College of Law

Mindanao State University

Iligan Extension

Case Digest Report

for Criminal Law I

I – Arellano S.Y. 2018 -2019

Atty. Annabelle B. Cañazares-Mindalano, RCh, RChE
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Name Page Number

Alcher T. Migriño 5-6

Intod vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 52
Jacinto vs. People, 592 SCRA 426

Vanessa Mae M. Cabili 7-8

Director of Prisons vs. Ang Cho Kio, G.R. No. L-30001, June 23, 197
People vs. Genosa, 341 SCRA 493

Reham-Aina A. Arumpac 9-10

People vs. Tibon, 622 SCRA 510 (2010)
People vs. Sotelo, G.R. No. L-33304, Dec. 13, 1930

Juhairah M. Bula 11-12

People vs. Gutierrez, 611 SCRA 633
People vs. Manulit, 635 SCRA 426

Jasmin Z. Baslot 13-15

People vs. Lopez, 585 SCRA 529
Herrera vs. Sandiganbayan, 579 SCRA 32

Rafael D. Balt 16-17

People vs. Domingo, 580 SCRA 436
Sierra vs. People, 591 SCRA 666

Sittie Aisah B. Hadji Amer 18-19

People vs. Anod, 597 SCRA 205
People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 195534, June 13, 2012

Remm Gaius R. Mamhot 20

People vs. Bandian, 63 Phil. 530
U.S. vs. Domen, 37 Phil. 57

Hadidah L. Amama 21-22

People vs. Martin, 89 Phil. 18
U.S. vs. Rivera, 41 Phil. 472

Princess Amaryah P. Ejares 23-24

People vs. de Jesus, 118 SCRA 616
People vs. Toring, 191 SCRA 38

Abegail L. Lagayada 25
People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
People vs. Bernal, 91 Phil. 619

Sittie Ayra Y. Abedin 26-27

U.S. vs. Reyes, 36 Phil. 904
People vs. Pagal, 79 SCRA 570

Dorothy Charme P. Orosa 28-29

People vs. Doniego, 9 SCRA 541
People vs. Lumayag, 13 SCRA 502

Hannani C. Langcua 30
U.S. vs. Taylor, 6 Phil. 162
U.S. vs. Hicks, 14 Phil. 217

2
Moh’d Farhan A. Magomnang 31-32
U.S. vs. de la Cruz, 22 Phil. 429
U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150

Daneva A. Anticamara 33-34

People vs. Rodil, 109 SCRA 308
People vs. Pagal, 79 SCRA 570

Jamal H.I. Sangca 35

People vs. Luchico, 49 Phil. 689
U.S. vs. Punsalan, 3 Phil. 260

Putri Salam T. Diampuan 36

U.S. vs. Barredo, 87 Phil. 800
People vs. Aguinaldo, 55 Phil. 610

Jamimah Y. Disomangcop 37-38

People vs. Lungbos, 162 SCRA 383
People vs. Licop, 94 Phil. 839

Humphrey James D. Jaraba 39-41

People vs. Lagarto, 196 SCRA 611
People vs. Ompad, 26 SCRA 750

Charity Niel S. Casas 42-43

People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 579
People vs. Yturriaga, 86 Phil. 534

Erwin Yrrem J. Ubagan 44-46

People vs. Tadeo, 389 SCRA 20
People vs. Belgar, 195 SCRA 98

Johayra Soraya P. Yusoph 47-48

People vs. Madrid, 88 Phil. 1
People vs. Verzo, 129 Phil. 628

Naim Nohar A. Suba 49-51

People vs. Fontillas, 638 SCRA 721
People vs. Mondigo, 543 SCRA 384

Roxan A. Tecson 52-53

People vs. Abello, 582 SCRA 378
People vs. Latag, 420 SCRA 695

Indirah M. Gaffar 54-56

People vs. Sumarago, 422 SCRA 324
People vs. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374

Melschie Erica S. Mancia 57-58

People vs. Lauas, 58 Phil. 742
People vs. Semanada, 103 Phil. 79

Rosemarie Tumapon 59-61

People vs. Acebedo, 18 Phil. 428
David, Jr. vs. People, 562 SCRA 22

3
Teodoro R. Llanes II 62-63
People vs. Montesclaros, 589 SCRA 320
People vs. Bi-ay, 637 SCRA 828

Rubayyi C. Ibrahim 64
People vs. Alpapara, 604 SCRA 800
U.S. vs. Macasaet, 11 Phil. 447

Sahanie M. Mohammad Ali 65-66

People vs. Villaraza, 81 SCRA 95
Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 277 SCRA 518

Hussein Hamdi S. Mohamad 67-68

Baking vs. Dir. of Prisons, 28 SCRA 851
Go vs. Dimagiba, 460 SCRA 451 (2005)

Celso D. Amantiad Jr. 69-70

People vs. Bensig, G.R. No. 138989, Sept. 17, 2002
People vs. Gregorio, G.R. No. 109614-15, March 29, 1996

4
 Alcher M. Migriño

Intod vs. CA | 215 SCRA 52 | GR No. 103119 | CAMPOS, JR., J.

FACTS:

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasinan, Santos Tubio, and
Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya’s house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Occidental and asked the latter to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan.
Thereafter, Mandaya, Intod, Pangasinan, Tubio, and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto
Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted to kill Palangpangan due to a land dispute
between them and if Mandaya will not accompany the four other men, he would also be killed.

On the same day, at about 10pm, Intod, Mandaya, Tubio, and Daligdig, all were armed
with firearms went to Palangpangan’s house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental to
commence their plan. When Mandaya located the bedroom of Palangpangan, Tubio and Daligdig
eventually fired it with their guns. However, it was found out that Palangpangan was not there
for he was in another city. With this, no one was hit by the gun fire.

The RTC held the herein petitioner guilty of attempted murder. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC. The herein petitioner sought for a petition for review of the
decision of the CA affirming in toto the judgment of the RTC. The herein respondent argued that
the absence of Palangpangan in her room was a manifestation that the offender’s act was
stopped by his own spontaneous desistance. The petitioner sought for a modification of the
judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in their decision for convicting the herein petitioner of
attempted murder?

RULING:

Yes, the RTC and the CA erred in their decision for convicting the herein petitioner of
attempted murder. Article 4 (2) provides that the criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means. This provision defines an impossible crime. Factual impossibility occurs when
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. In the case at bar, the absence of Palangpangan in his
bedroom which the herein petitioner fired with guns is an illustration of factual impossibility. This
renders the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. With this, the petition is granted and
the decision of the lower courts is modified holding that the petitioner is guilty of an impossible
crime and sentences him to suffer the penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor with the accessory
penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.

Jacinto vs. People | 592 SCRA 426 | GR No. 162540 | PERALTA, J.

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA which
affirmed the ruling of the RTC which convicted the herein petitioner for qualified theft. In the
June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed the herein petitioner
Jacinto a BDO postdated check with the amount of Php.10 000 as a payment for the purchases
that Baby Aquino made from Mega Foam Int’l., Inc. The petitioner was then the collector of the
said company. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso

5
Capitle,the husband of Jacqueline Capitle. Jacqueline Capitle is the sister of the petitioner and
the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of the aforementioned company.

Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, an employee of Mega Foam received a phone call from
Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for Generoso Capitle in order to inform him that
the BDO deposited in his account had been dishonored. Thereafter, Ricablanca called Anita
Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam and told her of the news. Eventually,
Valencia instructed Ricablanca to ask Aquino to replace the check with cash. Also, Ricablanca was
told of the plan to divide the money equally into four: for Valencia, Ricablanca, Jacinto
(petitioner), and Jacqueline Capitle. Upon advice of the Mega Foam’s accountant, Ricablanca
reported the matter to Joseph Dyhengco, the owner of Mega Foam. After verification from Baby
Aquino and company records, it was discovered that the petitioner never remitted the check to
Mega Foam. Hence, Dyhenco filed a complaint in the NBI and an entrapment operation of its
agents was worked out. Jacinto, Valencia, and Capitle were arrested. The NBI filed a criminal case
of qualified theft.

The RTC convicted the accused/herein petitioner of qualified theft. CA modified the
decision of the RTC: acquitting Capitle, reducing the penalty of Valencia, and retaining the penalty
of the herein petitioner Jacinto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused/herein petitioner committed qualified theft?

RULING:

No, the herein petitioner did not commit qualified theft. The Revised Penal Code provides
that the personal property subject of the theft must have some values, as the intention of the
accused is to gain from the thing stolen. Moreover, Art. 309 of the same code denotes that the
penalty imposed on the accused is dependent on the thing stolen. In the case at bar, the herein
petitioner should have committed qualified theft if not for the unfunded check giving the said
felony inherent impossibility of accomplishment as provided in Article 4 (2) of the RPC. For this
reason, the petition is granted and the decision of the CA is modified convicting the herein
petitioner Jacinto with impossible crime with a penalty of 6 months arresto mayor and to pay to
costs.

6
 Vanessa Mae M. Cabili

Director of Prisons vs. Ang Cho Kio | G.R. No. L-30001 | June 23, 1970 | Zaldivar, J.

FACTS:

Respondent Ang Cho Kio aka Ang Ming Huy had been charged, tried and convicted of
various offenses committed in the Philippines and was sentenced to suffer penalties.

He filed a petition for habeas corpus which the CFI of Rizal denied. The CA affirmed the
decision but recommended that Ang may be allowed to leave the country on the first available
transportation abroad.

The Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration praying for the deletion of the
recommendation. The Solicitor General maintains that the recommendation is not a part of the
decision and was uncalled for; that it gives the decision a political complexion, because courts
are not empowered to make such a recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the
exercise of judicial powers. He also contends that allowing convicted aliens to leave the country
is an act of the state exercises solely in the discretion of the Chief Executive. It is urged that the
act of sending an undesirable alien out of the country is political in character, and the courts
should not interfere with, nor attempt to influence, the political acts of the President.

ISSUE:

Whether the courts of justice may interfere in the exercise by the President, thru his Executive
Secretary, of his administrative power of recommitment.

RULING:

No. The only question to be resolved by the Court of Appeals was whether, or not, the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, had rightly dismissed the petition of Ang Cho Kio for habeas
corpus. The Court of Appeals was not called upon to review any sentence imposed upon Ang Cho
Kio.

The recommitment to prison of Ang Cho Kio was done in the exercise by the President of
the Philippines of his power pursuant to the provision of Section 64 of the Revised Administrative
Code, and the courts should not interfere with the exercise of that power.

The recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are limited to those expressly
provided in the law — and such law is the provision of Section 5 of the Revised Penal Code as
follows:

Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress
and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court
to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.

In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the
execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would
result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree
of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

The Court of Appeals was not called upon to review any sentence that was imposed on Ang Cho
Kio. It was simply called upon to determine whether Ang Cho Kio was illegally confined, or not,
in the insular penitentiary under the Director of Prisons.

7
 People vs. Genosa | GR No. 135981 | January 15, 2004 | Panganiban, J.

FACTS:

Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his
husband which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her
husband when she got home that night and it was her husband who began the provocation. The
appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure
she would deliver her baby safely.

The appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be suffering from
Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her
husband. She was found guilty of the crime of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

ISSUES:

1. Whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus.

2. Whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

RULINGS:

1. No. The court reiterates the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant
self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete
or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. Thus, Marivic’s killing of Ben was not completely
justified under the circumstances. Marivic can further be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
2. No. It is in the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery
cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said
to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.

8
 Reham-Aina A. Arumpac

People vs. Tibon | G.R. No. 188320 | June 29, 2010 | Velasco Jr, J.

FACTS:

On or about the 12th day of December, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, Honorio
Tibon, murdered KEEN GIST TIBON, 3 years of age and REGUEL ALBERT TIBON, 2 years of age,
both his legitimate children, by stabbing them several times on the chest with a bladed weapon,
thereby inflicting upon KEEN GIST and REGUEL ALBERT stab wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of their death thereafter.

Honorio Tibon (accused-appellant) and his common-law wife Gina Sumingot (Gina) lived
together as husband and wife. They had two children, Keen Gist (KenKen) and Reguel Albert
(Reguel). Gina went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper, leaving their children to Tibon’s
custody. After some time, it was revealed that Gina was apparently having an affair in Hong Kong,
Tibon then started drinking a lot and was seen hitting his two children.

At around 11:30 p.m., accused-appellant’s mother and his siblings discovered the
wounded and lifeless bodies of the children, Tibon stabbed himself on the chest with a kitchen
knife and jumped out of the window of their house. He confessed to stabbing their children and
begged for forgiveness to his wife.

In court, Tibon denied the charges against him and raised insanity as defense. He said that
he could not recall what happened on the night he allegedly stabbed his two children; could not
remember being taken to the hospital and that he was only informed by his siblings that he had
killed his two children, causing him to jump off the window of their house.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the exempting circumstance of insanity applies to the accused-appellant’s case?

RULING:

No. Under Article 12 of the RPC “An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has
acted during a lucid interval” is exempted from criminal liability. Anyone who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing
evidence. Testimony or proof of insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or
coetaneous with the commission of the offense.

The medical records of Tibon with the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) is
inapplicable for such refers to his condition to stand trial and not to his mental state immediately
before or during the commission of the crimes.

The court considered Parricide as the applicable law in this case. Under Article 264
Parricide is committed when: (i) a person is killed; (ii) the deceased is killed by the accused; (iii)
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Tibon was found
guilty by this Court with the punishment of reclusion perpetua. Tibon’s behavior was triggered
by jealousy because of the revelation that his wife was having an affair overseas. Uncontrolled
jealousy and anger are not equivalent to insanity.

9
 People vs. Sotelo |55 Phil. 39 | G.R. No. L-33304 | December 13, 1930 |VILLAMOR, J.

FACTS:

On the night of December 24, 1929, in the municipality of Narvacan, Province of Ilocos
Sur, the Sotelo bothers namely, Constante, Dominador, and Vicente Sotelo, armed with a
penknife, a stick, and an iron bar, respectively, acting together and helping one another, attacked,
beat up, and commit assault upon Ignacio Cambaliza, inflicting a mortal wound upon him on the
level of the left nipple, which penetrated the left lung and the left ventricle of the heart, another
on the outward surface of the right arm, a bruise on the nose and another on the upper lip: as a
result of which said Ignacio Cambaliza died after a few minutes.

Witness Baltazar Capistrano who accompanied the deceased Cambaliza, stated that when
he and Cambaliza were barely 20 meters away from the house of the Sotelo brothers, Constante
Sotelo who was in the entrance of his yard, turned his flashlight on the passers-by to see who
they were. When Ignacio Cambaliza saw this, he walked back to where Constante Sotelo stood
and inquired why he turned his flashlight on them, and what it was he wanted, winding up with
a vulgar remark. When Constante's brothers, who were then in the yard on the side of the road,
saw Cambaliza's attitude, they approached their brother to separate or defend him, whereupon
Cambaliza's commenced beating them with his iron crop, once striking

Constante's arm. The brothers, in turn, fell upon Cambaliza, Dominador striking him
across the face with the stick he carried, and Vicente wounding him in the right shoulder with a
penknife. At this juncture, Capistrano attempted to intervene, but he was warned by Vicente and
probably by Dominador also, for which reason he withdrew from the scene, and the fight then
continued between Cambaliza and Constante.

In the course of this fight, while Constante was under Cambaliza and was about to get hit, the
accused stabbed a penknife into Cambaliza at about the level of the left nipple, producing a
wound which penetrated the left lung into the left ventricle of the heart, resulting in his death a
few minute later.The appellant admits he inflicted the injury which resulted in Ignacio
Cambaliza's death, but maintains he did so in self-defense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not justifying circumstance of self-defense applies to Constante Sotelo’s case?

RULING:

Yes, but with modifications. Under Article 11 of the RPC, justifying circumstance need
three requisites. The deceased started the aggression, but was provoked by the offensive
language used by Constante and his brothers, imputing to him the utterance of vulgar language
against them. In such a situation the deceased naturally used his whip against those who were in
front of him, striking Constante's arm. The court therefore believe this is a case of incomplete
self-defense, wherein the appellant was unlawfully attacked by the deceased and compelled to
employ reasonable means to defend himself, but he is responsible for provoking the attack.

10
 Juhaira M. Bula

People vs. Gonzales | G.R. No. 188602 | 4 February 2010 | Nachura, J.:

FACTS:

On August 15, 2003, five (5) separate informations for murder, frustrated murder and
three (3) counts of attempted murder were filed against appellant.

When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not
guilty to the charges. Trial on the merits then ensued. Not finding credence in appellant's claim
of self-defense, the RTC convicted him of murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder on
three (3) counts.

Appellant assails the trial court and the CA for giving credence to the prosecution’s
evidence. He admits having killed Regis and wounding Dalit, but insists that he did so in self-
defense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused act in self-defense?

HELD:

No, the accused did not act in self defense. In claiming self defense, the accused-appellant
has the burden to prove its element convincingly and clearly. The Requisites are as follows;

(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;

(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel it; and
(c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part. While all three elements must concur, self-
defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.

In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression.
His version of the events was uncorroborated, and his testimony was found to be less credible
by the trial court. On the other hand, the surviving victims were unanimous that appellant
suddenly fired at them, without any provocation on their part. The credibility of the prosecution
witnesses had been weighed by the trial court, and it found their testimonies to be more
convincing.

