Liberal Approaches: Collective Security and Arms Control/Disarmament

COLLECTIVE SECURITY:

Collective security is captured in the old adage “one for all and all for one.” Based on the
proposition that aggressive and unlawful use of force by any state against another must be
stopped, collective security posits that such unlawful aggression will be met by united action: all
(or many) states will unite against the aggressor. Potential aggressors will know this fact ahead
of time, and thus, will choose not to act.

The concept that aggression against one state should be defeated collectively b/c aggression
against one state is aggression against all. It became the basis of League of Nations and UN. The
formation of a broad alliance of major actors in international system for the purpose of jointly
opposing aggression by any actor, sometimes seen as presupposing the existence of universal
organization (such as UN) to which both the aggressor and opponent belong.

Assumptions of Collective Security Theory

■ Wars are caused by aggressive states. ■ Aggressors must be stopped.
■ Aggressors are easily identified. ■ Aggression is always wrong.
■ Aggressors will be deterred from aggression by the credible threat of a collective response.

Is collective security always worked?

Collective security does not always work. In the period between the two world wars, Japan
invaded Manchuria and Italy overran Ethiopia. In neither case did other states act as if it was in
their collective interest to respond. In these instances, collective security did not work because,
as realists assert, the states capable of acting to halt the violence (particularly Britain and France)
could not see sufficient national interest in doing so, especially when the threat of another war
with Germany seemed increasingly likely.
Collective security may also fail due to the problematic nature of a key assumption, that
aggressors can be easily identified. Easy identification is not always the case. In 1967, Israel
launched an armed attack against Egypt: clearly an act of aggression.
The week before, however, Egypt had blocked Israeli access to the Red Sea, kicked the UN out
of Sinai, and, in combination with Syria and Jordan, moved hundreds of tanks and planes closer
to Israel. Clearly these, too, were acts of aggression.

Both the League of Nations and the United Nations were founded on the principle of collective
security.
Historical background:
Collective security is one of the most promising approaches for peace and a valuable device for
power management on an international scale. Cardinal Richelieu proposed a scheme for
collective security in 1629, which was partially reflected in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. In the
eighteenth century many proposals were made for collective security arrangements, especially in
Europe.
The concept of a peaceful community of nations was outlined in 1795 in Immanuel
Kant's Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. Kant outlined the idea of a league of nations
that would control conflict and promote peace between states.
[The Quran] teaches that when two nations are in dispute and this leads to war, then other
governments should strongly counsel them towards dialogue and diplomacy so that they can
come to an agreement and reconciliation on a basis of a negotiated settlement. If, however, one
of the parties does not accept the terms of agreement and wages war, then other countries should
unite together and stop that aggressor. When the aggressive nation is defeated and agrees to
mutual negotiation, then all parties should work towards an agreement that leads to long-standing
peace and reconciliation.

International co-operation to promote collective security originated in the Concert of Europe that
developed after the Napoleonic Wars in the nineteenth century in an attempt to maintain
the status quo between European states and so avoid war.

Ww1 and it’s impacts; strengthen the need of collective security system. Thus the League of
Nation were founded on the basis of collective security. This was the first global collective
security system.

League of Nation and its failure to provide collective security:

After World War I, the first large scale attempt to provide collective security in modern times
was the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919–20. The provisions of the League of
Nations Covenant represented a weak system for decision-making and for collective action.

Despite having an aim for achieving collective security the League failed time and again; for e.g.
its failure during the Manchurian Crisis. After the invasion, the League passed a resolution
reprimanding Japan to withdraw or face dire consequences. Japan promptly vetoed the resolution
in pursuance of its rights under Article 5, thereby limiting the League's ability to respond. After 2
years, the League passed another resolution condemning the invasion though without any armed
action or any imposition of sanctions. The Japanese subsequently, simply walked out of
the League of Nations.
League of Nations fail to provide collective security and thus ww2 occur which was more
disastrous than ww1. After ww2 the world main power realizes the need of global institution to
maintain peace and thus UN came into existence.

Collective Security and the United Nations

During this last decade of the 20th century, the Collective Security System began acting as a
popular and useful device for the preservation of international peace and security.

The Charter of the United Nations regards the preservation of international peace and security as
its most major objective. In this Charter “International Peace and Security” have been used 32
times. In its very first article, while stating the purposes of the United Nations, it makes the
preservation of international peace and security as the first priority. It lays down a collective
security system for this purpose.

