next conference be held on April 30, 1962, which was later
postponed to May 21, 1962. When petitioner's representatives appeared before respondent, on the date
last mentioned, they were advised by the latter that the scheduled conference had been cancelled, that
the petition to quash the subpoena duces tecum had been granted, and that, on May 17, 1962,
respondent had issued an order, from which we quote:
We now have the audit report of the General Auditing Office dated May 4, 1962, covering the
operation of the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. in Vigan, Bantay and Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, for the
period from January 1 to December 31, 1961. We find from the report that the total invested
capital of the utility as of December 31, 1961, entitled to return amounted to P118,132.55,
and its net operating income for rate purposes of P53,692.34 represents 45.45% of its
invested capital; that in order to earn 12% per annum, the utility should have a computed
revenue by rates of P182,012.78; and that since it realized an actual revenue by rates of
P221,529.17, it had an excess revenue by rates of P39,516.39, which is 17.84% of the actual
revenue by rates and 33.45% of the invested capital. In other words, the present rates of the
Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. may be reduced by 17.84%, or in round figure, by 18%.
Upon consideration of the foregoing, and finding that the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is
making a net operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital,
we believe that it is in the public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 3043 that reduction of its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect
immediately.
WHEREFORE, Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to reduce the present meter rates
for its electric service effective upon the billing for the month of June, 1962, to wit:
METER RATE — 24-HOUR SERVICE
For the first 15 kwh per month at P0.328 per kwh
For the next 35 kwh per month at P0.246 per kwh
For the next 50 kwh per month at P0.205 per kwh
For all over 100 kwh per month at P0.164 per kwh
Minimum Charge: P4.90 per month for connection of 200 was or less plus P0.01
per watt per month for connection in excess of 200 watts.
TEMPORARY LIGHTING
P0.01 per watt per night.
Minimum Charge: P1.00
Billings to customers shall be made to the nearest multiple of five centavos. The above rates may be
revised, modified or altered at anytime for any just cause and/or in the public service.
Soon later, or on June 25, 1962, petitioner herein instituted the present action for certiorari to annul said
order of May 17, 1962, upon the ground that, since its Corporate inception in 1948, petitioner it "never
was able to give and never made a single dividend declaration in favor of its stockholders" because its
operation from 1949 to 1961 had resulted in an aggregate loss of P113,351.523; that in the conference
above mentioned petitioner had called the attention of respondent to the fact that the latter had not
furnished the former a "copy of the alleged letter-petition of Congressman Crisologo and others"; that
respondent then expressed the view that there was no necessity of serving copy of said letter to
petitioner, because respondent was merely holding informal conferences to ascertain whether petitioner
would consent to the reduction of its rates; that petitioner objected to said reduction without a hearing,
alleging that its rates could be reduced only if proven by evidence validly adduced to be excessive; that
petitioner offered to introduce evidence to show the reasonableness of its aforementioned rates, and
even the fairness of its increase; that petitioner was then assured that it would be furnished a copy of
the aforementioned letter-petition and that a hearing would be held, if a reduction of its rates could not
be agreed upon; that petitioner had not even been served a copy of the auditor's report upon which the
order complained of is based; that such order had been issued without notice and hearing; and that,
accordingly, petitioner had been denied due process.
In its answer respondent admitted some allegations of the complaint and denied other allegations
thereof, particularly the conclusions drawn by petitioner. Likewise, respondent alleged that it granted
petitioner's motion to quash the aforementioned subpoena duces tecum because the documents therein
referred to had already been audited and examined by the General Auditing Office, the report on which
was on file with said respondent; that the latter had directed that petitioner be served a copy of said
report; and that, although this has not, as yet, been actually done, petitioner could have seen and
examined said report had it really wanted to do so. By way of special defenses, respondent, moreover,
alleged that the disputed order had been issued under its delegated legislative authority, the exercise of
which does not require previous notice and hearing; and that petitioner had not sought a
reconsideration of said order, and had, accordingly, failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
In support of its first special defense respondent maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that
legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice of hearing;
and that the decision in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil., 635) — in which we held that
such notice and hearing are essential to the validity of a decision of the Public Service Commission — is
not in point because, unlike the order complained of — which respondent claims to be legislative in
nature — the Ang Tibay case referred to a proceeding involving the exercise of judicial functions.
At the outset, it should be noted, however, that, consistently with the principle of separation of powers,
which underlies our constitutional system, legislative powers may not be delegated except to local
governments, and only to matters purely of local concern (Rubi vs. Provincia Board, 39 Phil., 660; U.S. vs.
Heinszen, 206 U.S. 370). However, Congress may delegate to administrative agencies of the government
the power to supply the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by a which is
complete in itself (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service
