G.R. No. 183965 September 18, 2009
During petitioner’s wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino
JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE NGO CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 24, which granted the demurrer to evidence of respondent Jose Ngo
Chua, resulting in the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB.
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a
Petition1 for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against
respondent. The Complaint was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 12562-
CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 24.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married,
had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene
had two children, namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent
attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to petitioner on 27 April
1959, and instructed that petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with the
following names: "ALFREDO F. SURPOSA" as father and "IRENE DUCAY" as
mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and
Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene’s mother. Respondent financially
supported petitioner and Allan. Respondent had consistently and regularly
given petitioner allowances before she got married. He also provided her
with employment. When petitioner was still in high school, respondent
required her to work at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his family.
She was later on able to work at the Gaisano- Borromeo Branch through
respondent’s efforts. Petitioner and Allan were introduced to each other and
became known in the Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate
children.
Chua (Catalino) as his representative, and it was the latter who acted as
father of the bride. Respondent’s relatives even attended the baptism of
petitioner’s daughter.2
In his Answer3 to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003, respondent
denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was
his daughter.4 Hearings then ensued during which petitioner testified that
respondent was the only father she knew; that he took care of all her needs
until she finished her college education; and that he came to visit her on
special family occasions. She also presented documentary evidence to prove
her claim of illegitimate filiation. Subsequently, on 27 March 2008,
respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence5 on the ground that the Decision
dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB
had already been barred by res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-
CEB before RTC-Branch 24.
It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on
27 October 2003, petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the
issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent. It was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 9.
Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise
Agreement in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, which was approved by
RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision6 dated 21 February 2000. The full contents of
said Decision reads:
Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the parties on
February 18, 2000, praying that judgment be rendered in accordance
therewith, the terms and conditions of which follows:
"1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that
there is no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother
Allan on one hand and [herein respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other.
This declaration, admission or acknowledgement is concurred with
petitioner’s brother Allan, who although not a party to the case, hereby
affixes his signature to this pleading and also abides by the declaration
herein.
2. As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and her
brother’s (Allan) civil, monetary and similar claims but without admitting any
liability, [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby binds himself to pay the
petitioner the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (₱2,000,000.00) and another
TWO MILLION PESOS (₱2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN SURPOSA.
Petitioner and her brother hereby acknowledge to have received in full the
said compromise amount.
3. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they have
absolutely no more claims, causes of action or demands against
[respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or
against the estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or
against all corporations, companies or business enterprises including Cebu
Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty Investment and Development
Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO NGO CHUA may
have interest or participation.
4. [Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-
demand with respect to the subject matter of the present petition.
5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the
permanent dismissal with prejudice of the captioned petition. [Respondent]
also asks for a judgment permanently dismissing with prejudice his
counterclaim."
Finding the said compromise agreement to be in order, the Court hereby
approves the same. Judgment is rendered in accordance with the provisions
of the compromise agreement. The parties are enjoined to comply with
their respective undertakings embodied in the agreement.7
With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the 21 February 2000 Decision
of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding 8830-CEB was declared final and
executory.
Petitioner filed on 15 April 2008 her Opposition8 to respondent’s Demurrer
to Evidence in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. Thereafter, RTC-Branch 24
issued its now assailed Resolution dated 25 June 2008 in Special Proceeding
No. 12562-CEB, granting respondent’s Demurrer.
RTC-Branch 24 summarized the arguments of respondent and petitioner in
the Demurrer and Opposition, respectively, as follows:
This is to resolve the issues put across in the Demurrer to the Evidence
submitted to this Court; the Opposition thereto; the Comment on the
Opposition and the Rejoinder to the Comment.
xxxx
1. The instant case is barred by the principle of res judicata because there
was a judgment entered based on the Compromise Agreement approved by
this multiple-sala Court, branch 09, on the same issues and between the
same parties.
2. That such decision of Branch 09, having attained finality, is beyond review,
reversal or alteration by another Regional Trial Court and not even the
Supreme Court, no matter how erroneous.
3. Judicial Admissions or admission in petitioner’s pleadings to the effect
that there is no blood relationship between petitioner and respondent,
which is a declaration against interest, are conclusive on her and she should
not be permitted to falsify.
4. That the Certificate of Live Birth showing that petitioner’s father is Alfredo
Surposa is a public document which is the evidence of the facts therein
stated, unless corrected by judicial order.