Collective Security system has been laid down in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and its title
reads: “Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of
Aggression.” It contain 13 Articles, from Art. 39 to 51, which together provide for a collective
system for preserving international peace and security. The UN Security Council has been
assigned the responsibility and power to initiate collective security action for meeting any threat
to international peace by a war or aggression.

Since 1945, the Collective Security system has been tried in a number of cases. It was used for
the first time for meeting the Korean Crisis of 1950.
It was successfully operationalized to meet the Iraqi aggression and occupation of Kuwait. To
meet the violations of international peace and security resulting from the Iraqi act of aggression,
the UN Security Council first called upon Iraq to vacate aggression, and when it failed to comply
with, enforced economic sanctions against Iraq. UN Security Council later on decided to take
military action, i.e. Collective Security action against Iraq.

Alliances and collective security:

In the post–World War II era, two major alliance systems—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—
arrayed states into two separate camps. States dared not engage in action against an ally or a foe,
even if that state was an aggressor, for fear of causing another world war.

Ideal Conditions for the Success of Collective Security:

1. Agreement on the definition of Aggression.

2. Broader based and more powerful United Nations.

3. More powerful role of UN Security Council and strong commitment of its permanent
members in favor of collective security of international peace and security.

4. Existence of a permanent international peace keeping force.

5. An established procedure for termination of every collective security action.

6. Popularization of peaceful means of conflict resolution.

7. Sustainable socio-economic development of all the nations.

8. Strengthening of peaceful means of crisis-management and international peacekeeping.

Criticism against Collective Security:

 It is Idealistic in Nature and Scope:

 At times it is not possible to identify the Aggressor:

 Admits War as a means:

 Rules out ‘Neutrality’ in times of War:

 Absence of a Permanent International Peace Keeping Force:

 Dependence on Powerful States:

ARM CONTROL:

To restrict the research, manufacture, or deployment of weapons system at certain level and to
not increase beyond that level is known as arm control.

Jaffrey Larsen: “AC can be defined as any agreement among states to regulate some aspect of
their military capability or potential. The agreement may apply to the location, amount,
readiness, and types of military forces, weapons and facilities.

DISARMAMANET:

The policy of eliminating a state’s offensive weaponry; may occur for all classes of weapons or
for specified weapons only.
Disarmament rests on a fundamentally different philosophical premise than arms control. It
envisions the drastic reduction or elimination of all weapons, looking toward the eradication of
war itself. Disarmament is based on the notion that if there were no more weapons there would
be no more war.

Historical Background;

The problem of arms control and disarmament is not peculiar to the modern era. People have
been concerned about war and its destructive potential for centuries. Pope Innocent II, in 1139,
called an international conference to discuss the possible means of controlling what then was
considered an awesome new weapon - the crossbow.

But "Disarmament" became the fashionable term during the nineteenth century, particularly
during and after the Hague Conference of 1899, to describe all efforts to limit, reduce, or control
the implements of war. While some individuals may employ disarmament in the literal sense—
the total elimination of armaments—most diplomats and commentators do not.

The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were the first multilateral treaties. Both conferences
included negotiations concerning disarmament, the laws of war and war crimes. A major effort in
both conferences was the creation of a binding international court for compulsory arbitration to
settle international disputes, which was considered necessary to replace the institution of war.
This effort, however, failed at both conferences; instead a voluntary forum for arbitration,
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, was established. Most of the countries present, including
the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, China, and Persia, favored a process for
binding international arbitration, but the provision was vetoed by a few countries, led
by Germany.
Subsequent to World War I, public opinion called for the creation of institutions and
international agreements that would prevent any recurrence. The League of Nations, however,
was hamstrung from the start due to American unwillingness to join. At the same time, the
Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, initiated by the United States, was probably the most
significant attempt to control major weapons prior to the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements
of 1972. The 1922 treaty limited the growth of capital ships among the major powers for over a
decade. Unfortunately, several classes of ships, including submarines and aircraft carriers, were
not controlled by the treaty, a fact which helped lead to its eventual demise.

The inter-war period was also witness to the Geneva Protocol (1925) on the prohibition of poison
gas and bacteriological weapons, to which Canada became a signatory on 6 May 1930. Although
the United States had introduced the protocol, the U.S. Senate did not ratify it until 10 April
1975. In 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed; it bound the signatories to renounce the use
of aggressive war and pursue peaceful means of resolving disputes, but made no provision for
sanctions. In 1932, the League of Nations sponsored an international disarmament conference,
but by this time the great powers were incapable of coming to a consensus on what weapons
should be limited. Soon after coming to power (1933), Adolf Hitler ordered the withdrawal of
Germany from the disarmament conference and the League of Nations and two years later, he
announced that Germany would no longer abide by the clauses of the Versailles Treaty that
prohibited that country from rearming. By the late 1930s, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
States and Great Britain had all embarked on significant military construction programs.

