3 China Reforms Jabbour Dantas

Review of Radical Political Economics
“Socialist Market Economy": A New Socio-Economic

Formation. A Complex Mode of Production
Journal: Review of Radical Political Economics
Manuscript ID Draft
Fo
Manuscript Type: Original Manuscript
China, socialist market economy, Complex Mode of Production,

Keywords:
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development, Marxist category of Socio-Economic Formation
Jel Classifications: To view Jel

classifications, please click <a href=
O1, O2, P2
ee
'http://www.aeaweb.org/jel/guide/jel.php'
target='_new'><b>here</b></a>.:
Abstract
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The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the growth of the

state sector in the Chinese economy, accelerated since 2009,
opens conditions to conclude that the "Chinese model" is
something that is distancing - historically - from a typical model
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of "state capitalism" and further away from being a "liberal

capitalism." Faced with a range of evidence, we affirm that
"socialist market economy" can already be classified as a new
Socio-Economic Formation (SEF) that has its main attribute in
iew
complexity, since it implies that it is a formation marked by the

coexistence of different social structures / formations. It is in
Abstract:
this new SEF that "socialist market economy" is founded as a
Complex Mode of Production (CMP). Because it is not a pure MP
(MP), "socialist market economy" must be treated as a
phenomenon governed by combinations between different
modes and relations of production. Classifying and exposing the
laws governing the development of "socialist market economy"
will be the object of analysis in this work.
Keywords: China; socialist market economy; Complex Mode of

Production, development; Marxist category of Socio-Economic
Formation
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Page 1 of 23 Review of Radical Political Economics
1
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3 A TRIBUTE TO IGNACIO RANGEL AND ARMEN MAMIGONIAN
4
5
6
“Socialist Market Economy": A New Socio-Economic
7 Formation. A Complex Mode of Production
8
9
10 Abstract
11
12 The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the growth of the state sector in the Chinese economy,
13 accelerated since 2009, opens conditions to conclude that the "Chinese model" is something that is
14 distancing - historically - from a typical model of "state capitalism" and further away from being a
15 "liberal capitalism." Faced with a range of evidence, we affirm that "socialist market economy" can
16
already be classified as a new Socio-Economic Formation (SEF) that has its main attribute in
17
complexity, since it implies that it is a formation marked by the coexistence of different social
18
19
structures / formations. It is in this new SEF that "socialist market economy" is founded as a
Complex Mode of Production (CMP). Because it is not a pure MP (MP), "socialist market economy"
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20
21 must be treated as a phenomenon governed by combinations between different modes and relations
22 of production. Classifying and exposing the laws governing the development of "socialist market
23 economy" will be the object of analysis in this work.
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24
25 JEL Classification: O1; O2; P2.
26
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27 Keywords: China; socialist market economy; Complex Mode of Production, development; Marxist
28 category of Socio-Economic Formation
29
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30
31
Putting aside the first and last of the fundamental Modes of Production, since in both of them,
32 the social body commands all the factors of production, in the others hegemony belongs to the
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33 class that holds the domain of the objectively strategic factor. And this is what characterizes
34 the MP and the Social Formation that is built upon it. (Ignacio Rangel, 1978)
35
36
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37 It is a curious fact that Deng had received Gorbachev in Beijing at the time of the Tiananmen
38 Square student protests in the emblematic year of 1989, when the Soviet man dictated the end
of the Soviet century, while Deng was leading China to the 21st century world scene. The
39
apostasy of Soviet socialism was being corrected by the Chinese Communist Part, the true
40 "modern Prince", in A. Gramsci's expression, while the CPSU disappeared wistfully. (Armen
41 Mamigonian, 2017)
42
43 Even if it offends our post-communist conventional wisdom, I think we have to begin
44 accepting the notion that Xi Jinping actually believes in Marx and Marxism. (Jude Blanchette,
45 consultora da Crumpton Group, 2018)
46
47 Introduction
48
49 It is a famous response from Ignacio Rangel to Jacob Gorender's1 criticism of his "dualism"2. On the
50 other hand, within the scope of that answer, Rangel does not omit that his reference - in relation to
51 the Marxist category of MP - would be the sequence that Stalin (2013:18) suggested, as follows:
52 primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism and socialism. It was, according to the Soviet
53
54
55 1
Gorender (1978)
56 2
Rangel (1978).
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58 1
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Review of Radical Political Economics Page 2 of 23
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3 leader, the so-called five fundamental MPs. According to Rangel, the "Brazilian Duality" as well as
4 the "Asiatic MP" were not fundamental MPs, let us see:
5
6 (...) since it can be studied as a complex formation, which associates in the same MP relations of
7 production of various aetiologies, that is, non-homogeneous. " (...) studying these Modes of
8 Production meant capturing "the nature of these combinations and, if possible, classifying them and
9 highlighting the laws governing their birth and development, their beginning and their end. (Rangel
10 1978: 73)
11
12 In this way, for Rangel:
13 (...) Mr Gorender admits, of course, that the same Social Formation may contain 'various Modes of
14 Production' (...) but seems to exclude the possibility that these multiple Modes of Production can
15 coexist stably (...) On the other hand, he rebels himself against the historical sequence of the five
16 Modes of Production cited. In other words, we lose Ariadne's thread of history, which we thought we
17 had received from Marx, since the Modes of Production cannot have their order changed at random,
18 as the concept of Mode of Production itself becomes nebulous now that we can go and invent new
19 ways (Rangel 1978:83)3.
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20
21 Is it worth questioning the relationship between a polemic in 1978 with a "development
22 model" capable of explaining China's intense growth process? It is a fact that the process of Chinese
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economic development is one of the most impressive phenomena in the world in which we live. Let
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us see: In these last 35 years, the average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth was 9.5% per
25
years, while per capita income in the period increased from US$ 250 in 1980 to US$ 9,040 in 2014
26
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27 (Jabbour and Paula 2018:14). Our question is to seek the essence of the phenomenon in its totality,
28 something closer to discovering the genesis of the process to the detriment of an explanatory
29 "model" itself.
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31 The polemic is not the "model" but the fact of this process occurs denying the deus ex-
32 machina that conditions the economic dynamism to the existence of institutions that guarantee the
primacy of private property4. On the contrary, its specificity is - for example - in the existence of a
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34 state that takes on the role both of "lender of last resort and investor of first instance" (Burlamaqui
35 2015:737).
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37 The objective of this article is to develop the previously discussed argument where we show
38 that:
39
40 A broad private sector advancement in the economy did not dispense the formation of a powerful new
41 state sector, notably from the 1990s. In theory, this means that the Chinese ownership structure is still
42 very different from other parts of the world. This process is directly reflected in a continuous increase
43 in government control over national income flows from the second half of the 1990s: from 13.5% of
44 GDP in 1996 to 37.3% in 2015 (Naughton, 2017, p.5). (Jabbour and Paula 2018: 22)
45
46
47
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49 3
Jacob Gorender promised an answer to the attacks of Ignacio Rangel, but unfortunately never got to produce such
50 answers. Mamigonian (1997:139) asserts: Rangel's courageous and repeated defense of inflation was only criticized by
51 G. Mantega and P. Sandroni, who after the replies gave up the debate and Jacob Gorender "criticized" the duality and,
52 before the reply, promised an answer, which never happened (...). Rangel was a pioneer in pointing out the qualities and
53 defects of ECLAC thought, when all the left lived in the 50s and 60s on a honeymoon with ECLAC, but when the ex-
54 ECLAs decided to renounce it, they used their criticism, without pointing out the intellectual credit.
4
55 The success of Townships and Village Enterprises (TVE's), based on hard-to-understand property rights, demonstrates
56 that private property per se does not guarantee economic dynamism. On this debate about TVEs and so-called "property
rights", read: Harry (2001).
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58 2
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3 It is impressive the growing trend of "nationalization" over the Chinese ownership structure.
4 Recent works5 show the great differentiation between the Chinese property structure compared to
5 other parts of the world (large state conglomerates, mixed capital companies, property divided by
6 shares). This process is directly reflected in a continuous increase, since the second half of the 1990s,
7 in government control over national income flows: from 13.5% of GDP in 1996 to 37.3% in 2015. It
8 can be seen (from 34.8% in 2011 to 2.8% in June 2016). On profits, the state-owned enterprises
9 increased from 15.2% in 2016 to 23.5% in 20176.
10
11
12
Therefore, our work will seek not only to demonstrate that the advance of the state sector in
13 the Chinese economy, accelerated since 2009, that opens conditions to conclude that the "Chinese
14 model" is something that is - historically – going far away from a typical model of "state capitalism
15 ", and further from being a "liberal capitalism". Let us go further up: we would be (or we are) being
16 impelled to admit the "socialist market economy" no longer as a mere abstraction, but as a new SEF.
17 We think this phenomenon is already an accomplished fact. In parallel, we work with the hypothesis
18 of, as the "Asiatic Mode of Production" and the "Brazilian Dualities", classifying this new SEF in the
19 milestones of being a CMP, as well. Thus, the great task is to discover, to study the nature of the
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20 combination that "socialist market economy" has, its derivation and the logics that govern its
21 development.
22
23
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In addition to this introduction, the article is divided into five other sections. In section 2, we
24 present the Marxist category of SEF as the main element of theoretical validation that we use both to
25 understand the Chinese phenomenon and to demarcate the dominant hegemonic views, in the debates
26
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about the nature of the Chinese system and in relation to the postulates postmodern ones. In section
27
3, we begin by exposing our basis of interpretation on the nature of socialism and then exposing the
28
29
evidence that sustains our perception of "socialist market economy" as a non-fundamental MP as a
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30 consequence of being a MP based under a Complex Social Formation, that is, a formation that
31 associates in the same MP relations of production of different historical epochs. In section 4 the five
32 general logics of the historical formation and functioning of the Chinese economy will be described,
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33 describing the country's development process in the field of Political Economy. In section 5 we will
34 seek to justify the need to build a new economic theory7, capable of unraveling a historical process
35 where the new SEF economy is being drawn from the synthesis between the financialization process,
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imperialist aggressiveness, new productive and technological paradigms and new and superior forms
37 of planning being developed and executed on a large scale in China. At the end we will present some
38 conclusions.
39
40 1. About the “Socialist Market Economy”: episteme and theoretical validation criteria
41
42 The central point of our discussion is not whether China is, according to its constitution and
43 leadership, a socialist State, or, in the most generous sense of value, an Asian variant of the central
44 point of our discussion is not whether China is, according to its constitution and leadership, a
45 socialist state, or, in the most generous sense of value, an Asian variant of State capitalism. In that
46 regard, unfortunately, hegemony lies in the notion that what is happening in China is a "capitalist
47
restoration" in the form of a “State capitalism with Chinese characteristics." It is not surprising that a
48
popular Marxist intellectual such as David Harvey who not only handles Deng Xiaoping to the same
49
50 neoliberal altar of Reagan and Thatcher, still "ascertains" that:
51
5
52 6
According to Piketty et al. (2017:4-5). In this same line of reasoning we indicate, the recent work of Naughton (2017).
53 According to: China’s Macroeconomic Outlook 2018. Center for Macroeconomic Research at Xiamen University. p. 13,
54 2018.
7
55 Whose starting point is the Historical Materialism of Marx and Engels plus all the existing theoretical collection
elaborated over time by the field of economic heterodoxy.
56
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58 3
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3 China's spectacular emergence as a post-1990 global economic form was an unintended consequence
4 of the neoliberal trend in the advanced capitalist world. (Harvey 1992:121)
5
6 It is a typical observation of a ready, modelling, and photographic scheme of reality that is
7 very close to a certain post-modern relativism rather than the historical objectivity characteristic of
8 analyses based on Historical Materialism (Jabbour, 2012, 78). In the realm of the debate of ideas, we
9 need to place ourselves in the opposite field from the currently hegemonic postulates of the social
10 sciences - among them classical positivism, which expresses itself in the form of a certain
11 postmodern intellectual idiom - which conceives of social theory as mere narrative with moral
12 purpose (Fernandes 2000:17). The theory and practice of relativism as the guiding thread and the
13 north of the theory of knowledge (Jabbour 2012:81) are putting in the core of the construction
14 process of the human subjectivity.
15
16 From us, against both the quoted intellectual fashion and any principle of "neutrality" in
17 scientific practice, we believe that objectivity and, consequently, the historical process view are still
18 the crucial criteria of theoretical validation.
19
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20 In concrete terms, within the epistemological frameworks above discussed, if we admit
21 China, and its "socialist market economy", as a CMP, to Harvey serves the relation Marx did (and
22 perfectly understood by a radical Marxist of the stature of Ignacio Rangel) between the development
23
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of geological formations and the society development process, as suggested in a letter sent to Vera
24
25
Zasulich dated February 16, 1881:
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The archaic or primary formation of our world contains in itself a series of layers of diverse ages, one
27 superimposed on the other; in the same way, the archaic formation of society [(la formation archaïque
28 de la société)]) reveals to us a series of different types <which form an ascending series between
29 them>, marking progressive epochs. The Russian rural commune belongs to the most recent type of
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30 the chain. The farmer now owns the private property of the dwelling house and the backyard that
31 forms the complement. This is the first dissolving element of the archaic form [(forme archaïque)],),
32 unknown to the ancient types, <which can serve as a transition from the [(de transition de la formation
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33 archaïque)]. (Marx 1982: 118).