The pieces of evidence gleaned by the trial court, the facts, are enough to show that
treachery was employed by appellant. The attack was sudden, as testified to by the witnesses,
and unexpected. Provocation on the part of the victims was not proven, and appellants testimony
that the victims were about to attack him cannot be given credence. The victims had no inkling
that an attack was forthcoming and had no opportunity to mount a defense. Thus, treachery was
correctly appreciated as a circumstance to qualify the crime to murder.

11
 People vs. Manulit | G.R. No. 192581:17 | November 2010 | Velasco, J.

FACTS:

Accused Dennis Manulit shot Reynaldo Juguilon while the latter was walking with his live-
in partner Anabel. The shot resulted in Reynaldo’s death.

He then tucked the gun in his waist, raised his hands and shouted “wala akong ginawang
kasalanan at wala kayong nakita.” And he ran towards the basketball court adjoining the
barangay hall. Lydia Juguilon, Manulit’s aunt and the victim’s sister in law, saw what happened
but kept quiet about it until bothered by her conscience, she decided to issue a statement before
the prosecutor of Manila. Manulit offered a story of self-defense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused act in self-defense?

RULING:

No the accused did not act in self-defense because he failed to prove the existence of
unlawful aggression which is one of the requisite to prove the claim of self-defense under article
11 of RPC.

RTC found him guilty of murder. The CA affirmed. The SC ruled that in the instant case,
Manulit failed to prove the existence of unlawful aggression. In addition, there was treachery
because the victim was only walking in the street when the accused-appellant suddenly shot him
at the back several times. He had no opportunity to defend himself, because he had no idea that
an attack was forthcoming. It likewise appears that the means was deliberately planned. What is
decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless
and unable to retaliate. Evidently, treachery attended the killing. Noteworthy also is the fact that
the accused-appellant held grudge against the victim since the victim filed a case against the
accused-appellant before the office of the city prosecutor.

12
 Jasmin Z. Baslot

People vs. Lopez | G.R. No. 177302 |Puno, C.J.

FACTS:

Than on or about 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon of April 25, 1996 at Bandola Street,
Poblacion, Municipality of Hinatuan, Province of Surigao del Sur, appellant Rogelio Regalado, who
was outside Bantogan Tailoring, a tailoring shop at Bandola Street Corner Villauz, Hinatuan,
Surigao del Sur, called out to victim, Edencito Chu and prompted him to come out of his mother’s
bakery. Chu thereupon merged from the bakery, put his arms around Regalado’s shoulders and
asked forgives. Regalado however pushed his arms aside, drew a curved knife and stabbed Chu
on the left nipple. As Chu ran towards Villauz Street, Regalado chased him and picked up two
pieces of firewood along the way with which he hit Chu. Appellant Jaime Lopez in the meantime
surfaced from the back of the tailoring shop and also joined the chase. Soon appellant Aragon
also surfaced from the back of the tailoring shop and joined the chase. The three caught up with
Chu. Aragon boxed Chu, causing the latter to fall. He then kicked the victim. Lopez stabbed Chu
several times as Regalado looked on. When Chu was no longer moving, the three appellants left.
Chu died before reaching the hospital.

Regalado, in his defense, denied taking part in the stabbing and claimed that Chu choked
him, causing him to run away from Chu after extricating himself from him. Appellant Lopez
interposed “defense of relative” and “self-defense” claiming that he intercepted Chu as he was
chasing, Regalado, Lopez’ father-in-law but Chu boxed him so he stabbed him several times and
thereafter surrendered to the police. Appellant Aragon invoked an alibi that he was at the wharf,
which is 40 meters away from the scene of stabbing at the time of the incident.

RTC found the three appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime MURDER
thus sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory penalties
provided by law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not “Defense of a Relative” should be appreciated on Lopez’ part.

RULING:

Under Paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the Justifying
Circumstance of defense of relatives as follow:

(a) Unlawful Aggression;

(b) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(c) In case provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense
had no part therein.

The SC ruled that the “defense of a relative” cannot be appreciated on Lopez’s part because
of the absence of “unlawful aggression” which is an essential element of “defense of a relative”
under par. 2 of Art. 11 in the RPC. Chu’s threatening words of, “Are you going to defend your
father-in-law?” was not considered by the SC as something that amounts to unlawful aggression.
Another element, “reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it” was also
found lacking by the SC in the instant case. Nowhere in the records is it shown that when Chu
allegedly chased Regalado, the former was wielding a weapon. Thus, the intention of Lopez to
get a knife for his protection and that of his father-in-law was unwarranted.

13
 Herrera vs. Sandiganbayan | G.R. Nos. 119660-61 | Puno, C.J.

FACTS:

Pat. Edgardo Herrera and Pat. Redentor Mariano, together with Pat. Roberto Barrera and
Pat. Rodolfo Alcalde, all members of the Paranaque Police Station, were charged with 2 counts
of murder, for killing Shi Shu Yang and George Go, before the Sandiganbayan (SB).

(NOTE: The other two accused, Barrera and Alcalde, did not file any more pleading after they
were convicted that’s why they are not part of the case.)

That on or about December 28,1989 in Paranaque, Herrera and Mariano who were
lighting firecrackers near Chow Chow which is the restaurant owned by Go, and when Go came
down with his pistol, he was apprehended by Pat. Barrera who introduced himself as a
policeman, asked for the license of the .45 caliber pistol, and told Go that he will bring the firearm
to the police station for verification. Barrera ordered Go and his Taiwanese friend Shi Shu to
board their jeepney. (In short, kinda like entrapment/ instigation). The police officers also
ordered the Go and Yang to undergo medical examination and thus they were taken to the
Paranaque Community Hospital (PCH). Thereafter, Go and Yang were brought to Timothy Street,
Multinational Village where they were killed. The defense on the other hand claims that Herrera
and Mariano were just assisting Barrera in bringing some persons for medical examination. Prior
to the shooting incident, they were informed that George Go was previously arrested by Barrera
for illegal possession of firearm. They brought Go and Yang to the PCH and on the way back to
the police station, they heard a struggle ensue at the back of the patrol van as Alcalde said,
“George, bitawan mo ang baril ko.” And then they heard successive shots. When they looked
back, they saw Go grappling for the possession of a firearm (later on, they said it was an armalite)
with Alcalde, they stopped the car and alighted to pacify the trouble but alas there were more
shots and they found Go and Young bloodied. (Basically, Herrera and Mariano testified
individually but they said almost the same things.) The defense also presented Dr. Soliven’s
findings that Go was positive for alcohol and that Go had no signs of physical injuries. What really
happened: Mariano parked the patrol van along Timothy Street which was
a practically deserted area, isolated from traffic and pedestrians. Alcalde, Barrera,
and petitioner Herrera brought out the two handcuffed victims from the back portion of the
patrol van in order to eventually salvage them. Petitioner Mariano appeared to be faking an
alleged interrogation and was trying to get the name of Shi Shu Yang, whose identity was then
not yet immediately known. Later, petitioner Mariano also participated in shooting at the
unarmed victims. The SB convicted Herrera and Mariano each for 2 counts of murder, and denied
petitioners’ Joint Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, Herrera and Mariano filed a petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners can assert that there was total absence of evidence to support the
theory that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime.

RULING:

No, the petitioners cannot assert that there was no evidence to support the theory that
conspiracy is present in the commission of the crime.

Conspiracy can be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a
concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime. The familiar rule in
conspiracy is that when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible, when the conspiracy is proven, for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of
the conspiracy. In this case, petitioner Herrera drove the vehicle along Timothy Street to a place
which was less conspicuous to passersby. There, Pat. Alcalde, Pat. Barrera, and petitioner
Mariano brought out the two victims from the back portion of the van in order to perpetuate the
killing. Petitioner Mariano alighted from the right front seat of the van and stood beside Pat.

14
Alcalde and Pat. Barrera who began shooting the victims. According to Winterhalter, petitioner
Mariano even appeared to be writing something on a sheet of paper immediately before the
shooting, although it cannot be determined with certainty as to whether he was making an
inquiry or merely noting the names of the victims. While it was Pat. Barrera who actually shot the
two victims, the evidence showed a common design on the part of both petitioners as they did
not do anything to prevent him from killing the victims, thus, indicative of the fact that they are
in unison with the criminal design of the Pat. Barrera. Petitioner Herrera alighted form the van
without doing anything to prevent the killing, and worse, after the killing took place along the
street, petitioner Herrera even helped carry the two victims into the van while petitioner
Mariano, the driver, remained in the vehicle during the incident. Consequently, applying the rule
that the act of one is the act of all, petitioners are thus as guilty as Pat. Barrera and Pat. Alcalde. In
fact, conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence but may be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances.

15
 Rafa D. Balt

People vs. Domingo | March 2, 2009 |G.R. No. 184343 | Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS:

The Court of Appeals found appellant Jesus Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, attempted murder, frustrated murder, and frustrated homicide.

On or about the 29th day of March 2000, complainant and her children were sleeping
inside their house when Domingo when she was awakened when the accused entered their
kitchen armed with a screwdriver and a kitchen knife. He stabbed the complainant and her
children. Raquel Indon, complainant, pleaded the appellant to spare her daughter but teh
appellant answered “Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na”. Two of her children died.

Five years passed, the defense counsel said that nine days prior the commission of the
crime, appellant suffered sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and nervousness. Occasionally, a voice
would tell him to kill. Appellant averred that when he regained his memory, one week had
already passed since the incidents, and he was already detained. They submitted a psychiatric
evaluation, and psychological examination as evidence that appellant suffered from
Schizophrenia, a mental disorder characterized by the presence of delusions and or
hallucinations, disorganized speech and behavior, poor impulse control and low frustration
tolerance. The doctor could not find out when the appellant started to suffer this illness, but the
symptoms of Schizophrenia which were manifested by the patient indicated that he suffered
from the illness six months before the Center examined the appellant. The counsel of the
appellant raised the defense of insanity of the appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of insanity.

RULING:

No, the defense of insanity is unmeritorious. Insanity exempts the accused only when the
finding of mental disorder refers to appellant’s state of mind immediately before or at the very
moment of the commission of the crime. This was not the case in the issue at bar, what was
presented was proof of appellant’s mental disorder that existed five years after the incident, but
not at the time the crimes were committed. The RTC also considered it crucial that appellant had
the presence of mind to respond to Raquel Indon’s pleas that her daughters be spared by saying,
“Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na.”

Even assuming that nine days prior the crime the appellant was hearing voices ordering
him to kill people, while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated with a
total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental
faculties will not exclude imputability.

The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes
that all acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are done unconsciously.
Thus, a person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or she was insane immediately before or at
the moment the crime was committed.

16
 Sierra vs. People | G.R. 182941 | July 03,2009 | Brion, J.

FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA that affirmed with
modification the conviction of Robert Sierra, the petitioner for the crime of qualified rape
rendered by the RTC branch 159, Pasig City on April 5,2006. That on August 5,2000 in Pasig City
the petitioner, a minor, 15 years old forcefully and unlawfully have sexual intercourse with his
sister, AAA, thirteen years old. The petitioner invoked that he should be exempted of criminal
liability for he was only 15 years old at the time the crime was committed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner will be exempted from criminal liability under paragraph 1, section
6, of R.A. No. 9344

RULING:

Yes, the CA seriously erred when it rejected that the petitioner was only 15 years old at
the time he committed the crime. Thus, Section 7 of R.A. 9344 expressly states how the age of
the child in conflict with the law may be determined.

In pursuant to Section 64, R.A. 9344, Criminal Case for rape against the petitioner was
dismissed. Referring the petitioner to appropriate local Social Welfare and Development who in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9344.

17
 Sittie Aisah B. Hadji Amer

People vs. Anod | G.R. NO. 1086420 | August 25, 2009 |Nachura, J.

FACTS:

Appellant and Lumbayan were charged with the crime of Murder in an Information dated June
23, 1997 which reads:

That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening, more or less, of May 16, 1997, at Purok 1,
Barangay Borbonan, Municipality of Bislig, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, Samuel Anod,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another for a common purpose, with intent
to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and hack one Erlando Costan with the use of a pointed bolo,
thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab and hack wounds which caused his instantaneous
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Costan.

CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

The appellant appealed that the Court shall consider the exempting circumstance of
compulsion under an irresistible force since his co-accused Lumbayan ordered him to stab the
victim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is exempt from criminal liability.

RULING:

No. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability
if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. A threat of future
injury is not enough. In this case, appellant had the chance to escape Lumbayan's threat or
engage Lumbayan in combat, as appellant was also holding a knife at the time. Thus, appellant's
allegation of fear or duress is untenable.

People vs. Gonzales | G.R. NO. 195534 |June 13, 2012 | Brion, J.

FACTS:

The appellant and his brother, co-accused Edmundo Gonzales, were charged with murder
under a criminal information which alleged conspiracy, evident premeditation and treachery in
the killing of Eligio Donato (victim). The records show that the victim went to the house of the
appellant at the invitation of Edmundo. When the victim arrived, he was met by the appellant
who was armed with a .22 caliber firearm. The appellant and Edmundo immediately fired at the
victim six (6) times, hitting him three (3) times - in the arm, in his left thigh and in his left chest.
The victim expired before he could receive medical treatment. The appellant denied the charge
and claimed that he had acted in self-defense. He narrated that he was at his house watching
television when the victim suddenly arrived, armed with a short firearm. The victim shouted
invectives at the appellant and threatened to kill him. When efforts by the appellant to pacify the
victim proved to be futile, the appellant retrieved his own firearm inside his house. A struggle for
the possession of the appellants firearm then ensued between the appellant and the victim which
caused the appellants gun to discharge three times; thus, hitting the victim.

18
 ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is justified in killing the victim.

RULING:

No. The first requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is patently absent.
There was no circumstance showing that the appellants life was in danger when he met the
victim. What the evidence shows is that the victim was unarmed when he went to the house of
the appellant. The second requisite of self-defense could not have been present in the absence
of any unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The number of gunshot wounds reveals a
clear intent to kill, not merely to repel the attack of the unarmed victim. The records disclose that
the struggle between the victim and the appellant occurred after the appellant fired at the victim.
In other words, the third requisite was not established given the sufficient provocation by the
appellant in placing the victim’s life in actual danger. Thus, any aggression made by the victim
cannot be considered unlawful as it was made as an act of self-preservation to defend his life.

19
 Remm Gaius R. Mamhot

People vs. Bandian | 63 Phil 530 (1936) | G.R. No. 45186 | Diaz J.

FACTS:

Josefina Bandian, 23 years old, was accused of infanticide when she was seen by he
neighbor Valentin Aguilar, go to a thicket to answer the call of nature. Bandian emerged, covered
with blood, disoriented and dizzy Valentin rushed to her aid, and called Adriano Comcom to help
gather herbs to stop the hemorrage, Comcom saw he body of a newborn babe near a path
adjoining the thicket where the appellant went. Bandian claimed it was hers, Dr. Emilion
Nepomuceno the attending physician testifies that Bandian gave birth to the child inside her
house, then brought it to the thicket to kill to hide her guilt from her past amorous relationship
from her husband Luis Kirol. This testimony was given credit at the trial. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the accused’s guilt of infanticide is proven beyond reasonable doubt?
2. Can the mental state of the accused be taken into account in determining criminal
liability?

RULING:

No, deliberate intent must be proven in order for infanticide or abandonment of a minor
to be punishable, or in the least, it must be a voluntary action, conscious, deliberate act in lucid
state. The evidences fall short of proving it otherwise. Futhermore, Nepomuceno’s testimony
was contradicted by the witnesses, Aguilar and Comcom. In addition, Bandian’s past relationship
was three years ago and in fact, she has been living with Kirol for over a year and they are
expecting the baby with full certainty that the child is Kirol’s. Hence, she had no reason to kill the
infant. Lastly Bandian, while pregnant, was suffering from three days of fever. Due to debility and
dizzy, bandian was not aware that by answering to the call of nature, accidentally gave birth.
Hence, having RPC Art 12 sections 4 and 7 in her favor, she is acquitted. Cost de oficio

United States vs. Urbano Domen| 37 Phil, 57 | G.R. No. L-12963 | Malcolm, J.

FACTS:

Urbano Domen and Victoriano Gadlit quarrelled. Deceased attacked the defendant and
struck him with a piece of wood called "Japanese" about a vara in length and about the size of
one’s wrist. The deceased struck at the accused four or five times. The accused did not retreat,
but struck back wounding the deceased on the forearm. This wound caused the death of the
deceased.

ISSUES:

1. Is the defendant’s self-defence valid?

2. Should “retreat to wall” or “Stand your ground” rule be applied?

RULING:

Yes, evidences and testimonies prove otherwise contrary to the widow and Angel
Pocong’testimony that the unlawful aggression came from the deceased first, and that the
defendant in the heat of the moment, and in preservation of his life, struck the deceased’s
forearm with a tuba knife. US common law “retreat to wall” doctrine dictates that one must
retreat as far as he can before he is justified to meet force with force. However, the court cites
Beard vs. United States ([1894] 158 U. S., 550) which gave way to the “stand your ground when
in the right rule” justifying the act because the necessity for retaliation was present in order to
preserve his own (defendant’s) life.

20
 Hafidah L. Amama

People vs. Martin, 89 Phil. 18 | G.R. No. L-3002 | Jugo, J.

FACTS:

Between four and five o’clock in the morning of August 1, 1948, the corpse of Laura Luiz
was found inside the family toilet, which was at a certain distance from their home, with a rope
around her neck. Upon being interrogated by the police officer, the defendant, Aniceto Martin,
at first denied any knowledge of the event, but later made a statement in the municipal building
on the killing of his wife. He confessed that about 4 o’clock of the same day, he had a conversation
with his wife about their marriage. He went to the toilet for major personal necessity. His wife
came after him to the toilet with a rope in her hands and, as she approached him she placed the
rope around his neck, which angered him so he snatched the rope from her, and in turn placed
same around her neck, and in that position tightened the rope and his wife died. The autopsy of
the corpse stated that the cause of death was heart failure due to fright or shock.

He was accused of the complex crime parricide with abortion. He was acquitted of
abortion but found guilty of parricide and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P2,000, with the accessory
penalties of the law, and to pay the costs. From the judgment, he appealed. He contends that the
death of Laura was not due to the strangling, but to her heart disease.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defense of Martin would constitute as a mitigating circumstance.

RULING:

Yes. The court considered mitigating circumstance in favor of the defendant that unlawful
aggression on the part of the deceased without any sufficient provocation on the part of the
defendant which in this case is equivalent to incomplete self-defense on the part of the
defendant, for after having snatched the rope from the deceased, he should not have wound it
around her neck and tightened it. The penalty next lower in degree should be imposed, which is
that of reclusion temporal. The Court imposed the penalty of from twelve (12) years of prision
mayor to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties of the law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

21
 United States vs. Rivera | 41 Phil. 472 | G.R. No. L-16443 |Malcolm, J.

FACTS:

Leona Laciste endeavored to set fire to the house of Martina Rivera in which the two small
children of the latter were sleeping. The two women grappled and Leona Laciste was boloed to
death by Martina Rivera. Martina Rivera was charged with murder but was convicted of
homicide. Rivera contended that she acted in defense of her person, rights and descendants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Martina Rivera should be exempted from all responsibility because of
having acted in defense of her person, her rights, and her descendants.

RULING:

No. Article 8 of the Penal Code exempts any one from criminal liability who acts in defense
of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur: (1) Unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity for the means employed to prevent or repel it; (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Anyone who acts in defense
of the person of his descendant is similarly exempted. In this case, the first and last requisites
above-mentioned concur, but the second is lacking. Martina Rivera acted in defense of her
person, her home, and her children but any reasonable necessity for killing the assailant was not
present. The evidence discloses more nearly on the mitigating circumstances. Judgment is
affirmed, with the modification to the penalty. Rivera shall be sentenced to three years of prison
correccional, and shall, in addition, pay the costs of this instance.

22
 Princess Amaryah P. Ejares

People vs. de Jesus | G.R. No. L-58506 | November 19, 1982 | De Castro, J.

FACTS:

At about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of May 21, 1978 in Aspere Avenue, Tatalon Estate,
Quezon City, Fernando de los Santos was taking a nap in their house when he was awakened by
a boy informing him that his father, Feliciano de los Santos is quarreling with someone. When he
arrived at the scene near Araneta Avenue, he saw one of the accused, Yalong pointing a gun at
his father.

Upon seeing this, he shouted at his father to run but his father was not able to do so
because Yalong already fired the gun. Then the other accused, de Jesus grabbed the gun from
Yalong and fired a shot at his father again where he fell and died. Petitioners interposed self-
defense. Yalong admitted to shot Feliciano twice after the victim almost stab him with a knife.

Court of First Instance (CFI) convicted Nilo De Jesus and Wilfredo Yalong of murder
qualified by treachery and conspired in killing Feliciano de los Santos

ISSUE:

Whether the claim of self-defense be considered or conviction of conspiracy be sustained?

RULING:

Fernando's testimony states that it was De Jesus who shot the victim was found to be
fabricated. Based on the record, Yalong admitted the shooting, corroborated by De Jesus and
another witness, Mrs. Anita Bernales' testimony. It was also found that Fernando was the one
who had a previous quarrel with the deceased, thus the former was with motive to harm the
latter. And if conspiracy existed, accused-appellants would not have to do it at the place where
they can be seen conspicuously.

The qualifying circumstance of treachery by the lower court cannot be sustained as

Yalong's decision to shoot the deceased appeared to be sudden, brought about by the latter's
unlawful aggression to stab the former by a dagger. Yalong is entitled to the benefit of the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense inasmuch as there was unlawful aggression
on the part of the deceased without any provocation coming from Yalong, but it was not proven
that the means employed by the latter was reasonably necessary.

De Jesus ACQUITTED; Yalong's conviction was MODIFIED to homicide

People vs. Toring | G.R. No. L-56358 | October 26, 1990 | Fernan, C.J.

FACTS:

At around 10:45 in the evening of May 25, 1980 at a benefit dance held at sitio Naga,
Babag II, Lapu-lapu City, the daughter of the deceased Samuel Augusto was proclaimed the
winner of the search for Princess to reign in their sitio fiesta. Beer and softdrinks were served all
night and having been tipsy after the coronation, Samuel stepped out for a while to answer the
call of nature.

During this time barangay tanod Felix Berdin saw Luis Toring, Carmelo Berdin and
Diosdado Berdon in a dark area whispering to each other. Diosdado Berdon handed a knife to
Toring, approached Samuel from behind, held Samuel's left hand with his left hand, and with his
right hand, stabbed with the knife the right side of Samuel's abdomen. Felix the run towards
them, Toring pulled out the knife rom Augusto and together with Berdin and Berdon, ran towards
the dark. Felix tried to chase the three but he was unable to do so. He returned to where Samuel

23
was and helped others in taking Samuel to the hospital. Samuel was already dead upon arrival at
the hospital.

The necropsy report states that Augusto died due to massive hemorrhage secondary to
stab wound on the abdomen. The three were charged with conspiracy of killing Samuel Augusto
in a treacherous manner. Berdon was alleged to have supplied the weapon that Toring used in
the commission of the crime and Berdin concealed the weapon.The next morning after the
incident, Edgar Augusto, brother of Samuel, shot Samuel who was at that time sleeping with his
older brother, Arsenio in their hut. He shot both off them and Arsenio was hit at his left leg. It
was also mentioned that Toring was shot by Edgar a year ago before the incident.

Toring seeks to be released by contending that his assault to Samuel was justified because
he acted in defense of his first cousin, Joel Escoba who happens to be a prosection witness at
another case with Samuel.

Article 11 (3) of the Revised Penal Code provides that no criminal liability is incurred
b anyone “who acts in defense of … his relatives … by consanguinity within the fourth civil
degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the net preceding
circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by
the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a complete defense of a relative?

RULING:

No, the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and the lack of proof of
provocation on the part of Toring notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring’s
claim of defense of a relative. Toring should be credited with the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense of relative and the generic mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.

Luis Toring is convicted as principal in the murder of Samuel Augusto and Diosdado
Berdon as an accomplice thereto.

The lower court's decision is modified as follows:

(a) Luis Toring shall be imposed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum as
maximum;
(b) Diosdado Berdon shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayorminimum as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal minimum as maximum;
(c) Carmelo Berdin is acquitted as an accessory to the murder of Samuel Augusto, and
(d) Luis Toring and Diosdado Berdon shall jointly and severally pay the heirs of Samuel
Augusto an indemnity of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00). Costs against appellants
Toring and Berdon.

24
 Abegail L. Lagayada

People Oanis | G.R. No. L- 47722 | July 27, 1943 | Montemayor, J.

FACTS:

Police officers Alberto Galanta and Antonio Oanis were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal
and escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive.

The group of Galanta and Oanis went to the house where Irene, said mistress of Balagtas was
living. They approached Brigida Mallare who pointed out to them Irene’s room and said that Irene was
sleeping with her paramour at that time. They went to the room and seeing a man sleeping with his back
towards the door, Oanis and Galanta simultaneously or successively fired at him which resulted to the
victim’s death. Later it was found that the man shot was not Balagtas but one Serapio Tecson, Irene’s
paramour.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Oanis or Galanta incur criminal liability for the death of Tecson.

RULING:

Yes. Murder, not homicide through reckless imprudence with qualifying circumstances.

Even though an officer is justified in using force in making a lawful arrest, he is not justified in
using unnecessary force. Balagtas may be a notorious criminal but the facts do not constitute justifications
for killing him, when in supposedly arresting him, the man who was mistaken for him was sleeping and
thus offered no resistance.

A mitigating circumstance of weight defined in the incomplete justifying circumstance in Article

11 No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code: A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of
a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.

It was only a mitigating circumstance because although they have acted in the performance of a
duty, the injury or offense committed is not a necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty.

People vs. Bernal | G.R. No. L-4409 | July 14, 1952 | Montemayor, J.

FACTS:

On September 20, 1947, Jose Bernal, a military police had an altercation with Alfonso Pilones. In
the evening the men met again and the dispute was renewed, Pilones inflicted bolo wounds on Bernal.
Bernal reported the incident to Captain Trinidad who later called Sgt. Ricardo Benting to find and
investigate Pilones. Benting called Pvts. Roleda Salvoro and Lomod to accompany him.

On the way to the camp Pilones was shot and killed by appellant Roleda by order of Sgt. Benting.

ISSUES:

Whether or not an incomplete justifying circumstance of obedience to an order can be credited as a

mitigating circumstance.

RULING:

Yes. The Solicitor General believes that Roleda merely obeyed the order of his sergeant. Roleda
served as a subordinate of Sgt. Benting who gave the order. The soldiers were under the immediate
command and control of their patrol leader, on this case, Sgt. Benting.

In view of the foregoing, appellants Jose Bernal and Hermenigildo Salvoro are hereby acquitted
with costs de officio. With the modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.

25
 Sittie Ayra Y. Abedin

United States vs. Reyes| 36 Phil. 904 | G.R. No. 12635 | Sep 25, 1917 | Malcolm, J.

FACTS:

Vicente Reyes, the defendant-appellant, was found guilty of homicide for killing a soldier
of the United States Army in the name of Guiseppe Goggiano. The implement used by Reyes was
a baston (stick). The means taken by Reyes was hitting the soldier on the head with the baston.

The appellant makes only one assignment of error which requires consideration. This is
to the effect that the trial court incurred error in not finding in favor of the accused mitigating
circumstance No. 3 of article 9 of the Penal Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court should favor the offender of a mitigating circumstance of having
no intention to cause so great a wrong as that committed.

RULING:

No. The offender hit the deceased on the head with a baston which its force on the head
of a person would ordinarily fracture the cranium and cause death. In a decision dated March 2,
1892 stated that “When the means employed by the accused are adequate and proportionate to
the result of the crime, circumstance No. 3 of article 9 cannot be considered in his favor.”
Furthermore, a decision dated March 22, 1901 stated that “The lack of intention to cause so
serious an evil as that produced, can only be considered in default of facts which may clearly
show it when there is such a disproportion between the resultant evil and the means employed
to cause it, so that the evil could not reasonably be presumed.”

People vs. Pagal | 79 SCRA 570 | G.R. No. L-32040 | October 25, 1977 | Concepcion Jr. J.

FACTS:

Pedro Pagal y Marcelino and Jose Torcelino y Torazo were charged with the crime of
robbery with homicide, with four aggravating circumstances. The accused took away a cash
amounting to P 1,281.00 from Gau Guan and killed him by stabbing him with an ice pick and
clubbing him with an iron pipe.

During the arraignment, the accused were informed of their intention to enter a plea of
guilty provided that they be allowed to prove mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation
or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act, and that of having
acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation. Both the accused
pleaded guilty of the charge.

The accused presented evidences of maltreatment/ill-treatment by the deceased to

prove the mitigating circumstances they claim. But the court approved the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty only, which rendered the decision to convict both the accused and
sentenced them to death.

26
 ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in not favoring the accused with the mitigating circumstances
of sufficient provocation, and passion or obfuscation as claimed with an evidence by the accused.

RULING:

No. The said mitigating circumstances can only be counted as one because they arose
from the same incident. The circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a
crime which is planned and calmly meditated before its execution. The maltreat of the victim
claimed by the appellants which was committed against them occurred much earlier than the
date of the commission of the crime. Furthermore, for a provocation on the part of the victim to
be a mitigating circumstance, it must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act.

27
 Dorothy Charme P. Orosa

People vs. Doniego | 9 SCRA 541 | G.R. Nos. L-57809-10 | Relova, J.

FACTS:

On the night of July 1, 1957, a dance was held in the auditorium of Cabanbanan Norte,
Gonzaga, Cagayan in celebration of Barrio Fiesta which soon transferred to the residence of
Severino Patubo as the rain fell. At about 10 o’clock in while the dance was still going on, Severino
saw Domingo Doniego talking to Patrocinio Viernes, Camilo Ragual, and a companion of
Patrocinio Viernes. While conversing, Severino saw Domingo suddenly lunge at Patrocinio with a
Batangas knife, but the latter was not hit because Camilo wrested the knife from Domingo and
with it stabbed the latter in his back. Severino called his brother Nemesio, the 2nd barrio
lieutenant, and informed him about the fight. Nemesio then sent Ciriaco Palor to call Magno
Taloza, the 1st Barrio Lieutenant. Magno Taloza arrived with Palor and after seeing the deceased,
called for rural policemen to see the place. Later, Anselmo Garcia, a rural policeman arrived. As
Taloza started the investigation, Santos Doniego arrived and asked who killed his son. When
Severino Patubo was asked, he then answered that it was Camilo Ragual who killed his son,
Doniego went up to the house, unsheathed his small sharped-pointed bolo and immediately
began to assault the people there.

He stabbed Vicente Pescador on his right thigh who immediately jumped from the back
porch (batalan) of the house; then he hacked rural policeman Anselmo Garcia on the left side of
his back. Turning around, he stabbed Avelino Paet, the operator of the amplifier, in the coccyx
when he (Avelino) was about to leap from the house; and as the Patubo brothers and companions
were many, Santos avoided the group and instead stabbed Ciriaco Palor in his abdomen while
the latter was helping Taloza, the first barrio lieutenant, conduct the investigation. Máximo
Viernes, secretary of the barrio council, ran towards the kitchen and there near the door Santos
inflicted upon the former (Máximo Viernes) a thru and thru wound on the right side of his back
piercing the abdomen which caused his intestines to come out. After his brother-in-law Ciriaco
Palor had been stabbed, Magno Taloza jumped out of the house and returned to his house. As a
result of the stab wounds inflicted upon Ciriaco Palor and Máximo Viernes the former died
instantaneously and the latter a little over half an hour later. Anselmo Garcia was able to return
home and told his wife that Santos Doniego stabbed him before he expired at 12:00 midnight.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court erred in giving more weight to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
and in convicting the accused of three murders.

RULING:
No. The trial Court correctly found that the appellant killed Anselmo Garcia, Ciriaco Palor
and Maximo Viernes. It was most natural and logical for the appellant to have been enraged and
obfuscated at the sight of his dead son, Domingo, who was stabbed to death, seized by the feeling
of hatred and rancour to have stabbed indiscriminately even his brother-in-law Ciriaco Palor, a
cousin of his wife, Maximo Viernes, and the husband of a niece of the appellant’s wife, Anselmo
Garcia, and wounded three more random people, including Vicente Pescador.

The crime committed by the appellant is homicide and the penalty provided for by section
249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal to its full extent. There being a mitigating
circumstance the penalty should be imposed in its minimum period. And, pursuant to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is sentenced to suffer a minimum of 10 years and one
day of prision mayor and a maximum of 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, the
accessories of the law, for each of the three homicides committed by him.

28
 People vs. Lumayag | 13 SCRA 502| G.R. No. L-49601 | Melencio-Herrera, J.

FACTS:

At about seven o'clock in the evening of April 12, 1959, in the barrio of Gumagamot,
municipality of Lala, Lanao del Norte, Pedro Lumayag was up in a coconut tree gathering tuba
while his wife, Luzviminda Pampilo, was on the ground lighting him with the beam of a flashlight
when they heard a scream that they recognized as Jose Pampilo, Pedro’s father-in-law. They
hurriedly ran towards the place where the shout came from. They heard the sound of hard
beating and the groaning of a man. Pedro Lumayag then directed his flashlight towards it and
saw Agrecio Lumayag, wearing a red shirt and maong pants, straddle over a person by the road
with his hands around the person's neck. Agrecio thereupon jumped and ran away towards his
house about 300 meters from the scene.

Pedro Lumayag and his wife approached the man lying face down and they confirmed it
was Jose Pampilo who sustained injuries in the nape and bruises in the right cheek and was
bleeding. Upon verifying that Jose was already dead, the spouses reported the incident to the
barrio lieutenant who, in turn, sent a rural policeman to notify the chief of police. Pedro Lumayag
and his wife, accompanied by the barrio lieutenant, returned to the scene of the crime.

Acting upon the account given by Pedro Lumayag, the chief of Police dispatched some
policemen to summon Agrecio Lumayag. The policemen found only Agrecio Lumayag's wife in his
house but, upon further search, found him hiding in a nearby shack armed with a bolo and a cane.
The policemen interrogated Agrecio who eventually confessed that he killed Jose Pampilo with a
cane called "bahi".

Subsequently, the provincial fiscal filed an information in the Court of First Instance charging
Agrecio Lumayag with the crime of murder. Accordingly, the accused has appealed to this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of murder in spite of the failure
of the prosecution to establish treachery and nocturnity as qualifying circumstances.

RULING:

The Solicitor General recommends a judgment for homicide instead of murder. The
information cites as qualifying circumstances "treachery, evident premeditation and taking
advantage of nocturnity to better insure the commission of the offense." As appellant points out,
however, these aggravating circumstances were not proved. While there is sufficient evidence to
establish the killing of Jose Pampilo by the accused, there is none, however, to show that he acted
with treachery or evident premeditation or that he specially sought the advantage of nighttime
to facilitate the commission of the crime. We may therefore apply the doctrine laid down in U.S.
v. Bañagale, 24 Phil. 69, to the effect that when the details and circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime are unknown, and there appears no evidence in the case that may
indicate the situation of the victim when he was killed or when it is not conclusively shown that
the violent death of a person was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances specified in
Article 248, the crime must be classified as homicide, and not murder.

Appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide
without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and condemned to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P6,000.00, and to pay the costs. It is so ordered.

29
 Hannani C. Langcua

United States vs. Hicks | 14 Phil. 217 (1909) | Torres, J.

FACTS:

For about 5 years, Augustus Hicks and Agustina Sola illicitly lived together until trouble
arise between them causing Augustina to live Hick's house. A few days later, Augustina had a new
relation with another man. Hicks went to where the two live and enraged by such conduct, he
had killed Agustina.

ISSUE:

Is mitigating circumstance present in the defendant's act?

RULLING:

No mitigating circumstance is present. Even if it is true that the accused acted with
obfuscation because of jealousy, mitigating circumstance does not favor him. Loss of reason and
self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, in as much as the only causes which
mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from
legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.

United States vs. Taylor | 6 Phil. 162 (1906) | Carson, J.

FACTS:

The accused and his companions, in violations of a lawful ordinance in the city of Manila,
made use of threatening and insulting language on the public streets of the said city, in the
presence and within the hearing of a policeman. The said policeman came to arrest them. It was
proven at the trial that while resisting the arrest, the accused violently assaulted the said
policeman.

ISSUE:

Whether or not mitigating circumstance should be taken into consideration in this case.

HELD:

No. The accused committed the offense in an uncontrollable burst of sudden burst of
passion but the fact that the offense was committed under stimulus of a sudden burst of passion
should not be taken into consideration unless it appears that it was provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts. The anger and indignation of the accused resulting from the arrest cannot be
considered passional obfuscation, because the policeman who arrested him was performing a
lawful duty.

30
 Moh’d Farhan A. Magomnang

United States vs. de la Cruz | 22 Phil. 429 | G.R. No. L-7094 | Carson, J.

FACTS:

Defendant (De la Cruz), in the heat of passion, killed his querida when he caught her red-
handed in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance. Trial court found defendant guilty
of homicide without any extenuating circumstances present. Defendant was sentenced to 14
years 8 months1 day of reclusion temporal (medium degree of penalty prescribed by the code).

ISSUE:

Whether or Not there is an extenuating/mitigating circumstance present.

RULING:

Yes. There is an extenuating circumstance present in the case. The Court is of the opinion
that the defendant acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and
obfuscation when he caught his querida in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.

United States vs. Manuel Rodrigues Et.Al | G.R. No. 5115 | November 29, 1909 | Moreland,
J.

FACTS:

This is an appeal by Manuel Rodriguez, Cipriano Galvez, Raymundo Revilla, Doroteo Rojas,
Feliciano Pantanilla, Roman Villaister, Pedro Villanueva, Nicomedes Abella, Sabino Raymundo,
Geronimo Guijon, Martin Sauler, Eusebio Bustamante, Victoriano Oalipusan and Valentin
Multialto from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Moro Province, Hon. Herbert D.
Gale presiding, convicting them of the crime of murder and sentencing them each to death.

From the proofs presented by the Government, it appears that the appellants, with nine
others, being members of the second company of the Constabulary stationed at Davao,
mutinied on the 6th day of June, 1909, attempting, during the course of such mutiny, to kill one
of their superior officers, Lieutenant Goicuria; that immediately after such revolt the
mutineers, having taken arms and ammunition from the depositary, left the vicinity of Davao
and marched toward the mountains of Lipada; that on the 8th day of June, 1909, said mutineers
returned to Davao for the purpose of attacking the town; that the inhabitants thereof, having
received previous notice of the proposed attack, prepared themselves to meet it; that J. L.
Burchfield, P. C. Libby, A. M. Templeton, and Roy Libby, armed with rifles, having been detailed
by those commanding the defense of the town, on the afternoon of the day referred to,
advanced to the cemetery within the limits of the town, forming an outpost for the purpose of
awaiting the coming of the mutineers; that about 4.15 o'clock they sighted the mutineers; that
immediately thereafter they heard a shot, followed by others, which came from near
the cemetery, where the mutineers had halted and dismounted; that after a few shots had been
exchanged Roy Libby was struck with a ball and killed; that the outpost retreated to the convent
and took refuge therein ; that the mutineers advanced against the town, attacking it at various
points and especially the convent, where a portion of the residents of the town had gathered,
including the women and children:, for the purpose of defending themselves; that no other
person except Roy Libby was killed, although several others were more or less severely
wounded.

31
 ISSUE:

Whether or not there was present premeditacion conocida, qualifying the crime as murder.

RULING:

Yes. The learned trial court found premeditation conocida as the element qualifying the
crime as murder. The learned counsel for the appellants excepts to this finding and asserts that,
in as much as the appellants did not know even of the existence of the deceased, Roy Libby, at
the time of his death, much less that he was at the time in the village they attacked and one of
the outposts of four, his death could not possibly have been premeditated.

32
 Daneva A. Anticamara

People vs. Rodil | 109 SCRA 308 | G.R. No. L-35156 | Makasiar, J.

FACTS:

At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo
Masana together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa
and Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the
Indang market. While they were eating, they saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant,
appellant outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their attention having been drawn to what
appellant was doing, Lt. Masana then in civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel,
went out of the restaurant, approached appellant and asked the latter, after Identifying himself
as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a license.

Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana appellant moved one step backward and
attempted to draw his gun. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun from
appellant's waist and gave it to Lt. Masana After that, Lt. Masana told the appellant to go inside
the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a
separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters from the table of Lt. Masana's three
companions — Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica. After the two were already seated, Lt. Masana placed
appellant's gun on the table.

After that Lt. Masana pulled out a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote
thereon the receipt for the gun, and after signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the same,
but appellant refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him. Lt. Masana
rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter that they would talk the matter over in the municipal
building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled
out a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times, on the chest and
stomach causing his death several hours thereafter.

While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt. Masana — PC
soldier Virgilio Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica stood up to assist Lt.
Masana but Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be taking his
lunch in the same restaurant, was quicker than any of them in going near the combatants and
embraced and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and thereafter wrested the dagger from the
accused-appellant. Immediately thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused to the
municipal building of Indang, Cavite, while the companions of Lt. Masana brought the latter to
the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he expired several hours later as a result of the stab
wounds inflicted by the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated.

RULING:

Yes. The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it

is obvious that the victim. Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a
member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the
victim.

Appellant guilty of homicide aggravated by contempt for or insult to a public authority or

disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank.

33
 People vs. Pagal | 79 SCRA 570 | G.R. No. L-3204 | Conception Jr, J.

FACTS:

Pedro Pagal and Jose Torcelino were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide,
with 4 generic aggravating circumstances. They stole the amount of P1,281.00 and killed Gau-
gan, their then employer, by stabbing him with an ice pick and clubbing him with an iron pipe.
During the arraignment, the counsel for the accused informed the court of their intention to
plead guilty, provided that they be allowed afterwards to prove the mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation on the part of the victim immediately preceding the act, and that of having
acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation. The judge asked if
that is truly what the accused wanted to do, and the accused agreed.

The accused were arraigned and both pleaded guilty. The accused were then allowed to
present their evidence, which were claims of maltreatment/ill-treatment by the deceased. After
they rested their case, the prosecution presented the statements of the accused and other
pertinent documents. After considering the aggravating circumstances, and accepting only the
mitigating circumstance of pleading guilty, the court rendered its decision finding both accused
guilty, and sentenced to death. The case was elevated to the sc for mandatory review on account
of the death penalty imposed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of sufficient
provocation, and passion or obfuscation as claimed via evidence by the accused.

RULLING:

No. The trial court found the appellant’s contention devoid of merit. First, mitigating
circumstances presented can only be counted as one, because they arose from the same incident.
Second, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime which is
planned and calmly meditated before its execution. Third, The maltreatment that appellants
claim the victim to have committed against them occurred much earlier than the date of the
commission of the crime. Provocation, in order to be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient
and immediately preceding the act.

After reviewing the case, the court held that there was only one generic aggravating
circumstance, instead of four, and this was then offset by the only accepted mitigating
circumstance of the guilty plea. Through this, the appellants were each imposed upon with the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

34
 Jamal H.I. Sangca

People vs. Luchico | G.R. No. L-26170 | December 6. 1926 | De Castro, J.

FACTS:

On about 6 o’clock in the evening of March 3, 1923, the offended party Inocencia Salva,
a girl of 13 years old being in the kitchen of the house herein accused, Teodoro Luchico as a
servant of the latter preparing a decoction of Senna Leaves, her master Approached her and
telling her that he loves the offended party but the offended party replied he look upon the
accused as her father but all of a sudden the accused kissed the girl on her left cheek and resisted.
The accused threw her to the ground, caught hold to her knees covered her mouth and mounted
her, and taking out his genital organ, wet it with saliva and introduced it with difficulty and great
suffering of the girl into her private parts and although on account of the pain, she attempted to
call for help, she could not do because her mouth was covered by the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the act of Rape?

RULING:

Yes, the evidence of the prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt
of the accuse. That in imposing the penalty the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and
abuse of confidence should be taken into consideration.

People v. Punsalan | G.R. No. 199892 | December 10, 2012 | Villa Real, J.

FACTS:

On August 10, 2002 at 5 or 6 pm, seaman 1ST Class Amulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna,
SN1 evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among
the members of the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at a Naval Education and training
command at San Miguel, San Antonio Zambales. And on about August 10, 2002 at 5 or 6 pm they
went to the ALL in One canteen to drink and at 10 pm transferred to Aquarius a videoke bar
where SN1 Bacosa and the appellant punsalan got into a fight. The Navy group walked back to
NETC Camp to avoid aggravating conflict. The appellant however drunk drove Nissan and follow
the group to the camp. The Navy sentries flagged down punsalan and heard him threaten the
member of the Navy he fought in the Bar. Punsalan charged forward despite being flagged down,
hit the group of navy personnel from behind and sped away resulting to the death of Andal and
Duclayna and injuries of the rest of the group. The appellant was charged with complex crime of
Double Murder qualified by treachery with attempted murder attended by the aggravating
circumstances

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime is qualified as murder.

RULING:

Yes, Treachery is clearly present in the crime. There is trachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tends directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from any defense which the offended part might make.

35
 Putri Salam T. Diampuan

People vs. Barredo | GR No.: L-2728 | December 29, 1950 | Montemayor, J.

FACTS:

On September 17, 1947 at about 11 o’clock in the evening, Rafael Deita, accompanied by
eight other men including the three appellants Jorge Barredo, Crisologo Bandelion and Salvador
Falcis, fired at Jaime Boday outside the latter’s house hitting him on the upper part of his right
thigh which caused his death on October 9, 1947. Afterwards, the band entered the deceased
house and took all the money they can find and some valuables. They were charged of the crime
of robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the RPC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellants are guilty of conspiracy.

RULING:

Yes. At the beginning, the appellants may not have entered into conspiracy to commit
robbery but at the later part, before the robbery took place, they learned about the evil plan and
entered into it. It is shown in the affidavits and testimonies of the appellants that two of them
joined the actual act of robbery while the other one was stationed at the house to act as a guard
and afterwards received their share of the loot.

People vs. Aguinaldo | GR No.: 33843 | February 11, 1931 |Villamor, J.

FACTS:

On April 29, 1930, the couple, Anselmo Oao and his wife Geronima Lacar, went to a hill
to dig up some roots to be used as a medicine for the latter’s toothache and while Anselmo was
stooping down and digging up the roots, the appellant, Juan Aguinaldo, appeared and suddenly
rushed to Anselmo Oao and stabbed him from behind thru his bolo which caused Anselmo’s
death. Aguinaldo is charged with the crime of murder penalized in Article 403 of the Penal Code.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of murder.

RULING:

Yes. The dead man’s position when he received the first blow was with his back and bent
down because he was digging up medical roots, entirely unprepared and unable to defend
himself from his assailant. It clearly shows the appellant’s treachery in attacking his victim,
thereby qualifying the crime as murder, defined and penalized in article 403 of the Penal Code.

36
 Jamimah Y. Disomangcop

People vs. Lungbos | G.R. No. L-57293 | June 21, 1988 | Griño-Aquino, J.

FACTS:

On July 12, 1980 at about 7:30 in the evening, Narido and Jackariya Lungbos alias
"Nasser," with two unidentified companions, entered the Sweet Angel Gardens Restaurant in Sta.
Cruz, Tetuan Highway, Zamboanga City. They occupied table No. 21 and ordered beer, cigarettes
and some "pulutan." At about 10:00 P.M., Lungbos went out of the restaurant. After closing the
door, Narido proceeded to table No. 16 and collared the customer Rolando Chiong who was
seated there. When the latter attempted to stand up, Narido shot him with a pistol. His two
companions proceeded to the counter and poked a gun at the cashier, Elizabeth Mahinay, and at
Julian Legarde, father-in-law of the restaurant owner, who was seated behind the counter. They
demanded money from Mahinay and Legarde. They divested Legarde of his wrist watch and
wallet containing P40 and took the day's earnings of P800. A burst of gunshots rang from the
counter, then the malefactors fled with their loot.

Chiong, Legarde and the restaurant's cook, Flaviano Gonzales, were hit. Legarde was
rushed to the Doctor's Hospital where he succumbed to a gunshot wound in the abdomen.
Chiong and Gonzales were brought to the Zamboanga General Hospital. They survived.

ISSUES:

The decision of the trial court is before Us for mandatory review.

Narido alleges that the court a quo erred:

1. In considering the aggravating circumstance of "robbery in band" despite the absence of
proof that more than three of the accused were armed;
2. In considering nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance despite lack of evidence that
the accused purposely sought it to commit the crime;
3. In holding that the appellant admitted the crime charged in the amended information
without mental reservation, including the aggravating circumstances alleged therein;
and
4. In imposing the supreme penalty of death upon the appellant.

RULINGS:

The first assignment of error is well-taken. There is a band whenever more than three
malefactors acted together in the commission of the offense (Art. 14, subpar. 6, Revised Penal
Code). The crime was not committed by a band because the prosecution failed to establish that
all four of the malefactors were armed.

The trial court properly considered nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance, even if

there was no direct evidence showing that the conspirators sought the nighttime to commit the
robbery for it cannot be gainsaid that nocturnity facilitated the successful commission of the
crime.
The trial court did not err in holding Narido bound by his judicial confession of guilt under
the amended information. There is no higher evidence of guilt than the accused's own
confession. Unless nullified by evidence of duress a voluntary plea of guilty is admissible as
evidence of guilt of a high quality.

The last assignment of error has become moot in view of the abolition of the death
penalty under the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the judgment finding the accused Romeo Narido y Remigio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide as defined and penalized under Article
294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code is affirmed, except his penalty which is reduced

37
to reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided by law, in consonance with Section 19 (1),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He is further ordered:
1. To indemnify the heirs of the deceased Julian Legarde in the amount of P30,000 plus the
sum of P540 representing the value of the wrist watch and money that he and his
companions took from the deceased, and
2. To pay the restaurant-owner Andres Enriquez y Fernandez the sum of P800 that was taken
from the restaurant's receipts.

People vs. Licop |GR No. L-6061 | Apr 29, 1954 | Paras, C.J.

FACTS:

Carmen Licop y Suarez, hereinafter to be referred to as Carmen, was prosecuted in the

Court of First Instance of Manila in two informations, one for serious illegal detention and
another for robbery. After a joint trial, Carmen was acquitted in the latter case on the ground
that the prosecution had failed to establish the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter,
but was convicted of the court over the subject matter, but was convicted of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention defined and penalized by article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 18, and, in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, aid
of armed women and the use of a motor vehicle, as against the sole mitigating circumstance of
lack of instruction, was sentenced to death. This judgment of conviction is now before us on
review section 9 Rule 118 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

It is uncontroverted that Nelia was kidnapped, but it is contended for Carmen that the
latter was incriminated in view of the incident which led Nelia to suppose that Carmen was selling
her to Miss Gonzales for immoral purposes. We cannot believe that, assuming Nelia to have
harbored some ill feeling, she would go to the extent of imputing to Carmen a crime so grave as
that of kidnapping, an arrangement that would bring to Nelia the humiliating features of a public
trial.

RULINGS:
The crime committed is kidnapping and serious illegal detention penalized by article 267
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18, with reclusion temporal in its
maximum to death, the victim being not only a minor but also a female. In view of the presence
of the three aggravating circumstances of nighttime, aid of armed women, and the use of a motor
vehicle and the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, the penalty imposed by the
trial court, which is death, is proper; but for lack of necessary votes, said penalty is reduced to
life imprisonment.

It being understood that the defendant Carmen Licop y Suarez is hereby sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, the appealed judgment is affirmed. So ordered with costs.