Arm race during cold war:

An arms race denotes a rapid increase in the quantity or quality of instruments of military power
by rival states in peacetime. The first modern arms race took place when France and Russia
challenged the naval superiority of Britain in the late nineteenth century.

The buildup of arms was also a characteristic of the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union, though the development of nuclear weapons changed the stakes for the par.

The United States’ use of nuclear weapons to end World War II led to a determined effort by the
Soviet Union to acquire those weapons, leading to a long-running nuclear arms race between the
two superpowers. The Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test in 1949. At the end of 1956,
the United States had 2,123 strategic warheads and the Soviet Union had 84. Those numbers
increased rapidly over the subsequent 30 years. The U.S. arsenal peaked in 1987 at 13,002
warheads, the Soviet Union two years later at 11,320. The end of the Cold War by the early
1990s effectively ended that arms race.

Treaties and agreement of arm control and disarmament in cold war:

During the Cold War, many arms control agreements were negotiated to reduce the threat of
nuclear war.
In the early 1950s, academic specialists linking the technology of nuclear weaponry to the
strategies of the Cold War began substituting the term "arms control." For them "disarmament"
not only lacked semantic precision but carried utopian expectations, whereas "arms control"
involved any cooperation between potential enemies designed to reduce the likelihood of conflict
or, should it occur, its scope and violence.

Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament

1. The United Nations

In the postwar period, most (although not all) multilateral arms control agreements have been
sponsored by the United Nations, which has developed a range of specialized arms control and
disarmament machinery.

The first resolution ever passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations called for the
elimination of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the peaceful use of
atomic energy. The General Assembly has passed hundreds of resolutions on this subject in the
past 50 years, but some have contained conflicting ideas and recommendations. The General
Assembly has held three Special Sessions on Disarmament. While the first, in 1978, resulted in a
129-paragraph Final Document declaring that the final objective of the international community
was to be "general and complete disarmament under effective international control," subsequent
special sessions in 1982 and 1988 added little. Led by the Non-Aligned states, many countries
now agree with the idea of holding a fourth special session, to discuss a disarmament and
security agenda for the 21st century.

The UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) was established by the UN Special Session on

Disarmament in 1978. It deals with a smaller number of items than the First Committee and in
greater detail. In 1998, for example, the UNDC was to consider nuclear weapon free zones, the
fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and guidelines on
conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament.

a. Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was negotiated in 1968 at the United Nations in
response to the Cuban missile crisis. The NPT illustrates both positive and negative effects of
such treaties. In force since 1970, the NPT spells out the rules of nuclear proliferation. In the
treaty, signatory countries without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire or develop them; states
with nuclear weapons promise not to transfer the technology to nonnuclear states and to
eventually dismantle their own. During the 1990s, three states that previously had nuclear
weapons programs—South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina—dismantled their programs and
became parties to the treaty, along with three other states—Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—
that gave up nuclear weapons left on their territory after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As
with many of the arms control treaties, however, several key nuclear states and threshold non-
nuclear states remain outside the treaty, including Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan.

IAEA:

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a UN-based agency established in 1957 to
disseminate knowledge about nuclear energy and promote its peaceful uses, is the designated
guardian of the treaty. The IAEA created a system of safeguards, including inspection teams that
visit nuclear facilities and report on any movement of nuclear material, in an attempt to keep
nuclear material from being diverted to non peaceful purposes and to ensure that states that
signed the NPT are complying.

b. Chemical and Biological Weapons

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction and it is administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), an intergovernmental organization based in The Hague, The
Netherlands. CWC negotiations started in 1980 in the UN Conference on Disarmament. The
convention opened for signature on January 13, 1993, and entered into force on April 29, 1997.
As of May 2018, 193 states have become parties to the CWC and accept its
obligations. Israel has signed but not ratified the agreement, while three other UN member
states (Egypt, North Korea and South Sudan) have neither signed nor acceded to the treaty. Most
recently, the State of Palestine deposited its instrument of accession to the CWC on 17 May
2018. In September 2013 Syria acceded to the convention as part of an agreement for
the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons

c. Conventional Arms

2. Alliance Negotiations

In the postwar years, conventional arms control efforts focused mainly on attempts to defuse the
alliance buildups in Europe. Canada participated in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
(MBFR) talks from their beginning in 1973 until their end in 1989. The talks, which involved
nations from NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, resulted in little substantive progress
over the years. The issues on which NATO focused included the pursuit of parity in military
power, effective methods of verification, and the need for collective action on reductions and
limitations

a. Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

On November 19, 1990, the United States, the USSR, and 20 other countries signed the Convent
ional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty)

b. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The CSCE was formed in 1973 in an attempt to promote détentebetween the United States and
the USSR. It includes 52 countries
50 European nations plus the United States andCanada. European leaders hoped the CSCE would
play a greater role in determining a peaceful, stable future for Europe,
with efforts in arms control being one of its major goals.

