Comendador v.

De Villa,
G.R. No. 93177, 95020, 96948, 97454, [August 2, 1991], 277 PHIL 93-123

FACTS:
The petitioners and the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d'etat that took
place on December 1 to 9, 1989. At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested
that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and
members of General Court Martial No. 14 invoking Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408, which
provides that “Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by the
accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court.”

However, on September 27, 1972, in line with the declaration of Martial Law, President
Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to
create military tribunals “to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as
may be referred to them.” On November 7, 1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the
Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to Military
Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge. On June 11, 1978, President
Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code, which was a compilation
and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended “to meet the continuing
threats to the existence, security and stability of the State.” The modified rule on challenges
under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree. Subsequently, on January 17, 1981, President
Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law
throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the
dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the
cases pending therein.

ISSUE:
WON P.D. 39 disallowing preemptory challenge, among others, was also revoked?

RULING:
The SC ruled that since P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and
the other general orders mentioned therein and with the termination of martial law and the
dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D.
No. 39 ceased automatically. The SC ruled that it is a basic canon of statutory construction that
when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.
This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.

Hence, according to the SC, applying these rules, it held that the withdrawal of the right
to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law
was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045. As a result, the old rule embodied
in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to
peremptory challenge. The SC did not agree with the respondents that the right to peremptory
challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree,
according to the High Court, was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January 17,
1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having
been cast out under the new dispensation act, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one
of the “iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.”
 Lamb v. Phipps,
G.R. No. 7806, [July 12, 1912], 22 PHIL 456-462
FACTS:
Petitioner was the superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony until he resigned on Dec.
31, 1911 due to ill health. Before his appointment to the said colony, he was assigned as
provincial treasurer for Marinduque, Mindoro and Laguna. After his resignation, he requested
the Auditor General, Respondent Phipps, for his clearance certificate to show that he has
accounted for all property and funds under his custody. Such certification is also necessary in
order that Lamb may be allowed to leave the Philippines without incurring criminal liability.
Respondent Phipps, although the records of the Auditor General show that Lamb indeed has
settled his accounts, refused to issue the certificate because of certain issues against Lamb.
Hence, a petition for mandamus was filed asking the SC to compel Phipps to issue the
certificate. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the case because, according to him, it is a
suit against the government and that he cannot be forced to issue the said certification.

ISSUE:
WON the SC may require the Respondent to issue Certification through Mandamus?

RULING:
The SC ruled that it cannot require the Auditor to issue certification through
Mandamus and that Petitioner failed to recourse to other adequate administrative remedies
as provided for by the law. According to the SC, as a general rule, it may be said that by the
phrase “another adequate remedy,” means if the remedy is specifically provided by law, it is
presumed to be adequate as against the claim of Petitioner. The SC said that it cannot
presume that a remedy expressly provided by the legislative department of the government
is not adequate. If, perchance, and in fact it is not adequate, it is the duty of the legislative
department and not of the judicial department to correct it.
Under the law the decision of the Auditor is final unless an appeal is taken within one
year. The Auditor is the chief or director of one of the executive branches of the government
and the appeal permitted is to the head of that branch of the government (first to the
Governor-General and second to the Secretary of War).
The right to appeal from the decision of an officer or court to which a particular matter
is specifically referred is purely statutory. Hence, if the legislative department of the
government by statute has not given the right of appeal, such right does not exist and such
omission by the Legislative to provide for such right to appeal means it does not afford to the
citizen such right, hence, in that regard, mandamus may lie. As clarified by the High Court,
the right to appeal is and always has been statutory, and does not exist in common law. It is
a remedy which the legislature may in its discretion grant or take away, and it may prescribe
in what cases, and under what circumstances, and from what courts, appeals may be taken;
and unless the statute expressly or by plain implication provides for an appeal from a
judgment of a court of inferior jurisdiction, none can be taken.
Under the law in cases like the present, the aggrieved party has the right to appeal. He
did not take advantage of that right, nor has he exhausted the ordinary remedy afforded him
by express law. In view of such failure to file an appeal, he is not entitled to this
extraordinary remedy until he has at least exhausted the ordinary remedies afforded him by
law because when a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the
executive department of the government, the courts will not interfere until at least that
remedy has been exhausted.
 The SC ruled that the administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted
before resort can be had to the courts, especially when the administrative remedies are, by
law, exclusive and final. Some matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely and
absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the executive department of the
government. When the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive
departments of the government to dispose of particular questions, their judgments or the
judgment of that particular department are no more reviewable by the courts than the final
judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be reviewed and modified by them.
 Fariñas v. Barba,
G.R. No. 116763, [April 19, 1996], 326 PHIL 416-429

FACTS:
This is a petition for quo warranto against Palafox, one of the respondents. Carlito B.
Domingo, was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, he is not a
member of any political party. On March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave to
the United States. To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, the Mayor-Respondent of San
Nicolas, Angelo M. Barba, recommended to the Petitioner-Governor of the province, Rodolfo
C. Fariñas, the appointment of respondent Edward Palafox.
Subsequently, a similar recommendation for the appointment of Edward Palafox was
made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor
Barba. The resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local Government
Code (R.A. No. 7160).
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the Local
Government Code, disapproved the resolution for the reason that the authority and power to
appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor, and therefore, the
Resolution should be addressed to the Provincial Governor and not to the Sanggunian.
Consequently, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment
of one of the Petitioners Al Nacino, as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas to
replace Carlito Domingo. On June 8, 1994, petitioner Governor appointed petitioner Nacino
and swore him in office that same day.
On the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox to
the same position on June 8, 1994. The next day, June 9, 1994, respondent Palafox took his
oath as member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Hence, this Petition for Quo Warranto filed by Fariñas and Nacino against Barba and
Palafox.

ISSUE:
WON Palafox was rightfully appointed by Mayor Barba?

RULING:
In view of the provisions of the LGC, reference was made by the SC to the different
provisions of the LGC such as Sections 50 and 63. The SC said that reference to these
provisions is appropriate not for the reason advanced by petitioners, i.e., that the power to
appoint implies the power to remove, but because implicit in these provisions is a policy of the
Legislature to vest in the President, the governor and the mayor in descending order the
exercise of an executive power whether to appoint in order to fill vacancies in local councils or
to suspend local officials. These provisions are in pari materia with Sec. 45.
The SC ruled that under the Local Government Code, where the Permanent Vacancy is
caused by a Sanggunian Member belonging to a Political Party, the rule is as follows:
A. Vacancies in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities and independent component cities, the appointing authority is the President,
through the Executive Secretary, upon the nomination and certification of the political party to
which the member who caused the vacancy belonged, as provided in Sec. 45(b)
B. Vacancies in Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities and Sangguniang Bayan —
The Governor upon the nomination and certification of the political party to which the
member who caused the vacancy belonged, as provided in Sec. 45(b).
 On the other hand, the SC declared that where the Vacancy is Caused by a Sanggunian
Member Not Belonging to a Political Party, the rule is as follows:
A. Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Panlungsod of highly urbanized and
independent component cites — The President, through the Executive Secretary, upon
recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod as the case
may be.
B. Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities and Sangguniang Bayan — The
Governor upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan as the
case may be.
And lastly, where the Vacancy is Caused by a Member of the Sangguniang Barangay —
City or Municipal Mayor upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Barangay.

The SC also said that there is no reason for supposing that those who drafted Sec. 45
intended to make the manner of filling vacancies in the Sanggunians, created by members who
do not belong to any political party, different from the manner of filling such vacancies when
created by members who belong to political party or parties. The provision for the first must
approximate the provision for the second situation. Any difference in procedure must be
limited to the fact that in the case of vacancies caused by those who have political affiliations
there is a party which can nominate a replacement while there is none in the case of those
who have no political affiliation. Accordingly, where there is no political party to make a
nomination, the Sanggunian, where the vacancy occurs, must be considered the appropriate
authority for making the recommendation, by analogy to vacancies created in the Sangguniang
Barangay whose members are by law prohibited from having any party affiliation.

Also, the SC ruled that, although, the appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone
recommended to him by the Sanggunian concerned because the power of appointment is a
discretionary power. However, neither is the appointing power vested with so large a
discretion that he can disregard the recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned. Since the
recommendation takes the place of nomination by political party, the recommendation must
likewise be considered a condition sine qua non for the validity of the appointment, by analogy
to the provision of Sec. 45(b).

Hence, as a conclusion, the SC ruled that since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor
respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding
discussion, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
which was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino was
appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of
San Nicolas. On the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the
Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him.
 Malonzo v. Zamora,
G.R. No. 137718, [July 27, 1999], 370 PHIL 240-278

FACTS:
In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Caloocan City authorized, through an
ordinance, the Mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 26 of the
Maysilo Estate registered in the name of CLT Realty Development Corporation. The ordinance
appropriated P35,997,975.00 to represent 15% of the fair market value of the property sought
to be expropriated. Because of a territorial dispute between Caloocan City and the
Municipality of Malabon, CLT Realty filed an action for interpleader praying for an order for
the two local government units to litigate their conflicting claims over the right to collect real
estate taxes from them.
In 1997, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, under the stewardship of incumbent Mayor
Malonzo, enacted an ordinance increasing the appropriated amount for the subject property
supposed to be expropriated. However, after failing to conclude the voluntary sale, a suit of
eminent domain was filed by the city government. In the meantime, the Vice Mayor requested
for the renovation of the councilors’ office and salaries for the city government personnel. The
City Treasurer issued a certification on the availability of funds. The City Council, acting
favorably on Mayor Malonzo’s endorsement, appropriated the amount of P39,343,028.00 and
passed Ordinance No. 0254, S1998. Such ordinance was passed based on the previous rule of
procedure of the Sanggunian. A certain Eduardo Tibor filed an administrative complaint
against petitioners before the Office of the President (OP) due to the passage of the said
ordinance. The OP rendered the assailed judgment meting upon them the penalty of
suspension for a period of three months, which is immediately executory upon the receipt of
the decision. Without moving for reconsideration, petitioners filed before the Supreme Court
the instant Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the passing of the ordinance violated provisions of the LGC?

RULING:
According to the Supreme Court, there was no violation of Sections 50 and 52 of the Local
Government Code requiring that on the first regular session following the election of its
members and within 90 days thereafter, the Sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its
existing rules of procedure. The minutes of the session held on July 2, 1998 would reveal that
the matter of adoption or updating of the house rules was taken up and that the council
arrived at a decision to create an ad hoc committee to study the rules. Moreover, even if the
Sanggunian failed to approve the new rules of procedure for the ensuing year, the rules which
were applied in the previous year shall be deemed in force and effect until new ones are
adopted.

The SC said that all that the law requires is that “on the first regular session . . .
the sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules or procedure.” There is
nothing in the language thereof that restricts the matters to be taken up during the first
regular session merely to the adoption or updating of the house rules. If it were the intent of
Congress to limit the business of the local council to such matters, then it would have done so
in clear and unequivocal terms. But as it is, there is no such intent. Moreover, adoption or
updating of house rules would necessarily entail work beyond the day of the first regular
session. In fact, it took the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City until July
23, 1998 to complete the task of adopting their house rules.
The SC said that this would mean that prior thereto, the local council’s hands were tied
and could not act on any other matter, including passing its own budget for the project.
According to the SC, that would certainly be absurd for it would result in a hiatus and a
paralysis in the local legislature's work which could not have been intended by the law.
The SC said that the maxim, Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper frienda est, ut
evitatur inconveniens et absurdum is applicable, which means that “where there is ambiguity,
such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.” The SC
believes that there has been sufficient compliance with the Code.
 Paras v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 123169 (Resolution), [November 4, 1996], 332 PHIL 56-67

FACTS:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City
who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong
Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall,
public respondent COMELEC resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing
on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the
registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law.
The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition.
On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16,
1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF,
with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing,
the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and
his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the
barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval.
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the
recall election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer
for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and
required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the
petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion
adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required
comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply.
Petitioner’s cited Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which states that “no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the
date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election,” petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred
as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first
Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter.

ISSUE:
WON the recall is barred by the SK election?

RULING:
The SC ruled that it is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to
recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph
(a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall
election, that is, during the second year of his term of office.
Thus, according the SC, subscribing to petitioner’s interpretation of the phrase regular
local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the
Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the
people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be
held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase
"regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be
conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have
done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be
avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be

interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the
Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the
Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to “enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum.”

Moreover, petitioner’s too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we
cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition “We admonish
against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose
and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in 'the letter that
killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth'

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute,
as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent. Finally, recall election is
potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating
additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year
immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of
the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate
could choose the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure
in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in
keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as
one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be
recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.

Nevertheless, according to the SC, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the
limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election
involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having
been scheduled on May 1997.
 Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 94723, [August 21, 1997], 343 PHIL 539-560

FACTS:
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12
years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg detained Karen for four days and
raped her several times. After policemen and people living nearby rescued Karen, Greg was
arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail.
A case for Serious Illegal Detention and four counts of rape charges were filed against
Greg Bartelli. A Civil Case for damages with preliminary attachment was also filed against him.
On the scheduled day of hearing for Bartelli’s petition for bail the latter escaped from jail,
thereby causing all criminal cases filed against him to be archived pending his arrest.
Meanwhile, the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment was granted for the
petitioners and the writ was issued. However, China Banking Corporation failed to honor
Notice of Garnishment served by the Deputy Sheriff of Makati. China Banking Corporation
invoked Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits
of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever.
Also, the trial court granted petitioner’s motion for leave to serve summons by
publication in the civil case. Summons was published. Bartelli failed to file his answer to the
complaint and was declared in default. After hearing ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in
favor of petitioner.
Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was
published in the Manila Bulletin. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last
publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the trial court had become final,
petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli’s dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation.
Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular No. 960. Thus, petitioners
seek relief from the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
WON the foreign currency deposit of a foreign transient is exempt from the execution?

RULING:
According to the Supreme Court, petitioner deserved the damages awarded to her by
the court. Disregarding the provision of the law, the SC said that the application of the law
depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if the Court rule that the questioned Section
113 of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempt from attachment, garnishment, or an
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Bartelli. This interpretation, according to SC, would
negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code, which provides that “in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right
and justice to prevail.” Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro."
Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental
solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.

It would be unthinkable, according to the SC, that the questioned Section 113 of Central
Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so
doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent. The SC, in its final discussion said
“Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso?
Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank
Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a
transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation
calls for fairness against legal tyranny. We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the
belief that we have served the ends of justice.”

The SC ruled that the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this
case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY
with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, “Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg
Bartelli y Northcott,” by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar
deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
 Santos, Jr. v. PNOC Exploration Corp. ,
G.R. No. 170943, [September 23, 2008], 587 PHIL 713-724

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals
under rule 45.
On December 23, 2002, respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint
for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, sought to collect the amount of P698,502.10 representing petitioner’s unpaid balance
of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of
directors.
Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in
his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondent's
motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent caused the
publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication of the
advertising manager of Remate and an affidavit of service of respondent’s employee to the
effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioner's last known
address. When petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period, respondent
moved that the case be set for the reception of its evidence ex parte. The trial court granted
the motion in an order dated September 11, 2003. Respondent proceeded with the ex
parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence. Thereafter, the case was deemed
submitted for decision on October 15, 2003.
On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an “Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to
Admit Attached Answer.” He sought reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order,
alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section
19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed
that he was denied due process as he was not notified of the September 11, 2003 order. He
prayed that respondent’s evidence ex parte be stricken off the records and that his answer
be admitted. In an order dated February 6, 2004, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order. It held that the rules did not require
the affidavit of complementary service by registered mail to be executed by the clerk of
court. It also ruled that due process was observed as a copy of the September 11, 2003 order
was actually mailed to petitioner at his last known address. It also denied the motion to
admit petitioner's answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner’s right to due process was violated?

RULING:
The SC ruled that since petitioner could not be personally served with summons
despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave
of court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication. Service of
summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal
clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which published
the summons.
The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons
by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address. This complementary service is
evidenced by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail
to his last known address.
The rules, according to the SC, do not require that the affidavit of complementary
service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of
copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by
registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication. Moreover,
even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the
action against him. In this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Petitioner
voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the “Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and to Admit Attached Answer.”
As is readily apparent, the September 11, 2003 order did not limit itself to permitting
respondent to present its evidence ex parte but in effect issued an order of default. But the
trial court could not validly do that as an order of default can be made only upon motion of
the claiming party. Since no motion to declare petitioner in default was filed, no default
order should have been issued. To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion, if a party
declared in default is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, all the more should a
party who has not been declared in default be entitled to such notice.
But what happens if the residence or whereabouts of the defending party is not known
or he cannot be located? In such a case, there is obviously no way notice can be sent to him
and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not require that the
impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no one to perform an
impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with
logic, common sense, reason and practicality.
Hence, even if petitioner was not validly declared in default, he could not reasonably
demand that copies of orders and processes be furnished him. Be that as it may, a copy of
the September 11, 2003 order was nonetheless still mailed to petitioner at his last known
address but it was unclaimed.
 In re: Satillon v. Miranda,
G.R. No. L-19281, [June 30, 1965], 121 PHIL 1351-1357

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying
the respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate estate of Pedro
Santillon.
On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his
residence, leaving one son Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage,
Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province. About four years after his
death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said
petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda
and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the
petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her
exclusive properties; On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a “Motion to Declare Share of Heirs” and
to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the
estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from
the conjugal properties as the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be
divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand,
claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil
Code, to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's
inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.

ISSUE:
WON the provision on intestate succession is the same with testamentary succession in
dividing the shares of the heirs as regards a child and the widow?

RULING:
The SC ruled that in the New Civil Code’s chapter in legal or intestate succession, the
only article applicable in this case is Art. 996, hence, when the widow survives with only
one legitimate child, they share the estate in equal parts. Article 996 provides, “If a widow
or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the
succession the same share as that of each of the children.”
According to the SC, the theory of those holding otherwise, seems to be premised on
these propositions: (a) Art. 996 speaks of “children,” therefore it does not apply when
there is only one “child;” consequently Art. 892 should be applied, thru a process of judicial
construction and analogy, which provides that, “If only one legitimate child or descendant
of the deceased survives, the widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the
hereditary estate. In case of a legal separation, the surviving spouse may inherit if it was
the deceased who had given cause for the same;” (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because
whereas in testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would
get 1/2 in intestate.
However, the SC clarified that it is a maxim of statutory construction that words in
plural include the singular. So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied): “if the
widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share
as that of the child.” Indeed, according to the SC, to refuse to apply the article to this case
on the ground that “child” is not included in “children,” the consequences would be
tremendous. The inconsistency is clear, because the only legitimate child gets one-
half under Art. 888, which speaks of “children,” not “child.” So if “children” in Art. 888
includes “child,” the same meaning should be given to Art. 996.
Such position, more clearly stated is this: In testate succession, where there is only
one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-fourth.
But in intestate, if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or
widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.
On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or
widower “gets only one-fourth.” She or he may get one-half — if the testator so wishes. So,
the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament) whether his or
her only child shall get more than his or her survivor.
The SC said that their conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the
circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was
taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow
or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the
widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for
the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one
general rule applicable to both situations. According to the SC, it is the clear mandate of the
statute, which they are bound to enforce. The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in
this instance.
 DENR v. United Planners Consultants, Inc.,
G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015

FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision od CA, which dismissed
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner.
On July 26, 1993, petitioner, through the Land Management Bureau, entered into an
Agreement for Consultancy Services (Consultancy Agreement) with respondent United
Planners Consultants, Inc. (respondent) in connection with the LMB's Land Resource
Management Master Plan Project (LRMMP). Under the Consultancy Agreement, petitioner
committed to pay a total contract price of P4,337,141.00, based on a predetermined
percentage corresponding to the particular stage of work accomplished. In December 1994,
respondent completed the work required, which petitioner formally accepted on December
27, 1994. However, petitioner was able to pay only 47% of the total contract price in the
amount of P2,038,456.30. On October 25, 1994, the Commission on Audit (COA) released the
Technical Services Office Report (TSO) finding the contract price of the Agreement to be
84.14% excessive. This notwithstanding, petitioner, in a letter dated December 10, 1998,
acknowledged its liability to respondent in the amount of P2,239,479.60 and assured payment
at the soonest possible time. For failure to pay its obligation under the Consultancy Agreement
despite repeated demands, respondent instituted a Complaint against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Upon motion of respondent, the case was subsequently
referred to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the Consultancy Agreement.
During the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to adopt the CIAC Revised Rules
Governing Construction Arbitration (CIAC Rules) to govern the arbitration proceedings.
The Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Award dated May 7, 2010 (Arbitral Award) in favor of
respondent, directing petitioner to pay the latter the amount of(a) P2,285,089.89 representing
the unpaid progress billings, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of
finality of the Arbitral Award upon confirmation by the RTC until fully paid. The RTC confirmed
the Arbitral Award pursuant to Rule 11.2 (A) 36 of the Special ADR Rules and ordered
petitioner to pay respondent the costs of confirming the award, as prayed for, in the total
amount of P50,000.00. From this order, petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration.
Thus, on June 15, 2011, respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution,
Petitioner moved to quash the writ of execution, positing that respondent was not entitled to
its monetary claims. It also claimed that the issuance of said writ was premature since the RTC
should have first resolved its May 19, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration and June 1, 2010
Manifestation and Motion, and not merely noted them, thereby violating its right to due
process. Petitioner contends that since the ADR rules does not provide for the rule on
execution, hence, it should be covered by the ordinary rules.

ISSUE:
WON the writ of execution is a necessary implication of the rules?

RULING:
The SC ruled that execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the
law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing
party.
While it appears that the Special ADR Rules remain silent on the procedure for the
execution of a confirmed arbitral award, it is the Court’s considered view that the Rules’
procedural mechanisms cover not only aspects of confirmation but necessarily extend to a
confirmed award’s execution in light of the doctrine of necessary implication which states that
every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power,
right or privilege.
According to the SC, no statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved
in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is
thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to
provide for the unfolding of events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law
is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of
necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part
thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all
such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make
effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral
and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex
necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include
all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser,
expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.
As the Court sees it, execution is but a necessary incident to the Court's confirmation of
an arbitral award. To construe it otherwise would result in an absurd situation whereby the
confirming court previously applying the Special ADR Rules in its confirmation of the arbitral
award would later shift to the regular Rules of Procedure come execution. Irrefragably, a
court’s power to confirm a judgment award under the Special ADR Rules should be deemed to
include the power to order its execution for such is but a collateral and subsidiary
consequence that may be fairly and logically inferred from the statutory grant to regional trial
courts of the power to confirm domestic arbitral awards.
All the more is such interpretation warranted under the principle of ratio legis est
anima which provides that a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is
within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within
the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Accordingly, since the Special ADR
Rules are intended to achieve speedy and efficient resolution of disputes and curb a litigious
culture, every interpretation thereof should be made consistent with these objectives.
Thus, with these principles in mind, the Court so concludes that the Special ADR Rules,
as far as practicable, should be made to apply not only to the proceedings on confirmation but
also to the confirmed award's execution.
 Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc. v. Laguesma,
G.R. No. 116194, [February 2, 2000], 381 PHIL 414-427

FACTS:
On October 26, 1993, the SRBI-Association of Professional, Supervisory, Office, and
Technical Employees Union (APSOTEU), a union in petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank (SRB),
filed a petition for certification election of the supervisory employees of SRBI. On October 28,
1993, the Med-Arbiter gave due course to the petition, but SRBI filed a motion to dismiss the
union's petition. It sought to prevent the holding of a certification election on the grounds that
the members of APSOTEU-TUCP were in fact managerial or confidential employees and ALU-
TUCP was representing the union.
The union filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss arguing that its members were
not managerial but merely supervisory employees. On December 9, 1993, the Med-Arbiter
denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. SRBI appealed the Med-Arbiter’s decision to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, but the appeal was denied. On December 22, 1993,
petitioner proceeded to file a petition with the DOLE Regional Office seeking the cancellation
of the respondent union's registration. It averred that APSOTEU-TUCP members were actually
managerial employees who were prohibited by law from joining or organizing unions. On April
22, 1994, the respondent DOLE Undersecretary denied SRBI's appeal for lack of merit. SRBI
moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
WON the employees concerned are confidential employees and thus prohibited to join the
union?

RULING:
The Supreme Court found the petition bereft of merit. The Court ruled that the
Undersecretary of Labor committed no reversible error or grave abuse of discretion when he
found the order of the Med-Arbiter scheduling a certification election in order. The list of
employees eligible to vote in said certification was also found in order. Likewise, the claim that
the members of respondent union are managerial are not true as the Cashiers, Accountants
and Acting Chiefs of the Loans Department of the petitioner did not possess the managerial
powers or duties. Also, according to the Court, neither of the respondent employees’ fell
under the category of confidential employees prohibited from joining the union as not one of
them had any duties specifically connected to labor relations.
According to the High Court, petitioner failed to show that the employees in question
were vested with similar powers as that of managerial employees. At best, they only had
recommendatory powers subject to evaluation, review, and final decision by the bank’s
management. The job description forms submitted by petitioner clearly show that the union
members in question may not transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign, or discipline
employees. Moreover, the forms also do not show that the Cashiers, Accountants, and Acting
Chiefs of the Loans Department formulate and execute management policies which are
normally expected of management officers.
As added by the SC, Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a
confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies specifically in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative,
and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee — that is,
the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his superior officer; and
that officer must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.
 Article 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from
engaging in union activities. However, under the doctrine of necessary implication, the
disqualification of managerial employees equally applies to confidential employees. The
confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of confidential employees because in the normal
course of their duties, they become aware of management policies relating to labor relations.
It must be stressed, however, that when the employee does not have access to confidential
labor relations information, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees from
forming, assisting, or joining a union. Petitioner’s explanation, however, does not state who
among the employees has access to information specifically relating to its labor relations
policies.
In view of the failure of the petitioner to prove that the employees are managerial or
their works are considered confidential, the petition was dismissed.
 Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
G.R. No. 84297, [December 8, 1988], 250 PHIL 390-403

FACTS:
Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his
proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties
of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the HRET and not the
COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests. Buan, Jr., and Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition),
alleged that the instant petition has become moot and academic because the assailed
COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on
October 6, 1987.
In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the instant petition should be given
due course because the proclamation was valid. The Order issued by the COMELEC directing
the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus
Election Code,” was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to
proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the
proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns
contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates
Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.

ISSUE:
WON the HRET had acquired jurisdiction over the Petitioner?

RULING:
The SC ruled that the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The exclusive original
jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to
elective regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving
municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and
regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election
protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general
power granted it by the Constitution. The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it
ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed.
It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of
the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to
the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in
the Electoral body. – Now, Congress or Electoral Tribunal in the respective houses.
A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973
Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted either to the legislative
body itself or to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature.
Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of being the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative
body. The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly apportion the powers of
the three branches of government, lodge the power to judge contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the legislature in an independent, impartial and non-
partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular purpose.

With regard to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and decide election contests.
This has been trimmed down under the 1987 Constitution. Whereas the 1973
Constitution vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa and
elective provincial and city officials [Art. XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987 Constitution, while lodging
in the COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate
jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C),
Sec. 2(2)], expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The inescapable conclusion from
the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within
which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and
jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself.

The matter of whether or not to issue a restraining order or a writ of preliminary

injunction during the pendency of a protest lies within the sound discretion of the HRET as sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives. Necessarily, the determination of whether or not there are
indubitable grounds to support the prayer for the aforementioned ancillary remedies also lies
within the HRET's sound judgment.

So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as
a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. As stated earlier, the power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal is full, clear and complete and "excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of
this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same."

Under the 1987 Constitution, the scope of the Court's authority is made explicit. The
power granted to the Court includes the duty "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRET's judgment.
 Cemco Holdings, Inc. v. National Life Insurance Co. of the Philippines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 171815, [August 7, 2007], 556 PHIL 198-217)

FACTS:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set
aside the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Union Cement Corporation (UCC) has two principal stockholders UCHC with shares
amounting to 60.51%, and petitioner Cemco with 17.03%. Majority of UCHCs stocks were
owned by BCI with 21.31% and ACC with 29.69%. Cemco, on the other hand, owned 9% of
UCHC stocks. BCI informed the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) that it and its subsidiary ACC
had passed resolutions to sell to Cemco the BCIs stocks in UCHC equivalent to 21.31% and
ACCs stocks in UCHC equivalent to 29.69%. as a result of petitioner Cemcos acquisition of BCI
and ACCs shares in UCHC, petitioners total beneficial ownership, direct and indirect, in UCC
has increased by 36% and amounted to at least 53% of the shares of UCC. As a consequence
the PSE, inquired to SEC as to whether the Tender Offer Rule under Rule 19 of the
Implementing Rules of the Securities Regulation Code is not applicable to the purchase by
petitioner of the majority of shares of UCC.The SECs Corporate Finance Department
responded to the query of the PSE that while it was the stance of the department that the
tender offer rule was not applicable, the matter must still have to be confirmed by the SEC
en banc. Thereafter, SEC confirmed that the SEC en banc had resolved that the Cemco
transaction was not covered by the tender offer rule.

Feeling aggrieved by the transaction, respondent National Life Insurance Company of

the Philippines, Inc., a minority stockholder of UCC, sent a letter to Cemco demanding the
latter to comply with the rule on mandatory tender offer. Cemco, however, refused.
Respondent filed a complaint with the SEC asking it to reverse its Resolution and to declare
the purchase agreement of Cemco void and praying that the mandatory tender offer rule be
applied to its UCC shares.

In a Decision the SEC ruled in favor of the respondent by reversing and setting aside its
Resolution and directed petitioner Cemco to make a tender offer for UCC shares to
respondent and other holders of UCC shares similar to the class held by UCHC in accordance
with Section 9(E), Rule 19 of the Securities Regulation Code.

Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of Appeals challenging the SECs jurisdiction to
take cognizance of respondents complaint and its authority to require Cemco to make a
tender offer for UCC shares, and arguing that the tender offer rule does not apply. The Court
of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the SEC.

The SEC and the Court of Appeals ruled that the indirect acquisition by petitioner of
36% of UCC shares through the acquisition of the non-listed UCHC shares is covered by the
mandatory tender offer rule.

ISSUE:
WON the SEC has the power to promulgate the said rule?

RULING:
The SC ruled that the interpretation given by the SEC and the Court of Appeals must be
sustained.
 The rule in this jurisdiction, according to the SC, is that the construction given to a
statute by an administrative agency charged with the interpretation and application of that
statute is entitled to great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to
be in sharp contrast with the governing law or statute. The rationale for this rule relates not
only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the
establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it
also relates to accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the
administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute.

The power conferred upon the SEC to promulgate rules and regulations is a legislative
recognition of the complexity and the constantly-fluctuating nature of the market and the
impossibility of foreseeing all the possible contingencies that cannot be addressed in
advance. Hence, rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or
authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a
statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law.
This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy,
purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the
manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted
with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the
product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions

Hence, the law bestows upon the SEC the general adjudicative power which is implied
from the express powers of the Commission or which is incidental to, or reasonably
necessary to carry out, the performance of the administrative duties entrusted to it. As a
regulatory agency, it has the incidental power to conduct hearings and render decisions
fixing the rights and obligations of the parties. In fact, to deprive the SEC of this power would
render the agency inutile, because it would become powerless to regulate and implement
the law. that have the effect of law.

The SEC and the Court of Appeals accurately pointed out that the coverage of the
mandatory tender offer rule covers not only direct acquisition but also indirect acquisition or
“any type of acquisition.” This is clear from the discussions of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on the Securities Act of 2000, on 17 July 2000. Hence, the legislative intent of
Section 19 of the Code is to regulate activities relating to acquisition of control of the listed
company and for the purpose of protecting the minority stockholders of a listed corporation.
Whatever may be the method by which control of a public company is obtained, either
through the direct purchase of its stocks or through an indirect means, mandatory tender
offer applies.
 Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 100152, [March 31, 2000], 385 PHIL 956-999

FACTS:
Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit.
After consideration of its application and the opposition interposed thereto by local
optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the
condition that since petitioner is a corporation, it cannot put up a clinic but only a
commercial store. Private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI), Iligan
Chapter, through its Acting President, Dr. Frances B. Apostol, lodged a complaint against the
petitioner before the Office of the City Mayor, alleging that petitioner had violated the
conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation
of such permit. After conducting an investigation, respondent Mayor sent petitioner a Notice
of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and giving
petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.
Petitioner brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the
respondents, City Mayor, City Legal Officer and Samahan ng Optometrist sa Pilipinas-Iligan
City Chapter (SOPI) before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 1.
The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier issued. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration met the same fate. Instead of taking an appeal, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the
questioned Order of Dismissal, branding the same as tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Undaunted, petitioner filed the present petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the LGC allows the Mayor to regulate the conduct of profession in their locality?

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that a business permit is issued primarily to regulate the
conduct of business as a grant of police power to local government. However, such grant of
police power does not include, through the issuance of such permit, the power to regulate
the practice of a profession, like that of optometry. Such a function is within the exclusive
domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the
profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners
in Optometry.
The Court by analogy compared petitioner to private hospitals maintained by
corporations and incorporated for the purpose of furnishing medical and surgical treatment.
In the course of providing such treatments, these corporations employ physicians, surgeons
and medical practitioners, in the same way that in the course of manufacturing and selling
eyeglasses, eye frames and optical lenses, optical shops hire licensed optometrists to
examine, prescribe and dispense ophthalmic lenses. No one has ever charged that these
corporations are engaged in the practice of medicine. There is indeed no valid basis for
treating corporations engaged in the business of running optical shops differently.
Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, according to the SC, is the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people. The State, through the legislature, has delegated
the exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the State, in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. This delegation of
police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code. The
scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all
matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the
community.
Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or
grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is
within the ambit of this power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and
business permits is beyond cavil. It is provided for by law. Section 171, paragraph 2 (n)
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1983,
reads: Sec. 171. The City Mayor shall: . . . n) Grant or refuse to grant, pursuant to law, city
licenses or permits, and revoke the same for violation of law or ordinance or the conditions
upon which they are granted. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business
permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the
rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.
To accomplish the objective of the regulation, a state may provide by statute that
corporations cannot sell eyeglasses, spectacles, and lenses unless a duly licensed physician or
a duly qualified optometrist is in charge of, and in personal attendance at the place where
such articles are sold. In such a case, the patient's primary and essential safeguard lies in the
optometrist's control of the "treatment" by means of prescription and preliminary and final
examination. In analogy, it is noteworthy that private hospitals are maintained by
corporations incorporated for the purpose of furnishing medical and surgical treatment. In
the course of providing such treatments, these corporations employ physicians, surgeons
and medical practitioners, in the same way that in the course of manufacturing and selling
eyeglasses, eye frames and optical lenses, optical shops hire licensed optometrists to
examine, prescribe and dispense ophthalmic lenses. No one has ever charged that these
corporations are engaged in the practice of medicine. There is indeed no valid basis for
treating corporations engaged in the business of running optical shops differently.
Hence, according to the SC, Distinction must be made between the grant of a license
or permit to do business and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a
particular profession. The first is usually granted by the local authorities and the second is
issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. A business
permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business or some form of
commercial activity. A professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a
natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.
In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit
to engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to
engage in the practice of optometry as a corporate body or entity, although it does have in
its employ, persons who are duly licensed to practice optometry by the Board of Examiners
in Optometry.
In the present case, the objective of the imposition of subject conditions on
petitioner’s business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner’s
employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of
Examiners in Optometry. The Mayor cannot impose a condition under the guise of police
power, which would, in effect, regulate the practice of profession. Hence, the condition that
petitioner cannot put up a clinic is void.
 Tawang Multi-purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District,
G.R. No. 166471, [March 22, 2011], 661 PHIL 390-426

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
petition challenges the judgment and order of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 1,
Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet.
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, registered with the
Cooperative Development Authority, and organized to provide domestic water services in
Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water
utility created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply
water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La
Trinidad, Benguet.
On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an
application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a
waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. However, LTWD opposed TMPC's application. LTWD
claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive.
In its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved TMPC's
application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision, the NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise
cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is
legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system.
In its 1 October 2004 Judgment, the RTC set aside the NWRB’s 23 July 2002 Resolution
and 15 August 2002 Decision and cancelled TMPC's CPC. The RTC held that Section 47 is
valid.
TMPC raises as issue that the RTC erred in holding that Section 47 of PD No. 198, as
amended, is valid.

ISSUE:
WON exclusive grant of franchise is allowed?

RULING:
The SC ruled that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This
rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does not need explanation. Indeed, if acts that
cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
The Court held that the Court has long and consistently adhered to the legal maxim
that those that cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. No one is allowed to do
indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.
This is so because the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly
franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are
exclusive in character. Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that “No
franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years.”
Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are
clear — franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that, "nor shall such
franchise . . . be exclusive in character." There is no exception.
When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of
the Court is to apply the law the way it is worded. Basic is the rule of statutory construction
that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to
apply the same according to its clear language.
Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that
are exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do
directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create
indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD)
of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises
that are exclusive in character.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm
of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void
and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract.
The SC reiterated that the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly prohibit the
creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. They uniformly command that "nor
shall such franchise . . . be exclusive in character." This constitutional prohibition is absolute
and accepts no exception. WHEREFORE, Section 47 of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional.
 Risos-Vidal v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 206666, [January 21, 2015]

FACTS:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the
crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly
stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights. In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of President. None of the disqualification cases against him
prospered but he only placed second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec
stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for
plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute
disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in
relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President
Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon
him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013
elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to
disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he
be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE:
WON President Joseph Estrada may run for public office despite having been convicted of
the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold
public office and is a crime involving moral turpitude?

RULING:
The SC ruled that Estrada may run because he was granted an absolute pardon that
fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered
by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms
to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by
former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be
inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President
Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, or to otherwise remit the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot
be upheld based on the pardon’s text.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C,
provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along
with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
 Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress.

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of

election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases
that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election
laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the
COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot
operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

Hence, subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power
cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. The Court reiterated that under the
present Constitution, a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed
by legislative action. Thus, it is unmistakably the long-standing position of the Court that the
exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered
with by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the
Constitution.
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s power of pardon
by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an
overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected a
proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power of the President in the form of
“offenses involving graft and corruption” that would be enumerated and defined by Congress
through the enactment of a law.
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there
should be no departure. It is the Court’s firm view that the phrase in the presidential pardon at
issue which declares that former President Estrada was restored to his civil and political rights
substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.
 Trade and Investment Development Corp. v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 182249, [March 5, 2013], 705 PHIL 357-378

FACTS:
On August 30, 2001, Arsemio de Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as
Financial Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP, a government-owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080. His appointment was
included in TIDCORP’s Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) for August 2001, which was
submitted to the CSC – Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Field Office. On
September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De Guzman’s appointment
because the position of Financial Management Specialist IV was not included in the DBM’s
Index of Occupational Service.

TIDCORP’s Executive Vice President Jane U. Tambanillo appealed the invalidation of De

Guzman’s appointment to Director IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC- NCR. According to
Tambanillo, Republic Act No. 8494, which amended TIDCORP’s charter, empowers its Board
of Directors to create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and to approve
its own compensation and position classification system and qualification standards. CSC-
NCR Director Padilla denied Tambanillo’s appeal because De Guzman’s appointment failed to
comply with Section 1, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, which requires that the
position title of an appointment submitted to the CSC must conform with the approved
Position Allocation List and must be found in the Index of Occupational Service. Since the
position of Financial Management Specialist IV is not included in the Index of Occupational
Service, de Guzman’s appointment to this position must be invalid.

TIDCORP’s President and CEO Joel C. Valdes sent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-
David a Letter appealing Director Padilla’s decision to the CSC-Central Office (CO). Valdes
reiterated TIDCORP’s argument that RA 8494 authorized its Board of Directors to determine
its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and exempted TIDCORP from all
existing laws on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. In its
Resolution No. 30144, the CSC-CO affirmed the CSC-NCR’s decision that de Guzman’s
appointment should have complied with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, as amended by
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15. Rule III, Section 1(c) is explicit in requiring that the
position title indicated in the appointment should conform with the Position Allocation List
and found in the Index of Occupational Service. Otherwise, the appointment shall be
disapproved. In disallowing De Guzman’s appointment, the CSC-CO held that Director
Bugtong was simply following the letter of the law.

TIDCORP moved to reconsider the CSC-CO’s decision, but this motion was denied,
prompting TIDCORP to file a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA. The petition asserted
that the CSC-CO committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 030144 and
Resolution No. 031037. CA denied TIDCORP’s petition and upheld the ruling of the CSC-CO in
Resolution No. 30144 and Resolution No. 31037. The CA noted that filing a petition for
certiorari was an improper recourse; TIDCORP should have instead filed a petition for review
under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA, however, brushed aside the
procedural defect, ruling that the assailed resolutions should still stand as they are consistent
with law and jurisprudence.
In its present petition for review on certiorari, TIDCORP argued that the CSC’s
interpretation of RA 8494 is misplaced.
ISSUE:
WON RA 8494 command TIDCORP to follow issued requirements pursuant to the Position
Classification Act despite its exemption from laws involving position classification?

RULING:
The 1987 Administrative Code then spelled out the CSCs rule-making power in concrete
terms in Section 12, Book V, Title I-A, which empowered the CSC to implement the civil service
law and other pertinent laws, and to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the civil
service. The CSCs rule-making power as a constitutional grant is an aspect of its independence
as a constitutional commission. It places the grant of this power outside the reach of Congress,
which cannot withdraw the power at any time. Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a
constitutional status the aforesaid statutory authority to grant the Commission broader and
more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from legislative
intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may
withdraw the same at any time. Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly
independent Commission on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred right of suffrage the
citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of government and in achieving and
promoting political stability.

But while the grant of the CSCs rule-making power is untouchable by Congress, the laws
that the CSC interprets and enforces fall within the prerogative of Congress. As an
administrative agency, the CSCs quasi- legislative power is subject to the same limitations
applicable to other administrative bodies. The rules that the CSC formulates must not
override, but must be in harmony with, the law it seeks to apply and implement.

However, under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis is derived from the maxim index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of intention) and rests on the valid presumption that the
words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent and preclude the
court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

The phrase "to endeavour" means to "to devote serious and sustained effort" and "to
make an effort to do." It is synonymous with the words to strive, to struggle and to seek. The
use of "to endeavour" in the context of RA 8494 means that despite TIDCORP’s exemption
from laws involving compensation, position classification and qualification standards, it
should still strive to conform as closely as possible with the principles and modes provided in
RA 6758. The phrase "as closely as possible," which qualifies TIDCORP’s duty "to endeavour
to conform," recognizes that the law allows TIDCORP to deviate from the Position
Classification Act, but it should still try to hew closely with its principles and modes. Had the
intent of Congress been to require TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly comply with the
Position Classification Act, it would have so stated in unequivocal terms. Instead, the
mandate it gave TIDCORP was to endeavour to conform to the principles and modes of RA
6758, and not to the entirety of this law. De Guzman's appointment as Financial
Management Specialist IV is valid.
 Revaldo v. People,
G.R. No. 170589, [April 16, 2009], 603 PHIL 332-346

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood
lumber in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code. June 17, 1992, in the Municipality of
Maasin, Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, the accused, with intent of gain, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of flat lumber with a
total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required under
existing forest laws and regulations from proper government authorities.

Maceda, the person in charge of the operations section of the PNP in Maasin,
Southern Leyte, testified that on 18 June 1992, at around 11:00 in the morning, he went with
Chief Alejandro Rojas, SPO3 Melquiades Talisic and SPO3 Nicasio Sunit to the house of
petitioner to verify the report of Sunit that petitioner had in his possession lumber without
the necessary documents. They were not armed with a search warrant on that day.They
confiscated 20 pieces of lumber of different varieties lying around the vicinity of the house of
petitioner.
September 5, 1997, the RTC-Branch 25 rendered judgment convicting petitioner of the
offense charged and sentencing him.

August 23 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The
Court of Appeals ruled that motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere
possession of the lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability.

ISSUE:
WON the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the police officers was legal.

RULING:

The SC ruled that even without a search warrant, the personnel of the PNP can seize
the forest products cut, gathered or taken by an offender pursuant to Section 80 of the
Forestry Code. Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents
when the police officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the
possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have
any legal documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair
of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without the proper
documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is
the law.

According to the Court, there are two distinct and separate offenses punished under
Section 68 of the Forestry Code, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations.

As the Court held in People v. Que, in the first offense, one can raise as a defense the
legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing timber or other forest
products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however,
it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products
are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents
consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial
because the Forestry Code is a special law which considers mere possession of timber or other
forest products without the proper documentation as malum prohibitum.

On whether the police officers had the authority to arrest petitioner, even without a
warrant, Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the
DENR or any personnel of the PNP to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has
committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code
and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense or the
forest products gathered or taken by the offender. Section 80 reads:

Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. — A forest officer or employee of

the Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National
Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is
committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall
also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment
used in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered or taken by
the offender in the process of committing the offense…

Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when the
police officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession
and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal
documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his
dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documentation
consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law.
 Sagana v. Francisco,
G.R. No. 161952, [October 2, 2009], 617 PHIL 387-398

FACTS:
On Dec.13, 1994, Arnel Sagana filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Quezon
City. He alleged that on November 20, 1992, Richard Francisco, with intent to kill, shot him
with a gun hitting him on the right thigh. On January 31, 1995, process server Manuel
Panlasigui attempted to personally serve the summons to respondent, Francisco, at his
address: No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City but was unsuccessful because the
occupant, who refused to give his identity, said that the respondent is unknown at the said
address. Subsequently, the trial court attempted to serve summons to respondent’s office
through registered mail on February 9, 1995. However, despite three notices, the respondent
failed to pick up the summons.
The Trial Court then dismissed the case on account of “petitioner’s lack of interest to
prosecute”, noting that the petitioner did not take any action since the filing of the Server’s
Return on 8 February 1995. In response, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
stating that he exerted efforts to locate the respondent and that respondent indeed lived at
No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City. The trial court granted petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration on August 4, 1995, conditioned upon the service of summons on the
respondent within 10 days from receipt of the Order. Thus, on August 25, 1995, Process Server
Jarvis Iconar tried to serve summons at the respondent’s address but was told by Michael
Francisco, the respondent’s 19-year old brother, that the respondent no longer lived at the
said address. As such, Iconar left a copy of the summons to Michael Francisco.
On November 10, 1995, the petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default,
since the respondent still failed to file an Answer despite the service of summons. The trial
court granted the Motion, finding that the summons was validly served through his brother,
Michael, and allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. Nonetheless, copies of
all pleadings and court documents were furnished to respondent at his address. On March 1,
1996, petitioner and movant Michael Francisco, through his counsel, Atty. Bernardo Q.
Cuaresma, filed a Manifestation and Motion denying that he received the summons or that he
was authorized to receive the summons on behalf of his brother. He alleged that the
substituted service did not comply with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, since
summons was not served at the defendant’s residence or left with any person who was
authorized to receive it on behalf of the defendant. Michael Francisco also asserted in an
Affidavit of Merit that his brother had left their residence in March 1993, and that respondent
would only call by phone, or write his family without informing them of his address.
Thereafter, Michael Francisco submitted his respective Opposition, Reply, and
Rejoinder. In his Rejoinder, he attached a copy of an Affidavit prepared by the respondent,
dated December 23, 1992, where he declared himself a resident of No. 36 Sampaguita St. The
affidavit was notarized by Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, the same lawyer who represented
respondent’s brother before the trial court. The trial court denied Michael Francisco’s
Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit, holding that: “plaintiff had already sent numerous
pleadings to defendant at his last known address. As also pointed out by [petitioner] in his
Opposition, movant has not adduced evidence, except his affidavit of merit, to impugn the
service of summons thru him. Movant herein also admits that defendant communicates with
him through telephone. Movant, therefore, being a person of sufficient age and discretion,
would be able, more likely than not, to inform defendant of the fact that summons was sent to
him by the court.”
On 20 September 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of the plaintiff.
 On November 23, 1999, respondent Richard A. Francisco filed a Notice of Appeal,
claiming that he received a copy of the trial court’s Decision on November 9, 1999, and that
the same was contrary to the law, facts, and evidence, and prayed that his appeal be given due
course.
On 5 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to file their respective briefs, a
copy of which was sent to respondent by registered mail at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa,
Quezon City.
The respondent attended the preliminary conference on September 3, 2002, but the
parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Thus, on August 13, 2003, the appellate court
rendered the Decision granting the appeal and setting aside the Decision of the trial court on
the grounds that the service of summons was irregular and such irregularity nullified the
proceedings before the trial court. The trial court’s decision was void since it did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration where he alleged that respondent did,
in fact, reside at No. 36 Sampaguita St. To prove this assertion, petitioner submitted the
original copy of the envelope containing respondent’s Notice of Appeal, which indicated
respondent’s return address to be No. 36 Sampaguita St. Nonetheless, on January 29, 2004,
the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the petitioner filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
WON there was valid service of summons upon the respondent?

RULING:
The SC ruled that under the circumstances obtaining in this case, there was a proper
substituted service of summons upon the respondent.

Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court provided:

Section 8. Substituted service. – If the defendant cannot be served within a

reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on
defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

In the case at bar, the personal service of summons was twice attempted by the trial
court, although unsuccessfully. The trial court also thrice attempted to contact the respondent
through his place of work, but to no avail. These diligent efforts to locate the respondent were
noted in the first sheriff’s return, the process server's notation, as well as the records of the
case. Moreover, respondent’s claim that he moved out of their residence on March 1993
without informing his family of his whereabouts despite the regular calls and letters is
incredulous. It is even more implausible when the respondent admitted to receiving the trial
court’s decision on September 20, 19999 which was sent to No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa,
Quezon City, and that his Notice of Appeal indicated the same address. He also admitted to
receiving a copy of the appellate court’s order for a preliminary conference which was also
sent to the same address. Finally, it is unbelievable that, since respondent and his brother was
assisted by the same lawyer, none of them was able to inform respondent of the receipt of
summons.
 Indeed, there was no proof presented as to when respondent left and then returned to
his original home, if he actually did leave his home.
According to the SC, the purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced
so that he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, the respondent was duly apprised of the action
against him and had every opportunity to answer the charges made by the petitioner.
However, since he refused to disclose his true address because of his own pretenses, it was
impossible to personally serve summons upon him.
It is, at times, difficult to reconcile the letter of the law with its spirit. Thus, it is not
altogether surprising that two competing values are usually discernable in every controversy
— the principle of dura lex sed lex versus the notion that technicalities should yield to broader
interests of justice. In our rules of procedure, for instance, judges often struggle to find a
balance between due process considerations and a liberal construction to secure a just
disposition of every action. In such cases, where a measure of discretion is permitted, courts
must tread carefully, with due consideration of the factual milieu and legal principles involved.
In so doing, we take steps — sometimes tentative, sometimes bold — to apply prior
experience and precedent towards an eventual just resolution. It is these principles that
animate our decision in the instant case.
The SC said that it did not intend this ruling to overturn jurisprudence to the effect that
statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully,
and that any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered
ineffective. However, an overly strict application of the Rules, according to the High Court, is
not warranted in this case, as it would clearly frustrate the spirit of the law as well as do
injustice to the parties, who have been waiting for almost 15 years for a resolution of this case.
The SC added that they are not heedless of the widespread and flagrant practice whereby
defendants actively attempt to frustrate the proper service of summons by refusing to give
their names, rebuffing requests to sign for or receive documents, or eluding officers of the
court. Of course it is to be expected that defendants try to avoid service of summons,
prompting this Court to declare that the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and
diligent in serving the process on the defendant.” However, sheriffs are not expected to be
sleuths, and cannot be faulted where the defendants themselves engage in deception to
thwart the orderly administration of justice.
 Defensor-Santiago v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 127325, [March 19, 1997], 336 PHIL 848-930

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Prohibition filed by the petitioners to prohibit the COMELEC to act
on the Petition filed by Atty. Delfin.
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC then,
upon its approval passed Resolution no. 2300 providing for the following; a.) set the time and
dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the
said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to
assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 December 1996, Sen.
Santiago et al. filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago
argues among others that the People’s Initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution
NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in power
(particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of people’s
initiative. The petitioners also agued that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to
amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and
considering that RA 6735 is not a sufficient law to amend the constitution, the people may not
yet exercise their legislative power to amend the same.

ISSUE:
WON RA 6735 is sufficient law for the people’s initiative to amend the constitution?

RULING:
The SC ruled that in view of the fact that Section 1 of Art. XVII is not self-executing, it
follows that there is a need to for the Congress to pass first a law before the people could use
the system of people’s initiative to amend the constitution. Hence, without the implementing
law, the SC held that the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for
whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. The SC also ruled that RA 6735 is
not sufficient to implement the legislative right of the people to amend the constitution
through initiative.

The SC further held that contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does
not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word
"Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant
to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and
local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals
to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do
so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."'

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and
that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of
the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other
systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on
the Constitution. Section 5 paragraph (c) requires, among other things, a statement of the
proposed law sought to be enacted, approve or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case
may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. . . . The use of
the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed"
only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative
and Referendum (Subtitle, II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle
is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering
that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws. . . . The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No.
6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive
matter are fatal and. cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act."

In view of the said ruling, the High Court also held that the COMELEC cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not
have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of
Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein
are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution,
or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness"
and the "sufficient standard" tests. In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable —
to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard
is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate
legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
 Navarro v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 180050 (Resolution), [April 12, 2011], 663 PHIL 546-665

FACTS:
October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9355 or the Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the plebiscite for the ratification of the
creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite yielded
69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes with the approval of the people from both
the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition
on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No.
9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the
people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue
Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was
passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only
106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of
the LGC.
On May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge
the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of
Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity,
when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the
application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is
applicable in the instant case.
On July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the
ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and
not after the resolution of this case. On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court,
allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should
be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10,
2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that prior to
the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case. October 5,
2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case
had become final and executory on May 18, 2010.

ISSUE:
WON not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 is valid?

RULING:
The SC ruled in the affirmative. According to the High Court, the Congress, recognizing
the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355,
following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation
of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to
its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the
Island Province of Dinagat.
The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting clearly
show the manifest intention of Congress to promote development in the previously
underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas by allowing them to directly share in the
allocation of funds under the national budget. It should be remembered that, under Sections
284 and 285 of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based
on land area, population, and local revenue.
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity,
impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction,
such as the legislative history of the law, 31 or may consider the implementing rules and
regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative
construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed
incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.
It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee
consisting of members of both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section
533 32 of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue
the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation
of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of local
autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also mandated by the Constitution that a
local government code shall be enacted by Congress, to wit —

Section 3.The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.

These State policies, according to SC, are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC,
with the view to attain decentralization and countryside development. Congress saw that the
old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of 1991,
which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic
country. This account for the exemption from the land area requirement of local government
units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the
LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from
Section 461 with respect to the creation of provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was
filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.

With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives,
particularly the chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local Government, it cannot
be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from the land
area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more
islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the
LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR. To be sure, the
Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an exemption in
Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR. The Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation
and consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and considered the operative
principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was formulated. 33
Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and
respect from this Court, 34 but to legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion
of representatives from the four leagues of local government units as members of the
Oversight Committee.

With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative
construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place,
which Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into
direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat
to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the
land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as
an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers,
Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR and
transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.

The SC added that the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably
voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress
definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from
the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of one
or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC
was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.

Applying ratio legis est anima or the spirit rather than the letter of the law, the SC said that a
statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the
statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the
spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, the SC said that which is within the intent
of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within
the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.
Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would
defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.

So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-

equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the
presumption of constitutionality of statutes. This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite
system of government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great
departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each other's acts, and not
to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end,
courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the
product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or
concept is infringed. Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal
breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative
one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.
 Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. Nos. 203766, 203818-19, 203922 & etc., [April 2, 2013], 707 PHIL 454-753)

FACTS:
These cases, constituting 54 Petitions, were filed before the Supreme Court, for
Certiorari and Prohibition by the party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the
party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and
December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed
to represent a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” their nominees do not come from
a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” and/or some of the organizations or groups
are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress. Petitioners
argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of the
petitioners’ application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the rest.
They also lamented the poll body’s “denial” to accord them due process in the evaluation
proceedings.

ISSUE:
WON the Party-List System is limited to sectoral representation?

RULING:
The Court revisited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission in 1986 and was
convinced that the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include
not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral
parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.

Thus, in the end, the proposal, said the Court, to give permanent reserved seats to
certain sectors was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was
only allowed for the first three consecutive terms. There can be no doubt whatsoever that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system
exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to
include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties. The common denominator between sectoral
and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but
they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning
candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry
point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties
that could not compete in legislative district elections.

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, as revisited by the
Court, to include in the party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly
written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution. What the framers intended, and what
they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer. The party-list system is
composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three
groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional
parties are separate from sectoral parties.
 The Court opined that it is clear from the text of the provision, the party-list system is
composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties
or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties
or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any
particular sector.

Furthermore, added by the Court, Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a party as either
a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. Clearly, a political party is different
from a sectoral party. Quoting Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941, the Court further provides that a
political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government. On the other hand, Section 3(d)
of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a “sectoral party” refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. R.A. No. 7941 provides different
definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, said the Court, they are separate and
distinct from each other. R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

The Court is of the view that to require all national and regional parties under the party-
list system to represent the marginalized and underrepresented is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system and posed
the question, “How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in
legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the
party-list system?” To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining
the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them
from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the
clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

Moreover, the Court said that, it is noticeable that the sectors mentioned in Section 5
are not all necessarily marginalized and underrepresented. For sure, added by the Court,
professionals are not by definition marginalized and underrepresented, not even the elderly,
women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may lack
well-defined political constituencies, and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in
advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Interpreting anew the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941, the Court declared that
such policy broadly refers to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941, according to the Court, do not
define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be marginalized and
underrepresented. On the contrary, the Court is in the position that to even interpret that all
the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are marginalized and underrepresented would lead to
“absurdities.”

The Court said that the phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” should refer only
to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically marginalized and
underrepresented. These sectors are distinguished by the Court, such as, labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, added by the Court, a majority of the
members of the sectoral party must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented.” The
nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector does not mean one must wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity. It is sufficient that
one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically
marginalized and underrepresented are those who fall in the low income group as classified by
the National Statistical Coordination Board.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give
rise to a multi-party system where those marginalized and underrepresented, both in
economic and ideological status will have the opportunity to send their own members to the
House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and
transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to
masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity, even as they attend sessions
in Congress riding in SUVs.

SEPARATE OPINION

–Chief Justice Sereno

Chief Justice is still in the view that Social Justice remains the primordial reason of the
Party-List System.

She vied that it is within this historical and textual millieu that the party-list provisions in
the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted. Every provision should be read in the context of
all the other provisions so that contours of constitutional policy are made clear. She further
added that, the place of the party-list system in the constitutional scheme was that it provided
for the realization of the ideals on social justice in the political arena party-list system is
primarily a tool for social justice, the standard of “marginalized and underrepresented” under
Section 2 must be deemed to qualify national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
To argue otherwise, the Chief warned, is to divorce national and regional parties or
organizations from the primary objective of attaining social justice, which objective surrounds,
permeates, imbues, and underlies the entirety of both the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.

Section 2 of RA 7941, according to the Chief, states that the party-list system seeks to
“enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties to become members of the House of Representatives.” On its face, it
is apparent that “marginalized and underrepresented” qualifies “sectors,” “organizations,” and
“parties”.

In her last contention, Chief Justice interpreted the phrase “marginalized and
underrepresented” as standards to provide for sufficient legislations. Sectoral parties or
organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined
political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector, those sectors include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers, while
the sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth. Ending her dissent, she is of the view that, such principles enunciated
by the law are ever evolving concepts, created to address social disparities, to be able to give
life to the “social justice” policy of our Constitution.
 Automotive Parts & Equip. Co., Inc. v. Lingad,
G.R. No. L-26406, [October 31, 1969], 140 PHIL 580-588

FACTS:
In the petition for declaratory relief, the then Secretary of Labor, Jose B. Lingad and the
then Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards, Ruben F. Santos being named as respondents,
appellant Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Inc., alleged that it was duly incorporated
on January 5, 1961 and that from the start of its operation, its employees were paid on a daily
and monthly basis.
On April 21, 1965 the aforesaid amendatory act took effect and that respondents
construed its provision in such a way as to require the petitioner to increase the salaries of all
the monthly paid employees of the petitioner to a minimum of P180.00 (not P152.00) which
according to them is the applicable minimum wage rate for the monthly paid employees.
Petitioner sought to justify its refusal to abide by the interpretative bulletin of
respondents requiring the increase to a minimum of P180.00 a month for employees paid on a
monthly basis in this wise: “The petitioner believes that Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 602 particularly
that portion prohibiting the reduction of wages paid to employees in excess of the minimum
wage established in the Act only refers and applies to employers in business prior to and at the
time of enactment Act and that the prohibition thereof against reduction of supplements as
envisioned in Sec 19 should not be applied prospectively to employers coming into existence
subsequent to the effective date of said Act.”
The lower court rejected such a contention. Thus: “Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 4180 provides that
‘Any provision of law previously enacted on the subject matter of this Act that is inconsistent
with any provision of this Act is hereby repealed.’ Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 602 not being
inconsistent with R.A. No. 4180 has not been repealed; on the other hand, the provisions of
Section 19 of R.A. No. 602 not being inconsistent with R.A. No. 4180 were deemed and
impliedly re-enacted.

ISSUE:
WON the lower court decided the matter correctly?

RULING:
Yes, the lower court decided the matter correctly. Even if the plain legislative purpose so
evident on the face of the statute is not to vitalize and implement what the Constitution
enjoins, still there is no escape from an equally authoritative principle of statutory
construction that bars acceptance on what appellant would foist upon the judiciary as an
acceptable interpretation.
It is fundamental that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect
should be given to it by the judiciary. According to the High Court, it has been their constant
holding that the choice between conflicting theories falls on that which best accords with the
letter of the law and with its purpose. The Court said that there was a caveat against a
construction that would tend to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator.
If the interpretation offered by appellant would be considered acceptable, the Court
said that then, there would be a negation of the above purpose of the amendatory act
increasing the minimum wage law. That would be to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster
its policy. Hence, it must be rejected.
Petitioner-appellant believes that Section 19 of R.A. No. 602, particularly that portion
prohibiting the reduction of wages paid to employees in excess of the minimum wage
established in the Act or supplements theretofore granted to employees only refers and
applies to employers in business prior to and at the time of enactment of R.A. No. 602 and that
the prohibition thereof against reduction of supplements in Section 19 of said Republic Act
should not be applied prospectively to employers coming into existence subsequent to the
effective date of said R.A. No. 602, and that despite the passage of R.A. No. 4180, such
interpretation is not altered since said R.A. No. 4180 amended only Section 3 of R.A. No. 602 in
the amendatory Act. Such construction is in collision with the constitutional command
pursuant to the social justice principle that the government extend protection to labor. If the
interpretation offered by appellant would be considered acceptable, then there would be a
negation of the purpose of the amendatory act increasing the minimum wage law. That would
be to defeat and frustrate rather than foster its policy.
In connection with the use of the word “now” and the phrase “furnish on the date of
enactment” appellant would have this Court accept the view that as it began business after
the Minimum Wage Law was enacted in 1951, the safeguard in said Section 19 of R.A. No. 602
that would preclude any evasion thereof becomes nugatory because of the presence therein
of the word "now" which for appellant, would have the effect of limiting its application only to
business establishments existing as of the date of its effectivity on April 6, 1951. Such view
pays no heed to the constitutional command of protection to labor or to assure that the
legislative purpose be attained. It would defy common sense. It best amounts to a
manifestation of verbal ingenuity but hardly satisfies the test of rationality on which law must
be based.

Court said in conclusion that, it is not to give words a meaning which would lead to
absurd or unreasonable consequence. It is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes
so as to avoid such a deplorable result.
 US v. Toribio,
15 Phil. 85, G.R. No. 5060, January 26, 1910

FACTS:
Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the
province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to
be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality
wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the
slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human
consumption.
The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter
of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal
treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house
and that he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property
for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the
compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the
state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.

ISSUE:
WON Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an
undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

RULING:
It is a valid exercise of police power of the state, according to the SC. The Supreme Court
said that sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be
slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided
for in section 30. Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the
manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted,
and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of
the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment

The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of Toribio it will
defeat the purpose of the law. The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-
protection and if ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified. The
Supreme Court thinks that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by the
provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and
proper exercise of that power. The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines
like an epidemic that wiped 70-100% of the population of carabaos. The Supreme Court also
said that these animals are vested with public interest for they are fundamental use for the
production of crops. These reasons satisfy the requesites of a valid exercise of police power

The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power
of eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of caraboes for public
purpose; it just serve as a mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for
the protection of general welfare and public interest.
 Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim and Sy,
G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009

FACTS:
On February 3 2003, Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the
corporation), a family corporation doing business under the name and style Guan Yiac
Hardware, submitted a letter to the corporation’s Board of Directors (Board) stating that
Felicidad Chan Sy did not make cash deposits to any of the corporation’s banks from 1
November 2001 to 31 January 2003, thus the total bank remittances for the past years were
less than reflected in the corporate financial statements, accounting books and records.
Finally, Juanita Tan sought to be free from any responsibility over all corporate funds.
On April 5, 2003, Banaria, Banaria & Company in its report, the accounting firm
attributed to the Spouses Sy P67,117,230.30 as unaccounted receipts and disbursements from
1994 to 2002. On April 15, 2003, a demand letter was subsequently served on the Spouses Sy.
On the same date, the children of the Spouses Sy allegedly stole from the corporation cash,
postdated checks and other important documents. After the incident, the Spouses Sy allegedly
transferred residence and ceased reporting to the corporation. Thereupon, the corporation
filed a criminal complaint for robbery against the Spouses Sy before the City Prosecutor’s
Office of Manila.
On July 1, 2003, the corporation, through Romer S. Tan, filed its Amended Complaint for
Accounting and Damages against the Spouses Sy before the RTC Manila, praying for a
complete and true accounting of all the amounts paid to, received and earned by the company
since 1993 and for the restitution of the said amount. The complaint also prayed for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and or preliminary injunction to restrain Sy Chim from
calling a stockholders’ meeting on the ground of lack of authority. On September 9, 2003, the
Spouses Sy filed their Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint, praying that their
attached Third Party Complaint be allowed and admitted against Sy Tiong Shiou and his
spouse. In the said third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy accused Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita
Tan as directly liable for the corporation’s claim for misappropriating corporate funds.
On October 8, 2003, the trial court granted the motion for leave to file the third-party
complaint, and forthwith directed the issuance of summons against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita
Tan. On January 16, 2004, their counsel allegedly discovered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita
Tan were not furnished with the copies of several pleadings, as well as a court order, which
resulted in their having been declared in default for failure to file their answer to the third-
party complaint; thus, they instead filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals granted the petition of Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan. The appellate court declared that a third-party complaint is not allowed under the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under R.A. No. 8799 or
the Interim Rules.

ISSUE:
WON a third-party complaint is prohibited by the Interim Rules?

RULING:
The SC rules that while a third-party complaint is not included in the allowed pleadings,
neither is it among the prohibited ones. Nevertheless, this conflict may be resolved by
following the well-entrenched rule in statutory construction, that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment.
Statutes, including rules, according to the SC, should be construed in the light of the
object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed and they should be given such
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure the benefits
intended. A statute should therefore be read with reference to its leading idea, and its general
purpose and intention should be gathered from the whole act, and this predominant purpose
will prevail over the literal import of particular terms or clauses, if plainly apparent, operating
as a limitation upon some and as a reason for expanding the signification of others, so that the
interpretation may accord with the spirit of the entire act, and so that the policy and object of
the statute as a whole may be made effectual and operative to the widest possible extent.
Otherwise stated, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence,
a statute, as in the rules in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
 Matabuena v. Cervantes,
G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971

FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married
only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or
September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being
the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property,
by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in
her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon
declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and
Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.

ISSUE:
WON the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship?

RULING:
The SC ruled that while Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation
between the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-
law relationship. If the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort
and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, the SC said that, then, there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to
persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.

According to the High Court, It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that

what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the
reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the
possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the
other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law
relationships. The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the
deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive
rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were
legitimated by marriage.

Again, according to SC, the lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee
does not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a
widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the
other half. Article 1001, Civil Code, provides “Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.”
 Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait v. Sec. Angelo Reyes,
G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015

FACTS:
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered
into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract
involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. On May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX
conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom
profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine the area's
underwater composition.
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-
Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental
Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of
JAPEX's application for an ECC.
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX
for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16,
2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.
Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both
dated December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from
implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON not the service contract is prohibited on the ground that there is no general law
prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts
involving oil exploration and extraction?

RULING:
According to the SC, while the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph
4, Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution seem like mere formalities, they, in reality,
take on a much bigger role. As we have explained in La Bugal, they are the safeguards put in
place by the framers of the Constitution to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during
the martial law regime. Thus, according to the High Court, they are not just mere formalities,
which will only render a contract unenforceable but not void, if not complied with. They are
requirements placed, not just in an ordinary statute, but in the fundamental law, the non-
observance of which will nullify the contract. Elucidating on the concept of a "constitution," A
constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which
it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on
which government is founded.
The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all
public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by
the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract.
As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President himself
be the signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving the
exploration, development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils.
This power cannot be taken lightly.
The Supreme Court said that it could not simply assume that while Presidential Decree
No. 87 had not yet been expressly repealed, it had been impliedly repealed. The SC stressed
that implied repeals are not lightly presumed. It is a settled rule that when laws are in conflict
with one another, every effort must be exerted to reconcile them.

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface,
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e.,every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must
be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize
and give effect to all laws on the subject.

Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a
construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction
should be preferred. The SC, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections expounding on this
point, pronounced:

It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted

in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the
law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according
to its spirit and intent.

Consequently, the SC finds no merit in petitioners' contention that SC-46 is prohibited

on the ground that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms,
conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.

As a conclusion the SC said that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the
general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be
authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be
allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.