1
APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMS for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant's
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.
Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case. They are
— is before us on an appeal from that judgment.
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was
riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the
left-hand side of the street as she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the
defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the defendant, and to
which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction
to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of
the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was
coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the
street and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to
pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the
carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely
wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the
carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.
xxx xxx xxx
These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to the effect that
the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred,
was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery
wagon had sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran, and that
employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon
and then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to
be delivered; that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out,
another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other
noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran
away, and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear
upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and
on which street they came into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff,
Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.
The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave
judgment against him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum from the 17th day of October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The case
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied
in the Civil Code. The provisions of that code pertinent to this case are —
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there
is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should
be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who
are under their authority and live with them.
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the
damages caused by the employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
may be employed or on account of their duties.
 2
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the
damages should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do
the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein
prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
damage.
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and
tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the
above provisions, liable for the negligence of such driver in handling the team, we are
of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the
evidence does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some what
different from that in Anglo-Saxon countries, a question we do not now discuss, the
rules under which the fact of negligence is determined are, nevertheless, generally
the same. That is to say, while the law designating the person responsible for a
negligent act may not be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the law determining
what is a negligent act is the same here, generally speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme
court of Spain, 4 December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14
March, 1901; 2 March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13 April,
1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March, 1898; 3 June, 1901.)
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage
were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he
had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six months; that he
had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which
they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that
time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave
the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the
day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the
character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the
day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the
horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case, either under Spanish or
American jurisprudence. (Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422; Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt.,
590; Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. vs. Lally,
48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y., 212.) lawphi1.net
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord Kenyon said:
He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, and, if every
person who suffered a cart to remain in the street while he took goods out of it was
obliged to employ another to look after the horses, it would be impossible for the
business of the metropolis to go on.
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his horse, at the
time of the injury, is that which would be exercised by a person of ordinary care and
prudence under like circumstances. It can not be said that the fact of leaving the
horse unhitched is in itself negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a horse
unhitched must be depend upon the disposition of the horse; whether he was under
the observation and control of some person all the time, and many other
circumstances; and is a question to be determined by the jury from the facts of each
case.
In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was error on the
part of the trial court to refuse to charge that "it is not negligence for the driver of a
quite, gentle horse to leave him unhitched and otherwise unattended on the side of a
public highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon."
The said court closed its opinion with these words:
There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in finding that the horse
was quite and gentle, and that the driver was upon the sidewalk loading goods on the
wagon, at time of the alleged injury, and that the horse had been used for years in
that way without accident. The refusal of the trial court to charge as requested left
the jury free to find was verdict against the defendant, although the jury was
convinced that these facts were proven.lawphil.net
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:
 3

That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver goods, upon
stopping with his horse and wagon to deliver a parcel at a house from fifty to a
hundred rods from a railroad crossing, left the horse unfastened for four or five
minutes while he was in the house, knowing that it was not afraid of cars, and having
used it for three or four months without ever hitching it or knowing it to start, is not
conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due care on his part.
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is
to exercise reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in
doing an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to produce damage to others, there
will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues. (Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms, 91 U.
S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson
Architectural Iron Works vs.Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63;
Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not
unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved
destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for
so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted
by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes
happen and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their
natural or customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in
accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does
not in any sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only
creates aprima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances
under which the act complained of was performed. It is something invoked in favor of
the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the conditions and circumstances under
which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard Costing
Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554):
done by a steamboat under control of her officers and carefully managed by them,
evidence that such damage was done in this case was prima facie, and, if unexplained,
sufficient evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might properly be so
instructed.
There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only the fact
of the runway and the accident resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under
which the runaway occurred. Those conditions showing of themselves that the
defendant's cochero was not negligent in the management of the horse, the prima
facie case in plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of
merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of
the injury, in the manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the
universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the
time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of
accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has
acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts,
without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades
and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to
believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the
custom of a people? We think not.
The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the case before the
jury, was that if the steamboat, on a calm day and in smooth water, was thrown with
such force against a wharf properly built, as to tear up some of the planks of the
flooring, this would be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the
defendant's agent in making the landing, unless upon the whole evidence in the case
this prima facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to a wharf is not ordinarily
 4

G.R. No. 70479 February 27, 1987

FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
CARLOS LARIOSA and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

FERNAN, J:

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the
Philippines [Firestone for brevity] assails the decision of public respondent National
Labor Relations Commission which ordered the reinstatement without backwages of
Carlos Lariosa, a dismissed tire builder of petitioner, as having been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The facts are as follows:

Carlos Lariosa started working with Firestone on January 3, 1972 as a factory worker.
At the time of his dismissal, he was a tire builder.

At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 27, 1983, as he was about to leave the
company premises Lariosa submitted himself to a routine check by the security
guards at the west gate. He was frisked by Security Guard Ambrosio Liso [Lizo] while
his personal bag was inspected by Security Guard Virgilio Olvez. In the course of the
inspection, sixteen [16] wool flannel swabs, all belonging to the company, were found
inside his bag, tucked underneath his soiled clothes.

As a result of the incident, Firestone terminated Lariosa's services on August 2, 1983,

citing as grounds therefor: "stealing company property and loss of trust." 1 Firestone
also filed a criminal complaint against him with the Rizal provincial fiscal for
attempted theft [IS No. 83-436-M]. 2

PERIODS Lariosa, on the other hand, sued Firestone before the Ministry of Labor and
Employment for illegal dismissal, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and its related
rules and regulations, and damages. The Labor Arbiter, in his decision dated May 8,
 5
1984, found Lariosa's dismissal justified. 3 However, on appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission on December 28, 1984 reversed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter [with one commissioner voting for affirmance] and held that the dismissal of
Lariosa was too severe a penalty. It therefore ordered Lariosa's reinstatement but
without backwages, the period when he was out of work to be considered a
suspension. 4
Petitioner Firestone, in this special civil action for certiorari, contends that the NLRC
erred in not dismissing Lariosa's appeal for being late, in finding that Lariosa was not
accorded due process and in reversing the Labor Arbiter.
We shall deal first with the timeliness of the appeal. It is admitted that Lariosa filed
his appeal on June 7, 1984 or after the lapse of fourteen days from notice of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Article 223 of the Labor Code clearly provides for a
reglementary period of ten days within which to appeal decision of the Labor Arbiter
to the NLRC. The ten-day period has been interpreted by this Court in the case
of Vir-jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 58011-12, July 20,
1982, 115 SCRA 347, 361, to mean ten "calendar" days and not ten "working" days.
However, the "Notice of Decision" which Lariosa's lawyer received together with a
copy of the arbiter's decision advised them that an appeal could be taken to the NLRC
within ten "working" days from receipt of the said decision. 5
Mindful of the fact that Lariosa's counsel must have been misled by the implementing
rules of the labor commission and considering that the shortened period for appeal is
principally intended more for the employees' benefit, rather than that of the
employer, We are inclined to overlook this particular procedural lapse and to proceed
with the resolution of the instant case.
A review of the record shows that Lariosa was indubitably involved in the attempted
theft of the flannel swabs. During the investigation called by the company's industrial
relations manager Ms. Villavicencio on July 28, 1983, or one day after the incident,
Security Guards Liso and Olvez contradicted Lariosa's bare claim that he had no
intention to bring home the swabs and that he had simply overlooked that he had
earlier placed them inside his bag after they were given to him by his shift supervisor
while he was busy at work. Guard Olvez stated that when he confronted Lariosa with
the swabs, the latter replied that they were for "home use." And when he requested
Lariosa to stay behind while he reported the matter to the authorities, Lariosa
refused and hurriedly left the premises and boarded a passing jeepney. 6
From the records, it is likewise clear that Firestone did not act arbitrarily in
terminating Lariosa's services. On the contrary, there are transcripts to prove that an
investigation of the incident was promptly conducted in the presence of the
employee concerned, the union president and the security guards who witnessed the
attempted asportation. Records also belie the allegation that Lariosa was shown his
walking papers on the very day of the incident. The letter of Ms. Villavicencio to
Lariosa dated August 1, 1983 informing the latter of his dismissal effective August 2,
1983 conclusively shows that he was discharged only on August 2, 1983, after an
investigation was held to ventilate the truth about the July 27 incident. 7 Thus, we
cannot agree with the NLRC's conclusion that even if Firestone had found substantial
proof of Lariosa's misconduct, it did not observe the statutory requirements of due
process.
There is no gainsaying that theft committed by an employee constitutes a valid
reason for his dismissal by the employer. Although as a rule this Court leans over
backwards to help workers and employees continue with their employment or to
mitigate the penalties imposed on them, acts of dishonesty in the handling of
company property are a different matter. 8
Thus, under Article 283 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an
employment for "serious misconduct" or for "fraud or willful breach by the employee
of the trust reposed in him by his employer or representative."
If there is sufficient evidence that an employee has been guilty of a breach of trust or
that his employer has ample reasons to distrust him, the labor tribunal cannot justly
deny to the employer the authority to dismiss such an employee. 9
As a tire builder, Lariosa was entrusted with certain materials for use in his job. On
the day in question, he was given two bundles of wool flannel swabs [ten pieces per
bundle] for cleaning disks. He used four swabs from one pack and kept the rest
[sixteen pieces] in his "blue travelling bag." 10 Why he placed the swabs in his
personal bag, which is not the usual receptacle for company property, has not been
satisfactorily explained.
If Lariosa, by his own wrong-doing, could no longer be trusted, it would be an act of
oppression to compel the company to retain him, fully aware that such an employee
could, in the long run, endanger its very viability.
 6

The employer's obligation to give his workers just compensation and treatment
carries with it the corollary right to expect from the workers adequate work, diligence
and good conduct. 11

In view of the foregoing, We rule that Firestone had valid grounds to dispense with
the services of Lariosa and that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
ordering his reinstatement. However, considering that Lariosa had worked with the
company for eleven years with no known previous bad record, the ends of social and
compassionate justice would be served if he is paid full separation pay but not
reinstatement without backages as decreed by the NLRC. 12

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated December 28, 1984 is reversed and set aside. Petitioner Firestone
Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines is directed to pay its dismissed worker
Carlos Lariosa the separation pay to which he may be entitled under the law, or any
collective bargaining agreement or company rules or practice, whichever is higher.

SO ORDERED.

Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Padilla and Bidin JJ., concur.

Cortes, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-14858 December 29, 1960

MARIANO S. GONZAGA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
AUGUSTO CE DAVID, as Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of
Cagayan, respondent-appellant.

Office of the Asst. Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor E. D. Ignacio for
appellant.
Ventura V. Perez for appellee.
 7
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The essential antecedents of this case are not disputed. On February, 1957, Mariano
Gonzaga, as owner, registered with the Motor Vehicles Office a cargo truck and a
passenger bus, paying the first installment for registration fees due on said vehicles
for 1957. To cover the second installment for registration fees, Gonzaga remitted to
the Provincial Treasurer of Cagayan, by registered mail, P500.00, under postal money
orders Nos. 18553, 18554 and 18555, purchased from and issued by the Post Office
of Camalaniugan, Cagayan. The postal cancellation mark on the envelope containing
the remittance of Gonzaga bears the date August 31, 1957; so does the postal
cancellation mark on the face of the money orders.
The Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of Cagayan ruled that pursuant to Section
8 (1), Act 3992, otherwise known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the second
installment for registration fees was payable on or before the last working day of
August; that the last working day of August, 1957 was Friday, August 30, 1957; that
consequently, the remittance of Gonzaga bearing postal cancellation mark dated
August 31, 1957 was made beyond the time fixed by law. Accordingly, said official
sought to impose a 50% delinquency penalty, or otherwise, threatened to confiscate
the certificate of registration for the two trucks (Annexes "B" & "C").lawphil.net
Gonzaga brought this action in the Court of First Instance, which, upon a stipulation
of facts, rendered judgment, the dispositive part reading —
POR TANTO, el Juzgado dicta decision declarando, como por la presente declara, que
el pago hecho con los giros postales Nos. 18553, 18554 y 18555, por el recurrente, se
ha hecho dentro del plazo fijado por ley; y, por tanto, el recurrente no ha incurrido
con morosidad en cuanto a dicho pago.
Se ordena al recurrido, sus agentes y representantes, que se abstengan de confiscar
el certificado de registro de los dos trucks del recurrente, por la alegada morosidad
del citado pago.
Sin costas.
ASI SE ORDENA.
The only issue in this appeal is whether the remittance of petitioner-appellee
covering the second installment of registration fees for 1957, made by registered mail
with postal cancellation dated August 31, 1957, was within the time fixed by law.
The following are the pertinent provisions of Act 3992 as amended —
Sec. 8 (I) ". . . The registration fees provided in this Act for trucks may be payable in
two equal installments, the first to be paid on or before the last working day of
February, and the second to be paid on or before the last working day of August.
(Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 6 (b) "The date of cancellation of the postage stamps of envelopes containing
money orders, checks, or cash shall be considered as the date of
application. . . .
In support of its contention that August 30, and not August 31, was the last working
day of August, 1957, respondent-appellant invokes Republic Act No. 1880, otherwise
known as the "40-Hour Week Law", pursuant to which government offices are to hold
office from Monday to Friday only, unless one of those expressly exempted
therefrom.
As correctly held by the court below, the fact that pursuant to Republic Act 1880, the
Motor Vehicles Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, had no office on Saturday, Aug. 31,
1957, is immaterial in the case. The last working day contemplated in Sec. 8(I) of Act
3992 as amended should not necessarily mean the last working day for Motor Vehicle
Office. Under Sec. 6(b) of said Act, providing for payment of registration fees by mail,
the date of cancellation of the postage stamps of the envelope containing the
remittance is considered the date of application. Consequently, where the manner of
payment falls under said Section 6(b), the law, in recognizing the date of cancellation
as the date of application, impliedly permits of a remittance or payment within that
last day of August that the Post Office may still effect cancellation; and the
remittance, in fact, bears a postal cancellation, dated August 31, 1957. Moreover, it is
not pretended by respondent-appellant that the Post Office ceased or has ceased to
transact business and discharge its functions on Saturdays by reason alone of
Republic Act No. 1880. Clearly, therefore,the remittance by petitioner-appellee was
within the by law, as provided in Section 8 (I), in connection with Section 6 (b) of Act
3992, as amended.lawphil.net
 8

The fact that August 31, 1957 was declared a special public holiday by Proclamation
No. 437 (dated August 21, 1957) of the President of the Philippines did not have the
effect of making the preceding day, August 30, the last day for paying registration
fees without penalty. On the contrary, Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides —

Sec. 31. Pretermission of holiday. — Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act
required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done the next
succeeding business day.

In Calano vs. Cruz, 91 Phil., 247, we ruled as follows:

The complaint filed by the petitioner herein was presented in the court a quo on
November 23, 1951, exactly on the eight day after the proclamation of the
respondent as duly elected councilor for the Municipality of Orion, Bataan. It happens,
however, that November 22, 1951, the last day of the seven-day period prescribed by
Section 173 of the Revised Election Code, was declared a "Special Public Holiday For
National Thanksgiving" by Proclamation No. 290, series of 1951, of the President of
the Philippines. The trial court held that the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 28 of the
Rules of Court could not be applied to the case at bar because it is an election case
(Rule 132, Rules of Court), and declared that the complaint was filed outside of the
period provided for by law. Assuming that Section 1 of Rule 28 of the Rules of Court is
not applicable, the law applicable is Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which provides that "Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or
permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding
business day." The court a quo, therefore, committed an error in declaring that the
complaint was filed out of time.

The ruling is on all fours on the issue before us, and against respondent-appellant.

The decision appealed from is affirmed. Without costs..

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David,

Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
 9

This is a petition for review by way of certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 39760-R entitled "Maxima Castro, plaintiff-appellee, versus
Severino Valencia, et al., defendants; Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc., Jose Desiderio, Jr.
and Arsenio Reyes, defendants-appellants," which affirmed in toto the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila in favor of plaintiff- appellee, the herein private
respondent Maxima Castro.

On December 7, 1959, respondent Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino

Valencia, went to the Rural Bank of Caloocan to apply for an industrial loan. It was
Severino Valencia who arranged everything about the loan with the bank and who
supplied to the latter the personal data required for Castro's loan application. On
December 11, 1959, after the bank approved the loan for the amount of P3,000.00,
Castro, accompanied by the Valencia spouses, signed a promissory note
corresponding to her loan in favor of the bank.

On the same day, December 11, 1959, the Valencia spouses obtained from the bank
an equal amount of loan for P3,000.00. They signed a promissory note (Exhibit "2")
corresponding to their loan in favor of the bank and had Castro affixed thereon her
signature as co-maker.

The two loans were secured by a real-estate mortgage (Exhibit "6") on Castro's house
and lot of 150 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7419 of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

On February 13, 1961, the sheriff of Manila, thru Acting Chief Deputy Sheriff Basilio
Magsambol, sent a notice of sheriff's sale addressed to Castro, announcing that her
property covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 would be sold at public auction on March 10,
1961 to satisfy the obligation covering the two promissory notes plus interest and
G.R. No. L-32116 April 2l, 1981
attorney's fees.

RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN, INC. and JOSE O. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,

Upon request by Castro and the Valencias and with conformity of the bank, the
vs.
auction sale that was scheduled for March 10, 1961 was postponed for April 10, 1961.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMA CASTRO, respondents.
But when April 10, 1961 was subsequently declared a special holiday, the sheriff of
Manila sold the property covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 at a public auction sale that was
held on April 11, 1961, which was the next succeeding business day following the
special holiday.
DE CASTRO, * J.:
 10
Castro alleged that it was only when she received the letter from the Acting Deputy
Sheriff on February 13, 1961, when she learned for the first time that the mortgage
contract (Exhibit "6") which was an encumbrance on her property was for P6.000.00
and not for P3,000.00 and that she was made to sign as co-maker of the promissory
note (Exhibit "2") without her being informed of this.
On April 4, 1961, Castro filed a suit denominated "Re: Sum of Money," against
petitioners Bank and Desiderio, the Spouses Valencia, Basilio Magsambol and Arsenio
Reyes as defendants in Civil Case No. 46698 before the Court of First Instance of
Manila upon the charge, amongst others, that thru mistake on her part or fraud on
the part of Valencias she was induced to sign as co-maker of a promissory note
(Exhibit "2") and to constitute a mortgage on her house and lot to secure the
questioned note. At the time of filing her complaint, respondent Castro deposited the
amount of P3,383.00 with the court a quo in full payment of her personal loan plus
interest.
In her amended complaint, Castro prayed, amongst other, for the annulment as far as
she is concerned of the promissory note (Exhibit "2") and mortgage (Exhibit "6")
insofar as it exceeds P3,000.00; for the discharge of her personal obligation with the
bank by reason of a deposit of P3,383.00 with the court a quo upon the filing of her
complaint; for the annulment of the foreclosure sale of her property covered by T.C.T.
No. 7419 in favor of Arsenio Reyes; and for the award in her favor of attorney's fees,
damages and cost.
In their answers, petitioners interposed counterclaims and prayed for the dismissal of
said complaint, with damages, attorney's fees and costs. 2
The pertinent facts arrived from the stipulation of facts entered into by the parties as
stated by respondent Court of Appeals are as follows:
Spawning the present litigation are the facts contained in the following stipulation of
facts submitted by the parties themselves:
1. That the capacity and addresses of all the parties in this case are admitted .
2. That the plaintiff was the registered owner of a residential house and lot located at
Nos. 1268-1270 Carola Street, Sampaloc, Manila, containing an area of one hundred
fifty (150) square meters, more or less, covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Manila;
3. That the signatures of the plaintiff appearing on the following documents are
genuine:
a) Application for Industrial Loan with the Rural Bank of Caloocan, dated December 7,
1959 in the amount of P3,000.00 attached as Annex A of this partial stipulation of
facts;
b) Promissory Note dated December 11, 1959 signed by the plaintiff in favor of the
Rural Bank of Caloocan for the amount of P3,000.00 as per Annex B of this partial
stipulation of facts;
c) Application for Industrial Loan with the Rural Bank of Caloocan, dated December
11, 1959, signed only by the defendants, Severino Valencia and Catalina Valencia,
attached as Annex C, of this partial stipulation of facts;
d) Promissory note in favor of the Rural Bank of Caloocan, dated December 11, 1959
for the amount of P3000.00, signed by the spouses Severino Valencia and Catalina
Valencia as borrowers, and plaintiff Maxima Castro, as a co-maker, attached as Annex
D of this partial stipulation of facts;
e) Real estate mortgage dated December 11, 1959 executed by plaintiff Maxima
Castro, in favor of the Rural Bank of Caloocan, to secure the obligation of P6,000.00
attached herein as Annex E of this partial stipulation of facts;
All the parties herein expressly reserved their right to present any evidence they may
desire on the circumstances regarding the execution of the above-mentioned
documents.
4. That the sheriff of Manila, thru Acting Chief Deputy Sheriff, Basilio Magsambol,
sent a notice of sheriff's sale, address to the plaintiff, dated February 13, 1961,
announcing that plaintiff's property covered by TCT No. 7419 of the Register of Deeds
of the City of Manila, would be sold at public auction on March 10, 1961 to satisfy the
total obligation of P5,728.50, plus interest, attorney's fees, etc., as evidenced by the
Notice of Sheriff's Sale and Notice of Extrajudicial Auction Sale of the Mortgaged
 11
property, attached herewith as Annexes F and F-1, respectively, of this stipulation of
facts;
5. That upon the request of the plaintiff and defendants-spouses Severino Valencia
and Catalina Valencia, and with the conformity of the Rural Bank of Caloocan, the
Sheriff of Manila postponed the auction sale scheduled for March 10, 1961 for thirty
(30) days and the sheriff re-set the auction sale for April 10, 1961;
6. That April 10, 1961 was declared a special public holiday; (Note: No. 7 is omitted
upon agreement of the parties.)
8. That on April 11, 1961, the Sheriff of Manila, sold at public auction plaintiff's
property covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 and defendant, Arsenio Reyes, was the highest
bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued to him as per Annex G of
this partial stipulation of facts;
9. That on April 16, 1962, the defendant Arsenio Reyes, executed an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex H of this
partial stipulation of facts;
10. That on May 9, 1962, the Rural Bank of Caloocan Incorporated executed the final
deed of sale in favor of the defendant, Arsenio Reyes, in the amount of P7,000.00, a
copy of which is attached as Annex I of this partial stipulation of facts;
11. That the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila issued the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 67297 in favor of the defendant, Arsenio Reyes, in lieu of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 7419 which was in the name of plaintiff, Maxima Castro, which was
cancelled;
12. That after defendant, Arsenio Reyes, had consolidated his title to the property as
per T.C.T. No. 67299, plaintiff filed a notice of lis pendens with the Register of Deeds
of Manila and the same was annotated in the back of T.C.T. No. 67299 as per Annex J
of this partial stipulation of facts; and
13. That the parties hereby reserved their rights to present additional evidence on
matters not covered by this partial stipulation of facts.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the foregoing partial stipulation of facts be
approved and admitted by this Honorable Court.
As for the evidence presented during the trial, We quote from the decision of the
Court of Appeals the statement thereof, as follows:
In addition to the foregoing stipulation of facts, plaintiff claims she is a 70-year old
widow who cannot read and write the English language; that she can speak the
Pampango dialect only; that she has only finished second grade (t.s.n., p. 4,
December 11, 1964); that in December 1959, she needed money in the amount of
P3,000.00 to invest in the business of the defendant spouses Valencia, who
accompanied her to the defendant bank for the purpose of securing a loan of
P3,000.00; that while at the defendant bank, an employee handed to her several
forms already prepared which she was asked to sign on the places indicated, with no
one explaining to her the nature and contents of the documents; that she did not
even receive a copy thereof; that she was given a check in the amount of P2,882.85
which she delivered to defendant spouses; that sometime in February 1961, she
received a letter from the Acting Deputy Sheriff of Manila, regarding the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale of her property; that it was then when she learned for the first time
that the mortgage indebtedness secured by the mortgage on her property was
P6,000.00 and not P3,000.00; that upon investigation of her lawyer, it was found that
the papers she was made to sign were:
(a) Application for a loan of P3,000.00 dated December 7, 1959 (Exh. B-1 and Exh. 1);
(b) Promissory note dated December 11, 1959 for the said loan of P3,000.00 (Exh-
B-2);
(c) Promissory note dated December 11, 1959 for P3,000.00 with the defendants
Valencia spouses as borrowers and appellee as co-maker (Exh. B-4 or Exh. 2).
The auction sale set for March 10, 1961 was postponed co April 10, 1961 upon the
request of defendant spouses Valencia who needed more time within which to pay
their loan of P3,000.00 with the defendant bank; plaintiff claims that when she filed
the complaint she deposited with the Clerk of Court the sum of P3,383.00 in full
payment of her loan of P3,000.00 with the defendant bank, plus interest at the rate
of 12% per annum up to April 3, 1961 (Exh. D).
 12
As additional evidence for the defendant bank, its manager declared that sometime
in December, 1959, plaintiff was brought to the Office of the Bank by an employee-
(t.s.n., p 4, January 27, 1966). She wept, there to inquire if she could get a loan from
the bank. The claims he asked the amount and the purpose of the loan and the
security to he given and plaintiff said she would need P3.000.00 to be invested in a
drugstore in which she was a partner (t.s.n., p. 811. She offered as security for the
loan her lot and house at Carola St., Sampaloc, Manila, which was promptly
investigated by the defendant bank's inspector. Then a few days later, plaintiff came
back to the bank with the wife of defendant Valencia A date was allegedly set for
plaintiff and the defendant spouses for the processing of their application, but on the
day fixed, plaintiff came without the defendant spouses. She signed the application
and the other papers pertinent to the loan after she was interviewed by the manager
of the defendant. After the application of plaintiff was made, defendant spouses had
their application for a loan also prepared and signed (see Exh. 13). In his interview of
plaintiff and defendant spouses, the manager of the bank was able to gather that
plaintiff was in joint venture with the defendant spouses wherein she agreed to
invest P3,000.00 as additional capital in the laboratory owned by said spouses (t.s.n.,
pp. 16-17) 3
The Court of Appeals, upon evaluation of the evidence, affirmed in toto the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive portion of which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court renders judgment and:
(1) Declares that the promissory note, Exhibit '2', is invalid as against plaintiff herein;
(2) Declares that the contract of mortgage, Exhibit '6', is null and void, in so far as the
amount thereof exceeds the sum of P3,000.00 representing the principal obligation
of plaintiff, plus the interest thereon at 12% per annum;
(3) Annuls the extrajudicial foreclosure sale at public auction of the mortgaged
property held on April 11, 1961, as well as all the process and actuations made in
pursuance of or in implementation thereto;
(4) Holds that the total unpaid obligation of plaintiff to defendant Rural Bank of
Caloocan, Inc., is only the amount of P3,000.00, plus the interest thereon at 12% per
annum, as of April 3, 1961, and orders that plaintiff's deposit of P3,383.00 in the
Office of the Clerk of Court be applied to the payment thereof;
(5) Orders defendant Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. to return to defendant Arsenio
Reyes the purchase price the latter paid for the mortgaged property at the public
auction, as well as reimburse him of all the expenses he has incurred relative to the
sale thereof;
(6) Orders defendants spouses Severino D. Valencia and Catalina Valencia to pay
defendant Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. the amount of P3,000.00 plus the
corresponding 12% interest thereon per annum from December 11, 1960 until fully
paid; and
Orders defendants Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc., Jose Desiderio, Jr. and spouses
Severino D. Valencia and Catalina Valencia to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the
sum of P600.00 by way of attorney's fees, as well as costs.
In view of the conclusion that the court has thus reached, the counterclaims of
defendant Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc., Jose Desiderio, Jr. and Arsenio Reyes are
hereby dismissed, as a corollary
The Court further denies the motion of defendant Arsenio Reyes for an Order
requiring Maxima Castro to deposit rentals filed on November 16, 1963, resolution of
which was held in abeyance pending final determination of the case on the merits,
also as a consequence of the conclusion aforesaid. 4
Petitioners Bank and Jose Desiderio moved for the reconsideration 5 of respondent
court's decision. The motion having been denied, 6 they now come before this Court
in the instant petition, with the following Assignment of Errors, to wit:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE PARTIAL ANNULMENT OF THE
PROMISSORY NOTE, EXHIBIT 2, AND THE MORTGAGE, EXHIBIT 6, INSOFAR AS THEY
AFFECT RESPONDENT MAXIMA CASTRO VIS-A-VIS PETITIONER BANK DESPITE THE
TOTAL ABSENCE OF EITHER ALLEGATION IN THE COMPLAINT OR COMPETENT PROOF
IN THE EVIDENCE OF ANY FRAUD OR OTHER UNLAWFUL CONDUCT COMMITTED OR
PARTICIPATED IN BY PETITIONERS IN PROCURING THE EXECUTION OF SAID
CONTRACTS FROM RESPONDENT CASTRO.
II
 13
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING UPON AND CONSIDERING
PREJUDICIALLY AGAINST PETITIONERS, AS BASIS FOR THE PARTIAL ANNULMENT OF
THE CONTRACTS AFORESAID ITS FINDING OF FRAUD PERPETRATED BY THE VALENCIA
SPOUSES UPON RESPONDENT CASTRO IN UTTER VIOLATION OF THE RES INTER ALIOS
ACTA RULE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEAL ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, UNDER THE FACTS FOUND BY
IT, RESPONDENT CASTRO IS UNDER ESTOPPEL TO IMPUGN THE REGULARITY AND
VALIDITY OF HER QUESTIONED TRANSACTION WITH PETITIONER BANK.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT, BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND
RESPONDENT CASTRO, THE LATTER SHOULD SUFFER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
FRAUD PERPETRATED BY THE VALENCIA SPOUSES, IN AS MUCH AS IT WAS THRU
RESPONDENT CASTRO'S NEGLIGENCE OR ACQUIESCENSE IF NOT ACTUAL
CONNIVANCE THAT THE PERPETRATION OF SAID FRAUD WAS MADE POSSIBLE.
V erred in not giving effect to the promissory note (Exhibit 2) insofar as they affect
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE DEPOSIT BY
RESPONDENT CASTRO OF P3,383.00 WITH THE COURT BELOW AS A TENDER AND
CONSIGNATION OF PAYMENT SUFFICIENT TO DISCHARGE SAID RESPONDENT FROM
HER OBLIGATION WITH PETITIONER BANK.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS VALID AND BINDING UPON
RESPONDENT CASTRO THE HOLDING OF THE SALE ON FORECLOSURE ON THE
BUSINESS DAY NEXT FOLLOWING THE ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED DATE THEREFOR
WHICH WAS DECLARED A HOLIDAY WITHOUT NECESSITY OF FURTHER NOTICE
THEREOF.
The issue raised in the first three (3) assignment of errors is whether or not
respondent court correctly affirmed the lower court in declaring the promissory note
(Exhibit 2) invalid insofar as they affect respondent Castro vis-a-vis petitioner bank,
and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) valid up to the amount of P3,000.00 only.
Respondent court declared that the consent of Castro to the promissory note (Exhibit
2) where she signed as co-maker with the Valencias as principal borrowers and her
acquiescence to the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) where she encumbered her
property to secure the amount of P6,000.00 was obtained by fraud perpetrated on
her by the Valencias who had abused her confidence, taking advantage of her old age
and ignorance of her financial need. Respondent court added that "the mandate of
fair play decrees that she should be relieved of her obligation under the contract"
pursuant to Articles 24 7 and 1332 8 of the Civil Code.
The decision in effect relieved Castro of any liability to the promissory note (Exhibit 2)
and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) was deemed valid up to the amount of
P3,000.00 only which was equivalent to her personal loan to the bank.
Petitioners argued that since the Valencias were solely declared in the decision to be
responsible for the fraud against Castro, in the light of the res inter alios acta rule, a
finding of fraud perpetrated by the spouses against Castro cannot be taken to
operate prejudicially against the bank. Petitioners concluded that respondent court
Castro and the bank and in declaring that the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) was valid
only to the extent of Castro's personal loan of P3,000.00.
The records of the case reveal that respondent court's findings of fraud against the
Valencias is well supported by evidence. Moreover, the findings of fact by respondent
court in the matter is deemed final. 9 The decision declared the Valencias solely
responsible for the defraudation of Castro. Petitioners' contention that the decision
was silent regarding the participation of the bank in the fraud is, therefore, correct.
We cannot agree with the contention of petitioners that the bank was defrauded by
the Valencias. For one, no claim was made on this in the lower court. For another,
petitioners did not submit proof to support its contention.
At any rate, We observe that while the Valencias defrauded Castro by making her
sign the promissory note (Exhibit 2) and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6), they also
misrepresented to the bank Castro's personal qualifications in order to secure its
consent to the loan. This must be the reason which prompted the bank to contend
 14
that it was defrauded by the Valencias. But to reiterate, We cannot agree with the
contention for reasons above-mentioned. However, if the contention deserves any
consideration at all, it is in indicating the admission of petitioners that the bank
committed mistake in giving its consent to the contracts.
Thus, as a result of the fraud upon Castro and the misrepresentation to the bank
inflicted by the Valencias both Castro and the bank committed mistake in giving their
consents to the contracts. In other words, substantial mistake vitiated their consents
given. For if Castro had been aware of what she signed and the bank of the true
qualifications of the loan applicants, it is evident that they would not have given their
consents to the contracts.
Pursuant to Article 1342 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such
misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual.
We cannot declare the promissory note (Exhibit 2) valid between the bank and Castro
and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) binding on Castro beyond the amount of
P3,000.00, for while the contracts may not be invalidated insofar as they affect the
bank and Castro on the ground of fraud because the bank was not a participant
thereto, such may however be invalidated on the ground of substantial mistake
mutually committed by them as a consequence of the fraud and misrepresentation
inflicted by the Valencias. Thus, in the case of Hill vs. Veloso, 10 this Court declared
that a contract may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent if deceit by a third
person, even without connivance or complicity with one of the contracting parties,
resulted in mutual error on the part of the parties to the contract.
Petitioners argued that the amended complaint fails to contain even a general
averment of fraud or mistake, and its mention in the prayer is definitely not a
substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court. The records of the case, however, will show that the amended complaint
contained a particular averment of fraud against the Valencias in full compliance with
the provision of the Rules of Court. Although, the amended complaint made no
mention of mistake being incurred in by the bank and Castro, such mention is not
essential in order that the promissory note (Exhibit 2) may be declared of no binding
effect between them and the mortgage (Exhibit 6) valid up to the amount of
P3,000.00 only. The reason is that the mistake they mutually suffered was a mere
consequence of the fraud perpetrated by the Valencias against them. Thus, the fraud
particularly averred in the complaint, having been proven, is deemed sufficient basis
for the declaration of the promissory note (Exhibit 2) invalid insofar as it affects
Castro vis-a-vis the bank, and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) valid only up to the
amount of P3,000.00.
The second issue raised in the fourth assignment of errors is who between Castro and
the bank should suffer the consequences of the fraud perpetrated by the Valencias.
In attributing to Castro an consequences of the loss, petitioners argue that it was her
negligence or acquiescence if not her actual connivance that made the fraud possible.
Petitioners' argument utterly disregards the findings of respondent Court of Appeals
wherein petitioners' negligence in the contracts has been aptly demonstrated, to wit:
A witness for the defendant bank, Rodolfo Desiderio claims he had subjected the
plaintiff-appellee to several interviews. If this were true why is it that her age was
placed at 61 instead of 70; why was she described in the application (Exh. B-1-9) as
drug manufacturer when in fact she was not; why was it placed in the application that
she has income of P20,000.00 when according to plaintiff-appellee, she his not even
given such kind of information -the true fact being that she was being paid P1.20 per
picul of the sugarcane production in her hacienda and 500 cavans on the palay
production. 11
From the foregoing, it is evident that the bank was as much , guilty as Castro was, of
negligence in giving its consent to the contracts. It apparently relied on
representations made by the Valencia spouses when it should have directly obtained
the needed data from Castro who was the acknowledged owner of the property
