Crim 1 furious appellant confronted them.

Appellant then whipped them with

Module 1 a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their
house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a coconut
Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood.
(delitos). - When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house,
Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness
Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of - As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at
fault (culpa). the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought
his son back to their house.
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is
fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of Accused Argument Court
foresight, or lack of skill. Appellant admits beating his sons as a The contentions of appellant fail to
disciplinary measure, but denies persuade. The imposition of parental
Art 365 (para 7) battering Noemar to death. He discipline on children of tender years
believes that no father could kill his must always be with the view of
own son. According to him, Noemar correcting their erroneous behavior. A
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing had a weak heart that resulted in parent or guardian must exercise
to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack attacks consisting of loss of restraint and caution in administering
of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such consciousness and froth in his mouth. the proper punishment.
act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of He claims that Noemar was conscious
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, as they traveled to the junction where Prior to whipping his sons, appellant
they would take a vehicle in going to a was already furious with them
time and place.
hospital. because they left the family dwelling
without permission and that was
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in Accused argues that his intention was already preceded by three other
which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger to just discipline his child and not to similar incidents.
clearly manifest. kill him.
Accused is charge of Parricide
Art 3 of the RPC states that Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit
People v Sales
(dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the act is
Facts: performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act
- On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. In the
eight years old, respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial case at bar, deceit was present when the accused intentionally beat his son and
procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the permission of their since Noemar died as a result of the beating there is fault. Therefore, the action
parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, of the father is a felony. Art 4 of the RPC also provides that Criminal Liability is
Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended. Accused is criminally liable
them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s
because his actions are proved to be felonious and although he only contends
rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their to discipline his son, and the result of his action was the death of Noemar.
mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home a
Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, Accused Argument
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or Petitioner claims in her appeal that
his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of respondent Judge erred in convicting
reclusion perpetua to death. her of the crime of slight physical
injuries. She maintains that as the
teacher, she was just trying to
"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by discipline her pupil Wilma for tripping
the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate her classmate and for denying that she
or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the did so. She contends she was not
legitimate spouse of accused." actuated by any criminal intent.
Court
Petitioner did not incur any criminal
liability for her act of whipping her
pupil, Wilma, with the bamboo-stick-
pointer, in the circumstances proven
in the record. Independently of any
civil or administrative responsibility
for such act she might be found to
have incurred by the proper
authorities,

And she is joined in this pose by the We are persuaded that she did not do
Art. 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Solicitor General, who recommends what she had done with criminal
Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the
her acquittal, coupled with the intent. That she meant to punish
circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty observation that although "petitioner Wilma and somehow make her feel
of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal. is not criminally liable for her conduct, such punishment may be true, but We
she may still be held accountable for are convinced that the means she
Bagajo vs. Marave her conduct administratively." actually used was moderate and that
Facts: she was not motivated by ill-will,
hatred or any malevolent intent.
- Petitioner who was a teacher, left her classroom to go to the principal's
office. WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby
- While the teacher was thus out of the room, complainant Wilma acquitted, with costs de oficio,
Alcantara, one of her pupils, left her desk and went to chat with Lilibeth without prejudice to her being dealt
Purlas, a classmate, while leaning over the desk of Ponciano Navarro, with administratively or in a civil case
another classmate. for damages not resulting ex-delicto.
- At that juncture, a fourth classmate, Benedicta Guirigay passed near
Wilma, who suddenly raised her leg causing the former to stumble on it People vs Carmen
and fall down, her head hitting the edge of the desk, her stomach a Issue:
sharp pointed umbrella and her knee a nail of the desk. She fainted. Whether accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless imprudence
- At that precise moment, petitioner was entering the room. resulting in homicide, considering that the information charges them with
- She asked Wilma what happened but the latter denied having anything murder. We hold that they can.
to do with what had just taken place.
- Petitioner thereupon became angry and, with a piece of "bamboo Accused Argument Court
stick" which she was using as a pointer whipped Wilma behind her legs Accused-Appellants urges that they It would appear that accused-
have no intention to kill the boy, they appellants are members of a cult and
and her thigh
were merely trying to heal him. that the bizarre ritual performed over
the victim was consented to by the
victims parents. With the permission
of the victims parents, accused-
appellant Carmen, together with the
other accused-appellants, proceeded
to subject the boy to a treatment
calculated to drive the bad spirit from
the boy’s body. Unfortunately, the
strange procedure resulted in the
death of the boy. Thus, accused-
appellants had no criminal intent to
kill the boy. Their liability arises from
their reckless imprudence because
they ought that to know their actions
would not bring about the cure. They
are, therefore, guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and
not of murder.
