DUE PROCESS AND EMINENT DOMAIN

LBP vs Hababag G.R. No. 172352, June 08, 2016

Digested by : Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts:

Land Bank filed a motion for reconsideration pertaining to the decision of the court as to the imposition
of interest to an unpaid amount of just compensation for taking of land owned by the respondent. LBP
contends that it had paid respondent a substantial amount of the just compensation and thus it should
no longer be liable for the payment of interest.

Issue:

Whether or not LBP is obliged to pay for interest despite payment of substantial amount of the just
compensation.

Ruling:

Yes, Land Bank should be obliged to pay the payment of interest. The value of the landholdings
themselves should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due, and that interest is
due and should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal sum after the taking has
been completed. The interest involved in the present case "runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter
of course from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as
of the date of taking.
DUE PROCESS AND EMINENT DOMAIN

NPC vs Manalastas G.R. No. 196140, January 27, 2016

Digested by : Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts:

The National Power Corporation took the land of the respondents without first taking the process of
expropriation and the payment of Just Compensation. They entered into the private property of the
respondents without the latter’s consent. Respondent filed an expropriation complaint against NPC with
the RTC. Upon determination of Just Compensation, RTC included in the computation the inflation rate
at that time.

Issue: Whether or not Inflation rate should be factored in the computation of Just Compensation.

Ruling:

No, it should not be. The formula for determination of just compensation to landowners does not include
the factor for inflation rate, as inflation is properly accounted for through payment of interest on the
amount due to the landowner, and through the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees in cases
where there was irregularity in the taking of property.
DUE PROCESS AND EMINENT DOMAIN

Republic vs Macabagdal G.R. No. 227215, January 10, 2018

Digested by : Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts:

DPWH as representative of the Republic filed an expropriation complaint against respondent. The
property of the respondent to form part of the C-5 North Link Road Project. DPWH filed for a writ of
possession upon making a provisional deposit. During the judicial determination of just compensation,
RTC imposed a legal interest rate of 12% per annum on the unpaid balance computed from the date of
taking of the subject lot until full payment. Petitioner assailed the imposition of 12% per annum interest
rate on the ground that BSP issued monetary board circular making legal interest rate at only 6% per
annum. CA modified RTC’s decision imposing only 12% per annum from the time of taking or issuance of
writ of possession until June 30, 2013 and from July 1, 2013 until full payment is made the legal interest
is at 6% per annum.

Issue:

Whether the interest to be imposed is subject to the BSP monetary board circular.

Ruling:

Yes, Interest rate to be imposed is subject to the issuance of the BSP. Delay in the payment of just
compensation amounts to an effective forbearance of money, entitling the landowner to interest on the
difference in the amount between the final amount as adjudged by the court and the initial payment
made by the government. The legal interest rate shall be as fixed by the BSP through the monetary circular
and it shall run not from the date of filing the complaint but from the issuance of the writ of possession
since it is from this date that the fact of deprivation of property can be established.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Biraogo et al. vs PH Truth Commission G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010

Digested by : Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts:

The case stemmed from the issuance of Executive Order no. 1 issued by President Benigno Aquino
creating the Philippine Truth Commission. Its mandate is to examine past events, investigate patterns of
abuse allegedly committed by the previous administration. Petitioners averred that this order illegally
amended the constitution as it grants a quasi-judicial power to the commission which in a duplicates or
supersedes the powers of the Ombudsman, only that it will only be after to the officials of the previous
administration.

Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 is unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling:

Yes, Executive Order No. 1 is unconstitutional violating the equal protection clause granted by the
constitution. It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Manotok vs Heirs of Barque G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010

Digested by : Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts:

This is a case in relation to property ownership of Lot No. 823 which is part of Piedad Estate originally
owned by the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the
British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands.

On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government pursuant to the Friar
Lands Act. The certificate of title in the name of the government was OCT No. 614. The Estate was placed
under the administration of the Director of Lands.

Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after a fire gutted portions of the Quezon
City Hall on June 11, 1988 which destroyed records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds.

In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 372302
covering Lot No. 823 with an area of 342,945 square meters GRANTED TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) was
issued in 1991. In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer Barque also covering Lot 823. In support of their
petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owner’s duplicate of the TCT, real estate tax receipts,
tax declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D covering the property.

The Court has explained the nature of equal protection guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed
or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Garcia vs Drilon G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

Digested by : Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts:

The case stemmed from a the filing of an action against herein petitioner by his spouse for
violation of RA 9269 entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes."
Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of this law as to him it is violative of the due process and the equal
protection clause of the constitution.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9262 runs counter with due process and equal protection clause

Ruling:

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but
on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that
are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by the territory within which it is to operate.