38
 Humphrey James. D. Jaraba

People vs. Lagarto | 196 SCRA 611 | G.R. No. 65833 | May 6, 1991 | Paras, J.

FACT:

On May 25, 1983, Reynato Aducal who was buying fish in the public market of Poblacion,
Laoang, Nothern Samar, was stabbed using a Balisong by Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado, Jr. The
wound incurred to the deceased were fatal causing immediate death. The wounds were located
at the chest area. The perpetrator was immediately apprehended by Pfc. Wenefredo Laguitan
while on his routine patrol over the area. After the apprehension, the accused admitted to killing
the deceased over revenge for stabbing his brother last 1980. The record shows that, during
arraignment, the accused pleaded a guilty plea. The court asked the accused if he understands
the meaning or consequences of pleading guilty, to which the accused responded with certainty.
Nonetheless, the court still directed the prosecution to present its evidence to determine the
degree of culpability of the accused.

Based on the accused guilty plea and the presentation of the prosecution, the trial court
rendered judgment which is read as follow:

WHEREFORE, the Court accepts his plea and declares accused, Eugenio Lagarto y beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Murder defined and penalized in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of spontaneous plea of guilty which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation, the Court hereby sentences said accused to suffer the extreme penalty
of DEATH with all the accessories provided for in Art. 40 of the Revised Penal Code.

The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Reynaldo Aducal in the amount of
P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.

(Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 20)

The judgement of Death penalty automatically warrants the review of the Supreme Court.
However, upon review, the Supreme Court altered the decision of the lower court to reclusion
perpetua. As per decision of the Supreme Court, the accused is a recidivist. A recidivist is one
who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment
of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. Herein accused had been
convicted of the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 before the trial of the present
Criminal Case No. 1566. The former counsel de oficio of herein accused alleged that the judgment
in Criminal Case No. 1473 was rendered on September 15, 1983, hence when the accused was
arraigned on October 11, 1983 for Criminal Case No. 1566 he was not a recidivist.

The former counsel de oficio is of the opinion that "the time of trial" is to be reckoned with the
date of the arraignment. The phrase "at the time of his trial" should not be restrictively
construed as to mean the date of arraignment.

The Supreme Court also emphasized that they have not found an evident display of
premeditation and treachery committed in this case. According to them, premeditation
requires 3 requisites which are as follows:

(a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(b) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to his determination; and
(c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will. (People vs. Cafe, 166 SCRA 704; People vs. Montejo,
167 SCRA 506).

According to the Supreme Court, the admission of the accused that he longed plan to kill
the deceased as an act of retaliation is not enough to consider the act premeditated. It was

39
necessary to establish meditation from the time is was conceived to the time the crime was
actually perpetrated. Thus, the defendant’s admission was only considered an expression of his
determination to commit the crime and not as a manifestation of premeditation. Treachery
cannot also be established as there was no enough evidence establish in this trial. There is no
evidence to show that the mode of attack was consciously adopted as to insure the perpetration
of the crime and safety from the defense that the victim might put up. There is an absence of
evidence to show the means employed by assailant and the mode of attack. Treachery may not
be simply deduced from assumptions; it must be as clearly proved as the crime itself in order to
qualify the crime into murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the existence of recidivism and the
qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.
Ruling:
No. The Trial Court’s judgment was modified by the Supreme Court. Appreciating in his
favor the mitigating circumstance of spontaneous plea of guilty which is offset by the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism, the Court sentenced said accused to an indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Reynaldo Aducal an indemnity of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00).

A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted
by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. The
accused was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 on September 15, 1983. There
being no appeal, the judgment therein became final on October 11, 1983. The second conviction
was rendered on October 26, 1983 for Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear that the accused is a
recidivist: the accused had been convicted by final judgment at the time of the rendition of the
judgment for the second offense.

The court also found no merit in the finding of the trial court that evident premeditation
and treachery existed in the commission of the crime. It is a rule that a plea of guilty cannot be
held to include evident premeditation and treachery where the evidence adduced does not
adequately disclose the existence of these qualifying circumstances.

Evident premeditation requires proof of the following requisites; (a) the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to
his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution
of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience
to overcome the resolution of his will.

To adequately prove the existence of evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish

that the accused meditated on his intention between the time it was conceived and the time the
crime was actually perpetrated. Defendant’s proposition in killing Reynaldo Aducal in retaliation
for the act of Reynaldo Aducal in stabbing his brother, was nothing but an expression of his own
determination to commit the crime which is entirely different from premeditation.

In addition, in order that treachery may be appreciated, it is necessary to prove the

manner in which the victim was attacked. Treachery can in no way be presumed but must be fully
proved. Where there are merely indications that the attack was sudden and unexpected, but
there are no precise data on this point, the circumstance of treachery cannot be taken into
account.

In the case at bar, there is no evidence to show that the mode of attack was consciously
adopted as to insure the perpetration of the crime and safety from the defense that the victim
might put up. There is an absence of evidence to show the means employed by assailant and
the mode of attack.

40
 People vs. Ompad | 20 SCRA 750 |G. R. No. L-23513 | January 31, 1969 | Makalintal, J.

FACT:

On around 8:00 pm of May 7, 1962 in Sitio Inalaran, Barrio San Isidro, Municipality of Sta.
Rita, Samar, Simplicio Tapulado, together with his common-law wife were about to retire for the
night when they have heard someone calling out from the outside of their house asking Simplicio
to come out. After identifying the identity of the caller, who is Vicente Ompad, Simplicio got up
to push open the shutter when a gunshot was heard fired by Vicente Ompad. Simplicio fell down
the ground immediately lifeless. Meanwhile, the common-law wife, Dominga del Monte, who
has risen almost simultaneously with Simplicio, was about to light the lamp when another
gunshot was fired but this time by one Angel Libre who was standing beside Vicente Ompad. Hit
on the chest, Dominga instinctively tried to run to the inner room for safety but fell dead after a
few steps. However, Dominga’s 17-year-old son, Pablo del Monte, was able to escape such
misfortune when he hid himself in the kitchen. From the position he was hidden, he was able to
identify the assailants and narrate the scenes that took place as he become a witness to the case.

Upon apprehension of the assailants by Sgt. Exequiel Loreno of the 64 th PC stationed at

Catbalogan. It was later found out at the investigation that Pastor Libutin, Vicente Ompad and
other individuals in company, while drinking alcoholic beverages, were already planning to kill
the deceased earlier that evening. According to the narration of the state witness, Lucio Samar,
which also one of their company earlier of that evening, it was Pastor Libutin who proposed to
Vicente Ompad to kill the deceased because he has a grudge towards him. In fact, the bullets
fired by Vicente Ompad were supplied by Pastor Libutin.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an evident premeditation was present in this case.

RULING:

Yes. Evident premeditation is present in this case. Premeditation is evident as the

instigator of the crime, Pastor Libutin, is the one who instigated and planted the idea of
committing the crime to Vicente Ompad (triggerman) even if there is an absence of grudge
between Vicente and Simplicio (deceased). He even supplied the ammunition towards Vicente
when hesitation from the triggerman presented. He also staged the intoxication of his
companions to provide him with a suitable and convenient avenue to present his idea of a crime.
He was also close with the triggerman when walking towards the house of the deceased until the
shooting. Thus, with these series of event, it is clear that Pastor Libutin carried out his plan
deliberately before planning implying evident premeditation.

41
 Charity Neil S. Casas

People vs. Carillo |G.R. No. L-2043 | February 28, 1950 |Per Curiam

FACTS:

On June 4, 1947, between 8 and 9 p.m., Emma Foronda-Abaya and her fried Marcelino
Lontok Jr., while walking side by side on Pampanga Street, Manila. on their way home from the
Far Eastern University, were held up by two men, each at the point of a pistol, and were robbed
of their personal belongings. After robbing Emma, one of the two robbers took her to a secluded
place, a vacant lot south of the street, and attempted to rape her. The satyr did not succeed in
raping his victim because she valiantly resisted and in the course of the struggle both of them fell
on the mire beside the log. At that precise the other robber left Marcelino and approach his
companion, telling him to stop and inviting him to leave the place. Marcelino escaped to seek
help. At a distance of about 15 meters he heard two shots. When later in the same evening he
returned to the place with a police patrol, they found Emma dead, her chest and abdomen
pierced by two bullets. Two empty shells were found at the scene of the crime.

The court declared Alejandro Carillo and Toribio Raquenio the guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide and robbery with violence against and
intimidation of person respectively, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in not considering the aggravating circumstances which
facilitated the commission of the offense.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that, the trial court erred in not considering the aggravating
circumstances of:

(1) recidivism, said appellant having been convicted twice of robbery;

(2) nocturnity, which facilitated the commission of the offense and rendered detection
difficult; and;
(3) abuse of superior strength, considering his sex and the weapon he used in the act which
overcame the victim and rendered her unable to defend herself from his savage
aggression (United States vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil., 612).

The attempted rape committed by Carillo on the same occasion may be penalized separately,
but the court think there is no need to do so, and that they consider it only as a further
aggravation of the offense. There is no mitigating circumstance.

People vs. Yturriaga |G.R. No. L-2816|May 31, 1950 | Tuason, J.

FACTS:

The appellant was municipal mayor of Robon, Province of Samar. On August 3, 1947, at
about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, accompanied by a policeman, he raided a house where a game
of monte was being or was to be played. Upon seeing the accused, the gamblers or would-be
gamblers fled from the house and were not arrested, except one whom the defendant caught up
with and grabbed. When he emerged from the gambling house, the accused met Jose Balite
walking down the street with a 12-year old daughter. And there shot Jose Balite. Later he
voluntarily surrendered and confessed his guilt before the court about the crime. It also appears
that Balite had been a rival candidate for mayor and was a political enemy of the accused.

42
 The appellant was charged with murder in the Court of First Instance of Samar allegedly
with two aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and taking advantage of his public
position.

The court, therefore, sentences the accused to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion

perpetua with civil interdiction for life and perpetual absolute disqualification, indemnify the
heirs of Jose Balite in the sum of P4,000 and pay the cost of this action.

There he appealed that he voluntarily surrendered and pleaded guilty of the crime but
pleaded not guilty of the two aggravating circumstances.

In finding the concurrence of evident premeditation as a generic aggravating

circumstance, the court relied solely on the testimony of witness that the defendant in a speech
in February 1947 has said that he will going to kill Jose Balite,

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant is guilty for the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and taking advantage of his public position.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that the remarks attributed to the accused, granting he was
correctly quoted, are utterly insufficient to warrant the finding of evident premeditation. It is
more reasonable to believe that the accused made those remarks, if he made them, in a fit of
anger without meaning what he said. It is worth noting that the defendant is impulsive and hot
tempered, as the record abundantly indicates.

In the second place, supposing again that the accused was in the earnest when he made
the threat, yet there is no showing that he persisted in his plan and that the killing was the
culmination of it. It should be kept in mind that the alleged threat was made six months before
Balite was murdered. Living in the same town as the deceased all that time, the defendant could
easily have killed his enemy long before August, 1947, if he had not given up his determination
to slay him. We are inclined to the theory that there was some provocation.

Based in the case of U.S. v. Gil ( 13 Phil. 530) and other decisions of the court, it was laid
down as a rule that the circumstance of evident premeditation must be evident and not merely
suspected, by which is meant “ a period sufficient in a judicial sense to afford full opportunity for
meditation and reflection and sufficient to allow the conscience of the actor to overcome the
resolution of his will if he desires to harken to its warnings.” Judged by this standard, the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation has not been satisfactorily established in this
case.

The allegation that the defendant took advantage of his office is also unwarranted by the
proof. In killing the deceased, the appellant did not avail himself of "the influence, prestige or
ascendancy which go with his position as a means of securing the execution of the crime." In
other words, his being a mayor did not in any way facilitate the murder. He could have committed
the crime in the same form or manner and with the same ease if he had been a plain citizen.

43
 Erwin Yrrem J. Ubagan

People vs. Tadeo | G.R. Nos. 127660 & 144011-12 | September 17, 2002 | Bellosillo, J.

FACTS:

On 4 November 1993, around 11:30 in the morning, accused-appellant Michael Tadeo

was drinking with the deceased Mayolito Cabatu and several others in a party hosted by
Nicomedes Cabacungan in Sto. Domingo, Quirino, Isabela, to celebrate the successful installation
of a water pump that would supply potable water to their barangay. Mayolito shouted "barako,"
apparently to tease accused-appellant and titillate him into a "fight" who, true enough, took
offense against the mocking remark. accused-appellant Michael Tadeo instantaneously grabbed
a beer bottle and tried to whack Mayolito with it on the head. But Ricky Cardona and Florencia
Cabatu quickly intervened to prevent accused-appellant from inflicting harm upon Mayolito.
Accused-appellant briskly went home exclaiming, "Aguray kadta a!" which means "Wait, I will
come back!" Then he hastily returned clutching a .38 cal. revolver and confronted Mayolito, Ricky
and Florencia why they were intervening. Mayolito vainly tried to grapple with accused-appellant
who lost no time in shooting Mayolito six (6) times, some bullets piercing his head. Accused-
appellant then trained his gun on Florencia, but unfortunately, the pistol did not fire as it was
already empty. accused-appellant retreated towards his house to reload his gun, and upon his
return, immediately shot Florencia on her left buttock. Afterwards accused-appellant
surrendered to authorities.

Tadeo was charged with Murder and frustrated murder.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Aggravating circumstances treachery and evident premeditation was

present in this case.
2. Whether or not the crime charged is justifiable.

HELD:

No. In this appeal, accused-appellant does not challenge the finding of the trial court that he
killed Mayolito Cabatu and injured his mother Florencia Cabatu, nor that he was the possessor
of the .38 cal. revolver, but questions the appreciation of the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation, and claims that he should instead be held guilty of
homicide and frustrated homicide only. accused-appellant Michael Tadeo and the deceased
Mayolito Cabatu were both drunk and the fight was preceded by rising tempers. Invariably,
accused-appellant was not in full possession of his faculties which would have been necessary
for him to kill Mayolito Cabatu, or try to kill Florencia Cabatu with the attendant evident
premeditation, i.e., the execution of the criminal act must come with sober thought and
reflection upon the In turn, because of accused-appellant's mental and moral stupor at the time
of the perpetration of the criminal acts, the prosecution could not have proved the requisites of
this qualifying circumstance: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and, (c) a sufficient
lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and for his conscience to overcome his will. In the same vein, having
been inebriated and overtaken by anger immediately prior to the assault, accused-appellant
cannot be accused of treachery. Under this state, he did not have the time nor the proper
disposition to reflect on the means or mode of attack for it to be said that he deliberately and
consciously pulled out his gun and fired at the deceased to insure the commission of the crime
without risk to himself. Furthermore, the heated exchanges between him and the deceased prior
to the attack must have placed the latter on his guard, hence, we cannot rule that Mayolito
Cabatu was caught completely by surprise when accused-appellant took up arms against him. For
there to be treachery by reason of the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack, there must
have been no warning of any sort to the deceased or offended party. Verily, the statement of

44
accused-appellant to Mayolito Cabatu, viz, "Aguray kadta a!" meaning "Wait, I will come back!"
which the deceased took seriously, as he did confront Michael Tadeo when he returned, shows
convincingly that the victim was not unprepared nor stunned to see accused-appellant wielding
a gun and firing at him. The element of a sudden unprovoked attack indicative of treachery was
therefore missing.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Joint Decision of the RTC-Br. 23 of Roxas, Isabela, sentencing
accused-appellant Michael Tadeo to reclusion perpetua for murder in Crim. Case No. 23-498, and
to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum, for frustrated murder in Crim.
Case No. 23-494, is MODIFIED.
Accordingly, in Crim. Case No. 23-498, we find accused-appellant guilty of HOMICIDE and,
considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, sentence him to an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years, three (3) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor minimum as minimum, to twelve (12) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal minimum, as maximum.
In Crim. Case No. 23-494 we find accused-appellant guilty of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and,
considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, sentence him to an
indeterminate prison term of three (3) months and twenty (20) days of arresto mayor medium as
minimum, to one (1) year, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional minimum
as maximum.
The monetary awards in the Joint Decision, i.e., indemnification in favor of the heirs of
Mayolito Cabatu in the amount of P50,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 23-498, and actual damages
of P15,000.00 to Florencia Cabatu in Crim. Case No. 23-494, are AFFIRMED.

People vs. Belgar (1991) | G.R. No. 92155 | GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:

This is a case of rape of a 12-year old girl, a mental retardate with the mentality of a 6-
year old. The assailant is a young man who is a habitual drug addict. Belgar committed rape when
he approached lorelyn, the victim,while watching television. Meanwhile, edu, a nephew of
accused, four years of age, approached the mother of lorelyn and informed her "lorelyn is
pinapatungan by kuya boy." belgar claims that lorelyn herself testified that she was not rape but
only was kissed and fingered, and that he came from a pot session just before the incident
occurred. The court later found out that lorelyn was deflowered by belgar long before the current
case. Belgar was charged with rape and pleaded not guilty. Consequently, the accused interposed
an appeal therefrom to this court, alleging the following errors:

The trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of the complaining
witness claiming that she was raped by the accused appellant despite the fact that the alleged
rape did not happen as narrated by the complainant herself because she was merely issued by
the accused-appellant.

The main thrust of the appeal is that complaining witness lorelyn herself did not testify
that she was raped by the appellant but that she was merely kissed and fingered. even the
information given by the 4-year boy edu was, according to appellant, simply that appellant was
kissing the complainant.

The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of rape despite
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUES:

Whether or not appellant’s conviction of rape be reverse and whether was there any aggravating
circumstance involved?

45
 RULING:

No. The foregoing testimony of complainant through propounded questions by

the prosecution which are leading shows without doubt that appellant actually raped her on that
fateful day on may 11, 1987, whereby after undressing her, he took off his trousers, held her
mouth and went on top of her by kissing her. Thereafter, he inserted his penis inside her vagina.
Complainant could not remember how long the sexual intercourse took place but she could
remember the pain on her back and body. The assertion of the complainant that she was raped
by the appellant is corroborated by the young boy edu who saw appellant on top of the
complainant. He said that he was kissing and "ginagahasa" (raping) her. Such candor of an
innocent boy should be given much weight contrary to the protestation of the appellant.

Article 335, paragraph 3, which states rape committed against a woman under 12 years
of age. In this case, the appellant was charged with rape through force and intimidation of the
complainant who is a 12-year-old minor, and a retardate. And although the complainant was
already 12 years old at the time, she was undeniably a retardate with the mentality of a 6-year
old child, so that she also falls under the fourth category, for being under 12 years of age.
More importantly, under section 17 of the dangerous drugs act of 1972, as amended by
batas pambansa blg. 179, "when a crime is committed by an offender who is under the influence
of dangerous drugs, such state shall be considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in
the definition of a crime and the application of the penalty provided for in the revised penal
code." this should serve as a sufficient deterrent if not a warning to those who are inclined to if
not actually habitually addicted to drugs. Their addiction will be no excuse but will aggravate any
offense they commit.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the only modification that the
indemnity for the offended party should be increased to p40,000.00, with costs against the
appellant.

46
 Johayra-Soraya P. Yusoph

People vs. Verzo | 129 Phil. 628 | GR No. L-22517 | Concepcion, C. J.

FACTS:

On July 6, 1962, the three (Getulio, Reynaldo and Roberto Verzo) defendants attacked
Camino with their bolos which resulted to the latter’s death. After attacking Camino who was
able to run away from them before he died, the defendants turned their fury at Filemon Casis
whom they hacked and stabbed, until Filemon fell down unconscious. Policeman Lope Jariel, who
was escorting Filemon that time, bade Getulio not to take the law into his hands and fired
warning shots to dissuade the Verzos from furthering the crime, but to no avail.

Defendants were charged with murder of Benjamin Camino and of frustrated murder for
the injuries inflicted upon Filemon Casis. The defendants argued that the lower court erred in
appreciating the presence of treachery and abuse of superior strength.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the lower Court erred in appreciating the presence of treachery and abuse
of superior strength.
2. Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities.

RULING:

1. No. Although the defendants may be given the benefit of doubt on whether or not there
had been treachery, it is manifest that they had acted with abuse of superior strength, for
whereas the three of them were wielding bolos, Benjamin Camino was unarmed and
trying to flee.

2. No. Although Patrolman Jariel was present at the scene of the crime, it cannot be said
that the same has been committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities,
inasmuch that a policeman is merely an agent of a person in authority, not a person in
authority.

People vs. Madrid | 88 Phil. 1 | G.R. No. L-3023 | Per Curiam

FACTS:

On February 1947, Yosua (S.B. Young), a Chinese merchant in Manila, together with
Ponciano Felicisimo, who drove, and two laborers by the name Demetrio Sinio and Feliciano
Guyapo, made a trip to Isabela in an International truck, to buy palay. All four went missing and
unheard for.

Lina Cayetano, Young’s business partner and co-owner in the truck, reported their
disappearance to the authorities. The missing truck, or most of what remained of it was found in
Cabanatuan, in the possession of one Valentin Magno.

Pursuant to an informant’s tip, the authorities called for Paciano Madrid for questioning.
Madrid was a driver by profession and a special agent of the military police. He went to Isabela,
in his own jeep and ran into Soriano, Lacalinao and Manuel, his townmates, and they asked for a
ride in his jeep. On the way to Nueva Ecija, they stopped when they came upon on overturned
bulldozer.

Soon after, Young’s truck appeared and Madrid signaled the driver to halt. Madrid
requested the driver to pull the bulldozer out of the way and the driver replied that he had no
chain. After that, Vicente de los Santos boarded the truck, drew his revolver and hauled down

47
the Chinese, while Macario did the same with the two laborers. He (accused) was also carrying a
pistol as special agent of the military police. Vicente put the Chinese in the jeep and Macario did
likewise to the two laborers upon Madrid’s orders.

Madrid and Vicente agreed to kill the four men. The first one that Madrid killed
was the Chinaman, shooting him in the forehead and then killed the other two laborers.
Vicente, on the other hand, killed the other one then drove the truck to Cabanatuan
where he sold the rice for P2,300 and gave the truck to Valentin Magno.

Appellant was found guilty of a complex crime of robbery with homicide and three
separate crimes of homicide. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellant’s acts
constitute a complex crime of robbery with quadruple homicide and not, as the trial court held,
four separate crimes.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the crime was committed with treachery.

2. Whether or not Madrid’s being a law officer is an aggravating circumstance.

RULING:

1. Yes. The victims were killed in such a way as to be deprived of opportunity to repel the
attack or escape with any possibility of success.
2. Yes. He took advantage of his position. He committed the crime with the aid of a gun
which he had been authorized to carry as a peace officer; and he succeeded in going
through the check point with the stolen truck and its cargo unsuspected of misdeed,
thanks to his official position.

48
 Naim Nohar A. Suba

People vs. Fontillas | 638 SCRA 721 |G.R. No. 184177 |December 15, 2010 |De Castro, J.

FACTS:

In the evening of December 08, 2001, while private complainant was sleeping in their
house in Bamban, Masinloc, Zambales with her younger brother, she was awakened by the arrival
of their father, appellant Andres Fontillas, whom she heard coughing. She stood up and helped
appellant enter their house because he was drunk. She let him sleep beside them. After a while,
she was roused by appellant who was then taking off her short pants. She cried but he warned
her not to make any noise. After removing his own pants, appellant pressed down ("inipit") both
her hands and feet and covered her mouth with his hands. She kept quiet because she was afraid
of him. After satisfying his lust, appellant went out of the house. When appellant left, she went
to report the incident to her Aunt who lived nearby. After hearing her story, her Aunt did not
allow her to go back to their house. Complainant also informed her Uncle about the incident. He
then brought her to the police station where she executed a sworn statement. After the
investigation, complainant was brought to the Home for Girls where she resided.

Accused-appellant Andres Fontillas, also known as "Anding," was qualified of rape by his
relationship with and the minority on the evening of December 08, 2001 as defined and penalized
under Articles 266-A(1)(c) and 266-B(1) of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution presented
the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" and Verified Complaint of the daughter, the offended party; Medico-
Legal Report of Dr. Liezl dela Llana Edaño (Dr. Edaño), the medico-legal who physically examined
the offended party for signs of sexual abuse; Ana A. Ecle’s Letter and Social Case Study Report, a
social worker from the Department of Social Welfare and Development, who referred and placed
the offended party under the protective custody of said institution; and offended party’s
Certificate of Live Birth. The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of accused-
appellant who denied offended party’s accusation; and accused-appellant’s relative and
neighbor, who testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on December 8, 2001, he saw accused-appellant
under a tamarind tree, drunk, with his head bowed down.

RTC’s decision dated October 28, 2005 decreed that accused Andres Fontillas y Calpo is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Incestuous Rape and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. Accused is ordered to pay the victim ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. The Court of
Appeals modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua. In his present appeal, Fontillas argues that
his severe intoxication from consuming eight bottles of gin with two drinking buddies on the night
of 8 December 2001 was corroborated by his cousin, who saw him drunk under a tamarind tree,
and even by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses themselves. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals should have at least appreciated his intoxication as a mitigating circumstance that would
absolve him from any criminal liability.

ISSUE:

Should Andres C. Fontillas’ intoxication be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, as

provided for in Article 15 of RPC?

RULING:

No. The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the accused-appellant's assertion that his
extreme intoxication from alcohol on the night of the rape should be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance.

Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code provides that intoxication is an alternative

circumstance. The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating
circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is
not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; But when the intoxication is

49
habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. The person
pleading intoxication must present evidence that his intoxication was not habitual or subsequent
to the plan to commit the felony. Moreover, he must prove that he took such quantity of
alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as it would blur his reason. Accused-
appellant did not present any evidence that his intoxication was not habitual or subsequent to
the plan to commit the rape. The person pleading intoxication must likewise prove that he took
such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his
reason. Accused-appellant utterly failed to present clear and convincing proof of the extent of his
intoxication on the night of December 8, 2001 and that the amount of liquor he had taken was
of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties.

People vs. MONDIGO | 543 SCRA 384|G.R. No. 167954 | January 31, 2008 | Cario, J.

FACTS:

The prosecution evidence showed that in the morning of September 27, 1998, the
appellant, Perlito Mondigo, along with Damaso Delima, Damaso’s son, Delfin Delima, and three
other unidentified individuals were having a drinking spree in Ligas, Malolos, Bulacan. At around
noon, Damaso’s other son, Anthony Delima, joined the group. At around 6:00 p.m., appellant
Perlito Mondigo, using a bolo, suddenly hacked Anthony on the head, causing him to fall to the
ground unconscious. Appellant next attacked Damaso. A witness who was in the vicinity, Lolita
Lumagi, hearing shouts coming from the scene of the crime, rushed to the area and there saw
appellant repeatedly hacking Damaso who was lying on his back, arms raised to ward off
appellant’s blows. Damaso later died from the injuries he sustained. While Anthony sustained a
15.25-centimeter long lacerated wound on his left temporal area.

The trial court found appellant guilty of Murder for the killing of Damaso and Serious
Physical Injuries for the hacking of Anthony, mitigated by intoxication. The trial court gave
credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Anthony and Lumagi, and correspondingly
found unconvincing appellant’s claim of self-defense. The trial court also held that treachery
qualified Damaso’s killing.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended the modification of the trial
court’s judgment by holding appellant liable only for Homicide for the killing of Damaso.
However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling with the modification that
appellant was liable for Frustrated Murder for the hacking of Anthony. The Court of Appeals held
that (1) the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are credible despite the inconsistencies
appellant noted as these had nothing to do with the central question of whether appellant
attacked Anthony and Damaso with a bolo; (2) the lack of motive for appellant to attack the
victims does not negate the commission of the crimes in question as motive becomes material
only when the identity of the assailant is in doubt; and (3) Damaso’s killing was attended by
treachery as appellant launched his attack without any warning, leaving the victims no chance to
defend themselves.

Appellant was charged before court with Murder and Frustrated Murder qualified by
treachery, evident premeditation, and taking advantage of superior strength. Appellant invoked
self-defense. According to him, a quarrel broke out between him and Anthony during their
drinking spree. Damaso and Delfin arrived and ganged-up on him. He ran home, followed
by Anthony, Damaso, and Delfin. Upon reaching his house, he got hold of a flat bar and whacked
Anthony’s head with it. Damaso attacked him with a bolo but Damaso lost hold of the weapon
which fell to the ground. Appellant retrieved the bolo and used it to hack Damaso.

ISSUE:

The issue is whether appellant is guilty of Murder and Frustrated Murder, as charged.

50
 RULING:

The court find appellant guilty of Homicide and Frustrated Murder.

By invoking self-defense, appellant admitted committing the felonies for which he was
charged albeit under circumstances which, if proven, would justify his commission of the crimes.
Thus, the burden of proof is shifted to appellant who must show, beyond reasonable doubt, that
the killing of Damaso and wounding of Anthony were attended by the following circumstances:

(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims;

(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the location and nature of the wound inflicted against
Anthony and the manner by which appellant carried out his attack shows intent to kill and
treachery.

Intoxication as mitigating circumstance not proven. The trial court made a mistake in
crediting appellant with the circumstance of intoxication as having mitigated his crimes because
the stabbing incident ensued in the course of a drinking spree. For the alternative circumstance
of intoxication to be treated as a mitigating circumstance, the defense must show that the
intoxication is not habitual, not subsequent to a plan to commit a felony and the accused’s
drunkenness affected his mental faculties. Here, the only proof is appellant’s testimony that
he drank about 3 to 4 bottles of beer. The low alcohol content of beer, the quantity of such liquor
that the appellant drank, and the absence of any independent proof that appellants alcohol
intake affected his mental faculties all negate the finding that appellant was intoxicated enough
at the time he committed the crimes to mitigate his liability.

In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, it is proper to impose upon

appellant a prison term of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant is also liable to pay the heirs of Damaso
civil indemnity of P50,000 and moral damages of P50,000 which are awarded automatically.

51
 Roxan A. Tecson

People vs. FORTADA | GR. NO. 151952 | March 25, 2009 | Brion, J.

FACTS:

Appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada (Abello) was convicted of one count of violation of
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended; and two (2) counts of
violation of sexual abuse under RA 7610 committed against his step daughter, AAA.

For these crimes, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of twelve (12) years or prision
mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, and two reclusion perpetuas,
respectively.

The victim was a 21 year old girl who contracted polio when she was just 7 months. On
June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock morning, AAA was sleeping in their house in Navotas with
her sister-in-law and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when Abello mashed her breast.
Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m, Abello again mashed the breast of AAA under the same
situation while the latter was sleeping. In these two occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello
because of the light coming from outside. Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m, Abello placed
his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA. The victim on the same date reported the incident to her
sister-in-law and mother.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the court a quo erred in not absolving the accused-appellant of the crime.

RULLING:

Our consideration of Abello’s defense of denial and his other arguments lead us to reject
them for the following reasons:

First , the issue of his credibility is reduced to a choice between the offended party’s
positive testimony and the denial of the accused. Settled jurisprudence tells us that the mere
denial of one’s involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the
offended party.

Second , we flatly reject Abellos argument that his relationship with AAA insulates him
from the crimes charged. Our judicial experience tells us that in handling these types of cases,
the relationship between the offender and the offended party has never been an obstacle to the
commission of the crime against chastity.

Third , we find the claim that AAA could have just dreamed of the incidents complained
of, to be preposterous. In the normal course, a woman will not expose herself to these risks
unless she is certain of what happened and she seeks to obtain justice against the perpetrator.

People vs. Latag | GR NO. 140411-13 | DEC 11, 2003 | Panganiban, J.

FACTS:

Appellant was charged with two counts of rape, one in the criminal complaint filed by
Charen May L Sarmiento and in another, by Stephanie L Sarmiento.

For Criminal Case No. 1458-97:

“ That on or about the 5th day of April, 1997 in the evening, at Sitio Santol, Baranga
Nangkaan, Municipality of Mataasnakahoy, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and

52
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have carnal
knowledge of the said twelve (12) year-old girl, Charen May Sarmiento y Latag, against her will
and consent.”

Criminal Case No. 0460-97:

“That sometime in the month of April, 1997, at Sitio Santol, Barangay Nagkaan,
Municipality of Mataasnakahoy, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have carnal knowledge of the said ten
(10) year-old girl, Stephanie Sarmiento y Latag, against her will and consent.”

For insuffiency of evidence, the trial court acquitted appellant of the rape of Charen May.
However, it found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping Stephanie and sentences him to
suffer the death penalty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in imposing the penalty of death upon accused-
appellant.

RULLING:

We affirm the conviction of appellant for the crime of rape, but reduce the penalty to reclusion
perpetua for the failure of the complaint to allege his relationship with the victim.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

“When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim.”

Indeed, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon the perpetrator, if his relationship
with the victim is not duly alleged in the complaint or information. If the offender is merely a
relation -- not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or common law spouse of the mother
of the victim -- the specific relationship must be alleged in the information, i.e., that he is a
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree.

Both minority and actual relationship must be alleged and proved; if not, a conviction for
rape in its qualified form will be barred. In the present case, while the minority of the victim was
properly alleged in the Complaint, her relationship with appellant was not specifically stated
therein.

53
 Indirah M. Gaffar

People vs. Sumarago |466 SCRA 956 |G.R. Nos. 140873-77 | Feb 6, 2004 | Callejo Sr, J.

FACTS:

Teodora Brigole have her in her custody her four children with his spouse who left
her. Two of them were girls Norelyn and her older sister Doneza. In 1991, Teodora and the
appellant, Levi Sumarago, an eighteen-year-old mestizo Subanen, started living together as
husband and wife.

In the morning of March 5, 1995, Norelyn, who was then barely ten years old, was
gathering firewood with the appellant in the latter’s farmland. While they were nearing a guava
tree, the appellant suddenly boxed her on the stomach. Norelyn lost consciousness. She had her
clothes when she woke up. It was about noon. She had a terrible headache and felt pain in her
vagina. She also had a bruise in the middle portion of her right leg. The appellant warned her not
to tell her mother about it, otherwise he would kill her. On March 13, 1995, Norelyn and the
appellant were again gathering firewood. The appellant ordered her to follow him to the banana
plantation. He walked ahead, while Norelyn followed. She then lost sight of the appellant. As she
passed by the banana plantation, the appellant suddenly appeared and grabbed her. He then
forced her to lie down and raped her. Norelyn felt excruciating pain. After he was satiated, the
appellant stood up and ordered her to put on her panties. He warned her “Don’t you ever tell, I
will surely kill you”. After that occurrence, Norelyn and the appellant were again gathering
firewood. She was raped again and this incident continued on the following dates March 24,
1995, April 2, 1995, and April 11, 1995.

On October 29, 1996, Teodora and Norelyn filed a criminal complaint for rape against the
appellant with the Municipal Trial Court of Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. The appellant was charged
with five counts of rape in five Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del
Sur, Branch 20. The appellant denied the charges. After due trial, the court rendered judgment,
finding the accused, LEVI SUMARAGO, GUILTY, as principal, of the crime of Rape in these Criminal
Cases Nos. 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, and 2541, and sentences him to the capital punishment of
DEATH.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erroneously sentenced him to suffer the death penalty despite the
absence of any allegation in the Informations that he was the victim’s stepfather?

RULING:
No. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
the accused may be sentenced to death if rape is committed under any of the following attendant
circumstances:
When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

The twin requisites of minority of the victim and her filiation with the appellant or the fact
that the appellant was the common-law husband of Teodora, Norelyn’s mother, must be alleged
in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
and proved by the prosecution. Although the crimes were committed before the effectivity of
the new Rule, it should be applied retroactively, as the same is favorable to the appellant.

The stepfather-stepdaughter relationship presupposes a legitimate relationship a valid

marriage between the accused and the mother of the private complainant. And the best evidence
to prove the marriage between the accused and the mother of the private complainant is their
marriage contract. Norelyns bare testimony and that of her mother that the appellant is her
stepfather is insufficient evidence to prove such allegation. No less than the presiding judge of

54
the trial court stated during the trial that the appellant was merely Teodora’s common-law
husband. In these cases, the Informations failed to allege that the appellant is the legal or
common-law husband of Teodora; or that he was Norelyn’s stepfather. Hence, the appellant
should be found guilty only of four counts of simple rape and not of rape in its qualified
form. Accordingly, the appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape.

People vs. Ulit | 423 SCRA 374 |G.R. Nos. 131799-801 | February 23, 2004 | Callejo Sr, J.

FACTS:

The appellant, Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of qualified rape. In the same decision, the appellant was convicted of two counts of acts
of lasciviousness. For each count of rape, the trial court sentenced him to suffer the supreme
penalty of death, while for each count of acts of lasciviousness the appellant was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment. The appellant was, likewise, ordered to indemnify the victim Lucelle
Serrano.

Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, four information were filed
against her uncle, the appellant. The appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty during the
arraignment. Joint trial of all the cases ensued. In the meantime, Lucelle was undergoing
psychiatric treatment at the Philippine General Hospital. On May 5, 1997, the prosecution
presented her as its first witness.

In her sworn statement, Lucelle alleged that sometime in November 1996, she was
sleeping in a room in the house. It was about 6 oclock in the evening, when she was awakened
by her uncle and raped. She was threatened not to tell anyone about that. In December 1996,
Lucelle was in the room when the appellant entered and kissed her and again raped her.
Sometime in February 1997, the appellant again abused her (sinalbahe) while she was in the
same room. It was about 11 o’ clock in the evening. He again warned her not to divulge to her
parents what he did to her.

Believing that the appellant had been abusing their daughter, Celso and Lourdes brought
Lucelle on March 5, 1997, to Barangay Chairman Romeo Medina. Lucelle told the barangay
chairman that the appellant sexually abused her. Thereafter, Lourdes filed a complaint with the
barangay chairman against the appellant for sexually molesting Lucelle. Barangay Tanod
Fernando David testified that on March 6, 1997, the barangay chairman ordered him and
Barangay Tanod Antonio Echavez to invite and bring the appellant to the barangay hall.
A Sinumpaang Salaysay was prepared in the Office of the Barangay Chairman in which the
appellant admitted that he raped Lucelle in February 1997, and on March 2, 1997, despite her
resistance, and that he threatened to kill her and her family if she divulged the incidents to her
parents. The appellant signed his statement in the presence of the barangay chairman and the
barangay tanods.

From the barangay headquarters, the appellant was brought to the Makati City Police
Headquarters where Celso, Lourdes and Lucelle filed a complaint against him for rape and acts
of laciviousness.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death penalty should be imposed on the appellant, the presence of an
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime?

55
 RULING:

No. The relationship between the appellant and the victim has been adequately
established. The allegations in both information that the appellant is the victims uncle, a relative
by consanguinity within the third civil degree is specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying
circumstance of relationship.

The prosecutions evidence has also shown that the appellant is the victim’s uncle, being
the older brother of the victim’s mother, a fact that the appellant himself admitted.

In the determination of whether the death penalty should be imposed on the appellant,
the presence of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime is crucial. In the
cases at bar, although the relationship of uncle and niece between the appellant and the victim
has been duly proven, the alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against the appellant. While it
is true that the alternative circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes against
chastity, regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of the
offended party, it is only taken into consideration under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code
when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted
brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender. The relationship of
uncle and niece is not covered by any of the relationships mentioned.
Hence, for the prosecutions failure to prove the age of the victim by any means set forth in Pruna,
and considering that the relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by any of the relationships
mentioned in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the appellant can only be
convicted of rape in its aggravated form, the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua to
death.

There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the crimes, the
appellant should be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of rape, conformably
to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.

56
 Melschie Erica S. Mancia

People vs. Lauas | G.R. No. L-38942 | November 14, 1933 | Vickers, J.

FACTS:

On the morning of June 28, 1932, the body of an Igorot boy, Juanito Mangeyew, was
found in a creek, in the municipal district of Itogon, Benguet. Investigations set and in less than a
month the appellant, Hilado Lauas, a 19 year old native Igorot of Bontoc, was arrested. At first,
he denied his responsibility but then, upon being quizzed by Constabulary officers, he signed a
statement before Justice of Peace M. Montilla admitting he killed Mangeyew.

The information through his town mate named Malota whom one forenoon, as he was
on the bridge, he met Lauas. Malota greeted him and indicated a disposition to talk, but Lauas
was uncommunicated and pale. After a few moments, Lauas stated that he had killed someone
without giving the name, and said that he was leaving for Cadaclan. At this time Malota had no
knowledge of the fact that Juanito Mangeyew had been slain, but after the body of the youth
had been discovered, Malota informed the investigators that the act had been done by Higino
Lauas and that he had returned to his native place. This information led a few days later to the
arrest of Lauas, and upon being questioned he at first denied his responsibility.

Later on, he said the deed had been committed by him in conjunction with Malota and
Malengta. The two were arrested and questioned, they denied their guilt and soon became
evident that Lauas’ implication was false. Lauas then took the responsibility for the crime upon
himself alone.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of the offense of homicide.

RULING:

Yes, the appellant is guilty of the offense of homicide because although the offense savors
strongly of murder, but in view of the lack of details as to the facts connected with the killing, it
must be qualified as homicide only. The trial court appreciated in favor of the accused the
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction and placed the penalty in the minimum degree
appropriate to homicide. The concession to the appellant of this mitigating circumstances was
proper, for the confession itself shows that the appellant, in committing this homicide, acted
upon an impulse drawn from the sources of uncivilized life, and although he had received
instruction in the schools that are now established among the non-Christian people of the
Mountain Province and had attained a respectable command of the English language, this veneer
of education had not changed his fundamentally savage character.

People vs. Semañada | G.R. No. L-11361 | May 26, 195 | Laurel, J.

FACTS:

17 year old Felix Semanada joined the Hukbalahap in 1950 as a courier whose job was to
deliver letters and messages. On the evening of 12 June 1952, Semada, along with two other
Huks, arrived at the house of spouses Serapio Villate and Nieves Magtibay in Gumaca, Quezon.
The couple having dinner when Semanada ordered Villate to come out, because the latter
resisted, was forced before being tied up by the two companions of Semanada. As the two
companions held Villate, Semanada stabbed him several times with a bolo in a torturous ordeal
that lasted for about 30 minutes. After killing Villate, Semanada and his companions then went
up and looted the house. A complaint of "robbery in band with murder" was filed against Felix
Semanada in the Justice of the Peace Court of Gumaca, Quezon without naming the two other
accomplices who were still at large. The defendant admitted that he was at the place and time

57
when the crime took place but said he was just guarding the road outside the house. He stated
that on that day, he was in barrio Labnig waiting for letters to be delivered when the two
Hukabalahap companions - who happened to be from the "liquidation unit" - arrived. The two
notorious Huks ordered Semanada to accompany them to Gumaca but the latter refused, that as
a courier, he had his own job to do. But the two Huks forced him at gunpoint to guide them to
the house of Serapio Villate. Semanada was told that they were just visiting Villate without any
intention of killing the man, thus he went on out of "uncontrollable fear".

ISSUE:

Whether or not the grounds of "uncontrollable fear" is sufficient for the defendant to claim the
case at bar in his favor.

RULING:

No. In order for fear to be a valid defense, it should be based on real, imminent or
reasonable fear for one's life. A person should not commit such serious crime, i.e., a torture that
lasted for 30 minutes, out of mere fanciful or speculative fear. Nevertheless, the evidence on
record does not show that the defendant acted by such uncontrollable fear. The government also
contends that the purported fear was merely made up, and that the appellant was a willing
participant in the act. Considering all the facts and records on hand, Felix Semanada is found
guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by the circumstance of treachery,
dwelling and cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanely increasing the suffering of the victim.
Therefore, he should be sentenced to the penalty of death. The said penalty, however, cannot
be imposed upon him since there were not enough votes. Thus, the decision of the court is
hereby lowered to reclusion perpetua in accordance with the provisions of the last paragraph of
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 296, with the corresponding accessories of the law and the payment
of the costs.

58
 Rosemarie D. Tumapon

United States vs. Acebedo | G.R. No. L-5799 | February 23, 1911 | Moreland, J.

FACTS:

L. W. Berry, auditor of the district, testified that on the 10th of April, 1909, he was in Palo,
Leyte, for the purpose of investigating certain irregularities alleged to have been committed by
the municipal president of said pueblo in relation to certain fines and costs imposed by the justice
of the peace of that place. In examining previously the records of the justice of the peace the
witness had found that certain sums due from the municipal president to the justice of the peace
had not been turned over to the latter. In view of this he went immediately to the office of the
village president, Carlos H. Acebedo, the accused, and asked him why he had not turned over
certain sums collected on behalf of the justice of the peace for which his secretary had given
receipts. The appellant answered that he had left the matter of the collection of the costs and
fines and the turning over of the same to his secretary, Crisanto P. Urbina. Thereupon the witness
went to the secretary's desk, which was near that of the accused, and asked him if he had
collected any money which he had not turned over to the justice of the peace. The secretary
appeared to be nervous and was unable to give a satisfactory answer. At first he said that he had
already turned over the sums for which he had given receipts, but later said that he had forgotten
to do so. Upon asking the accused why he had not ordered his secretary to turn over said sums,
he replied that he understood that the secretary had already done it. The witness asked the
secretary for a list of the sums collected by him. He replied that he had no list other than certain
memoranda which he had indorsed upon the various executions issued by the justice of the
peace, which were in his desk. These notes simply expressed the payment of certain sums, which
aggregated a total of P50.85. Upon asking the accused and his secretary as to what had been
done with this amount, the accused answered that his secretary ought to have it. The secretary
thereupon opened his money box but could find therein only P10.55. The witness then asked him
for the balance and he replied that he would get it from the house. Agains asking the accused
why he had not turned over those sums immediately after having collected them, calling his
attention to the fact that several months before he had spoken to him about the same matter,
at which time he had told him that it was his duty always to turn over sums collected as quickly
as they were recovered, the accused gave no other explanation that that he had confided the
whole matter to his secretary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance erred in its decision convicting the appellant of the
crime of malversation of funds.

RULING:

Yes. Under the provisions of the law a person is guilty of malversation of public funds only
when he converts them to his own use or to the use of some other person, or when he handles
them so negligently as to permit someone else to convert them. In this case it is unquestioned,
from the evidence, that the accused did not convert said sums or any portion of them to his own
use, nor to the use of any other person. It appears proved beyond question that said sums were
converted by his secretary, Crisanto P. Urbina, to his own personal use and not to the use or
benefit of the appellant in this case. That portion of the law which provides that the failure on
the part of a person to account for public funds which have come into his hands is prima
facie evidence of his guilt does not meet the situation here presented. Such presumption simply
takes the place of affirmative proofs showing the actual conversion. It obviates the necessity of
proving acts of conversion on the part of the accused, a thing almost always extremely difficult
to do. Therefore, such presumption stands, making a prima facie case against the accused only
until such time as he rebuts it by proof showing the contrary. In the case at bar the appellant has
presented proofs conclusively showing that such presumption is not applicable in his case,
inasmuch as he did not receive the money, never had it in his physical possession, and did not
convert the same. This court recently convicted the said Crisanto P. Urbina of the crime

59
of estafa for stealing the very sum, or a part thereof, which the appellant in this case is charged
with having embezzled. No conspiracy between the appellant and his secretary has been shown
in this case, nor did such conspiracy appear in the case against Urbina. No guilty knowledge of
the theft committed by the secretary was shown on the part of the appellant in this case, nor
does it appear that he in any way participated in the fruits of the crime. If the secretary stole the
money in question without the knowledge or consent of the appellant and without negligence
on his part, then certainly the latter can not be convicted of embezzling the same money or any
part thereof. law library

The evidence completely fails in showing that any portion of the money in this case
actually into the hands of the appellant. It fails utterly to establish that he had any knowledge of
the peculations of his secretary. It, therefore, fails to demonstrate that he, directly or indirectly,
embezzled the money in question or any portion thereof. Nor is it shown that the accused was
guilty of negligence or bad faith in leaving the collection and remitting the said sums to his
secretary. The fact that the appellant permitted his secretary to make these collections and to
turn the sums collected over to the justice of the peace does not constitute such abandonment,
fault or negligence as is described and penalized in the law. law library
A person, to be guilty of a crime, must commit that crime himself or he must, in some
manner, participate in its commission or in the fruits thereof. The appellant in this case so far as
appears from the record, has done none of these things.

For these reasons the judgment of conviction is hereby reversed and the discharge of the
defendant from custody ordered forthwith.

David vs. People | G.R. No. 181861 | October 17, 2011 | Peralta, J.

FACTS:

On June 29, 2003 at around 1PM the Intelligence Operative of Concepcion Police
Station,Concepcion, Tarlac descended upon L. Cortez St., Brgy. San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac to
conduct a search with a warrant upon the house of Raul David accompanied by Brgy.
Captain Antonio Cannono and found six (6) sachets of marijuana and three (3) plastic sachets of
asubstance identified as shabu on top of a locked aparador. At the time the appellant was two
meters away in the sala, photographs of seized items were taken and inventoried and signed by
Brgy. Captain Cannono.

Apellant was then charged with violation of Section 11, Art. II, of RA 9165 for illegally
possessing 3.865 grams of marijuana and 0.327 grams of shabu. The RTC Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac
sentenced the accused to imprisonment of 12 years and 1day as minimum to 14 years as
maximum and a fine of PHP 300,000. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the lower court
but modified penalty to imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day as minimum to 14 years as maximum
and a fine of PHP 300,000 for the illegal possession of marijuana and imprisonment of 12 years
and 1 day as minimum to 14 years as maximum and a fine of PHP 300,000 for illegal possession
of shabu.

ISSUE:

Did the CA erred in affirming with modifications the decision of the RTC?

RULING:

No, the Court ruled that in all criminal prosecutions for possession of dangerous drugs to
prosper, the following elements must be present:

(1) the offender is in possession of an item or object that is prohibited or regulated,

(2) that such possession is no authorized by law and
(3) that possession is freely and consciously done.

60
 Such were present when PO3 Flores found the six sachets of marijuana and 3 sachets of shabu
on top of the aparador and affirmed by Brgy.Captain Cannono when he affixed his signature in
the certificate of good search.

However, the Court applied the principle that penal statutes are construed in favor of the
accused against the state and so affirms the single penalty imposed by the RTC and sets aside the
modified penalty imposed by the CA, therefore, the accused is sentenced to imprisonment of
12years and 1 day as minimum to 14 years as maximum and a fine of PHP 300,000 for the illegal
possession of marijuana and shabu.

Petition is denied.

61
 Teodoro R. Llanes II

People vs. Montesclaros | 589 SCRA 320 | G.R. No. 181084 | Puno, C.J.

FACTS:

ABC, a 13 year old at the time of the incident was the daughter of Ida Montesclaros. Both
of them are renting a room owned by Bartolome Tampus, a barangay tanod. Ida worked as a
waitress in a beer house. On April 1, 1995 at 4pm, ABC testified that she was in the house with
Ida and Tampus, both of them are drinking beer. She was forced to drink beer and became
intoxicated after three and a half glasses. While laying on the floor, she overhear that Tampus
requested Ida to have “remedyo” / sexual intercourse with her.

Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave soon as he is finished. She left Tampus with
alone with ABC and headed to work. ABC woke up with loose garter of her panties and pain over
her body and blood stain on her genitalia. Her mother arrived home the following morning, ABC
cried but was ignored by her mother. Another testimony of ABC that on April 4, 1995 around
1AM, she was left alone in her room since Ida was working. Tampus went inside her room and
threatened to kill her if she ever shouts, he then performed sexual act on ABC and left after
consummating the act. ABC told her mother about the incident but was ignored again.