Commission, 70 Phil., 221; People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil., 328; People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Cruz vs.
Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394; U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil., 1;
Schechter vs. U.S., 295 U.S., 495 Mulford vs. Smith, 307 U.S., 38; Bowles vs. Willingham, 321 U.S., 503).
Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or
determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative
body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said Policy (People vs. Lim Ho, L-
12091, January 28, 1960; Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, L-8895, April 30, 1957; Cervantes vs. Auditor General, L- services and other parties concerned, giving them reasonable opportunity to be heard, ... .
4043, May 26, 1952; Philippine Association of Colleges vs. Secretary of Education, 51 Off. Gaz., 6230; (Emphasis supplied.)
People vs. Arnault, 48 Off. Gaz., 4805; Antamok Gold Fields vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 68 Phil., 340;
U.S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil., 327; Yakus vs. White, 321 U.S., 414; Ammann vs. Mallonce, 332 U.S., 245; U.S.
Since compliance with law must be presumed, it should be assumed that petitioner's current rates were
vs. Rock Royal Corp. 307 U.S., 533; Mutual Film Corp. vs. Industrial Commission, 276 U.S., 230).
fixed by respondent after proper notice and hearing. Hence, modification of such rates cannot be made,
Otherwise, there would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted within
over petitioner's objection, without such notice and hearing, particularly considering that the factual
the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the power of legislation would eventually be exercised
basis of the action taken by respondent is assailed by petitioner. The rule applicable is set forth in the
by a branch of the Government other than that in which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not
American Jurisprudence the following language:
only of the allocation of powers therein made, but, also, of the principle of separation of powers. Hence,
Congress his not delegated, and cannot delegate legislative powers to the Public Service Commission.
Whether notice and a hearing in proceedings before a public service commission are
necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional provisions applicable to such
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates — when such rules and/or
proceedings, which make notice and hearing, prerequisite to action by the commission,
rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines — may partake of a
and upon the nature and object of such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are, on
legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same
the one hand, legislative and rule-making in character, or are, on the other hand,
applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact — based
determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial, affecting the rights an property of private or
upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office — that petitioner is making a profit of more than
specific persons. As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be
12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-
heard as to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service
examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or
commission.(43 Am. Jur. 716; Emphasis supplied.)
explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of
a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order complained of partakes of
the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that having been issued without previous notice and hearing
said order is clearly violative of the due process clause, and, hence, null and void, so that a motion for
Indeed, sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, explicitly require notice Indeed hearing.
reconsideration thereof is not an absolute prerequisite to the institution of the present action
The pertinent parts thereof provide:
for certiorari (Ayson vs. Republic. 50 Off. Gaz., 5810). For this reason considering that said order was
being made effective on June 1, 1962, or almost immediately after its issuance (on May 17, 1962), we
SEC. 16. The Commission shall have the power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance find that petitioner was justified in commencing this proceedings without first filing said motion
with the rules and provision of this Act, subject to the limitations and exception mentioned (Guerrero vs. Carbonell, L-7180, March 15, 1955).
and saving provisions to the contrary:
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and the preliminary injunction issued by this Court hereby
xxx xxx xxx made permanent. It is so ordered.

(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls charges, classifications, or schedules
thereof, as well as commutation, mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be
imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the
Commission may in its discretion approve rates proposed by public services provisionally
and without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereof within thirty days
thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory
affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service equipment of an operator is use
principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business the net profits of said
private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for
the purpose of fixing the rates.

SEC. 20. Acts requiring the approval of the Commission. — Subject to established limitations
and exception and saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any public service
or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the approval and authorization of the
Commission previously had —

(a) To adopt, establish, fix, impose, maintain, collect or carry into effect any individual or joint
rates, commutation mileage or other special rate, toll, fare, charge, classification or itinerary.
The Commission shall approve only those that are just and reasonable and not any that are
unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential, only upon reasonable notice to the public