Constitutional Law Case Digests

Department of Political and Criminal Laws CASE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I DIGEST
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
 SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50
dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent
GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and
mandamus.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It
is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness
of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To
all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues
that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the
national economy.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional
provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.
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Held:
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be
sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine
history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of
the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and
accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and
protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from
selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept
the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph,
Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is
complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court
En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by
the provision in question.
The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of
said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and
controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s
cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be
interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not
prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of
qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid
of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are
qualified, too.
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 AMENDMENT AND REVISION
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
Facts:
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a

“Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s
Initiative” (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time
and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary publications of
said Order and the attached “Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of
general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of
the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time
and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the
conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid
exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law
because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.
Issue:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is
adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .
Held:
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution are declared void.
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative,
which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission
indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future
law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC,
sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of
such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election
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Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each
legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature
stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’ identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the
COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under
any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution
No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said
petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than
a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996,
the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Separate opinions:
PUNO, concurring and dissenting
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide
insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot
share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and
cannot implement the people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the
petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and
MENDOZA concur)
VITUG, concurring and dissenting
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO
earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to
campaign for constitutional amendments.
[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under
the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as
having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of
such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative.
FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a
scholarly and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A.
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No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
(MELO and MENDOZA concur)
PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority,
holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the “initiatory” Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to “be directly proposed by the people
through initiative,” there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is “incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned.”
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, “insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.”
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the
required number of signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines
with at least 3% in every legislative district — no public funds may be spent and no government
resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot
even entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the
majority’s two other rulings.
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Lambino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006
Facts:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a

plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section
5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3
million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) 4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and
Held:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that
allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
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Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers
also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must
“prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a
petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a
petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in

gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the
paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this
Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed
their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements
of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system
of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which
effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to
implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution
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THE PRINCIPLES AS A STATE
 ELEMENTS OF A STATE
1. PEOPLE
2. ORY
Straight Baseline Method
Magallona v. Ermita
G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011
Facts:
In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified
on February 27, 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend,

among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their
particular arguments are as follows:
 RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the
terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.
 RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all
vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
 RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic
baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.
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Discussions:
The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which
we connect the outermost points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the
waters enclosed thereby as internal waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the
Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an
explicit definition in congruent with the archipelagic doctrine.
Held:
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the
Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate
Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows
an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and
continental shelf.
Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic
waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an
archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime
of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the
exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein.
The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS
III to precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states
and it is in no way affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.
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3. GOVERNMENT
Doctrine of Parens Patriae
Soriano v. Laguardia
G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating
Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the
MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon
and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner
in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly
alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV
program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the
religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:
The SC ruled that “Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to
the average child,” and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing
decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be “context
based” and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television
broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all
factors that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how
the uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context that
they were used.”
The SC also said “that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a “form of
permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.” In affirming the power of the
MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that “it is a sanction that the MTRCB
may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause.” visit
fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the suspension “is not a prior restraint on the right of
petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to
him by MTRCB,” rather, it was a sanction for “the indecent contents of his utterances in a “G”
rated TV program.”
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De Jure versus De Facto Government
Lawyers League v. Aquino

G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines.”
Issue:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
Held:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
 The Court further held that:

1. The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the
entire country;
2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
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4. SOVEREIGNTY
Definition
Tanada v. Angara
G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers,
taxpayers, and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy
and against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially
its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural
and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and
uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the
predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free
market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since
the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that
Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare
if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and
three (3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit
and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the
exercise of legislative power by Congress.
4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by
this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of
the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
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Discussions:
 1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government.
 Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor
“mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO itself has some built-in
advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority
of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto
powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign
equality, with each member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor
countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than
through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing
countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than
outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO
Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to “share in
the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development.”
 In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By
the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. A state
which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations
such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may
intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedures. With regard to Infringement of a design patent, WTO members
shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of
TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
 The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers
is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after deliberation and voting,
voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making
it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.
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Held:
1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.”
2. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest
of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
3. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty.
By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for
greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits,
they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by
the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations.”
4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable

burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement
inherent in our judicial system.
5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the
Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO
Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the
members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated
August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring
in.
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Ruffy v. Chief of Staff

G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946
Facts:
Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the outbreak of war
on December 8, 1941. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro on February 27, 1942,
Mayor Ruffy retreated to the mountains and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as the
Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. The case at bar is a petition for prohibition praying that
respondents be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of the petitioners on
the ground that petitioners were not subject to military law at the time of offense.
Issue:
1. Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese occupation?
2. Is 93d Article of War constitutional?
Held:
Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War (2d).
The Bolo Area was a contingent of the 6th military district which had been recognized by the
United States army.
The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War on the ground that it
violates Article VIII Section 2 par. 4 of the Constitution which provides that “National Assembly
may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment”. The petitioners are in error for courts martial
are agencies of executive character and are not a portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no
merits and is dismissed with cost.
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Derogation of Sovereignty
Tanada v. Angara
G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of

the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the
prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public
funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government
properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith.
They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
“develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x
x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods” as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines
“to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of
both Congress and the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit,
restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2,
Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the Philippines.
Held:
No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine
sovereignty, particularly the legislative power granted by the Philippine Constitution. The Senate
was acting in the proper manner when it concurred with the President’s ratification of the
agreement.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the
Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the
Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In
its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental
16
rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed
in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.”
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty.
By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for
greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits,
they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties
have been used to record agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as,
for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the
regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial
relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact
and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations
imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed
by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, “Today, no nation can build its destiny
alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here.”
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without
discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality
and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
“equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that
can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade
environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino
capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
17
Bayan v. Zamora
G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an
agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty
by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the
concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the
Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”
ISSUE:
Was the VFA unconstitutional?
HELD:
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA.
The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification
by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has
not required it.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the
other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United
18
States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the
phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they
have in common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a
treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under
international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the
terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA
as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed
marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
19
CITIZENSHIP
 CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commisioner of Immigration

G.R. No. L-21289, October 4, 1971
Facts:
This is a case filed to enjoin the Commissioner of Immigration from causing the arrest
and deportation of the petitioner herein - Lau Yuen Yueng.
Petitioner herein applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant.
She is a Chinese residing in Kowloon, Hongking and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to
the Philippines and to visit her great grand uncle for a period of one month.
When she arrived in the Philippines, Asher Y Cheng filed a bond in the amount of PHP1,
000 to undertake among others that Lau Yuen Yueng would actually depart from the Philippines
on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as
in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might
properly allow.
After repeated extensions, petitioner was allowed to stay until Feb. 13, 1962. But on
January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim
an alleged Filipino Citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of the respondent to confiscate her bond and order
her arrest deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for
injunction with preliminary injunction.
During the hearing, it was admitted that Lao Yuen Yueng could not write either English
or Tagalog. Except a few words she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not
even name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa.
Issue:
Whether or not marriage by Lao Yuen Yueng made her ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines.
Held:
Pertinent part of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No 473, upon which petitioners rely,
reads:
20
“Any woman who is not or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and
who might herself be lawfully naturalised shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
Citing several cases decided by the Supreme Court, the phrase, “who might herself be
lawfully naturalised,” refer to a class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that
compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws was not required.
Being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife “may be lawfully naturalised,” what
should be required is not only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but she must also
possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral
character, adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable
conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write English
or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of children in certain schools, etc.
In Philippine jurisprudence it was held that an alien wife is required to prove only that
she may herself be lawfully naturalized, that she is not one of the disqualified persons
enumerated in the Section 4 of the law, on order to establish her citizenship status as a fact.
Section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act 473), an alien woman marrying
a Filipino, native born or naturalised, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien
woman married to an alien who i subsequently naturalised here follows the Philippines
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she
does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Seciton 4 reads:
1. Person opposed to organised government or affiliate with any associations or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organised governments.
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity
of propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of
their ideas.
3. Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy.
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos.
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines are at war, during the period
of such war.
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than United States, whose laws does not
grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
21
Djumantan v. Domingo
G.R. No. 99358, January 30, 1995
Facts:
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.
On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married
petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979. On
January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, arrived in Manila as the “guests”
of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was
merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. When petitioner
and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13, 1979,
Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.As “guests,” petitioner and her two children lived
in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary
visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner.
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to
that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner
was issued an alien certificate of registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez’ eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the
Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter,
petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell.
The CID issued an order revoking the status of permanent resident given to petitioner, the
Board found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Phils. There
was thus no basis for giving her the status of permanent residence, since she was an Indonesian
citizen and her marriage with a Filipino Citizen was not valid.
Thus this petition for certiorari
Issue:
Whether or not the courts may review deportation proceedings
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of Article 8 says Judicial Power includes 1) settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable 2) determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government.
22
We need not resolve the validity of petitioner’s marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID can
validly deport petitioner as an “undesirable alien” regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical
to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry
into the country.
However, under clause 1 of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 an “alien who enters
the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or
without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or
at any place other than at a designated port of entry” is subject to deportation.
The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and “shall
not be effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after
the cause for deportation arises”. Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when
Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country, more than
five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990.
23
 ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
In re: Vicente Ching

Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999
Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was
born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the
Philippines
He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application
to take the 1998 Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submits to the Court the
following documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified

accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a
registered voter of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tubao, La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was
scheduled on May 5, 1999. Because of his questionable status of Ching’s citizenship, he was not
allowed to take oath. He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching’s petition for
admission to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so,
unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance
with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 “an act providing for the manner in which
the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino
citizen”
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he
does, it would already be beyond the “reasonable time” allowed by the present jurisprudence.
Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within “a reasonable time”.
24
Held:
No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within
a reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years
from “upon reaching the age of majority”, which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine
citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within the
reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship,
as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest
civil registry.
25
 DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED ELECTION
Co v. HRET
G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991
Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent
Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar
was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the
private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the
following grounds: 1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2) Jose
Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
On Jurisdiction
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use
of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded
jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the
government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution.
(Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
26
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental
branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or
has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide.
(Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process
on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by
the Supreme Court.
On Citizenship
His grandfather was naturalized as a Filipino, Ong married a Filipina and that he is only
renting a house
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the
Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not
required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is
enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or
relative.
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that
the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it
required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified
to run.
27
 NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS
Bengson v. HRET
G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001
Facts:
Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable
was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the United States
Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
others, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
Cruz was thereafter naturalized as a US citizen on June 5, 1990 in connection with his service in
the U.S. Marine Corps. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a
convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running
for re-election. Bengson then filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of
the Constitution. On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for
quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the 2nd District
of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. Bengson’s MR was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Held:
Yes. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.
These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born
citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of
aparticular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. As defined in the same Constitution,
natural-born citizens “are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.”On the other hand, naturalized citizens
are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which
repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. Thed ecision granting Philippine
citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is
28
satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1)not left the Philippines; (2) has
dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest
of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. Filipino citizens who have lost
their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)by repatriation, and
(3) by direct act of Congress. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring
Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former
Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation,
on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
(1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a
Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity. As distinguished from the
lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry
of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. As a rule, repatriation results in
the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand,
if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. The rule applies to Cruz’s case. Being a
natural-born citizen, Cruz reacquired this status upon his repatriation.
29
Tecson v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for
having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming
that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. COMELEC
dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the
case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.

2. Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a
Filipino citizen.
Held:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a

candidate” for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
“Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal” in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7,

of the 1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the “President” or “Vice-President”, of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take
cognizance, and not of “candidates” for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino

Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s

birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of
the Philippines.”
Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the

latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from
the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in
1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954
was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being
so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondent’s father.
30
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American

citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s
birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the
allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on
respondent’s citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public
documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation
in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
31
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 221697; G.R. No. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
Facts:
Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn

infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing the parental care and
custody over petitioner by Edgardo Militar to Emiliano Militar and his wife, she has been
reported and registered as a foundling and issued a Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live
Birth, thus was given the name, Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.
When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley
(aka Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces) filed a petition foe her
adoption. The trial court granted their petition and ordered that her name be changed to Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of 18 in 1986; in 1988, she
applied and was issued Philippine Passport by the DFA; in 1993 and 1998, she renewed her
passport.
She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies after enrolling and
pursuing a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines. She graduated in
1991 from Boston College where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.
She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and
the U.S., in San Juan City and decided to flew back to the U.S. after their wedding. She gave
birth to her eldest child while in the U.S.; and her two daughters in the Philippines.
She became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came back to the Philippines to
support her father’s candidacy for president in the May 2004 elections and gave birth to her
youngest daughter. They then returned to the U.S. in 2004 but after few months, she rushed back
to the Philippines to attend to her ailing father. After her father’s death, the petitioner and her
husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 2005 and immediately
secured a TIN, then her children followed suit; acquired property where she and her children
resided.
In 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; she filed a sworn
petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on
behalf of her three children which was granted. She registered as a voter; secured Philippine
passport; appointed and took her oath as Chairperson of the MTRCB after executing an affidavit
of Renunciation of American citizenship before the Vice Consul of the USA and was issued a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the USA in 2011.
32
In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator
for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period of
residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” Petitioner obtained the highest number of
votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached to her COC an “Affidavit
Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in
Quezon City on 14 October 2015.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she
cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en
banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she was in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is
qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the
natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue:
Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Held:
Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-born

Filipino.
It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no

restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings as they are already impliedly so
recognized.
There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting
discrimination against foundlings as the three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws.
Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported by some treaties,
adhering to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the
foundling is found.
33
 DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND DUAL ALLEGIANCE
Mercado v. Manzano
G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999
Facts:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold elective office on the
ground that he is both an American citizen and a Filipino citizen, having been born in the United
States of Filipino parents. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Manzano for being a
dual citizen pursuant to the Local Government Code RA 7160, that those with dual citizenship
are disqualified from running any public position.
Issue:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the local
position.
Held:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual
citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be
understood as referring to “dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship
do not fall under this disqualification.
34
 NATURALIZATION
Republic v. De la Rosa
G.R. No. 104654, June 6, 1994
Facts:
On September 20, 1991, Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the
Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the RTC Manila.
On October 7, 1991, Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and
directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least 6
months before the date of the said hearing. Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16
hearing and move it to January 24, 1992, citing his intention to run for public office in the May
1992 elections. Judge granted the motion and the hearing was moved to February 21. No
publication or copy was issued about the order.
On February 21, 199, the hearing proceeded. However, on February 27, 1992, Judge rendered the
assailed Decision and held that Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines by naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to annul the
decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on
same date.
Issue:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.
Held:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the Province of
Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of
the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. The proceedings of the
trial court was marred by the following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.
35
 BY NATURALIZATION
Frivaldo v. Comelec
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed
office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized
in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he
was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the
Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be,
among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement
for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He

claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged
forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he
could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
36
Labo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship.
He was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the
Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous.
According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines.
HELD:
The petitioner’s contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that
he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of
Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in
his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization,
he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing
all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship.
37
 BY EXPRESS RENUNCIATION OR EXPATRIATION
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago
G.R. No. L-83882, January 24, 1989
FACTS:
In the case at bar, herein petitioner, despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen,
applied and renewed his Portuguese passport. Moreover, while still a citizen of the Philippines,
petitioner also declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of applying for a foreign passport and declaration of foreign nationality
in commercial documents, constitute an express renunciation of one’s Philippine citizenship
acquired through naturalization.
HELD:
Yes, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of

petitioner’s Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In a related jurisprudence,
express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
38
 RETROACTIVITY OF REPATRIATION
Frivaldo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996
FACTS:
Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was
disqualified by the Court twice due to his alien citizenship. He claims to have re-assumed his lost
Philippine citizenship thru repatriation. Respondent Lee was the second placer in the canvass and
claimed that the votes cast in favor of petitioner should be considered void; that the electorate
should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured
the most number of valid votes; or the incumbent Vice-Governor should take over the said post
due to permanent vacancy due to Frivaldo’s ineligibility.
ISSUES:
1) Was the repatriation valid and legal and reasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify
him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office?
2) Is disqualification for lack of citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for or be
elected to or hold public office?
3) Did Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering that said petition is not
a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case?
4) Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?
HELD:
1) Yes. According to law, citizenship may be reacquired by 1) direct act of Congress, 2)

by naturalization or 3) by repatriation under P.D 725. The law does not specifically state a
particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (at
least 1 year residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least 35 years old
on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
public office to ensure that no alien, or person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern
our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. An official begins to govern or to
discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of
office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on the very day the term of his
office began, he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold office and to discharge
the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. The law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first.
The Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not
require him to vote actually. In other words, the law’s purpose in this second requirement is to
ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern — and not
anywhere else. In fact, petitioner voted in all the previous elections. The prime issue of
39
citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election
or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Hence, the repatriation of the petitioner retroacted
upon the date of filing of his application.
2) No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a

person’s future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for
that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
3) No. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power to “exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective provincial officials. Such power to annul a proclamation must be done within ten (10)
days following the proclamation. Frivaldo’s petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee’s
proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
4) No. The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will. Lee is just a
second placer. The rule is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
The petition was DISMISSED for being moot and academic and has no merit.
40
STATE OF IMMUNITY
 BASIS OF IMMUNITY
Lasco v. UN Revolving Fund

G.R. Nos. 109095-109107, February 23, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United
Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special
fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of
the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.
Petitioners are the complainants for illegal dismissal and damages. Private respondent alleged
that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic
immunity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity
HELD:
Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.
Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized

Agencies of the United Nations states that ³each specialized agency shall make a provision for
appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of
private character to which the specialized agency is a party.´ Private respondent is not engaged in
a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into
by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island.
41
 WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
1. FORMS OF CONSENT
Express
Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v. CA

GR No. 91359, September 25 1992, 214 SCRA 286
FACTS:
Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) alleges that the provisions
under Section 4 and 17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law violate the
1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade,
and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective
Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than
one security agency.
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of

the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses
and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen.
Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that “all private security
agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized
within the Region where their main offices are located...”. As such membership requirement in
PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions
against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade.
A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed
the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at
P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.
Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-
throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the
standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO

Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the
cancellation of its license to operate a security agency. The PC-SUSIA affirmed the findings and
likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI’s license. As a result, PADPAO refused to
issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI.
42
VMPSI made a request letter to the PC Chief to set aside or disregard the findings of
PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate
of membership from PADPAO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the
State without its consent.
HELD:
Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if
he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts
for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed
as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be
had against them in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the
Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an
implied consent by the State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from
statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such
consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction over the public respondents. Petition for
review is denied and the judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto.
43
Garcia c. Chief of Staff

G.R. No. L-20213. January 31, 1966
FACTS:
The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, an action to collect a
sum of money against the above defendants. He suffered injuries while undergoing a 10-month
military training at Camp Floridablanca, Pampanga. He filed a claim under Commonwealth Act
400 and in April 1957 with the Adjutant General’s Office which later disallow his claim for
disability benefit. After further demands of the plaintiff, the same Adjutant General’s Office
denied the claim, alleging that the Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610
which took effect January 1, 1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, he was
deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently disabled; and by the reason of
unjustified refusal of defendants on the claim, plaintiff was deprived of his disability pension
from July 1948 totalling no less than P4,000 at the rate of P20/mo and suffered moral damages
and attorney’s fees the amount of P2,000. The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief
of Staff of AFP file separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies before coming to court; that the complaint states no cause of action; and
that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Acting on the said Motion, the
Court of First Instance, on March 2, 1962, rendered an order dismissing the complaint on the
ground that action has prescribed. Motion for reconsideration of the said order having been
denied, the plaintiff has interposed this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court is right in dismissing the complaint.
HELD:
The SC uphold the order of dismissal for the simple reason that the Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being a money claim against the
government. It was already held in the case of New Manila Lumber vs. Republic in L-14248,
4/28/60, that a claim for the recovery of money against the government should be filed with the
Auditor General, in line with the principle that the State can not be sued without its consent.
Commonwealth Act 327 provides:
Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of
accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within 60 days, exclusive
of Sundays and holidays after their presentation….
44
Section 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the
settlement of an account or claim, may within 30 days from receipt of decision, take an appeal in
writing to (c) the Supreme Court, if the appellant is a private person or entity.
The well-established rule that no recourse to court can be had until all administrative
remedies had been exhausted and that actions against administrative officers should not be
entertained if superior administrative officer could grant relief is applicable to this case. The
order dismissing the complaint is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
45
Ernesto Callado vs. International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)

G.R. No. 106483, May 22, 1995
FACTS:
Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving
an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an
accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the

IRRI’s Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was
charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to
start because of a problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI
issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal,
illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal
process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such
diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by
petitioner, not having waived the same.
While admitting IRRI’s defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an
Order issued by the Institute to the effect that “in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI
waives its immunity,” and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal
obstacle in resolving the case.
The NLRC found merit in private respondent’s appeal and, finding that IRRI did not
waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the
complaint dismissed.
In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international
organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the
case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on “Guidelines on
the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620.”
46
ISSUE:
Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-
employee relationship?
HELD:
No.
P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil
and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by
the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case “a categorical
recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to
international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question
conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at
bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion
by the principal law officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction.
The raison d’etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their
functions by the agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-
General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that
such waiver is discretionary on its part.
47
Merritt v. Government of the Philippines

GR No. L-11154, March 21 1916, 34 Phil. 311
FACTS:
Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the
ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to
return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the
Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which
he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence of the
driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government
to pay the same.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it
also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?
HELD:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its
liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the
act performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This concept does not
apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his
own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office
and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not a special agent; thus the Government is not liable. (Merritt vs Government of
the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-11154, March 21 1916, 34 Phil. 311)
NOTE:
■ The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. (Art. 2180 par.
6, Civil Code)
48
■ The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of
acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office,
because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. (Merritt vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands)
■ The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except
when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to
guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs since that would
involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands)
49
Implied
Ministerio v. City of Cebu

G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971
FACTS:
Petitioners sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot alleging that in
1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material
possession of it and used it for the widening of a national road, without paying just compensation
and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated
demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway
Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are immune from suit.
HELD:
NO. Where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of
possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial
liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government itself,
and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the court except with the
consent of said Government. In as much as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts,
for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the
State from suit.
50
Republic v. Purisima
G.R. No. L-36084, August 31, 1977
FACTS:
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn
Administration in a pending civil suit inthe sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a
money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent
Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration,
Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a
court to pass on the meritsof a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery
of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions.
Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the
motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent’s decision is valid
HELD:
No. The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in
this provision of the present Constitution: “The State may not be sued without its consent.” “The
doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935]
Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes,
negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on
which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to
problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business
pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought
alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They
could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of
having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final
adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington
Insurance decision: “Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as
it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of
injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being
undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective
appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the
determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the
verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a
fundamental postulate of constitutional law.” [Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v.
Republic of the Philippines]
51
2. TEST OF SUABILITY FOR GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Incorporated
Philippine National Railways vs IAC

G.R. No. 70547 January 22, 1993
FACTS:
The Petitioners, Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their
son, Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was
between Tarlac City and Capas. The said train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in
view of the proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to
pay them damages totalling P136,370. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it had
no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a suit
against the State. The petitioners appealed to SC pursuant to RA No. 5440.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PNR is immune from suit?
HELD:
NO. Although the PNR is a government instrumentality under Republic Act No. 4156, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, it was held that the State
divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its
predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did
not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common
carriers. However, as held in precedents, the correct rule is that not all government entities,
whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by
the character of the objectives for which the entity was organized. The Manila Hotel case also
relied on the following rulings: “By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality
of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to
render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.” The order of
dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings, costs against the Philippine National Railways. It would be unjust if the heirs of the
victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could not sue the PNR for damages. Like
any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons engaged in that
private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function.
52
Unincorporated
Air Transportation Office v. Ramos

G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011
FACTS:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their land
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio City land records with
an area of 985 square meters, more or less, was being used as part of the runway and running
shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO).
Respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO
in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated
verbal and written demands.
In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of
land that included the respondents’ affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted
that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the State’s consent considering
that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.
ISSUE
Could the ATO be sued without the State’s consent?
HELD:
An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its

own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty.
Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated
government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions
has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is
governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose
function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business.
The State’s immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner because it is an agency of the
State engaged in an enterprise that is far from being the State’s exclusive prerogative.
DENIED
53
3. EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

4. SUABILITY VERSUS LIABILITY
Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte

G.R. No. L-10059, January 31, 1958
FACTS:
Sabas Torralba was employed as the driver of Ilocos Norte and detailed to the Office of
the District Engineer. While driving his truck, Sabas ran over Proceto Palafox resulting to the
latter’s death. Sabas was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence to which he
pleaded guilty. The heirs of Palafox instituted a civil case against him, the Province, the District
Engineer and the Provincial Treasurer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Province of Ilocos Norte can be held liable.
HELD:
NO. The general rule is that local government units are not liable for negligent acts of its
employees while they are performing governmental functions or duties. In this case, the driver
was involved in the construction or maintenance of roads which was a governmental duty.
Therefore, the province cannot be held liable for his negligent act. However tragic and
deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary
consideration.
54
UP v. Dizon
G.R. No. 171182; August 23, 2012
FACTS:
University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation of the
buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing.
However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the
Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern
Builders. Then on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied
the motion. The denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco
(Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the
counsel of record of the UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City.
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied
due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon
motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final
and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their
previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already
issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003
(although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently,
the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the
release of the funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
I. Was UP’s funds validly garnished?

II. Has the UP’s appeal dated June 3, 2002 been filed out of time?
HELD:
UP’s funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment. (Garnishment of
public funds; suability vs. liability of the State)
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a “chartered

institution” performing a legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government
55
instrumentality, performing the States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and

accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced
from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No.
714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act
1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP,
including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution,
constitute a “special trust fund,” the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the
UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of
the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from
the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its
institutional objectives.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court
succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first
be made between suability and liability. “Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued,
liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable
does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does
not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed
itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff
the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The Constitution strictly mandated that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The execution of the monetary judgment
against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final
and executory decision already validated the claim against the UP.
HELD:
The period of appeal did not start without effective service of decision upon counsel of
record. (The doctrine of immutability of a final judgment; service of judgments; fresh-period
rule; computation of time)
At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount of P16,370,191.74
illegally garnished from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality of the judgment based
on the supposed tardiness of UPs appeal, which the RTC declared on September 26, 2002. It is
true that a decision that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and cannot be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact and law, and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by this Court
as the highest court of the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not been
absolute, and has admitted several exceptions, among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors;
(b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments;
and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that render its
execution unjust and inequitable. We rule that the UPs plea for equity warrants the Courts
56
exercise of the exceptional power to disregard the declaration of finality of the judgment of the
RTC for being in clear violation of the UPs right to due process.
Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of
the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of
record of the UP. Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be
validly made upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other. It is settled that where a party has appeared
by counsel, service must be made upon such counsel. This is clear enough from Section 2,
second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states that: “If any party has
appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless
service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several
parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side.”
Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective,
such that the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it
would still not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and immutable
thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the
judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in
the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing the appeal; and that the
period resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the
CA and the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the fresh-period
rule that the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals, viz: “to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.” The
retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims “to regiment or make
the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution,” is
impervious to any serious challenge. This is because there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco
received the denial, the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within
the context of the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service
of the denial of the motion for reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday.
Hence, the UP had until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to
appeal, conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: “If the last day
of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place
where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
57
GSIS v. Group Management Corp.

G.R. Nos. 167000-71, June 8, 2011
FACTS:
This case revolves around the petitions of the Lapu-Lapu Development & Housing
Corporation (LLDHC), Group Management Corporation (GMC) and the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS). The three entities consistently filed cases for the same subject lots
from April 30, 1980, until this case. The cases were filed before both the RTC of Lapu-Lapu
City, where the subject lots are situated in, and the RTC of Manila.
LLDHC entered into a Project and Loan Agreement with GSIS on February 4, 1974,
involving seventy-eight lots situated in Barrio, Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City. GSIS agreed to a
25 million peso loan with LLDHC, the owner of the lots. LLDHC failed to fulfill all of its
obligations regarding the lots, which included the real estate mortgage in favor of GSIS, and so,
GSIS closed the mortgage. Being the only bidder in the public auction sale, GSIS won over the
subject lots, and in time secured its ownership over the lots with the transfer certificate of titles
issued to its name. GMC offered to purchase on installment the subject lots with a collective area
specified as 423,177 square meters from GSIS, with the amount of 1,100,000 pesos. GSIS
accepted the offer through a Deed of Conditional Sale on February 26, 1980. GMC then learned
that the subject lots was only 298,504 square meters and requested GSIS to reduce the price
according to the actual proportion of the land. This proposal was approved with an Amendment
to the Deed of Conditional Sale, which reflected the agreement of GSIS and GMC. LLDHC filed
a complaint against GSIS before the RTC of Manila on April 23, 1980 for Foreclosure with Writ
of Mandatory Injunction, known as Civil Case No. R-82-3429. GMC filed a complaint also
against GSIS on November 3, 1989, known as Civil Case No. 2203-L, for Specific Performance
with Damages before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. GSIS, in its defense, submitted a COA
Memorandum dated April 3, 1989 disallowing in audit the sale of the subject to the court, stating
that there were “apparent inherent irregularities,” and that GMC bought the property at a value
much lower than GSIS’ purchasing price.
On February 24, 1992, with regard to Civil Case No. 2203-L, the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City
decided in favor of GMC, and that GSIS was to execute order of the court pertaining to damages,
and actions needed to finalize the deed of absolute sale with GMC. On May 10, 1994, the RTC
of Manila also rendered its judgment that, aside from court orders, all claims and counterclaims
by the parties against each other are dismissed in Civil Case No. R-82-3429. LLDHC now used
the Manila RTC decision as a means to file a Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the Lapu-
Lapu RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L, named CA-GR SP No. 34696, which was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals. After this was a series of filing petitions to appeal the
judgment. Throughout the years, eventually, the three parties approached the Supreme Court,
where, in G.R. No. 167000, GSIS seeks to reverse and set aside the decision made on November
25, 2004 and January 20, 2005, and to annul and set aside the March 1, 2004 and May 7 2004
orders from the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L. And in G.R. No. 169971, GMC seeks
58
to reverse and set aside the Decision made in September 23, 2005 and to annul and set aside the
March 11, 2004 Lapu-Lapu RTC decision.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the decisions of the Manila RTC in Civil Case No. R-82-3429 shall be executory,
despite the decision of Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L. Whether or not the decision in
CA GR SP No. 84382 and GSIS Petition in 167000 are barred by Res Judicata. Whether or not
due process was given to the parties/entities involved in the case.
Whether or not GSIS can be immune to acting out the orders of the court.
HELD:
The petition in G.R. No. 167000 was denied by the court, and the petition in G.R. No. 169971 is
granted.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The decision of the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L does not in any way affect
the orders from the Manila RTC in Civil Case No. R-82-3429, since the former has been
finalized on January 28, 1995, while the latter became final on May 30, 1997. Procedural due
process was extended to all parties, that there was no immediate dismissal of their cases before
they were heard by the respective courts, even if they have already had a rendered decision.
However, the Supreme Court also recognized the doctrine of “Finality of Judgment,” where the
decisions, once final and executed cannot be appealed, unless of circumstances that happen after
the finalization, void judgments, correction of clerical errors and nunc pro tunc entries. The
decision in CA GR SP No. 84382 and GSIS Petition in 167000 are barred by Res Judicata, which
is one of the reasons why G.R. No. 167000 was denied. GSIS acted jure gestonis, entering into a
contract, and being solely liable for their irresponsibility. They are not immune from acting out
the orders of the court.
59
5. EXECUTION
Makati v. CA
G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private

respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After hearing, the RTC fixed the
appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordered petitioner to pay this amount
minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private respondent. It
then issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds
of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to
do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required
under the law. The RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed; hence, petitioner filed a petition for
review before the SC.
Issue:
1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from garnishment and levy upon
execution?
2. If so, what then is the remedy of the private respondents?
Held:
1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy
and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a
municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and
sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues
derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively
for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are
exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an
ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under
the RTC decision, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of
petitioner.
2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal
recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a
final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in
order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the
corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor.
60
For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property
notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just
compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the property since the same has
been the site of Makati West High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will not
condone petitioner’s blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation
proceedings it had in fact initiated. The State’s power of eminent domain should be exercised
within the bounds of fair play and justice.
61
Hagonoy v. Dumdum
G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010
Facts:
A complaint was filed by Lim Chao against the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan for
collection of sum of money and damages. The complaint alleged that a contract was entered into
by Lim Chao and the Municipality for the delivery of motor vehicles which supposedly were
needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the municipality. Chao then delivered
to the Municipality 21 motor vehicles amounting to 5,820,000.00 php. However, despite having
made several deliveries, the municipality did not heed Chao’s claim for payment. Thus, she filed
a complaint for full payment with interests and damages and prayed for the issuance of a writ of
Preliminary Attachment against the municipality. The trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment directing the sheriff “to attach the estate, real and personal properties” of the
Municipality
Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the Municipality of Hagonoy is valid.
Held:
No. The universal rule is that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law. It may limit claimant’s action “only up to the completion
of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution” and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered. Since government funds and properties mat not be seized under writs of
execution and garnishment to satisfy such judgments is based on the considerations of public
policy. Thus, the functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds form their legitimate and specific objects.
62
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

 CHARACTERISTICS OF A REPUBLIC STATE
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.

224 SCRA 792 (1993)
Facts:
A taxpayer’s class suit was initiated by the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI)
together with the minors Juan Antonio Oposa et al and their parents. All were duly represented.
They claimed that as taxpayers they have the right to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resources of the country’s rainforests.
They prayed that a judgment be rendered ordering Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr, his
agents, representatives, and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber license agreements, Factoran being the secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action.
Held:
Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all
Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the
country’s forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or
violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action.
63
 CHARACTERISTICS OF A REPUBLIC STATE


Villavicenaio v. Lukban
39 Phil. 778
Facts:
Justo Lukban, mayor of Manila, ordered the district of ill-repute women closed. One
hundred and seventy women were deported to Davao without their knowledge and consent. The
women were received as laborers in a banana plantation. Some of the women were able to escape
and return to Manila. The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the
deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to the Supreme Court.
One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without
their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were
forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble
attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown
by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and
that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts.
Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.
Held:
Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed
a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will.
There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public
officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his
residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same
rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of profession should
not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it
does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the
human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without
even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting
to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban and others must be severely punished.
64
 THE CONTROL POWER
Petitioner Organization v. Executive Secretary

669 SCRA 49
Facts:
In 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961, the Coconut Industry Code, which
consolidated and codified existing laws relating to the coconut industry. The Code provided that
surpluses from the CCS Fund and the CID Fund collections. This is not used for replanting and
other authorized purposes, were to be invested by acquiring shares of stock of corporations,
including the San Miguel Corporation (SMC), engaged in undertakings related to the coconut
and palm oil industries.
UCPB was to make such investments and equitably distribute these for free to coconut
farmers. These investments constituted the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF). P.D. 961
also provided that the coconut levy funds (coco-levy funds) shall be owned by the coconut
farmers in their private capacities.
Issue:
Whether or not the appropriating public funds violate substantive due process.
Held:
Yes. The coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law to support a proper governmental
purpose. They were raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for the
benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in general. The Court has also recently declared
that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose.
In COCOFED v. Republic, the Court held as unconstitutional Section 2 of P.D. 755 for
“effectively authorizing the PCA to utilize portions of the CCS Fund to pay the financial
commitment of the farmers to acquire UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCS Fund levies with
UCPB interest free. And as there also provided, the CCS Fund, CID Fund and like levies that
PCA is authorized to collect shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to be
transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning they shall be deemed private funds.”
Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961, and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.
1468 completely ignore the fact that coco-levy funds are public funds raised through taxation.
And since taxes could be exacted only for a public purpose, they cannot be declared private
properties of individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct group of persons.
But the assailed provisions, which removed the coco-levy funds from the general funds of
the government and declared them private properties of coconut farmers, do not appear to have a
color of social justice for their purpose. The declarations do not distinguish between wealthy
65
coconut farmers and the impoverished ones. Consequently, such declarations are void since they
appropriate public funds for private purpose and, therefore, violate the citizens’ right to
substantive due process.
66
 DEFENSE OF THE STATE


Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato
246 SCRA 540
Facts:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the
gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is
allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and
responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment
for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995.
A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of
Lease Petitioner’s Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of
PCSO’s charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-
D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law
of the case Respondent’s reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding
required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of
PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do
not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing
Held:
No. Stare Decisis cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the
petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no
constitutional issues were actually involved. Law of the case cannot also apply. Since the
present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr.,
the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but
the cases are not. Rule on conclusiveness cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed
upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action
between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to
issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second
proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the
one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an
independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the
previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner’s standing. Standing is a
67
concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more
appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are real parties in interest
68
 INCORPORATION CLAUSE
Ang LADLAD LGBT Party v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since
their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar
as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal
protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations
against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941
Held:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC.
It also directed the COMELEC to grant petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The

crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere
in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as
a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
69
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to
elections be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
70
Milajes v. Ranada
G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005
Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, and others all of whom suffered human
rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the
Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly 1.9 Billion U.S. Dollars in
compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US
District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying Php 410.00 as docket and filing fees based on
Rule 141, Section 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct
filing fees. The Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject
matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court
ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the
value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was 472 Million Philippine pesos,
which Petitioners had not paid.
Issue:
Whether or not the viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign
judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction
Held:
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof.
However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause
of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations.The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as
binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
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Agustin v. Edu
88 SCRA 195
Facts:
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of
Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly
to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing
that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars
are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning
devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
In compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land

Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof. This
petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order are unlawful
and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and
undue delegation of police power.
Issue:
Whether or not the said is EO is valid
Held:
Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive,
for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said
motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2)
petroleum lamps (the Kinke) because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said
1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400
meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized
rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude,
without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or
expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or
endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned
other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance
warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency
vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the
mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
72
Sec. of Justice v. Lantion

G.R. No. L-139465, January 18, 2000
Facts:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines
and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent
Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge
of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark
Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official
extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the
request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the
request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that
the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings
arising out of a request for extradition.
Issue:
Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties
under a treaty
Held:
Petition dismissed. The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights
of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed
by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state.
This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally
accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the
land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted

with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
73
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the

extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable
period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of
the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic
sphere. “The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
74
Bayan Muna v. Romulo

G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was
impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC) with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for
the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national
criminal jurisdictions.” The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under
international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed
the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the
signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries
appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is
not among the 92.
Issue:
Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting
obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized
principles of international law
Held:
The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates
to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for
concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international

doctrines, practices, and jargons––is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as
expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An
exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter-governmental agreements,” which is an
internationally accepted form of international agreement.
75
 REARING OF THE YOUTH
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. v. Montano

603 SCRA 621
Facts:
In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the
death of their unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement,
then filed death benefits claim from his employer, the Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation which denied the claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration and both
parties agreed to have Atty. Allan Montaño act as the arbitrator. Montaño ruled that Hortillano is
entitled to his claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Montaño.
On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the
CBA, death benefits are awarded if an employee’s legitimate dependent has died; but that in this
case, no “death” has occurred because the fetus died inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus
has no juridical personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code
which provides a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born; that the fetus was not
born hence it is not a legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as
contemplated under civil laws.
Issue:
Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die
Held:
No. Death is defined as “cessation of life”. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There
is no need to discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality – that is not
the issue here. But nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil personality. Moreover, while
the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not
explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this case,
Hortillano’s fetus had had life inside the womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life for
38 weeks before the unfortunate miscarriage. Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence
Hortillano as an employee is entitled to death benefit claims as provided for in their CBA.
 WOMEN
PT and T Co. v. NLRC

G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997
Facts:
76
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman
specifically as “Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990
until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again
invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from
June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary

employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job
application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a
few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor,
Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy.
Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the company’s policy of not accepting
married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29,
1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner
illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee.
Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company policies.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of
an employee
Held:
One of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by
reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate
manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business
judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by
our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with
PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not
qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.
77
 SOCIAL JUSTICE
Ondoy v. Ignacio
G.R. No. L-47178 May 16, 1980
Facts:
The petitioner, Estrella Ondoy, is a mother of one Jose Ondoy, an employee who worked
under Virgilio Ignacio. According to the chief engineer and oiler, Jose Andoy was aboard the
ship of the respondent’s enterprise as part of the workforce. He was invited by friends to a
drinking spree, left the ship and thereafter was found dead due to drowning. Thus the petitioner
asked for compensation, however, the testimonies by the chief engineer were dismissed by the
hearing officer due to lack of merit. Afterwards, a motion for reconsideration was also filed
before the Secretary of Labor, but was denied again due to lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the compensation for Jose’s death is constitutional
Held:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, granting Estrella Ondoy 6,000 pesos as
compensation for Jose’s death, 300 pesos for burial fees and 600 pesos as attorney’s fee with the
costs against respondent, Ignacio.
The principle of social justice applied in this case is a matter of protection, and not equality.
The Supreme Court recognized the right of petitioner to claim compensation from the
respondent, as Jose did drown while “in the actual performance of his duty.” To fortify this
ruling, the SC cited cases wherein, with accordance to the constitutional scheme of social justice
and protection to labor, Workmen’s Compensation Act, which dealt with the right of workers for
compensation for personal injury, was applied. Among them is a case where there was no direct
testimony attesting that the deceased drowned while in the performance of his duty, however, the
compensation was sustained. Lastly from another case, the SC quoted that “as between a laborer,
usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the
law has reason to demand from the latter strict compliance. Social justice in these cases is not
equality but protection.
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 SOCIAL JUSTICE
PRRM v, Pulgar
623 SCRA 244
Facts:
Pulgar was the manager of PRRMs branch office in Quezon Province. When Pulgar was
reassigned to PRRMs central office, PRRM conducted an investigation into alleged financial
anomalies committed at the TBFO.
In her investigation report, Solis stated that part of the funds allotted to the TBFO was
missing or not properly accounted for. The report also stated that some of the receipts that the
TBFO submitted to liquidate the organizations financial transactions were fictitious and
manufactured.
PRRM maintains that while the investigation was ongoing, Pulgar went on leave. After
the lapse of his last leave, Pulgar no longer reported to work, leading PRRM to believe that
Pulgar had abandoned his work to evade any liability arising from the investigation. PRRM was
therefore surprised to learn that Pulgar had filed an illegal dismissal case.
Labor Arbiter found in his decision that Pulgar had been illegally dismissed. On appeal,
the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter in its decision and dismissed Pulgars complaint, giving
more weight to PRRMs allegation that Pulgar abandoned his work. CA rendered the assailed
decision, granting Pulgars petition and reinstating the Labor Arbiters decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Pulgar illegally dismissed
Held:
While we recognize the rule that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of
proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, in the present case, however, the
facts and the evidence do not establish a prima facie case that the employee was dismissed from
employment. Before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal,
the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service.
Logically, if there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to its legality or illegality.
Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record,
cannot be given credence.
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of
the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically
decided in favor of labor. Management also has its rights which are entitled to respect and
79
enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privilege in
life, the Supreme Court has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker and upheld his
cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to
the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.
80
 SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
Austria v. NLRC
312 SCRA 410
Facts:
The Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The
petitioner was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were
terminated.
On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several

communications form Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit
accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma
Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.
The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was
Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was
very ill to be able to do the collecting.
A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of

dismissal citing:
1) Misappropriation of denominational funds;

2) Willful breach of trust;
3) Serious misconduct;
4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and
5) Commission of an offense against the person of  employer’s duly authorized representative as
grounds for the termination of his services.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the
SDA for reinstatement and backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of
petitioner.
SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as
such, involves the separation of church and state
Held:
81
No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is
involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee,
which is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of faith, worship or
doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor
Code.
82
 SUPREMACY OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITY
Gudani v. Senga
498 SCRA 671 (2006)
Facts:
Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security to shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were
directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before
said Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.
However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order
directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General
(OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily
retired from military service. After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be
charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus,
Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of
President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3)
Gen. Senga and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be
permanently enjoined from proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified
before the Senate.
Issue:
Whether or not the President may prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry
Held:
Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require
military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based
foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as
commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as
budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that
the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions
appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of
command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed
forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the
83
President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to
choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
84
SEPARATION OF POWERS
 EXPLANATION
Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. CIR

G.R. No. 173425, January 22, 2013
Facts:
In 1995, Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation purchased from the national

government a portion of the Fort Bonifacio reservation. On January 1, 1996, the enactment of
RA 7716 extended the coverage of VAT to real properties held primarily for sale to customers or
held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business. Thus, FBDC sought to register by
submitting to BIR an inventory of all its real properties, the book value of which aggregated to
about P71 B.
In October 1996, FBDC started selling Global City lots to interested buyers. For the first
quarter of 1997, it paid the output VAT by making cash payments to the BIR and credited its
unutilized input tax credit on purchases of goods and services. Realizing that its 8% transitional
input tax credit was not applied in computing its output VAT for the first quarter of 1997, FBDC
filed with the BIR a claim for refund of the amount erroneously paid as output VAT for the said
period.
The CTA denied refund on the ground that “the benefit of transitional input tax credit
comes with the condition that business taxes should have been paid first.” It contends that since
FBDC acquired the Global City property under a VAT-free sale transaction, it cannot avail of the
transitional input tax credit. The CTA likewise pointed out that under RR 7-95, implementing
Section 105 of the old NIRC, the 8% transitional input tax credit should be based on the value of
the improvements on land such as buildings, roads, drainage system and other similar structures,
constructed on or after January 1, 1998, and not on the book value of the real property.
Issues:
a. Whether or not prior payment of taxes is required in availing of the transitional input tax credit
b. Whether or not the transitional input tax credit applies only to the value of improvements
c. Whether or not the Tax Code allows either a cash refund or a tax credit for input VAT
Held:
a. No. First, nothing in Sec 105 of the NIRC indicates that prior payment of taxes is
necessary to avail of the transitional input tax credit. Clearly, all it requires is for the taxpayer to
file a beginning inventory with the BIR. Courts cannot limit the application or coverage of a law
nor can it impose conditions not provided therein because to do so constitutes judicial legislation.
85
Second, prior payment of taxes is not required to avail of the transitional input tax credit because
it is not a tax refund per se but a tax credit. Tax credit is not synonymous to tax refund. Tax
refund is defined as the money that a taxpayer overpaid and is thus returned by the taxing
authority. Tax credit, on the other hand, is an amount subtracted directly from one’s total tax
liability. It is any amount given to a taxpayer as a subsidy, a refund, or an incentive to encourage
investment. Thus, unlike a tax refund, prior payment of taxes is not a prerequisite to avail of a
tax credit.
Lastly, the fact that FBDC acquired the Global City property under a tax-free transaction
makes no difference as prior payment of taxes is not a pre-requisite.
b. No. Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95, insofar as it limits the transitional input tax credit to
the value of the improvement of the real properties, is a nullity. The 8% transitional input tax
credit should not be limited to the value of the improvements on the real properties but should
include the value of the real properties as well.
Hence, since FBDC is entitled to the 8% transitional input tax credit which is more than
sufficient to cover its output tax for the first taxable quarter, the amount of VAT output taxes
erroneously paid must be refunded.
c. Yes. First, a careful reading of Section 112 of the Tax Code shows that it does not
prohibit cash refund or tax credit of transitional input tax in the case of zero-rated or effectively
zero-rated VAT registered taxpayers, who do not have any output VAT.
The phrase “except transitional input tax” in Section 112 of the Tax Code was inserted to
distinguish creditable input tax from transitional input tax credit. Transitional input tax credits
are input taxes on a taxpayer’s beginning inventory of goods, materials, and supplies equivalent
to 8% (then 2%) or the actual VAT paid on such goods, materials and supplies, whichever is
higher. It may only be availed of once by first-time VAT taxpayers. Creditable input taxes, on
the other hand, are input taxes of VAT taxpayers in the course of their trade or business, which
should be applied within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were
made.
As regards Section 110, while the law only provides for a tax credit, a taxpayer who
erroneously or excessively pays his output tax is still entitled to recover the payments he made
either as a tax credit or a tax refund.
Here, since FBDC still has available transitional input tax credit, it filed a claim for
refund to recover the output VAT it erroneously or excessively paid for the 1st quarter of 1997.
Thus, there is no reason for denying its claim for tax refund/credit.
86
 PURPOSES
Nieves A. Saguiguit v. People

G.R. No. 144054, June 30, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with eight counts of violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. The
RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The instant
case calls for a re-examination and modification, if not abandonment, of rulings to the effect that
the mere issuance of a check which is subsequently dishonored makes the issuer liable for
violation of BP Blg. 22 regardless of the intent of the parties . Petitioner respectfully submits that
it was not the intention of the lawmaking body to make the issuance of a bum check ipso facto a
criminal offense already; there must be an intent to commit the prohibited act, and subject check
should be issued to apply on account or for value.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court can delve into the policy behind or wisdom of B.P. 22.
Held:
No. Under the doctrine of Separation of Powers, the Court cannot delve into the policy
behind or wisdom of a statute, i.e., B.P. Blg. 22, matters of legislative wisdom being within the
domain of Congress. Even with the best of motives, the Court can only interpret and apply the
law and cannot, despite doubts about its wisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts of justice have no
right to encroach on the prerogatives of lawmakers, as long as it has not been shown that they
have acted with grave abuse of discretion. And while the judiciary may interpret laws and
evaluate them for constitutional soundness and to strike them down if they are proven to be
infirm, this solemn power and duty do not include the discretion to correct by reading into the
law what is not written therein.
87
 CHECKS AND BALANCES
Disomangcop v. Datumanong
G.R. No. 149848, November 25, 2004
Facts:
On Aug. 1, 1989, RA 6734 was passed (Organic Act of ARMM). Four provinces voted
for inclusion in ARMM, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In
accordance with it, EO 426 was issued by Pres. Cory Aquino on Oct. 12, 1990. The same
devolved to the ARMM the power of the DPWH.
On May 20, 1999, DO 119 was issued by DPWH Sec. Vigilar. It created a DPWH
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national
infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur. On
Jan. 17, 2001, RA 8999 which created a new Engineering District in the first district of Lanao del
Sur was passed by Pres. Estrada.
On March 31, 2001, RA 9054 which amended RA 6734 was passed. The province of
Basilan and the City of Marawi voted to join ARMM through said law. Petitioners Disomangcop
and Dimalotang in their capacity as OIC and Enginer II respectively of the First Engineering
District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur filed a petition questioning the constitutionality and
validity of DO 119 and RA 8999 on the ground that they contravene the constitution and the
organic acts of the ARMM.
Issue:
Whether or not DO 119 and RA 8999 are both invalid and constitutionally infirm.
Held:
On RA 8999
RA 8999 never became operative and was superseded or repealed by a RA 9054. By

creating an office with previously devolved functions, RA 8999, in essence sought to amend RA
6074, which is an organic act which enjoys affirmation through a plebiscite. Hence, the
provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute such as RA 8999. The amendatory
law needs to be submitted also to a plebiscite which is lacking in the case of RA 8999. RA 6734
devolved the functions of the DPWH to ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur.
Moreover, RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054 which is a later law. RA 9054,
which is anchored on the 1987 Constitution advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by
detailing the powers of the ARMM which covers among others Lanao del Sur. However, RA
8999 ventures to reestablisht he National Government’s jurisdiction over the infrastructure
programs in Lanao del Sur. RA 8999 is patently inconsistent with RA 9054, and it destroys the
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latter law’s objective of devolution of the functions of DPWH in line with the policy of the
Constitution to grant LGUs meaningful and authentic regional autonomy.
On DO 119
DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over
infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of EO
426 which implements the transfer of control and supervision of the DPWH to the ARMM in
line with RA 6734. The office created under DO 119 having essentially the same powers with
the District Engineering Office of Lanao del Sur as created under EO 426, is a duplication. The
DO in effect takes back powers which have been previoulsy devolved under EO 426. RA 9054
however has repealed DO 119 because the former seeks to transfer control and supervision of
DPWH offices to ARMM.
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 DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS
Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona
G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998
Facts:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of
the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator Francisco S.
Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of Senate President. By a
vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had
voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while those who voted for him, belonged to the
minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that the senators
belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No consensus was arrived at during the
following days of session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from
the 7 members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as
minority leader. The Senated President then recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader of
the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition
for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully
belongs to Senator Tatad.
Issues:
a. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

b. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
c. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader?
d. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?
Held:
a. In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also
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invoke the Court’s judicial power “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives.
b. Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate
President recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is that
“[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” The court held that,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method
must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of
majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such
offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof.
However, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon
which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect
for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of
the legislature.
c. For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right
to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear
and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. The specific norms or
standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has
not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has
been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or
irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s assumption and exercise of the powers of the office
of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to
characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
d. Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as
Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. The latter belongs
to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution
of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two
Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their
standpoints.
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Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot be
accused of “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment” or of “an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.” Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or
even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within
their competence and authority.
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Philippine Judges Association v. Pete Prado

G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993
Facts:
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC)
to withdraw franking privileges from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a
privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the
postal service comes from the judiciary’s use of the postal service (issuance of court processes).
Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn from the
judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity
of Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal protection
clause.
Issue:
Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The
judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need
is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained
in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut
expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing
the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all
at once from all the other departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking
privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including
those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it
from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which
may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not
solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons
or things without distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from
other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different because its operation largely
relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of
age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
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classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the
franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
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Gonzales v. OP
G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232, September 4, 2012
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional
Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989,which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the
Ombudsman
Facts:
A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and
physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector
(P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before
the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the
Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the
request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently
a case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow
police officers in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a
finding that the material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated “by any
evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged.” Similarly, the
Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without
prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the
complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice. However, upon the
recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and
his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman.
Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to
Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review
and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of
August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
Issue:
Does the Office of the President have administrative jurisdiction over the deputy Ombudsman
and the special prosecutor?
Held:
The omission of the filing of a motion for reconsideration poses no obstacle for the
Court’s review of its ruling on the whole case since a serious constitutional question has been
raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the presidential action. If
the President does not have any constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman
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and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OP’s
decision on the merits will be an empty one. In other words, since the validity of the OP’s
decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on the final and correct ruling on
the constitutional issue, the whole case – including the constitutional issue – remains alive for the
Court’s consideration on motion for reconsideration.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that “all other public officers
and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment” in the
second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more
stringent rule of “removal only by impeachment” to favoured public officers. Contrary to the
implied view of the minority, in no way can this provision be regarded as blanket authority for
Congress to provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the manner and cause of
removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be consistent with constitutional
guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and substantive due process; the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the principle of separation of powers; and the
principle of checks and balances. The authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to
provide for the manner and cause of removal of all other public officers and employees does not
mean that Congress can ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the
Constitution.
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DELAGATION OF POWERS
 EXPLANATION
 PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION
1. TARIFF POWERS
Abakada Guro Party List, et al v Exec. Sec. Ermita

G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005
Facts:
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT
rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied,
to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 ½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by

Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the
1987 Philippine Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or
exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the
exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon
merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said
that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to
bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made
by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim,
nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by
the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the
President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
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Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and
Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI
Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III
Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Discussions:
Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill which is
required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but
Senate has the power not only to propose amendments, but also to propose its own version even
with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House. the
Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come
from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On
the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of
such laws.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it

is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the
hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or
delegate of the legislature.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.”
Held:
1. R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively originated
in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to
introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950
amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI,
Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the
amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
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2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions
or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is
the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.
3. Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to make
reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established.
Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the
amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is
entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power
absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
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2. EMERGENCY POWERS
David v. Macapagal -Arroyo

G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the

Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out
power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: â€œThe President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may
call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,â€• and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law
and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as
any act of insurrection or rebellion [“take care” power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws
and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the
members of the AFP and PNP “to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.”
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and
“unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5
have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary
powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The
petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
Issue:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
Held:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
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First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of
the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless,
without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In
declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public
interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President
Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing
lawless violence.
Second Provision: The “Take Care” Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
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House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of

national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII
grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But
to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor
of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a
body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers,
the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to
the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause.
The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the
State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may
exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in
issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the
emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point
out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17,
Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
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As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and
the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism”
have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared unconstitutional.
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3. DELEGATION TO PEOPLE
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455, January 7, 1986
Facts:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for
special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and
Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the
President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not
create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the
basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular
elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing)
the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is
proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his
proclamation.”
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited
constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it
over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have
not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election.
They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean,
fair and honest.
Issue:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding
of the elections
Held:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction
restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are
less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3, as the Court did not issue any
restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue
of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the
President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at
the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot
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stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent
president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
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4. DELEGATION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Antonio Mendez, Sr.

G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994
Facts:
On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68
and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating
the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San
Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora
and Tala along with their respective sitios.
EO No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through
the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon.
By virtue of EO No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado

Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained
the status of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1515. 2 The executive order added that “(t)he conversion of this municipal
district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of
Representatives.”
Petitioner Municipality of San Narciso: filed a petition for quo warranto with RTC which
petition sought the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 Invoking the ruling of this Court in
Pelaez v. Auditor General.
Respondent San Andres: San Narciso is estopped from questioning the creation of the
new municipality and that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of
Republic Act No. 7160 (Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .(d) Municipalities existing as of
the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.)
Petitioner: The above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since
the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation
had been void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether or not Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de facto municipal corporation.
Held:
Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20
August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the
municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order.
106
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case
hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least
attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de
facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in
1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in
existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was
promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary,
certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s recognition of the continued existence of the
Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive
Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having
surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be
dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the
House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres
has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of
the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to
the effect that municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon
must now be conceded.
107
5. DELEGATION TO ADIMINISTRATIVE BODIES
Gerochi v. Department of Energy

G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007
Facts:
RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA),
which sought to impose a universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of
funding NAPOCOR’s projects, was enacted and took effect in 2001.Petitioners contest the
constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that the imposition of the universal charge on all end-
users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation for not
giving the consumers a chance to be heard and be represented.
Issue:
Whether the universal charge is a tax
Held:
NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the
State’s police power. That public welfare is promoted may be gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA,
which enumerates the policies of the State regarding electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust
Fund feature of the universal charge reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity
of the purposes for which the universal charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of the
country’s electric power industry), further boosting the position that the same is an exaction
primarily in pursuit of the State’s police objectives. If generation of revenue is the primary
purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the impositions a tax; but if regulation is the primary
purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax. The
taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. The theory behind the exercise of
the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate
of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.
108
Chavez v. Romulo
G.R. No. 157036, June 09, 2004
Facts:
GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend
the issuance pf Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued
guidelines banning carrying firearms outside of residence. Petitioner, Francisco Chaves
requested DILG to reconsider the implementation. The request was denied. Hence the petition
for prohibition and injunction against Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief
Ebdane.
Issue:
Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property? Whether or not the
banning of carrying firearms outside the residence is a valid exercise of police power?
Held:
Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be
exercised under existing restrictions. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as
the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it
might be revoked. Revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or
privilege.
The basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. the assailed
Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the
carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms
outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If
the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.
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 TEST OF DELEGATION
People vs Dacuycuy
173 SCRA 90 (1989)
Facts:
On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and

Cirilio M. Zanoria, public school officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal Court
of Hindang, Leyte for violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers). The respondents pleaded not guilty and petitioned for certeriori and prohibition with
preliminary injuction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VII alleging that:
a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case due to the correctional
nature of the penalty of imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670) prescribed for the
offense
b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of imprisonment is
unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion
of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government.
On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV where the respondent
Judge, Judge Dacuycuy ruled that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its
violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.
Issue:
Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.

Whether or not the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional.
Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative

power by vesting in the court the responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of
imprisonment, as if the courts were the legislative department of the government.
Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.
Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, considers crimes
punishable by fine of not more than Php 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of municipal
courts.
110
The decision and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge Dacuycuy) are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to
be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
111
BOCEA v. Teves
G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011
Facts:
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335. RA [No.]
9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR
and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with
constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioners
directly filed the present petition before this Court against respondents.
BOCEA asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR,
and their adverse effects on the constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees, direct
resort to this Court is justified. BOCEA argued, among others, that its members and other BOC
employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required quota
provided under the law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure, and at
their and their respective families prejudice.
Respondents countered that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not violate the right to due
process and right to security of tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG stressed that the
guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual
employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided a reasonable and valid ground for the
dismissal of an employee which is germane to the purpose of the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335
and its IRR provided that an employee may only be separated from the service upon compliance
with substantive and procedural due process. The OSG added that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR
must enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.
In Abakada, the Court declared Section 12of R.A. No. 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the IRR as unconstitutional and violative of the
principle of separation of powers. However, the constitutionality of the remaining provisions of
R.A. No. 9335 was upheld pursuant to Section 13of R.A. No. 9335. The Court also held that
until the contrary is shown, the IRR of R.A. No. 9335 is presumed valid and effective even
without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
Issue:
Did R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEAs members to: (a) equal protection of
laws, (b) security of tenure and (c) due process?
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Held:
Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA has locus
standi. BOCEA impugns the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its members,
who are rank-and-file employees of the BOC, are actually covered by the law and its IRR.
BOCEAs members have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have
sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR.
***
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-
delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest,
which means “what has been delegated, cannot be delegated.” This doctrine is based on the
ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed
by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening
mind of another. However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous
exceptions, one of which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized
administrative agencies like the Board in this case.
***
Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or
by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities. In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.
***
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to

administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side. BOCEA’s
apprehension of deprivation of due process finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No.
9335. The concerned BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue
collection and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due
consideration to all relevant factors that may affect the level of collection.
As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the veracity of, and the proper
action on these anomalies are in the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom for
113
the enactment of this law remains within the domain of the Legislative branch. We merely
interpret the law as it is. The Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from
the manifest intendment and language thereof. Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or
argumentative. We have so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR are constitutional.
114
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
 THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1. THE DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES
Aldaba v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010
Facts:
This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A. 9591
which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates
the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the
May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts.
Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and
Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor
Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population
of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos,
Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000
actual or projected.
Held:
It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being
violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a
city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda
issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal
effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification
based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President
Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:
115
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared
official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the
document have been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the
Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded,
the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August
1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of
legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.
116
2. THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES
Atong Paglaum v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
Facts:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the
Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed
resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these
party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented
sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or
some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to
represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list
system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations; andsecond, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down
inAng Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.
Commission on Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
Held:
No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in
the two aforestated cases.
Political Law- Party-list system
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed
that “the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation.”
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not
only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to
constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.As explained by Commissioner
Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system “For as long as they
117
field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.”
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-
list system prescribed in the Constitution.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a “party” as”either a political party or a sectoral
partyor a coalition of parties.” Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section
3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a”political partyrefers to anorganized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government.”On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a “sectoral
partyrefers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereofwhose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector.”R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly

different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and
need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national
or regional political party must represent a “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform,
or the same governance principles and policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors, and (2) all
nominees must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties
they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented.”
Also, petitioners’ nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have
been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise,
nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any
sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed
to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee.
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
118
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or

lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized
and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either
must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-
fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if

some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and
desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the
Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the
Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because
petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
119
Atty. Isidro Lico v. Comelec En Banc

GR No. 205505, 2015-09-29
Facts:
Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-

list representative: from the House of Representatives, on the one hand; and from his party-list
organization, on the other.
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization registered under Republic Act

(R.A.) No. 7941, also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law).
Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to participate in the Party-List System of
Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections. It filed with the COMELEC the list of its
nominees, with petitioner Lico as first nominee. COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of
the winning party-list groups. Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office and thereafter assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations,
Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing
agreement signed by its nominees. Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-
list Representative for the first year of the three-year term
Ating Koop introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient changes
was the composition of the Central Committee. The amendments likewise mandated the holding
of an election of Central Committee members within six months after the Second National
Convention.In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members
(referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central Committee. The Interim
Central Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group. Almost one year after
petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating
Koop for disloyalty.
Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner.
Lico’s refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for
his expulsion under Ating Koop’s Amended Constitution and By-laws.
Issue:
Whether or not Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a

sitting party-list representative: from the House of Representatives and from his party-list
organization, on the other.
120
Held:
The COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from
the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected his
qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it was the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over the Petition.
The COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico’s expulsion from Ating Koop,
explaining that when the Interim Central Committee ousted him from Ating Koop, the said
Committee’s members remained in hold-over capacity even after their terms had expired; and
that the COMELEC was not in a position to substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with
respect to the cause of the expulsion.
We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner
Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless
proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its
purview.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list
representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of
the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the
House of Representative
In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group;
petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is
the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in upholding
the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that the
HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These findings already touch upon the
qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide member of the party-list group
sought to be represented.
The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel
concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is
circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on the
jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full
authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the
proclaimed winner.
The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement of
bona fide membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI
121
of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of
the members of the House of Representatives.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC En

Banc Resolution dated 31 January 2013 and the COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated
18 July 2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE insofar as it declares
valid the expulsion of Congressman Lico from Ating Koop and it upholds the ATING KOOP
Party-list Group represented by its President, Amparo T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list
Group.
122
 APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
Aquino III v. Comelec

G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Issue:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.”
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009
creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the
existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2

distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No.
9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.
The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end
up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation

of a new legislative district in a province?
123
Held:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum

population that must compose a legislative district. The use by the subject provision of a comma
to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from
the phrase “or each province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum
population is only required for a city, but not for a province.26
A purpose for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation
of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district.
Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation:
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant
prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely

an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
124
Aldaba v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010
Facts:
This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A. 9591
which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates
the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the
May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts.
Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and
Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor
Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population
of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos,
Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000
actual or projected.
Held:
It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being
violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a
city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda
issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal
effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification
based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President
Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared
official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the
document have been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.
125
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the
Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded,
the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August
1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of
legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.
126
Navarro v. Ermita
G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010
Facts:
Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition for certiorari under Rule65
to nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being
unconstitutional. Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population of the Province
of Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted by the Provincial
Government of Surigao del Norte which yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants with
average annual income for calendar year 2002-2003 of P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of
802.12 square kilometers as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. Under
Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local Government Code, a province may be created if it has
an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified
by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000inhabitants as certified
by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or
is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province.
Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was enacted into law and a plebiscite
was held subsequently yielding to 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative. With the
approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of
Dinagat Islands, Dinagat Islands was created into a separate and distinct province. Respondents
argued that exemption from the land area requirement is germane to the purpose of the Local
Government Code to develop self-reliant political and territorial subdivisions. Thus, the rules and
regulations have the force and effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects and
purposes of the law.
Issue:
Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid.
Held:
No. The rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic
law. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any
exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. The IRR went
beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added the
italicized portion “The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands.”
The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the purpose of the law as it
already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating a territorial subdivision. Thus,
127
there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations
implementing the said law, the basic law prevails.
128
 QUALIFICATIONS
Jalosjos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and
acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines
and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his
return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian
citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in
the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans
Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name in the voter’s list was then filed by Erasmo
before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed
the lower court’s decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of

Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground
of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local
government code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a
gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his
domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Held:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial
governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of
the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a
person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence
in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
129
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the
following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once
established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one
domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has
met the residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for
granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he
migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for
26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good.
He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that
country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal
right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since
lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the
loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law
(Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence
somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since
he has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support
such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a
house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient
that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To
insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for
public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil
and an intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where
he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences
with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover,
Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
Sibugay.
130
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the
COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable
misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos
presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga
Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts
regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.
131
Mitra v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010
Facts:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra
was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included,
among other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected
Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district
for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second term as Representative), Puerto
Princesa City was reclassified as a “highly urbanized city” and thus ceased to be a component
city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the
ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial
officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra
applied for the transfer of his Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta.
Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province
of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident
of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the
respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC.
Issue:
Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.
Held:
YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme
Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as
mandated by the Constitution.
The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010
elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3. The respondents were not able to present a convincing
case sufficient to overcome Mitra’s evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan
and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC. Likewise, the “COMELEC could
not present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his COC regarding
his residence was a misrepresentation.”
132
Tagolino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013
Facts:
In this case, on November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of
candidacy (CoC) with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office
as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal
Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura
Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of
College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he
resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that
Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to
run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course
and/or cancelled.The COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution granting Juntilla’s
petition without any qualification.
Richard thereafter manifested that he is accepting the resolution in order to enable his
substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for substitution. His wife, Ms. Lucy
Torres-Gomez accepted the nomination and endorsement from the Liberal Party.
Juntilla, opposed the candidacy of Ms. Lucy as Richard’s substitute. Juntilla stated that
there should be no substitution because there is no candidate to substitute for.The COMELEC
First Division decided in favor of Juntilla, but said that the substitution was valid. The
COMELEC en banc affirmed the First Division’s resolution. The resolution hinges upon the
reasoning that Richard is indeed disqualified, but one’s “disqualification does not automatically
cancel one’s certificate of candidacy, especially when it is nominated by a political party. In
effect, the political party is still allowed to substitute the candidate whose candidacy was
declared disqualified. After all, the right to substitute is a privilege given to a political party to
exercise and not dependent totally to a candidate.” At this point, the COMELEC was close to
perpetuate their wrong decision. This was thereafter corrected by the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the substitution of Richard Gomez as a candidate valid.
Held:
The Supreme Court said no, it is not valid. A substitution is only valid when the
candidate is disqualified. If the candidate to be substituted made material misrepresentation in his
COC, it will result to a denial of due course/ cancellation of COC. In disqualification, there is a
candidate to be substituted. In cancellation, there is no candidate to speak of in the first place.
133
Under the Omnibus Election Code, disqualification is provided under Section 68

(pursuant to Section 77), while cancellation is provided under Section 78. Section 77 expressly
enumerates the instances where substitution is permissible, that is when an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party “dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause.”
Noticeably, “material misrepresentation” cases are not included in the said section and therefore,
cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate substitution.
RICHARD GOMEZ COMMITTED MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION RESULTING TO

THE CANCELLATION OF HIS COC.
The COMELEC First Division decision was the cause of the confusion when it used the
word “disqualification” instead of “denied due course to and/or cancelled”. Still, the COMELEC
en banc could have corrected this confusion. At this point, the Supreme Court has this to say;
“In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections
due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement. The confusion, however,
stemmed from the use of the word “disqualified” in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the
substitution of private respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo
warranto petition. In short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified – and not that his CoC
was denied due course to and/or cancelled – would mean that he could have been validly
substitute by private respondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy.
Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution did not
explicitly decree the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC should not
have obviated the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private respondent’s
substitution. It should be stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for Richard’s
“disqualification” is his failure to comply with the residency requirement under Section 6,
Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for the denial of due course to and/or
cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, misrepresentation contemplated under a
Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting one’s qualifications for elective office such as
age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status”
Reading the case at this point is disheartening, because by the time Juntilla won the case,
Ms. Lucy had two months left before the next elections. Justice was served, only too late.
The Supreme Court further stated:
“In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC
First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Department’s finding
that Richard was only “disqualified” and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or
cancelled, paving the way for the approval of private respondent’s substitution. It overlooked the
fact that the COMELEC First Division’s ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richard’s CoC
and in consequence, disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It was therefore grave and
serious error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondent’s
substitution.”
134
The Court ended:

“Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not
a bona fide candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she
ran for office, which means that she could not have been elected. Considering this
pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues respecting
private respondent’s own qualification to office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision rendered
by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
HRET decided in favor of Lucy Torres.
135
 TERMS OF OFFICE
Abundo vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 201716, Jan. 8, 2013
Facts:
Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001
and 2007 runs, he emerged and as proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the
Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres who, in due
time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and
proclamation. Abundo as eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest,
paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007
term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the
May 10, 2010 elections Where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo
filed his certifcate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres
lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, the corresponding petition, predicated
on the three consecutive term limit rule.
Issue:
Is the service of a term less than the full three years by Mayor Abundo, in view of an election
protest, considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three
consecutive term limit for elective local officials?
Held:
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials; Elements to constitute a
disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and
statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms;
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different
factual milieus has its complicated side.
In the instant case, the Court revisited and analyzed the various holdings and relevant
pronouncements of the Court on the matter.
The Supreme Court further held that there has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the
successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when
136
the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law
is unequivocal that a “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be
considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.” This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective
local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her
third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption
which may be brought about by certain events or causes.
137
 SALARIES
PHILCONSA v. Gimenez
G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965
Facts:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of Republic
Act No. 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and
sick leave to Senators and Representatives. PHILCONSA now seeks to enjoin Pedor Gimenez,
the Auditor General, from disbursing funds therefor.
According to PHILCONSA, the provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to

circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during
their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The
same provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because it allows members and officers of
Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one
year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-
election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only
after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one
month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The
provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as
members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their
compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General, arguing for Congress, averred that the grant of retirement or
pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers does not constitute “forbidden
compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution.
The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation
and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for computing the
gratuity due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their
salary.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.
Held:
No, the said law is unconstitutional. Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, provides:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided
by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including
per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and
from their respective district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and
from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress.
138
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until
otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members
of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special
proviso which reads as follows:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase.
In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National
Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of
such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the
term compensation “other emoluments”.
“Emolument” is “the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as
compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and
perquisites.”
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it

is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
RA 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22,
1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby declared unconstitutional by the SC.
139
 PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES
Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago
A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009
Facts:
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago argued that the statements he made were covered b#
the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunities being part of a speech she delivered in
the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. She claims to have made
those comments to expose anomalies with regard to the selection process of the Judicial Bar
Council for the next Chief Justice. The argument of the respondent is based on Article , VI
Section 11 which states that: “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.”
Issue:
Whether Miriam Defensor-Santiago can be charged for her comments.
Held:
The court ruled in favor of Defensor-Santiago in this case. The plea of Senator Santiago
for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed her
privilege speech is not actionable criminal or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of
Court. Despite this the court feels that the lady senator has gone beyond the limits of decency
and good conduct for the statements made which were intemperate and highly improper in
substance. The court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on her but the
factual and legal circumstances of this case however deter the Court from doing so even without
any sign of remorse from her.
140
 INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES
Dante Liban, et al. v. Richard Gordon

G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011
Facts:
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City
Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare
Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who
was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during
his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August
6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent
Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of
Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the
office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes
of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected
by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate
government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned,
privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a
Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent
Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his
incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264
and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article
XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law,
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The
fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation
141
for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also
declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine
National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and
1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate
powers.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the
Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the
PNRC Charter.
Issue:
Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality
of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?
Held:
[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision
by deleting the second sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it
was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a
GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not
among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the
case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality
in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It
is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a
law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when
it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until such question will be unavoidable.
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of the PNRC Charter.
Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there
was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the
PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was
not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision,
142
to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60)
years of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June
11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855,
R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws
relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional
proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not
strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in
terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by
the State and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure
is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has
remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935
Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The
PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional
grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and
respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva
Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This
constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the
Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize
under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009
lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary
of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its
character of neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is
regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the

government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the
Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he
served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private
corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be
organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to
approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international
143
law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the
issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears
emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is
widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its
humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an
untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who
depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image
of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were
declared void must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED
the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation
for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]
144
 INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS
Garcia v. Executive Secretary

GR No 101273, July 03, 1992
Facts:
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles
imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was
imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products
imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same
year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil
products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that
EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution
which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in
Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and
478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
Issue:
Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
Held:
Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and
tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the
Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised
by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to
such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff
145
rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which
authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.
146
 DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
Paredes v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 118368, August 10, 1995
Facts:
In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur
filed a case against Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province),
Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three
allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued
against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification
from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the
arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained
that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes
claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the
Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of
Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the
Sandiganbayan.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by
the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the
prerogatives of congress.
The SC ruled:
“x x x. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals

with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly
behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to
the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days – is
unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA
3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact
that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives.”
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 JOURNALS
Arturo Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 115455; October 30, 1995
Facts:
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known

as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of
the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings
in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known
as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by
striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a
House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s ironic
however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
Issue:
Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
Held:
No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments
to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9
justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several
instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far
as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has
always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no
showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has
been done.
148
 ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
Brillantes v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004
Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the

assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of advanced
result of “unofficial” count. Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption
and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-
President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’
accredited arm, to conduct the “unofficial” quick count as provided under pertinent election
laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and
administrative power “to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec
added that the issue is beyond judicial determination.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec’s promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified.
Held:
The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded
jurisdiction of the court.
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon
Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of
President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No.
8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-
accredited citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial counting of votes for the national or local
elections. The quick count under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation would not only be
preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional
and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the
constitutional provision that “no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.” It being “unofficial”, any disbursement of public fund would be
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General
Appropriations Act.
The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission
subjects the same to certain conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest technological
and electronic devices, to wit: (1)consideration of the area and available funds (2) notification to
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all political parties and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were found to have not been
substantially met.
Resolution 6712 was null and void.
150
 COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
Franklin M. Drilon, et al. v. Hon. Jose De Venecia, et al

594 SCRA 743 (2009)
Facts:
Issues involving the deprivation of a seat in the Commission on Appointments should be

lodged before the respective Houses of Congress and not with the Supreme Court.
The Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to the
Commission on Appointments (CA). In the second week of August 2007, Franklin Drilon et al.
went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the
CA. However, no report or recommendation was proffered by the Legal Department, drawing
Representative Tañada to request a report or recommendation on the matter within three days.
Hence spawned the filing by Drilon (in representation of the Liberal Party), et al., alleging that
the liberal party with at least twenty (20) members who signed herein, is constitutionally entitled
to one (1) seat in the CA.
Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal of PDP-Laban wrote a letter
claiming that ―the Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation‖. The Senator avers that political parties PMP and KAMPI were
given more seats than they were entitled to in the CA and the political party PRP and other
Independents cannot be represented in the CA.
The CA, speaking through its Ex-Officio Chairman Manny Villar, advised Senator
Madrigal that CA ―has neither the power nor the discretion to reject a member who is elected
by either House, and that any complaints about the election of a member or members should be
addressed to the body that elected them.‖ Villar further explained that instructions have been
given to ―transmit the original copies of Senator Madrigal’s letters to the Senate Secretary for
their immediate inclusion in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate.
Madrigal, not satisfied with the CA’s action, filed a petition with the Supreme Court for
prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ
of preliminary injunction against Senator Villar as Senate President and Ex-Officio Chairman of
the CA.
The Court consolidated the petitions filed by Drilon et al. and Madrigal et al.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition before the Supreme Court is proper.
151
Held:
The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the
designation of a Liberal Party member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for,
the petition is withdrawn. As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it fails. Senator Madrigal
failed to show that she sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Her petition
does not in fact allege that she or her political party PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA,
or that she or PDP-Laban possesses personal and substantial interest to confer on her/it locus
standi.
Senator Madrigal’s primary recourse rests with the respective Houses of Congress and
not with this Court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House
is necessary before she may bring her petition to court. Senator Villar’s invocation of said
doctrine is thus well-taken.
152
 ORGANIZATION
Arroyo v. De Venecia
G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its
report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by
the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
153
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed
to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to
a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private
rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only
that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.
154
POWERS OF THE CONGRESS
 LAW-MAKING
People vs. Siton, et al.

GR 169364, 18 September 2009
Facts:
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy
pursuant to Art. 202 (2) of the RPC in two separate informations. Accused were found
wandering and loitering around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets of Davao City, without any
visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose. Respondents filed separate
Motions to Quash on the ground that Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional for being vague and
overboard. The municipal trial court denied the motions, directed respondents to file their
respective counter-affidavits, and declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the
State’s police power (or the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property) and justified by the Latin maxim “salus populiest suprema lex”
(which calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number).
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC challenging the
constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law and claiming that Art 202 (2) violated the equal
protection clause. The RTC granted the petition of the herein respondents and declared Art. 202
(2) unconstitutional.
Issue:
Does Article 202 (2), RPC on vagrancy violate the equal protection clause?
Held:
No. Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does
itdiscriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished
not fortheir status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such
circumstancesas to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the
community. Being poor orunemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to
engage in immoral conduct.
155
 LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES
Sabio v. Gordon
G.R. No. 174340, 17 October 2006
Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No.
455 “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to
the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to
this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG
inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same
time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s
unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly
ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
Held:
No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence
and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in
Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to
cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that
“the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”.
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
156
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making

and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to
enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information,
citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies
and their effective implementation.
157
Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita

GR 169777, April 20, 2006
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well
as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate
the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before
the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads
cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief
of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled.
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments

who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals
and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police
(PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security
officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such
hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate
committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing
proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring
military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court
martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on
the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
Issue:
Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
Held:
The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the
provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the
1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the
end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
158
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry –
with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse
must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is
closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement
of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very
essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.
Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to
inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he
refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries
in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in
the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22,
therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power
of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it
under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When
Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by
a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1,
limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section
22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the
refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
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powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault .
NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking
Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials
and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence,
including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.
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Gudani v. Senga
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006
Facts:
Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security to shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were
directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before
said Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two
testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan
to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for
investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service.
After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of Article of
War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared
unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their
successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently
enjoined from proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified before the
Senate.
Issues:
1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative
inquiry?
2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the
President desires otherwise?
3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4 October
2005?
Held:
1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require
military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based
foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as
commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as
budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that
the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions
appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of
command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed
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forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the
President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to
choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to
appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one
of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-
advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified
anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement
today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces,
the clash may soon loom or actualize.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which
members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President
desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as
commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.
The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the
legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress
must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches,
informed by due deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal
courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to
compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of
government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches.
Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies
and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution
to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.
3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to
be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated
against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the
officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen.
Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him
occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005.
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Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability

G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008
Facts:
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project
was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions
relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the
NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted
that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the
NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up
the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to
the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
Issue:
Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive
privilege.
Held:
The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the

President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority
of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
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2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the
“operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo’s cabinet.
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation
of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
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 THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION
Belgica v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 208493, November 19, 2013
Facts:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922.
Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest
“Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard
projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft
projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million
for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain
cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that
the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned. Presidential
Pork Barrel.
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-
called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the
Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund
which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July
2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the
corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had
been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-
government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in
legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by
the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions
before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
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Issues:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
Held:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional

because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the
purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which
the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel
system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note
in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF
or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to
get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does
grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative
are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot
delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local
matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to
which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative
power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the
exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
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One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in
the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined
because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to
which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA –
again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their
Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the
house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a
project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local
government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the
PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as
well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for
the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-
related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to
further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may
direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall
be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
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Araullo v. Aquino III

G.R. No. 2019135, July 1, 2014
Facts:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish
growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan.
Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of
waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain
government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted
therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as
“savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The
DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and
portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress
in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that
he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of
the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money
was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to
name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the
MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for
certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang

Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was: DAP is unconstitutional
because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA
(savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of
the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to
suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
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Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
Held:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in
Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were
already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to
the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s
no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the
Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be
made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the
Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds
to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds
were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they
are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such,
transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when
there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or
finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving
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project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP,
there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the
fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the
middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the
DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the
DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets.
In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior
to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP
effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what
they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of
Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if
it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not
acted in good faith.
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 THE POWER OF TAXATION
Tan v. Del Rosario

GR No 109289, 03 October 1994
Facts:
Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme (“SNIT”), which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules
and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law. Petitioners posit that
RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in

applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of HB
34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being merely entitled, “Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their
Profession” (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title actually reads,
‘An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and
Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the
National Internal Revenue Code,’ as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due process.
The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents. The Court has
given due course to both petitions.
Issue:
Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due process
Held:
NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear
contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such
transgression is so evident in herein case.
1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects
or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities.
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Uniformity does not violate classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are
substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose,
(3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the
classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class.
2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the
income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers
and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. The Court
does not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.
Issue 2:
Whether or not public respondents exceeded their authority in promulgating the RR
Held:
No. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory
legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment of
professionals who practice their respective professions individually and of those who do it
through a general professional partnership.
172
Planters Products v. Fertiphil

G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008
Facts:
President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465
which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the
domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers which resulted in having Fertiphil paying P 10/bag sold
to the Fertilizer and Perticide Authority (FPA).
FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust Company who applies to the
payment of corporate debts of Planters Products Inc. (PPI)
After the Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy.
Upon return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded a refund but PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a
complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC on the ground that LOI
No. 1465 is unjust, unreaonable oppressive, invalid and unlawful resulting to denial of due
process of law.
FPA answered that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the state in ensuring the
stability of the fertilizing industry in the country and that Fertiphil did NOT sustain damages
since the burden imposed fell on the ultimate consumers.
RTC and CA favored Fertiphil holding that it is an exercise of the power of taxation ad is
as such because it is NOT for public purpose as PPI is a private corporation.
Issues:
1. W/N Fertiphil has locus standi

2. W/N LOI No. 1465 is an invalid exercise of the power of taxation rather the police power
Held:
1. Yes. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a “real party in interest” or
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. In public suits, there is
the right of the ordinary citizen to petition the courts to be freed from unlawful government
intrusion and illegal official action subject to the direct injury test or where there must be
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result. Being a mere procedural technicality, it has also been held that locus standi may be
waived in the public interest such as cases of transcendental importance or with far-reaching
implications whether private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi. As a seller, it bore the
ultimate burden of paying the levy which made its products more expensive and harm its
business. It is also of paramount public importance since it involves the constitutionality of a tax
law and use of taxes for public purpose.
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2. Yes. Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the state but
distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is the power of the state to enact the
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty on property in order to promote general
welfare. While, the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes as to be used for public purpose.
The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is
revenue generation. The lawful subjects and lawful means tests are used to determine the validity
of a law enacted under the police power. The power of taxation, on the other hand, is
circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.
In this case, it is for purpose of revenue. But it is a robbery for the State to tax the citizen
and use the funds generation for a private purpose. Public purpose does NOT only pertain to
those purpose which are traditionally viewed as essentially governmental function such as
building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to
promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers,
low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform.
174
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
 QUALIFICATIONS, ELECTION AND TERM
Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos
P.E.T. Case No. 001, February 13, 1996
Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992
election. In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment of
the 29th of August of the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the
remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot
areas be deemed computed.
The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and
protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her
election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the 30th
of June in the year 1995.
Held:
YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or
considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and
her discharge of the duties and functions thereof.
The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in
the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura
of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too
crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.
175
 PREREQUISITES AND INHIBITION
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991
Facts:
On July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set
therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution”,
the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of
the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
Issue:
Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
Held:
No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding
during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases
specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive
officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s
manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.
176
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-
B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to
their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them
from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
177
 EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Senate v. Ermita
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power
by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence
to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”.
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter
alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project,
others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the
role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal.”
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
Issue:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
constitutional?
Held:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain
information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in
this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
178
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
179
 PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
Estrada v. Desierto
G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001
Facts:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking,

illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January
16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the
entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote
against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the
crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently
with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office.
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether or not Estrada resigned as President.
3. Whether or not Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. Whether or not the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. Whether or not the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
Held:
1. Political questions- “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
180
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and freedom of
exercise of the people power of assemblyto petition the government
revolution which overthrew the for redress of grievances which only
whole government. affected the office of the President.
extra constitutional and the intra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new government resignation of the sitting President
that resulted from it cannot be the that it caused and the succession of
subject of judicial review the Vice President as President are
subject to judicial review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II,
and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The
issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also
involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment.
Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing

material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive
resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed
by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was
going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service
of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before,

during and after January 20, 2001.
181
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R.
178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR
No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear
is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has
clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did
not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he
is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot
be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery
and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder
which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible.
Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and
legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also
said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has
influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the
cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case
would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
182
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
 THE APPOINTING POWER AND REMOVAL POWER
Banda v. Ermita
G.R. No. 16662, April 20, 2010
Facts:
President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 285 by inter alia, removing the exclusion jurisdiction of the National
Printing Office ( NPO) over the printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, governmental agencies and instrumentalities are
allowed to source their printing services from the private supplier be of superior quality and
lower in cost compared to what was offered by the National Printing Office. Executive Order
No. 378 also limited to National Printing Office appropriation in the General Appropriation Act
to its income.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order 378 is constitutional.
Held:
Yes. E.O. 378 is constitutional. It is a well-settled principle to jurisprudence that the

President has the power to recognize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line
with the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by
virtue of previous delegations of the legislative power to recognize executive offices under
existing statutes.
183
 THE APPOINTING POWER AND REMOVAL POWER
In Re Appointment of Hon. M. Valenzuela

A.M. No. 98-5-01 SC, November 9, 1998
Facts:
On March 30, 1998, the President signed appointment of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and
Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of RTC-Baguio City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These
appointments were deliberated as it seemed to be expressly prohibited by Article VII, Section 15
of the Constitution.
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss the
constitutionality of appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in the light of the forthcoming
1998 Presidential Elections. The Chief Justice (CJ) receive on April 6, 1998 on official
communication from the executive secretary transmitting the appointments of 8 associate Justice
of CA duly signed on March 11, 1998 which implies that the President’s Office did not agree
with the hypothesis.
On May 12, CJ received from Malacanang by the appointments of the 2 judges of the
RTC mentioned. Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations on this matter, the court
resolved by refraining the appointment from taking their oaths. According to Judge Valenzuela,
he did to because of the May 7 Malacanang copy of his appointment.
Issue:
Whether or not the President can fill in the vacancies in the judiciary pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 4 and 9 during the appointment ban period stated in Article VII, Section 15.
Held:
The Supreme Court in an en banc division declared the appointments signed by the
President on March 30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta void. They are ordered to
cease and desist from discharging the Office of Judge of the Courts to which they were
respectively appointed on the said date. They come within the operation of the prohibition on
appointments while the filling of judiciary vacancies in the public interest, there is no compelling
reason to justify such appointment within 2 months appointment loan.
184
 THE CONTROL POWER
Drilon v.Lim
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
Facts:
The Secretary of Justice declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila
Revenue Code null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment
of the ordinance as given in Section 187 of the Local Government Code.
Consequently, a petition filed by the City of Manila then the Regional Trial Court
revoked the Secretary’s Resolution and sustained ordinance holding that the procedural
requirements had been observed. Further, they said that Section 18 of the Local Government
Code is unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax
ordinances and inferentially to annul them. This was based that the power of control is only
vested to the President of the Philippines. Thereby, the Secretary of Justice having the power of
control over local governments is in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution and of the specific provisions therein conferring on the President of the Philippines
only the power of supervision over local governments.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the trial court correct
Held:
Section 187 of the Local Government Code authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only
the constitutionality of legality of the tax ordinance and if warranted to revoke it on either or
both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also
permitted to substitute his own judgment of the local government that enacted the measure.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code but he did not replace it with his own
version of what the code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable.
What this presupposes is that the act of Secretary Drilon is basically a supervision and not
control.
185
 THE “TAKE-CARE” CLAUSE POWER
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
Facts:
E.O. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by
President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch framed under the Office of the President
tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration
and submit their findings and recommendations to the President , Congress and Ombudsman.
However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body. It cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or
render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and assess evidence
gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people
in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist at to warrant
the filling of information in our courts of law. Petitioners contend the constitutionality of the
E.O. grounds that it violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create
a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
The E.O. illegally amended the constitution when it made the Truth Commission and
vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ.
Issue:
Whether or not the E.O. constitutional
Held:
Yes. E.O No. 1 should be stuck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause the
Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
Having been unconstitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department to which
respondents belong. The President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. With A.O 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigation is
sustained such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had
the same composition.
186
 THE MILITARY POWER
Kulayan v. Gov. Abdusakur Tan

G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012
Facts:
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (LCRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Sulu. Andres Rotter, Eugenio Vagni, and
Marie Jean Lacaba were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial
Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later conformed to be the members of
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee (CMC) was then formed to investigate
the kidnapping incident. The committee convened under the leadership of Abdusakur Ian, the
provincial Governor of Sulu.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2003 declaring a state of emergency
in the province of Sulu. The proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said
declaration, declaring it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A 9372). It also
invoked Section 465 of the LGC of 1991 (R.A 7160) which bestows as the Provincial Governor
the power to carry out emergency measures during reasonable and natural disasters and
calamities and to call upon the appropriate national law agencies.
Issue:
Whether or not the Governor can exercise the calling out powers of a President
Held:
It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers and that is
in the President. Corollary, it is the only President who is authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Section 23 of Article VI of the Constitution as well as what became
known as the calling power under Section 7, Art. VII thereof.
Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding. The calling out power is exclusive to the President.
187
Gonzales v. Abaya
498 S 445, August 20, 2006
Facts:
On July 27, 2003 more than 300 heavily aimed junior officers and enlisted men of the
AFP entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati
City. They disarmed the Security Guards and planted explosive devices around the building. Led
by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV the troops then through broadcast media announced their
grievances against the administration such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal
sale of arms and ammunition to be enemies of the state and the bombings in Davao City intended
to acquire more military assistance from the US government, this demanded then the President
Gloria reigns as President.
Petitioner invoke R.A. 7055 which says that the members of the AFP and other person
subject to military law who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code
and other Special Penal Code shall be tried by the proper civil court. But an exception to the
general rule is that the civil court before arraignment has determined the offense to be service
connected and then offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioners be granted that their case be tried in a civil court
and not to military tribunal
Held:
No. The trial courts orde4r that what the petitioners did was not service-connected but
rather absorbed and in the crime of coup d’état fails because it practically amended the law
fundamentally, the law expressly vests that the court martial has the jurisdiction over “service
connected crimes or offenses.”
Still, the focus in that the Supreme Court has recognized that courts martial are
instrumentalities of the executive to enable the President as commander-in-chief to effectively
command and discipline the armed forces.
188
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004
Facts:
Armed with high-powered communitions and explosives, some three hundred junior
officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003. The soldiers
demanded the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and his Chief of Philippine
National Police (PNP). President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4 both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the armed forces to suppress the
rebellion. By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. The President,
however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on
August 1, 2003 through Proclamation No. 435. The petitioner now contend that Section 18, Art.
VII of the Constitution does not regulate the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the
armed forces.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioners correct
Held:
No. Although, it is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power, the
constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion still
Article VII of Section 18. Basically, the provisions grants the President as commander-in-chief, a
“sequence of graduated power”.
Thus, it could be seen that the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs
in the main from her powers as chief executive and at the same time as the commander-in-chief
powers.
189
David v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Facts:
On February 24, 2006 as the nation celebrated the 20th anniversary of the EDSA People
Power 1, President Arroyo issued PD 1017 declaring a state of National Emergency commanding
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. On the same day, the President issued G.O No. 5
implementing PD 1017. On March 3, 2006 exactly one week after the declaration of a state of
national emergency and after all the petitions had been failed, the President lifted PD 1017.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PD 1017 and G.O No. 5, respondents stated
that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy of the New People’s
Army and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo.
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full
discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the Armed
Forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners had shown that PP 1017 was without factual
bases.
Issue:
Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 unconstitutional.
Held:
The Court finds that and holds PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by
the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained
by Sec. 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. The
court also rules that under Sec. 17, Article XV of the Constitution, the President in the absence of
legislation cannot take over privately owned public utility and private business affected with
public interest. It also an order by the President acting as commander-in-chief addressed to sub
alters in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017.
190
Lagman v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017
Facts:
Effective May 23, 2017 and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017,
a government operation to capture high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayaff (ASG) and the Maute
Group was conducted. These group, which have been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however,
confronted the government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not
only against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilian and their
properties.
A report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant
role it plays in Mindanao and the Philippines as a whole. President Duterte concluded while the
government presently conducting legitimate operations to address the ongoing rebellion, if not
the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and
the suspension of writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao.
` After the submission of the report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution
No. 290 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding it to be satisfactory
and constitutional.
The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned the
Supreme Court questioning the factual basis of the Pres. Duterte’s Proclamation of Martial Law.
The OSG sided with President Duterte.
Issue:
Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned Proclamation No. 216 and in the report of the
President to Congress sufficient basis for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region
Held:
Yes. Public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the will of habeas corpus in the whole Mindanao.
Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power of but definitely
not the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
191
In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the
Maute Group were directed not only against the government forces or establishments but
likewise against civilian and their properties. In addition to the armed hostilities, bomb threats
were issued; road blockades and checkpoint were set up; schools and churches were burned;
civilian hostages were taken and killed and the compromised of the security of the entire
Mindanao Island was set.
192
IBP v. Zamora
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2010
Facts:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, the President in a
verbal directive ordered the PNP and the marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the
purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
The President confirmed his previous directive on deployment of the marines in a

Memorandum. In the said Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace
and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program
including increased –police patrols. The President further stated that to heighten police visibility
in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his power as commander-
in-chief under Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution. The President directed the AFP Chief of
Staff and the PNP Chief of Coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization
of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only until such time when the situation
shall have improved.
Issue:
Whether or not the President’s act in calling the AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
valid.
Held:
Yes. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom
in view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out armed forces. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden
as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the
armed forces. There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the
President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for
the exercise of such power.
193
Lacson v. Perez
G.R. No. 147780-81, May 10, 2001
Facts:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo faced by an angry and violent mob armed
with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulting
and attempting to break into Malacanang issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a
state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1
directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the
rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrest of several alleged leaders promote of
the rebellion were effected. Four related petitions were filed assailing the declaration of sate of
rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly affected by
virtue as having both in fact and in law.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of state of rebellion violates the doctrine of separation of power of
the government
Held:
No. section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that the President
shall be the commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. The evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the
armed forces may be of a nature of not constituting technical proof.
194
 THE BUDGETARY POWER
Gonzales v. Narvaza
G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000
Facts:
The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by the

President Estrada on November 9, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 in order to study
and recommend proposed amendments and or revisions to the 1987 Constitution. On December
9, 1999, petitioner Roman A. Gonzales in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer assailed the
constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR on two grounds. First, he contends that it is a public
office which only the legislature can create by way of a law. Secondly, petitioner asserts that by
creating such a body the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded
by the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner have a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 43.
Held:
No. a citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct. Petitioner has not shown that he
sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the
PCCR. The appropriation of the PCCR was authorized by the President not by Congress. There
being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to
question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer but rather he must establish that
he has personal and substantial interest.
195
 OTHER POWERS
Marcos v. Manglapus
177 SCRA 668, September 15, 1989
Facts:
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the Presidency, he and his family fled to
Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the courts to order the respondents issue
their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their
return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the
President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so within
the limits prescribed by law. Nor according to the petitioners may the President impair their right
to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue:
Whether or not the President has the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
Held:
The President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote
their welfare and advance national interest. This case falls for the exercise for the President’s
power as protector of the peace. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in
times of emergency but is also tasked with day to day problems maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears in the horizon.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and circumstances poses
serious threat to national interest and welfare in prohibiting their return to the Philippines.
196
 THE VICE PRESIDENT
Borja v. COMELEC
Facts:
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros. On September
2, 1989, he became mayor by operation of law upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On
March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros relative to the May
11, 1998 election. Petitioner Benjamin Borja Jr. who was also a candidate for mayor sought
Capco’s disqualification ion the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for
three consecutive terms and would therefore ineligible to serve for another term after that.
The COMELEC second division ruled in favor of petitioner and declared Capco
disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. However, on motion of Capco, the
COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the
May 11, 1998 elections.
A petition for certiorari was then brought to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC.
Petitioner contends that Capco already served three consecutive terms within the contemplation
of Art. X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and 43 (b) of the Local Government Code and it is irrelevant
that Capco became mayor by succession because the purpose of the constitutional provision in
limiting the number of term of elective local officials.
Issue:
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law serves the
remainder of the term considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-
term limit.
Held:
No. First, the policies embodied in the constitutional provision in question are: a) to
prevent political dynasties; and b) enhance the freedom of choice of the people. To consider only
to stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office whether by election
or by succession by operation of law would be disregard one to the purposes of the constitutional
provisions in question. Second, historical examination and textual analysis supports the ruling of
the COMELEC.
The Vice President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the
latter’s death, permanent disability, removal or resignation. In running for Vice-President, he
may be thus be said to also seek the Presidency. Petitioner contends that by analogy, the Vice-
197
Mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the
latter’s office.
198
THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTS
 JUDUCIAL POWER
Petitioner Organizations v. Executive secretary

G.R. No. 147036-37, April 10, 2012
Facts:
On June 19, 1971, Congress enacted RA 6260 that established a coconut Investment
Fund for the development of the coconut industry through capital financing. Coconut farmers
were to capitalize and administer the fund through the coconut through the coconut investment
company (CIC) whose objective was to advance the coconut farmers interests. The law imposed
a loves of P.55 on the coconut farmers first domestic sale of energy 100kg of copra for which
levy he was to get a receipt convertible into CIC shares of stock.
On November 2000, Pres. Estrada issued E.O. 312, establishing a Sagip Niyugan
Program which sought to provide immediate supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the
creation and other coconut products. At about the same time, Pres. Estrada issued E.O. 313,
which created an irrevocable trust fund known as the coconut trust fund. However,, on January
26, 2001, former Pres. Arroyo ordered the suspension of E.O.s 312 and 313.
Issue:
Whether or not the coco-levy funds are public funds are public funds.
Ruling:
The Court has declared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be
used for public purpose. Taxes are enforced proportional contributions from persons and
property, levied by the senate state by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the government
general funds but to provide means for rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry,
the coconut industry which is so affected with public interest as to be within the police power of
the state.
199
 THE JUDUCIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
Chavez vs. Judicial Bar Council

676 SCRA 579, July 17, 2012
Facts:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the Judicial
Bar Council (JBC) as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the
House Of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/20 vote.
Senator Francis Joseph Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. simultaneously sit in the
JBC as representatives of the Legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this
petition. Respondent argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “ a Representative of
Congress”. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representative, are
permanent and mandatory components of “Congress” such that the absence of either divest the
term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Thus, when Sec. 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress,” it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Issue:
Is the current practice of the JBC perform its function, run counter to the letter of the 1987
Constitution?
Ruling:
Yes. The practice is unconstitutional. The Court held that it should be construed as to
having only one representative that would come from either house, not both, that the framers of
the Constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative. In the
passage of law, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the
process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative power.
200
 FISCAL AUTONOMY
Bengzon v. Drilon
208 S 133, April 15, 1992
Facts:
This is an instant petition for reconsideration for the readjustment of retired Justices of
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals monthly pensions under R.A. No. 910 as amended by
RA No. 1797.
Section 3-A, which authorizes said pensions of RA 1797 was repealed by President
Marcos. The legislature saw the need to re-enact said law to restore said retirement pension and
privilege. President Aquino vetoed it. B No. 162-97 as well as portions of Section 1 and the
entire Sec. 4 of the special provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Issue:
Can the President veto certain provisions of the General Appropriation Act?
Ruling:
No. The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a
constitutionally vested power. But even as the constitution grants the power, it also provides
limitations to its exercise. The executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she is,
therefore, completed to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts.
201
 THE SUPREME COURT
In Re: Appointment of Mateo Valenzuela

198 S 408, November 9, 1998
Facts:
On March 30, 1998, the President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela as
Judge of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments were
deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly prohibited by Article VII Sec. 15 of the Constitution. A
meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by Judicial Bar Council to discuss the constitutionality of
appointments to the CA in light of the forthcoming 1998 Presidential elections. Senior Associate
Justice Florenz Regaldo, Consultant of the council and member of the 1998 Constitutional
Commission, was in the position that election ban had no application to the CA based on the
Commission’s records.
The Chief Justice received an April 6, 1998, an official communication from the
Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of a associate Justices of CA dully signed on
March 11, 1998, which implies that the President’s Office did not agree with hypothesis.
In construing Article VII and VIII: when there are no presidential elections. Article VIII
shall apply where vacancies in SC shall be filled within 90 days otherwise prohibition in Article
VII must be considered.
Issue:
Whether he can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest of
public service.
Held:
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment,

during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may
be the case should the membership of the Court be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or
should the voting on a particularly important question requiring explitious resolution be evenly
divided. Such a case is covered by neither Sec. 15 of Art. VII nor Sec. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII.
202
 THE JUDUCIAL INQUIRY
Apex Mining Co. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp.

605 SCRA 100, November 20, 2009
Facts:
In view of this, and considering that under Sec. 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise
known as the Mining Act of 1995”, mining operations in mineral reservation may be undertaken
directly by the state or through a contractor, the court deemed the issue of ownership of priority
right over the contested Diwalwal Gold Rust Area as having been overtaken by the said
proclamation. Thus, it was held that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive Department
to undertake directly the mining operations of the disputed area. Apex, for its part, filed a Motion
for Clarification of the Assailed Decision, pronouncement that mining operations, are now,
therefore, within the full control of the state through the executive branch.” Moreover, Apex asks
this court to order the Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an
exploration permit. Belite echoes the same concern as that of Apex on the actual takeover by the
state of the mining industry in the disputed area to the exclusion of the private private sector.
Issue:
Is the assailed Decision dated 23 June 2006 of the Third Division in the case contrary to and
overturns the earlier decision?
Held:
The assailed decision did not overturn the 16 July 1991 Decision in Apex Mining Co vs.
Garcia. The former was decided on facts and issues that were not attendant in the latter, such as
the expiration of EP 133 prohibiting its assignment, and the unauthorized and invalid assignment
of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since it was effected without the approval of the Secretary of
DENR. The prayer of Apex and Bellite cannot be granted, since it is the Executive Department
that has the prerogative to accept such applications.
203
 EFFECTS OF A DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Tan v. Barrios
Gr. No. 85481-82, October 18, 1990
Facts:
On April 17, 1975, the three petitioner, with 12 others, were arrested and charged before
the Military Commission No. 1, for the crimes of: (1) Murder through the use of an unlicensed or
illegally possessed firearm, (2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol.
September 15, 1998, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez issued Department Order No.
226 designating the state Prosecutor Hermani Barrios to collaborate with the City Fiscal of
Cagayan de Oro City in the investigation or reinvestigation and if the evidence warrants to
prosecute the case in the court of competent jurisdiction.
November 7, 1998, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed this petition for
certiorari and prohibition praying that the information in criminal cases and order of respondent
Judge date October 26, 19987 be annulled and that the public respondents or any other
prosecuting and trying them a new for the offenses charged because they had already.
Issue:
Did the State Prosecutor Barrios executed his jurisdiction and gravely abused his
discretion in prosecuting them?
Ruling:
Yes, the public respondents gravely abused their discretion and acted without or excess
of their discretion and acted without or excess of their jurisdiction in misconstruing the third
paragraph of the dispositive portion of this Court’s decision in Cruz vs. Enrile. It is an
unreasonable application of the said case for the decision therein will be searched in vain for
such authority to reprosecute every civilian who had ever faced a court martial, much more less
those who had been acquitted by such bodies more than a decade ago like petitioner by such
bodies more than a decade ago like petitioner Tan.
204
Gayo v. Verceles
452 S 504, February 28, 2005
Facts:
During 1987, Verseles migrated to USA with family but she retained her Filipino
citizenship.
On 1993, Verceles returned to the Philippines for good. In 1995, she registered herself as
a voter of La Union and filed her Income Tax Returns.
Between 1993-1997, they would travel to the United States of America to visit her
children. In 1997, she effectively abandoned her status as lawful resident of the United States of
America for the May 1998 Elections January 1998, she surrendered her allied registration and he
can and was elected mayor in May 1998 and he was elected then.
Issue:
Whether the Local Government Code impliedly repealed Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC) by the fact that the Local Government Code does not provide waiver for status as
permanent residents abroad.
Held:
No. Section 40 (f) Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 65 (e) OEC, BP 881
(1985) provides for an exception of the disqualification. Both provisions are in pari matria they
relate to the same subject matter and thus should be construed together and each legislative intent
is to be interpreted.
OEC is a catch phrase or a conditional cause on how a permanent resident or immigrant

of a foreign country could fall outside the coverage of prohibition.
205
 POWERS
Re: 1989 Election of the IBP

178 SCRA 398, October 6, 1989
Facts:
In Re election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines held on
June 3, 1987 of the Philippine International Convention Center, the newly elected officers were
set to take their oath of office on July 4, 1989 before the Supreme Court en banc. However,
disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers whi
had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the
columns of some newspapers about intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates,
led by the main protagonists for the Office of President of the Association, namely, Attorneys
Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and
the officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-laws
which prohibit such activities, the Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision
over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP offices- elect and to
inquire into the vacitnity of the reports. Media reports done by Mr. Jurado, Mr. Mauricio and Mr.
Locsin in the newspaper opened the avenue for investigation on the anomalies in the IBP
elections.
The prohibited acts are against the IBP By-laws more specifically Article 1, Section 4 of
the IBP By-laws emphasizes the “strictly non-political” character of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Any relation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited
acts and practices defined in Section 14 of the By-laws of the Integrated shall be a ground for the
disqualification of candidate.
Issue:
Is the principal candidates for the national position in the Integrated Bar violates Section
14 thereof?
Held:
It has been mentioned with no little insistence with no little insistence that the provision
in the 1987 constitution providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7)
members among whom is “a representative of the Integrated Bar”, tasked to participate in the
selection of nominees for appointment to vacant position of the IBP President has attracted so
much interest among lawyers she must coveted “power” erroneously perceived to be inherent in
that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections.
206
 ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF COURTS
Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman

368 SCRA 36
Facts:
Pursuant to the Government’s plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the
Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation case against the owners of the properties
affected by the Project. The expropriation case was prescribed by Judge Renato Fuentos. The
Government won the expropriation case. DPWH still owed the defendants lot owners. The lower
court granted Tessio’s motion for issuance for issuance of writ of execution against the DPWH
to satisfy her unpaid claim.
May 3, 1994, Respondent Sheriff Paralison issued a Notice of Ley, addressed to the
Regional Director of DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim.
On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second District of
Davao City and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court direct Judge
Renato Fuentes and Sheriff Patalisan to comment on the report recommending the filing of
administrative case against the sheriff and other responsible for the anomalous implementation of
the writ of execution.
Fuentes filed with the Office of Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to discuss the criminal
complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his
official duties and function alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
in the absence of an administrative change for the same acts before the Supreme Court.
Held:
No. Republic Act No. 6670, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides
the powers, function and duties of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the Ombudsman may not
initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner
judge.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation if the laws of
the land.
207
No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.
208
 TENURE OF JUDGES
People v. Gacott
246 S 52, July 13, 1995
Facts:
For failure to read the text of the cited LOI No. 2 namely “Abolishing the Anti-Dummy
Board” of the Prosecution, the order of the respondent dismissing the criminal case was annulled
by the SC. Respondent was sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross
ignorance of the law. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration dated April 1, 1995. He also
begged with humility that the spreading of the Decision on his personal records be reconsidered.
April 26, 1995, he filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration copies of the basic
motion and supplemental motions were punished by him to the chief Justice, Judicial and Bar
Council, Office of the Solicitor General, Department of Justice Secretary, Office of the
Ombudsman, among others.
Issues:
Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court has competence to administering
administrative discipline of respondent judge.
Held:
Yes. The Second Division of the Supreme Court has competence to administratively
discipline the respondent judge because the court validly and solemnly raffled the case to Mr.
Justice Burden of the 3rd Division who was later transferred to the Second Sentence of Section
11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in questioning the competence of the 2nd Division.
209
 CONSULTATIONS OF THE COURT
City Government of Tagaytay vs. Guerero

Facts:
Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development (TTDC) is the registered owner of two parcels of

land. It incurred real estate tax liabilities on the said properties for the tax years 1976-1983. For
failure of the TTDC to settle its delinquent real estate tax obligations, the City Government of
Tagaytay offered the properties for sale of TTDC to settle its delinquent real estate tax
obligations, the City Government of Tagaytay offered the properties for sale at a public auction.
Being the only bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in favour of the City Government of
Tagaytay and was correspondingly inscribed on the titles of the properties TTTDC filed a
petition for nullification of the public auction involving the disputed properties on teh ground
that the properties were not within the jurisdiction of the City of Tagaytay and thus, beyond its
taxing authority. On the other hand, City of Tagaytay averred that based on its Charter and
properties are within its territorial jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court denied this motion. This
is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA.
Issue:
Is the city of Tagaytay liable for damages when it levelled its real estate taxes on the subject
properties?
Held:
Yes. It is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due
to tax delinquency, the subject property should be under its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the failure
of the City of Tagaytay to verify if the property is within its jurisdiction before levying the taxes
on the same constitute negligence. It is liable for the tortuitous acts committed by its agent who
said the properties to the Melencious despite the despite the clear mandate of RA no. 1418.
210
Linkaichong v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 178831-32, July 30, 2009
Facts:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the Qualification of Jocely
Linkaichong to run for, be elected to and assume and discharge the position as Representative of
1st District of Negros Oriental. The contention of parties who sought her disqualification is that
she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. The election that ensued, she was voted for the constituents of
Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as Member of
the House of Representatives.
The proponents against Linkaichong’s qualification stated that she is not a natural-born
citizen because her parents were Chinese citizen at the time of her birth. They went on to
claimthat the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained
finality due to procedural and substantial defects.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the citizenship of Linkaichong’s parents may be questioned in an election

case.
b) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
Held:
No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization certificate of one person
should be in accordance with Section 18 CA No. 473. Clearly under the law and jurisprudence, it
is the state, through the Solicitor General or the representative designated by statute, that may
question in the appropriate denaturalization proceeding.
Yes. Linkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken
her oath of office and she was allowed to officially assume office. Accordingly, the HRET, and
no longer the COMELEC, should now assume office jurisdiction over disqualification case.
211
 PERIODS OF DECISION
Malacora vs. CA
GR no. 31042, September 30, 1982
Facts:
In view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants Rodrigo
Libames and Consuelo Libares to pay herein plaintiffs Dionisio Malacora and Lucia Marabular
the total amount of P2,595.00 for one half of the banana plants said plaintiffs planted on the
defendants land and after payment of said amounts their tenancy relation will be considered as
terminated and the said plaintiffs will be allowed to surrender and leave their tenanced holding.
Both parties are hereby ordered to pay 50-50 the court fees, the plaintiffs to pay their one-half
share upon receipt of the payments for one-hold of the improvements as ordered.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA entered in declaring the writ of execution, the sheriff’s certificate of sale
and the sheriffs final deed of sale and the sheriffs final deed of sale as annulled.
Held:
The constitution intends that aside from the way on appealed decision, ordered or
resolution is deemed affirmed because of lack of recovery note under Section 7 of Article X,
same effect is contemplated by reason of the lapse of the period fixed without the case being
decided on the merits.
212
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Brillantes v. Yorac
192 S 358
Facts:
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact
finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate
his chairmanship over the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac, an associate
commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a
temporary substitute, in short, she was appointed in an acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then
questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution “in no case shall any
member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity”.
Brillantes further argued that the choice of the acting chairman should not come from the
President for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and
that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional
commission.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of
the COMELEC.
Held:
Yes. Yorac’s designation as acting chairman is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court

ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not
under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions. The designation made by
the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the quote “administrative
expediency” to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found
no basis on existing rules on statutes. It is the members of the COMELEC who should choose
whom to sit temporarily as acting chairman in the absence of Davide (they normally do that by
choosing the most senior member).
But even though the president’s appointment of Yorac as acting president is void, the
members of COMELEC can choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting chairman – the point here
is that, it is the members who should elect their acting chairman pursuant to the principle that
constitutional commissions are independent bodies.
213
Funa v. The Chairman COA

670 S 579
Facts:
On February 15, 2001, Pres Arroyo appointed Carague as Chairman of the COA for a
term of 7 years. Carague’s term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008.
On February 7, 2004, Villar was appointed as the third member of the COA for a term of 7 years
starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of
Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February
4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed
as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment
papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on
February 2, 2011.
Issue 1:
W/N a promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner to Chairman is

constitutionally permissible and does NOT constitute reappointment as barred by the Article IX
(D), Sec 1 (2) of the Constitution
Yes. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven
years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the
term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,
provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired
period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed 7 years and provided further that the
vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment.
Reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same
office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an
appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman)
would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment
barred under the Constitution.
Issue 2:
W/N the appointment of Villar to the position of COA Chairman which is made vacant by the
expiration of term of the predecessor is valid
214
No. The Constitution clearly provides that if the vacancy results from the expiration of
the term of the predecessor, the appointment of a COA member shall be for a fixed 7-year term.
Here, the vacancy in the position of COA chairman left by Carague in February 2, 2008
resulted from the expiration of his 7-year term. Under that circumstance, there can be no
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor to speak of. Hence, in light of the 7-year
aggregate rule, Villar’s appointment to a full term is not valid as he will be allowed to serve
more than seven 7 years under the constitutional ban.
Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter
term, however, to comply with the 7-year aggregate rule would also be invalid as the
corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of
giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term
of office of 7 years.
215
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
PAGCOR v. CA
202 S 191, 194
Facts:
For the alleged fund transfer for P4,200,000.00 in favor of “Arnulfo or David
Fuentabella.” Manahan, Treasury Officer of petitioner Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) was interrogated by PAGCOR’s Casino Operations Manager, Branch
Manager and Senior Chief Security Officer.
A notice of preventive suspension was received by Manahan.After investigation,

charging her of serious procedural deviation/gross negligence, arising from the anomalous fund
transfer transaction.
Manahan finally received from PAGCOR’s Human Resource Department (HRDa letter
of even date informing her of the PAGCOR Board of Directors’ (BOD) decision to dismiss her
from the service.
Manahan filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the PAGCOR BOD’s decision to dismiss
her from the service. The motion was denied by the PAGCOR BOD for lack of merit. Feeling
aggrieved, Manahan appealed from the PAGCOR’s rulings to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC).
CSC issued Resolution granting herein respondent Manahan’s appeal from the decisions
of PAGCOR. PAGCOR’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CSC. CA rendered the
assailed Decision affirming in toto the Resolutions of the CSC.
Issue:
Whether or not Manahan is guilty of the offense charged?
Held:
Court of Appeals decision is sustained.
As contemplated under the foregoing provision, a formal charge is a written specification

of the charge(s) against an employee. While its form may vary, it generally embodies a brief
statement of the material and relevant facts constituting the basis of the charge(s); a directive for
the employee to answer the charge(s) in writing and under oath, accompanied by his/her
evidence; and advice for the employee to indicate in his/her answer whether he/she elects a
formal investigation; and a notice that he/she may secure the assistance of a counsel of his/her
own choice. A cursory reading of the purported formal charge issued to Manahan shows that the
216
same is defective as it does not contain the abovementioned statements, and it was not issued by
the proper disciplining authority. Hence, under the foregoing factual and legal milieu, Manahan
is not deemed to have been formally charged.
The petitioner did not refute Manahans allegation in her Written Statement dated April
26, 2004 that she was not allowed to be assisted by counsel during the scheduled meeting with
the CIU on April 23, 2004, when the CIU was to ask her questions and take her statement. This
stance of PAGCOR was in clear disregard of the respondent’s rights protected under the cited
Section 16 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936. While due process in an agency investigation may
be limited as compared to due process in criminal proceedings, where however a statute
specifically provides for a procedure and grants particular rights to a party under investigation
such as in the investigations of persons covered by the Civil Service Rules, these rights shall not
be utterly disregarded, especially so when invoked by the party under investigation, as was
Manahan, because these rights already form part of a procedural due process.
The finding that PAGCOR failed to comply with the required procedure is further
supported by the fact that in PAGCOR’s letter dated April 26, 2004, it explained that the
investigation process against the respondent had just commenced. If this were the case, i.e., that
the investigation process had just began at that time, then the proceedings conducted by
PAGCOR were clearly flawed, since a formal charge can be made only after a finding of prima
facie case during investigations.
217
Casino Labor Association v. CA

554 S 323
Facts:
This petition for certiorari assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 50826. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the
petitioner against the First Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The series of events which ultimately led to the filing of the petition at bar started with
the consolidated cases filed by the petitioner labor union with the Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC. In an Order dated 20 July 1987, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the consolidated cases for
lack of jurisdiction over the respondents therein, Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) and Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC).
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission en banc issued a Resolution dated 15

November 1988, which dismissed the separate appeals filed by the petitioner on the ground that
the NLRC has no jurisdiction over PAGCOR. Petitioner then elevated the case to this Court, via
a petition for review on certiorari, entitled Casino Labor Association v. National Labor Relations
Commission, Philippine Amusement & Gaming Corporation, Philippine Casino Operators
Corporation and Philippine Special Services Corporation and docketed as G.R. No. 85922. In a
Resolution dated 23 January 1989, the Third Division of the Court dismissed the petition for
failure of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not P.D. 1869 exempts casino employees from the coverage of Labor Code
provisions and although the employees are empowered by the Constitution to form unions, these
are subject to the laws passed to regulate unions in offices and corporations governed by the
Civil Service Law
Held:
In this case, the Civil Service Commission is the proper venue for petitioner to ventilate its
claims.
The Court is not oblivious to petitioners’ plea for justice after waiting numerous years for
relief since it first filed its claims with the labor arbiter in 1986. However, petitioner is not
completely without fault. The 23 January 1989 Resolution in G.R. No. 85922, declaring the lack
of jurisdiction by the NLRC over PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC, became final and executory on
March 27, 1989.The petitioner did not file a second motion for reconsideration nor did it file a
motion for clarification of any statement by the Court which petitioner might have thought was
ambiguous. Neither did petitioner take the proper course of action, as laid down in G.R. No.
218
85922, to file its claims before the Civil Service Commission. Instead, petitioner pursued a
protracted course of action based solely on its erroneous understanding of a single sentence in
the Courts resolution to a motion for reconsideration.
219
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Geronimo v. Ramos
135 S 435
Facts:
The Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The
petitioner was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were
terminated.
On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several

communications form Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit
accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma
Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.
The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was
Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was
very ill to be able to do the collecting.
A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of

dismissal citing:
1) Misappropriation of denominational funds;

2) Willful breach of trust;
3) Serious misconduct;
4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and
5) Commission of an offense against the person of  employer’s duly authorized representative as
grounds for the termination of his services.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the
SDA for reinstatement and backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of
petitioner.
SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as
such, involves the separation of church and state
Held:
220
No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is
involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee,
which is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of faith, worship or
doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor
Code.
221
BANAT Party-list v. COMELEC

595 S 477
Facts:
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the
NBC. BANAT filed its petition because “the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC
have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall
implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-
list seats.”
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution
No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941
(R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the
proceedings of the NBC.
Issue:
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we
defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections?
Held:
WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution

of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated
9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the
distribution of additional party-list seats.
222
Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire
20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow
the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as
a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a
valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the
two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party
list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of
the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the
total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of
seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is
the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of
the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats.
Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats
are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of
seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating
in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact,
the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats,
and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a
“party” that participates in party-list elections as either “a political party or a sectoral party,”
R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
223
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Dela Llana v The Chairperson, COA

665 S 176 (2012)
Facts:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking
to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister
of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges
of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the
CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify
a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
Issue:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as
provided for under the Constitution.
Held:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices
from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in
good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office.

There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant.
In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is
in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise.
224
Yap v. COA
619 S 154
Facts:
Ramon Yap is Department Manager of National Development Company (a GOCC with

original charter) and was appointed as VP for Finance of Manila Gas Corporation (MGC) (a
subsidiary of NDC). The additional employment entitled him to an honorarium of 50% of his
basic salary in NDC and the allowances attached to the office. MGC issued notices of
disallowances against Yap with regards to his subscription to NatGeo and Reader’s Digest, car
maintenance, fellowship with PCA club members on Sunday etc. The disallowances were
predicated on the grounds that his appointment to MGC + his regular position as Department
Manager of NDC (and subsequent receipt of allowances and reimbursements) directly
contravened proscription in Sec 7(2) and Sec 8, Art IX-b of the Constitution. Yap appealed the
Auditors disallowances, contending that the benefits were approved by the MGC Board of
Directors. His appeal was denied by the CAO II. Yap sought reconsideration from COA - he
argued that his assignment to MGC was required by the primary functions of his office and
allowed by law. Respondent COA denied his appeal and upheld CAO II’s ruling that the
disallowances were prohibited by the Constitution. It also ruled that the allowances and
reimbursements claimed by petitioner failed to pass the test of public purpose - not enough that
the payments were authorized by the Board of Directors of the MGC. It’s also necessary that the
payments do not contravene principles provided for under Sec 4 of PD 1445 on the use of
government funds, specifically the public purpose requirement under Sec4(2) of PD 1445(Gov’t
Auditing Code of the Philippines). Petitioner MOR - denied by COA. COA ruled that although
petitionerwas correct in arguing that there was no legal impediment to the validity of his
appointment as VP and Treasurer of MGC and to his entitlement to compensation for the 2nd
office, the more important consideration is the condition that government funds or property shall
be spent or used solely for public purpose.
Issue:
Whether or not COA committed gave abuse of discretion when it used the public purpose
requirement as basis in affirming the questioned disallowances
Held:
PARG - MGC, as a GOCC is subject to the jurisdiction of COA however subjecting the
salaries, allowances and benefits of MGC employees to public purpose test is wrong since the
salaries, allowances and benefits are intended to compensate MGC employees for services
performed on behalf of the corporation. If the public purpose requirement would be applied in
auditing the salaries, allowances and benefits given to gov’t employees, no such compensation
would pass audit. The Supreme Court held that the mere act of disbursing public funds to pay
allowances and salaries of government.
225
Pacete v. Acting Chairman of the COA

185 S 1
Facts:
On April 14, 1966, Petitioner Felizardo Pacete, alleging that he was appointed by the
President as the Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato, filed a suit for mandamus and
prohibition to compel the Secretary of Commission on Appointments to issue him certificate of
confirmation.
Petitioner was appointed on August 31, 1964. He assumed office on September 11, 1964
and discharged his duties as such. His appointment was made during recess of Congress band
was submitted at its next session in 1965, On May 20, 1965, His appointment was unanimously
confirmed.
On February 7, 1966, The Secretary of Justice sent him a letter ordering him to vacate his
position because his confirmation was by-passed.
When he inquired about it, he learned that on May 21, 1965, one day after his
confirmation, Sen. Rofolfo Ganzon, member of Commission on Appointments, wrote to
Chairman of the Commission on Appointments to file for a motion for reconsideration on
petitioner’s confirmation in view of derogatory information received by Sen. Ganzon.
The Secretary of Commission on Appointments notified Secretary of Justice regarding

the practice that a motion of reconsideration automatically cancels the confirmation of
appointment in question.
Petitioner contends that the Commission on Appointments exercises power to approve or

reject appointments thru majority votes of members in the quorum and not thru members
individually as provided by Sec. 10 of its Rules.
Respondents contend that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction because the case only
involves internal rules of Commission on Appointments. There are no constitutional questions
involved.
Issues:
1. Whether or the not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction

2. Whether or the not petitioner’s appointment must be confirmed
Held:
1. Yes. The case involves interpretation of the Constitution regarding the powers of
Commission on Appointments.
226
2. Yes. The controlling principle is Altarejos v. Molo which interpreted Rule 21 of the
Revised Rules of Commission on Appointments. It held that mere filing of motion for
reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a confirmation. Instead, it will only
reopen the appointment and submit it for approval or disapproval by the majority of members of
the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, there is distinction between appointments made during recess of Congress and
appointments while Congress is in session. When Congress is in session, presidential nominees
can only assume office once confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
When Congress is in recess, the President makes ad interim appointments which take
effect at once. The individual chosen may qualify and perform his function. The appointment is
effective until the disapproval of the Commission on Appointments or next adjournment of
Congress.
227
Albon v Fernando
494 S 141 (2006)
Facts:
In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen, clear and
repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Green heights Subdivision. It was undertaken by the
city government pursuant to Ordinance No. 59. Subsequently, petitioner Albon filed a taxpayer’s
suit for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with damages against respondents City Engineer
Alfonso Espirito, Assistant City Engineer Anaki Maderal and City Treasurer Natividad
Cabalquinto. According to the petitioner it was unconstitutional and unlawful for respondents to
use government equipment and property, and to disburse public funds, of the City of Marikina
for the grading, widening, clearing, repair and maintenance of the existing sidewalks of Marikina
Green heights Subdivision. He alleged that the sidewalks were private property because
Marikina Green heights Subdivision was owned by V.V. Soliven, Inc. Hence, the city
government could not use public resources on them. In undertaking the project, therefore,
respondents allegedly violated the constitutional proscription against the use of public funds for
private purposes as well as Sections 335 and 336 of RA 7160 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents. Ordinance No. 59 is a valid
enactment. The court recognized the inherent police power of the municipality and with this it is
allowed to carry out the contested works. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial
court stating that sidewalks of Marikina Green heights Subdivision were public in nature and
ownership thereof belonged to the City of Marikina or the Republic of the Philippines following
the 1991 White Plains Association decision. Thus, the improvement and widening of the
sidewalks pursuant to Ordinance No. 59 of 1993 was well within the LGU’s powers.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 59
Held:
NO. Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes set forth in the Local Government Code (RA 7160). It is expressly vested with police
powers delegated to LGUs under the general welfare clause of RA 7160. With this power, LGUs
may prescribe reasonable regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their
constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Also, in
the exercise of their inherent police power the cities and municipalities have the power to
exercise such powers and discharge such functions and responsibilities as may be necessary,
appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities,
including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their residents and
which are financed by their own funds. These infrastructure facilities include municipal or city
roads and bridges and similar facilities. Regarding the nature of ownership of the sidewalks in
question, there is also no hindrance in declaring that the sidewalks are of public dominion. PD
228
957, as amended by PD1216, mandates subdivision owners to set aside open spaces which shall
be devoted exclusively for the use of the general public.
229
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
 IMPEACHMENT
Chief Justice Renato Corona, vs. Senate of the Philippines

G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of
temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief
Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the
respondent Members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by
respondent Senate of the Philippines.
On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which
a verified complaint for impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the
Committee on Justice. After a brief presentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted in
session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one third vote required by the
Constitution.
On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as
an impeachment court the following day.
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with
culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and Corruption, which
alleged that:
Betrayed the public trust through his track record marked by partiality and subservience
in cases involving the Arroyo Administration from the time of his appointment As Supreme
Court justice and until his dubious appointment as a midnight chief justice to the present;
Respondent committed culpable violation of the Constitution and/or betrayed the public trust
when he failed to disclose to the public his SALN as required under sec. 17, art. XI of the 1987
Constitution
Respondent committed culpable violations of the constitution and/or betrayed the public trust by
failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under the constitution that provides that “[a]
Member of the judiciary must be a person of Proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence” in allowing the supreme court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which
Caused the issuance of flip-flopping Decisions in Final and executory cases; in creating an
excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office; and in
discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court.
230
Respondent betrayed the public trust and/or committed culpable violation of the Constitution
when he blatantly disregarded the principle of separation of powers by issuing a “status quo
ante” order against the House of Representatives in the case concerning the Impeachment of then
Ombudsman Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez.
And such other allegations of arbitrariness in relation to his office and his relationship
with former Pres. Arroyo and her husband, as well, failure to account for collections of the JDF.
Petitioner filed his answer and assailed the swift manner by which the impeachment
complaint as initiated and transferred from the HOR to the Senate.
Petitioner argued at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses imputed to him were either
false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for the outright dismissal of
the complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the Impeachment
Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment.
Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of respondent Representatives held a press

conference revealing evidence which supposedly support their accusations against petitioner,
which was carried on front page newspaper reports, the following day.
On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment

Court, commenced trial proceedings against the petitioner. Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary
hearing was denied. On January 18, 2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of this Court,
in compliance with a subpoena issued by the Impeachment Court, took the witness stand and
submitted the SALNs of petitioner for the years 2002 to 2010.
Other prosecution witnesses also testified regarding petitioner’s SALNs and other
properties. In a subsequent Resolution dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court granted
the prosecution’s request for subpoena directed to the officers of two private banks where
petitioner allegedly deposited millions in peso and dollar currencies.
On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No.
200238) seeking to enjoin the Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing
the aforesaid subpoena requiring PSBank thru its authorized representative to testify and to bring
the original and certified true copies of the opening documents for petitioner’s alleged foreign
currency accounts, and thereafter to render judgment nullifying the subpoenas including the bank
statements showing the yearend balances for the said accounts.
On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On February 13,
2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition claiming that his right to due process is being
violated in the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator Judges have lost the
cold neutrality of impartial judges by acting as prosecutors.
231
The Petitioner was eventually impeached based on evidence presented to the Senate
sitting as impeachment court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion
in ruling for the former Chief Justice’s impeachment.
Held:
No. Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious
crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of
power, impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through
the influence of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court,
Senator Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and
counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part of
any Senator Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a
political question that is not within this Court’s power of expanded judicial review.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In such
cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which
would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
232
Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 120422, September 27, 1995
Facts:
On May 18, 1995, eleven suspected members of the notorious robbery gang, “Kuratong
Baleleng,” were killed in an alleged shootout with composite teams of the National Capital
Regional Command (NCRC), Traffic Management Command (TMC), Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC), Central Police District Command (CPDC) and Criminal Investigation
Command (CIC).
SPO2 Eduardo de los Reyes of the Central Intelligence Command (CIC) then made an
expose’, stating that there was no shootout and that the “Kuratong Baleleng” members were
victims of summary execution.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) received the complaint of the relatives of the
slain suspected gang members, accusing the PACC, NCRC, TMC, CIC and CPDC of murder.
Acting Ombudsman Villa directed public respondent Deputy OmbudsmanCasaclang to create a
panel to monitor the investigations being conducted by the Commission on Human Rights, the
Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, and the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Director for Investigation regarding the alleged shootout.
The panel recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted against petitioners

and all the participating personnel listed in the After Operations Report of the PNP. Casaclang
then issued the order directing petitioner[s] and nine others to submit their counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence within ten days from receipt thereof, which the petitioners failed to
comply.
The petitioners instead filed a motion with Casaclang to suspend the preliminary
investigation against them pending resolution of the petition for certiorari filed with the Supreme
Court. Casaclang granted the motion, only to be reversed by Villa. Villa then took over “the
direct supervision and control of the preliminary investigation”. The petitioners challenged the
take-over, asserting that neither the Ombudsman nor his Deputy may conduct preliminary
investigation.
Issues:
Whether or not the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman are authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations
Whether or not public respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Military Manuel Casaclang
committed grave abuse of discretion when he set the case for preliminary investigation and
required the petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits before any preliminary evaluation of
the complaint as required by Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 of the Office of
theOmbudsman.
233
Held:
1. Yes. By express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution,

among the functions of the Ombudsman are those other powers, functions or duties as may be
provided by law.
Through the passage of R.A. No. 6770, the Office of the Special Prosecutor was made an organic
component of the Office of the Ombudsman, while the Ombudsman was granted the following
powers, among others:
Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
2. Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty

as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein
or hereinafter provided. The petitioners have not proven any distinction between “the duty to
investigate” and “the power to conduct preliminary investigations”; neither have the petitioners
established that the power remains with the Tanodbayan, now the Special Prosecutor
234
Lastimosa v. Vasquez
G.R. No. 116801, April 06, 1995
Facts:
On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu,
filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts,
abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio
Ilustrisimo. The cases were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman -Visayas where they were
docketed as OMB-VIS-(CRIM)-93-0140 and OMB-VIS-(ADM)-93-0036, respectively.
The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after an investigation,
found no prima facie evidence and accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint.
After reviewing the matter, however, the Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez,
disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with
attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court.
Accordingly, in a letter dated May 17, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas,
respondent Arturo C. Mojica, referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E.
Kintanar for the “filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City,
“ The case was eventually assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Gloria G. Lastimosa.
It appears that petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she
found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. With the approval of Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar, she filed on July 4, 1994 an information for acts of lasciviousness against
Mayor Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe.
In two letters written to the Provincial Prosecutor on July 11, 1994 and July 22, 1994,
Deputy Ombudsman Mojica inquired as to any action taken on the previous referral of the case,
more specifically the directive of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted
rape.
As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor’s Office, Deputy
Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner
Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for “refusing and failing
to obey the lawful directives” of the Office of the Ombudsman.
For this purpose a hearing was set on August 1, 1994. Petitioner and the Provincial
Prosecutor were given until August 3, 1994 within which to submit their answer. An answer was
timely filed by them and hearings were thereupon conducted.
235
It appears that earlier, on July 22, 1994, two cases had been filed against the two
prosecutors with the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas by Julian Menchavez, a resident of
Santa Fe, Cebu. One was an administrative complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and
P.D. No. 807 (the Civil Service Law) and another one was a criminal complaint for violation of
§3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaints were
based on the alleged refusal of petitionerand Kintanar to obey the orders of the Ombudsman to
charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.
In the administrative case (OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189) respondent Deputy Ombudsman

for Visayas Mojica issued an order on August 15, 1994, placing petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa
and Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six
(6) months, pursuant to Rule III, §9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Administrative Order No. 7), in relation to §24 of R.A. No. 6770. The order was approved by
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on August 16, 1994 and on August 18, 1994 Acting Secretary
of Justice Ramon J. Liwag designated Eduardo Concepcion of Region VII as Acting Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu.
On the other hand, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Edgardo G. Canton, issued orders in
the two cases, directing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar to submit their counter
affidavits and controverting evidence.
On September 6, 1994, petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present petition for
certiorari.
Issue/s:
I. Whether or not the petitioner’s suspension is invalid.

II. Nor is there merit in petitioner’s claim that the contempt charge should first be resolved
before any action in the administrative complaint case can be taken because the contempt case
involves a prejudicial question.
Held:
I. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such

investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore,
nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the charges
against him are heard and be given an opportunity to prove his innocence.
Petitioner questions her preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay and
contends that it should only be for ninety (90) days on the basis of cases decided by this Court.
Petitioner is in error. She is referring to cases where the law is either silent or expressly limits the
period of suspension to ninety (90) days. With respect to the first situation, we ruled in the case
of Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan that:
236
To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under Section 13 of
Rep. Act 3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of all concerned that
this Court set forth the rules on the period of preventive suspension under the aforementioned
laws, as follows:
1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to
a maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuances thereof, and this applies to all public
officers, (as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged under said Act.
2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers
or employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under Sections 3
and 4 of said Pres. Decree 807, and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days
from issuance, except where there is delay in the disposition of the case, which is due to the
fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of delay shall both be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person
suspended is a presidential appointee, the continuance of his suspension shall be for a reasonable
time as the circumstances of the case may warrant.
II. There is simply no basis for this contention. The two cases arose out of the same act or
omission and may proceed hand in hand, or one can be heard before the other. Whatever order is
followed will not really matter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of
Preventive Suspension is DENIED.
237
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
University Of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and University of San Agustin
Employees Union-Ffw
593 SCRA 663 (2009)
Facts:
A collective bargaining agreement, when voluntarily entered into by the parties, becomes
the law between them.
In the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between University of San Agustin and
its Employees Union, the parties agreed to include a provision on salary increases based on the
incremental tuition fee increases or tuition incremental proceeds (TIP). However, the parties
disagreed whether or not the term ―salary increases‖ includes other increases in benefits
received by the employee.
The Voluntary Arbiter held that the salary increase shall be paid out of 80% of the TIP,
should it be higher than P1,500. Moreover, scholarship grants and tuition fee discounts given by
the university should not be deducted from the TIP. The appellate court sustained the
interpretation of the CBA but revised TIP computation. The present petition questions only the
interpretation of the CBA provision by the appellate court.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of the CBA should be applied
Held:
It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the
parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. If the terms of a contract, in this case
the CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of their stipulations shall control.
A reading of the provisions of the CBA shows that the parties agreed that 80% of the TIP or at
the least the amount of P1,500 is to be allocated for individual salary increases.
The CBA does not speak of any other benefits or increases which would be covered by
the employees’ share in the TIP, except salary increases. The CBA reflects the incorporation of
different provisions to cover other benefits such as Christmas bonus (Art. VIII, Sec. 1), service
award (Art. VIII, Sec.5), leaves (Article IX), educational benefits (Sec.2, Art. X), medical and
hospitalization benefits (Secs. 3, 4 and 5, Art. 10), bereavement assistance (Sec. 6, Art. X), and
signing bonus (Sec. 8, Art. VIII), without mentioning that these will likewise be sourced from
the TIP. Thus, the university’s belated claim that the 80% TIP should be taken to mean as
238
covering ALL increases and not merely the salary increases as categorically stated in Sec. 3, Art.
VIII of the CBA does not lie.
In the present case, the university could have, during the CBA negotiations, opposed the
inclusion of or renegotiated the provision allotting 80% of the TIP to salary increases alone, as it
was and is not under any obligation to accept respondent’s demands hook, line and sinker. Art.
252 of the Labor Code is clear on the matter.
The records are thus bereft of any showing that the university had made it clear during
the CBA negotiations that it intended to source not only the salary increases but also the
increases in other employee benefits from the 80% of the TIP. Absent any proof that the
university’s consent was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, it is presumed that it entered into
the CBA voluntarily, had full knowledge of the contents thereof, and was aware of its
commitments under the contract.
It is axiomatic that labor laws setting employee benefits only mandate the minimum that
an employer must comply with, but the latter is not proscribed from granting higher or additional
benefits if it so desires, whether as an act of generosity or by virtue of company policy or a CBA,
as it would appear in this case. While, in following to the letter the subject CBA provision the
petitioner will, in effect, be giving more than 80% of the TIP as its personnel’s share in the
tuition fee increase, the university’s remedy lies not in the Court’s invalidating the provision, but
in the parties’ clarifying the same in their subsequent CBA negotiations.
239
Ateneo De Manila University v. Capulong

222 SCRA 644
Facts:
On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School named Aquila Legis
conducted its initiation rites upon neophytes. Unfortunately, one neophyte died as a result thereof
and one was hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution dated March 9, 1991,
the Disciplinary Board formed by Ateneo found seven students guilty of violating Rule 3 of the
Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, then president of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings,
ordered the expulsion of the seven students. However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio Capulong
of the Makati RTC, upon the students’ petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the said students.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order dismissing such
students pursuant to its rules.
Held:
Yes, Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students and
therefore it had validly exercised such power. The students do not deserve to claim such a
venerable institution such as Ateneo as their own a minute longer for they may forseeably cast a
malevolent influence on students currently enrolled as well as those who come after them. This is
academic freedom on the part of the school which includes:
a. freedom to determine who may teach;

b. freedom to determine what may be taught;
c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught;
d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.
240
University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals

222 S 644
Facts:
Private respondent enrolled in the College of Architecture, University of San Carlos

(USC), during the first semester of school year 1978-79. At the end of the second semester of
that school year, she obtained a grade of “I.C.” (Incomplete) in Architecture 121, and grades of
“5’s” (failures) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123.
The following school year, 1979-1980, she shifted to the College of Commerce of the
USC. Some of the units she had completed when she was still an architecture student were then
carried over and credited in her new course. As a commerce student, she obtained good grades.
However, she was aware of her earlier failing grades in the College of Architecture and that the
same would be taken into consideration in the evaluation of her overall academic performance to
determine if she could graduate with honors.
So, on December 10, 1981, she wrote the Council of Deans of the USC, requesting that
her grades of 5s in Architecture 121 and Architecture 122 be disregarded in the computation of
her grade average. She wrote a similar letter to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports
MECS in Region VII on January 5, 1982 and this letter was referred to the President of the USC
for comment and return to the MECS.
In the 3rd endorsement dated February 4, 1982, the President of the USC informed the
MECS that the university policy was that any failing grade obtained by a student in any course
would disqualify the student for honors; that to deviate from that policy would mean injustice to
students similarly situated before who were not allowed to graduate with honors; that the bad
grades given to her were justified and could not be deleted or removed because her subjects were
not “dropped” as required; that she had two failures and one incomplete grade which became a
failure upon her inaction to attend to the incomplete grade within one year; and that while her
three failures did not affect her graduation from the College of Commerce, they nonetheless
caused her disqualification from graduating with honors. She was furnished a copy of said
endorsement but she did not ask for a reconsideration.
On March 17, 1982, when the USC President was out of town, private respondent wrote
to the USC Registrar’ requesting that her failing grades be changed. The USC Registrar referred
her letter to the MECS and the request for change of grades was approved in a 4th endorsement
of March 22, 1982. Thus, her grade of IC in Architecture 121 was changed to “1.9” by Professor
Victor Leves Jr. and the grades of “5” in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 were changed to
“W” (Withdrawn).
On March 24, 1982, Mr. Marcelo Bacalso of MECS’ Higher Education Division
discovered that the change of the grade of private respondent from “IC” to “1.9” did not have the
241
supporting class record required, so he wrote to MECS Supervisor Mr. Ortiz requesting the
submission of the class record.
On March 28, 1982, the USC held its graduation exercises, and the private respondent
graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting, without
honors.
On March 31, 1982, the private respondent, assisted by counsel, demanded from Dean
Victoria A. Satorre that she be allowed to graduate, cum laude. Dean Satorre explained that the
matter was held in abeyance pending compliance with certain requirements of the MECS
through the memo of Mr. Bacalso.
On May 24, 1982, Arch. Leves Jr., the teacher required to produce the class records,
reported he could not produce the same. Thus, on May 27, 1982, Dean Satorre wrote to the
MECS Regional Director Aurelio Tiro asking for the revocation of the change of grades of
private respondent. The request was denied as there was no positive proof of fraud.
Issue:
Whether or not the school has the academic freedom in the granting of honors.
Held:
Schools of learning are given ample discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the
granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within the
parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and colleges to determine
who are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this
academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave
abuse of discretion in its exercise.
242
UP Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine

G.R. No. 134625, August 31, 1999
Facts:
Private respondent Ms. Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine a citizen of India enrolled
doctoral program in UP CSSP Diliman QC. She is ready for oral defense with selected panel
members Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and Isagani
Medina, the last included as the dean’s representative.
Even though Dr. Medina noticed that there were portions of her dissertation that was
lifted from different sources without proper acknowledgement, she was still allowed to continue
to with her oral defense. Four (4) out five (5) give her a passing mark with condition to
incorporate the suggestion made by the panel members. Dr. Medina did not sign the approval
form. Dr. Teodoro also noted that a revision should be submitted.
On March 24, 1993, The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved her graduation
pending the final revised copies of her dissertation. Private respondent submitted the supposedly
final revised copies although petitioners maintained that suggestions were not incorporated. She
left a copy for Dr. Teodoro and Dr. Medina and did not wait for their approval relying to the
Dean Paz remarks during previous meeting that a majority vote was sufficient for her to pass.
The supposedly revised copies were later disapproved by Dr. Teodoro and Dr. Medina
Private respondent was disappointed with the administration. She charge Dr. Diokno and
Medina with maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation and further warned
Dean Paz against encouraging perfidious act against her. Dean Paz attempts to exclude the
private respondent in the graduating list in a letter addressed to the Vice Chancellor for
Academic Affairs (Dr. Milagros Ibe), pending for clarification of her charges against panel
members and accusations relating to her dissertation. Unfortunately the letter did not reach on
time and the respondent was allowed to graduate. Dean Paz wrote a letter that she would not be
granted an academic clearance unless she substantiated the accusations. In a letter addressed to
Dean Paz, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended
for the withdrawal of her doctorate degree.
Dean Paz formed an ad-hoc committee (Ventura Committee) to investigate and

recommend to Chancellor Dr. Roman to withdraw her doctorate degree. Private respondent was
informed of the charges in a letter. Ventura Committee finds at 90 instances or portions of thesis
lifted from other sources with no proper acknowledgement. After it was unanimously approved
and endorsed from the CSSP and Univ. Council the recommendation for withdrawal was
endorsed to Board of Regents who deferred its actions to study further for legal implications.
Private respondent was provided with a copy of findings and in return she also submitted her
written explanation. Another meeting was scheduled to discuss her answer.
243
Zafaralla Committee was also created and recommends private respondent for withdrawal of her
degree after establishing the facts the there were massive lifting from published sources and the
private respondent also admits herself of being guilty of plagiarism.
On the basis of the report and recommendation of the University Council, the Board of Regents
send a letter to inform private respondent that it was resolved by majority to withdraw your
doctorates degree.
On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages to RTC QC. She alleged that
petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her
procedural due process. She prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree and to pay
her P500, 000.00 as moral and exemplary damages and P1, 500,000.00 as compensation for lost
earnings. RTC dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s
decision and ordered to restore her doctorates degree.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of mandamus and ordering
petitioners to restore doctoral degree.
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that respondent’s doctoral degree cannot be
recalled without violating her right to enjoyment of intellectual property and to justice and
equity.
Held:
The decision of Court of Appeals was reversed.
Yes. The court of appeals decisions was based on grounds that the private respondent was
denied of due process and that she graduated and no longer in the ambit of disciplinary powers of
UP.
In all investigations held by the different committee assigned to investigate the charges,
the private respondent was heard on her defense. In fact she was informed in writing about the
charges and was provided with a copy from the investigating committee. She was asked to
submit her explanation which she forwarded. Private respondent also discussed her case with the
UP Chancellor and Zafaralla Committee during their meetings. She was given the opportunity to
be heard and explain her side but failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her.
The freedom of a university does not terminate upon the “graduation” of a student, as the
Court of Appeals held because the “graduation” of such a student that is in question. The
investigation began before graduation. She was able to graduate because there were many
244
investigations conducted before the Board finally decided that she should not have been allowed
to graduate.
Yes. The court held that academic freedom is guaranteed to institutions of higher learning
by Art XIV of the 1987 Constitution. This freedom includes deciding whom a university will
confer degrees on. If the degree is procured by error or fraud then the Board of Regents, subject
to due process being followed, may cancel that degree.
Art. XIV, Section 5 par. 2 of the Constitution provides that “academic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.”
It is a freedom granted to “institutions of higher learning” which is thus given “a wide

sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students.” If such institution of higher
learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom
it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.
245

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Department of Political and Criminal Laws CASE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I DIGEST

 SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

 AMENDMENT AND REVISION

Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a

PUNO, concurring and dissenting

VITUG, concurring and dissenting

FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting

PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting

On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

THE PRINCIPLES AS A STATE

Straight Baseline Method

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend,

Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.

Doctrine of Parens Patriae

De Jure versus De Facto Government

Lawyers League v. Aquino

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

 The Court further held that:

1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.

4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable

Ruffy v. Chief of Staff

Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

 CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES

Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commisioner of Immigration

Thus this petition for certiorari

Whether or not the courts may review deportation proceedings

 ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

In re: Vicente Ching

1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified

Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within “a reasonable time”.

 DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED ELECTION

Whether or not, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.

1. Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.

1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a

“Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal” in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7,

2.) COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American

Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn

Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-born

It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no

 DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND DUAL ALLEGIANCE

Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.

Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He

Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines.

 BY EXPRESS RENUNCIATION OR EXPATRIATION

Yes, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of

1) Yes. According to law, citizenship may be reacquired by 1) direct act of Congress, 2)

2) No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a

Lasco v. UN Revolving Fund

Whether or not specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity

Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.

Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized

Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v. CA