ABC sought the help from her Aunt Nielle Montesclaros. They filed a complaint . ABC
revealed a deep healed laceration on her hymen, which was examined by an expert, who later
testified on Court. Both Ida and Tampus appealed and deny allegations against them.

Ida claimed that she left for work at 4pm on April 1 and came back 6am on the following
day. She said would always bring her daughter with her for work and there was never an instance
that she was left alone in the house.

Tampus claimed that he was on duty on April 3 and 4 from 7pm to 5am. Guillermo Berdin,
a defense witness of Tampus, testified that he reported on 8pm and left at 5am as reflected on
the logbook but on cross-examination, Berdin could not tell whether the signature on the logbook
belonged to Tampus. It was noted that handwriting of Tampus in logbook entry of April 2 is
different from April 3. It was also revealed that the house of Tampus is 500 meters away or three
minute walk from barangay tanod outpost and he could leave unnoticed without permission.

A medical certificate of Ida Montesclaros was brought to court showing that she was an
outpatient at Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry Department from Nov 11, 1994
to Jan 12 1995 and was provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia, paranoid type.

On the basis of the medical report and the testimony of the attending physician, Ida’s
schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals to have
diminished the exercise of her will-power though it did not deprive her of the consciousness of
her acts. The court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found
that Ida failed to prove that she was completely deprived of intelligence on April 1, 1995.

Foregoing considerations, Court finds Tampus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of rape, as principal. Tampus died during pending resolutions of his appeal and his case
was dismissed. Ida is found guilty as an accomplice of two counts of rape by Tampus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not records for Ida Montesclaros liable as an accomplice for rape of ABC?

RULLING:

Yes, Ida Montesclaros is liable as an accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC.
Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code,

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cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. The following
requisites must be proved in order that a person can be considered an accomplice

(a) community of design, I.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose
(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed
to the person charged as accomplice.

The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the execution of the rape by
Tampus when prior to the act of rape by Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer and she agreed
to Tampus’ request for him to have sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida’s acts show that she had
knowledge of and even gave her permission to the plan of Tampus to have sexual intercourse
with her daughter, thus she is an accomplice.

People vs. Bi-ay | 637 SCRA 828 | G.R. No. 197540 | Brion, J.

FACTS:

On Dec. 26, 1996 at 7pm, victim Rodrigo Claro, together with his son Baby Boy Claro were
in the house of his father, Francisco Claro in Sitio Barangay Caliling, Cauayan, Negros Occidental.
While Rodrigo and Francisco were talking, all accused Jorge Bi-ay, Alex Lingasa and Elisio B-iay Jr.
arrived. Jorge approached Francisco to ask some coffee and was accommodated. After the coffee
was ready, Jorge asked Rodrigo to serve coffee to his two companions outside.

Eliseo denies the accusation against him and he claimed an alibi that on Dec 26, 1996
5PM, he was with Jerry Siblag in Sitio Kalapisan, Barangay Inawayan and was renting a sound
system from Uldarico Alipan in celebration for the birth anniversary of their deceased
grandmother. They all left Uldarico’s house with the sound system and headed to their father's
house at Sitio Kantyang about 7mi away, arrived at 7pm, stayed entire evening and never left the
place. However, this was not proven. The court finds no inconsistencies on the testimonies of
Baby Boy and Francisco Claro.

Case was hold for Alex because he is still being apprehended and case for Jorge was
dismissed because he died. Eliseo is charged for murder of Rodrigro Claro. Eliseo appealed the
RTC decision for he is only liable as an accomplice instead as principal and that the court failed
to show an existence of conspiracy in killing the victim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Eliseo Bi-ay Jr, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder?

RULING:

Yes, the ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals that he is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder. Indeed, the accused is guilty as principal by direct participation. By his own
admission, he delivered the first blow on the unwary victim. He initiated the deadly assault by
hacking the helpless victim on the nape, causing the latter to immediately lose his balance and
fall to the ground. Right after his initial attack, his co-accused rushed towards the poor and
helpless victim and stabbed him several times in the back until he died. Court cannot hold the
accused liable as a mere accomplice because his active and direct involvement in the brutal killing
of the victim was too obvious.

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 Rubayyi C. Ibrahim

People vs. Alpapara | 604 SCRA 800 | G.R. No. 180421 | Quisumbing, J.

FACTS:

Domingo Alpapara, Pedro Alpapara and Alden Paya challenged Gomez Relorcasa to come
out of his house. Shortly thereafter, the three accused stormed into into the victim’s house. He
was pinned down and was then shot twice. Alden fired upwards and warned those present not
to testify to what happened. The three then took off in a passenger jeep driven by Mario Bicuna.
The RTC found the three as well as Mario Bicuna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
During the appeal, they contended that the witnesses were not credible.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

Yes, in so far as it included Mario Bicuna. There was clear conspiracy when the three-
named accused killed Gomez. Each of them performed acts which contributed to the execution
of the crime. However, the same conclusion cannot include appellant Mario Bicuna. Although he
does not deny having driven the three cited appellants, it was not proved that he knew about the
plan to kill Gomez. He cannot also be held liable as an accessory for helping the escape of the
appellants for it could not inferred that the appellants intended to escape when they boarded
the jeep driven by Bicuna after the shooting.

United States vs. Macasaet | 11 Phil. 447 | G.R. No. L-4432 | Mapa, J.

FACTS:

In September 1907, Appellant Agripino Macasaet had been selling native wine at retail
without the necessary license. This act was in violation of Section 66, in relation with Section 68,
subsection 5 of the Internal Revenue Law. The said section prescribes alternatively the payment
of a fine or imprisonment or both in the discretion of the court. In this case, appellant was
charged with a fine of 300php and subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency with respect to
the payment imposed. Macasaet appealed as he felt that the penalty of imprisonment was illegal.
The judgment was based on Act. No. 1732 which took effect on November of the same year when
the case was still pending trial. Act No. 1732 provides that the guilty person shall be charged with
subsidiary imprisonment until the fine is satisfied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not penalties provided in Act. No. 1732 be applicable to the case of Macasaet.

HELD:

No. No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission. Penal statutes cannot be made retroactive, except in the case they are favorable to
the accused. Inasmuch as Act No. 1732 did not go into force until after the commission of the
crime by Macasaet, subsidiary imprisonment cannot be imposed.

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 Sahanie M. Mohammad Ali

People vs. Villaraza | 81 SCRA 95 | G.R. No. L-46228 | January 17, 1978 | Aquino, J.

FACTS:
On October 16, 1974, Caesar Puerto issued two bouncing checks for the total sum of
P4,966.63. City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order March 31, 1976 noted that the accused
had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. He directed that the case be
elevated, for trial, to the Court of First Instance or the Circuit Criminal Court.

His view is that the case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance because estafa committed by the accused is punishable by prision mayor medium under
Presidential Decree No. 818 which amended article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first Instance of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan
de Oro Branch VIII returned the case to the city court because in its opinion the case falls within
the concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts and, the city court, as the first court which took
cognizance of the case, should try it.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Presidential Decree No. 818 is applicable to the Puerto’s case.
2. Whether or not the case can be elevated for trial to the Court of First Instance.

HELD:

1. No. The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one day to ten years,
imposed by Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to swindling by means of issuing
bouncing checks committed on or after October 22, 1975. That increased penalty does
not apply to estafa committed on October 16, 1974 because it would make the decree an
ex post facto law.

2. No. City courts shall try parties charged with an offense, in which the penalty provided by
law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or
fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both. Since the case of estafa imputed to Caesar
Puerto is punishable under Article 325 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto mayor
maximum to prision correctional minimum or four months and one day to two years and
four months, the case shall be returned to the city court.

Gonzales v. Court of Appeals |277 SCRA 518 |G.R. No. 95523| August 18, 1997 | Romero, J.

FACTS:
Version of the prosecution:

On May 20, 1984, at about six o’clock in the evening, petitioner arrived outside the house
the Verdes (victims) and without provocation started to attack Zenaida (Verde), Jaime (Verde)
tried to restrain the petitioner which made the latter turn on the former. Petitioner pulled out
his gun and fired at Jaime but missed his mark. It was reported to the authorities, and the paraffin
test showed that the petitioner’s right hand was positive for gunpowder residue.

Version of the defense:

Petitioner testified that on the day of the incident he was with his barrio mates when a
commotion attracted their attention. A group of persons were chasing and unidentified person
who was running towards their direction with a gun in hand while the mob was shouting
“harangin.” The unidentified person accidentally fell and dropped the gun he was holding which

65
petitioner then grabbed. The former hastily boarded a passing bus, and the Verdes who turned
out to be the persons giving chase demanded the gun from the petitioner who refused to give it.
A scuffle issued during which the gun accidentally went off without hitting anybody.

The court a quo acquitted the petitioner of the offense of attempted homicide but found him
guilty of the offense of illegal possession of firearm, with the latter charge the Court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner was sentenced17 years, 4 months, 1 day to
18 years, 8 months of Reclusion Temporal, without pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioner filed an appeal, which did not persuade the appellate court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of firearm.

RULING:

YES. There is no doubt that the petitioner is indeed guilty of having intentionally
possessed an unlicensed firearm. On this score, we note that a prosecution witness testified that
petitioner pulled the gun from his waist and fired a shot aimed at Jaime Verdes foot. The court
did not find compelling reason in departing from the factual findings of the two courts,
petitioner’s conviction is affirmed.

The initial ruling of the court is modified, reducing the sentence of the petitioner in view
of the passage of R.A. No. 8294 wherein the penalty for simple illegal possession of firearms has
been lowered. Since penal laws when favorable to the accused shall be given retroactive effect,
the enacted law applies to the case at bar. Prior to the passage of R.A. 8294 the crime of simple
illegal possession of firearm was penalized with reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua, after its enactment, the penalty was reduced to prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).

Accordingly, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the principal penalty for the
offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is four (4) years and two (2) months as minimum,
to six (6) years, as maximum and a fine of P15,000.00. Consistent with the doctrine that an appeal
in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, the appellate court may, applying the
new law, additionally impose a fine, which if unpaid, will subject the convict to subsidiary
imprisonment, pursuant to Art. 39 of the Revised Penal Code. The decision of the CA in the
conviction of the petitioner is affirmed with modification that the penalty is reduced to four (4)
years and two (2) months, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. Since the petitioner has
already served the punishment which is well beyond the current penalty, the court ordered his
immediate release.

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 Hussein Hamdi S. Mohamad

Go vs. Dimagiba | 460 SCRA 451 | GR No. 151876 | June 21, 2005 | Panganiban, J.

FACTS:

Respondent, Dimagiba was prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22, for allegedly
issuing 13 checks (bounced checks) to petitioner Go. On February 27, 2001, the said respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He prayed for the recall of the order of arrest and the
modification of the final decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment,
should have been imposed on him.

The RTC held that the rule be retroactively applied in favor of the Respondent Dimagiba.
It further noted that he was a first-time offender and an employer of at least 200 workers who
would be displaced as a result of his imprisonment and the civil liability had been satisfied
through the levy of his properties.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the retroactive application of penalty is considered valid.

RULING:

The retroactive effect of the law should be applied to the respondent.

SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law. Article 22 of the RPC is not
applicable. SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference of the
penalties for violation of BP 22. It does not the legislative intent behind.

The said law further urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the
accused-whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence.

Therefore, Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the accused,
much less those convicted by final judgment. Hence, the court ruled that the said respondent can
seek the retroactive application of the said law in his favor on the basis alone of the alleged
settlement of his civil liability.

Baking vs. The Director of Prisons | 28 SCRA 851 | GR No. L-30364 | Concepcion, C.J.

FACTS:

Petitioners concededly had been under detention for more than 18 years under the
charge of respondent, Director of Prisons on May 16, 1969.The convicted petitioners were
charged of the crime of rebellion and sentenced each of them to 10 years imprisonment. The
decision has since become final.

Previously, on march 31, 1969, petioners Baking et al. had filed their petition for Habeas
corpus. They claimed that they had been denied the right to a speedy trial.

Consequently, on May 24, 1969, after the court render its conviction for the accused, the
petitioners filed a petition for their immediate release on the grounds that they have already
served the 10-year sentences.

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 ISSUE:

Whether or not the Article 97 of the Revised Applicable to detention on prisoners or prisoners
who just serving their preventive imprisonment.

RULING:

The petitioners as detention prisoners, cannot by any stretch of imagination, be said to

be serving sentence during the period of their preventive imprisonment.

The said detention prisoners are entitled to good conduct allowances if they voluntarily
offer in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them. In which case, the credit they
receive shall be deducted. From such sentence as may be imposed upon them in the event of
their conviction.

In this case, there is no proof that the petitioners have voluntarily offered in writing to
perform such labor as may be assigned to them. Petitioners have not even told that they’ve
worked during the period of preventive imprisonment.

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 Celso D. Amantiad Jr.

People vs. Bensig | G.R. NO. 138989 | September 17, 2002 |Corona, J.

FACTS:

That on or about the 30th day of May, 1996, at about 2:00 o’clock dawn, in Brgy. Don
Potenciano Larrazabal, Ormoc City, during a barangay fiesta and there was dancing thereat, the
above-named accused attack, assault, stab and wound the person of the victim LEONIDES
VILLEGAS, without giving the latter sufficient time to defend himself, thereby inflicting upon him
mortal wound which caused his instantaneous death.

On August 5, 1996, an order of arrest was issued against the accused but he was nowhere
to be found and remained at large for over a year. Finally, on January 10, 1998, he was arrested.

During arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime of murder by setting up
the defense of denial and testified that a certain Pepe Boya was the one who killed the victim.
The RTC, however, convinced by the evidences presented by the prosecution, ruled against the
accused thereby finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt to the crime of murder sentencing
him to forty (40) years of imprisonment, pay the aggrieved party the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000) as civil indemnity, Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) as actual damages and Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000) as moral damages.

Aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, the accused filed an appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether of not the trial court erred in imposing the sentence of forty (40) years
imprisonment, pay the aggrieved party the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) as civil
indemnity, Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) as actual damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000) as moral damages.

RULING:

The decision of the RTC finding the accused-appellant Erlindo Bensig guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.

The penalty imposed upon the accused-appellant is the indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua instead of 40 years reclusion perpetua.

The award of actual damages is hereby deleted for lack of evidence. Accused-appellant
is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.

People vs. Gregorio | G.R. No. 109614-15 | March 29, 1996 |Kapunan, J.

FACTS:

That on or about the 8th day of May, 1986, in the Municipality of Murcia, Province of
Negros Occidental, Philippines, the above-named defendants-appellants, armed with a samurai
and a bolo, conspiring and confederating and mutually helping each other, with evident
premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill, attack, assault, stab and hack CARLOS
CATORSE y APELYEDO and MARCELO LO y NICAVERA thereby inflicting multiple stab and hack
wounds upon the body of the victims, which caused their instantaneous death.

The incident transpired during the wake of the grandson of one of the accused wherein
the victims, Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo and some other people namely Jovito Nicavera,

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Renato Calabas, Tunggak (son of Adronico) and Ricardo Gregorio were also attending the wake
and playing pusoy (russian poker).

At around 1:00 AM of May 8, 1986, Ricardo, in a very loud noise, reprimanded Tunggak
from peeping at the cards of other players. Overhearing this, Adronico ordered Tunggak
downstairs and scolded and boxed the latter several times.

Seeing the incident, Carlos Catorse approached and begged Adronico from further hurting
his son. While in this act of pacifying, suddenly Ricardo stealthily stabbed Carlos Catorse with a
samurai several times and fell to the ground. For his part, Adronico also repeatedly hacked the
victim with a bolo.

Meanwhile, Jovito Nicavera also tried to get out of the house but Adronico hacked him
instead hitting his left shoulder. Jovito’s nephew, Marcelo Lo, tried to help his uncle but Ricardo
hacked him on his forearm. Adronico followed and hacked Marcelo in the nape. Although
wounded, the latter managed to run out of the house but the former overtook him and hacked
him again.

After the incident, both the accused fled from the place of the crime but was pursued by
authorities and succeeded in apprehending them.

The post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the victims revealed that Carlos Catorse
sustained twelve (12) hack and four (4) stab wounds while Marcelo Lo sustained six (6) hack
wounds which caused their death.

Accordingly, an information for the murder of Carlos Catorse was filed against both
accused and another information for the murder of Marcelo Lo was filed against Adronico
Gregorio. Later, the two cases were consolidated and tried jointly by the RTC of Negros
Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 43.

Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged against them.

The trial court, however, convinced by the evidences presented by the prosecution, find
both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder sentencing them to life
imprisonment and indemnify the heirs of the victims the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (30,000)
with no subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The herein accused instituted an appeal on the following grounds: 1) the RTC erred in
giving weight and credence to the theory of the prosecution and disregarding that of the defense,
2) the RTC erred in rejecting the appellants defense of self-defense, 3) the RTC erred in finding
that their exist conspiracy and treachery, 4) the RTC erred in finding both the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

However, Ricardo Gregorio died prior to the filing of their appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC was correct in imposing the penalty of life imprisonment against the
accused.

RULING:

The Court modify the decision of the RTC with regards to the penalty imposed against
Adronico Gregorio wherein he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
indemnify the heirs of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000)
each. As to Ricardo Gregorio, his death extinguished both his criminal and civil liability arising
from the said crime.

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