5. After receiving the benefits and concessions pursuant to their
compromise agreement, she is estopped from refuting on the effects
thereof to the prejudice of the [herein respondent].
The summary of the Opposition is in this wise:
1. That the illegitimate filiation of petitioner to respondent is established by
the open, and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
2. The Demurrer to the evidence cannot set up the affirmative grounds for a
Motion to Dismiss.
3. The question on the civil status, future support and future legitime can
not be subject to compromise.
4. The decision in the first case does not bar the filing of another action
asking for the same relief against the same defendant.9
Taking into consideration the aforementioned positions of the parties, RTC-
Branch 24 held that:
Looking at the issues from the viewpoint of a judge, this Court believes that
its hands are tied. Unless the Court of Appeals strikes down the Compromise
Judgment rendered by Branch 09 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
this Court will not attempt to vacate, much more annul, that Judgment
issued by a co-equal court, which had long become final and executory, and
in fact executed.
This court upholds the Policy of Judicial Stability since to do otherwise would
result in patent abuse of judicial discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The defense of lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived. At any rate, such is
brought forth in the Affirmative Defenses of the Answer.
This Court, saddled with many cases, suffers the brunt of allowing herein
case involving same parties to re-litigate on the same issues already
closed.10
In the end, RTC-Branch 24 decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to the Evidence is
hereby given due course, as the herein case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.11
RTC-Branch 24 denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration12 in a
Resolution13 dated 29 July 2008.
Petitioner then filed the instant Petition raising the following issues for
resolution of this Court:
I
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments
predicated upon a compromise agreement on cases enumerated in Article
2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
II
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the parties
herein before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 09 of Cebu City effectively
bars the filing of the present case.14
At the outset, the Court notes that from the RTC Resolution granting
respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner went directly to this Court
for relief. This is only proper, given that petitioner is raising pure questions of
law in her instant Petition.a1f
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.
Clearly, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision or final
order or resolution of the trial court on pure questions of law. A question of
law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact exists, on the other hand,
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely
relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the
undisputed facts.15
The central issue in this case is whether the Compromise Agreement
entered into between petitioner and respondent, duly approved by RTC-
Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No.
8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB still
pending before RTC-Branch 24.1avvphi1
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well- regulated
system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in
various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity,
which makes it in the interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause, nemo debet bis
vexari pro eadem causa.16
For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or
order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits;
and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action.17
It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously before
RTC-Branch 9, and Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, presently before RTC-
Branch 24, were both actions for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate
filiation filed by petitioner against respondent. Hence, there is apparent
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two
cases. However, the question arises as to whether the other elements of res
judicata exist in this case.
The court rules in the negative.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.18
In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,19 the Court pronounced
that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based
on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise
agreement must comply with the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code,
to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the
subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that is
established. And, like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a
compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public policy and public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary
to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights in and holds no
obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect at all.20
In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to Article 2035 of
the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed
on 18 February 2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21
February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to
settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an
illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother
Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent,
respondent would pay petitioner and Allan ₱2,000,000.00 each. Although
unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise
Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and
future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the
Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and
respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil
Code.
Advincula v. Advincula21 has a factual background closely similar to the one
at bar. Manuela Advincula (Manuela) filed, before the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Iloilo, Civil Case No. 3553 for acknowledgment and support, against
Manuel Advincula (Manuel). On motion of both parties, said case was
dismissed. Not very long after, Manuela again instituted, before the same
court, Civil Case No. 5659 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel.
This Court declared that although Civil Case No. 3553 ended in a
compromise, it did not bar the subsequent filing by Manuela of Civil Case
No. 5659, asking for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was
an action for acknowledgement, affecting a person’s civil status, which
cannot be the subject of compromise.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a
child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no
compromise on the status and filiation of a child.22 Paternity and filiation or
the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and
it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the
will or agreement of the parties.23
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated
18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and
vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all.
The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties'
alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.24
Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise
Agreement, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No.
8830-CEB, already made said contract valid and legal. Obviously, it would
already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal.
RTC-Branch 9 had no authority to approve and give effect to a Compromise
Agreement that was contrary to law and public policy, even if said contract
was executed and submitted for approval by both parties. RTC-Branch 9
would not be competent, under any circumstances, to grant the approval of
the said Compromise Agreement. No court can allow itself to be used as a
tool to circumvent the explicit prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil
Code. The following quote in Francisco v. Zandueta25 is relevant herein:
It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as
such, jurisdiction in a matter which is excluded by the laws of the land. In
such a case the question is not whether a competent court has obtained
jurisdiction of a party triable before it, but whether the court itself is
competent under any circumstances to adjudicate a claim against the
defendant. And where there is want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter, a
judgment is void as to all persons, and consent of parties can never impart
to it the vitality which a valid judgment derives from the sovereign state, the
court being constituted, by express provision of law, as its agent to
pronounce its decrees in controversies between its people. (7 R. C. L., 1039.)
A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be
the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it
can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may
be said to be a lawless thing that can be treated as an outlaw and slain on
sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.26
In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not
barred by res judicata, since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in
its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
petitioner and respondent’s Compromise Agreement, which was contrary to
law and public policy; and, consequently, the Decision dated 21 February
2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, being null and void for having
been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction, could not have attained
finality or been considered a judgment on the merits.
Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise
Agreement between petitioner and respondent is void for being contrary to
law and public policy, the admission petitioner made therein may still be
appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch 24
is only reminded that while petitioner’s admission may have evidentiary
value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of filiation.27
Proceeding from its foregoing findings, the Court is remanding this case to
the RTC-Branch 24 for the continuation of hearing on Special Proceedings
No. 12562-CEB, more particularly, for respondent’s presentation of
evidence.
Although respondent’s pleading was captioned a Demurrer to Evidence, it
was more appropriately a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, Section 1
of which is reproduced in full below:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. – After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If
the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case
without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would
ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he is not entitled to
the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the
expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which
the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.28
The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a demurrer to
evidence should be granted, thus:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law,
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff's evidence
together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn
therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to
evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise
sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and
indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable
therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material
elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation
necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence
is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.29
The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether
petitioner has been able to show that she is entitled to her claim, and it is
incumbent upon RTC-Branch 24 to make such a determination. A perusal of
the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 in Special Proceeding
No. 12562-CEB shows that it is barren of any discussion on this matter. It did
not take into consideration any of the evidence presented by petitioner. RTC-
Branch 24 dismissed Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB on the sole basis of
res judicata, given the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, approving the Compromise Agreement
between petitioner and respondent. Hence, the Resolution dated 25 June
2008 of RTC-Branch 24 should be deemed as having dismissed Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on the ground of res judicata rather than an
adjudication on the merits of respondent’s demurrer to evidence.
Necessarily, the last line of Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court should
not apply herein and respondent should still be allowed to present evidence
before RTC-Branch 24 in Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB.
It must be kept in mind that substantial justice must prevail. When there is a
strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict
application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the
interest of substantial justice. The Rules of Court were conceived and
promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to
bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is
precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in
fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the
balance, technicalities take backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around.30
WhereforE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24, in Special Proceeding No.
12562-CEB is REVERSED and set aside. This case is ordered REMANDED to
the said trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the ruling of
the Court herein. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999
MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City
and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her mother/guardian
VIRCEL D. ANDRES, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 oft he Revised Rules of Court seeking to
nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's