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.

It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield
to the necessities of protecting vital public interests,103among which is protection of women and
children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Aquino vs PPA G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

Digested by : Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts: The case presented an issue regarding salaries and benefits received by employees/officials of PPA
having the position of supervisor and above who were appointed in the position after July 1, 1989. They
are the parties which in the case is considered as the second categories of employees/officials. They
assailed the constitutionality of COA disallowance upon them based on the enactment of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6758 entitled "An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification in the
Government and for Other Purposes" otherwise known as The Salary Standardization Law. Prior to this
law is the letter of instruction issued by then President Marcos granting to its officials holding managerial
and supervisory positions representation and transportation allowance (RATA) in an amount equivalent
to 40% of their basic salary. This letter of instruction was superseded by the Salary Standardization Act
which took effect on July 1, 1989. Only those incumbent to the position and were hired before July 1,
1989 were given the RATA while those hired to the position after July 1, 1989 were disallowed.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional right to equal protection of the law of the PPA officials is violated,
hence, unconstitutional.

Ruling:

No, it was not. The grant of non-integrated benefits lies in the fact that the legislature intended to
gradually phase out the said benefits without, however, upsetting its policy of non-diminution of pay and
benefits.

A law is not invalid simply because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality,
so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must
apply equally to each member of the class.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

National Artist vs Executive Sectretary G.R. No. 189028 July 16, 2013

Digested by : Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts:

The issue in this case revolves around the conferment of award to National Artist. During the time of
President Marcos, the awarding for National Artist was enacted into law along with the establishment of
a committee that shall administer the nomination, selection and recommendation to the President as to
who can become a National Artist. The Committee included in their list the herein petitioners while the
private respondents were directly recommended to President Gloria Arroyo. Among those conferred with
the awards were those directly recommended to the President while some of those in the list
recommended by the committee were not granted with the award.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution against
the petitioners.

Ruling:

There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution87 when the former President gave
preferential treatment to private respondents. The former President’s constitutional duty to faithfully
execute the laws and observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and the CCP as to the selection
of the nominees for conferment of the Order of National Artists proscribed her from having a free and
uninhibited hand in the conferment of the said award. The manifest disregard of the rules, guidelines and
processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly favored respondents.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

1-Utak vs COMELEC G.R. No. 206020 April 14, 2015

Digested by : Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of the COMELEC Resolution Section 7(g) items (5) and (6),
in relation to Section 7(f). Petitioners averred that the said resolution is in conflict with the equal
protection clause and the freedom of speech of the petitioners. The said section prohibits the postings
of electoral campaign materials in all Public Terminals and PUVs which are privately owned as opposed to
the allowance of posting to all private-owned vehicles.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a violation of the equal protection clause based on the issued
COMELEC Resolution prohibiting owners of terminals for PUVs.

Ruling:

Yes, COMELEC Resolution Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) in relation to Section 7 (f) violate the equal protection
clause. COMELEC does not have the constitutional power to regulate public transport terminals owned by
private persons. The ownership of transport terminals, even if made available for use by the public commuters,
likewise remains private. A regulation of public transport terminals based on extraneous circumstances, such
as prohibiting the posting of election campaign materials thereon, amounts to regulating the ownership of the
transport terminal and not merely the permit to operate the same. The posting of election campaign material
on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but
also an act of ownership - it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport
terminal.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Ferrer vs Bautista G.R. No. 210551 June 30, 2015

Digested by : Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts:

Petitioner argues that the collection of the Socialized Housing Tax being imposed by the Quezon City LGU
is a kind of class legislation that violates the right of property owners to equal protection of the laws since
it favors informal settlers who occupy property not their own and pay no taxes over law-abiding real
property owners who pay income and realty taxes. Petitioner further argues that the SHT is a penalty
imposed on real property owners because it burdens them with expenses to provide funds for the housing
of informal settlers, and that it is a class legislation since it favors the latter who occupy properties which
is not their own and pay no taxes.

Issue: Whether or not a Socialized Housing Tax is a valid imposition without violating the equal protection
clause.

Ruling:

Yes, it is a valid tax imposition. It does not violate the equal protection clause.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The guarantee means that no person or class of persons
shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances. Similar subjects should not be treated differently so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others. The law may, therefore, treat and regulate one class differently from
another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.

An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal
protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. For the purpose
of undertaking a comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing program, the disparities
between a real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct classes are too obvious and need
not be discussed at length. The differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and
is not discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax may
legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over
another. It is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free to select the subjects of taxation. Inequities
which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation.