EN BANC of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots,
ioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail; and (11) private
[G.R. No. 101949. December 1, 1994.]
THE HOLY SEE, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61
and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
QUIASON, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set
aside the Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991
of theRegional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in
Civil Case No. 90-183.
The Order dated June 20, 1991 denied the motion of
petitioner to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 90- 183,
while the Order dated September 19, 1991 denied themotion
for reconsideration of the June 20, 1991 Order.
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty
over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented
in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.,
is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business. LLphil
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of
land consisting of 6,000 square meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in theMunicipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of
petitioner.
Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which
are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and
265388 respectively and registered in the name of thePhilippine
Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through
Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers.
Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private
respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to
vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as
who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and
clearingthe land of squatters. Complicating the relations
Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
I of thecontract to sell and has actually made plans to
On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati,
Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of
land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner,
represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants:
namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., thePRC and Tropicana
(Civil Case No. 90-183).
The complaint alleged that: (1) on April 17, 1988,
Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of petitioner and the PRC, agreed to
sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at the price of
P1,240.00 per square meters; (2) the agreement to sell was
made on the condition that earnest money of P100,000.00 be
paid by Licup to the sellers, and that the sellers clearthe said
lots of squatters who were then occupying the same; (3) Licup
paid the earnest money to Msgr. Cirilos; (4) in the same month,
Licup assigned his rights over theproperty to private respondent
and informed the sellers of the said assignment; (5) thereafter,
private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos
that the sellers fulfill their undertaking and clear the property of
squatters; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent
of the squatters' refusal to vacate the lots, proposing instead
either that private respondent undertake the eviction or
that the earnest money be returned to the latter; (6) private
respondent counterproposed that if it would
undertake the eviction of the squatters, the purchase price
of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per
square meter; (7) Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of
P100,000.00 and wrote private respondent giving it seven days
from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in
cash; (8) private respondent sent the earnest money back
tothe sellers, but later discovered that on March 30, 1989,
petitioner and the PRC, without notice to private respondent,
sold the lots to Tropicana, as evidenced by two separate Deeds
of Sale, one over Lot 5-A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D;
and that the sellers' transfer certificate of title over the lots
were cancelled, transferred and registered inthe name of
Tropicana; (9) Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to
sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of
private respondent; (10) private respondent
demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana
respondent is willing and able to comply with the terms
develop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view
of the sellers' breach, it lost profits of not less than
P30,000.000.00. LLjur
Private respondent thus prayed for:
(1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner
and the PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the other;
(2) thereconveyance of the lots in question; (3) specific
performance of the agreement to sell between it
and the owners of the lots; and (4) damages.
On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos
separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack
of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and
Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition
to the motion was filed by private respondent.
On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order
denying, among others, petitioner's motion to dismiss after
finding that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign immunity by
entering into the business contract in question" (Rollo, pp. 20-
21).
On July 12, 1991, petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the order. On August 30, 1991, petitioner
filed a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose of
Establishing Factual Allegation for claim of Immunity as a
Jurisdictional Defense." So as to facilitate the determination of
its defense of sovereign immunity, petitioner prayed that a
hearing be conducted to allow it to establish certain facts upon
which the said defense is based. Private respondent opposed
this motion as well as the motion for reconsideration.
On October 1, 1991, the trial court issued an order
deferring the resolution on the motion for reconsideration until
after trial on the merits and directing petitioner to file its
answer (Rollo, p. 22).
Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its
petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity
only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official
representative, the Papal Nuncio.
On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was
filed before us by the Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming
that it has a legal interest in the outcome of the case as
regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner, and that it
"adopts by reference, the allegations contained in the petition
of the Holy See insofar as they refer to arguments relative to its
claim of sovereign immunity from suit" (Rollo, p. 87).
Private respondent opposed the intervention
of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In compliance
with the resolution of this Court, both parties
and the Department of Foreign Affairs submitted their
respective memoranda.
II
A preliminary matter to be threshed out
is the procedural issue of whether the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to
question the order denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss. The general rule is that an order denying a motion to
dismiss is not reviewable by the appellate courts, the remedy
of the movant being to file his answer and to proceed
with the hearing before the trial court. But the general rule
admits of exceptions, and one of these is when it is very clear
in the records that the trial court has no alternative but to
dismiss the complaint (Philippine National Bank v. Florendo, 206
SCRA 582 [1992]; Zagada v. Civil Service Commission, 216 SCRA
114 [1992]. In such a case, it would be a sheer waste of time
and energy to require the parties to undergo the rigors of a
trial.
The other procedural question raised by private
respondent is the personality or legal interest
of the Department of Foreign Affairs to intervene in the case in
behalf ofthe Holy See (Rollo, pp. 186-190). prLL
In Public International Law, when a state or
international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic
immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office
ofthe state where it is sued to convey to the court that said
defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed
is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state
or the international organization sued in an American court
requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to
whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds
that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn,
asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion"
that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar
procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a
certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion"
(O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from
Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50
Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign
government or the international organization to first secure an
executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic
immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its
endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic
Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130
(1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly
to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter
that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it
enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v.
Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57
SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf
of the Commander ofthe United States Naval Base at Olongapo
City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent
Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a
Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae. LLphil
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this
Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of
petitioner.The Court allowed the said Department to file its
memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign
immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was
submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents
through their private counsels (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50
[1945]; Miquiabas v. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262
[1948]; United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]
and companion cases). In cases wherethe foreign states
bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts
and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts
and transactions involved.
III
The burden of the petition is that respondent trial
court has no jurisdiction over petitioner, being a foreign state
enjoying sovereign immunity. On the other hand, private
respondent insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not
anymore absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such
a cloak when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial
transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located
in the Philippines.
A. The Holy See
Before we determine the issue of petitioner's non-
suability, a brief look into its status as a sovereign state is in
order.
Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in
1870, the Pope was the monarch and he, as the Holy See, was
considered a subject of International Law. With theloss
of the Papal States and the limitation of the territory
under the Holy See to an area of 108.7 acres, the position
of the Holy See in International Law became controversial
(Salonga and Yap, Public International Law 36-37 [1992]).
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered
into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the exclusive
dominion and sovereign jurisdiction
of the Holy See over theVatican City. It also recognized the right
of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its own
diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties
according to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems
In International Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]).
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood
of the Vatican City "for the purpose of assuring
to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of
guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of
international relations" (O'Connell, I International Law 311
[1965]). llcd
In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is
difficult to determine whether the statehood is vested
in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even
suggested that the treaty created two international persons —
the Holy See and Vatican City (Salonga and Yap, supra., 37).
The Vatican City fits into none of the established
categories of states, and the attribution to it of "sovereignty"
must be made in a sense different from that in which it is
applied to other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-125
[1948]; Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of
national states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized
not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international
objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an
independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also
head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of
State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its
mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and
activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an
"international state" (Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of
International Law 160 [1956]).
One authority wrote that the recognition
of the Vatican City as a state has significant implication — that it
is possible for any entity pursuing objects essentially different
from those pursued by states to be invested with international
personality (Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International
Law, 46 The American Journal of International Law 308 [1952]).
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign
relations and enter into transactions as the Holy See and not
in the name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that
inthe Pope's own view, it is the Holy See that
is the international person.
The Republic of the Philippines has
accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign
sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal
Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine
government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to
be the universal practice in international relations.
B. Sovereign Immunity
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987
Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted
principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation,
such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated
as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of
our admission in the society of nations (United States of
America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign
immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According
to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without
its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with
regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (United States of
America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-
Santiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]). prLL
Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines
for the executive or judicial determination when an act may be
considered as jure gestionis. The United States
passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which
defines a commercial activity as "either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or
act." Furthermore, the law declared that the "commercial
character of the activity shall be determined by reference
to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction
or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." The Canadian
Parliament enacted in 1982 an Act to Provide For State
Immunity In Canadian Courts. TheAct defines a "commercial
activity" as any particular transaction, act or conduct or any
regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a
"commercial character."
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a
solution to the host of problems involving the issue of sovereign
immunity, has created problems of its own. Legal treatises
and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive
theory have difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of a
sovereign state with a private party is an actjure gestionis or an
act jure imperii.
The restrictive theory came about because
of the entry of sovereign states into purely commercial
activities remotely connected with the discharge of
governmental functions. This is particularly true with respect
to the Communist states which took control of nationalized
business activities and international trading.
This Court has considered the following transactions
by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure imperii:
(1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment buildings
for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312
[1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a
wharf at a United States Naval Station (United States of
America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment
status of base employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88
[1988]). LLpr
On the other hand, this Court has
considered the following transactions by a foreign state with
private parties as acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook
in therecreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a
cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop
at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to American
servicemen and the general public (United States of America v.
Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding
for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles
City (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644
[1990]). The operation of the restaurants and other facilities
open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a
commercial and not a governmental activity. By entering
into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of
its proprietary function, the United States government
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
In the absence of legislation defining what activities
and transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as
constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with our
own guidelines, tentative they may be.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a
foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test.
Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. Thelogical
question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity
in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not
engaged regularly in a business or trade, theparticular act or
transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in
pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is
an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain
or profit. LLjur
As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra):
"There is no question that the United States of
America, like any other state, will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has
entered into a contract in its proprietary or
private capacity. It is only when the contract
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity
that no such waiver may be implied."
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold
lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business,
surely the said transaction can be categorized as an actjure
gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition
and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but
claimed that it acquired said property for thesite of its mission
or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said claim.
 Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation
from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct
thereon the official place of residence of the Papal
Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property,
real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary forthe creation
and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized
in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts.
20-22). This treaty was concurred in by thePhilippine Senate
and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15,
1965.
In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy
is granted immunity from the civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to
private immovable property situated in the territory
of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf
of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this
immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more
reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign
itself, which in this case is the Holy See. LLphil
The decision to transfer the property
and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a
governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit
or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same
because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible
for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. Thefact
that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and
that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been
admitted by private respondent in its complaint (Rollo, pp. 26,
27).
The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be
determined by the trial court without going to trial in the light
of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private
respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this
case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and
Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines'
foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I,
Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally
intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy
of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission
to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction
and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a
diplomatic mission or embassy in this country (Rollo, pp. 156- "By taking up the case of one of its subjects and
157). The determination of theexecutive arm of government by reporting to diplomatic action or
that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or international judicial proceedings on his behalf,
diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive a State is in reality asserting its own rights — its
upon the courts (International Catholic Migration Commission v. right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,
Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is respect for the rules of international law
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1
ofthe courts to accept this claim so as not to Hudson, World Court Reports 293, 302 [1924]).
embarrass the executive arm of the government in WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED
conducting the country's foreign relations (World Health and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is
Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International DISMISSED.
Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health SO ORDERED.
Organization, we abide by the certification of the Department
of Foreign Affairs. cdll Narvasa, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Ordinarily, the procedure would be to
Padilla, J., took no part.
remand the case and order the trial court to conduct a hearing
to establish the facts alleged by petitioner in its motion. In view Feliciano, J., is on leave.
of said certification, such procedure would however be ||| (The Holy See v. Rosario, Jr., G.R. No. 101949, [December 1,
pointless and unduly circuitous (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. 1994], 308 PHIL 547-561)
Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, July 25,
1994).
IV
Private respondent is not left without any legal
remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public
International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels
aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own
government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine
government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims
against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine
government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its
claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a
determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations
between the Philippine government
and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against
Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of
Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]).
Once the Philippine government decides to
espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private
cause. cdphil
According to the Permanent Court of International
Justice, the forerunner of the International Court of Justice:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-4699. November 26, 1952.]
TEODORA SANTOS, assisted by her husband
Donato de Castro, JOSEFINA SANTOS, assisted
by her husband Santiago Rodriguez and
EMILIANA SANTOS,plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
LEONCIO SANTOS, THE ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION,
and NATIONAL AIRPORTS
CORPORATION,defendants-appellees.
Ramon Diokno and Jose W. Diokno for appellants.
Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Esmeraldo
Umali for appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND
CONTRACTS; ACTIONS AGAINST THE STATE. — Where the state
or its government enters into a contract, through its officers or
agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and
pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual
or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise
therefrom, and if the law granting the authority to enter into
such contract does not provide for or name the officer against
whom such action may be brought in the event of a breach
thereof, the state itself may be sued even without its consent,
because by entering into a contract the sovereign state has
descended to the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued
is implied from the very act of entering into such contract.
DECISION
PADILLA, J p:
Teodora Santos and her nieces Emiliana and Josefina
surnamed Santos complain that from 1945 to 1949
Leoncio Santos collected from the Army of the United States of
America rentals for the use and occupation of a parcel of land,
known as Lot No. 4 of CAA Survey Plan AERO R-1, containing an
area of 21,577 square meters, situated in the municipality of
Las Piñas, province of Rizal, more particularly described in the
complaint, belonging to them and Leoncio Santos in common
by inheritance from their ancestor, the late Paulino de
los Santos, father of Teodora Santos and Leoncio Santos and
grandfather of Josefina Santos and Emiliana Santos, who died
sometime in 1919, in the proportion of 1/7 undivided share for
Teodora Santos and 1/14 undivided share each for
Josefina Santos and Emiliana Santos and 5/7 undivided share
for Leoncio Santos, for the accounting of which and payment of
their respective shares therein they made a demand upon
Leoncio Santos but the latter failed and refused to do so. They
also complain that they made a demand upon Leoncio Santos to
have the lot partitioned among them but the latter refused to
do so, he having sold the lot to the Administrator of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration on or about 13 May 1949, who is
now in possession thereof; and that the sale of the lot made by
Leoncio Santos to the Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration insofar as their shares in the lot are concerned is
null and void. Upon these allegations they pray that
Leoncio Santos be ordered to render an accounting of the
rentals and such other fruits, products and benefits as he might
have received from 1945 on and thereafter and to pay and
deliver 1/7 thereof to Teodora Santos and 1/14 thereof each to
Josefina and Emiliana surnamed Santos; that the parcel of land
be partitioned among them in the proportion above stated; that
the purported sale by Leoncio Santos to the National Airports
Corporation, the predecessor of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, insofar as their shares are concerned be
declared null and void; that the Administrator of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration be directed to vacate the portions
of the lot belonging to them, to pay them a reasonable rental
until after possession of their shares in the lot shall have been
restored to them and to pay damages and costs.
The Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction and insufficiency of the complaint against him,
invoking the case of Metropolitan Transportation Service
METRAN vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz., 2835, where it has been held
that the suit was against the state which could not be brought
without its consent. This motion was granted on the ground
that the Civil Aeronautics Administration not being a juridical
person has no capacity to sue and be sued and for that reason it
cannot come under the jurisdiction of the court.
The principle that the state or its government cannot
be sued without its consent has its root in the juridical and
practical notion that the state can do no wrong. Demandable
and enforceable obligations which may be the subject of judicial
action come into being either by law, contract, quasi-contract,
acts or omissions punishable by law, acts which do not
constitute or amount to a crime or a misdemeanor known at
common law as torts and in civil law as culpa aquiliana or extra
contractual. An obligation or liability of the state created by
statute is enforceable against the officer or agent charged with
the duty to execute the law. If there should be anything
demandable which had been paid or delivered to or collected
by officers or agents of the state without the authority of law,
the action would not be against the state but against the
responsible officers or agents who received what was not due
the state or made the unauthorized collection. Punishable acts
or omissions committed by officers or agents of the state are
crimes and violations of law perpetrated by such officers or
agents and not by the state. The same postulate may be applied
to torts committed by officers or agents of the state.
Nevertheless, if, where and when the state or its government
enters into a contract, through its officers or agents, in
furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to
constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or
reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise
therefrom, and if the law granting the authority to enter into
such contract does not provide for or name the officer against
whom action may be brought in the event of a breach thereof,
the state itself may be sued even without its consent, because
by entering into a contract the sovereign state has descended
to the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is implied
from the very act of entering into such contract. If the dignity of
the state, the sacredness of the institution, the respect for the
government are to be preserved and the dragging of its name in
a suit to be prevented, the legislative department should name
the officer or agent against whom the action may be brought in
the event of breach of the contract entered into under its name
and authority. And the omission or failure of the legislative
department to do so is no obstacle or impediment for an
individual or citizen, who is aggrieved by the breach of the
contract, to bring an action against the state itself for the
reasons already adverted to, to wit: the descent of the
sovereign state to the level of the individual or citizen with
whom it entered into a contract and its consent to be sued
implied from the act of entering into such contract.
The action brought in this case is for partition and
accounting of rentals received by the defendant
Leoncio Santos from 1945 to December 1949 for the use and
occupation of a parcel of land allegedly owned in common by
the plaintiffs and the defendant Leoncio Santos in the
proportion stated in the complaint. It is also averred that the
National Airports Corporation created by Republic Act No. 224, ||| (Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. L-4699, [November 26, 1952], 92 PHIL
which had acquired the parcel of land from the defendant 281-286)
Leoncio Santos, was abolished by Executive Order No. 365,
series of 1950, and in its place and stead the Civil Aeronautics
Administration was created and took over all the assets and
assumed all the liabilities of the abolished corporation. The Civil
Aeronautics Administration, even if it is not a juridical entity,
cannot legally prevent a party or parties from enforcing their
proprietary rights under the cloak or shield of lack of juridical
personality, because it took over all the powers and assumed all
the obligations of the defunct corporation which had entered
into the contract in question. In National Airports
Corporation vs. Teodoro *, G.R. No. L-5122, 30 April 1952, we
held that the Civil Aeronautics Administration may be sued and
that the principle of state immunity from suit does not apply to
it.
If the plaintiffs are not entitled to any share in the
parcel of land sold by Leoncio Santos and acquired by the
National Airports Corporation, now in possession of its
successor, the Civil Aeronautics Administration, the complaint
would have to be dismissed. But if the right to such shares as
claimed be established, the plaintiffs should not and can not be
deprived of their proprietary rights in the parcel of land sold by
their co-owner without their knowledge and consent.
Leoncio Santos would be responsible for warranty and eviction
to the Civil Aeronautics Administration. If the Torrens title does
not show such shares of the plaintiffs in the parcel of land sold
by Leoncio Santos to the National Airports Corporation, then
the action would not lie against the National Airports
Corporation or its successor, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, but LeoncioSantos would be responsible to his
co-owners for the value of their shares in the parcel of land and
of their natural or civil fruits of which they had been deprived
by the sale and conveyance of the whole parcel of land to the
National Airports Corporation by Leoncio Santos. The
accounting of rentals received would not affect the Civil
Aeronautics Administration, because it would be the exclusive
liability of Leoncio Santos.
The order appealed from dismissing the complaint as
to the Civil Aeronautics Administration is reversed and the case
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
accordance with law. No costs shall be taxed.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-1232. January 12, 1948.]
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION SERVICE
(METRAN), petitioner, vs. JOSE MA. PAREDES,
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ and ARSENIO C. ROLDAN,
Judges of Court of Industrial Relations, and THE
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, respondents.
Deogracias T. Reyes for petitioner.
Emilio Lopez for respondent judges, CIR.
Antonio Paguia and Baltazar M. Villanueva for National
Labor Union.
SYLLABUS
1. PARTIES; WHO MAY BE PARTIES IN CIVIL ACTIONS.
— Only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a civil
action.
2. ACTIONS; DEFINITION OF. — "Action" is defined by
Rule 2, section 1, as "an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by
which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redness of a wrong."
3. COURTS, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, A
COURT OF JUSTICE. — The Court of Industrial Relations is a
court of justice within the meaning of Rule 2, section 1, of the
Rules of Court.
4. ACTIONS; GOVERNMENT, SUIT AGAINST; SUIT
AGAINST AGENCY OR OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT;
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION SERVICE (METRAN) AS
PARTY DEFENDANT. — The Metropolitan Transportation Service
(METRAN) is and was at the times covered by the petition in the
Court of Industrial Relations an office created by Executive
Order No. 59 and operating under the direct supervision and
control of the Department of Public Works and
Communications. Said office is not a corporation or any of the
juridical entities enumerated in article 35 of the Civil
Code. Held: That any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it
were to produce any effect, would in practice be a suit, action
or proceeding against the Government itself, of which the said
Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) is a mere office
or agency. It is a well-settled rule that the government cannot
be sued without its consent (Merritt vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 34 Phil., 311) and here no consent of the
government has been shown. This case is different from those of
the so-called government-owned corporations, such as the
Philippine National Bank, National Development Company, the
Manila Hotel, etc., which have been duly incorporated under the
corporation law or special charters, one of whose powers is "to
sue and be used in any court" (Corporation Law, section 13 [a].
It is not even a case governed by Act No. 3083 which specifies
the instances where this government has given its consent to be
sued (Compañia General de Tobacos vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 45 Phil., 663).
5. ID.; ID.; SUIT BY AGENCY OR OFFICE OF
GOVERNMENT; METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION SERVICE
(METRAN) AS PARTY PLAINTIFF. — The instant proceedings
should be considered as having been instituted by the
Government itself, since the Metropolitan Transportation
Service (Metran) is a mere office or agency of said government,
unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under
the law, incapable of not only being sued but suing (Rule 3,
section 1). The very allegations, arguments and contentions
contained in the petition clearly show that to all intents and
purposes said petition was being presented in behalf of the
Government as the real party in interest
DECISION
HILADO, J p:
Before the Court of Industrial Relations a petition was
filed in case No. 36-V entitled "National Labor
Union, versus Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran),"
wherein petitioner alleged that it was a legitimate labor
organization, thirty of whose affiliated members were working
and under the employ of the respondent; that the respondent
"is a semi-governmental transportation entity, popularly known
as 'Metran,' and after several other allegations concluded with
the prayer that its nine demands at length set forth in said
petition be granted. In behalf of the so-called respondent an
oral petition for dismissal of the case was made before the
court on October 22, 1946. " on the ground that the respondent
belongs to the Republic of the Philippines and as such, it can
not be sued" (Order of C.I.R. of November 7, 1946, Annex C). By
its aforesaid order, the court denied the motion to dismiss,
citing in support of such resolution a paragraph allegedly
quoted from an opinion of Justice Ozaeta speaking for the
Supreme Court "in the case of the Manila Hotel," in the words
of the order.
In behalf of the instant so-called petitioner a motion
for reconsideration of that order was filed (Annex D) but it was
denied by the Court of Industrial Relations by its resolution
dated December 3, 1946 (Annex E).
On December 7, 1946, a notice of appeal (Annex F) was
filed by counsel, and the case is now submitted on appeal under
the provisions of Rule 44.
It appears that the Metropolitan Transportation
Service (Metran) is not a corporation nor any of the juridical
entities enumerated in article 35 of the Civil Code. Rule 3,
section 1 provides:
"SECTION 1. Who may be parties. —
Only natural or judicial persons may be parties
in a civil action."
"Action" is defined by Rule 2, section 1,
as "an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by
which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong." Considering
that the very law of its creation (Commonwealth
Act No. 103, as amended), denominates the
lower tribunal as a "court" (section 1),
considering the powers and duties conferred
and imposed upon it (Chapter II), its incidental
powers (Chapter III), the fact that Chapter IV of
said Act and Rule 44 of the Rules of Court
provide for an appeal from an award, order, or
decision of the Court of Industrial Relations to
the Supreme Court, unquestionably a court of
justice, and the fact that section 20 of
said Commonwealth Act No. 103 confers upon
the Court of Industrial Relations the power to
adopt its rules of procedure and "such other
powers as generally pertain to a court of justice"
(italics supplied), and considering finally the
importance in the life and economy of the
nation of the industrial relations which have
thus been placed under the jurisdiction of said
Court of Industrial Relations, in the hearing and
determination of which cases thus submitted to
it, said court administers justice between
parties, we have no hesitation in holding that it
is a "court of justice" within the meaning of Rule
2, section 1.
 In the case of Health vs. Steamer "San Nicolas" (7 Phil.,
532), suit was brought H. L. Heath against the Steamer "San
Nicolas." "No natural or juridical person was named as
defendant in the complaint," commented this Court. Mr. Justice
Willard, speaking for the Court, stated the important question
calling for decision therein as follows:
"The important question discussed in
the briefs in this court, and to be decided, is
whether such a proceeding as the one in
question, directed against the ship itself,
without naming any natural or juridical person
as defendant, can be maintained in these
Islands." (Page 534 of cited volume.)
The Court, in resolving said question, inter alia,
declared:
"The first question to be considered is
whether this action was properly brought
against the ship and whether an action can now
be maintained when the only defendant named
is neither a natural nor juridical person. Under
the law in force prior to 1898 there was no
doubt upon this subject. It was absolutely
indispensable for the maintenance of a
contentious action in the courts of justice to
have as defendant some natural or juridical
person. A suit against a ship, such as is
permitted in the English and the American
admiralty courts, was unknown to the Spanish
law. It is true that the Spanish Law of Civil
Procedure contained certain provisions relating
to voluntary jurisdiction in matters of
commerce, but none of these provisions had
any application to a contentious suit of this
character.
"It being impossible to maintain an
action of this character against a ship as the only
defendant prior to June, 1901, it follows that it
such action can now be maintained it must be
by virtue of some provision found in the Code of
Civil Procedure and which is the only new law
now in force relating to this matter. An
examination of the provisions of that code will
show that no such action is authorized. It
cannot, therefore, be now maintained and the
demurrer of Borja should have been sustained
on that ground." (Pages 537-538 of cited
volume.)
Under the foregoing doctrine, it is obvious that the
Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) could not be
sued in the Court of Industrial Relations. A corollary of this is
that no award, order or decision could be rendered against it. If
so, how could it be said that the Court of Industrial Relations
had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case?
Moreover, there is another vital reason why the Court
of Industrial Relations lacked jurisdiction to entertain the
petition, much less to grant the remedies therein prayed for. It
is beyond dispute that the Metropolitan Transportation Service
(Metran) is and was at the times covered by the petition in the
Court of Industrial Relations an office created by Executive
Order No. 59 and operating under the direct supervision and
control of the Department of Public Works and
Communications. (Petition par. 1, admitted by respondent
judges' answer, par. 1 and by respondent Union's answer, par.
1.) The said office not being a juridical person, any suit, action
or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would
in practice be a suit, action or proceeding against the
Government itself, of which the said Metropolitan
Transportation Service (Metran) is a mere office or agency. Any
award, order or decision granting any of the Union's demands,
if attempted to be executed, would necessarily operate against
the government which is really the entity rendering the services
and performing the activities in question through its office or
agency called Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran).
The case is different from those of the so-called government-
owned corporations, such as the Philippine National Bank.
National Development Company, the Manila Hotel, etc., which
have been duly incorporated under our corporation law or
special characters, as one of whose powers is "to sue and be
sued in any court" (Corporation Law, section 13 [a], and which
actually engage in business; while in rendering the services and
performing the activities here involved the Government has
never engaged in business nor intends to do so. Now, it is a
well-settled rule that the Government cannot be sued without
its consent (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 34
Phil., 311) and here no consent of the government has been
shown. This is not even a case governed by Act No. 3083 which
specifies the instances where this government has given its
consent to be sued (Compañia General de Tabacos de
Filipinas vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 45 Phil., 663.
And the Manila Hotel case relied upon by the Court of Industrial
Relations in its order Annex C, is inapplicable for the reason that
the Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) is not a
corporation, nor any other kind of judicial person for that
matter. If the Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran)
could not be sued and the Court of Industrial Relations could not
render any decision, judgment, award or order against it, all the
proceedings had in said court were null and void. A case very
similar to the present was Salgado vs. Ramos (64 Phil., 724,
727), from which we quote the following passage;
". . . Consequently, while the claim is
actually made against the Director of Lands, it is
juridically against the Government of the
Philippine Islands of which the Director of Lands
is a mere agent, in accordance with the
provisions of article 1727 of the Civil Code."
On the other hand, the instant proceedings should be
considered, as we treat it, as having been instituted by the
Government itself, since the Metropolitan Transportation
Service (Metran) is a mere office or agency of said government,
unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under
the law, incapable of not being sued but suing (Rule 3, section
1). The very allegations, arguments and contentions contained
in the petition clearly show that to all intents and purposes said
petition was being presented in behalf of the Government as
the real party in interest. Rule 3, section 2, provides that every
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest. And giving effect to the spirit of liberality inspiring Rule
1, section 2, and in order to avoid multiplicity of suits, we
believe that this is a proper case for applying the principle that
the "the law considers that as done which ought to have been
done." Parenthetically, however, we may say that were we to
be more rigorous with petitioner herein in this regard, we will
have to be equally rigorous with petitioner in the Court of
Industrial Relations on the same score, with the practical result
that any way the proceedings before that court will have to be
dismissed.
It would be sophistical to say that the suit or action
against the said office or agency of the government is not a suit
or action against the government itself, upon the ground that
the prohibition only covers suits against the government as a
whole. A commonplace illustration will, we think, demonstrate
the fallacy of such a theory: In order that it may be said that a
man has been attacked by another, the latter does not need to
deliver blows or shower shots all over the body of the victim
injuring each and every part thereof, but if the blow or the shot
is inflicted upon the arm or any other part of his body, we say
that the victim was attacked by the aggressor. The Bureau of
Public Works under whose supervision the Metropolitan
Transportation Service (Metran) has been organized and
functions is an integral part of the government, just as the said
office or agency. And apart from the consideration that neither
said Bureau nor said office has any juridical personality to be
sued for reasons already set forth, any suit or action attempted
against either will necessarily be a suit or action against the
government itself.
". . . Accordingly it is well settled, as a
general proposition, that, where a suit is
brought against an officer or agency with
relation to some matter in which defendant
represents the state in action and liability, and
the state, while not a party to the record, is the
real party against which relief is sought so that a
judgment for plaintiff, although nominally
against the named defendant as an individual or
entity distinct from the state, will operate to
control the action of the state or subject it to
liability, the suit is in effect one against the state
and cannot be maintained without its consent.
Apparently for this rule to apply the relief asked
must involved some direct or substantial
interest of the state, as a distinct entity, apart
from the mere interest a state may have in the
welfare of its citizens or the vindication of its
laws. Within the inhibition of the rule, however,
are suits wherein a state officer or agency is, or
will be, required to use state property or funds
in order to afford the relief demanded . . ." (59 C.
J., 307-309; italics supplied.)
In a republican state, like the Philippines, government
immunity from suit without its consent is derived from the will
of the people themselves in freely creating a government "of
the people, by the people, and for the people" — a
representative government through which they have agreed to
exercise the powers and discharge the duties of their
sovereignty for the common good and general welfare. In so
agreeing, the citizens have solemnly undertaken to surrender
some of their private rights and interest which were calculated
to conflict with the higher rights and larger interests of the
people as a whole, represented by the government thus
established by them all. One of those "higher rights," based
upon those "larger interests" is that government immunity. The
members of the respondent Labor Union themselves are part of
the people who have freely formed that government and
participated in that solemn undertaking. In this sense — and a
very real one it is — they are in effect attempting to sue
themselves along with the rest of the people represented by
their common government — an anomalous and absurd
situation indeed.
The case is radically different from a dictatorship, or an
aristocratic, oligarchical, autocratic, or monarchical
government, where any similar immunity will be the creature of
the will of one man or of a powerful few. The principle is further
grounded upon the necessity of protecting the performance of
governmental and public functions from being harassed unduly
or constantly interrupted by private suits. (See
also McClellan vs. State, 170, p. 662; 35 Cal. App., 605, 606.)
Where the government is "of the people, by the people, and for
the people," such immunity from suit will only be the
reaffirmation of the sovereignty of the people," such immunity
from suit will only be the reaffirmation of the sovereignty of the
people themselves as represented by their government in the
face of the obvious impossibility of constituting the entire
people into one single body to exercise the powers and enjoy the
immunities of that sovereignty.
Upon the whole, we are clearly of opinion that the
proceedings had in the Court of Industrial Relations and now
subject of this appeal are null and void, particularly said court's
order of November 1, 1946 (Annex C) and the resolution of
December 3, 1946 (Annex E), with the necessary consequence
that the said court should be, as it is hereby, enjoined from
taking any further action in the case inconsistent with this
decision.
No costs. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengson, Hontiveros,
Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
The present case places before us for our
consideration several questions of no mean importance.
Are the laborers of an office or agency of government
to be discriminated against and deprived of the essential rights
recognized by the Constitution and the laws in laborers working
in the service of private persons or companies?
Have the laborers in the service of a government office
or agency lost their fundamental right to air grievances before
the competent authorities?
Have such laborers, because they are serving an official
agency, lost their human personality, to become voiceless serfs
or slaves or simple beasts of burden?
Is an office or agency of government a thing placed
and should be placed above the law?
Can the government itself validly pretend to be above
the law?
Within our democratic system of government, is it
possible to recognize anything paramount to the supremacy of
the law?
Have we lost the democratic bearings of our national
way of life, as to reject now the political philosophy to defend
which we fought in the last war, to be replaced by the
totalitarian practices that enthrones the powerful above all
law?
On October 21, 1946, the National Labor Union, a
worker's organization with more than thirty affiliated members,
working in the service of Metran, a government agency, filed
with the Court of Industrial Relations, a petition with the
following prayer:
"The demands of the petitioning union
are as follows:
"1. That the present unfair and
unreasonable practices should be immediately
abolished:
"(a) The 'Grading System' and its
resultant unjust suspension of personnel;
"(b) The capricious 'Rotation System'
which is undemocratic and based upon
favoritism;
 "(c) The continued recruitment and
placement of new personnel when
the METRAN is already overmanned with its
regular and substitute working force — a
pernicious practice that undermines the morale
and affects gravely the efficiency and economic
security of its laboring constituents;
"(d) The economic lynching in the
practice of cutting the earning hours of drivers
and conductors after the lapsing of thirty (30)
minutes allowance given for the repairing of
buses and trucks, which troubles are duly
reported to the management, and the
dictatorial practice of retaining without pay the
personnel concerned in spite of the fact that
repairs of said buses had not been effected
within said time allotment and immediately
thereafter;
"(e) The confiscation of badges from
personnel suspended without justifiable causes
and without first returning the corresponding
deposits therefor;
"2. That the general deduction of Fifty
Centavos (P0.50) from the wages and salaries of
personnel affected should be returned and paid
is for from the date it was effectuated up to the
time this case is finally terminated;
"3. That one hundred per cent (100%)
additional compensation over the regular wages
and salaries be paid to all workers and
employees compelled to work during Sundays
and legal holidays;
"4. That long waiting beyond eight (8)
hours of conductors for the reporting and
accounting of daily earnings of their respects
buses be considered 'Overtime Work' and be
paid for;
"5. That all overtime work already
rendered by all affected workers and the
employees should be paid;
"6. That all workers and employees,
especially drivers and conductors of buses and
trucks, should have one day of rest in seven with
pay;
"7. That permanent employees and
workers, who have rendered at least six (6)
months service to the company, should be
entitled to sick leave of two (2) weeks with pay;
"8. That workers and employees should
have representation in the management, a
practice initiated by the government; and
"9. All workers and employees who
were dismissed or suspended because of their
union activities should be reinstated."
On October 29, 1946, Metran filed a motion praying
for the dismissal of the petition upon the allegation that "the
government cannot be sued without its consent."
On November 7, 1946, Associate Judge Vicente de la
Cruz, denied the motion for dismissal and ordered respondent
to file his answer, the order being based on the opinion that the
Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case in accordance with section 4 of Commonwealth Act
No. 103. Said section is as follows:
"Strikes and lockouts. — The Court shall
take cognizance for purposes of prevention,
arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely
to cause a strike or lockout, arising from
differences as regards wages, shares of
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
tenancy or employment, between employers
and employees or laborers and between
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
provided that the number of employees,
laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved
exceeds thirty, and such industrial or
agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by
the Secretary of Labor, or by any or both of the
parties of the controversy and certified by the
Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be
dealt with by the Court for the sake of public
interest. In all such cases, the Secretary of Labor
or the party or parties submitting the disputes,
shall clearly and specifically state in writing the
questions to be decided. Upon the submission
of such a controversy or question by the
Secretary of Labor, his intervention therein as
authorized by law, shall cease.
"The Court shall, before hearing the
dispute and in the course of such hearing,
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce
them to settle the dispute by amicable
agreement. It any agreement as to the whole or
any part of the dispute is arrived at by the
parties, a memorandum of its terms shall be
made in writing, signed and acknowledged by
the parties thereto before the Judge of the
Court or any official acting in his behalf and
authorized to administer oaths or
acknowledgments, or, before a notary public.
The memorandum shall be filed in the office of
the Clerk of the Court, and, unless otherwise
ordered by the Court, shall, as between the
parties to the agreement, have the same effect
as, and be deemed to be, a decision or award."
On November 11, 1946, petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the order and the motion was denied in a
resolution adopted on December 3, 1946, by Judges Jose
Ma. Paredes, Presiding, Arsenio C. Roldan and Vicente de la
Cruz. The following pronouncements are made in the
resolution:
"We believe, however, that irrespective
of the question as to whether or not the
respondent is a company, corporation or is
merely an entity, so long as it is engaged in
business and an industrial dispute exists
between itself and more than 30 of its
employees, laborers, drivers and conductors,
arising from differences as regards to wages,
compensation, dismissals, lay-offs, or
suspension of employees or laborers, causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout, this Court is
fully authorized and has complete jurisdiction to
decide said dispute.
"The mere fact that the Metran Branch
of the National Labor Union in whose behalf the
petition was filed is still unregistered, does not
 deprive this Court of its right to exercise its
jurisdiction, as provided for by law.
"It cannot be denied that the Metran is
in business. It cannot screen itself behind the
sovereign power of the state, from any legal
claim which its employees or laborers or third
parties may have against it."
Metran appealed against the action of the Court of
Industrial Relations, by filing the petition for certiorari under
our consideration.
The position of the Court of Industrial Relations is
absolutely correct and, therefore, the petition should be denied
and so we vote. Petitioner alleges that Metran was organized
"in order to provide the public with means of transportation,
more efficient, faster, and cheaper than those at present
available" and it "will also be in charge of the allocation of U.S.
Army trucks and motor vehicles, accessories, spare parts and
supply of gasoline, oil and others to the different private
transportation companies." It is an office "under the supervision
and control of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications," under Executive Order No. 59. It distributes
free tickets to all employees of the government and provides
the transportation needs of the government. Executive Order
No. 28, series of 1946, directed it to furnish modern
transportation facilities to all bureaus and offices of the
national government.
In support of its theory, that it cannot be sued without
its consent, Metran invokes the authorities quoted in the
following paragraphs of its petition:
"Since it is an office of the Government
created by the State, 'it is elemental that the
state or sovereign cannot be sued in its own
courts without its consent.' (Beers vs. Arkansas,
20 How., 527; Memphis & C.R. Co. vs.
Tennessee, 101 U.S., 337.)
"This principle has been adopted 'as
part of the general doctrine of publicists that
the supreme power in every State, wherever it
may reside, shall not be compelled by process of
courts of its own creation, to defend itself in
those courts,' because 'the sovereign power of
any nation being supreme is not amenable to
the judicial department and will not permit
process against itself, either directly or
indirectly, or allow its operations or
instrumentalities to be affected or disturbed
except by special consent.' (U.S. vs. Lee, 106
U.S., 196.)
"'A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or absolute
theory but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. As the ground is thus logical and
practical, the doctrine is not confined to powers
that are sovereign in the full sense of juridical
theory but naturally is extended to those that, in
actual administration, originate and change at
their will the law of contract and property, from
which persons, within the jurisdiction, derive
their rights.' (Kawawanakoa vs. Polyblank, 205
U.S., 349.)
"The practical advantages and benefits
of the doctrine of non- suability of a state
cannot be over-estimated. The United States
Supreme Court explained that 'the public service
would be rendered nugatory and public safety
endangered, if the supreme authority could be
subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen,
and consequently, controlled in the use and
disposition of the means required for the proper
administration of the Government.' (Siren vs.
U.S., 7; Wall, 152.) Or in the words of Justice
Gray: 'The broader reason is that it would be
inconsistent with the very idea of supreme
executive power and would endanger the
performance of the public duties of the
sovereign, to subject him to repeated suits as a
matter of right, at the will of any citizen, and to
submit to the judicial tribunals the control and
disposition of his property, his instruments and
means of carrying on his government in war and
peace, and the money of his treasury.' (Briggs vs.
The Light Boats, 11 Allen, 162.)"
Those who are able to read will immediately find that
none of the authorities invoked by petitioner have any bearing
with the present controversy. What said authorities declare
exempt from suit is what is designated in the following words of
the cited authorities: "the state or sovereign"; "the supreme
power in every state"; "the sovereign power of any nation"; "a
sovereign"; "the supreme authority"; "the supreme executive
power"; "the powers that originate and change at their will the
law of contract and property."
Does Metran pretend to be identified with the "state"?
Is Metran another king of France proclaiming "L'etat cest moi"?
Is Metran the "sovereign," when, according to our Constitution,
sovereignty resides in the people" Is Metran "the supreme
power" or the "supreme authority" of our nation? Only a
paranoiac megalomania may justify an affirmative answer to
these questions.
Petitioner's proposition to the effect that, because it is
an office or agency of government, it is exempt from suit, is not
supported by any authority invoked by petitioner himself, and it
cannot be supported by any authority in his senses, because it is
utterly unreasonable, without any foundation in law, and
diametrically opposed to the system of government of laws,
which is the one established by our Constitution. Merrit vs.
Government (34 Phil., 311) and Compañia vs. Government (45
Phil., 663) do not support the theory. The refer to the
government as a whole.
The elemental rights of the laborers working in the
service of Metran should not be nullified upon such a far-
fetched proposition. Besides, it involves a dissolvent and
destructive political philosophy. What does Metran intend by
denying the power of the Court of Industrial Relations to hear
and decide the labor dispute between itself and its employees?
Instead of the orderly settlement of the dispute by the Court of
Industrial Relations, does it want to drive its laborers into
declaring a strike, into resorting to picketing, or into taking
violent and desperate measures, whether hopelessness may
suggest to persons struggling for personal dignity, for
fundamental rights, for the opportunity of enjoying a decent
living? While the people, as the sovereign, and the state
representing that sovereignty, or the government as a whole,
representing the supreme authority of the state, cannot be
sued in any court, no individual officer of government and no
single office or agency of government can claim such
exemption. No official or agency of the government in above
the law and everybody who is under the law is amenable to be
sued in court.
The old monarchs of divine origin, assumed that they
could not do wrong and, therefore, they were placed beyond
the pale of the law. They were the law themselves. The
dictators, such human specimens as Hitler, Mussolini, the
Japanese Emperor, had the crazedness of placing themselves
above the law, and humanity felt the overwhelming scourage of
such bathismal madness or perversity. It there anyone in our
government who is attempting to emulate the misdeeds of said
megalomaniacs? Has any one in our government been infected
by the virus of insanity which drove the dictators into a spree of
destruction and mass murders?
Metran's theory that it cannot be sued without its
consent is too pretentious to merit consideration from a court
of justice. The theory is premised on the preposterous
proposition that to sue Metran is to sue the government, and
the government cannot be sued without the consent of the
same government. Since when has Metran become the
government? There is no government in the Philippines except
the one established by the Constitution, and such government
is constituted by the whole and complete structure, wherein
the Legislative Department, the Executive Department, the
Judicial Department are each one but a part of a united system,
deriving all its powers from the people, on whom sovereignty
resides. The President is not the government. He is but the
highest personal authority within it. Congress is not the
government; neither are its component chambers — the Senate
and the House of Representatives. It only holds the highest
power of determining the national policies through laws it may
enact. Neither the Supreme Court nor the whole judicial
machinery is the government, although to make effective the
supremacy of the law, the Constitution placed in the Supreme
Court the conclusive power of saying the last word on all
matters and controversies where law and justice are invoked.
It petitioner itself alleges that it is but an adjunct under
the supervision and control of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, who is but a member of the Cabinet,
which is only an auxiliary body to help the President in the
performance of his executive duties, — and the members may
remain in office only at the pleasure of the President — how
can it be the government when even the principal to which it is
but an appendage is not and cannot be the government?
The evil consequences of petitioner's theory are
immediately apparent. In case Metran should happen to
employ in its service reckless chauffeurs to drive its many heavy
trucks, and by their recklessness private property is destroyed
and the life of innocent citizens is taken, shall the aggrieved
parties have to secure first the consent ofMetran before they
can sue? If in the simple labor disputes submitted to the Court
of Industrial Relations, Metran has chosen to refuse its consent
to be sued, to the extent of seeking our help to its claim to be
placed above the law, can anyone expect that it will give its
consent, where its responsibility for property destroyed and
lives taken is to be enforced in the tribunals? Shall the victims
then resign to their helplessness, without even the consolation
of the sacramental "I am sorry" with which the
Nippon kempeisused to bid farewell to those who, after many
months of incarceration and unbearable torture, were finally
released because the kempeis themselves concluded that all
their suspicions were absolutely groundless?
The possibility of the hypothesis being materialized is
not remote. Personal safety and life are constantly in jeopardy
whether at nighttime or in the daytime, in the crowded or
uncrowded streets, in the very capital of the nation. Traffic
laws, ordinances and rules are every minute wantonly violated
under the very noses of police officers in uniform and bearing
all the external symbols of authority. Uncontrolled speed where
it may cause more harm; insolent cutting of way and criss-
crossing; breaking lines, purportedly to get a few meters ahead
of other cars resulting in blocking the traffic and causing many
persons long and unreasonably long delays; the arrogance with
which big trucks and buses enforce their self-bestowed right of
way, because they will suffer less in collision; the shameless
focusing of headlights with blinding glare at nighttime, are but
some of the culpable everyday practices that are continuously
endangering the property and life of innocent citizens. Lack of
discipline in the great majority of the drivers of public service
vehicles, and of many low-numbered cars of high officials, is
bolstered by the indifference or leniency of many agents of the
law in charge of traffic. There is absolutely no method as to
when or where passengers are to be picked. Buses and jeeps
will run at great speed to short distances, causing vexatious and
deafening noise, then suddenly stop to scramble for the favor
of a lone by-stander which might be a prospective passenger. In
this general scorn for the law, for the security of property for
the safety of the life and limb of the people, the Metran buses
cannot be excluded from the group of public service vehicles,
which are the most frequent and worst violators. Were all the
employees of Metran advised that Metran is above the law,
that it cannot be sued without its consent, no matter what
injustices, grievances and iniquities it may perpetrate?
If Metran's theory is to find support in this Court, what
will preclude other offices and agencies of government from
claiming the same privilege? What will preclude all officers and
employees of the government from claiming the same
immunity? The government then will become a bunch of
immunes and untouchables. No matter what arbitrariness,
abuses, anomalies and culpable blunders they may commit and
no matter the magnitude of the harm they may cause to private
persons, the latter will just have to keep quiet as those herded
in the Nazi concentration camps. We are not willing to live
under such a condition. A people with any sense of dignity
would rather endure a thousand deaths than submit to such a
humiliating and shameless situation."
The petition must be denied. The Court of Industrial
Relations must not be hampered in taking cognizance of the
case and in proceeding to try it until final decision.
BRIONES, M., disidente:
Creo que el presente recurso debe denegarse. Estimo
que la Corte de Relaciones Industriales tiene jurisdiccion para
actuar y resolver la disputa obrero-industrial de que se trata y
por tanto la orden, cuya revocacion se pide, debe ser sostenida.
El caso de Manila Hotel Employees' Association contra
el Manila Hotel y la Corte de Relaciones Industriales (R. G. No.
48524, decidido por esta Corte Suprema el 1.° de Noviembre,
1941) es aplicable, por analogia, al presente asunto. Se arguye
que existe una diferencia fundamental como es la Manila
Railroad, la Metropolitan Transportation Service conocida
vulgarmente por METRAN no lo es sino que es una oficina
sujeta al Departamento de Obras Publicas. En otras palabras, se
arguye que la METRAN no tiene personalidad juridica y, por
tanto, no puede demandar ni ser demandada.
Creo, sin embargo, que para los efectos de la
jurisdiccion de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales, tal diferencia
es immaterial y carece de importancia. Queramos o no, nuestro
gobierno — el gobierno de Filipinas — esta
adherid_definitivamente desde hace bastante tiempo, tanto en
el terreno de los principios como de la realidad, a una politics
limitada de explotacion de ciertos negocios y utilidades publicas
para promover la capacidad industrial y productiva de la nacion,
y para fomentar el bienestar general. La formacion de la
Compañia de Fomento Nacional (National Development
Company), con sus diferentes ramificaciones como la fabrica de
cemento de Cebu, la manufactura de tejidos, la conserva de
pescados, la explotaciones carboniferas, etc., etc., esta
concebida e inspirada en dicha politica. La idea no es talmente
organizar un Estado socialista, sino mas bien suplir la iniciativa
privada alli donde o falta y escasea el capital, o donde este, por
timidez, no quiere exponerse a riesgos. Una vez que la empresa
este establecida y funcionando con exito, el plan preconcebido
es entregarla a manos particulares, yendo el gobierno a
explotar como "pioneer" otros campos no probados. En la
Constitucion se autoriza expresamente la expropiacion de
utilidades publicas de propiedad particular, cuando el interes
general lo exigiere.
"The State may, in the interest of
national welfare and defense, establish and
operate industries and means of
transportation and communication, and, upon
payment of just compensation, transfer to
public ownership utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the government.
(Art. XIII, sec. 6 Constitucion de Filipinas.)
Ahora bien; cuando el gobierno hace esto ¿ha de ser
necesariamente por medio de una corporacion debidamente
organizada de acuerdo con la ley general de corporaciones, o
creada mediante una ley especial, o tambien puede hacerlo
creanado una simple agencia mediante una orden ejecutiva,
como en este case de la METRAN? Creo que si, que este ultimo
es perfectamente viable, y cuando el gobierno hace esto la
agencia resultante tiene tanta personalidad como cualquier
otra corporation para ser, por lo menos, sometida y regulada
por la Comision de Servicios Publicos y por la Corte de
Relaciones Industriales. En tal caso, para poder interponer una
queja o reclamacion contra dicha agencia ante cualquiera de
estas dos ultimas entidades, no es necesario contar con el
permiso previo del gobierno como en los casos ordinarios de
demanda para exigir del mismo responsabilidades. Es absurdo
pensar que el gobierno organice una agencia como la METRAN,
con la idea de sustraerla a la jurisdiccion de la Comision de
Servicios Publicos o de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales,
segun sea el caso. Asi como la METRAN se somete a la Comision
de Servicios Publicos para el ajuste y regulacion de las rutas y
horario de sus vehiculos, colocandose en este respecto en el
mismo nivel de las empresas y compañias particulares, sin
necesidad de permiso previo del Gobierno, tanto si ella es la
recurrente como es la recurrida, asi tambin debe someterse a la
Corte de Relaciones Industriales para el arreglo y solucion de las
diferencias y disputas con sus obreros, sin tampoco necesidad
de previa licencia del gobierno. Cuando el gobierno interviene
en la operacion de utilidades publicas, aunque no sea para fines
de lucro como en el caso de la METRAN, debe ser tratado como
un particular cualquiera el gobierno se crearia injustamente
para si ventajas y privilegios en relacion con las empresad
particulares, y sus obreros, sobre todo, estarian en peor
situacion que los particulares, pues quedarian privados del
amparo y de los beneficios proveidos por las leyes que rigen las
relaciones industrio-obreras. Presumo que el gobierno no
permitira que se anulen los fines altamente buenos y saludables
de dichas leyes; por el contrario, debe ser el primero en el
respeto y observancia de las mismas.
Ademas, la METRAN se halla en "estoppel" para
cuestionar la jurisdiccion del Tribunal de Relaciones
Industriales. De autos resulta que ella, por medio de su Gerente
General interino Sr. Hermenegildo B. Reyes, sometio al
Departamento del Trabajo una solicitud de afiliacion a la
National Labor Union, lo cual significa implicitamente una
sujecion voluntaria y automatica a la jurisdiccion de la Corte de
Relaciones Industriales.
Es una verdadera lstima. Dicho sea con todos los
respetos debidos, la dicision de la mayoria en este asunto
constituye un retroceso en los progresos y avances que nuestra
legislacion y jurisprudencia sociales e industriales han hecho
firmemente en estos ultimos años. En vez de cortarle los vuelos
a la Corte de Relaciones Industriales en todo lo que es propia y
legitimamente posible, debieramos permitir una sana y vigorosa
expansion de sus funciones transcendentales de arbitraje
industrial y obrero.
||| (Metropolitan Transportation Service v. Paredes, G.R. No. L-
1232, [January 12, 1948], 79 PHIL 819-839)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26386. September 30, 1969.]
PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE
CO., plaintiff-appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES and BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, defendants-appellees.
Quasha, Asperilla, Blanco, Zafra & Tayag for plaintiff-appellant.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General
Antonio G. Ibarra, Trial Attorney Herminio Z. Florendo and Felipe T.
Cuison for defendants-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATE; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT;
DOCTRINE. — The doctrine of non-suability holds undisputed sway.
Its primacy appears to be undeniable. For a suit against the State to
prosper, there must be a showing of consent either in express terms
or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to
be misinterpreted.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — A continued adherence to the doctrine of
non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience
that may be caused private parties, the loss of government
efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not
restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our
people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and
energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a
basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very
well be imagined.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY IN CASE OF CLAIM ARISING FROM
CONTRACT. — In case of money claim arising from contract, express
or implied, which could serve as a basis for civil action between
private parties, such a consent has been given by a statute enacted
by the Philippine legislature, even before the Constitution took
effect and still applicable at present. The procedure provided for in
such a statute was made more expeditious by a Commonwealth Act,
enabling the party or entity, who feels aggrieved by the final
decision of the Auditor General required to decide the claim within
sixty days, having the right to go to this Court for final adjudication.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO INJUSTICE TO CLAIMANTS. — The doctrine of non-
suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated
in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the
fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening
scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever
difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective
appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so
unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if
government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it
has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a
fundamental postulate of constitutional law.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AS OPERATORS OF ARRASTRE
SERVICE IS IMMUNE PROM SUIT. — The Bureau of Customs in the
operation of the Arrastre Service, is immune from suit, there being
no statute to the contrary.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
Providence Washington Insurance Co. filed, on October
21, 1966, its brief as appellant against an order of the lower
court dismissing its suit for the non-delivery of thirty cases of
steel files, which cargo was insured by it against loss and
damage, naming as defendants the Republic of the Philippines
and the Bureau of Customs as the operator of the arrastre
service, thus rendering unavoidable the invocation of the well-
settled doctrine of non-suability of the government. Less than
two months later, on December 17, 1966, our decision in Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service was
promulgated. 1 We there explicitly held: "The Bureau of
Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national
government in the operation of the arrastre service,. pursuant
to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its
prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being
no statute to the contrary."
As of this date, thirty-six subsequent cases, certainly a figure far
from unimpressive, have been similarly decided expressly
reaffirming the above ruling of governmental immunity from suit
without its consent. 2 The futility of this appeal is quite apparent.
We affirm the lower court order of dismissal.
The doctrine of non-suability thus holds undisputed sway. Its
primacy appears to be undeniable. For a suit of this character to
prosper, there must be a showing of consent either in express terms
or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to
be misinterpreted. Its absence being obvious, the lower court acted
correctly.
Nor did the Mobil decision blaze a new trail. So it has been from the
time the Constitution took effect in 1935. Bull v. Yatco, a 1939
decision during the Commonwealth, spoke to that
effect. 3 Adherence to such a view is reflected in the various cases
decided after independence before the Mobil Exploration
case. 4 The classic formulation of Holmes of this doctrine of non-
suability thus bears restatement: "A sovereign is exempt from suit,
not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends." 5
This is not to deny that while indeed logical and far from impractical
the doctrine does give rise to problems considering how widely
immersed in matters hitherto deemed outside its sphere the
government is at present. Nor is it likely considering its expanding
role, demanded by the times and warranted by the Constitution,
that a halt would be called to many of its activities, at times
unavoidably adversely affecting private rights. Nonetheless, a
continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be
deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused
private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle
to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if
such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of
judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least
provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against
law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes
such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.
At any rate, in case of a money claim arising from contract, express
or implied, which could serve as a basis for civil action between
private parties, such a consent has been given by a statute enacted
by the Philippine legislature, even before the Constitution took
effect and still applicable at present. 6 The procedure provided for
in such a statute 7 was made more expeditious by a Commonwealth
Act, enabling the party or entity, who feels aggrieved by the final
decision of the Auditor General required to decide the claim within
sixty days, having the right to go to this Court for final
adjudication. 8 It is worthy of note likewise that in the pursuit of its
activities affecting business, the government has increasingly relied
on private corporations possessing the power to sue and be sued. 9
Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its
consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the
charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering
the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being
undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still
exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the
balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what
principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal,
the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its
continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional
law.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of the lower court of May 23,
1966 is affirmed. With costs against plaintiff-appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Capistrano and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on official trip.
||| (Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic, G.R. No. L-
26386, [September 30, 1969], 140 PHIL 177-183)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-46930. June 10, 1988.]
DALE SANDERS, and A.S. MOREAU,
JR., petitioners, vs. HON. REGINO
T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I,
Court of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo
City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L.
WYERS, respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the
petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the
acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private
respondents. Once this question is decided, the other answers will
fall into place and this petition need not detain us any longer than it
already has.
Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question
occurred, the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station
(NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. 1 Petitioner Moreau was the
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said
station. 2 Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with
permanent residence in the Philippines, 3as so was private
respondent Wyer, who died two years ago. 4 They were both
employed as gameroom attendants in the special services
department of the NAVSTA, the former having been hired in 1971
and the latter in 1969. 5
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their
employment had been converted from permanent full-time to
permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975. 6 Their reaction
was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance
proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of
the U.S. Department of Defense. The result was a recommendation
from the hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the
reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time
status plus backwages. The report on the hearing contained the
observation that "Special Services management practices an
autocratic form of supervision." 7
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex
"A" of the complaint), Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's
report and asked for the rejection of the abovestated
recommendation. The letter contained the statements that: a) "Mr.
Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b)
"Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their
immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and
c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the
case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where
others not involved in the case could hear."
On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a
letter (Annex "B" of the complaint) purportedly coming from
petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval
Station in Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel
explaining the change of the private respondent's employment
status and requesting concurrence therewith. The letter did not
carry his signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by direction,"
presumably of Moreau.
On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed
in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for
damages against the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976. 8 The
plaintiffs claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations
that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish
and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an
invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were
being sued in their private or personal capacity. However, in a
motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners
argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court
had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.
After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion
was denied in an order dated March 8, 1977, 9 on the main ground
that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts
were official in nature and not personal torts, moreover, the
allegation in the complaint was that the defendants had acted
maliciously and in bad faith. The same order issued a writ of
preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the filing of a P10,000.00
bond by the plaintiffs, against the properties of petitioner Moreau,
who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines.
Subsequently, to make matters worse for the defendants, petitioner
Moreau was declared in default by the trial court in its order dated
August 9, 1977. The motion to lift the default order on the ground
that Moreau's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference was the
result of some misunderstanding, and the motion for
reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss, which was
filed by the petitioner's new lawyers, were denied by the
respondent court on September 7, 1977.
This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction
was thereafter filed before this Court, on the contention that the
above-narrated acts of the respondent court are tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners
were acting officially or only in their private capacities when they
did the acts for which the private respondents have sued them for
damages.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a
government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will
not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of
public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity.
By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not
suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed
to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his
authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to
the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its
courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the
present case.
The respondent judge, apparently finding that the complained acts
were prima facie personal and tortious, decided to proceed to trial
to determine inter alia their precise character on the strength of the
evidence to be submitted by the parties. The petitioners have
objected, arguing that no such evidence was needed to substantiate
their claim of jurisdictional immunity. Pending resolution of this
question, we issued a temporary restraining order on September 26,
1977, that has since then suspended the proceedings in this case in
the court a quo. LLjur
In past cases, this Court has held that where the character of the act
complained of can be determined from the pleadings exchanged
between the parties before the trial, it is not necessary for the court
to require them to belabor the point at a trial still to be conducted.
Such a proceeding would be superfluous, not to say unfair to the
defendant who is subjected to unnecessary and avoidable
inconvenience.
Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, 10 we held that a motion to dismiss a
complaint against the commanding general of the Olongapo Naval
Base should not have been denied because it had been sufficiently
shown that the act for which he was being sued was done in his
official capacity on behalf of the American government. The United
States had not given its consent to be sued. It was the reverse
situation in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 11 where we sustained the
order of the lower court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint
against certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be
acting officially in the name of the American government. The
United States had also not waived its immunity from suit. Only three
years ago, in United States of America v. Ruiz, 12 we set aside the
denial by the lower court of a motion to dismiss a complaint for
damages filed against the United States and several of its officials, it
appearing that the act complained of was governmental rather than
proprietary, and certainly not personal. In these and several other
cases,13 the Court found it redundant to prolong the proceedings
after it had become clear that the suit could not prosper because
the acts complained of were covered by the doctrine of state
immunity.
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the
petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in
the discharge of their official duties.Sanders, as director of the
special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had
supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents,
and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline,
dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter
he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the
other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the
private respondents. 14 Moreover, even in the absence of such
request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing
officer's criticism — in effect a direct attack against him — that
Special Services was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."
As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief
of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the
private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance
proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the
question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature,
performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and
directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the
special services department of NAVSTA. In fact, the letter dealt with
the financial and budgetary problems of the department and
contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-
designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal
or private about it.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have
to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued
as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on
behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority,
it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is
responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it
is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of
damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners
in their personal capacities but by the United States government as
their principal. This will require that government to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz., the appropriation of the
necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the
action a suit against that government without its consent. cdrep
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot
prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable
has given its consent to be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer
but in many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state
immumity as applicable not only to our own government but also to
foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our
courts. 15
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that
"there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the
law on which the right depends." 16 In the case of foreign states,
the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of
states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet
imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace
of nations." 17 Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed
in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from
our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land."
All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as
such without the previous consent of the state. To be sure, there
are a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is clear that a public
officer may be sued as such to compel him to do an act required by
law, as where, say, a register of deeds refuses to record a deed of
sale; 18 or to restrain a Cabinet member, for example, from
enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional; 19 or to compel the
national treasurer to pay damages from an already appropriated
assurance fund; 20 or the commissioner of internal revenue to
refund tax overpayments from a fund already available for the
purpose; 21 or, in general, to secure a judgment that the officer
impleaded may satisfy by himself without the government itself
having to do a positive act to assist him. We have also held that
where the government itself has violated its own laws, the
aggrieved party may directly implead the government even without
first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as normally
required, as the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice." 22
This case must also be distinguished from such decisions
as Festejo v. Fernando, 23 where the Court held that a bureau
director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by
him when he acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly
taking private property without paying just compensation therefor
although he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not
necessary to secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it
be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it was not responsible
for the defendant's unauthorized act.
The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any
of the recognized exceptions. The government of the United States
has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the
petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered
against them. As it is the American government itself that will have
to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may
be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts
of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith,
which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even
mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not
actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by
malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 24 This, too, is
well-settled. 25 Furthermore, applying now our own penal laws, the
letters come under the concept of privileged communications and
are not punishable, 26 let alone the fact that the resented remarks
are not defamatory by our standards. It seems the private
respondents have overstated their case.
A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in
the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the performance of
their official duties and the private respondents are themselves
American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this
country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat
it as coming under the internal administration of the said base.
The petitioners' counsel have submitted a memorandum replete
with citations of American cases, as if they were arguing before a
court of the United States. The Court is bemused by such attitude.
While these decisions do have persuasive effect upon us, they can at
best be invoked only to support our own jurisprudence, which we
have developed and enriched on the basis of our own persuasions
as a people, particularly since we became independent in
1946. LLjur
We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not
only from the United States but also from Spain and other countries
from which we have derived some if not most of our own laws. But
we should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and
regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we
cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our
own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide
our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and
of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with
our own concept of law and justice.
The private respondents must, if they are still so minded, pursue
their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the
United States, of which they are all citizens and under whose
jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed. Even assuming
that our own laws are applicable, the United States government has
not decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts, which
therefore has not acquired the competence to act on the said claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated
March 8, 1977, August 9, 1977, and September 7, 1977, are SET
ASIDE. The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No.
2077-O. Our Temporary restraining order of September 26, 1977, is
made PERMANENT. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Sanders v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-46930, [June 10, 1988], 245
PHIL 63-76)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 84607. March 19, 1993.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, GEN. ALFREDO LIM, GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. EDGAR DULA
TORRES, COL. CEZAR NAZARENO, MAJ.
FILEMON GASMEN, PAT. NICANOR ABANDO,
PFC SERAPIN CEBU, JR., GEN. BRIGIDO
PAREDES, COL. ROGELIO MONFORTE, PFC
ANTONIO LUCERO, PAT. JOSE MENDIOLA, PAT.
NELSON TUAZON, POLICE CORPORAL PANFILO
ROGOS, POLICE LT. JUAN B. BELTRAN, PAT.
NOEL MANAGBAO, MARINE THIRD CLASS
TRAINEE (3CT) NOLITO NOGATO, 3CT
ALEJANDRO B. NAGUIO, JR., EFREN ARCILLAS,
3CT AGERICO LUNA, 3CT BASILIO BORJA, 3CT
MANOLITO LUSPO, 3CT CRISTITUTO GERVACIO,
3CT MANUEL DELA CRUZ, JR., MARINE (CDC)
BN., (CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL), MOBILE
DISPERSAL TEAM (MDT), LT. ROMEO
PAQUINTO, LT. LAONGLAANG GOCE, MAJ.
DEMETRIO DE LA CRUZ, POLICE CAPTAIN
RODOLFO NAVAL, JOHN DOE, RICHARD DOE,
ROBERTO DOE AND OTHER
DOES, petitioners, vs. HON. EDILBERTO
G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch IX, ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA
ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA
EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA
GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA
YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA,
RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA
ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO
DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the
deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY"
PEREZ, DIONESIO BAUTISTA, DANTE
EVANGELIO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA,
VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO)
respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured
victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO
ALBASIA, NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ,
EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE
ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO
LABAMBA, JR., EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON
MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT,
JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO
COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA
CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA,
CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS, TOMAS VALLOS,
ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS,
FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA,
JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS
MENDOZA, VICTORINO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME,
RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS
ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO
ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA
ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME
CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO, RODRIGO
CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS
SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO
GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO
JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY,
JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL
SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN,
BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO,
CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, and
ROSELLA ROBALE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 84645. March 19, 1993.]
ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES
PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA
EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA
GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA
YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA,
RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA
ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO
DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the
deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY"
PEREZ, DIONESIO BAUTISTA, DANTE
EVANGELIO, RODRIGO GRAMPA, ANGELITO
GUTIERREZ, BERNABE LAKINDANUM, ROBERTO
YUMUL, LEOPOLDO ALONZO, ADELFA ARIBE,
DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES,
RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names
of sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE
AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON
BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA,
ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN
CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO LABAMBA, JR.
EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO,
ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT, JUN
CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO
COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA
CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA,
CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS, TOMAS VALLOS,
ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS,
FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA,
JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS
MENDOZA, VICTORINO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME,
RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS
ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO
ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA
ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME
CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO, RODRIGO
CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS
SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO
GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO
JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY,
JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL
SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN,
BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO,
CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, ROSELLA
ROBALE, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE EDILBERTO
G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 9, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; PRINCIPLE OF STATE'S IMMUNITY FROM SUIT;
CONSTRUED. — Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of
the government from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI,
Section 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty,
and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy — that public
service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the
sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance
of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and
dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of
the government.
2. ID.; ID.; NOT DEEMED WAIVED WHEN THE GOVERNMENT
AUTHORIZES THE INDEMNIFICATION FOR THE VICTIM OR THROUGH
PUBLIC ADDRESSES MADE BY THE PRESIDENT. — Petitioners (Caylao
group) advance the argument that the State has impliedly waived its
sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view that by the
recommendation made by the Commission for the government to
indemnity the heirs and victims of the Mendiola incident and by the
public addresses made by then President Aquino in the aftermath of
the killings, the State has consented to be sued. This is not a suit
against the State with its consent. Firstly, the recommendation
made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of
the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government
does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the
State. It is important to note that A.O. 11 expressly states that the
purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body that will
conduct an "investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that
took place." In the exercise of its functions, A.O. 11 provides
guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion reads: "1. Its
conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the
commission of any offense and of the persons probably guilty of the
same shall be sufficient compliance with the rules on preliminary
investigation and the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly
with the proper court." In effect, whatever may be the findings of
the Commission, the same shall only serve as the cause of action in
the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore,
the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is
not the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in
any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not
having become final and executory. This is precisely the essence of it
being a fact-finding body. Secondly, whatever acts or utterances
that then President Aquino may have done or said, the same are not
tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The
President's act of joining the marchers, days after the incident, does
not mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability. In
fact to borrow the words of petitioners (Caylao group), "it was an
act of solidarity by the government with the people." Moreover,
petitioners rely on President Aquino's speech promising that the
government would address the grievances of the rallyists. By this
alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any liability,
much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.
3. ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE; RULE; CASE AT BAR. — Some instances
when a suit against the State is proper are" (1) When the Republic is
sued by name; (2) When the suit is against an unincorporated
government agency; (3) When the suit is on its face against a
government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will
belong not to the officer but to the government. While
the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does
not pertain to the government. Although the military officers and
personnel, then party defendants, were discharging their official
functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be
official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the
Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the
government forces in the use of firearms. Moreover, the members
of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a
prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 as there was unnecessary firing by
them in dispersing the marchers.
4. ID.; ID.; CANNOT INSTITUTIONALIZE IRRESPONSIBILITY AND NON-
ACCOUNTABILITY NOR GRANT A PRIVILEGE STATUS NOT CLAIMED
BY ANY OTHER OFFICIAL OF THEREPUBLIC. — As early as 1954, this
Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the
plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office
when his acts are wholly without authority. Until recently in 1991,
this doctrine still found application, this Court saying that immunity
from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-
accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other
official of the Republic. The military and police forces were deployed
to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to
guarantee the safety of the very people that they are duty-bound to
protect. However, the facts as found by the trial court showed that
they fired at the unruly crowd to disperse the latter.
5. ID.; ID.; DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE RELIEF DEMANDED BY THE
SUIT REQUIRES NO AFFIRMATIVE OFFICIAL ACTION ON THE PART OF
THE STATE NOR THE AFFIRMATIVE DISCHARGE OF ANY OBLIGATION
WHICH BELONGS TO THE STATE IN ITS POLITICAL CAPACITY. —
While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule
that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in
the courts except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked
by both the military officers to release them from any liability, and
by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the
government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not
apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires
no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the
affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in
its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are
made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the
state and as its agents and servants. This Court has made it quite
clear that even a "high position in the government does not confer a
license to persecute or recklessly injure another."
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
People may have already forgotten the tragedy that transpired on
January 22, 1987. It is quite ironic that then, some journalists called
it a Black Thursday, as a grim reminder to the nation of the
misfortune that befell twelve (12) rallyists. But for most Filipinos
now, the Mendiola massacre may now just as well be a chapter in
our history books. For those however, who have become widows
and orphans, certainly they would not settle for just that. They seek
retribution for the lives taken that will never be brought back to life
again. LLjur
Hence, the heirs of the deceased, together with those
injured(Caylao group), instituted this petition, docketed as G.R. No.
84645, under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the Orders of respondent
Judge Sandoval, 1 dated May 31 and August 8, 1988, dismissing the
complaint for damages of herein petitioners against the Republic of
the Philippines in Civil Case. No. 88-43351.
Petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, through a similar remedy,
docketed as G.R. No. 84607, seeks to set aside the Order of
respondent Judge dated May 31, 1988, in Civil Case No. 88-43351
entitled "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al."
The pertinent portion of the questioned Order 2 dated May 31,
1988, reads as follows:
"With respect however to the other defendants,
the impleaded Military Officers, since they are
being charged in their personal and official
capacity, and holding them liable, if at all, would
not result in financial responsibility of the
government, the principle of immunity from suit
can not conveniently and correspondingly be
applied to them.
WHEREFORE, the case as against the
defendant Republic of the Philippines is hereby
dismissed. As against the rest of the defendants
the motion to dismiss is denied. They are given a
period of ten (10) days from receipt of this order
within which to file their respective pleadings."
On the other hand, the Order 3 , dated August 8, 1988, denied the
motions filed by both parties, for a reconsideration of the
abovecited Order, respondent Judge finding no cogent reason to
disturb the said order.
The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of
encampment by members of the militant Kilusang Magbubukid sa
Pilipinas (KMP) at the then Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian
Reform (MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco Administration Building
along Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City.
The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for
what they called "genuine agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its
national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and
demands, among which were: (a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b)
zero retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of
land payments.
The dialogue between the farmers and the MAR officials began on
January 15, 1987. The two days that followed saw a marked increase
in people at the encampment. It was only on January 19, 1987 that
Jaime Tadeo arrived to meet with then Minister Heherson Alvarez,
only to be informed that the Minister can only meet with him the
following day. On January 20, 1987, the meeting was held at the
MAR conference room. Tadeo demanded that the minimum
comprehensive land reform program be granted immediately.
Minister Alvarez, for his part, can only promise to do his best to
bring the matter to the attention of then President Aquino, during
the cabinet meeting on January 21, 1987.
Tension mounted the following day. The farmers, now on their
seventh day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and
prevented the employees from going inside their offices. They
hoisted the KMP flag together with the Philippine flag.
At around 6:30 p.m. of the same day, Minister Alvarez, in a meeting
with Tadeo and his leaders, advised the latter to instead wait for the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and just allow the government
to implement its comprehensive land reform program. Tadeo,
however, countered by saying that he did not believe in
the Constitution and that a genuine land reform cannot be realized
under a landlord-controlled Congress. A heated discussion ensued
between Tadeo and Minister Alvarez. This notwithstanding, Minister
Alvarez suggested a negotiating panel from each side to meet again
the following day.
On January 22, 1987, Tadeo's group instead decided to march to
Malacañang to air their demands. Before the march started, Tadeo
talked to the press and TV media. He uttered fiery words, the most
telling of which were: ". . . inalis namin ang barikada bilang
kahilingan ng ating Presidente, pero kinakailangan alisin din niya ang
barikada sa Mendiola sapagkat bubutasin din namin iyon at dadanak
ang dugo . . ." 4
The farmers then proceeded to march to Malacañang, from Quezon
Memorial Circle, at 10:00 a.m. They were later joined by members
of other sectoral organizations such as the Kilusang Mayo Uno
(KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino
Students (LFS) and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod
(KPML).
At around 1:00 p.m., the marchers reached Liwasang Bonifacio
where they held a brief program. It was at this point that some of
the marchers entered the eastern side of the Post Office Building,
and removed the steel bars surrounding the garden. Thereafter,
they joined the march to Malacañang. At about 4:30 p.m., they
reached C.M. Recto Avenue.
In anticipation of a civil disturbance, and acting upon reports
received by the Capital Regional Command (CAPCOM) that the
rallyists would proceed to Mendiola to break through the police
lines and rush towards Malacañang, CAPCOM Commander General
Ramon E. Montaño inspected the preparations and adequacy of the
government forces to quell impending attacks.
OPLAN YELLOW (Revised) was put into effect. Task Force Nazareno
under the command of Col. Cesar Nazareno was deployed at the
vicinity of Malacañang. The civil disturbance control units of the
Western Police District under Police Brigadier General Alfredo S. Lim
were also activated.
Intelligence reports were also received that the KMP was heavily
infiltrated by CPP/NPA elements and that an insurrection was
impending. The threat seemed grave as there were also reports that
San Beda College and Centro Escolar University would be forcibly
occupied.
In its report, the Citizens' Mendiola Commission (a body specifically
tasked to investigate the facts surrounding the incident, Commission
for short) stated that the government anti-riot forces were
assembled at Mendiola in a formation of three phalanges, in the
following manner:
"(1) The first line was composed of policemen
from police stations Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10
and the Chinatown detachment of the Western
Police District. Police Colonel Edgar Dula Torres,
Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police
District, was designated as ground commander
of the CDC first line of defense. The WPD CDC
elements were positioned at the intersection of
Mendiola and Legarda Streets after they were
ordered to move forward from the top of
Mendiola bridge. The WPD forces were in khaki
uniform and carried the standard CDC
equipment — aluminum shields, truncheons
and gas masks.
(2) At the second line of defense about ten (10)
yards behind the WPD policemen were the
elements of the Integrated National Police (INP)
Field Force stationed at Fort Bonifacio from the
61st and 62nd INP Field Force, who carried also
the standard CDC equipment — truncheons,
shields and gas masks. The INP Field Force
was under the command of Police Major
Demetrio dela Cruz.
(3) Forming the third line was the Marine Civil
Disturbance Control Battalion composed of the
first and second companies of the Philippine
Marines stationed at Fort Bonifacio. The
marines were all equipped with shields,
truncheons and M-16 rifles (armalites) slung at
their backs, under the command of Major
Felimon B. Gasmin. The Marine CDC Battalion
was positioned in line formation ten (10) yards
farther behind the INP Field Force.
At the back of the marines were four (4) 6 x 6
army trucks, occupying the entire width of
Mendiola street, followed immediately by two
water cannons, one on each side of the street
and eight fire trucks, four trucks on each side of
the street. The eight fire trucks from Fire District
I of Manila under Fire Superintendent Mario C.
Tanchanco, were to supply water to the two
water cannons.
Stationed farther behind the CDC forces were
the two Mobile Dispersal Teams (MDT) each
composed of two tear gas grenadiers, two
spotters, an assistant grenadier, a driver and the
team leader.
 In front of the College of the Holy Spirit near
Gate 4 of Malacañang stood the VOLVO Mobile
Communications Van of the Commanding
General of CAPCOM/INP, General Ramon E.
Montaño. At this command post, after General
Montaño had conferred with TF Nazareno
Commander, Colonel Cezar Nazareno, about the
adequacy and readiness of his forces, it was
agreed that Police General Alfredo S. Lim would
designate Police Colonel Edgar Dula
Torres and Police Major Conrado Francisco as
negotiators with the marchers. Police General
Lim then proceeded to the WPD CDC elements
already positioned at the foot of Mendiola
bridge to relay to Police Colonel Torres and
Police Major Francisco the instructions that the
latter would negotiate with the
marchers." 5 (Emphasis supplied)
The marchers, at around 4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to
15,000. From C.M. Recto Avenue, they proceeded toward the police
lines. No dialogue took place between the marchers and the anti-
riot squad. It was at this moment that a clash occurred and,
borrowing the words of the Commission "pandemonium broke
loose". The Commission stated in its findings, to wit:
". . . There was an explosion followed by
throwing of pillboxes, stones and bottles. Steel
bars, wooden clubs and lead pipes were used
against the police. The police fought back with
their shields and truncheons. The police line was
breached. Suddenly shots were heard. The
demonstrators disengaged from the
government forces and retreated towards C.M.
Recto Avenue. But sporadic firing continued
from the government forces.
After the firing ceased, two MDTs headed by Lt.
Romeo Paguinto and Lt. Laonglaan Goce sped
towards Legarda Street and lobbed tear gas at
the remaining rallyist still grouped in the vicinity
of Mendiola. After dispersing the crowd, the
two MDTs, together with the two WPD MDTs,
proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio upon order of
General Montaño to disperse the rallyists
assembled thereat. Assisting the MDTs were a
number of policemen from the WPD, attired in
civilian clothes with white head bands, who
were armed with long firearms." 6 (Emphasis
ours)
After the clash, twelve (12) marchers were officially confirmed dead,
although according to Tadeo, there were thirteen (13) dead, but he
was not able to give the name and address of said victim. Thirty-
nine (39) were wounded by gunshots and twelve (12) sustained
minor injuries, all belonging to the group of the marchers.
Of the police and military personnel, three (3) sustained gunshot
wounds and twenty (20) suffered minor physical injuries such as
abrasions, contusions and the like.
In the aftermath of the confrontation, then President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 11, 7 (A.O. 11, for brevity)
dated January 22, 1987, which created the Citizens' Mendiola
Commission. The body was composed of retired Supreme Court
Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman, retired Supreme Court
Justice Jose Y. Feria and Mr. Antonio U. Miranda, both as members.
A.O. 11 stated that the Commission was created precisely for the
"purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths, and
casualties that took place in the vicinity of Mendiola Bridge and
Mendiola Street and Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
afternoon of January 22, 1987". The Commission was expected to
have submitted its findings not later than February 6, 1987. But it
failed to do so. Consequently, the deadline was moved to February
16, 1987 by Administrative Order No. 13. Again, the Commission
was unable to meet this deadline. Finally, on February 27, 1987, it
submitted its report, in accordance with Administrative Order No.
17, issued on February 11, 1987.
In its report, the Commission recapitulated its findings, to wit:
"(1) The march to Mendiola of the KMP led by
Jaime Tadeo, together with the other sectoral
groups, was not covered by any permit as
required under Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the
Public Assembly Act of 1985, in violation of
paragraph (a) Section 13, punishable under
paragraph (a), Section 14 of said law.
(2) The crowd dispersal control units of the
police and the military were armed with .38 and
.45 caliber handguns, and M-16 armalites, which
is a prohibited act under paragraph 4(g), Section
13, and punishable under paragraph (b), Section
14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
(3) The security men assigned to protect the
WPD, INP Field Force, the Marines and
supporting military units, as well as the security
officers of the police and military commanders
were in civilian attire in violation of paragraph
(a), Section 10, Batas Pambansa 880.
(4) There was unnecessary firing by the police
and military crowd dispersal control units in
dispersing the marchers, a prohibited act under
paragraph (e), Section 13, and punishable under
paragraph (b), Section 14, Batas Pambansa Blg.
880.
(5) The carrying and use of steel bars, pillboxes,
darts, lead pipe, wooden clubs with spikes, and
guns by the marchers as offensive weapons are
prohibited acts punishable under paragraph (g),
Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (e),
Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
(6) The KMP farmers broke off further
negotiations with the MAR officials and were
determined to march to Malacañang,
emboldened as they are, by the inflammatory
and incendiary utterances of their leader, Jaime
Tadeo — "bubutasin namin ang barikada.
Dadanak and dugo . . . Ang nagugutom na
magsasaka ay gagawa ng sariling butas . . ."
(7) There was no dialogue between the rallyists
and the government forces. Upon approaching
the intersections of Legarda and Mendiola, the
marchers began pushing the police lines and
penetrated and broke through the first line of
the CDC contingent.
(8) The police fought back with their truncheons
and shields. They stood their ground but the
CDC line was breached. There ensued gunfire
from both sides. It is not clear who started the
firing.
(9) At the onset of the disturbance and violence,
the water cannons and tear gas were not put
into effective use to disperse the rioting crowd.
 (10) The water cannons and fire trucks were not
put into operation because (a) there was no
order to use them; (b) they were incorrectly
prepositioned; and (c) they were out of range of
the marchers.
(11) Tear gas was not used at the start of the
disturbance to disperse the rioters. After the
crowd had dispersed and the wounded and
dead were being carried away, the MDTs of the
police and the military with their tear gas
equipment and components conducted
dispersal operations in the Mendiola area and
proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio to disperse the
remnants of the marchers.
(12) No barbed wire barricade was used in
Mendiola but no official reason was given for its
absence." 8
From the results of the probe, the Commission recommended 9 the
criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals,
shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the
marchers. In connection with this, it was the Commission's
recommendation that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be
tasked to undertake investigations regarding the identities of those
who actually fired their guns that resulted in the death of or injury
to the victims of the incident. The Commission also suggested that
all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police District and
the INP Field Force, who were armed during the incident, be
prosecuted for violation of paragraph 4(g) of Section 13, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. The
Commission's recommendation also included the prosecution of the
marchers, for carrying deadly or offensive weapons, but whose
identities have yet to be established. As for Jaime Tadeo, the
Commission said that he should be prosecuted both for violation of
paragraph (a), Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 for holding the
rally without a permit and for violation of Article 142, as amended,
of the Revised Penal Code for inciting to sedition. As for the
following officers, namely: (1) Gen. Ramon E. Montaño; (2) Police
Gen. Alfredo S. Lim; (3) Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres; (4) Police Maj.
Demetrio dela Cruz; (5) Col. Cezar Nazareno; and (5) Maj. Felimon
Gasmin, for their failure to make effective use of their skill and
experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola,
administrative sanctions were recommended to be imposed. LLpr
The last and the most significant recommendation of the
Commission was for the deceased and wounded victims of the
Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. It was
this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for
damages from the government.
Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of
compensation was received by the victims. Thus, on July 27, 1987,
herein petitioners, (Caylao group) filed a formal letter of demand for
compensation from the Government. 10 This formal demand was
indorsed by the office of the Executive Secretary to the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) on August 13, 1987. The House
Committee on Human Rights, on February 10, 1988, recommended
the expeditious payment of compensation to the Mendiola
victims. 11
After almost a year, on January 20, 1988, petitioners (Caylao group)
were constrained to institute an action for damages against
the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers,
and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident, before the trial
court. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-43351.
On February 23, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its
consent. Petitioners opposed said motion on March 16, 1988,
maintaining that the State has waived its immunity from suit and
that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both
the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights.
Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order, dismissed
the complaint as against the Republic of the Philippines on the
ground that there was no waiver by the State. Petitioners (Caylao
group) filed a Motion for Reconsideration therefrom, but the same
was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated August 8, 1988.
Consequently, Caylao and her co-petitioners filed the instant
petition.
On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines, together with
the military officers and personnel impleaded as defendants in the
court below, filed its petition for certiorari.
Having arisen from the same factual beginnings and raising
practically identical issues, the two (2) petitions were consolidated
and will therefore be jointly dealt with and resolved in this Decision.
The resolution of both petitions revolves around the main issue of
whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit.
Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the argument that the State has
impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is their
considered view that by the recommendation made by the
Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims
of the Mendiola incident and by the public addresses made by then
President Aquino in the aftermath of the killings, the State has
consented to be sued.
Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government
from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The principle
is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends. 12 It also rests on
reasons of public policy — that public service would be hindered,
and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be
subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and
consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means
required for the proper administration of the government. 13
This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding
indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the
incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability
automatically attaches to the State. It is important to note that A.O.
11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the Commission was
to have a body that will conduct an "investigation of the disorder,
deaths and casualties that took place." 14 In the exercise of its
functions, A.O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our
discussion reads:
"1. Its conclusions regarding the existence of
probable cause for the commission of any
offense and of the persons probably guilty of
the same shall be sufficient compliance with the
rules on preliminary investigation and the
charges arising therefrom may be filed directly
with the proper court." 15
In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the
same shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any
party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the Commission is
merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not the end in itself.
Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the
State immediately, such recommendation not having become final
and executory. This is precisely the essence of it being a fact-finding
body.
Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino the very people that they are duty-bound to protect. However, the
may have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State facts as found by the trial court showed that they fired at the unruly
having waived its immunity from suit. The President's act of joining crowd to disperse the latter.
the marchers, days after the incident, does not mean that there was While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule
an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in
words of petitioners (Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the courts except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked
the government with the people". Moreover, petitioners rely on by both the military officers to release them from any liability, and
President Aquino's speech promising that the government would by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the
address the grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not
inferred that the State has admitted any liability, much less can it be apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires
inferred that it has consented to the suit. no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the
Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the State in
be maintained that such consent was given considering the its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are
circumstances obtaining in the instant case. made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the
Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State. state and as its agents and servants. 22 This Court has made it quite
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: 16 clear that even a "high position in the government does not confer a
license to persecute or recklessly injure another." 23
(1) When the Republic is sued by name;
The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly
(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated
liable for the deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability
government agency;
should fall on the named defendants in the lower court. In line with
(3) When the suit is on its face against a the ruling of this court in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 24 herein public
government officer but the case is such that officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their
ultimate liability will belong not to the officer authority, may be held liable for damages.
but to the government.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of
While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability discretion committed by respondent Judge in issuing the questioned
does not pertain to the government. Although the military officers orders, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging their official
SO ORDERED.
functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be
official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the ||| (Republic v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 84607, 84645, [March 19, 1993])
Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the
government forces in the use of firearms. 17 Moreover, the
members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed
a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 18 as there was unnecessary
firing by them in dispersing the marchers. 19
As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot
shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the
color of his office when his acts are wholly without
authority. 20 Until recently in 1991, 21 this doctrine still found
application, this Court saying that immunity from suit cannot
institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic.
The military and police forces were deployed to ensure that the rally
would be peaceful and orderly as well as to guarantee the safety of
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-1648. August 17, 1949.]
PEDRO SYQUIA, GONZALO SYQUIA, and
LEOPOLDO SYQUIA, petitioners, vs.
NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ, Judge of Municipal
Court of Manila, CONRADO V. SANCHEZ, Judge
of Court of First Instance of Manila, GEORGE F.
MOORE ET AL., respondents.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian & Quasha for petitioners.
J. A. Wolfson for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. COURTS; JURISDICTIONS; CLAIM OF TITLE AND
POSSESSION OF PROPERTY BY PRIVATE CITIZEN; AGAINST
OFFICERS AND AGENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. — A private
citizen claiming title and right of possession of a certain
property may, to recover possession of said property, sue as
individuals, officers and agents of the Government who are said
to be illegally withholding the same from him, though in doing
so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the
Government, and the courts may entertain such a suit although
the Government itself is not included as a party-defendant.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; IF JUDGMENT WILL INVOLVE FINANCIAL
LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT, SUIT CANNOT PROSPER OR BE
ENTERTAINED EXCEPT WITH GOVERNMENT'S CONSENT. — But
where the judgment in the suit by the private citizen against the
officers and agents of the government would result not only in
the recovery of possession of property in favor of said citizen
but also in a charge against or financial liability to the
Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against
the Government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or
be entertained by courts except with the consent of said
government
3. ID.; ID.; SUIT BY CITIZEN AGAINST FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT WITHOUT LATTER'S CONSENT; COURTS LACK OF
JURISDICTION. — This is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit
against his own Government without the latter's consent but it
is of citizen filing an action against a foreign government
without said government's consent, which renders more
obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J p:
For the purposes of this decision, the following facts
gathered from and based on the pleadings, may be stated. The
plaintiffs named Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all
surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint owners of three
apartment buildings situated in the City of Manila known as the
North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel
Apartments located at 1131 M. H. del Pilar, 1151 M. H. del Pilar
and 1188 A. Mabini Streets, respectively.
About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs
executed three lease contracts, one for each of the three
apartments, in favor of the United States of America at a
monthly rental of P1,775 for the North Syquia Apartments,
P1,890 for the South Syquia Apartments, and P3,335 for the
Michel Apartments. The term or period for the three leases was
to be "for the duration of the war and six months thereafter,
unless sooner terminated by the United States of America." The
apartment buildings were used for billeting and quartering
officers of the U. S. armed forces stationed in the Manila area.
In March, 1947, when these court proceedings were
commenced, George F. Moore was the Commanding General,
United States Army, Philippine Ryukus Command, Manila, and
as Commanding General of the U. S. Army in the Manila
Theatre, was said to control the occupancy of the said
apartment houses and had authority in the name of the United
States Government to assign officers of the U. S. Army to said
apartments or to order said officers to vacate the same. Erland
A. Tillman was the Chief, Real Estate Division, Office of the
District Engineers, U. S. Army, Manila, who, under the
command of defendant Moore was in direct charge and control
of the lease and occupancy of said three apartment buildings.
Defendant Moore and Tillman themselves did not occupy any
part of the premises in question.
Under the theory that said leases terminated six
months after September 2, 1945, when Japan surrendered,
plaintiffs sometime in March, 1946, approached the
predecessors in office of defendants Moore and Tillman and
requested the return of the apartment buildings to them, but
they were advised that the U. S. Army wanted to continue
occupying the premises. On May 11, 1946, said plaintiffs
requested the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman to
renegotiate said leases, execute lease contracts for a period of
three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those
payable under the old contracts. The predecessor in office of
Moore in a letter dated June 6, 1946, refused to execute new
leases but advised that "it is contemplated that the United
States Army will vacate subject properties prior to 1 February
1947." Not being in conformity with the continuance of the old
leases because of the alleged comparatively low rentals being
paid thereunder, plaintiffs formally requested Tillman to cancel
said three leases and to release the apartment buildings on
June 28, 1946. Tillman refused to comply with the request.
Because of the alleged representation and assurance that the U.
S. Government would vacate the premises before February 1,
1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps to secure possession
of the buildings and accepted the monthly rentals tendered by
the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman on the basis of
a month to month lease subject to cancellation upon thirty days
notice. Because of the failure to comply with the alleged
representation and assurance that the three apartment
buildings will be vacated prior to February 1, 1947, plaintiffs on
February 17, 1947, served formal notice upon defendants
Moore and Tillman and 64 other army officers or members of
the United States Armed Forces who were then occupying
apartments in said three buildings, demanding (a) cancellation
of said leases; (b) increase in rentals to P300 per month per
apartment effective thirty days from notice; (c) execution of
new leases for the three or any one or two of the said
apartment buildings for a definite term, otherwise, (d) release
of said apartment buildings within thirty days of said notice in
the event of the failure to comply with the foregoing demands.
The thirty-day period having expired without any of the
defendants having complied with plaintiffs' demands, the
plaintiffs commenced the present action in the Municipal Court
of Manila in the form of an action for unlawful detainer
(desahucio) against Moore and Tillman and the 64 persons
occupying apartments in the three buildings for the purpose of
having them vacate the apartments, each occupant to pay P300
a month for his particular apartment from January 1, 1947 until
each of said particular defendant had vacated said apartment;
to permit plaintiffs access to said apartment buildings for the
purpose of appraising the damages sustained as the result of
the occupancy by defendants; that defendants be ordered to
pay plaintiffs whatever damages may have been actually caused
on said property; and that in the event said occupants are
unable to pay said P300 a month and/or the damages sustained
by said property, the defendants Moore and Tillman jointly and
severally be made to pay said monthly rentals of P300 per
month per apartment from January 1, 1947 to March 19, 1947,
inclusive, and/or the damages sustained by said apartments,
and that defendants Moore and Tillman be permanently
enjoined against ordering any additional parties in the future
from entering and occupying said premises.
Acting upon a motion to dismiss filed through the
Special Assistant of the Judge Advocate, Philippine Ryukus
Command on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over
the defendants and over the subject matter of the action,
because the real party in interest was the U. S. Government and
not the individual defendants named in the complaint, and that
the complaint did not state a cause of action, the municipal
court of Manila in an order dated April 29, 1947, found that the
war between the United States of America and her allies on one
side and Germany and Japan on the other, had not yet
terminated and, consequently, the period or term of the three
leases had not yet expired; that under the well settled rule of
International Law, a foreign government like the United States
Government cannot be sued in the courts of another state
without its consent; that it was clear from the allegations of the
complaint that although the United States of America has not
been named therein as defendant, it is nevertheless the real
defendant in this case, as the parties named as defendants are
officers of the United States Army and were occupying the
buildings in question as such and pursuant to orders received
from that Government. The municipal court dismissed the
action with costs against the plaintiffs with the suggestion or
opinion that a citizen of the Philippines, who feels aggrieved by
the acts of the Government of a foreign country has the right to
demand that the Philippine Government study his claim and if
found meritorious, take such diplomatic steps as may be
necessary for the vindication of the rights of that citizen, and
that the matter included or involved in the action should be a
proper subject matter of representations between the
Government of the United States of America and the
Philippines. Not being satisfied with the order, plaintiffs
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, where the
motion to dismiss was renewed.
The Court of First Instance of Manila in an order dated
July 12, 1947, affirmed the order of the municipal court
dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. It conceded that under the
doctrine laid down in the case of U. S. vs. Lee, 106 U. S., 196 and
affirmed in the case of Tindal vs. Wesley, 167 U. S., 204,
ordinarily, courts have jurisdiction over cases where private
parties sue to recover possession of property being held by
officers or agents acting in the name of the U. S. Government
even though no suit can be brought against the Government
itself, but inasmuch as the plaintiffs in the present case are
bringing this action against officers and agents of the U. S.
Government not only to recover the possession of the three
apartment houses supposedly being held illegally by them in the
name of their government, but also to collect back rents, not
only at the rate agreed upon in the lease contracts entered into
by the United States of America but in excess of said rate, to say
nothing of the damages claimed, as a result of which, a
judgment in these proceedings may become a charge against
the U. S. Treasury, then under the rule laid down in the case of
Land vs. Dollar, 91 Law. ed., 1209, the present suit must be
regarded as one against the United States Government itself,
which cannot be sued without its consent, specially by citizens of
another country.
The plaintiffs as petitioners have brought this case
before us on a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to order
the Municipal Court of Manila to take jurisdiction over the case.
On October 30, 1947, counsel for respondents Almeda Lopez,
Sanchez, Moore and Tillman filed a motion to dismiss on several
grounds. The case was orally argued on November 26, 1947. On
March 4, 1948, petitioners filed a petition which, among other
things, informed this Court that the North Syquia Apartments,
the SouthSyquia Apartments and Michel Apartments would be
vacated by their occupants on February 29, March 31, and May
31, 1948, respectively. As a matter of fact, said apartments
were actually vacated on the dates already mentioned and
were received by the plaintiffs-owners.
On the basis of this petition and because of the return
of the three apartment houses to the owners, counsel for
respondents Almeda Lopez, Sanchez, Moore and Tillman filed a
petition to dismiss the present case on the ground that it is
moot. Counsel for the petitioners answering the motion,
claimed that the plaintiffs and petitioners accepted possession
of the three apartment houses, reserving all of their rights
against respondents including the right to collect rents and
damages; that they have not been paid rents since January 1,
1947; that respondents admitted that there is a total of
P109,895 in rentals due and owing to petitioners; that should
this case be now dismissed, the petitioners will be unable to
enforce collection; that the question of law involved in this case
may again come up before the courts when conflicts arise
between Filipino civilian property owners and the U. S. Army
authorities concerning contracts entered into in the Philippines
between said Filipinos and the U. S. Government. Consequently,
this Court, according to the petitioners, far from dismissing the
case, should decide it, particularly the question of jurisdiction.
On June 18, 1949, through a "petition to amend
complaint" counsel for the petitioners informed this court that
petitioners had already received from the U. S. Army Forces in
the Western Pacific the sum of P109,895 as rentals for the three
apartments, but with the reservation that said acceptance
should not be construed as jeopardizing the rights of the
petitioners in the case now pending in the courts of the
Philippines or their rights against the U. S. Government with
respect to the three apartment houses. In view of this last
petition, counsel for respondents alleging that both
respondents Moore and Tillman had long left the Islands for
other Army assignments, and now that both the possession of
the three apartments in question as well as the rentals for their
occupation have already been received by the petitioners
renew their motion for dismissal on the ground that this case
has now become moot.
The main purpose of the original action in the
municipal court was to recover the possession of the three
apartment houses in question. The recovery of rentals as
submitted by the very counsel for the petitioners was merely
incidental to the main action. Because the prime purpose of the
action had been achieved, namely, the recovery of the
possession of the premises, apart from the fact that the rentals
amounting to P109,895 had been paid to the petitioners and
accepted by them though under reservations, this Court may
now well dismiss the present proceedings on the ground that
the questions involved therein have become academic and
moot. Counsel for the petitioners however, insists that a
decision be rendered on the merits, particularly on the question
of jurisdiction of the municipal court over the original action,
not only for the satisfaction of the parties involved but also to
serve as a guide in future cases involving cases of similar nature
such as contracts of lease entered into between the
Government of the United States of America on one side and
Filipino citizens on the other regarding properties of the latter.
We accept the suggestion of petitioners and shall proceed to
discuss the facts and law involved and rule upon them.
We shall concede as correctly did the Court of First
Instance, that following the doctrine laid down in the cases of
U. S. vs. Lee and U. S. vs. Tindal, supra, a private citizen claiming
title and right of possession of a certain property may, to
recover possession of said property, sue as individuals, officers
and agents of the Government who are said to be illegally
withholding the same from him, though in doing so, said
officers and agents claim that they are acting for the
Government, and the courts may entertain such a suit altho the
Government itself is not included as a party-defendant. Of
course, the Government is not bound or concluded by the
decision. The philosophy of this ruling is that unless the courts
are permitted to take cognizance and to assume jurisdiction
over such a case, a private citizen would be helpless and
without redress and protection of his rights which may have
been invaded by the officers of the government professing to
act in its name. In such a case the officials or agents asserting
rightful possession must prove and justify their claim before the
courts, when it is made to appear in the suit against them that
the title and right of possession is in the private citizen.
However, and this is important, where the judgment in such a
case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the
property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or
financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be
regarded as one against the government itself, and,
consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the
courts except with the consent of said Government. (See case of
Land vs. Dollar, 91 Law. ed., 1209.)
From a careful study of this case, considering the facts
involved therein as well as those of public knowledge of which
we take judicial cognizance, we are convinced that the real
party in interest as defendant in the original case is the United
States of America. The lessee in each of the three lease
agreements was the United States of America and the lease
agreements themselves were executed in her name by her
officials acting as her agents. The consideration or rentals was
always paid by the U. S. Government. The original action in the
municipal court was brought on the basis of these three lease
contracts and it is obvious in the opinion of this court that any
back rentals or increased rentals will have to be paid by the U.
S. Government not only because, as already stated, the
contracts of lease were entered into by such Government but
also because the premises were used by officers of her armed
forces during the war and immediately after the termination of
hostilities.
We cannot see how the defendants and respondents
Moore and Tillman could be held individually responsible for
the payment of rentals or damages in relation to the occupancy
of the apartment houses in question. Both of these army
officials had no intervention whatsoever in the execution of the
lease agreements nor in the initial occupancy of the premises
both of which were effected thru the intervention of and at the
instance of their predecessors in office. The original request
made by the petitioners for the return of the apartment
buildings after the supposed termination of the leases, was
made to, and denied not by Moore and Tillman but by their
predecessors in office. The notice and decision that the U. S.
Army wanted and in fact continued to occupy the premises was
made not by Moore and Tillman but by their predecessors in
office. The refusal to renegotiate the leases as requested by the
petitioners was made not by Moore but by his predecessors in
office according to the very complaint filed in the municipal
court. The assurance that the U. S. Army will vacate the
premises prior to February 29, 1947, was also made by the
predecessors in office of Moore.
As to the defendant Tillman, according to the
complaint he was Chief, Real Estate Division, Office of the
District Engineer, U.S. Army, and was in direct charge and
control of the leases and occupancy of the apartment buildings,
but he was under the command of defendant Moore, his
superior officer. We cannot see how said defendant Tillman in
assigning new officers to occupy apartments in the three
buildings, in obedience to order or direction from his superior,
defendant Moore, could be held personally liable for the
payment of rentals or increase thereof, or damages said to have
been suffered by the plaintiffs.
With respect to defendant General Moore, when he
assumed his command in Manila, these lease agreements had
already been negotiated and executed and were in actual
operation. The three apartment buildings were occupied by
army officers assigned thereto by his predecessors in office. All
that he must have done was to assign or billet incoming army
officers to apartments as they were vacated by outgoing
officers due to changes in station. He found these apartment
buildings occupied by his government and devoted to the use
and occupancy of army officers stationed in Manila under his
command, and he had reason to believe that he could continue
holding and using the premises theretofore assigned for that
purpose and under contracts previously entered into by his
government, as long as and until orders to the contrary were
received by him. It is even to be presumed that when demand
was made by the plaintiffs for the payment of increased rentals
or for vacating the three apartment buildings, defendant
Moore, not a lawyer by profession but a soldier, must have
consulted and sought the advise of his legal department, and
that his action in declining to pay the increased rentals or to
eject all his army officers from the three buildings must have
been in pursuance to the advice and counsel of his legal
division. At least, he was not in a position to pay increased
rentals above those set and stipulated in the lease agreements,
without the approval of his government, unless he personally
assumed financial responsibility therefor. Under these
circumstances, neither do we believe nor find that defendant
Moore can be held personally liable for the payment of back or
increased rentals and alleged damages.
As to the army officers who actually occupied the
apartments involved, there is less reason for holding them
personally liable for rentals and supposed damages as sought
by the plaintiffs. It must be remembered that these army
officers when coming to their station in Manila were not given
the choice of their dwellings. They were merely assigned
quarters in the apartment buildings in question. Said
assignments or billets may well be regarded as orders, and all
that those officers did was to obey them, and, accordingly,
occupied the rooms assigned to them. Under such
circumstances, can it be supposed or conceived that such army
officers would first inquire whether the rental being paid by
their government for the rooms or apartments assigned to
them by order of their superior officer was fair and reasonable
or not, and whether the period of lease between their
government and the owners of the premises had expired, and
whether their occupancy of their rooms or apartments was
legal or illegal? And if they dismissed these seemingly idle
speculations, assuming that they ever entered their minds, and
continued to live in their apartments unless and until orders to
the contrary were received by them, could they later be held
personally liable for any back rentals which their government
may have failed to pay to the owners of the buildings, or for any
 damages to the premises incident to all leases of property,
specially in the absence of proof that such damages to property
had been caused by them and not by the previous occupants,
also army officers who are not now parties defendant to this
suit? Incidentally it may be stated that both defendants Moore
and Tillman have long left these Islands to assume other
commands or assignments and in all probability none of their
64 co-defendants is still within this jurisdiction.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of
the belief and we hold that the real party defendant in interest
is the Government of the United States of America; that any
judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to
be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-
defendants but by the said U.S. Government. On the basis of
the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar already cited, and on
what we have already stated, the present action must be
considered as one against the U.S. Government. It is clear that
the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of
Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful
detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and
interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S.
Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit
which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover,
this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own
Government without the latter's consent but it is of citizen filing
an action against a foreign government without said
government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of
jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law
behind this rule are so elementary and of such general
acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in
support thereof.
In conclusion we find that the Municipal Court of
Manila committed no error in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction and that the Court of First Instance acted correctly
in affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal. Case
dismissed, without pronouncements as to costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
The petition must be granted. This is the conclusion we
have arrived at long ago, soon after this case had been
submitted for our decision. We regret that, to avoid further
delay in the promulgation of the decision in this case, we are
constrained to limit ourselves to a synthesis of the reasons for
our stand. So that this opinion may be released immediately,
we are making it as short as possible. To said effect we have to
waive the opportunity of elaborating on our arguments.
We are of the opinion that both the municipal court
and the Court of First Instance of Manila erred in dismissing
petitioners' complaint and the majority of the Supreme Court
have given their exequatur to such grievous error.
There is no question that the Municipal Court of
Manila had and has complete jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and decide the case initiated by petitioners. That jurisdiction is
the same whether the true defendants are those specifically
mentioned in the complaint or the Government of the United
States.
The contention that the Government of the United
States of America is the real party defendant does not appear
to be supported either by the pleadings or by the text of the
contract of lease in question. If said government is the real
party defendant and had intended to impugn the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Court of Manila, it must have done so through its
diplomatic representative in the Philippines, i. e., the American
Ambassador. It does not appear that the American Ambassador
had intervened in the case in any way and we believe no one
appearing in the case has the legal personality to represent said
government.
In the hypothesis that the Government of the United
States of America is the lessee in the contract in question and,
therefore, should be considered as the real party defendant in
the ejectment case, that simple fact does not deprive our courts
of justice of their jurisdiction to try any legal litigation relating
to said contract of lease. The very fact that the government of
the United States of America had entered into a private
contract with private citizens of the Philippines and the deed
executed in our country concerns real property located in
Manila, places said government, for purposes of the jurisdiction
of our courts, on the same legal level of the lessors.
Although, generally, foreign governments are beyond
the jurisdiction of domestic courts of justice, such rule is
inapplicable to cases in which the foreign government enters
into private contracts with the citizens of the court's
jurisdiction. A contrary view would simply run against all
principles of decency and violative of all tenets of morals.
Moral principles and principles of justice are as valid
and applicable as well with regard to private individuals as with
regard to governments either domestic or foreign. Once a
foreign government enters into a private contract with the
private citizens of another country, such foreign government
cannot shield its non-performance or contravention of the
terms of the contract under the cloak of non- jurisdiction. To
place such foreign government beyond the jurisdiction of the
domestic courts is to give approval to the execution of
unilateral contracts, graphically described in Spanish as
"contratos leoninos," because one party gets the lion's share to
the detriment of the other. To give validity to such contract is to
sanctify bad faith, deceit, fraud. We prefer to adhere to the
thesis that all parties in a private contract, including
governments and the most powerful of them, are amenable to
law, and that such contracts are enforceable through the help
of the courts of justice with jurisdiction to take cognizance of
any violation of such contracts if the same had been entered
into only by private individuals.
To advance the proposition that the Government of
the United States of America, soon after liberating the
Philippines from the invading Japanese forces, had entered with
the petitioners into the lease contract in question with the
knowledge that petitioners could not bring an action in our
courts of justice to enforce the terms of said contract is to hurl
against said government the blackest indictment. Under such
situation, all the vociferous avowals of adherence to the
principles of justice, liberty, democracy, of said Government
would appear as sham. We cannot believe that the Government
of the United States of America can in honest conscience
support the stand of respondents in this case. We cannot
believe that said government is so callous as not to understand
the meaning of the shame entailed in the legal stand of non-
jurisdiction intended to place said government beyond the
reach of our courts of justice.
||| (Syquia v. Lopez, G.R. No. L-1648, [August 17, 1949], 84 PHIL
312-326)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-5156. Marzo 11, 1954.]
CARMEN FESTEJO, demandante y on A., p. 3.
apelante, contra ISAIAS FERNANDO, Director de
Obras Públicas, demandado y apelado.
D. Eloy B. Bello en representacion de la apelante.
El Procurador General Sr. Pompeyo Díaz y el
Procurador Sr. Antonio A. Torres en representacion del apelado.
SYLLABUS
PRACTICA FORENSE; ACCION CONTRA UN
FUNCIONARIO PUBLICO POR DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS. — La acción
contra el demandado como Director de Obras Públicas
encargado y responsable de la construcción de los sistemas de
irrigación en Filipinas, por alegadas extralimitaciones en el
desempeño de sus funciones oficiales, es una dirigida
personalmente contra él. "Ordinarily the officer or employee
committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be
sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever
injury or damage results from his tortious act." (49 Am. Jur. 28.)
En ese caso, no procede el sobreseimiento de la demanda por el
fundamento de que la acción es una dirigida contra la República
de Filipinas.
DECISION
DIOKNO, M p:
Carmen Festejo, dueña de unos terrenos azucareros,
de un total de unas 9 hectáreas y media de superfice, demandó
a "Isaías Fernando Director, Bureau of Public Works, que como
tal Director de Obras Públicas tiene a su cargo los sistemas y
proyectos de irrigación y es el funcionario responsable de la
construcción de los sistemas deirrigación en el país," alegando
que — .
"The defendant, as Director of the
Bureau of Public Works, without authority
obtained first from the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way,
and without the consent and knowledge of the
plaintiff, and against her express objection,
unlawfully took possession of portions of the
three parcels of land described above, and
caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on
the portion of the three parcels of land on or
about the month of February 1951 the
aggregate area being 24,179 square meters to
the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff." — R.
causando a ella variados daños y perjuicios. Pidió, en su
consecuencia, sentencia condenando el demandado:
". . . to return or cause to be returned
the possession of the portions of land unlawfully
occupied and appropriated in the aggregate
area of 24,179 square meters and to return the
land to its former condition
under the expenses of the defendant." . . .
"In the remote event that the portions
of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated
can not be returned to the plaintiff, then to
order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the
sum of P19,343.20 as value of the portions
totalling an area of 24,179 square meters;" — R.
on A., p. 5.
y además a pagar P9,756.19 de daños y P5,000 de honorarios
de abogado, con las costas R. on A., pp. 5-6.
El demandado, por medio del Procurador General,
presentó moción de sobreseimiento de la demanda por el
fundamento de que el Juzgado no tiene jurisdicción para dictar
sentencia válida contra él, toda vez que judicialmente la
reclamación es contra la República de Filipinas, y esta no ha
presentado su consentimiento a la demanda. El Juzgado inferior
estimó la moción y sobreseyó la demanda sin perjuicio y sin
costas.
En apelación, la demandante sostiene que fué un error
considerar la demanda como una contra la República y
sobreseer en su virtud la demanda.
La moción contra "Isaías Fernando, Director de Obras
Públicas, encargado y responsable de la construcción de los
sistemas de irrigación en Filipinas" es una
dirigidapersonalmente contra él, por actos que asumió ejecutar
en su concepto oficial. La ley no le exime de responsabilidad por
las extralimitaciones que cometa o haga cometer en el
desempeño de sus funciones oficiales.
Un caso semejante es el de Nelson vs. Bobcock (1933)
18 minn. 584, 24 NW 49, 90 ALR 1472. Allí el Comisionado de
Carreteras, al mejorar un trozo de la carretera ocupó o se
apropió de terrenos contiguos al derecho de paso. El Tribunal
Supremo del Estado declaró que es personalmente responsable
al dueño de los daños causados. Declaró además que la
ratificación de lo que hicieron sus subordinados era equivalente
a una orden a los mismos. He aquí lo dijo el Tribunal.
"We think the evidence and conceded
facts permitted the jury in finding that in the
trespass on plaintiff's land defendant committed
acts outside the scope of his authority. When he
went outside the boundaries of the right of way
upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or
destroyed its former condition and usefulness,
he must be held to have designedly departed
from the duties imposed on him by law. There
can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's
land southeasterly of the right of way
innocently. Surveys clearly marked the limits of
the land appropriated for the right of way of this
trunk highway before construction began. . . .
"'Ratification may be equivalent to
command, and cooperation may be inferred
from acquiescence where there is power to
restrain.' It is unnecessary to consider other
cases cited, . . ., for as before suggested, the jury
could find or infer that, in so far as there was
actual trespass by appropriation of plaintiff's
land as a dumping place for the rock to be
removed from the additional appropriated right
of way, defendant planned, approved, and
ratified what was done by his subordinates." —
Nelson vs. Bobcock, 90 A. L. R., 1472, 1476,
1477.
La doctrina sobre la responsabilidad civil de los
funcionarios en casos parecidos se resume como sigue:
"Ordinarily the officer or employee
committing the tort is personally liable therefor,
and may be sued as any other citizen and held
answerable for whatever injury or damage
results from his tortious act." — 49 Am. Jur. 289.
. . If an officer, even while acting under color of
his office, exceeds the power conferred on him
by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea
that he is a public agent." — 43 Am. Jur. 86.
 "It is a general rule that an officer-
executive, administrative quasi-judicial,
ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the
scope of his jurisdiction and without
authorization of law may thereby render himself
amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he
exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he
cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a
public agent acting under color of his office, and
not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts
then are wholly without authority." — 43 Am.
Jur. 89-90.
El articulo 32 del Código Civil dice, a su vez:
"ART. 32. Any public officer or
employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person
shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx.
"(6) The right against deprivation of
property without due process of law;
xxx xxx xxx.
"In any of the cases referred to in this
article, whether or not the defendant's acts or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for
damages, and for other relief. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may
be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
"The indemnity shall include moral
damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated."
Veanse tambien Lung vs. Aldanese, 45
Phil., 784; Syquia vs. Almeda, No. L-1648, Agosto
17, 1947; Marquez vs. Nelson, No. L-2412,
Septiembre 1950.
Se revoca la orden apelada y se ordena la continuación
de la tramitación de la demanda conforme proveen los
reglamentos. Sin especial pronunciamiento en cuanto a las square meters and to return the land to its
costas. Así se ordena. former condition under the expense of the
Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo y Labrador, defendant". (Paragraph a, of the complaint).
MM., estan conformes. We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation
Separate Opinions projects and system referred to in the complaint — of which
the defendant, Isaias Fernando, according to the same pleading,
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
is "in charge" and for which he is "responsible" as Director of
To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to
the Bureau of Public Works — are established and operated
no other conclusion than that appellee Isaias Fernando is a
with public funds, which pursuant to the Constitution, must be
party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as an officer
appropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner in which the
of the Government. According to said pleading the defendant is construction may have been undertaken by the Bureau of
"Isaias Fernando, Director, Bureau of Public Works." Moreover,
Public Works, the system or canal is, therefore, a property of
in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, it is alleged:
the Government. Consequently, in praying that possession of
"4. That the defendant as Director of the portions of land occupied by the irrigation canal involved in
the Bureau of Public Works is in charge of the present case be returned to plaintiff herein, and that said
irrigation projects and systems, and the official land be restored to its former condition, plaintiff seeks to divest
responsible for the construction of irrigation the Government of its possession of said irrigation canal, and,
system in the Philippines: what is worse, to cause said property of the Government to be
5. That the defendant, as Director of removed or destroyed. As held in Syquia vs. Lopez * (47 Off.
the Bureau of Public Works, without authority Gaz., 665), the Government is, accordingly, "the real party in
obtained first from the Court of First Instance of interest as defendant" in the case at bar. In other words, the
Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way same partakes of the nature of a suit against the state and may
and without the consent and knowledge of the not be maintained without its consent.
plaintiff, and against her express objection, Hence I am constrained to dissent.
unlawfully took possession of portions of the Bengzon, J., concurs.
three parcels of land described above, and
caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on ||| (Festejo v. Fernando, G.R. No. L-5156, [March 11, 1954], 94 PHIL
the portion of the three parcels of land on or 504-509)
about the month of February 1951 the
aggregate area being 24,179 square meters to
the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff."
(Italics supplied.)
The emphasis thus placed upon the allegation that the
acts complained of were performed by said defendant "as
Director of the Bureau of Public Works," clearly shows that the
designation of his office was included in the title of the case to
indicate that he was being sued in his official capacity. This
conclusion is bolstered up by the fact that, among other things,
plaintiff prays, in the complaint, for a judgment.
"Ordering the defendant to return or
caused to be returned the possession of the
portions of land unlawfully occupied and
appropriated in the aggregate area of 24,179
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 76607. February 26, 1990.]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE
AND YVONNE REEVES, petitioners, vs. HON.
ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII,
Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, ROBERTO T.
VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO
C. DEL PILAR, respondents.
[G.R. No. 79470. February 26, 1990.]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANTHONY LAMACHIA,
T/SGT. USAF, WILFREDO BELSA, PETER ORASCION
AND ROSE CARTALLA, petitioners, vs. HON. RODOLFO
D. RODRIGO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 7, Regional
Trial Court (BAGUIO CITY), La Trinidad, Benguet and
FABIAN GENOVE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 80018. February 26, 1990.]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TOMI J. KINGI, DARREL
D. DYE and STEVEN F. BOSTICK, petitioners, vs. HON.
JOSEFINA D. CEBALLOS, As Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac, and LUIS
BAUTISTA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 80258. February 26, 1990.]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MAJOR GENERAL
MICHAEL P. C. CARNS, AIC ERNEST E. RIVENBURGH,
AIC ROBIN BLEVINS, SGT. NOEL A. GONZALES, SGT.
THOMAS MITCHELL, SGT. WAYNE L. BENJAMIN, ET
AL., petitioners, vs. HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON
VERGARA, as Presiding Judge, Branch 62 REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, Angeles City, and RICKY SANCHEZ,
FREDDIE SANCHEZ AKA FREDDIE RIVERA, EDWIN
MARIANO, AKA JESSIE DOLORES SANGALANG, ET
AL., respondents.
Luna, Sison & Manas Law Office for petitioners.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM
SUIT; GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW;
EMBODIED IN PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION. — The rule that a state
may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI,
Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the
law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision
merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to
abide by the rules of the international community.
2. ID., ID., ID., PRINCIPLE DEEMED INCORPORATED IN THE LAW OF
EVERY CIVILIZED STATE; STATE IS AUTOMATICALLY OBLIGATED TO
COMPLY WITH THE PRINCIPLE. — Even without such affirmation, we
would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this
doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are
deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a
condition and consequence of its membership in the society of
nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is
automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its
relations with other states.
3. ID.; ID.; BASIS. — As applied to the local state, the doctrine of
state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes
that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes
the law on which the right depends." There are other practical
reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the
foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the
added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet
imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the
language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations."
4. ID., ID., APPLIES TO OFFICIALS OF THE STATE FOR ACTS
PERFORMED IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR DUTIES. — While the
doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of
their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials
will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy
the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay
the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as
against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded.
In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
5. ID., ID., NOT ABSOLUTE AND MAY BE SUED IF STATE GIVES
CONSENT. — The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal
prerogative of dishonesty" because of the privilege it grants the
state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its
non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for
the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of
its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the
state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the
rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which
clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.
6. ID., ID., ID., CONSENT MAY BE GIVEN EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY. —
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a
special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract
or it itself commences litigation.
7. ID., ID., ID., ID., WAIVER OF IMMUNITY; INSTANCES. — The
general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found
in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine government "consents
and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a
basis of civil action between private parties." In Merritt v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to
enable a person to sue the government for an alleged tort. When
the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested
of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Waiver
is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening
itself to a counterclaim.
8. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., EXCEPTIONS. — The above rules are
subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will
of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. We
have held that not all contracts entered into by the government will
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made
between its sovereign and proprietary acts. As for the filing of a
complaint by the government, suability will result only where the
government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.
9. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEEMED TO
HAVE IMPLIEDLY WAIVED ITS NON-SUABILITY IF IT HAS ENTERED
INTO A CONTRACT IN ITS PROPRIETARY CAPACITY. — There is no
question that the United States of America, like any other state, will
be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has
entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is
only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental
capacity that no such waiver may be implied. This was our ruling in
United States of America v. Ruiz, where the transaction in question
dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation
at Subic Bay. As this was a clearly governmental function, we held
that the contract did not operate to divest the United States of its
sovereign immunity from suit.
10. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., CHARGES MAY NOT BE SUMMARILY
DISMISSED ON MERE ASSERTION THAT ACTS ARE IMPUTABLE TO
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. — The other petitioners in the
cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their
official functions as officers or agents of the United States. However,
this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be
summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are
imputable to the United States of America, which has not given its
consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held
answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not
involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the
judgment.
11. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., PETITIONERS CHARGED WITH THE
ENFORCEMENT OF LAW REGARDING PROHIBITED DRUGS ARE
AGENTS OF THE UNITED STATES. — It is clear from a study of the
records of G.R. No. 80018 that the individually-named petitioners
therein were acting in the exercise of their official functions when
they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and
thereafter testified against him at his trial. The said petitioners were
in fact connected with the Air Force Office of Special Investigators
and were charged precisely with the function of preventing the
distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting
those guilty of such acts. It cannot for a moment be imagined that
they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they
apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows
that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they
cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal,
which has not given its consent to be sued.
12. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., SUABILITY AND LIABILITY, DIFFERENTIATED.
— There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and
liability and a misconception that the two terms are synonymous.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on
the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that
a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the
other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to
be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has
allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can,
that the defendant is liable.
13. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE
ESTABLISHES A RULE OF LIABILITY. — The private respondent
invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the government
liable if it acts through a special agent. The argument, it would
seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are
designated "special agents," the United States government should
be liable for their torts. The said article establishes a rule of liability,
not suability. The government may be held liable under this rule
only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted
forms of consent.
14. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., AN AGENT PERFORMING REGULAR
FUNCTIONS IS NOT A SPECIAL AGENT EVEN IF SO DENOMINATED;
ARTICLE APPLIES ONLY TO PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT. — Moreover,
the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent
even if he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less
important, the said provision appears to regulate only the relations
of the local state with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the
Philippine government and not to foreign governments impleaded
in our courts.
15. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., EXPRESS WAIVER MUST BE EFFECTED
THROUGH A DULY-ENACTED STATUTE. — We reject the conclusion
of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of the
Office of the Sheriff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base was a
submission by the United States government to its jurisdiction. As
we noted in Republic v. Purisima, express waiver of immunity
cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be
effected through a duly-enacted statute. Neither does such answer
come under the implied forms of consent as earlier discussed.
16. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., INQUIRY MUST BE MADE AS TO WHAT
CAPACITY PETITIONERS WERE ACTING. — But even as we are certain
that individual petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were acting in the
discharge of their official functions, we hesitate to make the same
conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations
in this case deserve in our view a closer study of what actually
happened to the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if
the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had
actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question
occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly decide
this case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court
so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on
the basis of the evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial.
Only after it shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners
were acting at the time of the incident in question will this Court
determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is
applicable.
17. ID., ID., ID., ID., ID., DOCTRINE CANNOT BE INVOKED WHERE THE
STATE ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT IN THE DISCHARGE OF ITS
PROPRIETARY FUNCTION; CASE AT BAR. — From the circumstances,
the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the
John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise
undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary
capacity. Such services are not extended to the American
servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in the Armed
Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that they are
exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well
known that they are available to the general public as well, including
the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to visit
John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves of this
facility pay for the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary
restaurants. Although the prices are concededly reasonable and
relatively low, such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as
a commercial and not a governmental activity. The consequence of
this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of
state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against
them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be
established that they were acting as agents of the United States
when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For that
matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such
immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment
contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
18. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; TERMINATION OF
EMPLOYMENT; DISMISSAL FOR THE UNBELIEVABLY NAUSEATING
ACT IS PROPER. — The dismissal of the private respondent was
decided upon only after a thorough investigation where it was
established beyond doubt that he had polluted the soup stock with
urine. The investigation, in fact, did not stop there. Despite the
definitive finding of Genove's guilt, the case was still referred to the
board of arbitrators provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement. This board unanimously affirmed the findings of the
investigators and recommended Genove's dismissal. There was
nothing arbitrary about the proceedings. The petitioners acted quite
properly in terminating the private respondent's employment for his
unbelievably nauseating act. It is surprising that he should still have
the temerity to file his complaint for damages after committing his
utterly disgusting offense.
19. ID.; ID.; BARBERSHOPS ARE NOT AGENCIES OF THE UNITED
STATES ARMED FORCES; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT CANNOT BE
INVOKED. — Concerning G.R. No. 76607, we also find that the
barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United States
government are commercial enterprises operated by private
persons. They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces
nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the
American servicemen. This being the case, the petitioners cannot
plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private
respondents in the court below. The contracts in question being
decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in the United States
of America v. Ruiz case cannot be applied here.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the
doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not
impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the
ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not
consented. It is now contesting the denial of its motions by the
respondent judges. cdll
In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers
of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with
the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering services
in the said base.
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office,
Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for such
contracts through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Among
those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto
T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar. Valencia
had been a concessionaire inside Clark for 34 years; del Pilar for 12
years; and Tanglao for 50 years. LLjur
The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the
private respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four
facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not
included in the invitation to bid.
The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area
Exchange (PHAX). The latter, through its representatives, petitioners
Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, explained that the Civil
Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon as a result
of the February 24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon was already operating
this concession, then known as the NCO club concession, and the
expiration of the contract had been extended from June 30, 1986 to
August 31, 1986. They further explained that the solicitation of the
CE barbershop would be available only by the end of June and the
private respondents would be notified. Cdpr
On June 30,1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the
court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel
the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the
barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a
writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions
pending litigation. 1
Upon the filing of the complaint, the respondent court issued an ex
parte order directing the individual petitioners to maintain
the status quo.
On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and
opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground
that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of
America, which had not waived its non-suability. The individual
defendants, as officials/employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also
immune from suit.
On the same date, July 22, 1986, the trial court denied the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 10, 1988, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion
to dismiss, holding in part as follows:
From the pleadings thus far presented to this
Court by the parties, the Court's attention is
called by the relationship between the plaintiffs
as well as the defendants, including the US
Government in that prior to the bidding or
solicitation in question, there was a binding
contract between the plaintiffs as well as the
defendants, including the US Government. By
virtue of said contract of concession, it is the
Court's understanding that neither the US
Government nor the herein principal defendants
would become the employer/s of the plaintiffs
but that the latter are the employers themselves
of the barbers, etc. with the employer, the
plaintiffs herein, remitting the stipulated
percentage of commissions to the Philippine
Area Exchange. The same circumstance would
become m effect when the Philippine Area
Exchange opened for bidding or solicitation the
questioned barber shop concessions. To this
extent, therefore, indeed a commercial
transaction has been entered, and for purposes
of the said solicitation, would necessarily be
entered between the plaintiffs as well as the
defendants.
The Court, further, is of the view that Article
XVIII of the RP-US Bases Agreement does not
cover such kind of services falling under the
concessionaireship, such as a barber shop
concession. 2
On December 11, 1986, following the filing of the herein petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, we issued
a temporary restraining order against further proceedings in the
court below. 3
In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages
against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla
and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force
Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had
been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa,
Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup
stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers.
Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred
the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective
bargaining agreement between the Center and its employees. The
board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his
dismissal. This was effected on March 5, 1986, by Col. David C.
Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark
Air Force Base. Genove's reaction was to file his complaint in the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City against the individual
petitioners. 4
On March 13, 1987, the defendants, joined by the United States of
America, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as
an officer of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air Station, was
immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity.
They argued that the suit was in effect against the United States,
which had not given its consent to be sued. Cdpr
This motion was denied by the respondent judge on June 4, 1987, in
an order which read in part:
It is the understanding of the Court, based on
the allegations of the complaint — which have
been hypothetically admitted by defendants
upon the filing of their motion to dismiss — that
although defendants acted initially in their
official capacities, their going beyond what their
functions called for brought them out of the
protective mantle of whatever immunities they
may have had in the beginning. Thus, the
 allegation that the acts complained of were
"illegal," done, with "extreme bad faith" and
with "pre-conceived sinister plan to harass and
finally dismiss" the plaintiff, gains significance. 5
The petitioners then came to this Court seeking certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction.
In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks
boy in Camp O'Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested
following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual
petitioners herein, namely, Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen
F. Bostick, officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air
Force Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). On the basis of the
sworn statements made by them, an information for violation
of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was
filed against Bautista in the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. The
above-named officers testified against him at his trial. As a result of
the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his
employment. He then filed a complaint for damages against the
individual petitioners herein claiming that it was because of their
acts that he was removed. 6
During the period for filing of the answer, Mariano Y. Navarro, a
special counsel assigned to the International Law Division, Office of
the Staff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base, entered a special
appearance for the defendants and moved for an extension within
which to file an "answer and/or other pleadings." His reason was
that the Attorney General of the United States had not yet
designated counsel to represent the defendants, who were being
sued for their official acts. Within the extended period, the
defendants, without the assistance of counsel or authority from the
U.S. Department of Justice, filed their answer. They alleged therein
as affirmative defenses that they had only done their duty in the
enforcement of the laws of the Philippines inside the American
bases pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
On May 7, 1987, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, having been
retained to represent the defendants, filed with leave of court a
motion to withdraw the answer and dismiss the complaint. The
ground invoked was that the defendants were acting in their official
capacity when they did the acts complained of and that the
complaint against them was in effect a suit against the United States
without its consent. prcd
The motion was denied by the respondent judge in his order dated
September 11, 1987, which held that the claimed immunity under
the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil
cases. Moreover, the defendants had come under the jurisdiction of
the court when they submitted their answer. 7
Following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, we issued on October 14,
1987, a temporary restraining order. 8
In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private
respondents against the herein petitioners (except the United States
of America), for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a
result of the acts of the defendants. 9 There is a conflict of factual
allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat
them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit
them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries
to them. The defendants deny this and claim the plaintiffs were
arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were
struggling and resisting arrest. The defendants stress that the dogs
were called off and the plaintiffs were immediately taken to the
medical center for treatment of their wounds.
In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the United States of America
and the individually named defendants argued that the suit was in
effect a suit against the United States, which had not given its
consent to be sued. The defendants were also immune from suit
under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the
performance of their official functions.
The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in its order
dated August 10, 1987, reading in part as follows:
The defendants certainly cannot correctly argue
that they are immune from suit. The allegations,
of the complaint which is sought to be
dismissed, had to be hypothetically admitted
and whatever ground the defendants may have,
had to be ventilated during the trial of the case
on the merits. The complaint alleged criminal
acts against the individually-named defendants
and from the nature of said acts it could not be
said that they are Acts of State, for which
immunity should be invoked. If the Filipinos
themselves are duty bound to respect, obey and
submit themselves to the laws of the country,
with more reason, the members of the United
States Armed Forces who are being treated as
guests of this country should respect, obey and
submit themselves to its laws. 10
and so was the motion for reconsideration. The defendants
submitted their answer as required but subsequently filed their
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction with this Court. We issued a temporary restraining
order on October 27, 1987. 11
II
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now
expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one
of the generally accepted principles of international law that we
have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section
2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our
resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the
generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine
of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of
states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every
civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in
the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state
is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its
relations with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based
on the justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no
legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the
right depends." 12 There are other practical reasons for the
enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought
to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is
expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All
states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a
celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." 13
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against
such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be
regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally
impleaded. 14 In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of
dishonesty" because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any
legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. That
is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an
unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact,
the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be
sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the
state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports
that it may be sued if it consents.
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a
special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract
or it itself commences litigation.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found
in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine government "consents
and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a
basis of civil action between private parties." In Merritt v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 15 a special law was passed to
enable a person to sue the government for an alleged tort. When
the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested
of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied
consent. 16 Waiver is also implied when the government files a
complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. 17
The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is
effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a
duly enacted statute. 18 We have held that not all contracts entered
into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary
acts. 19 As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability
will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief
from the defendant. 20
In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of
international law on state immunity is expressed with more
specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. Article III thereof provides as
follows:
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall
have the rights, power and authority within the
bases which are necessary for the
establishment, use, operation and defense
thereof or appropriate for the control thereof
and all the rights, power and authority within
the limits of the territorial waters and air space
adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which
are necessary to provide access to them or
appropriate for their control.
The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon, 21 along with
several other decisions, to support their position that they are not
suable in the cases below, the United States not having waived its
sovereign immunity from suit. It is emphasized that in Baer, the
Court held:
The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from
suit of a foreign state without its consent is
appropriate. More specifically, insofar as alien
armed forces is concerned, the starting point is
Raquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision. In
dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the
release of petitioners confined by American
army authorities, Justice Hilado, speaking for
the Court, cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it
was explicitly declared: `It is well settled that a
foreign army, permitted to march through a
friendly country or to be stationed in it, by
permission of its government or sovereign, is
exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of
the place.' Two years later, in Tubb and Tedrow
v. Griess, this Court relied on the ruling in
Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support thereof
excerpts from the works of the following
authoritative writers: Vattel, Wheaton, Hall,
Lawrence, Oppenheim, Westlake, Hyde, and
McNair and Lauterpacht. Accuracy demands the
clarification that after the conclusion of the
Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement,
the treaty provisions should control on such
matter, the assumption being that there was a
manifestation of the submission to jurisdiction
on the part of the foreign power whenever
appropriate. More to the point is Syquia v.
Almeda Lopez, where plaintiffs as lessors sued
the Commanding General of the United States
Army in the Philippines, seeking the restoration
to them of the apartment buildings they owned
leased to the United States armed forces
stationed in the Manila area. A motion to
dismiss on the ground of non-suability was filed
and upheld by respondent Judge. The matter
was taken to this Court in a mandamus
proceeding. It failed. It was the ruling that
respondent Judge acted correctly considering
that the `action must be considered as one
against the U.S. Government.' The opinion of
Justice Montemayor continued: `It is clear that
the courts of the Philippines including the
Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction
over the present case for unlawful detainer. The
question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and
interposed at the very beginning of the action.
The U.S. Government has not given its consent
to the filing of this suit which is essentially
against her, though not in name. Moreover, this
is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against
his own Government without the latter's
consent but it is of a citizen filing an action
against a foreign government without said
government's consent, which renders more
obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of
his country. The principles of law behind this
rule are so elementary and of such general
acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite
authorities in support thereof.' Then came
Marvel Building Corporation v. Philippine War
Damage Commission, where respondent, a
United States Agency established to
compensate damages suffered by the
Philippines during World War II was held as
falling within the above doctrine as the suit
against it `would eventually be a charge against
or financial liability of the United States
Government because . . ., the Commission has
no funds of its own for the purpose of paying
money judgments.' The Syquia ruling was again
explicitly relied upon in Marquez Lim v. Nelson,
involving a complaint for the recovery of a
motor launch, plus damages, the special defense
interposed being `that the vessel belonged to
the United States Government, that the
defendants merely acted as agents of said
Government, and that the United States
Government is therefore the real party in
 interest.' So it was in Philippine Alien Property
Administration v. Castelo, where it was held that
a suit against Alien Property Custodian and the
Attorney General of the United States involving
vested property under the Trading with the
Enemy Act is in substance a suit against the
United States. To the same effect is Parreno v.
McGranery, as the following excerpt from the
opinion of Justice Tuazon clearly shows: `It is a
widely accepted principle of international law,
which is made a part of the law of the land
(Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution), that a
foreign state may not be brought to suit before
the courts of another state or its own courts
without its consent.' Finally, there is Johnson v.
Turner, an appeal by the defendant, then
Commanding General, Philippine Command (Air
Force, with office at Clark Field) from a decision
ordering the return to plaintiff of the
confiscated military payment certificates known
as scrip money. In reversing the lower court
decision, this Tribunal, through Justice
Montemayor, relied on Syquia v. Almeda Lopez,
explaining why it could not be sustained. LLphil
It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not
confer on the United States of America a blanket immunity for all
acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the
other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this
country merely because they have acted as agents of the United
States in the discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the United States of America, like any
other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-
suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. This was
our ruling in United States of America v. Ruiz, 22 where the
transaction in question dealt with the improvement of the wharves
in the naval installation at Subic Bay. As this was a clearly
governmental function, we held that the contract did not operate to
divest the United States of its sovereign immunity from suit. In the
words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos:
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State
from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a
necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However,
the rules of International Law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving.
And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish
them — between sovereign and governmental
acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is
that State immunity now extends only to acts
jure imperii. The restrictive application of State
immunity is now the rule in the United States,
the United Kingdom and other states in Western
Europe.
xxx xxx xxx
The restrictive application of State immunity is
proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to
have descended to the level of an individual and
can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted
to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted
in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the
United States. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges
against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere
assertion that their acts are imputable to the United States of
America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the
defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in
which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they
and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
In Festejo v. Fernando, 23 a bureau director, acting without any
authority whatsoever, appropriated private land and converted it
into public irrigation ditches. Sued for the value of the lots invalidly
taken by him, he moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the suit was in effect against the Philippine government, which had
not given its consent to be sued. This Court sustained the denial of
the motion and held that the doctrine of state immunity was not
applicable. The director was being sued in his private capacity for a
personal tort.
With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to resolve the
cases at hand.
III
It is clear from a study of the records of G.R. No. 80018 that the
individually-named petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of
their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation
against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his
trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected with the Air Force
Office of Special Investigators and were charged precisely with the
function of preventing the distribution, possession and use of
prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of such acts. It cannot
for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or
unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified
against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties
as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded
for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent
to be sued. As we observed in Sanders v. Veridiano: 24
Given the official character of the above-
described letters, we have to conclude that the
petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as
officers of the United States government. As
they have acted on behalf of that government,
and within the scope of their authority, it is that
government, and not the petitioners personally,
that is responsible for their acts.
The private respondent invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
holds the government liable if it acts through a special agent. The
argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the
officers are designated "special agents," the United States
government should be liable for their torts.
There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and
liability and a misconception that the two terms are synonymous.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on
the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that
a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the
other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to
be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has
allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can,
that the defendant is liable.
The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The
government may be held liable under this rule only if it first allows
itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent.
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a
special agent even if he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No
less important, the said provision appears to regulate only the
relations of the local state with its inhabitants and, hence, applies
only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments
impleaded in our courts.
We reject the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by
the special counsel of the Office of the Sheriff Judge Advocate of
Clark Air Base was a submission by the United States government to
its jurisdiction. As we noted in Republic v. Purisima, 25 express
waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere counsel of the
government but must be effected through a duly-enacted statute.
Neither does such answer come under the implied forms of consent
as earlier discussed. Cdpr
But even as we are certain that the individual petitioners in G.R. No.
80018 were acting in the discharge of their official functions, we
hesitate to make the same conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The
contradictory factual allegations in this case deserve in our view a
closer study of what actually happened to the plaintiffs. The record
is too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging
their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when
the incident in question occurred. Lacking this information, this
Court cannot directly decide this case. The needed inquiry must first
be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of the evidence that has
yet to be presented at the trial. Only after it shall have determined
in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the
incident in question will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the
doctrine of state immunity is applicable.
In G.R. No. 79470, private respondent Genove was employed as a
cook in the Main Club located at the U.S. Air Force Recreation
Center, also known as the Open Mess Complex, at John Hay Air
Station. As manager of this complex, petitioner Lamachia is
responsible for eleven diversified activities generating an annual
income of $2 million. Under his executive management are three
service restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a Class VI store, a coffee
and pantry shop, a main cashier cage, an administrative office, and a
decentralized warehouse which maintains a stock level of
$200,000.00 per month in resale items. He supervises 167
employees, one of whom was Genove, with whom the United States
government has concluded a collective bargaining agreement.
From these circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant
services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of
a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government
in its proprietary capacity. Such services are not extended to the
American servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in the
Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that they
are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is
well known that they are available to the general public as well,
including the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point
to visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves of
this facility pay for the privilege like all other customers as in
ordinary restaurants. Although the prices are concededly reasonable
and relatively low, such services are undoubtedly operated for
profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity.
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke
the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage
suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it
be established that they were acting as agents of the United States
when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For that
matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such
immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment
contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
But these considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the
complaint against the petitioners in the court below must still be
dismissed. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable.
It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the
strength of the evidence before us, which we have carefully
examined.
The dismissal of the private respondent was decided upon only after
a thorough investigation where it was established beyond doubt
that he had polluted the soup stock with urine. The investigation, in
fact, did not stop there. Despite the definitive finding of Genove's
guilt, the case was still referred to the board of arbitrators provided
for in the collective bargaining agreement. This board unanimously
affirmed the findings of the investigators and recommended
Genove's dismissal. There was nothing arbitrary about the
proceedings. The petitioners acted quite properly in terminating the
private respondent's employment for his unbelievably nauseating
act. It is surprising that he should still have the temerity to file his
complaint for damages after committing his utterly disgusting
offense.
Concerning G.R. No. 76607, we also find that the barbershops
subject of the concessions granted by the United States government
are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are
not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their
facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American
servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs
of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave (as
required in most military organizations) but such other amenities as
shampoo, massage, manicure and other similar indulgences. And all
for a fee. Interestingly, one of the concessionaires, private
respondent Valencia, was even sent abroad to improve his tonsorial
business, presumably for the benefit of his customers . No less
significantly, if not more so, all the barbershop concessionaires are,
under the terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United
States government fixed commissions in consideration of the
exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas.
This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from
the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below.
The contracts in question being decidedly commercial, the
conclusion reached in the United States of America v. Ruiz case
cannot be applied here.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the
defendants as we have done in G.R. No. 79470, except for the
paucity of the record in the case at hand. The evidence of the
alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is not
before us. This means that, as in G.R. No. 80258, the respondent
court will have to receive that evidence first, so it can later
determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the
relief they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the
court below for further proceedings.
IV
There are a number of other cases now pending before us which
also involve the question of the immunity of the United States from
the jurisdiction of the Philippines. This is cause for regret, indeed, as
they mar the traditional friendship between two countries long
allied in the cause of democracy. It is hoped that the so-called
"irritants" in their relations will be resolved in a spirit of mutual
accommodation and respect, without the inconvenience and
asperity of litigation and always with justice to both parties.
WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court
hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent
judge is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil
Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order dated December
11, 1986, is LIFTED.
2. In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-
R(298) is DISMISSED.
3. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 115-
C-87 is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated October
14, 1987, is made permanent.
4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent
court is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil
Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining order dated October 27,
1987, is LIFTED. LibLex
All without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (United States of America v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, 79470,
80018, 80258, [February 26, 1990], 261 PHIL 777-802)
FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 11154. March 21, 1916.]
E. MERRITT, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
Crossfield & O'Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avanceña for defendant.
1. DAMAGES; MEASURE OF. — Where the evidence
shows that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for six months
it is an error to restrict the damages to a shorter period during
which he was confined in the hospital.
2. SPECIAL STATUTES; CONSENT OF THE STATE TO BE
SUED; CONSTRUCTION. — The Government of the Philippine
Islands having been "modeled after the federal and state
governments of the United States' the decisions of the high
courts of that country may be used in determining the scope
and purpose of a special statute.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. — The state not being liable to suit
except by its express consent, an act abrogating that immunity
will be strictly construed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID. — An act permitting a suit against the
state gives rise to no liability not previously existing unless it is
clearly expressed in the act.
5. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS;
LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS, AGENTS,
AND EMPLOYEES. — The Government of the Philippine Islands
in only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and
employees when they are acting as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil code, and a
chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such a special agent.
DECISION
TRENT, J p:
This is an appeal by both partied from a judgment of
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the
plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the
cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred
(1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered
to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and
(2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to
two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage
accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed
by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges
that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision
between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b)
in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable
for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the
collision, even if it be true that collision was due to the
negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment
against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully
supported by the record, are as follows:
"It is a fact not disputed by counsel for
the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on
a motorcycle, was going toward the western
part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west
side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles
and hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when
he was ten feet from the southwestern
intersection of said streets, the General Hospital
ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead
of turning toward the south, after passing the
center thereof, so that it would be on the left
side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the
ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned
suddenly and unexpectedly and long before
reaching the center of the street, into the right
side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded
any whistle or horn, by which movement it
struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet
from the southwestern point or from the post
placed there.
"By reason of the resulting collision, the
plaintiff was so severely injured that, according
to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very
same day that he was taken to the General
Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in
the left parietal region, a wound in the same
place and in beck part of his head, while blood
issued from his nose and he was entirely
unconscious.
"The marks revealed that he had one or
more fractures of the skull and that the grey
matter and brain mass had suffered material
injury. At ten o'clock of the night in question,
which was the time set for performing the
operation, his pulse was so weak and so
irregular that, in his opinion, there was little
hope that he would live. His right leg was
broken in such a way that the fracture extended
to the outer skin in such manner that it might be
regarded as double and the wound would be
expose to infection, for which reason it was of
the most serious nature.
"At another examination six days
before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby notice
that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of
an inch and a half and a curvature that made his
leg very weak and painful at the point of the
fracture. Examination of his head revealed a
notable re-adjustment of the functions of the
brain and nerves. The patient apparently was
slightly deaf, had a slight weakness in his eyes
and in his mental condition. This latter weakness
was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do
any difficult mental labor, especially when he
attempted to use his memory for mathematical
calculations.
"According to the various merchants
who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental
and physical condition prior to the accident was
excellent, and that after having received the
injuries that have been discussed, his physical
condition had undergone a noticeable
depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy,
and ability that he had constantly displayed
before the accident as one of the best
constructors of wooden buildings and he could
not now earn even a half of the income that he
had secured for his work because he had lost 50
per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he
could no longer, as he had before done, climb
up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest
parts of the building.
 "As a consequence of the loss the
plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as
a contractor, he had to dissolve the partnership
he had formed with the engineer, Wilson,
because he was incapacitated from making
mathematical calculations on account of the
condition of his leg and of his mental faculties,
and he had to give up a contract he had for the
construction of the Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord
with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the
plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741
and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000,
the amount awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the
P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the
time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his
occupation. We fund nothing in the record which would justify
us in increasing the amount of the first. as to the second, the
record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's
services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The
court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty-
one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the
hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was clearly
established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a
period of sex months. The mere fact that he remained in the
hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the
remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not
prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that
the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any
fault on his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort
committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the
inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally liable
for the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
"An act authorizing E. Merritt to bring
suit against the Government of the Philippine
Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of
said Islands to appear in said suit.
"Whereas a claim has been filed against
the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr.
E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from
a collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital on March
twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
"Whereas it is not known who is
responsible for the accident nor is it possible to
determine the amount of damages, if any , to
which the claimant is entitled; and
"Whereas the Director of Public Works
and the Attorney-General recommend that an
act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr.
E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the
Government, in order that said questions may
be decided: Now, therefore,
"By authority of the United States, be it
enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
"SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby
authorized to bring suit in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila against the
Government of the Philippine Islands in order to
fix the responsibility for the collision between
his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital, and to determine the amount
of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is
entitled on account of said collision, and the
attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is
hereby authorized and directed to appear at the
trial on the behalf of the Government of said
Islands, to defend said Government at the same.
"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its
passage.
"Enacted, February 3, 1915."
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted act,
simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its
liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be
held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of
the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case
not previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant)
cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It is also
admitted that the instant case is one against the Government.
As the consent of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff
was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully
into the terms of the consent, and render judgment
accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against
the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages,
if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said
collision, . . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the
court for determination. The Act was passed "in order that said
questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the
accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who
was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we have
also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a
result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the
Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must
look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been
"modeled after the Federal and state Governments in the
United States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts
of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope
of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable
for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it
employs, except when expressly made so by legislative
enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice
Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any person the
fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that
would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public
interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing
U.S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and
Beers vs. State, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State ( 121 Cal., 16), the
plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for personal
injuries received on account of the negligence of the state
officers at the state fair, a state institution created by the
legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and
kindred industries; to disseminate information calculated to
educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to advance to
educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to advance by
such means the material interests of the state, being objects
similar to those sought by the public school system. In passing
upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of
its officers or agents, the court said:
"No claim arises against any
government in favor of an individual, by reason
of the misfeasance, laces, or unauthorized
exercise of powers by its officers or agents."
(Citing Gibbons vs. U.S., 8 Wall., 269;
Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N.C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep.,
440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am.
St. Rep., 158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29;
Bourn vs.Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203;
Story on Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting
individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out
of either tort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
"By consenting to be sued a state
simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or
create any cause of action in his favor, or extend
its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce
a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense."
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced
sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which
authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
"SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given
to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit,
Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in
such court or courts and in such form or forms
as he may be advised for the purpose of settling
and determining all controversies which he may
now have with the State of Wisconsin, or its
duly authorizes officers and agents, relative to
the mill property of said George Apfelbacher,
the fish hatchery of the State Wisconsin on the
Bark River, and the mill property of Evan
Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake,
and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark
River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of
Waukesha, Wisconsin."
In determining the scope of this act, the court said;
"Plaintiff claims that by the enactment
of this law the legislature admitted liability on
the part of the state for the acts of its officers,
and that the suit now stands just as it would
stand between private parties. It is difficult to
see how the act does, or was intended to do,
more than remove the state's immunity from
suit. It simply gives authority commence suit for
the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies
with the state. Nowhere in the act is there a
whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in
the disposition of the suit shall depart from well
established principles of law, or that the amount
of damages is the only question to be settled.
The act opened the door of the court to the
plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of
liability, but left the suit just where it would be
in the absence of the state's immunity from suit.
If the Legislature had intended to change the
rule that obtained in this state so long and to
declare liability on the part of the state, it would
not have left so important a matter to mere
inference but would have done so in express
terms. (Murdoc Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth,
152 Mass., 28; 24 N. E., 854; 8 L. R.A., 399)"
In Denning vs. state (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of
the Act of 1893, relied upon and considered, are as follows:
"All persons who have, or shall
hereafter have claims on contract or for
negligence against the state not allowed by the
state board of examiners, are hereby
authorized, on the terms and conditions herein
contained, to bring suit thereon against the
state in any of the courts of this state of
competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same
to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil
cases shall apply to such suits, except as herein
otherwise provided."
And the court said:
"This statute has been considered by
this court in at least two cases, arising under
different facts, and in both it was held that said
statute did not create any liability or cause of
action against the state where none existed
before, but merely gave an additional remedy to
enforce such liability as would have existed if
the statute had not been enacted.
(Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St.
Rep., 158; Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)"
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to
the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the
commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with an exception
not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing this statute
the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass.,
28), said:
"The statute we are discussing discloses
no intention to create against the state a new
and heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities,
but only an intention to provide a judicial
tribunal where well recognized existing liabilities
can be adjudicated."
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of
the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of New York,
jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the
management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained,
Chief Justice Ruger remarks; "It must be conceded
that the state can be made liable for injuries arising
from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of
some positive statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate
to extend the Government's liability to any cause not previously
recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching
the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers,
agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the civil
Code reads:
"The state is liable in this sense when it
acts through a special agent, but not when the
damage should have been caused by the official
to whom properly it pertained to do the act
performed, in which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable."
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of
this paragraph said:
 "That the obligation to indemnify for
damages which a third person causes another
by his fault or negligence is based, as is
evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7,
on that the person obligated, by his own fault or
negligence, takes part in the act or omission of
the third party who caused the damage. It
follows therefrom that the state by virtue of
such provision of law, is not responsible for the
damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault
nor even negligence can be presumed on the
part of the state in the organization of branches
of the public service and in the appointment of
its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose
all foresight humanly possible on its part in
order that each branch of service serves the
general weal and that of private persons
interested in its operation. Between these latter
and the state therefore, no relations of a private
nature governed by the civil law can arise except
in a case where the state acts as a judicial
person capable of acquiring rights and
contracting obligations." (Supreme Court of
Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
"That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title
16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise
out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the
first articles thereof, No. 1902, where the
general principle is laid down that where a
person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another through fault or negligence,
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done,
reference is made to acts or omissions of the
persons who directly or indirectly cause the
damage, the following article refers to third
persons and imposes an identical obligation
upon those who maintain fixed relations of
authority and superiority over the authors of the
damage, because the law presumes that in
consequence of such relations the evil caused by
their own fault or negligence is imputable to
them. This legal presumption gives way to proof,
however, because, as held in the last paragraph
of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third
persons ceases when the persons mentioned in
said article prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
the damage, and among these persons, called
up[on to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary
manner, are found, in addition to the mother or
the father in a proper case, guardians and
owners or director of an establishment or
enterprise, the state, but not always, except
when it acts through the agency of a special
agent, doubtless because and only in this case,
the fault or negligence, which is the original
basis of this kind of objections, must be
presumed to lie with the state.
"That although in some cases the state
might by virtue of the general principle set forth
in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is
occasioned to private parties by orders or
resolutions which by fault or negligence are
made by branches of the central administration
acting in the name and representation of the
state itself and as an external expression of its
sovereignty in the exercise of its executive
powers, yet said article is not applicable in the
case of damages said to have been occasioned
to the petitioners by anexecutive official, acting
in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to
enforce the collections of certain property taxes
owing by the owner of the property which they
hold in sublease.
"That the responsibility of the state is limited by article
1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a
special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed,
is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state and being bound
to act as an agent thereof he executed the trust confided to
him. this concept does not apply to any executive agent who is
an employee of the active administration and who in his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law
and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904;
98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
"That according to paragraph 5 of
article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle
laid down in a decision, among others, of the
18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the
responsibility of the state is limited to that
which it contracts through a special agent, duly
empowered by a definite order or commission to
perform some act or charged with some definite
purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not
where the claim is based on acts or omissions
imputable to a public official charge with some
administrative or technical office who can be
held to the proper responsibility in the manner
laid down by the law of civil responsibility.
Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding
and in sentencing the said entity to the payment
of damages, caused by an official of the second
class referred to, has by erroneous
interpretation infringed the provisions of articles
1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code." (Supreme
Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146)
It is, therefore, evident that the State (the Government
of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above
quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of
its agents, officers and employees when they act as special
agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article
1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed
from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether
the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the
amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has
sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its
employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating
sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine.
This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the
courts.
||| (Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 11154,
[March 21, 1916], 34 PHIL 311-323)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-26400. February 29, 1972.]
VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as
Commissioner of Public Highways and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-
appellees.
Quirico del Mar, Domingo Antigua, Antonio Paulin and
N. Capangpangan for plaintiff and appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo Torres and Solicitor Dominador
L. Quiroz for defendants and appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; PROJECT USED BY
GOVERNMENT FOR ROAD PURPOSES; RIGHTS OR REGISTERED
OWNER TO DUE COMPENSATION ANYTIME. — Considering that no
annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her
certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of
conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the
appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner,
she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of
land in question at anytime because possession is one of the
attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of
said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at
this time because it has been and is now being used for road
purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make
due compensation which it could and should have done years ago.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO DAMAGES. — The owner of the land is
entitled to damages in the form of legal interest on the price of the
land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is
made by the government. In addition, the government should pay
for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial
court after hearing.
3. ID.; ID.; BASIS FOR DUE COMPENSATION. — To determine the due
compensation for the land appropriated by the Government, the
basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-5977, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of
Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the
Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in
favor of the government of any right or interest in the property
appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or
negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an
area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921
although "they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike
the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that
the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal
construction in 1925." *
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the
Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had
been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to
the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated
December 9, 1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted
to Amigable's counsel by the Office of the President on January 7,
1959.
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint,
which was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the
defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and
Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways
for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square
meters of land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She
also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of
P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages in
the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and
the costs of the suit.
Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer
denying the material allegations of the complaint and interposing
the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was
premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of
the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of
any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already
prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government,
the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid
basis since as to these items the Government had not given its
consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of
Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the
construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action
against the defendants.
During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants
notwithstanding due notice, so the trial court proceeded to receive
the plaintiff's evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court
rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and
ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that
the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had
neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide
plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages in the sum of
P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against the government;
and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it
have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not
given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was
dismissed. Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the
case to Us, there being no question of fact involved.
The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the
government under the facts of the case.
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of
Cebu, 1 involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of
land used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this
Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held that where
the government takes away property from a private landowner for
public use without going through the legal process of expropriation
or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent. We there
said:
". . . If the constitutional
mandate that the owner be compensated
for property taken for public use were to
be respected, as it should, then a suit of
this character should not be summarily
dismissed. The doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice
on a citizen. Had the government
followed the procedure indicated by the
governing law at the time, a complaint
would have been filed by it, and only
upon payment of the compensation fixed
by the judgment, or after tender to the
party entitled to such payment of the
 amount fixed, may it have the right to WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the
enter in and upon the land so case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of
condemned, to appropriate the same to compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is
the public use defined in the judgment.' If entitled as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.
there were an observance of procedural Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
regularity, petitioners would not be in Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
the sad plaint they are now. It is ||| (Amigable v. Cuenca, G.R. No. L-26400, [February 29, 1972], 150
unthinkable then that precisely because
PHIL 422-427)
there was a failure to abide by what the
law requires, the government would
stand to benefit. It is just as important, if
not more so, that there be fidelity to
legal norms on the part of officialdom if
the rule of law were to be maintained. It
is not too much to say that when the
government takes any property for public
use, which is conditioned upon the
payment of just compensation, to be
judicially ascertained, it makes manifest
that it submits to the jurisdiction of a
court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still
be appropriately invoked."
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears
at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed
any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the
government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As
registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of
the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one
of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of
possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient
nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for
road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to
make due compensation which it could and should have done years
ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis
should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. 2
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in
the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it
was taken up to the time that payment is made by the
government. 3 In addition, the government should pay for
attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial
court after hearing.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-35645. May 22, 1985.]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E.
GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V.M. RUIZ,
Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First
Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN &
CO., INC., respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law Office for petitioners.
Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perlas & Dominguez Law Office for
respondents.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J p:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the
respondent judge from trying Civil Case No. 779-M of the defunct
Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The factual background is as follows:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a
naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided
in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and
the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of
bids for the following projects:
1. Repair fender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S.
Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi
shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline
revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf
approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines. LLpr
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and
submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from
the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price
proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company
complied with the requests. [In its complaint, the company alleges
that the United States had accepted its bids because "A request to
confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant
to defendant United States' bidding practices." (Rollo, p. 30.) The
truth of this allegation has not been tested because the case has not
reached the trial stage.]
In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by
William I. Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy
of the United States, who is one of the petitioners herein. The letter
said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the
projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating
on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S.
Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the projects
had been awarded to third parties.
In the abovementioned Civil Case No. 779-M, the company sued
the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway,
William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering
Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the
defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the
projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer
possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company
also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third
parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance "for the purpose
only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject
matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject
matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual
defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a
foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any
other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo,
p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion. The
trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants
moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant
petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
The petition is highly impressed with merit. LexLib
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being
sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver.
This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing
and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it
has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity
now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of
State immunity is now the rule in the United States,
theUnited Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia
and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209
[1984].) 2006cdtai
The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State
immunity when he said in his Order denying the defendants' (now
petitioners) motion: "A distinction should be made between a
strictly governmental function of the sovereign state from its
private, proprietary or non-governmental acts." (Rollo, p. 20.)
However, the respondent judge also said: "It is the Court's
considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of
wharves or shoreline is certainly not a governmental function altho
it may partake of a public nature or character. As aptly pointed out
by plaintiff's counsel in his reply citing the ruling in the case of
Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and which this Court quotes with
approval, viz.:
'It is however contended that when a sovereign
state enters into a contract with a private
person, the state can be sued upon the theory
that it has descended to the level of an
individual from which it can be implied that it
has given its consent to be sued under the
contract. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
'We agree to the above contention, and
considering that the United States government,
through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a
contract with appellant for stevedoring and
miscellaneous labor services within the Subic
Bay Area, a U.S. Naval Reservation, it is evident
that it can bring an action before our courts for
any contractual liability that political entity may
assume under the contract. The trial court,
therefore, has jurisdiction to entertain this case .
. .'" (Rollo, pp. 20-21.)
The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced
for the following reasons:
In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America supra, plaintiff
brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to collect
several sums of money on account of a contract between plaintiff
and defendant. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant and over
the subject matter of the action. The court granted the motion on
the grounds that: (a) it had no jurisdiction over the defendant who
did not give its consent to the suit; and (b) plaintiff failed to exhaust
the administrative remedies provided in the contract. The order of
dismissal was elevated to this Court for review. cdrep
In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said:
"It appearing in the complaint that appellant has
not complied with the procedure laid down in
Article XXI of the contract regarding the
prosecution of its claim against
the UnitedStates Government, or, stated
differently, it has failed to first exhaust its
administrative remedies against said
Government, the lower court acted properly in
dismissing this case." (At p. 598.)
It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of
State immunity from suit was purely gratuitous and,
therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an imperative authority.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent
to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval
base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and
the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial
or business purposes.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the
conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is
shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the
plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United States of
America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to
recover possession of the premises on the ground that the term of
the leases had expired, They also asked for increased rentals until
the apartments shall have been vacated.
The defendants who were armed forces officers of
the United States moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the court. The Municipal Court of Manila granted the
motion to dismiss; sustained by the Court of First Instance, the
plaintiffs went to this Court for review on certiorari. In denying the
petition, this Court said:
"On the basis of the foregoing considerations
we are of the belief and we hold that the real
party defendant in interest is the Government
of the United States of America; that any
judgment for back or increased rentals or
damages will have to be paid not by defendants
Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants
but by the said U.S. Government. On the basis of
the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar already
cited, and on what we have already stated, the
present action must be considered as one
against the U.S. Government. It is clear that the
courts of the Philippines including the Municipal
Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the
present case for unlawful detainer. The question
of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed
at the very beginning of the action. The U.S.
Government has not given its consent to the
filing of this suit which is essentially against her,
though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a
case of a citizen filing a suit against his own
Government without the latter's consent but it
is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign
government without said government's consent,
which renders more obvious the lack of
jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The
principles of law behind this rule are so
elementary and of such general acceptance that
we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in
support thereof." (At p. 323.) LLphil
In Syquia, the United States concluded contracts with private
individuals but the contracts notwithstanding the United States was
not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the
reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not for jure
gestionis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the
respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. 779-M is
dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin, Relova Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente,
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, J., dissents:
The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in Civil Case
No. 779-M in the defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be allowed to
continue therein.
In the case of Lyons vs. the United States of America (104 Phil. 593),
where the contract entered into between the plaintiff (Harry Lyons,
Inc.) and the defendant (U.S. Government) involved stevedoring and
labor services within the Subic Bay area, this Court further stated
that inasmuch as ". . . the United States Government, through its
agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with appellant for
stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay
area, a U.S. Navy Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action
before our courts for any contractual liability that political entity
may assume under the contract."
When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay,
confirmed the acceptance of a bid of a private company for the
repair of wharves or shoreline in the Subic Bay area, it is deemed to
have entered into a contract and thus waived the mantle of
sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of the
ordinary citizen. Its consent to be sued, therefore, is implied from its
act of entering into a contract (Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 284).
Justice and fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits
a breach of its contractual obligation — in the case at bar by the
unilateral cancellation of the award for the project by
the United States government, through its agency at Subic Bay —
should not be allowed to take undue advantage of a party who may
have legitimate claims against it by seeking refuge behind the shield
of non-suability. A contrary view would render a Filipino citizen, as
in the instant case, helpless and without redress in his own country
for violation of his rights committed by the agents of the foreign
government professing to act in its name. cdll
Appropriate are the words of Justice Perfecto in his dissenting
opinion in Syquia vs. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312, 325:
"Although, generally, foreign governments are
beyond the jurisdiction of domestic courts of
justice, such rule is inapplicable to cases in
which the foreign government enters into
private contracts with the citizens of the court's
jurisdiction. A contrary view would simply run
 against all principles of decency and violative of
all tenets of morals.
"Moral principles and principles of justice are as
valid and applicable as well with regard to
private individuals as with regard to
governments either domestic or foreign. Once a
foreign government enters into a private
contract with the private citizens of another
country, such foreign government cannot shield
its non-performance or contravention of the
terms of the contract under the cloak of non-
jurisdiction. To place such foreign government
beyond the jurisdiction of the domestic courts is
to give approval to the execution of unilateral
contracts, graphically described in Spanish as
'contratos leoninos,' because one party gets the
lion's share to the detriment of the other. To
give validity to such contract is to sanctify bad
faith, deceit, fraud. We prefer to adhere to the
thesis that all parties in a private contract,
including governments and the most powerful
of them, are amenable to law, and that such
contracts are enforceable through the help of
the courts of justice with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of any violation of such contracts if
the same had been entered into only by private
individuals."
Constant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of
State immunity in this jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our
sovereignty and dignity as a nation. Its application will particularly
discourage Filipino or domestic contractors from transacting
business and entering into contracts with United States authorities
or facilities in the Philippines — whether naval, air or ground forces
— because the difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing a validly
executed contract and of seeking judicial remedy in our own courts
for breaches of contractual obligation committed by agents of
the United States government, always looms large, thereby
hampering the growth of Filipino enterprises and creating a virtual
monopoly in our own country by United States contractors of
contracts for services or supplies with the various U.S. offices and
agencies operating in the Philippines.
The sanctity of upholding agreements freely entered into by the
parties cannot be over emphasized. Whether the parties are nations
or private individuals, it is to be reasonably assumed and expected
that the undertakings in the contract will be complied with in good
faith.
One glaring fact of modern day civilization is that a big and powerful
nation, like the United States of America, can always overwhelm
small and weak nations. The declaration in the United Nations
Charter that its member states are equal and sovereign, becomes
hollow and meaningless because big nations wielding economic and
military superiority impose upon and dictate to small nations,
subverting their sovereignty and dignity as nations. Thus, more
often than not, when U.S. interest clashes with the interest of small
nations, the American governmental agencies or its citizens invoke
principles of international law for their own benefit.
In the case at bar, the efficacy of the contract between the U.S.
Naval authorities at Subic Bay on one hand, and herein private
respondent on the other, was honored more in the breach than in
the compliance. The opinion of the majority will certainly open the
floodgates of more violations of contractual obligations. American
authorities or any foreign government in the Philippines for that
matter, dealing with the citizens of this country, can conveniently
seek protective cover under the majority opinion. The result is
disastrous to the Philippines. LibLex
This opinion of the majority manifests a neo-colonial mentality. It
fosters economic imperialism and foreign political ascendancy in our
Republic.
The doctrine of government immunity from suit cannot and should
not serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen
(Amigable vs. Cuenca, L-26400, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 360;
Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, L-31635, August 31, 1971, 40
SCRA 464).
Under the doctrine of implied waiver of its non-suability,
the United States government, through its naval authorities at Subic
Bay, should be held amenable to lawsuits in our country like any
other juristic person.
The invocation by the petitioner United States of America is not in
accord with paragraph 3 of Article III of the original RP-US Military
Bases Agreement of March 14, 1947, whichstates that "in the
exercise of the above-mentioned rights, powers and
authority, the United States agrees that the powers granted to it will
not be used unreasonably. . . ." (italics supplied).
Nor is such posture of the petitioners herein in harmony with the
amendment dated May 27, 1968 to the aforesaid RP-US Military
Bases Agreement, which recognizes "the need to promote and
maintain sound employment practices which will assure equality of
treatment of all employees . . . and continuing favorable employer-
employee relations . . ." and "(B)elieving that an agreement will be
mutually beneficial and will strengthen the democratic institutions
cherished by both Governments, . . . the United States Government
agrees to accord preferential employment of Filipino citizens in the
Bases, thus (1) the U.S. Forces in the Philippines shall fill the needs
for civilian employment by employing Filipino citizens, etc." (Par. 1,
Art. I of the Amendment of May 27, 1968).
Neither does the invocation by petitioners of state immunity from
suit express fidelity to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the aforesaid
amendment of May 27, 1968 which directs that "contractors and
concessionaires performing work for the U.S. Armed Forces shall be
required by their contract or concession agreements to comply with
all applicable Philippine labor laws and regulations," even though
paragraph 2 thereof affirms that "nothing in this Agreement shall
imply any waiver by either of the two Governments of such
immunity under international law."
Reliance by petitioners on the non-suability of
the United States Government before the local courts, actually
clashes with No. III on respect for Philippine law of the
Memorandum of Agreement signed on January 7, 1979, also
amending RP-US Military Bases Agreement, which stresses that "it is
the duty of members of the United StatesForces, the civilian
component and their dependents, to respect the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with
the spirit of the Military Bases Agreement and, in particular, from
any political activity in the Philippines. The United States shall take
all measures within its authority to insure that they adhere to them"
(italics supplied). cdll
The foregoing duty imposed by the amendment to the Agreement is
further emphasized by No. IV on the economic and social
improvement of areas surrounding the bases, which directs that
"moreover, the United States Forces shall procure goods and
services in the Philippines to the maximum extent feasible" (italics
supplied).
Under No. VI on labor and taxation of the said amendment of
January 6, 1979 in connection with the discussions on possible
revisions or alterations of the Agreement of May 27, 1968, "the
discussions shall be conducted on the basis of the principles of
equality of treatment, the right to organize, and bargain collectively,
and respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines"
(italics supplied).

The majority opinion seems to mock the provision of paragraph 1 of

the joint statement of President Marcos and Vice-President
Mondale of the United States dated May 4, 1978 that
"the United States re-affirms that Philippine sovereignty extends
over the bases and that Its base shall be under the command of a
Philippine Base Commander," which is supposed to underscore the
joint Communique of President Marcos and U.S. President Ford of
December 7, 1975, under which "they affirm that sovereign equality,
territorial integrity and political independence of all States are
fundamental principles which both countries scrupulously
respect; and that "they confirm that mutual respect for the dignity of
each nation shall characterize their friendship as well as the alliance
between their two countries."
The majority opinion negates the statement on the delineation of
the powers, duties and responsibilities of both the Philippine and
American Base Commanders that "in the performance of their
duties, the Philippine Base Commander and the American Base
Commander shall be guided by full respect for Philippine
sovereignty on the one hand and the assurance of unhampered U.S.
military operations on the other hand;" and that "they shall promote
cooperation, understanding and harmonious relations within the
Base and with the general public in the proximate vicinity thereof"
(par. 2 & par. 3 of the Annex covered by the exchange of notes,
January 7, 1979, between Ambassador Richard W. Murphy and
Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, italics supplied).
||| (US v. V.M. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-35645, [May 22, 1985], 221 PHIL
179-191)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-30671. November 28, 1973.]
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO
P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL-
SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON
CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA,
THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of
Cebu, P.J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO
UNCHUAN, and INTERNATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
Solicitor General Felix V . Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo
P. Pardo for petitioner.
Andres T . Velarde & Marcelo B. Fernan for respondents.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent
Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch I, 1 declaring a decision final and executory and of an
alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance thereof,
the alleged ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least,
grave abuse of discretion. As thus simply and tersely put, with the
facts being undisputed and the principle of law that calls for
application indisputable, the outcome is predictable.
The Republic of the Philippines is entitled to the writs prayed for.
Respondent Judge ought not to have acted thus. The order thus
impugned and the alias writ of execution must be nullified.
In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7,
1969, a summary of facts was set forth thus: "7. On July 3, 1961, a
decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of
respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and
International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner
herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of
P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. 8. On June 24, 1969,
respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order
declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and
executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as
well as] Manila to execute the said decision. 9. Pursuant to the said
Order dated June 24, 1969, the corresponding Alias Writ of
Execution [was issued] dated June 26, 1969, . . . 10. On the strength
of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969,
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of
garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks, specially on
the `monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of
deposits, sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ
of Execution'; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same
notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969 . . . 11. The funds of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks,
particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine
National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated
and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and
allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance
and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per
Certification dated July 3, 1969 by the AFP Comptroller, . . ." 2 The
paragraph immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged:
"12. Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in
excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of
execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of
garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void." 3 In the
answer filed by respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde and
Marcelo B. Fernan, the facts set forth were admitted with the only
qualification being that the total award was in the amount of
P2,372,331.40. 4
The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did
right in filing this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was
done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of
the Constitution.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its
government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is
readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation
of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right
depends." 5 Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not
dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision, Providence
Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 6 with its
affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-
suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that
may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency
and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are
far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the
availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well
known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the
least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend
against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that
constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined." 7
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now
made explicit in the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided:
"The State may not be sued without its consent." 8 A corollary, both
dictated by logic and sound sense from such a basic concept is that
public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even
if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state
liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public
Highways v. San Diego, 9 such a well-settled doctrine was restated
in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule that where
the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant's action `only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and
that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not be seized under
writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is
based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects,
as appropriated by law." 10 Such a principle applies even to an
attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an
employee. Director of Commerce and Industry v.
Concepcion, 11 speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm asponente left
no doubt on that score. Thus: "A rule, which has never been
seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers,
although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the
creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One
reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be
sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the
Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to
permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that
moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands
of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter,
although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific
portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the
foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it." 12
In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why
the Republic of the Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate
grievance.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted,
nullifying and setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring
executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of
execution issued thereunder. The preliminary injunction issued by
this Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made permanent.
||| (Republic v. Villasor, G.R. No. L-30671, [November 28, 1973], 153
PHIL 356-362)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-33112. June 15, 1978.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. HO
N. JUDGE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court
of First Instance, Branch III, La Union, AGOO
TOBACCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO
ADMINISTRATION, and PANFILO P. JIMENEZ,
Deputy Sheriff, La Union, respondents.
Conrado E. Medina, Edgardo M. Magtalas & Walfrido
Climaco for petitioner.
Felimon A. Aspirin for respondent Agoo Tobacco
Planters Association, Inc.
Virgilio C. Abejo for respondent Phil. Virginia Tobacco
Administration.
SYNOPSIS
Judgment was rendered against respondent Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration. A writ of execution, followed thereafter by
a notice of garnishment of funds for the full amount mentioned in
the writ, was issued by respondent judge.
Petitioner Philippine National Bank, with whose La Union Branch the
funds to be garnished are deposited, objected and raised the
doctrine of non-suablity of the state, alleging that such funds are
public in character. Failing to have the order set aside, petitioner
instituted this present action.
The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner Bank could not legally set
forth as a bar to a notice of garnishment the doctrine of non-
suability for the reason that respondentPhilippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration is a public corporation whose funds could properly
be made the object of a notice of garnishment.
Petition dismissed.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM
SUIT; A GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATION
HAS DISTINCT PERSONALITY OF ITS OWN; FUNDS OF THE
CORPORATE ENTITY MAY BE PROCEEDED AGAINST. — The doctrine
of non-suability cannot be legally set forth as a bar or impediment
to a notice of garnishment. In National Shipyard and Steel
Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, 118 Phil. 782 (1963), it
was explicitly stated: "That allegation to the effect that the funds of
the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and that, as such
the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is
untenable for, as a government owned and controlled corporation,
the NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from
that of the Government. It has — pursuant to Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 . . ., pursuant to which the
NASSCO has been established — "all the powers of a corporation
under the Corporation Law . . . " Accordingly, it may sue and be sued
and may be subjected to court processes just like any other
corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459, as amended.)"
2. ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — When the government enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be
treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular
business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government
divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render
the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private
corporations. (Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel
Company, 73 Phil. 374)
DECISION
FERNANDO, Acting C.J p:
The reliance of petitioner Philippine National Bank in this certiorari
and prohibition proceeding against respondent Judge
Javier Pabalan who issued a writ of execution, 1followed thereafter
by a notice of garnishment of the funds
respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, 2 deposited
with it, is on the fundamental constitutional law doctrine of non-
suability of a state, it being alleged that such funds are public in
character. This is not the first time petitioner raised that issue. It did
so before in PhilippineNational Bank vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 3 decided only last January. It did not meet with success,
this Court ruling in accordance with the two previous cases
of NationalShipyard and Steel Corporation 4 and Manila Hotel
Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, 5 that funds of
public corporations which can sue and be sued were not exempt
from garnishment. As respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration is likewise a public corporation possessed of the
same attributes, 6 a similar outcome is indicated. This petition must
be dismissed. prLL
It is undisputed that the judgment against
respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration had reached
the stage of finality. A writ of execution was, therefore, in order. It
was accordingly issued on December 17, 1970 7 There was a notice
of garnishment for the full amount mentioned in such writ of
execution in the sum of P12,724.66. 8 In view of the objection,
however, by petitioner Philippine National Bank on the above
ground, coupled with an inquiry as to whether or not
respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration had funds
deposited with petitioner's La Union branch, it was not until January
25, 1971 that the order sought to be set aside in this certiorari
proceeding was issued by respondent Judge. 9 Its dispositive portion
reads as follows: "Conformably with the foregoing, it is now
ordered, in accordance with law, that sufficient funds of
thePhilippine Virginia Tobacco Administration now deposited with
the Philippine National Bank, La Union Branch, shall be garnished
and delivered to the plaintiff immediately to satisfy the Writ of
Execution for one-half of the amount awarded in the decision of
November 16, 1970." 10 Hence this certiorari and prohibition
proceeding.
As noted at the outset, petitioner Philippine National Bank would
invoke the doctrine of non-suability. It is to be admitted that under
the present Constitution, what was formerly implicit as a
fundamental doctrine in constitutional law has been set forth in
express terms: "The State may not be sued without its
consent." 11 If the funds appertained to one of the regular
departments or offices in the government, then, certainly, such a
provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not the case here.
Garnishment would lie. Only last January, as noted in the opening
of
paragraph of this decision, this Court, in a case brought by the same
petitioner precisely invoking such a doctrine, left no doubt that the
funds of public corporations could properly be made the object of a
notice of garnishment. Accordingly, this petition must fail.
1. The alleged grave abuse of discretion, the basis of this certiorari
proceeding, was sought to be justified on the failure of respondent
Judge to set aside the notice of garnishment of funds belonging to
respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration. This excerpt
from the aforecited decision of Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Industrial Relations makes manifest why such an argument is far
from persuasive: "The premise that the funds could be spoken of as
public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned
entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt from
garnishment. NationalShipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of
Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in
the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: 'The
allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public
funds of the government, and that, as such, the same may not be
garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a
government-owned and controlled corporation, the NASSCO has a
personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the
Government. It has — pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No.
356, dated October 23, 1950 . . ., pursuant to which the NASSCO has
been established — "all the powers of a corporation under the
Corporation Law . . . ." Accordingly, it may be sue and be sued and
may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation
(Section 13, Act No. 1459, as amended.)' . . . To repeat, the ruling
was the appropriate remedy for the prevailing party which could
proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even if owned or
controlled by the government." 12
2. The National Shipyard and Steel Corporation decision was not the
first of its kind. The ruling therein could be inferred from the
judgment announced in Manila Hotel Employees Association v.
Manila Hotel Company, decided as far back as 1941. 13 In the
language of its ponente, Justice Ozaeta: "On the other hard, it is
well-settled that when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like
any other corporation. (Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank,
9 Wheat. 904, 6 L. ed. 244). By engaging in a particular business thru
the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests
itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the
corporation subject to the rules of law governing private
corporations." 14 It is worth mentioning that Justice Ozaeta could
find support for such a pronouncement from the leading American
Supreme Court case of United States v. Planters' Bank, 15 with the
opinion coming from the illustrious Chief Justice Marshall. It was
handed down more than one hundred fifty years ago, 1824 to be
exact. It is apparent, therefore, that petitioner Bank could not
legally set forth as a bar or impediment to a notice of garnishment
the doctrine of non-suability.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed.
No costs.
||| (Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan, G.R. No. L-33112, [June 15,
1978], 173 PHIL 25-30)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-15751. January 28, 1961.]
BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and
MARIANO
LEDESMA, petitioners, vs. THE BUREAU OF PRIN
TING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU),
PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA,
PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO
TOLERAN, respondents.
Solicitor General for petitioner.
Eulogio Lerum for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. JURISDICTION;
FUNCTIONS OF BUREAU OF PRINTING NOT EXCLUSIVELY
PROPRIETARY IN NATURE; COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
BROUGHT AGAINST THE BUREAU. — The Bureau of Printing is
primarily a service bureau and is not engaged in business or
occupation for pecuniary benefit. Although it receives outside
jobs and many of its employees are paid for overtime work on
regular working days and on holidays, these facts do not justify
the conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in
nature." Hence, the Court of Industrial Relations is without
jurisdiction to hear and determine complaints for unfair labor
practice filed against the Bureau of Printing.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; SUITS AGAINST THE
STATE; BUREAU OF PRINTING NOT SUBJECT TO SUIT WITHOUT
ITS CONSENT. — As an office of the Government, without any
corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot
be sued without its consent, much less over its objection.
(Angat River Irrigation System, et. al. vs. Angat River Workers'
Union, et. al., 102 Phil., 789.)
DECISION
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction to annul certain orders of the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations and to restrain it from further
proceeding in the action for unfair labor practice pending
before it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Giving due course
to the petition, this Court ordered the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for without bond.
The action in question was — upon complaint of the
respondent Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU),
Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and
Teodulo Toleran — filed by an acting prosecutor of the
Industrial Court against herein petitioners Bureau of Printing,
Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the
Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma, the
Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that
Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in
unfair labor practice by interfering with, or coercing the
employees of the Bureau of Printing, particularly the
members of the complaining association, in the exercise of their
right to self-organization and discriminating in regard to hire
and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them
from pursuing their union activities.
Answering the complaint, the
petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano
Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed
to them and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among
other things, that respondents Pacifico Advincula, Roberto
Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were
suspended pending result of an administrative investigation
against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations;
that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue
and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial
concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the
Republic performing governmental functions. For relief, they
prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Thereafter, before the case could be heard, petitioners filed an
"Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the
question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for
suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the
determination of such jurisdictional question. The motion was
granted, but after hearing, the trial judge of the Industrial Court
in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the
jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the
functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary
in nature," and, consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal.
Reconsideration ofthis order having been also denied by the
court en banc, the petitioners brought the case to this court
through the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government
created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As
such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the
direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and
binding, including work incidental to those processes, required
by the National Government and such other work of the same
character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the
(Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to
undertake . . .." (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no
corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in
the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet
the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a
service bureau and is obviously, not engaged in business or
occupation for pecuniary profit.
It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that
the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that many of its
employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days
and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion
that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature."
Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the
interest of the service so requires (sec. 566, Rev. Adm. Code).
As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime
compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary
with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current
appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that
the functions of said Bureauare wholly proprietary in character.
Anent the additional work it executes for private persons, we
find that such work is done upon request, as distinguished from
those solicited, and only "as the requirements of Government
work will permit" (sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and "upon terms
fixed by the Director of Printing, with the approval ofthe
Department Head" (sec. 1665, id.). As shown by the
uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners, most of these
works consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas
from government officials, and for printing of checks of private
banking institutions. On those greeting cards, the Government
seal, of which only the Bureau of Printing is authorized to use, is
embossed, and on the bank checks, only
the Bureau of Printing can print the reproduction of the official
documentary stamps appearing thereon. The volume of private
jobs done, in comparison with government jobs, is only one-
half of 1 per cent, and in computing the costs for work done for
private parties, the Bureau does not include profit, because it is
not allowed to make any. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is officials. Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus
allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be are authorized to institute and investigate administrative
pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. charges against erring subordinates. For the Industrial Court
The additional work it executes for private parties is merely now to take cognizance of the case filed before it, which is in
incidental to its function, and although such work may be effect a review of the acts of executive officials having to do
deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the with the discipline of government employees under them,
employees performing said proprietary function are separate would be to interfere with the discharge ofsuch functions by
and distinct from those employed in its general governmental said officials.
functions. WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is
From what has been stated, it is obvious that the granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the
Court of Industrial Relations did not acquire jurisdiction over complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is
the respondent Bureau of Printing, and is thus devoid ofany dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the
authority to take cognizance of the case. This Court has already respondent court.
held in a long line of decisions that the Industrial Court has no Bengzon, Bautista, Angelo, Labrador,
jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint for unfair Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
labor practice filed against institutions or corporations not Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.
organized for profit and, consequently, not an industrial or
business organization. This is so because the Industrial Peace ||| (Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Employees Association,
Act was intended to apply only to industrial employment, and G.R. No. L-15751, [January 28, 1961], 110 PHIL 952-958)
to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry
and occupations for purposes of gain, and their industrial
employees. (University of the Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, et al.,
G.R No. L-15416, April 28, 1960; University of Sto.
Tomas vs. Villanueva, et al., G.R No. L-13282, April 22, 1960; See
also the cases cited therein.)
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any
corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot
be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or
proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would
actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government
itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be
sued without its consent, much less over its objection. (See
Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz., 2835; Angat River Irrigation
System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union, et al., G.R. Nos. L-
10943-44, December 28, 1957).
The record also discloses that the instant case arose
from the filing of administrative charges against some
officers of the respondent Bureau of Printing Employees'
Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services. Said
administrative charges are for insubordination, grave
misconduct and acts prejudicial to public service committed by
inciting the employees of the Bureau of Printing to walk
out of their jobs against the order of the duly constituted
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23139. December 17, 1966.]
MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION,
INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. CUSTOMS
ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, defendants-appellees.
Alejandro Basin, Jr. & Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
Felipe T . Cuison for defendants-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTION. — A defendant in a
civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3) an
entity authorized by law to be sued.
2. ID.; ID.; BUREAU OF CUSTOMS OR CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE
NOT PERSONS: IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. — Neither the Bureau of
Customs (a fortiori) nor its function unit, the Customs Arrastre
Service, is a person. They are merely parts of the machinery of
Government. The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the
Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code); and the Customs
Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Customs, set up under
Customs Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962. It
follows that defendants herein cannot be sued under the first two
above-mentioned categories of natural or juridical persons.
3. ARRASTRE SERVICE; NATURE OF ARRASTRE SERVICE. — The
statutory provision on arrastre service is found in Section 1213
of Republic Act 1937 (Tariff and Customs Code, effective June 1,
1957). The statutory provisions authorizing the grant by contract to
any private party of the right to render said arrastre services
necessarily imply that the same is deemed by Congress to be
proprietary or non-governmental function.
4. ID.; PERFORMANCE BY NON-CORPORATE GOVERNMENT ENTITY
OF PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS DOES NOT MAKE IT SUABLE. — The
fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function
proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable.
If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its
governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign
immunity from suit extended to such government entity (Bureau of
Printing, et al., vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Association, et
al., G.R. No. L-15751, January 28, 1961).
5. ID.; ARRASTRE FUNCTION OF BUREAU OF CUSTOMS ALTHOUGH
PROPRIETARY IS NECESSARY INCIDENT TO ITS GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTION. — Although said arrastre function may be deemed
proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and
governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging
in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit.
For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function
without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity
granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary
means to that end.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; NATURE OF FUNCTIONS OF BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS; ARRASTRE SERVICE NECESSARY INCIDENT TO FUNCTIONS
OF BUREAU. — The Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of
Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with no personality of its own
apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from
imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees,
charges, fines, and penalties (Sec. 602,Republic Act No. 1937). To
this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For practical
reasons said revenues and customs duties cannot be assessed and
collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or
consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and
imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities
and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the
merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the
landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable
place in the customs premises to enable said customs officers to
make it, that is, it requires arrastre operations.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATE CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS
CONSENT. — Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the
State, for obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without
its consent. Plaintiff should have filed its present claim with the
General Auditing Office, it being for money, under the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 327, which state the conditions under
which money claims against the Government may be filed.
8. ID.; ID.; BUREAU OF CUSTOMS IMMUNE FROM SUIT. — The
Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national
government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to
express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime
governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute
to the contrary.
9. ID.; ID.; STATUTORY PROVISIONS WAIVING STATE IMMUNITY
FROM SUIT, HOW CONSTRUED. — Statutory provisions waiving
State immunity from suit are strictly construed and waiver of
immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly
inferred (49 Am. Jur., States, Territories and Dependencies, Sec. 96,
p. 314; Petty vs. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Com, 359 U.S. 275, 3 L.
Ed. 804, 79 S. Ct. 785).
DECISION
BENGZON, J.P., J p:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S.
"Leoville" sometime in November of 1962, consigned
to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment arrived
at the Port of Manila on April 10, 1963, and was discharged to the
custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of
Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs
Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three
cases only of the shipment. cdphil
On April 4, 1964 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre
Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the
undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages.
On April 20, 1964 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law,
defendants cannot be sued.
After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964,
dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs
Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable. Plaintiff
appealed to Us from the order of dismissal.
Raised, therefore, in this appeal is the purely legal question of the
defendants' suability under the facts stated.
Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune
from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the
arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary
functions and as such can be sued by private individuals.
The Rules of Court, in Section 1, Rule 3, provide:
"SECTION 1. Who may be parties. — Only
natural or juridical persons or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action."
Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person;
(2) a juridical person or (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued.
Neither the Bureau of Customs nor (a fortiori) its function unit, the
Customs Arrastre Service, is a person. They are merely parts of the
machinery of Government. The Bureau of Customs is a bureau
under the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Revised Administrative
Code); and as stated, the Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the
Bureau of Customs, set up under Customs Administrative Order No.
8-62 of November 9, 1962 (Annex "A" to Motion to Dismiss, pp. 13-
15, Record on Appeal). It follows that the defendants herein cannot
be sued under the first two above-mentioned categories of natural
or juridical persons.
Nonetheless it is urged that by authorizing the Bureau of Customs to
engage in arrastre service, the law thereby impliedly authorizes it to
be sued as arrastre operator, for the reason that the nature of this
function (arrastre service) is proprietary, not governmental. Thus,
insofar as arrastre operation is concerned, appellant would put
defendants under the third category of "entities authorized by law"
to be sued. Stated differently, it is argued that while there is no law
expressly authorizing the Bureau of Customs to sue or be sued, still
its capacity to be sued is implied from its very power to render
arrastre service at the Port of Manila, which, it is alleged, amounts
to the transaction of a private business.
The statutory provision on arrastre service is found in Section 1213
of Republic Act No. 1937 (Tariff and Customs Code, effective June 1,
1957), and it states:
"SECTION 1213. Receiving, Handling, Custody
and Delivery of Articles. — The Bureau of
Customs shall have exclusive supervision and
control over the receiving, handling, custody
and delivery of articles on the wharves and piers
at all ports of entry and in the exercise of its
functions it is hereby authorized to acquire, take
over, operate and superintend such plants and
facilities as may be necessary for the receiving,
handling, custody and delivery of articles, and
the convenience and comfort of passengers and
the handling of baggage, as well as to acquire
fire protection equipment for use in the
piers: Provided, That whenever in his judgment
the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of
articles can be carried on by private parties with
greater efficiency, the Commissioner may, after
public bidding and subject to the approval of the
department head, contract with any private
party for the service of receiving, handling,
custody and delivery of articles, and in such
event, the contract may include the sale or lease
of government-owned equipment and facilities
used in such service."
In Associated Workers Union, et al., vs. Bureau of Customs, et al., L-
21397, resolution of August 6, 1963, this Court indeed held "that the
foregoing statutory provisions authorizing the grant by contract to
any private party of the right to render said arrastre services
necessarily imply that the same is deemed by Congress to be
proprietary or non-governmental function." The issue in said case,
however, was whether laborers engaged in arrastre service fall
under the concept of employees in the Governmentemployed in
governmental functions for purposes of the prohibition in Section
11, Republic Act 875 to the effect that "employees in the
Government . . . shall not strike," but "may belong to any labor
organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to
join in strike" which prohibition "shall apply only to employees
employed in governmental functions of the Government. . . ."
Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial Relations
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but not that the
Bureau of Customs can be sued. Said issue of suability was not
resolved, the resolution stating only that "the issue on the
personality or lack of personality of the Bureau of Customs to be
sued does not affect the jurisdiction of the lower court over the
subject matter of the case, aside from the fact that amendment may
be made in the pleadings by the inclusion as respondents of the
public officers deemed responsible for the unfair labor practice acts
charged by petitioning Unions".
Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a
function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being
suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an
incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of
the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government
entity. This is the doctrine recognized in Bureau of Printing et al., vs.
Bureau of Printing Employees Association, et al., L-15751, January
25, 1961:
"The Bureau of Printing is an office of the
Government created by the Administrative
Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such
instrumentality of the Government, it operates
under the direct supervision of the Executive
Secretary, Office of the President, and is
'charged with the execution of all printing and
binding, including work incidental to those
processes, required by the National Government
and such other work of the same character as
said Bureau may, by law or by order of the
(Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be
authorized to undertake. . . .' (Sec. 1644, Rev.
Adm. Code). It has no corporate existence, and
its appropriations are provided for in the
General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet
the printing needs of the Government, it is
primarily a service bureau and, obviously, not
engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary
profit.
xxx xxx xxx
". . . Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is
allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it
cannot be pretended that it is thereby an
industrial or business concern. The additional
work it executes for private parties is merely
incidental to its function, and although such
work may be deemed proprietary in character,
there is no showing that the employees
performing said proprietary function are
separate and distinct from those employed in its
general governmental functions.
xxx xxx xxx
"Indeed, as an office of the Government,
without any corporate or judicial personality,
the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1,
Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit, action or
proceeding against it, if it were to produce any
effect, would actually be a suit, action or
proceeding against the Government itself, and
the rule is settled that the Government cannot
be sued without its consent much less over its
objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz.,
2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al., vs.
Angat River Workers Union, et al., G.R. Nos. L-
10943-44, December 28, 1957.)"
The situation here is not materially different. The Bureau of
Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81,
Rev. Adm. Code), with no personality of its own apart from that of
the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that
of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles
and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and
penalties (Sec. 602, R. A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a
necessary incident. For practical reasons said revenues and customs
duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the
importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise
being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law.
Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration
tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up
requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side
to a suitable place in the customs premises to enable said customs
officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operation. 1
Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed
proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and
governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging
in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit.
For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function
without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity,
granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary
means to that end. liblex
And herein lies the distinction between the present case and that of
National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, 91 Phil., 203, on which
appellant would rely. For there, the Civil Aeronautics Administration
was found to have for its prime reason for existence not a
governmental but a proprietary function, so that to it the latter was
not a mere incidental function:
"Among the general powers of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration are, under Section 3,
to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase
property, and to grant concession rights, and
under Section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties
on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline,
accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use
of any property under its management.
"These provisions confer upon the Civil
Aeronautics Administration, in our opinion, the
power to sue and be sued. The power to sue
and be sued is implied from the power to
transact private business . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes
under the category of a private entity. Although
not a body corporate it was created, like the
National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a
necessary function of government, but to run
what is essentially a business, even if revenue
be not its prime objectives but rather the
promotion of travel and the convenience of the
traveling public . . ."
Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for
obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its
consent. Plaintiff should have filed its present claim with the
General Auditing Office, it being for money, under the provisions
of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which
money claims against the Government may be filed.
It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State
immunity from suit are strictly construed and that waiver of
immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly
inferred. (49 Am. Jur., States, Territories and Dependencies, Sec. 96,
p. 314; Petty vs. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Com., 359 U.S. 275, 3 L.
Ed. 804, 79 S. Ct. 785.) From the provision authorizing the Bureau of
Customs to lease arrastre operations to private parties, We see no
authority to sue the said Bureau in the instances where it
undertakes to conduct said operation itself. The Bureau of Customs,
acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the
operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative
mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental
function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the
contrary. cda
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
||| (Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service,
G.R. No. L-23139, [December 17, 1966], 125 PHIL 270-279)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 52179. April 8, 1991.]
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA
UNION, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO
N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA,
LAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA
BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA ORJA BANIÑA
AND LYDIA R. BANIÑA, respondents.
Mauro C . Cabading, Jr. for petitioner.
Simeon G. Hipol for private respondent.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the nullification or
modification of the proceedings and the orders issued by the
respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme, in his capacity as the presiding
judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial
District, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union in Civil Case No. 107-BG,
entitled "Juana Rimando Baniña, et al. vs. Macario Nieveras, et al."
dated November 4, 1975; July 13, 1976; August 23, 1976; February
23, 1977; March 16, 1977; July 26, 1979; September 7, 1979;
November 7, 1979 and December 3, 1979 and the decision dated
October 10, 1979 ordering defendants Municipalityof San Fernando,
La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs
for funeral expenses, actual damages consisting of the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees and costs of suit
and dismissing the complaint against the Estate of Macario Nieveras
and Bernardo Balagot.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal
corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Romeo
N. Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge
of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La
Union. While private respondents Juana Rimando-Baniña, Laureano
Baniña, Jr., Sor Marietta Baniña, Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña and
Lydia R. Baniña are heirs of the deceased Laureano Baniña Sr. and
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107-Bg before the aforesaid court.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision
occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot
and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand
truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez
and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and
driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of
the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the
injuries they sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees
of physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a
complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and
Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger
jeepney, which was docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in the Court of
First Instance of La Union, Branch I, San Fernando, La Union.
However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint
against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of
petitioner. llcd
Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV,
presided over by respondent judge and was subsequently docketed
as Civil Case No. 107-Bg. By virtue of a court order dated May 7,
1975, the private respondents amended the complaint wherein the
petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded
for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and
raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-
suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the
negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the
proximate cause of the collision. cdll
In the course of the proceedings, the respondent judge issued the
following questioned orders, to wit:
(1) Order dated November 4, 1975 dismissing
the cross-claim against Bernardo Balagot;
(2) Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the
Amended Answer of the Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union and Bislig and setting the
hearing on the affirmative defenses only with
respect to the supposed lack of jurisdiction;
(3) Order dated August 23, 1976 deferring the
resolution of the grounds for the Motion to
Dismiss until the trial;
(4) Order dated February 23, 1977 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the order of July
13, 1976 filed by the Municipality and Bislig for
having been filed out of time;
(5) Order dated March 16, 1977 reiterating the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of July 13, 1976;
(6) Order dated July 26, 1979 declaring the case
deemed submitted for decision it appearing that
parties have not yet submitted their respective
memoranda despite the court's direction; and
(7) Order dated September 7, 1979 denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and or
order to recall prosecution witnesses for cross
examination.
On October 10, 1979 the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion is hereunder quoted as follows:
"IN VIEW OF ALL OF (sic) THE FOREGOING,
judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs,
and defendants Municipality of San Fernando,
La Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay
jointly and severally, plaintiffs Juana Rimando-
Baniña, Mrs. Priscilla B. Surell, Laureano Baniña,
Jr., Sor Marietta Baniña, Mrs. Fe B. Soriano,
Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia B.
Baniña the sums of P1,500.00 as funeral
expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost expected
earnings of the late Laureano Baniña Sr.,
P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,500.00 as
attorney's fees. Costs against said
defendants. cdasia
"The Complaint is dismissed as to defendants
Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo
Balagot.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 30)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial
without prejudice to another motion which was then pending.
However, respondent judge issued another order dated November
7, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of
September 7, 1979 for having been filed out of time.
Finally, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 3,
1979 providing that if defendants municipality and Bislig further
wish to pursue the matter disposed of in the order of July 26, 1979,
such should be elevated to a higher court in accordance with the
Rules of Court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
aforesaid orders and in rendering a decision. Furthermore,
petitioner asserts that while appeal of the decision may be available,
the same is not the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of
the petitioner and allege that the petition is devoid of merit, utterly
lacking the good faith which is indispensable in a petition for
certiorari and prohibition. (Rollo, p. 42.) In addition, the private
respondents stress that petitioner has not considered that every
court, including respondent court, has the inherent power to amend
and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable
to law and justice. (Rollo, p. 43.)
The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the
State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the resolution of
the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of
jurisdiction until trial. However, said respondent judge failed to
resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and thereafter
rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when in the exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve
the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of
the municipality. However, said judge acted in excess of his
jurisdiction when in his decision dated October 10, 1979 he held
the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular
employee. cdll
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for
in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may
not be sued without its consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not
be sued except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the
form of express or implied consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law.
The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money
claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No.
3083. A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the
government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v. Government
of the Philippine Islands(34 Phil 311). (see United States of
America v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA
644, 654.)
Consent is implied when the government enters into business
contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting
party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself
to a counterclaim. (Ibid)
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are
agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental
functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from
suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance
of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue
and be sued. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, p. 39)
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability.
"Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability
on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance
that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on
the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent
to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state
has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to
prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable." (United States of
America v. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660).
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the
torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of
the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in
behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio v.
Fontanilla (G.R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606),
the distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of
determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents
which result in an injury to third persons.
Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo v. Loy,
decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1916, thus:
"Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity,
and their functions are twofold. In one they
exercise the right springing from sovereignty,
and while in the performance of the duties
pertaining thereto, their acts are political and
governmental. Their officers and agents in such
capacity, though elected or appointed by them,
are nevertheless public functionaries performing
a public service, and as such they are officers,
agents, and servants of the state. In the other
capacity the municipalities exercise a private,
proprietary or corporate right, arising from their
existence as legal persons and not as public
agencies. Their officers and agents in the
performance of such functions act in behalf of
the municipalities in their corporate or
individual capacity, and not for the state or
sovereign power." (112 N.E., 994-995) (Ibid, pp.
605-606.)
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable
because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be
sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed
by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the
State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant
was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was
committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized
by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. (Cruz, supra, p. 44.)
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of
the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian
river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San
Fernando's municipal streets." (Rollo, p. 29.)
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the
performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m)
of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the
driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining
to his office. LexLib
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et al. v. Province of Ilocos
Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil
1186) that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the
truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are
admittedly governmental activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We
arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable
for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the
death of the passenger — tragic and deplorable though it may be
imposed on themunicipality no duty to pay monetary
compensation.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent
judge's dereliction in failing to resolve the issue of non-suability did
not amount to grave abuse of discretion. But said judge exceeded
his jurisdiction when it ruled on the issue of liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the
respondent court is hereby modified, absolving the
petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
||| (Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, G.R. No.
52179, [April 8, 1991], 273 PHIL 56-65)