Orders, dated November 25, 1993 and February 4, 1994, respectively,
denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Civil Case No. C-
16107, entitled "Glen Camil Andres de Asis, etc. vs. Manuel de Asis", and the
motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are as follows:
On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in
her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis,
brought an action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-935 before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 94, alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis (the
petitioner here) is the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis,
and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the
latter, despite repeated demands.
In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor and
theorized that he cannot therefore be required to provide support for him.
On July 4, 1989, private respondent Vircel D. Andres, through counsel, sent
in a manifestation the pertinent portion of which, reads;
1. That this proposed Amended Answer, defendant (herein petitioner)
has made a judicial admission/declaration that "1). defendant denies that
the said minor child (Glen Camil) is his child 2) he (petitioner) has no
obligation to the plaintiff Glen Camil . . .
2. That with the aforesaid judicial admission/declarations by the
defendant, it seems futile and a useless exercise to claim support from said
defendant.
3. That under the foregoing circumstances it would be more practical
that plaintiff withdraws the complains against the defendant subject to the
condition that the defendant should not pursue his counterclaim in the
above-entitled case, . . . 1
By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the defendant
agreed to move for the dismissal of the case. Acting thereupon, the Regional
Trial Court a quo issued the following Order of August 8, 1989, dismissing
Civil Case No. Q-88-935 with prejudice, to wit:
Acting on the manifestation of Atty. Romualdo C. delos Santos, counsel for
the defendant, that counsel for the plaintiff Atty. Ismael J. Andres has no
objection that this case be withdrawn provided that the defendant will
withdraw the counterclaim, as prayed for, let the case be dismissed with
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.2
On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance and support
was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the name of Glen Camil
Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres.
Docketed as Civil Case No. C-16107 before Branch 130 of the Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan, the said Complaint prayed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that judgment
be rendered ordering defendant:
1. To pay plaintiff the sum of not less than P2,000.00 per month for
every month since June 1, 1987 as support in arrears which defendant failed
to provide plaintiff shortly after her birth in June 1987 up to present;
2. To give plaintiff a monthly allowance of P5,000.00 to be paid in
advance on or before the 5th of each and every month.
3. To give plaintiff by way of support pendente lite a monthly
allowance of P5,000.00 per month, the first monthly allowance to start
retroactively from the first day of this month and the subsequent ones to be
paid in advance on or before the 5th of each succeeding month.
4. To pay the costs of suit.
Plaintiff prays for such other relief just and equitable under the premises. 3
On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the
ground of res judicata, alleging that Civil Case C-16107 is barred by the prior
judgment which dismissed with prejudice Civil Case Q -88-935.
In the Order dated November 25, 1993 denying subject motion to dismiss,
the trial court ruled that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support
for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by
law. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order met the same
fate. It was likewise denied.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. But on
June 7, 1996, the Court of Appeals found that the said Petition devoid of
merit and dismissed the same.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this court via the present petition,
posing the question whether or not the public respondent acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding
the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court, and holding that an
action for support cannot be barred by res judicata.
To buttress his submission, petitioner invokes the previous dismissal of the
Complaint for maintenance and support, Civil Case Q-88-935, filed by the
mother and guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, (the herein
private respondent). In said case, the complainant manifested that because
of the defendant's judicial declaration denying that he is the father of
subject minor child, it was "futile and a useless exercise to claim support
from defendant". Because of such manifestation, and defendant's assurance
that he would not pursue his counterclaim anymore, the parties mutually
agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint. The motion was granted
by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, which then dismissed the case with
prejudice.
Petitioner contends that the aforecited manifestation, in effect admitted the
lack of filiation between him and the minor child, which admission binds the
complainant, and since the obligation to give support is based on the
existence of paternity and filiation between the child and the putative
parent, the lack thereof negates the right to claim for support. Thus,
petitioner maintains that the dismissal of the Complaint by the lower court
on the basis of the said manifestation bars the present action for support,
especially so because the order of the trial court explicitly stated that the
dismissal of the case was with prejudice.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a
third person. Article 301 of the Civil Code, the law in point, reads:
Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it
be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what
the recipient owes the obligor. . . .
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.
Art. 2035, ibid, provides, that:
No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
The raison d' etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission
and/or compromise of the right to support is stated, thus:
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to
maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for
this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to
life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to attain the
former, cannot be renounced.
xxx xxx xxx
To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of
a person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of
the recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to public policy. 4
In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff in the
first case, manifested that she was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile
to claim support from petitioner who denied his paternity over the child.
Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of filiation
between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to
believe that such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support
from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future complaint for
support.
The manifestation sent in by respondent's mother in the first case, which
acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its complaint for support,
amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the minor,
Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the
petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner
and respondent's mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance
and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the
nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the
prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.
Thus, the admission made by counsel for the wife of the facts alleged in a
motion of the husband, in which the latter prayed that his obligation to
support be extinguished cannot be considered as an assent to the prayer,
and much less, as a waiver of the right to claim for support. 5
It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first
be shown between the claimant and the parent. However, paternity and
filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially
established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which
the right to support is derived being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can
be .given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as
to the existence of the cause. 6
Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding upon the
respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary and does not
conclusively establish the lack of filiation.
Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's theory that the dismissal with
prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the effect of res judicata on the
subsequent case for support. The case of Advincula vs. Advincula 7 comes to
the fore. In Advincula, the minor, Manuela Advincula, instituted a case for
acknowledgment and support against her putative father, Manuel Advincula.
On motion of both parties and for the reason that the "plaintiff has lost
interest and is no longer interested in continuing the case against the
defendant and has no further evidence to introduce in support of the
complaint", the case was dismissed. Thereafter, a similar case was instituted
by Manuela, which the defendant moved to dismiss, theorizing that the
dismissal of the first case precluded the filing of the second case.
In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:
The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional
because the amount may be increased or decreased depending upon the
means of the giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the
right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a
third person neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes
the obligator (Art .301). Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived
or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of
compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135, cited in IV Civil Code
by Padilla, p. 648; 1956 Ed.). This being true, it is indisputable that the
present action for support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact the
previous case filed against the same defendant was dismissed. And it also
appearing that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an adjudication
upon the merits, as heretofore shown, the right of herein plaintiff-appellant
to reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment is available, as her
needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she has the right to bring an
action for support, for it is only then that her cause for action is accrues.. . .
xxx xxx xxx
It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon compromise.
Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of a persons and future
support, cannot be the subject of compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil
Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not
bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the same
defendant. (emphasis supplied).
Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case Q-88-935 and the
lower court's pronouncement that such dismissal was with prejudice, the
second action for support may still prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143256 August 28, 2001
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and MERCEDES CARANTO FERNANDEZ, HUSBAND
and WIFE, EDDIE C. FERNANDEZ and LUZ FERNANDEZ, SPOUSES, petitioners,
vs.
ROMEO FERNANDEZ, POTENCIANO FERNANDEZ, FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ,
JULITA FERNANDEZ, WILLIAM FERNANDEZ, MARY FERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
FERNANDEZ, GERARDO FERNANDEZ, RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and GREGORIO
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision1 of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated December 22, 1999 affirming the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court Branch 40, Dagupan City in an action
for nullity of contracts, partition, recovery of possession and damages in
favor of plaintiffs-appellees, herein respondents.
The facts as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows:3
"The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were
the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City covered by
TCT No. T-9267 (525) consisting of 194 sq. meters, and the two-storey
building constructed thereon covered by Tax Declaration 22-592-1. It is
undisputed that Generosa gave birth to a baby boy named Rogelio who died
when he was only twelve (12) years old as paralytic. In the testimony of
Romeo Fernandez (TSN, Aug. 31, 1994, pp. 9-14) it was revealed that the
late Spouses being childless by the death of their son, purchased from a
certain Miliang for P20.00 a one (1) month baby boy. The boy being referred
to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant.
Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and
became a dental technician. He lived with the couple until they became old
and disabled.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving his wife Generosa
A. de Venecia and Rodolfo Fernandez and an estate consisting of the
following:
(a) "A parcel of land (Lot 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral
Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No.
925), situated in the Barrio of Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE.
by Lot No. 447; on the SE. by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano
Street; and on the NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One Hundred
Ninety Four (194) square meters, more or less. Covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan Registry of Deeds."
(b) "A two (2) storey residential building made of concrete and wood, G.
I. roofing with a floor area of 154 square meters and 126 square meters of
the first and second floor, respectively. Declared under Tax Decl. No. 22-
592-1 and assessed therein at P26,000.00."
On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the following:
To: Generosa de Venecia Vda. De Fernandez

(a) 119.5 sq. m. located on the southwestern portion of the land;
(b) Whole residential house above-mentioned;
To: Rodolfo V. Fernandez
74.5 square meters to be taken on the northeastern portion of the land.
On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Eddie Fernandez, appellant's son over the following:
"A portion of One Hundred Nineteen and One-Half (119.5) Square meters
including the building and/or all existing thereon to be taken from the
southwestern portion of the parcel of land described as follows, to wit:
'A parcel of land (Lot No. 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral Survey
of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925),
situated in the Barrio of Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot
No. 447; on the SE by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano Street; and
on the NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One Hundred and Ninety-
Four (194), Square Meters, more or less, covered by TRANSFER CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE NO. 525 (T-9267) — Pangasinan Registry of Deeds" (Exh. "8",
Exhibits for the Defendants)
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William,
Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez,
being nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father
Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an action to
declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio
(docketed as Civil Case No. 94-00016-D).
The complaint alleged that defendants (herein appellants), motivated by
unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious acts of depriving the plaintiff
and other heirs (herein appellees) of the deceased spouses, without basis of
heirship or any iota of rights to succession or inheritance, taking advantage
of the total physical and mental incapacity of the deceased Generosa de
Venecia aggravated by unlawful scheme confederated, colluded and
conspired with each other in causing the fake, simulated grossly inauthentic
contracts purporting to be executed on August 31, 1989 and jointly on the
same date, caused the execution of the deed of absolute sale purportedly
signed by Generosa de Venecia covering the same property described in the
deed of extra-judicial partition and by virtue of the said acts, appellants
were able to secure new land titles in their favor (Records, pp. 3-4,
Complaint). Appellees thus prayed that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition,
Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54641 be declared
void from the beginning.
Significantly, in their answer, defendants alleged:
"16. That the deceased Sps. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa were
husband and wife blessed with one child the herein defendant Rodolfo V.
Fernandez whom they acknowledged during their lifetime. (italics supplied)
18. That the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by the late Generosa de Venecia and defendant Rodolfo V.
Fernandez which are now in question were all made with the full
knowledge, consent and approval of the parties thereto and for value."
(Records, pp. 20-21, Answer)."
On May 10, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiffs, the dispositive portion reads:4
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against
the defendants;
1. Declaring the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989
(Exh. "3 ), the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 31, 1989 (Exh. 8"), the
TCT No. 54641, and the TCT No. 54693 null and void;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey to, and to peacefully surrender
to the plaintiffs the possession of the house and lot in question;
3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay to plaintiffs the
following:
(a) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(d) P2,000.00 as litigation costs.
SO ORDERED."
In so ruling, the trial court found that defendant Rodolfo Fernandez was not
a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the
spouses. Rodolfo's claim as a son of the deceased spouses Fernandez was
negated by the fact that (1) he only reached high school and was told to stop
studying so that he could help in the clinic of Dr. Fernandez, (2) he failed to
present any birth certificate, (3) the book entitled Fercolla clan which was
compiled and edited by respected people such as Ambassador Armando
Fernandez, Justice Jorge Coquia and Teresita Coquia-Sison, showed the
geneology of the family of Dr. Jose and Generosa Fernandez without a child;
a pedigree may be admitted in evidence to prove the facts of genealogy and
that entries in a family bible or other family books or charts, engravings or
rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of
pedigree,5 (4) the certification issued by the Records Management and
Archives Office that there was no available information about the birth of
petitioner Rodolfo to the spouses Fernandez, (5) the application of Dr. Jose
Fernandez for backpay certificate naming petitioner Rodolfo as his son was
doubtful considering that there were blemishes or alteration in the original
copy; (6) that Rodolfo's baptismal certificate was spurious and falsified since
there were no available records of baptism with the parish from June 7,
1930 to August 8, 1936, while Rodolfo's baptismal certificate which was
issued in 1989 showed that he was baptized on November 24, 1934. The
court found that the extra-judicial partition and the deed of absolute sale
were prepared and executed under abnormal, unusual and irregular
circumstances which rendered the documents null and void.
Defendants Rodolfo Fernandez et. al appealed to the respondent Court of
Appeals which affirmed the trial court's judgment in its assailed decision
dated December 22, 1999.
In resolving the appeal, the respondent court delved into the legitimacy of
defendant-appellant Rodolfo Fernandez' filiation with the deceased spouses.
It found that appellants' evidence which consisted of a certificate of baptism
stating that he was a child of the spouses Fernandez and the application for
recognition of rights to back pay under RA 897 filed by Dr. Jose Fernandez,
wherein the latter referred to Rodolfo as his son, did not acquire evidentiary
weight to prove his filiation. The appellate court concluded that while
baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they were
evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates
therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations
made therein with respect to his kinsfolk; that while the application for back
pay was a public document, it was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose
K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein appellant; that the
public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family Code referred to
the written admission of filiation embodied in a public document purposely
executed as an admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case
wherein the public document was executed as an application for the
recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act No. 897.
Appellants Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed their motion for reconsideration
which was denied in a resolution dated May 17, 2000.6
Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed the instant petition for review with the
following issues:

I THAT THE PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ WAS NOT THE CHILD OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT ORDERING THE DEFENDANTS, PETITIONERS HEREIN, TO
RECONVEY TO, AND PEACEFULLY SURRENDER TO THE PLAINTIFFS,
RESPONDENTS HEREIN, THE POSSESSION OF THE HOUSE AND LOT IN
QUESTION BECAUSE THE SAID ORDER IS PALPABLY CONTRARY TO THE
ADMITTED FACTS THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASONS:
(a) THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION ARE ADMITTED BY THE PARTIES
TO BE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF THE SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ
AND GENEROSA DE VENECIA, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE NOT RELATED TO GENEROSA DE VENECIA
BY CONSANGUINITY, ARE NOT HER INTESTATE HEIRS AND CANNOT SUCCEED
AB INTESTATO TO HER INTESTATE ESTATE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT DECLARING (1) THE DEED OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION
DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. '3'), THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE ALSO
DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. '8'), TCT NO. 54641, AND TCT NO. 54693
NULL AND VOID FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(a) IT HAS NO FACTUAL BASIS DULY ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, NOT BEING PARTIES TO THE QUESTIONED DEEDS,
HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF SAID DOCUMENTS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING
SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA DE VENECIA BECAUSE
(a) THE FILIATION OF PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ COULD NOT
BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF DOCUMENTS, PARTITION, RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND DAMAGES,
AND;
(b) THE DECISION AS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT
DECLARE IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION THEREOF THAT PETITIONER
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ IS NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE FERNANDEZ
AND GENEROSA FERNANDEZ.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO FACTUAL
BASIS IN THE AFFIRMED DECISION TO JUSTIFY SUCH AWARD.
The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the rights of the
parties to the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Fernandez.
Petitioners allege that the respondent court found the extra-judicial
partition executed by petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa
Fernandez, widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, null and void because the former
allegedly failed to prove legitimate filiation to his putative father, the late Dr.
Jose Fernandez. Petitioners, contend, however, that the burden of proof lies
with the respondents because they were the ones contesting the filiation of
Rodolfo Fernandez. They insist that both lower courts had no power to pass
upon the matter of filiation because it could not be collaterally attacked in
the present action but in a separate and independent action directly
impugning such filiation.
We are not persuaded.

It must be noted that the respondents' principal action was for the
declaration of absolute nullity of two documents, namely: deed of extra-
judicial partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an action to impugn
one's legitimacy. The respondent court ruled on the filiation of petitioner
Rodolfo Fernandez in order to determine Rodolfo's right to the deed of
extra-judicial partition as the alleged legitimate heir of the spouses
Fernandez. While we are aware that one's legitimacy can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no
application in the instant case considering that respondents' claim was that
petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa
Fernandez; we do not have a situation wherein they (respondents) deny that
Rodolfo was a child of their uncle's wife. The case of Benitez-Badua vs. Court
of Appeals,7 which has a similar factual backdrop is instructive:
"A careful reading of the above articles8 will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not
to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a
child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn
the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for
him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for
biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child;
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the
written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and
171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when
it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench
is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is
not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was
not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz:
"Petitioners' recourse to Art. 263 of the New Civil Code (now Art. 170 of the
Family Code) is not well taken. This legal provision refers to an action to
impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action
to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents
to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt.
They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child
of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither
legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal
fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.""
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner Rodolfo
Fernandez to the deceased spouses Fernandez for the purpose of
determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the property subject of the
extra-judicial partition. In fact, the issue of whether or not Rodolfo
Fernandez was the son of the deceased spouses Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia was squarely raised by petitioners in their pre-trial
brief9 filed before the trial court, hence they are now estopped from
assailing the trial court's ruling on Rodolfo's status.
We agree with the respondent court when it found that petitioner Rodolfo
failed to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses Fernandez. Such is a
factual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by
the trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court and
they carry even more weight10 when the Court of Appeals affirms the
factual findings of the trial court.11 We accordingly find no cogent reason to
disagree with the respondent court's evaluation of the evidence presented,
thus:12
"The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft of any records of
the birth of appellant Rodolfo Fernandez. On October 11, 1995, it issued a
certification worded as follows:

"This is to certify that the Register of Births for the Municipality of Dagupan,
Pangasinan in the year 1984 is not on file with the National Archives, hence,
there is no available information about the birth of Rodolfo V. Fernandez
alleged to have been born on November 24, 1934 to the spouses Jose K.
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia in Dagupan, Pangasinan" (Records, p.
146)
Appellant nonetheless, contends that the Application for Recognition of
Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public document and a conclusive
proof of the legitimate filiation between him and the deceased spouses
(Rollo, p. 41, Appellants' Brief). We do not agree.
It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights
Under Act No. 897 is a public document nevertheless, it was not executed to
admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the
herein appellant. The public document contemplated in Article 172 of the
Family Code refer to the written admission of filiation embodied in a public
document purposely executed as an admission of filiation and not as
obtaining in this case wherein the public document was executed as an
application for the recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act No.
897. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
"SECTION 32. Public documents as evidence — Documents consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave
rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."
The rule is not absolute in the sense that the contents of a public document
are conclusive evidence against the contracting parties as to the truthfulness
of the statements made therein. They constitute only prima facie evidence
of the facts which give rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
Thus, a baptismal certificate issued by a Spanish priest under the Spanish
regime constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts certified to by the
parish priest from his own knowledge such as the administration of the
sacrament on the day and in the place and manner set forth in the
certificate; but it does not constitute proof of the statements made therein
concerning the parentage of the person baptized (Francisco, Evidence, 1994
ed., p. 516, citing Garcia vs. Gajul, 53 Phil. 642; Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil.
350; Buan vs. Arquiza, 5 Phil. 193; Siguion vs. Siguion, 8 Phil. 7). Public
documents are perfect evidence of the fact which give rise to their execution
and of the date of the latter if the act which the officer witnessed and
certified to or the date written by him are not shown to be false; but they
are not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the
statements made therein by the interested parties (Martin, Rules of Court in
the Philippines with Note and Comments, vol. 4, p. 577).
Corollarily, the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No.
897 is only a proof that Jose K. Fernandez filed said application on June 5,
1954 in Dagupan City but it does not prove the veracity of the declaration
and statement contained in the said application that concern the
relationship of the applicant with herein appellant. In like manner, it is not a
conclusive proof of the filiation of appellant with his alleged father, Jose K.
Fernandez the contents being, only prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
Additionally, appellant claims that he enjoyed and possessed the status of
being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and continuously until they
died (Rollo, p. 42; Appellants' Brief). Open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the
position and privileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate child
such as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the parents and family
of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the child's support and
education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child of his parents
(Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 245-246). However, it
must be noted that, as was held in Quismundo vs. WCC, 132 SCRA 590,
possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an
acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his
assumed parent.

Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate child appellant
presented a baptismal certificate issued by Fr. Rene Mendoza of the St. John
Metropolitan Cathedral of Dagupan City on August 10, 1989 stating therein
that appellant is a child of the late spouses having been born on November
15, 1934 and baptized on November 24, 1934 (Exh. "1" Exhibits for the
Defendants). As stated, while baptismal certificates may be considered
public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk (Reyes
vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439). It may be argued that a baptismal
certificate is one of the other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws of proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity of the
baptismal certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St.
John the Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a
certification on October 16, 1995 attesting that the records of baptism on
June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged (Records, p. 148, Exh. "G").
Neither the family portrait offered in evidence establishes a sufficient proof
of filiation Pictures do not constitute proof of filiation (Reyes vs. Court of
Appeals) (supra). In fine, the evidence presented by appellant did not
acquire evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. Consequently the Extra-
Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989 executed by appellant Rodolfo
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia is null and void."
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by
nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez,
thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose
Fernandez between Generosa vda. de Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and
void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned13 pursuant to Art. 1105 of the New
Civil Code which states:
"A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not,
shall be void only with respect to such person."
Petitioners next contend that respondents admitted that the property in
question was the conjugal property of the late spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez
and Generosa de Venecia, thus when Dr. Jose Fernandez died intestate in
1982, his estate consisted solely of ½ pro indiviso of the conjugal property
and the other half belonged to his wife Generosa de Venecia; that granting
Dr. Jose Fernandez was only survived by his wife, the respondents nephews
and nieces of Dr. Jose are entitled to inherit the ½ share of the decedent's
estate while the ¾ share of the conjugal property will still belong to
Generosa as the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, hence the trial court's order
reconveying the possession of the subject lot and building to respondents
was contrary to the admitted facts and law since respondents are not
related by consanguinity to Generosa vda de Fernandez.
We agree.
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides:
"Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half."
Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as provided in the
above-quoted Article 1001, she is entitled to the ½ of the inheritance and
the respondents to the other ½. In effect, ¾ pro indiviso is the share of
Generosa as the surviving spouse, i.e., ½ as her share of the conjugal
property estate and ½ of the remaining ½ as share as heir from her
husband's estate. Thus, we find well taken the petitioners' assertion that the
annulment of the extra-judicial partition between Generosa and petitioner
Rodolfo does not necessarily result in respondents' having exclusive right to
the conjugal property, as erroneously found by the respondent court.
Generosa, during her lifetime, had the right to enjoy and dispose of her
property without other limitations than those established by law,14 which
right she exercised by executing a deed of sale in favor of petitioner Eddie
Fernandez.
Petitioners assails respondents' right, not being heirs of Generosa, to
question the validity of the deed of sale since the action for the annulment
of contracts may only be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally
or subsidiarily.15
We disagree.
As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party obliged
principally or subsidiarily under a contract. However, when a contract
prejudices the rights of a third person, he may exercise an action for nullity
of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the
contracting parties, and can show detriment which would positively result to
him from the contract in which he had no intervention.16 As we have
discussed above, respondents are entitled to the ¼ of the entire conjugal
property, i.e., lot and building; however considering that widow Generosa,
during her lifetime, sold the entire building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez,
respondents had been deprived of their ¼ share therein, thus the deed of
sale was prejudicial to the interest of respondents as regards their ¼ share in
the building. Respondents therefore, have a cause of action to seek the
annulment of said deed of sale.
Petitioners further allege that the respondent court erred in declaring null
and void the deed of sale executed between Generosa and petitioner Eddie
Fernandez concluding that the same was simulated or false and in affirming
the trial court's findings that the deed was prepared and executed under
abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances without however,
particularly stating the circumstances.
We agree.
Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and simulated
because there was no consideration for the sale. However, this assertion was
controverted by vendee petitioner Eddie Fernandez' declaration, that the
money he paid for the sale came from his savings as overseas contract
worker in Saudi Arabia from 1982-1989 which respondents failed to
controvert by presenting evidence to the contrary. The presumption that a
contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere
assertion that it has no consideration.17 Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code,
consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven.
Respondents also claim that the signature appearing in the deed of sale was
not that of Generosa because she was already bedridden with both legs
amputated before she died. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved
by clear, positive and convincing evidence18 and whoever alleges it has the
burden of proving the same;19 a burden respondents failed to discharge.
The respondents had not presented any convincing proof to override the
evidentiary value of the duly notarized deed of sale. A notarial document is
evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed. It
has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there
must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.20
We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey building to
petitioner Eddie Fernandez, i.e. she did not only sell her ¾ undivided share
in the building but also the ¼ share of the respondents. We rule, that such a
sale of the entire building without the consent of the respondents is not null
and void as only the rights of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer, petitioner Eddie, a co-owner of the ¾ share of the
building together with the respondents who owned the ¼ share therein.21
Finally, anent the issue of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees
awarded by the trial court, we find them to be bereft of factual basis. A
party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered by him as he has duly proven.22 Such damages, to be
recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved
with a reasonable degree of certainty.23 Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages.24 The testimony of respondent Romeo Fernandez that he
suffered around P100,000 actual damages was not supported by any
documentary or other admissible evidence. We also agree with the
petitioners that the respondent court should not have awarded moral
damages in the amount of P100,000 since they also failed to show proof of
moral suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and social humiliation. Attorney's fees should likewise be
deleted for lack of factual basis and legal justification. Both the lower courts
did not cite specific factual basis to justify the award of attorney's fees,
which is in violation of the proscription against the imposition of a penalty
on the right to litigate.25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment is hereby

Affirmed with Modification, as follows:

1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are entitled to

the ¼ share of the conjugal lot and building of the deceased spouses Jose
and Generosa Fernandez who died childless and intestate;

2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the share of

petitioner Rodolfo in the conjugal lot is concerned and the title issued
pursuant thereto in the name of Rodolfo Fernandez;

3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the ¾ share of

Generosa sold to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT No. 54693 is cancelled and
a new title should be issued in the names of petitioner Eddie Fernandez and
respondents as co-owners of the ¾ and ¼ shares respectively in the conjugal
building.

4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees are
deleted.

SO ORDERED.