The elements of reckless imprudence
are apparent in the acts done by
accused-appellants which, because of
their lack of medical skill in treating
the victim of his alleged ailment,
resulted in the latters death. As
already stated, accused-appellants,
none of whom is a medical
practitioner
The fact that the information does not
allege that the falsification was
committed with imprudence is of no
moment for here this deficiency
appears supplied by the evidence
submitted by appellant himself and
the result has proven beneficial to
him. Certainly, having alleged that the
falsification has been willful, it would
be incongruous to allege at the same
time that it was committed with
imprudence for a charge of criminal
intent is incompatible with the
concept of negligence.
Yapyuco vs Sandiganbayan
Accused Argument
Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayan’s finding of conspiracy and labels the same
to be conjectural.
The court has not established that he had by positive acts intended to
participate in any criminal object in common with the other accused, and that
his participation in a supposed common criminal object has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
He also points out the uncertainty in the Sandiganbayan’s declaration that the
incident could not have been the product of a well-planned police operation,
but rather was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted against the
victims by the barangay officials involved or an amateurish attempt on their
part to earn commendation.
He theorizes that, if it were the latter alternative, then he could hardly be found
guilty of homicide or frustrated homicide but rather of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide.
He also says that the injuries were results of warning shots and that his
presence at the scene was because he is a bona fide member of the police
force.
He also invokes mistake of facts since they believed that the victims who were
in the jeepney were armed rebels.
Court’s Ruling:
First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence,
the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the
injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being the incident of
another act performed without malice.
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by
the Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless
imprudence.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in classifies felonies according to the
the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death means by which they are committed,
of Licup and for the non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that they in particular: (1) intentional felonies,
deserve an acquittal together with the other accused, of the charge of and (2) culpable felonies. These two
types of felonies are distinguished
attempted murder with respect to the unharmed victims.
from each other by the existence or
absence of malicious intent of the
Calimutan vs. People offender –

Accused Argument Court In intentional felonies, the act or

Calimutan maintained that he had no
personal grudge against the victim
previous to the stoning incident
Petitioner Calimutan contended that
the existence of the two autopsy
reports, with dissimilar findings on the
cause of death of the victim Cantre,
constituted reasonable doubt as to
the liability of petitioner Calimutan for
the said death
This Court is morally persuaded that
the victim Cantre died from a
lacerated spleen, an injury sustained
after being hit by a stone thrown at
him by petitioner Calimutan. Not even
the post-mortem report of Dr.
Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer
who first examined the body of the
victim Cantre, can raise reasonable
doubt as to the cause of death of the
victim Cantre. Invoking Dr. Ulanday’s
post-mortem report, the defense
insisted on the possibility that the
victim Cantre died of food poisoning.
While this Court is in accord with the
factual findings of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals and affirms that
there is ample evidence proving that
the death of the victim Cantre was
caused by his lacerated spleen, an
injury which resulted from being hit by
the stone thrown at him by petitioner
Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is
at variance with the RTC and the Court
of Appeals as to the determination of
the appropriate crime or offense for
which the petitioner should have been
convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code
omission of the offender is malicious.
In the language of Art. 3, the act is
performed with deliberate intent
(with malice). The offender, in
performing the act or in incurring the
omission, has the intention to cause
an injury to another. In culpable
felonies, the act or omission of the
offender is not malicious. The injury
caused by the offender to another
person is "unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act
performed without malice."
In the Petition at bar, this Court
cannot, in good conscience, attribute
to petitioner Calimutan any malicious
intent to injure, much less to kill, the
victim Cantre; and in the absence of
such intent, this Court cannot sustain
the conviction of petitioner Calimutan
for the intentional crime of homicide,
as rendered by the RTC and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this
Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the
culpable felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.
People vs Vistan discretion in convicting him of the precaution on the part of the accused
Accused Argument Court offense of simple negligence resulting because the evidence showed that he
The accused who, had his eyes toward Taking into consideration all the in homicide. was moving slowly when the incident
the door, seeing the nobody was circumstances of the case at bar, we happened.
alighting or boarding the car, rang the are of the opinion that the act of the Petitioner also maintains that no
bell, whereupon the car started. It is accused in giving the order to start the prudent man placed in the same Petitioner had exercised extreme
not improbable that when the accused car, when the offended party had his situation could have foreseen the precaution as he drove slowly upon
saw the last passenger with both hands already on the holding devices vehicular accident or could have reaching the vicinity of the school. He
hands clinging to the holding device of of the car and his foot on the running stopped his vehicle in time when its cannot be faulted for not having seen
the car and one foot on the running board, constitutes carelessness or left rear tire bounced due to the the victim who came from behind on
board, he thought that the passenger negligence, but does not show grave following reasons: (1) the victim was the left side.
had completely boarded the car and fault amounting to reckless only a trespasser; (2) petitioners
that is why he gave the signal to start. imprudence and the accused having attention was focused on the road and Petitioner on the second stage of the
acted with simple imprudence or the students outside the schools gate; incident also is not at fault. The
negligence and (3) the jeepney was fully loaded evidence on record do not show that
with passengers and cargoes and it the jeepney dragged the victim after
was impossible for the petitioner to he was hit and run over by the
The accused is charge with simple imprudence since Art. 365 provides that,
promptly stop his vehicle. jeepney. Quite the contrary, the
simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in
evidence discloses that the victim was
which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger
clearly manifest. The facts shows us that the conductor, upon seeing that the not dragged at all. In fact, it is the
other way around. Conviction must
hands of the passenger was clinging on the holding device and seeing that his
rest on nothing less than a moral
foot was on the running board thought that the latter was completely boarded
certainty of the guilt of the accused.
and signalled the driver. Due to the lack of precaution on the part of the
The overriding consideration is not
conductor and not for sighting that there will be danger after he signalled the
driver, his actions resulted to serious physical injury to the victim due to simple whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused but whether
negligence.
it entertains doubt as to his guilt.
Gaid vs. People
Since there was no deliberate intent on the part of the petitioner and it was
Accused Argument Court
proven that he exercised precaution - driving slowly - there is also no fault.
Petitioner argues that there is lack of During the first stage, the petitioner Therefore, the act committed was not felonious.
precaution on his part when he was not shown to be negligent. Art
continued even after he had noticed 365 of the RPN states that, Reckless
that the left rear tire and the jeep imprudence consists of voluntarily
tilted to its right side. Petitioner doing or failing to do, without malice, Motive and Intent
stressed that he, in fact, stopped his an act from which material damage
jeep when its left rear tire bounced results by reason of an inexcusable People vs Ducabo
and upon hearing that somebody had lack of precaution on the part of the Facts:
been ran over. person performing or failing to
- Rolando - victim's brother - testified that on the morning of Oct. 24,
perform such act.
Petitioner asserts that the Court of 2000, he saw appellant walking back and forth in front of their house.
Appeals committed a grave abuse of There was no inexcusable lack of When the victim went out, the appellant as not there but moments
 later, he saw the appellant standing behind the victim and suddenly
poked a gun and shot him.
Accused Argument Court
The appellant alleges the credibility of This Court had previously said that
Rolando's testimony. The appellant aside from its intrinsic weakness, the
denied he was the one who shot the defense of denial cannot prevail over
victim because they were gangmates the positive identification made by the
in Simeon Street, Talon Dos, Las Pias prosecution witness who had no
City, for more than two years and he improper motive whatsoever to falsely
had no motive to kill him. testify against the accused.
Moreover, in the crime of murder,
motive is not an element of the
offense. Motive becomes material
only when the evidence is
circumstantial or inconclusive, and
there is some doubt on whether a
crime has been committed or whether
the accused has committed it.
Indeed, motive is totally irrelevant
when ample direct evidence sustains
the culpability of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Where a reliable
eyewitness has fully and satisfactorily
identified the accused as the
perpetrator of the felony, motive
becomes immaterial in the successful
prosecution of a criminal case. Hence,
whether or not appellant had any
motive in killing the victim, his
conviction may still follow from the
positive and categorical identification
made by the witness.
Motive is immaterial if the accused is already identified
Dimat vs. People
Facts:
- The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law beforethe Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC).
- On March 7, 2001, Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic
Management Group spotted the Nissan Safari bearing a suspicious
plate number.
- After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that it had
been stolen Jose Mantequilla.
- Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla and that he bought
the Nissan Safari in good faith and for value from a certain Manuel
Tolentino under a deed of sale.
- Dimat later sold the vehicle to Delgado. He also claimed that, although
the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the police
officers took into custody had the same plate number, they were not
actually the same vehicle.
Argument Court
Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as But Presidential Decree 1612 is a
his main defense. special law and, therefore, its violation
is regarded as malum prohibitum,
requiring no proof of criminal intent.
Therefore, Dimat is guilty of violation
of the Anti-Fencing Law
Motive and intent is irrelevant in special laws
Dado vs People
Facts:
- Petitioner Geronimo Dado and accused Francisco Eraso were charged
with murder
- On the night of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police
Station formed three teams to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay
Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat.
- They were all facing southwards in a half-kneeling position and were
about 2 arms length away from each other.
- At around 11:00 of the same evening, the team saw somebody
approaching at a distance of 50 meters. Though it was a moonless
night, they noticed that he was half-naked.
 - Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his flash light,
Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately
thereafter, petitioner, who was on the left side of Rufo Alga, fired a
single shot from his .45 caliber pistol.
Argument
petitioner testified that on the night of
the incident, he was armed with a .45
caliber pistol.
He admitted that he knew the rapid
gun burst which he thought to be from
their enemies came from 2 meters
behind him. He explained that his arm
was then broken making it difficult for
him to move. Thus, when he heard the
gun burst, he did not turn to face the
source thereof and instead fired his
.45 caliber pistol in front of him. He
declared that his purpose in firing his
.45 caliber pistol opposite the source
of the rapid gun burst was to
demoralize their enemy
Court
Evidently, the prosecution failed to
prove that the metallic fragments
found in the fatal wound of the victim
are particles of a .45 caliber bullet that
emanated from the .45 caliber pistol
fired by petitioner. For this reason,
the Court cannot in good conscience
affirm his conviction for the crime of
homicide.
Petitioner cannot be held responsible
for the wound inflicted on the victims
right outer lateral arm for the same
reason that there is no evidence
proving beyond moral certainty that
said wound was caused by the bullet
fired from petitioners .45 caliber
pistol.
Petitioner is not completely without
liability. The Court sustains the finding
of the trial court that petitioner fired
his .45 caliber pistol towards the
victim. From the attendant
circumstances, it appears that there
is no evidence tending to prove that
petitioner had animus interficendi or
intent to kill the victim.
Animus interficendi must be
established with the same degree of
certainty as is required of the other
elements of the crime. The inference
of intent to kill should not be drawn in
the absence of circumstances
sufficient to prove such intent beyond
reasonable doubt.
Absence of intent to kill in firing the
gun towards the victim, petitioner
should be held liable for the crime of
illegal discharge of firearm under
Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code.
The elements of this crime are: (1) that
the offender discharges a firearm
against or at another person; and (2)
that the offender has no intention to
kill that person. Though the
information charged the petitioner
with murder, he could be validly
convicted of illegal discharge of
firearm, an offense which is
necessarily included in the crime of
unlawful killing of a person.
Rimando vs Comelec
Petitioner’s Argument Court
Petitioner filed a Motion for To reiterate, under Section 261 (s)
Reconsideration contending that 1) the of the Omnibus Election Code, the
aforesaid Resolution went beyond the punishable act is the bearing of
scope of the law when it held petitioner, as arms outside the immediate
President of the security agency, criminally vicinity of one’s place of work
liable for an act that was not prohibited during the election period and not
under Section 261 (s) of the Omnibus the failure of the head or
Election Code; 2) there was no conflict responsible officer of the security
between Sections 2 and 3 of COMELEC agency to obtain prior written
Resolution No. 3382 and if ever there was, COMELEC approval
the same should be resolved in his favor
since penal laws were construed strictly
against the State and in favor of the
accused; 3) the application for exemption
filed by petitioners security agency with
the COMELEC through the PNP-SAGD was
for the authority to transport firearms and
not to bear arms inside or within the
vicinity of the place of work of petitioners
security personnel; and 4) since no election
offense was committed, the filing of a
criminal case against petitioner was
unwarranted and contrary to law.

The Act that was punishable was “the bringing of firearms outside of the
workplace”. Since the petitioner is only the president of the agency where the
security guards who brought their firearms was employed, Petitioner has no
action to begin with that is punishable therefore he is of no felonious act since
the punishable act was done – not by him – but by the guards on duty.