C. Open Skies

In September 1989, agreement was reached to hold a Canadian-sponsored conference in Ottawa

to discuss the U.S. "Open Skies" initiative. In May 1992, the Open Skies Treaty was finally
signed in Helsinki. The treaty permits short-notice over flights of any signatory state’s territory
by the unarmed surveillance aircraft of another signatory state

D. Bilateral (Superpower) Arms Control and Disarmament

ABM:

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty or ABMT) (1972—2002) was an arms
control treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of the anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) systems used in defending areas against ballistic missile-
delivered nuclear weapons. Under the terms of the treaty, each party was limited to two ABM
complexes, each of which was to be limited to 100 anti-ballistic missiles.
On 13 December 2001, George W. Bush gave Russia notice of the United States' withdrawal
from the treaty, in accordance with the clause that required six months' notice before terminating
the pact—the first time in recent history that the United States has withdrawn from a major
international arms treaty.[14] This led to the eventual creation of the American Missile Defense
Agency.

1: SALT 1 & 2

2. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

The completed START agreement was finally signed at the Moscow summit on 31 July 1991.
Under its provisions, the arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union would be
reduced by roughly 30%; warheads would be reduced by about 20% and launchers by 27%.
Overall, START focused on quantitative reductions while preserving the qualitative basis of the
arms race through its protection of strategic modernization programs on both sides. In order to
help verify the START agreement, some 12 types of on-site inspection and about 60 types of
notification are contained in the treaty. Arms control advocates recommended that a START II
agreement focus more on arms modernization than on total numbers.

The breakup of the Soviet Union complicated the START ratification process by effectively
increasing the number of states required to approve the Treaty. START I finally entered into
force in December 1994, and, by the end of 1996, all nuclear weapons had been removed from
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The U.S. Congress ratified START II in January 1996

3. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Agreement

The first significant development to emerge from the new era in bilateral talks was the U.S.-
Soviet treaty on the elimination of medium and shorter range missiles, signed at the summit
between Reagan and Gorbachev in December 1987. The Treaty, which covers nuclear missiles
with a range of 500-5,500 kilometers required the Soviet Union to destroy 1,752 such missiles
and the United States to destroy 859, within a period of three years. On 12 May 1991, the last
missiles covered by the INF agreement were destroyed.

Besides other efforts and treaties were implemented to guarantee arm control and disarmament
such as;
May 1995 - NPT extended indefinitely and unconditionally.

September 1996 - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) introduced for signature at the
United Nations after India had blocked its adoption in the Conference on Disarmament.

March 1997 - Agreement reached on a framework START III Treaty; FMCT; PTBT; NSG etc:

PARLIAMENTARY ACTION

The Special Joint Committee on Canada’s International Relations (June 1986) recommended that
Canada "intensify its efforts, multilaterally within NATO, the United Nations and in
disarmament forums and bilaterally with the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries,
to win acceptance for a comprehensive set of arms control measures." These measures were
those already stressed by the government; namely,

 a mutually agreed and verifiable radical reduction of nuclear forces and associated
measures to enhance strategic stability. The latter should include, in particular,
reaffirmation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, interpreted strictly as prohibiting all but
basic research on defensive systems;

 the maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime;

 the negotiation of a global ban on chemical weapons;

 the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty that will be mutually verifiable;

 the prevention of an arms race in outer space; and

 agreement on confidence-building measures sufficient to permit the reduction of

conventional military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

The U.S. and Russia, the two erstwhile Cold War rival, are now energized to improve their
bilateral relations by pressing the “reset button”.

1 Among other issues, arms control and disarmament are on the key agenda of the current
Russia-U.S. multidimensional approach towards normalization of their relations. The U.S. wants
to play a leading role in elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide. In 2008, responding to an
Arms Control Today set of questions; Obama stated that the U.S. would set a new direction to
the elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide by making it a central element of its nuclear
policy. However, the U.S. would not disarm unilaterally.