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1.1. Marxist category of SEF as a basilar core of the argumentation

37
38 A diagnostic typology requires solid theoretical and conceptual bases. Therefore, our main element
39
of theoretical validation is in a category that is poorly understood, resulting in problems related to
40
theoretical validation issues, for example. We refer to the ESF category. The term "SEF" it was first
41
42 used in Marx's writings in the Preface to "Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy":
43 Asian, old, feudal, and, in the modern, bourgeois modes of production can be termed progressive
44 epochs of economic and social formation. The bourgeois relations of production are the last
45 antagonistic form of the social process of production, antagonistic not in the sense of individual
46 antagonism, but of an antagonism which results from the social conditions of individuals' lives; but
47 the productive forces that develop within bourgeois society create at the same time the material
48 conditions for the resolution of this antagonism. With this social formation, therefore, the prehistory
49 of human society (Marx 2008: 48) 8
50
51
52
53 8
We are grateful for the comments of Sergio Barroso on the way in which Marx treated the category of ESF. On the
54 passage quoted, two observations. 1) According to Sereni (2013:301): It is true that long before this work, the concept
55 (if not the term) of socioeconomic formation is found in the first complete elaboration of the materialist conception of
56 history that Marx and Engels left us in the manuscript of The German Ideology of 1846. Here, as can be easily verified,
much of Volume I is devoted to a rapid passage through world history, whose periodization is rightly based on the
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2
3 For Sereni, it is in Lenin that a true "restoration" of the meaning of the FES category occurs,
4 let us see:
5
6 In short, these maximal exponents of the "Marxism of the Second International" are the total
7 incomprehension (if not, of the systematic rejection) of one of the fundamental categories of the
8 Marxist materialist conception of history; and when one considers the fact that similar observations
9 could be repeated to most of the other exponents of this same "Marxism of the Second International" -
10 with the only two significant exceptions, if we are not wrong, by Antonio Labriola and Franz Mehring
11 - will appear the central importance that Lenin will give from his earliest works to this notion of
12 economic and social formation, assuming the value of a true restoration, also in this field, of the
13 theory and practice of revolutionary Marxism, not to mention its further deepening. (Sereni 2013:
14 314)
15
16 According to Silva (2009:1), the category of SEF had in Emilio Sereni its most finished and
17 rich understanding, citing the following passage from Sereni:
18
19 ( ...) the notion (...) places itself unequivocally on the plane of history, which is... that of the totality
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20 and unity of all (structural, supra-structural, and other) spheres of social life in the continuity and at
21 the same time in the discontinuity of its historical development. (Sereni 2013: 316).
22
23 Althusser and Balibar discuss this category on two levels. The first is closer to an outline of
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24 the construction of a "historical time theory," as follows:

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26 Theory of historical time that allows to establish the possibility of a history of the different levels
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27 considered in their ‘relative’ autonomy”. (...) the form of historical existence peculiar to a social
28 formation arising from a determinate Mode of Production. (Althusser and Balibar 1970:104)9
29
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30
31
They arrive at a clearer and more coherent definition of the SEF category as:
32 Totality of instances articulated on the basis of a determinate Mode of Production (Althusser and
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33 Balibar, 1970: 209)10.

34
35 In this regard, relating the observations of Marx, Althusser, Balibar and Sereni above exposed
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with the use of the category of SEF as an instrument of theoretical validation, the words of Roberts
37 are relevant, that in a recent article, we can read the following:
38
39 This brings us to the question of whether China is a capitalist state or not? I think the majority of
40 Marxist political economists agree with mainstream economics in assuming or accepting that China is.
41 However, I am not one of them. China is not capitalist. Commodity production for profit, based on
42 spontaneous market relations, governs capitalism. The rate of profit determines its investment cycles
43 and generates periodic economic crises. This does not apply in China. In China, public ownership of
44
45
46
47 different degrees of development of the productive forces and relations of property, that is, of the MP (Weise der
Produktion) that characterizes different epochs. The term Ökonomische Gesellschaftsformation, however, is missing in
48
the German Ideology, and in its place, there is only the Gesellschaftsform (literally "form of society" or "social form")
49 which soon reappears in the Grundrisse as in many other writings of the years between 1846 and 1857. 2) We tend to
50 agree with Gabriele and Schettino (2012:22), according to them in the “Preface”, the difference between the concepts of
51 SEF and the MP is not perceptible
52 9
We thank Prof. Luiz Eduardo Motta (IFCS-UFRJ) for indicating this reading in Althusser
53 10
An interesting analysis of the development of the SEF category in Althusser can be found in Resch (1992) especially in
54 the first chapter "Althusser: The Social Formation as a Totality of Instances". In Brazil, Milton Santos is responsible for
55 introducing this category in the debate and currently the most fruitful works based on this category has in Armen
56 Mamigonian its core. In addition to Marx's "Preface," we read Sereni (1971), Lenin (1894), Santos (1977), and
Mamigonian (1996).
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58 5
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1
2
3 the means of production and state planning remain dominant and the Communist party’s power base is
4 rooted in public ownership. (Roberts 2017).
5
6 The background to the reasons why most of Marxists equate with the vulgar economists of
7 our times (neoclassical) to take positions based on "static models" for whom China is a capitalist
8 country lies in the static treatment, a "desire" to classify and demarcate phenomena within previously
9 accepted frameworks and categories. Hobsbawn is more acute in stating:
10
11 [...] the desire to categorize each society or period firmly into one or other of the accepted categories
12 has resulted in demarcation disputes, as is natural when one insists on embedding dynamic concepts
13 within static ones. There was, thus, much discussion in China about the date of transition from slavery
14 to feudalism. In the West, similar difficulty led to debates about the character of the centuries from the
15 fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries. (Hobsbawn 1985: 63).
16
17 That's exactly what it's all about: switching from static to dynamic. To realize that in the
18 reality of the modes of production we must follow the path suggested by Rangel to realize that the
19 degree of complexity of a society - where its famous expression contemporaneousness of the non-
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20 contemporary (Rangel 2005:295)11 is a general rule - demands to exercise the difficult search only of
21
what is essential, necessary. To do so, raising the degree of abstraction is essential, something that
22
goes beyond the category of MP trying to find the origin of a certain society. Returning to Lenin, one
23
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24 has to use a category capable of, as Lenin did, according to Sereni:

25
26 What most of the "Marxists of the Second International" (...) had falsified and that Lenin had restored,
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27 deepened, and developed into the Marxian notion of economic and social formation? The most valid
28 materials to answer the question are offered to us by Lenin himself, who from his earliest works - in
29 his essay Who are the friends of the people - written and published in 1894 - begins to place again not
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30 only the notion, but also the term social and economic formation at the core that Marx had attributed
31 to it as an expression of a fundamental category of historical materialism. This category expresses the
32 unity (and, we will add, the totality) of the different spheres: economic, social, political and cultural of
the life of a society; and expresses it, moreover, in the continuity and at the same time in the
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33
34 discontinuity of its historical development. (Sereni 2013: 314)
35
36 We classify the People's Republic of China as a society commanded by a political force
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37 determined to carry out the transition to socialism, which does not - in any way - recognize the
38 present economic order as socialist. Samir Amin reminds us very well that:
39 Mao described the nature of the revolution carried out in China by its Communist Party as an anti-
40 imperialist/anti-feudal revolution looking toward socialism. Mao never assumed that, after having
41 dealt with imperialism and feudalism, the Chinese people had “constructed” a socialist society. He
42 always characterized this construction as the first phase of the long path to socialism. (Amin 2013:35).
43
44 An interesting example of totalizing analysis can be seen in the following passage where
45 Mamigonian perceives in the "Marxism of Mao Tsetung" the level of consequence that can give
46 good use of the categories of Historical Materialism to a Complex Social Formation:
47
48 Unlike Soviet Marxism, heir to Marxism in Western Europe, brilliantly adapted by Lenin to the
49 conditions of Russian society and to the nascent imperialist world stage, Mao's Marxism, adopting
50 Leninism, was characterized by an obsessive and deep concern for the destiny of China, who needed
51
52 11
There are those who try to explain China by describing it as a large forced labour camp led by "savage capitalists"
53 within the rules of a particular "Party-State" to an interesting attempt at a "mixed economy." The overwhelming majority
54 of China's studies of thousands of books on bookstore shelves fail to see that the building of an original building is
55 occurring in that country, where elements and institutions of different historical epochs emerge and reappear. We have
56 argued here that the only reason for this gigantic process underway in China is to observe it as part of the history of
human civilization, it is not a miracle; much less by chance.
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1
2
3 to get rid of any foreign domination, including the IC12, regaining his former greatness and for that to
4 retake the crucial role of peasants in Chinese life, as Li Dazhao taught his disciples. (...).
5
6 Mamigonian complete his reasoning as follows:
7
8 The concern over China's destiny allowed: (1) to withdraw the IC from command of the Chinese
9 revolution (1935), (2) alliance with the Kuomintang to combat the Japanese invasion (1937-45),
10 making the CCP the main depository of national interests; the military offensive in the 1946-49 civil
11 war against the US-backed Kuomintang, (4) the decisive participation in the Korean War (1950-53),
12 (5) China's rupture with the Soviets (1960); and (6) the approach of the USA (1972), which ensured
13 China's reintegration into the world economy under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s.
14 (Mamigonian 2008: 190).
15
16 At the end of this article, we will come back to this subject.
17
18 2. "Socialist Market Economy" as a Complex Social Formation
19
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20 No social formation disappears before the development of all the productive forces which it contains,
21 and new and higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions for its existence
22 have matured within the old society itself. This is why mankind never proposes itself but the problems
23 that it can solve, for, deepening the analysis, it will always be seen that the problem itself arises only
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24 when the material conditions for solving it exist or are in the process of existing. (Karl Marx, 1859)
25
26 As information and demonstration of the scope of the proposal of this work that will be explored in
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27 this subitem, we need explains some points:

28
29 1) The concept "socialist market economy" is officially used by the Chinese government. In
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30 our opinion there is no contradiction between the concept and what we can define as "socialism".
31 Opening our field of abstraction, we admit to being signatories of the first socialist experiences13,
32 and are refuting latent subjectivism in visions that project socialism as a "negative portrait of the
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33 most harmful aspects of capitalism”14;

34
35 2) We have the understanding that the term "socialism", as we use it in this article, does not
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allow us much room for manoeuvre for some level of "conceptual flexibility". The reason for this is
37 simple, without being simplistic: our focus is concentrated on what is exclusively related to the
38 domain (according to Rangel) of objectively strategic factors;
39
40
3) Therefore, from what we classify as "socialism" becomes inadequate, comparing our
41
conception with other concepts and values that common sense define and associate with socialism,
42
43
such as the struggles for justice and equality, equality, planning (as an end in itself), freedom or its
44 lack etc;
45 4) The nature of the viability of socialism nowadays should be more limited and less
46 ambitious compared to the time when the USSR vied for the vanguard of humanity;
47
48
49
50 12
International Communist.
51 13
Treating the first socialist experiences demands a deep exercise of historical process vision. Its opposite is the cage of
52 subjectivism. We do not deny errors and misunderstandings. But his legacy to the workers' struggle, the political, moral
53 and material support of the oppressed peoples is undeniable. It was also an introducer of the social issue in the global
54 political agenda. About this, please read Fernandes (2017).
14
55 According to Marx (1891:31), on the transition to socialism and the permanence of "bourgeois right": These defects,
56 however, are inevitable in the first phase of communist society, as it springs from capitalist society after a long and
painful labour.
57
58 7
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1
2
3 5) In our view, the long - term persistence of contradictions of multiple natures in the current
4 processes of experience - and persistence - socialist, especially in the unit of analysis chosen by us
5 (China), is inevitable;
6
7 6) Thus, let us be more careful in discussing what "socialism" or "non-socialism" is (if
8 country "a" is more socialist than country "b") having as background moral, existentialist precepts,
9 "good versus evil." Finally, to exchange the seduction exercised by moral judgments of value for
10
more concrete, objective, historical and highly politicized visions;
11
12
13 7) Hence our option for the category of SEF as the main element of episteme.
14
15 ***
16
17 Samir Amin and Armen Mamigonian help us to make it clearer that the synonym for the
18 perception of "socialist market economy" as a non-fundamental MP is to assume, according to the
19 proposal of Ignacio Rangel, that we are treating the unit of analysis as a social formation complex.
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20 Thus, "socialist market economy" is a formation that associates in the same MP Relations of
21 Production of different historical epochs in a clear unity of opposites. It is not a society structured at
22 the highest possible level of human development, that is, socialism in its fullness. From the process
23
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described by Amin and Mamigonian until today China has gone through a whole historical
24
25
process that has in the economic reforms initiated in 1978 a typical process that
26 combines continuity and rupture15.
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27
28 ***
29
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30
31 The question that arises: which of the social structures/ formations predominates? The
32 answer demands the interposition of other questions: which class and / or political force controls
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33 the objectively strategic factors are they political (the political force representative of the social class
34 that exerts control of the State power) or economic (the social structure / formation which
35 holds real power over both the crucial instruments of the accumulation process [interest policy,
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credit, foreign exchange, and the financial system] and the promotion of displacement and
37
concentration of its own productive sector in key industries [key sectors that combine high
38
39 productivity with large returns to scale] and allowing gains from the generation of industrial linkage
40 effects to other social structures / formations)? The answer will come down. But it is suggestive the
41 following passage where, according to Fan, Morck and Yeung:
42
43 The socialist foundation of China’s economic system is the unconditional supremacy of the Chinese
44 Communist Party. Consistent with Marxist-Leninist tradition, the Party directs the law. Regulations,
45 laws, and administrative rulings are applied in accordance with current Party policy. Just as a Party
46 position corresponds directly to each key position in government, a Party hierarchy parallels corporate
47 governance in banks, SOEs, listed non-SOEs, hybrid enterprises, joint ventures, and sufficiently large
48 private businesses. Party cells throughout business enterprises constitute parallel internal
49 accountability systems to those established by enterprises themselves, keeping an enterprise’s Party
50 Secretary and Party Committee up-to-date and able to provide timely advice to its CEO and board.
51 Imported corporate governance regulations, mandating independent directors and the like essentially
52 ignore Party involvement in enterprise governance. (Fan, Morck and Yeung 2011: 3)
53
54
55 15
56 The continuity towards the direction and objectives that led the CCP to take the power in 1949 and a break with the
method and forms that since the mid-1950s have come to prevail throughout the Chinese social body.
57
58 8
59
1
2
3 On the other hand, there is a big difference between classifying China as a capitalist country
4 and recognizing that capitalism, be it private or state, exists in the country as an important - and
5 powerful - structure / social formation16. In addition to having been recognized, legitimized, and
6 sustained by laws and regulations (Naughton, 2006, p. 2), the expansion of its scope of activity also
7 increased from massive transfers of state assets to the sector that occurred between 1994 and 2000,
8 especially in small and medium-sized state enterprises (Paula and Jabbour 2016:19).
9
10
In this sense the realization of the transition in a complex social formation like the Chinese
11
12
implies to recognize that the unit of contraries alluded above is expressed in the coexistence of the
13 following structures / social formations17:
14
15 1. Natural subsistence economy: it is the structure that, despite being in sharp
16 decomposition, still concentrates the entire population living below the poverty line in
17 China. Most of them are ethnic minority populations. Your absolute number is confusing.
18 The government itself announces the variations in this number that is between 30 and 43
19 million people18;
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20
21 2. Small market production: characterized by small (family) agricultural production focused
22 on the market, mainly in medium-sized cities. However, it is very common to perceive the existence
23
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of this sector in the periphery of big cities. Despite advances in the mechanization of agricultural
24
25
production in China, it is estimated that 300 million Chinese are still engaged in small-scale, market-
26 oriented agricultural production;19;
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27
28 3. Private and / or collective rural industry: One of the key features of the recent Chinese
29 development process lies in the rural character of large-scale expanded manufacturing in the 1980s.
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30 Increases in income and productivity of agricultural labour - and the consequent increase in demand
31 by industrial goods - was a factor of displacement of labour surplus not to the large coastal cities but
32 to the environment itself, in the so-called village (Jabbour and Dantas, 2017, p. 794). The main
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33 example of this dynamic is inserted in the transformation of the nature of employment in the country
34 and its direct relation with the greater power of economic decision to the provinces and to the
35 companies, the liberation of the surplus labour of the agriculture and the strengthening of the
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industries of known rural character such as Townships and Village Enterprises (TVE`s). Currently in
37
decline, it had its peak between the years of 1984-1997 (Jin 2017:69).
38
39
40 4. Private capitalism: sector created, guided and formed under the wings of the Communist
41 Party of China (CCP). The existence of this social structure / formation in China gives rise to great
42 exaggerations and misunderstandings about its power and role in the Chinese economy and society in
43 general. Privatizations and the opening-up of state and collective enterprises from the mid-1990s
44 were the first massive movement of capital concentration in private hands in China (Nogueira
45 2018:7). Although it concentrates a great deal of wealth, income and great bargaining power with the
46 state, it is not a class capable enough to become a "ruling class" as in capitalist countries.
47
48
49 16
On the analysis of the main mechanisms used for capital concentration and formation of a domestic capitalist class in
50 China, please read Nogueira (2018). Reasoning similar to that of Nogueira, on the influence of Chinese domestic
51 capitalists, but from a geographer's point of view, can be found in Lim (2014).
52 17
Construction largely based on Lenin (1964).
53 18
The plan is totally eliminated the existence of people living under such conditions by 2020. It is worth remembering,
54 for example, that according to the World Bank the percentage of the Chinese population living in extreme poverty fell
55 from 88% in 1981 to 6.5 % in 2012.
19
56 300 million farmers: Agriculture in China. In, Australian Farmers, 12 April 2017. Available in:
https://farmers.org.au/community/blog/the-sheer-scale-of-agriculture-in-China-12042017.html Access in 10/04/2018.
57
58 9
59
1
2
3 5. State capitalism20: It is a formation with visible contours in the relations of dependence of
4 the private capitalism with the policies executed by the State, for example, as beneficiary of the
5 chaining effects generated by the state corporations, access to credit in state banks, etc.
6
7 6. Socialism: Social formation that defines the very nature of the Chinese National State. The
8 Communist Party has the political force that controls the state, which in turn has control of
9 objectively strategic factors. According to Gabriele:
10
11
State-owned and state-holding enterprises are now less numerous, but much larger, more capital- and
12
knowledge-intensive, more productive and more profitable than in the late 1990s. Contrary to popular
13
belief, especially since the mid-2000s, their performance in terms of efficiency and profitability
14
compares favourably with that of private enterprises. The state-controlled sub-sector constituted by
15
state-holding enterprises, in particular, with at its core the 149 large conglomerates managed by
16
SASAC, is clearly the most advanced component of China's industry and the one where the bulk of in-
17
house RandD activities take place. (Gabriele 2009:17).
18
19
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20
21 2.1. The elements of mediation among the different social structures / formations
22
23 The development process does not occur by impulses, or it rarely occurs this way. Much less is it a
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24 "balanced development" process as Rosenstein-Rodan and Nurske tried to show us in his famous and
25 pioneering works on external economies and balanced growth 21. Ignacio Rangel and Albert
26 Hirschman were excellent critics of this conception. To both of them, the process of development is a
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27 process of jumps not from one point of equilibrium to another. On the contrary: the essence of the
28 development process is precisely because it occurs in the form of jumps between points of
29 imbalances. According to Rangel:
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30
31
People can come up with a somewhat romantic idea of economic development, as if it were a paradise
32 of stability, well-being, and peace. These illusions must be abandoned at once. In Brazil, as in all
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33 countries, development is a painful process, full of deprivation, conflict and anxiety. Such concerns
34 are, it seems, a raw material for development, (...). A developing economy does not solve a problem
35 without creating an even bigger one. It jumps uninterruptedly from one imbalance to another one.
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(Rangel 2005: 41).

37
38
The reasoning above developed fits perfectly the development process into a complex social
39
40
formation as we have shown above, about China. Different economic and social structures and
41 formations, each one representing a particular stage of development of humanity itself requires the
42 existence of elements of mediation between the different dynamics and respective speeds and
43 movements characteristic of each social structure / formation. Are they:
44
45 1. natural economy: in a clear decomposition process;
46
47 2. market economy: where the private economy of varying size coexists and competes, from
48 the small mercantile production to the large-scale production of a capitalist type. However, unlike
49 other essentially capitalist market economies, in this market the large state-owned business and
50 financial conglomerates dominates, which in turn can be considered as the heart (the 149 state
51
52
53
20
54 It is very common to associate China as an experience of "state capitalism." This association is a consequence of the
55 separation between politics and economics in the analysis of the process. To us is a phase of capitalist development in
56 countries where the state plays a large role but has as its dominant formation / structure private companies.
21
On the "balanced development" thesis, please read Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Nurske (1953).
57
58 10
59
1
2
3 business conglomerates) and the soul (state financial system) of the new ESF ("socialist market
4 economy");
5
6 3. foreign trade: under socialism, the foreign trade is a public, planned and State institution
7 (Jabbour and Dantas 2017:794). It is where new type relations prevail in relation to foreign trade of
8 the capitalist type. Although China acts - through its foreign trade - in a field of capitalist
9 domination, the competence of its planned contact with the outside world shows that socialism, at
10
the same time that it contests with capitalism, has become something already affirmed with
11
12
undeniable success.
13
14
15 3. The Political Economy of "Socialist Market Economy": the logics regarding its movement
16
17 We are not here to deny that the theoretical construction we are attempting to construct is part of a
18 critique of the realization by steps that has existed and still exerts influence in Marxist elaborations
19 on the transition from capitalism to socialism. Indicating "socialist market economy" as a new SEF is
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20 not only part of an effort to unravel the logic that governs the construction of socialism in complex
21 social formations. In the same way that Rangel saw the “Basic Duality” both as the main
22 organizational element of his thinking and as the fundamental law of the Brazilian economy
23
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(Bielschowsky 1996: 211).

24
25
26 This same reasoning holds true for our reading of "socialist market economy"; an effort to
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27 understand China and discover the fundamental logic of its development process. We have clarity
28 about economic laws and their non-universality, we seek to adapt Historical Materialism to the
29 peculiarities of a complex social formation, like the Chinese one. Engels sums up this fundamental
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30 aspect of the method of Political Economy, as follows:

31
32 The conditions under which men produce and exchange what has been produced vary greatly for each
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33 country and, within each country, from generation to generation. For this reason, Political Economy
34 cannot be the same for all countries or for all historical epochs. (Engels 2015: 127).
35
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Having exposed these indications and being clear that we are dealing with a complex social
37 formation, the step now is to extract the general logics of the historical formation and functioning of
38 the Chinese economy, describing the country's development process in the field of Political
39 Economy. "Socialist market economy" is, in fact, the answer, almost a "method of analysis", which
40
we find to these and other questions that arise. This is our particular interpretation of the reason and
41
42
meaning of the development of productive forces in China, the counterpart of which is the political
43 power exercised by the CCP.
44
45 A fair question arises: what is the difference between "socialist market economy" and
46 capitalism, since the existence of a large public sector can also take place under capitalism? Gabriele
47 and Schettino discuss the differences between the two systems, as follows:
48
49 The State is endowed with a high degree of direct and indirect control of the means of production,
50 and, as a result, social production relations are different from those prevalent in capitalism. This
51 statement implies that, at a lower level of abstraction, a “market socialist” and a capitalist system
52 differ essentially in two key aspects. The first one is that in a market socialist system the role of the
53 State is both quantitatively larger and qualitatively superior, thereby allowing the public sector as a
54 whole to exert an overall strategic control over the country’s development path, especially in crucial
55 areas such as setting the economy-wide rate of the accumulation and determining the speed and
56 direction of technical progress. The second difference is that in a market socialist system, although
57
58 11
59
1
2
3 capitalists endowed with private ownership rights on some means of production do exist, they are not
4 strong enough to constitute a hegemonic and dominant social class, as it happens in “normal”
5 capitalist countries. (Gabriele and Schettino 2012: 32).
6
7 Following this line of reasoning, the work of Fan, Morck and Yeung concludes that:
8
9 The studies in this volume reveal that China is not copying free market institutions but trying
10 something substantially different: Socialist market economy with Chinese Characteristics is a
11 genuinely unique system. A host of its formal reforms emulate the institutional forms of a market
12 economy, often in painstaking detail. But its heart remains resolutely socialist: strategically placed
13 SOEs, SOE-controlled pyramidal business groups, and ubiquitous Party cells, Party Secretaries, and
14 Party Committees leave Lenin’s “commanding heights” firmly and exclusively under the control of
15 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and consign much of the rest to provincial and local Party
16 cadres. (Fan, Morck and Yeung 2011: 13).
17
18 Realizing that in China various historical modes of development coexist, it has led us to
19 discover how the logics of the various modes of contemporary production articulate, help, or limit
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20 one another. After 40 years of the beginning of the process of reform and opening up in China it is
21 possible to perceive at least five logics of operation, as follows:
22
23
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1) So, immediately assuming that the Chinese social formation is a myriad where there are
24
25
different structures / formations that are based on different modes of production and their proper
26 logics of operation, we must assume, as a logic of operation, that such formations are not
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27 limited to coexist. Cohabit in conflict and exert pressure - one over the other - open to each
28 other.
29
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30 For example, the expansion of the market economy pressures and imposes the tendency
31 towards the disappearance of the natural subsistence economy; the same happens in the pressure that
32 the transformation of the agriculture in a branch of the industry exerts on the small mercantile
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33 production. The same happens between the socialist sector of the economy and the private capitalist,
34 with the latter being pressured by the trend of increasing centralization of large industrial production
35 in the 149 State-owned business conglomerates and the afore mentioned process of continuous
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increase of government control over the flows of national income.

37
38
39 22) The law of value is not passive of overcoming under "socialist market economy"
40 seen as part of the beginning of the historical process of building socialism 22. We believe that
41 this observation is essential to those who, like us, have concerns about the limits of economic
42 planning in social formations where pieces of private capitalism are not only present but also puts
43 pressure on the dominant formation (socialism)23;
44
45 3) We first identified (Jabbour and Dantas 2017) that economic reforms allowed the
46 emergence of a large private sector alongside a pre-existing State sector. To us this cohabitation
47 demands a continuous reorganization of activities between the state and private sectors of the
48 economy24. Such a diagnosis advanced by demonstrating that this continuous reorganization of
49
50
51
52 22
To us, "socialist market economy" is a synonymous as has been called the "primary stage of socialism". We wrote
53 about this in Jabbour, Dantas and Belmonte (2017).
23
54 24
On the limits of planning under socialist market economy, please read Gabriele (2016).
55 The following passage from Rangel (1985, p. 5) also applies to the Chinese case: In all periods of history (...) the
56 economy has always had, alongside the private sector, the public sector. From time to time, the share of allocations
among these sectors is called into question and (...), we redistribute these allocations between the two sectors. This helps
57
58 12
59
1
2
3 activities is mediated by the cyclical emergence of institutions that delimit a continuous
4 reorganization of activities between the state and private sectors of the economy (Jabbour and
5 Paula, 2018)25.
6
7 4) There is a regularity in this cyclical process of reorganization of activities between the two
8 sectors. The growth of the private sector does not occur to the detriment of a diminishing role
9 of the State. There is in concrete a strategic relocation of the State. The Chinese reaction to the
10
crisis of 2008 demonstrated that there was a process characterized by the construction of a State that
11
12
has the capacity both to manage policies of socialization of investment and of investor and lender,
13 not only waived the inducement to the existence of a concomitant private sector. It went further by
14 promoting the shifting and concentration of its own productive sector into key industries, which
15 combine high productivity with large returns to scale. The private sector, far from being the
16 protagonist of the process, is nothing more than an ancillary sector of State corporations26;
17
18 5) The historical behaviour of capitalism is generally understood, and if there is anything that
19 can be considered permanent in a capitalist economy is that periods of depression alternate with
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20 periods of prosperity. Historically, alternative solutions to this cyclical instability have been
21 constructed. It indicates that alternatives to solving such cyclical instability have been built
22 historically. In capitalism, through public spending and socialism, the cycle is confronted with
23
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planning27 and its tools and mechanisms. In this way, planning - seen as deliberate human action
24
25
for stability - is meaningful in the form of an essential economic logic in "socialist market
26 economy".28”.
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27
28 4. A new theory to understand the new SEF?
29
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30 Outside of history, economics is reduced to logic, dialectic, and a gnosis, which are either economic,
31 physical or chemical. Therefore, there is no 'pure' economy [...]. Economic science, however, varies
with the MP and it changes without interruption. (...). It is to admit that humanity varies in its being and
32
conscience according to the general, social and telluric reality in which he arises and grows. (...). We
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33 must be averse to the uncritical incorporation of imported models (Marxists or not), or academic fads.
34 What matters is how knowing the concrete society behaves in your economic life (Ignacio Rangel,
35 1957).
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37 The almost natural result of the abstraction contained in this paper can be summarized as follows:
38 "socialist market economy" is the new ESF that is being drawn in our present epoch. This
39 "differentiated SEF" or "Modern MP" (Gabriele and Schettino 2012) that emerges and develops is
40 the result of a political decision of the CCP to promote the so-called "Four Modernizations"29, thus
41
inaugurating a characterized historical process - for example - by cycles of institutional innovations
42
43
that have resulted in a quantitative increase in the private sector and qualitative leaps in the role of
44
to overcome the crisis and open a new period of development. Now, there is no way to suppose that this dialectic is
45
exhausted.
46 25
We deepen this observation in Jabbour and Paula (2018)
47 26
It is interesting to note the fact that the emergence of new institutional frameworks does not occur throughout the
48 industrialization process, lead to a discontinuity solution (Medeiros, 2013, page 435), which distinguishes the Chinese
49 developmental experience from other cases.
50 27
According to Harnecker (2012:243).
51 28
Rangel's words (2005:453) are all about planning. This science and art have now become the queen of all the arts and
52 all the sciences of our time, for it is thanks to them that the enormous human knowledge accumulated over the centuries
53 has gained new meaning, producing surprising new results. And above all, it is because of them that human society
54 becomes truly capable of will, enabling itself to choose the rhythm and the meaning of its march.
29
55 These are about the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology and national defense announced by
Zhou Enlai in 1974.
56
57
58 13
59
1
2
3 the State. Empirically, since the 1990s institutional conditions have been built that have allowed a
4 huge process of mergers and acquisitions in the state sector resulting in the emergence of 149 state-
5 owned business conglomerates.
6
7 Another complex coordinated transition by the State can be seen in the expansion of the
8 monetary base - already in the 1980s -, creating conditions for replacing a financing system based on
9 the government budget for another, more focused on State credit, not private.
10
11
12
Ata previous moment we have discussed about this process, as per follows:
13
14 China was able to overcome both the internal political avalanches of the late 1980s and the
15 vicissitudes of an era marked by the predominance of neoliberal conceptions in the economy by
16 building institutions that consolidated strategic options and overcoming 'uneven development' and
17 “terms of trade ". The construction of a "powerful socialist State," based on huge state-owned business
18 conglomerates and a well capillary public long-term financing system, did not dispense with capital-
19 flow controls that enabled the state to isolate monetary policy from capital flows increasing the room
for manoeuvre for adopting autonomous economic policies in relation to international financial
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20
21 conditions. A mix of flexible monetary and fiscal policies with industrial and sectoral surgical policies
22 and continuous cycles of import substitution shaped the country's transformation into a "factory in the
23 world." (Jabbour and Paula 2018: 18).
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24
25 If Ignacio Rangel and, consequently, the epigraph that opens this section is correct, we are
26 faced with a historical process that requires those committed to science to understand and transform
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27 reality from the Political Economy to a theoretical collection that instrumentalize ourselves in order
28 to understand this new SEF. After all, according to the epiphora, economic science, however, varies
29 with the MP and this changes without interruption. In this sense, one of the explanations for the
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30 ossification of Marxism in the last century would not have been the lack of a theory to understand
31 which economy the historical process was drawing in the twentieth century from financial
32 capitalism, Keynesianism, and Soviet planning?
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33
34
Without proselytizing of any kind, we confess our nonconformity with the current theories
35
and interpretations about China30. We are not closing our eyes to the contradictions and tensions
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37 (immense social and regional inequality, for example) generated by this process. The difference is
38 that while the contradictions of that gigantic process are used as a common-sense argument, which
39 unites the great majority of Marxists to the neoclassicals, which classifies China as a capitalist
40 country, we believe that one of the characteristics of this "socialist market economy" lies precisely in
41 the capacity that the competent successors of Mao Zedong have demonstrated to face this range of
42 contradictions. Otherwise, how to explain almost 40 years of uninterrupted growth? Which capitalist
43 country in the world has the Chinese State's demonstrated ability to practice "socialization of
44 investment" policies at a level never imagined by Keynes himself?
45
46 "Socialist market economy" is a MP that is emerging in China. In a simplified way its goal is
47
to produce, as is universal in any MP, use value31. However, it is consciously and rationally regulated
48
and has its main auxiliary means in planning. It is precisely in the possibility of planning for
49
50
production that one of the differences lies in relation to capitalism, where the production of use
51 values is regulated by the market through value, whether explained by labour, for the classics, or by
52 marginal utility, for the neoclassical ones.
53 30
54 31
And we extend this concern to current interpretations of Brazil and the world.
55 "Doing science" does not necessarily require giving up value judgments of any kind. We know that the notion of utility
56 is passive of prejudice and full of value judgments. But just as we are aware that we are using a notion of this typology,
we know that socialism is the expected and historically constructed becoming.
57
58 14
59
1
2
3
4 4.1. A world in a fast transformation
5
6 This new SEF based on "socialist market economy" develops in a world characterized by the cross
7 between financialization as hegemonic accumulation dynamics and the difficulty of finding an exit
8 from the great crisis of the system initiated in 2007-2008 creating a situation of each challenge to the
9 order created after the Bretton Woods Agreement. The unipolar order that emerged with the end of
10
the Cold War - in which the apex of world power is the United States - also enters a process of
11
12
decline tending to multipolarization. This situation has shaped a system of world power in transition,
13 with the advent of new poles of power emerging from the periphery of the international system,
14 outside the world capitalist-imperialist centre. Still in the field of geopolitical analysis, Rabelo calls
15 attention to the existence of an order where the "old" still holds hegemony and strength:
16
17 Within this framework of profound changes in the world order - with neoliberal dominance and new
18 forms of neo-colonial submission - imperialist action, with its combined endeavours, imposes a
19 powerful structural domain that countries on the periphery of the world system cannot achieve, much
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20 less supplant. Even the progressive cycle in Latin America, begun in the late 1990s, has not threatened
21 this structural dominance. (Rabelo 2017).
22
23
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Revolutionary transformations are occurring in the field of the productive sphere with the
24 process of spreading / emergence of new technological paradigms, a process commonly called the 4th
25 Industrial Revolution, creating a new manufacturing standard with impacts on the world still
26 unimaginable32. According to Coutinho:
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27
28 The industry of the future will be part of this immense global digital network in the process of
29 formation. Industrial automation will be articulated through the Internet, encompassing all the
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30 productive chains from the supply of raw materials, inputs, parts and sub-assemblies, through
31 manufacturing, distribution, marketing and reaching consumers. The ability to virtualize, online or in
32 real time, the operation of entire strings through advanced computing systems, will significantly
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33 optimize efficiency and productivity. (...). This new standard of connected and intelligent
34 manufacturing will also enjoy remarkable advances in robotics and so-called additive manufacturing
35 (3D printing). The machines, equipment, robots, 3D printers will gain their own cognitive capacities,
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based on the advances of Artificial Intelligence (AI). In fact, the connected digitization of the
37 production networks will allow the accumulation of data on a large scale (the so-called Big Data).
38 (Coutinho 2018:33).
39
40 In this way, we are facing a historical process in which the economy of the new ESF is being
41
drawn from the synthesis between the financialization process, imperialist aggression, new
42
43
productive and technological paradigms (opening wide challenges and possibilities for planning) and
44 new and superior forms of planning being developed and executed on a large scale in China.
45
46 4.2. Starting point and interesting approaches
47
48 It is evident that we are experiencing a moment of rapid transformation in the world. Sufficient
49 transformations to affirm that the junction between "socialist market economy" with the profound
50 changes in the sphere of production demands the construction of a new economic theory whose
51 objective would be to understand this degree of complexity that marks the era in which we are living.
52
53 The starting point is the historical materialism of Marx and Engels, plus all the existing
54
theoretical collections elaborated over time by the field of economic heterodoxy, from the classics of
55
56 32
On the consequences of this process of transformation in the field of technology, please read Coutinho (2018).
57
58 15
59
1
2
3 Political Economy (Smith and Ricardo), through Thorstein Veblen's institutionalism, the "pioneers of
4 development" (Albert Hirschman, Gunnar Myrdal, Raul Prebisch, Alexander Gerschenkron etc.) by
5 the contributions of two unorthodox bourgeois economists (Keynes and Schumpeter). This is not, as
6 it may seem, a theoretical construction of an eclectic type. It is a recognition of the historicity of the
7 laws of science 33. Or that is, the reverse of dogmatism. An open-minded view to different
8 approaches created over time. Or, according to Hansen:
9
10
It is safe to say that any economic doctrine long accepted by any considerable group of competent
11 economists was never wholly without merit. Though later discarded, such doctrines often afforded as
12 first approximation significant insights into the functioning of the economic system. (Hansen 1953:3).
13
14
15
The unit of analysis is the ongoing process in China. The construction of a theory in
16 accordance with the specificities of a complex social formation imposes on us the need for
17 intellectual flexibility in the form of a particular appropriation of the theories that, by being
18 historical, define the behaviour of reality in certain circumstances and are only valid as long as they
19 last (Rangel 2005:287). There is, therefore, no "pure economy" based on universal laws only
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20 applicable to the treatment of certain types of phenomena, as Marshall:
21
22 But, while attributing this high and transcendent universality to the central scheme of economic
23
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reasoning, we may not assign any universality to economic dogmas. For that part of economic
24 doctrine, which alone can claim universality, has no dogmas. It is not a body of concrete truth, but an
25 engine for the Discovery of concrete truth, similar to, say, the theory of mechanics. (Marshall
26 1885:129).
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27
28 In an article published in the Monthly Review, the following reference caught our attention:
29
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30 President Xi Jinping has emphasized the need to uphold and develop a Marxian political economy for
31 the twenty-first century, adapted to China’s needs and resources. The bulletin of a conference on
32 China’s economy of the Communist Party central committee, held in December 2015, accordingly
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33 stressed the importance of eight major principles of “socialist political economy with Chinese
34 characteristics”. (Enfun and Xiaoqin 2017: 17).
35
36
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In the same article, the authors offer an auxiliary line of reasoning in proposing a question
37 similar to ours and going further: suggesting that Chinese success is derived from theoretical
38
advances in Political Economy arising in China itself:
39
40
41 China’s rapid economic development in recent years is often characterized as “miraculous”. Talk of a
42 “Beijing Consensus” or “China model” has become commonplace in academic debates. But as we
43
have written elsewhere, “theoretical problems have started to emerge with regards to the very
44
existence, content, and prospects of the China model. “The key question, then, is what kind of
45
economic theory and strategy underpin this “miracle. China’s model has been variously described
as a form of neoliberalism, or as a novel kind of Keynesianism. Against these positions, we hold
46
47
that the country’s major recent developmental gains are the achievements of theoretical
advances in political economy, originating in China itself, while the main problems that have
48
accompanied China’s development reflect the damaging influence of Western neoliberalism (Enfun
49
and Xiaoqin 2017:18).34.
50
51
52 33
In Rangel, this historicity of the laws of science is enclosed in a vision of economic science as a historical matter,
53 consequently, sensitive to a double evolutionary process. In his words (Rangel 2005:204): Economics is a historical
54 science par excellence - a quality that shares the other social sciences. It means that it is subject to a double evolutionary
55 process: the phenomenal and the nominal. And it also means that, unlike the natural sciences, especially those of non-
56 living nature, it can only be studied in this double context. consequently, sensitive to a double evolutionary process.
34
Our emphases.
57
58 16
59
1
2
3
4 By denying both neo-liberalism and a "new type" Keysianism as insufficient theories to
5 explain the "Chinese model," the authors demonstrate a rare historicist view. Neoliberalism is
6 nothing more than an ideology associated with seemingly scientific economic and political theories
7 (Bresser Pereira 2009:3). The Chinese "model" is its antithesis. On the other hand, Keynes fits within
8 the framework of China’s economic theory, China does not fit within the framework of Keynes35.
9 For example is essential for the understanding of development in China insofar as it demonstrates
10 that complementarity between the State and the market is possible and necessary, and in many cases
11
this complementarity tends to escape by political and conjunctural injunctions with the State being a
12
13
substitute for the private sector and the market itself36.
14
15 It is valid to affirm that China is an empirical demonstration of the words of Henderson
16 (1951:234), for whom the State would assume the role of "entrepreneur in chief."37 On the other
17 hand, the limit of Keynesian analysis lies in the excessive emphasis on the role of saving and
18 investment as key variables to explain the Chinese case, to the detriment of, for example, the role of
19 labour productivity38.
Fo
20
21 They do not perceive an essential attribute of the "model": an economy, mediated by
22 planning, whose backbone are state-owned enterprises, the action of the law of value is distorted. By
23
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reducing the object of the economy to the analysis of a society made up of producers and consumers
24
- thus displacing the role of the class struggle that permeates the whole production process - both the
25
neoclassical and the Keynesians ignore the contradiction between labour productivity and law of
26
ee
27 value.
28
29 4.3. On socialism: tackling common sense and the "dialectic of Saturn"
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30
31 It is not difficult to realize that common sense has successfully designed a version of China as a
32 capitalist country. Apart from the pejorative judgments of value amplified by the mass media, a
ev
33 tragicomic portrait of the interests of imperialism. We have full clarity of the low adherence that our
34 view of that process raises. Some considerations are important.
35
36
iew
We know that it is not an easy task to propose the construction of a theory as a subsidy
37 capable of explaining this "socialist market economy" involved, and main part, in a world
38
undergoing transformation. And at the heart of this transformation is an SEF of a new type,
39
40
socializing, whose host country is very close to becoming the leader of a new centre of the system
41 that transits from the North Atlantic to East Asia. Being clear: the country with the third largest
42 territorial size, and also the most populous in the world, and which advocates the socialist character
43 of its experience is started to take on a growing role in world system. Let us return to the controversy
44
45 35
Ross (2010)
46 36
According to Ross (2015), The Chinese model of development, 'socialism with Chinese characteristics', is in reality a
47 radical version of Keynesianism.
48 37
Still on Keynes, the ways of capitalism have created a great contradiction, as Ross (2010): It is an irony. Keynes
49 explicitly put forward his theories to save capitalism. But the structure of the US and European economies has made it
50 impossible to implement Keynes's policies even when confronted with the most severe recession since the Great
51 Depression. The anti-crisis measures of China's 'socialist market economy' are far closer to those Keynes foresaw that
52 any capitalist economy. Looking at the US, for example, fixed investment fell by over twenty-five per cent during the
53 financial crisis in China urban fixed investment rose by over thirty per cent. Consequently, there is no mystery why
54 China's economy has grown by 41.4 per cent in the four years since the peak of the last US business cycle, in the 4th
55 quarter of 2007, while the US economy has grown by 0.7 per cent.
38
56 . In Marxist analysis, productivity is the central factor in economic growth. On the centrality of the productivity factor,
Khuong (2014) makes an interesting comparative analysis between the countries of Asia, especially China.
57
58 17
59
1
2
3 over Chinese socialism, which is a polemic that tends to extend over at least the next decade. The
4 historical process view deficit is part of the problem. In this sense, it is worth remembering the
5 following passage by Mamigonian:
6
7 Just as the transition feudalism-capitalism lasted centuries, (...), the transition capitalism-socialism is
8 also being done for centuries. The germs of capitalism in the Italian and Flemish cities (thirteenth and
9 fourteenth centuries) were not enough, and only much later capitalist production relations in England
10 had enough strength to break the feudal shell. Now when Marx and Engels envisioned the victory of
11 the revolution simultaneously in England, France, and Germany, creating a socialist world nucleus
12 around which other countries (including Russia, with its egalitarian agrarian base) could rotate and
13 incorporate, based on the revolutions of 1848 that shook Europe (...). But the reality turned out to be
14 different, for at the time of the world revolutionary conjuncture of 1917-1923, in Russia alone the
15 revolution was victorious, thanks in part to Lenin's ideas, which succeeded in pushing forward radical
16 Marxist thinking. (Mamigonian 2001:7).
17
18 On the thematic of the construction of the socialism, according to Mamigonian:
19
Fo
20 However, the absence of revolution in the central countries and the revolutionary victory in backward
21 countries like Russia (1917), Vietnam (1945), Yugoslavia (1945), China (1949), Cuba (1959) posed
22 the question of "building" socialism, since in these countries the minimal material basis for socialist
23
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production relations did not exist. The victorious socialist revolutions had to take on many complex
24 tasks, instead of simply implanting socialist relations of production (...). A system similar to Meiji
25 Innovation (1868) was created, when feudal lords took power, created a capitalist state, dissolved
26
ee
feudal relations, and implemented capitalist relations of production from the top to bottom. (...).
27 (Mamigonian 2001:8).
28
29 Mamigonian complements his reasoning in this way:
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30
31
For many years, the struggle for the survival of the revolution was among these tasks. Such as the
32
preparation of the Red Army to confront Nazi Germany or the decades-long civil war in China to
ev
33
defeat the feudal lords and imperialism and in both cases carry out in parallel tasks of the bourgeois
34
revolution (agrarian reform), which neither Kerensky nor Chiang Kaishek succeeded in implanting.
35
Thus, the moderate Marxists of today (radicals of yesterday), who prefer the Mensheviks to the
36
iew
Bolsheviks, postulate their ahistorical illusions. (Mamigonian 2001: 9).

37
38
39 Differences of opinion and conception about the nature of socialism were already visible
40 from the outset. From Lassale ("right"), Blanqui ("left") and Marx, whose overall view has led him to
41 always adopt more centrist positions. So, it is not to be imagined that the same is true when it comes
42 to China. And it was frequent with respect to the Soviet Union. How to explain these divisions?
43 According to Losurdo:
44
45 The dialectic on the basis of which "Saturn devours its children" is certainly not an exclusive feature
46 of the October Revolution: the choral unity that presides over the overthrow of an old regime now
47 wicked because the majority of the population inevitably cracks or disperses, in the moment when it
48 comes to deciding on the new order to be established. This applies also to the English and American
49 Revolutions. (Losurdo 2010: 47).
50
51 Socialism raises expectations of messianic type. This is the source by which the "dialectic of
52 Saturn" acts violently. It is not uncommon to relate socialism as the expression of a society where
53 contradiction disappears, taking with it social inequalities, the monetary economy, the boundaries
54 between "my" and "yours." On China, "socialist market economy" within a Talmudic view is
55
synonymous with "betrayal" of the principles of Marxism. In this case, the "dialectic of Saturn" is
56
57
58 18
59
1
2
3 expressed in the confusion among those who perceive the market economy as a historical category
4 and those who put a mark of equality between market and capitalism. The very common
5 egalitarianism in the communist movement leads to the reduction of Marx to another thinker of the
6 "social question" or, at most, a Ricardian minor.
7
8 It is necessary a parenthesis. Among the reasons for the almost unanimous verdict of
9 "Chinese capitalism" lies in the inability of the so-called "academic" community to differentiate itself
10
from common sense (in this sense "common sense" are force ideas created in the North Atlantic)
11
12
appeal in shape and fragile in content. "Denouncing” the immense social inequalities in China using
13 "beautiful and strong words" hold strong appeal. On the other hand, few are committed - for example
14 - to understand the grade of upper-level planning annexed in the transfer of 200 million peasants
15 from the countryside to the cities; a real process of development of the social division of labour
16 characterized by the incorporation of agriculture - with increasing elevation of the organic
17 composition of capital - by industry 39.
18
19 Returning, in the "Communist Manifesto", Marx and Engels remind us that: Nothing is easier
Fo
20 than to cover Christian asceticism with a socialist veneer. Egalitarian notions must be faced in this
21 task of building a new theory a we are proposing. In this sense, the following passage from Losurdo
22 is interesting and preserves essentiality:
23
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24
In the Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel highlights the aporia contained in the idea of material
25
equality which is at the foundation of the claim of "communion of goods." When an equal satisfaction
26
ee
of the different needs of individuals is put into practice, it is clear that there is an inequality in relation
27
to the "participation quota", i.e. the distribution of goods; if, however, an "equal distribution" of the
28
goods is made, then it is clear that the "needs satisfaction" (always different) becomes unequal in
29
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individuals. (Losurdo 2010: 57-58).

30
31
32
It is evident, therefore, the impossibility of the "promise" of material equality contained in the
notion of "communion of goods". Losurdo gives consequence to this reasoning as follows:
ev
33
34
35 Marx, who knew the Phenomenology very well, solves the corresponding difficulty (in the Critique of
36 the Gotha Program) the two different ways of declining "equality" (which is always partial and
iew
37 limited) to two different states of development of post-capitalist society : in the socialist stage, the
38 distribution according to an "equal law", that is, by giving an equal measure to the work provided by
39 each individual citizen, which is always more different, produces an evident inequality in retribution
40 and income; in this sense "equal law" is nothing other than the "right of inequality". In the communist
41 stage, the equal satisfaction of different needs also implies an inequality in the distribution of
42 resources, but the enormous development of the productive forces, also satisfying the needs of all,
43 makes such inequality unimportant. (Losurdo 2010:58)
44
45 Two consequences can be drawn from the passages given above: (1) in socialism, material
46 equality is not possible; and (2) in communism this "material equality" is meaningless. Hence the
47 emphasis of the founders of scientific socialism on the commitment of workers to the
48 development of productive forces. Coincidentally, according to Chinese President Xi Jinping:
49
50
51
52
53 39
Some examples are interesting. A recent survey, published by the Department of Geosciences of UFSC Federal
54 University of Santa Catarina State, in Brazil), Carlos José Espíndola, shows that pork production increased from 22,808
55 tons in 1990 to 52,990 tons in 2016. In the same period, the production of chicken meat jumped from 2,427 to 12,300,
56 beef from 1,256 to 7,000. Production of soybean meal increased by 229.3% between 1990 and 2016. Examples of this
development are multiplying in China.
57
58 19
59
1
2
3 By firmly understanding this basic national condition that China is in the early stages of socialism,
4 effectively relying on this greater reality and persisting in the fundamental line of the Party - the vital
5 line of the Party and State and the line of well-being of all the people, the whole Party must ruler and
6 unite the people of all ethnic groups of the country, keep economic construction as the central task.
7 (...). Emancipating and developing the social productive forces is an inherent requirement of
8 socialism (Jinping 2017:32)40.
9
10 As a synthesis of what we discussed about socialism, we conclude this section with the
11 following observations of Marx and Engels:
12
13 The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to
14 centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of theproletariat organised as the
15 ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible (Marx and Engels,
16 1998:56) 41.
17
18
19 5. Conclusions
Fo
20
21
First a warning: this article is only part of the beginning of an effort not only to understand the
22
23
reasons for the success of the Chinese "model". It is also part of our recent observation that relates
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24 the process of re-Statization of the Chinese productive system as a consequence of the last wave of
25 institutional innovations that occurred in the late 1990s, concomitant to the process of mergers and
26 acquisitions in the State sector of the economy whose synthesis is the 149 state-owned business
ee
27 conglomerates in the strategic sectors of the economy. The crisis of 2009, and the Chinese response,
28 left no doubt about the new levels of state action in the economy.
29
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30 By raising the field of abstraction, such evidence has opened up to us the possibility of the
31 emergence in China of a new SEF, a CMP we call "socialist market economy." The tribute to Ignacio
32 Rangel and Armen Mamigonian is thus justified. Mamigonian continues the saga of Rangel
ev
33 characterized by the constant pursuit of the possibilities of combinations among different modes of
34
production. Both Marxists whose radicality is expressed in the use of the Marxist category of ESF
35
taking away all the consequences that this category provides.
36
iew
37
38 We try to take full advantage of Rangel's advices. Not just your advices. He was a source of
39 inspiration and courage to exercise abstraction as an act of overcoming and reducing the so-called
40 sensitive matter as a simple phenomenon and anchors the essential that manifests itself in the
41 concept, to "socialist market economy" in our case. Rangel appears convincing us about the
42 possibility of combinations of different modes of production based on the same social formation,
43 generating complex modes of production. Thus, "socialist market economy" - just as the Asiatic MP
44 and Brazilian Dualities are phenomena of the same aetiology - is a complex MP. Our effort has been
45 to identify the nature of this phenomenon and outline the five general logics of its operation.
46
47
At the end, in view of the emergence of a new MP, we propose the need to build a theory that
48
will enable us to understand this historical process where the economy of the new SEF is being
49
50
drawn from the synthesis between the process of financialization, imperialist aggressiveness, new
51 productive and technological paradigms (opening up broad challenges and possibilities for planning)
52 and the new and higher forms of planning being developed and executed on a large scale in China.
53 We offer possibilities of theoretical combinations and possible approximations. We end the article at
54
55 40
56 Our emphasis.
41
Idem
57
58 20
59
1
2
3 the same time exposing and positioning itself on the open wounds (in the form of a Saturn dialectic")
4 by the discussions about socialism, its nature and China.
5
6 We have open a road. A long road.
7
8 Declaration of Conflicting Interests
9 The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
10
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
11
12
13 Funding
14 The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of
15 this article.
16
17
18
19
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Review of Radical Political Economics

“Socialist Market Economy": A New Socio-Economic

Journal: Review of Radical Political Economics

China, socialist market economy, Complex Mode of Production,

Jel Classifications: To view Jel

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the growth of the

of "state capitalism" and further away from being a "liberal

complexity, since it implies that it is a formation marked by the

Keywords: China; socialist market economy; Complex Mode of

33 archaïque)]. (Marx 1982: 118).

1.1. Marxist category of SEF as a basilar core of the argumentation

24 the construction of a "historical time theory," as follows:

33 Balibar, 1970: 209)10.

24 has to use a category capable of, as Lenin did, according to Sereni:

27 this subitem, we need explains some points:

33 most harmful aspects of capitalism”14;

(Rangel 2005: 41).

(Bielschowsky 1996: 211).

30 aspect of the method of Political Economy, as follows:

increase of government control over the flows of national income.

Bolsheviks, postulate their ahistorical illusions. (Mamigonian 2001: 9).

individuals. (Losurdo 2010: 57-58).

24 Amin, S. 2013: China 2013. Monthly Review (64): 15-27.

27 Bresser-Pereira, L. 2009. Assalto ao Estado e ao mercado, neoliberalismo e teoria econômica

37 Engels, F. 2015. Anti-Dühring. São Paulo: Boitempo.

Analyses in Asia. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

30 neoliberalization and the dialectical differentiation of state spatiality. Progress in Human

33 Mamigonian, A.1997. Notas sobre as raízes e originalidade do pensamento de Ignacio

Mamigonian, A. 2001. Capitalismo e Socialismo em fins do século XX (visão marxista).

27 Paulista de Geografia – BPG. (54): 81-99.

30 Revista de Geografía. (2): 248-346.

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