2 Obama stated that, as a first step, he would seek Russia’s cooperation in reduction of nuclear
armament by extending the landmark 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) before it
expires on December 5, 2009. He also said that he would initiate a high-level dialogue among all
the declared nuclear weapons States to first move towards reduction and eventually the
elimination of all nuclear weapons

As far as international expert opinion on complete disarmament is concerned, the Weapons of

Mass Destruction Commission, Washington, has stated, “What matters is not just words, but
deeds. Momentum should be created by agreement on follow-up to the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty I (START I), and further ratifications of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).”
The commission further stressed on strengthening of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
agreement to end production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (FMCT), and to increase the
ability of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for a real disarmament.

Similarly, on June 29, 2009, a group called “Global Zero” announced a “Global Zero Action
Plan” for a phased, verified and proportionate reduction of all nuclear weapons to zero.”

The Global Zero Action Plan has projected 14 years (2010-2023) to reach a global zero accord
and additional seven years (2024-2030) to complete the dismantlement of all remaining nuclear
warheads. The Plan outlined the following four phases: Phase 1: 2010-2013, U.S. and Russia to
cut 1,000 total warheads each; increase the rate of dismantling their nuclear warheads; prepare
multilateral negotiations; encourage nuclear weapons States not to develop more nuclear
weapons, sign and ratify CTBT, FMCT; encourage de-alerting and no first use; and
establishment of nuclear weapons-free zones. Phase 2: 2014-2018, negotiate and ratify
multilateral accord; U.S. and Russia reduce to total 500 warheads each; other nuclear weapons
States freeze their stockpiles; entry into force of the multilateral accord with a strong verification
and enforcement system; civilian fuel cycle safeguards; full-scope IAEA safeguards; adoption of
Additional Protocol; establishment and management of international fuel bank and
enrichment/reprocessing facilities. Reflections No. 4, 2009 4 Phase 3: 2019-2023, phased and
proportionate reduction of all nuclear arsenals to zero and continuous international monitoring
and enforcement. Phase 4: 2024-2030, complete elimination of all remaining nuclear warheads
and a continuous international monitoring and enforcement. However, under present day
realities, there seems to be a very remote possibility of a world without nuclear weapons. A
State’s national interests, its geo-political location, its internal political and external security
situation are some of the main factor for a State to go nuclear, and it is very difficult to abandon
them without any substantial guarantees. Moreover, nuclear proliferation concerns, international
terrorism, and growing role of militant/terrorist organizations and non-State actors are
threatening international peace and security. So, without a serious commitment to root out threats
to international peace and security, such agreements would be meaningless. If both the United
States and Russia want to win trust of each other for a lasting confidence to achieve success in
their bilateral relations, they should eliminate the Cold War thinking and take a fresh start. The
two should focus on areas where there is a desire for mutual cooperation. With the changing
realities, the past nuclear doctrines are no longer valid. Both the States should initiate a new
strategic dialogue with an objective to open windows into each other’s strategic thinking. In this
regard, any success in post-START would not only strengthen Russia-U.S. bilateral relations, but
such a plan would fit best into their shifting strategic postures.

On 20 May 2014, the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) and the
Heinreich Böll Foundation co-hosted a seminar to present a new publication entitled “The
Future of Arms Control.” The speakers included Dr. Oliver Meier, associate at the German
Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Dr. Nikolai Sokov, senior fellow at the
VCDNP, and Anne Finger, research fellow at the Institute for Peace Research and Security
Policy at the University of Hamburg. Gregor Enste, head of the Foreign and Security Policy
Section at the Heinreich Böll Foundation, moderated the event.

Dr. Oliver Meier focused on three different types of arms control: the traditional arms control
approach, based on strategic stability and limitations on deployed weapon systems; non-
proliferation instruments aimed at limiting the spread of WMD and associated sensitive
technologies; and the humanitarian arms control approach, focused on preventing human
suffering caused by weapons during and after armed conflict. In light of the recent crisis over
events in Ukraine, Dr. Meier suggested that the relative importance of the traditional, Cold War-
type arms control approach is likely to grow in the near- to mid-term. In his view, the impact of
this crisis on the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime has been limited, at least so
far. The West and Russia continue to cooperate on key non-proliferation challenges, such as Iran
and Syria. Both the United States and Russia clearly realize, he said, that collaboration on non-
proliferation remains in their own best interest.

Conclusion

Disarmament remains a complex field, encompassing many different issues. While there is
already much activity in this field, the need for ever greater dialogue, cooperation and action
cannot be overstated. This Conference provides an opportunity to take this dialogue one step
further.