offered as collateral. Moreover, considering Castro's personal circumstances – her
lack of education, ignorance and old age – she cannot be considered utterly
neglectful for having been defrauded. On the contrary, it is demanded of petitioners
to exercise the highest order of care and prudence in its business dealings with the
Valencias considering that it is engaged in a banking business –a business affected
with public interest. It should have ascertained Castro's awareness of what she was
signing or made her understand what obligations she was assuming, considering that
she was giving accommodation to, without any consideration from the Valencia
spouses.
 15
Petitioners further argue that Castro's act of holding the Valencias as her agent led
the bank to believe that they were authorized to speak and bind her. She cannot now
be permitted to deny the authority of the Valencias to act as her agent for one who
clothes another with apparent authority as her agent is not permitted to deny such
authority.
The authority of the Valencias was only to follow-up Castro's loan application with
the bank. They were not authorized to borrow for her. This is apparent from the fact
that Castro went to the Bank to sign the promissory note for her loan of P3,000.00. If
her act had been understood by the Bank to be a grant of an authority to the Valencia
to borrow in her behalf, it should have required a special power of attorney executed
by Castro in their favor. Since the bank did not, We can rightly assume that it did not
entertain the notion, that the Valencia spouses were in any manner acting as an
agent of Castro.
When the Valencias borrowed from the Bank a personal loan of P3,000.00 evidenced
by a promissory note (Exhibit 2) and mortgaged (Exhibit 6) Castro's property to
secure said loan, the Valencias acted for their own behalf. Considering however that
for the loan in which the Valencias appeared as principal borrowers, it was the
property of Castro that was being mortgaged to secure said loan, the Bank should
have exercised due care and prudence by making proper inquiry if Castro's consent to
the mortgage was without any taint or defect. The possibility of her not knowing that
she signed the promissory note (Exhibit 2) as co-maker with the Valencias and that
her property was mortgaged to secure the two loans instead of her own personal
loan only, in view of her personal circumstances – ignorance, lack of education and
old age – should have placed the Bank on prudent inquiry to protect its interest and
that of the public it serves. With the recent occurrence of events that have
supposedly affected adversely our banking system, attributable to laxity in the
conduct of bank business by its officials, the need of extreme caution and prudence
by said officials and employees in the discharge of their functions cannot be
over-emphasized.
Question is, likewise, raised as to the propriety of respondent court's decision which
declared that Castro's consignation in court of the amount of P3,383.00 was validly
made. It is contended that the consignation was made without prior offer or tender
of payment to the Bank, and it therefore, not valid. In holding that there is a
substantial compliance with the provision of Article 1256 of the Civil Code,
respondent court considered the fact that the Bank was holding Castro liable for the
sum of P6,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum, while the amount consigned was only
P3,000.00 plus 12% interest; that at the time of consignation, the Bank had long
foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially and the sale of the mortgage property had
already been scheduled for April 10, 1961 for non-payment of the obligation, and
that despite the fact that the Bank already knew of the deposit made by Castro
because the receipt of the deposit was attached to the record of the case, said Bank
had not made any claim of such deposit, and that therefore, Castro was right in
thinking that it was futile and useless for her to make previous offer and tender of
payment directly to the Bank only in the aforesaid amount of P3,000.00 plus 12%
interest. Under the foregoing circumstances, the consignation made by Castro was
valid. if not under the strict provision of the law, under the more liberal
considerations of equity.
The final issue raised is the validity or invalidity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale at
public auction of the mortgaged property that was held on April 11, 1961.
Petitioners contended that the public auction sale that was held on April 11, 1961
which was the next business day after the scheduled date of the sale on April 10,
1961, a special public holiday, was permissible and valid pursuant to the provisions of
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code which ordains:
Pretermission of holiday. – Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required
or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding
business day.
Respondent court ruled that the aforesaid sale is null and void, it not having been
carried out in accordance with Section 9 of Act No. 3135, which provides:
Section 9. – Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than
twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the
property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos,
such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
We agree with respondent court. The pretermission of a holiday applies only "where
the day, or the last day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a
holiday," or when the last day of a given period for doing an act falls on a holiday. It
does not apply to a day fixed by an office or officer of the government for an act to be
done, as distinguished from a period of time within which an act should be done,
 16

which may be on any day within that specified period. For example, if a party is
required by law to file his answer to a complaint within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the summons and the last day falls on a holiday, the last day is deemed moved to
the next succeeding business day. But, if the court fixes the trial of a case on a certain
day but the said date is subsequently declared a public holiday, the trial thereof is not
automatically transferred to the next succeeding business day. Since April 10, 1961
was not the day or the last day set by law for the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, nor
the last day of a given period but a date fixed by the deputy sheriff, the aforesaid sale
cannot legally be made on the next succeeding business day without the notices of
the sale on that day being posted as prescribed in Section 9, Act No. 3135.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment under review, We affirm the
same in toto. No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Acting, C.J.) Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,

concur.
 17
G.R. No. 143687 July 31, 2001
SPOUSES RAMON ESTANISLAO, JR. and DINA TEOTICO ESTANISLAO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HI-YIELD REALTY, INC., HUMBERTO BASCO, and NORBERTO
VASQUEZ,respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision,1 dated March 20, 2000, of the Court of
Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court; Branch 128, Caloocan City,
which dismissed petitioners' complaint for annulment of private respondent Hi-Yield
Realty, Inc.'s title and instead ordered petitioners to pay damages and attorney's fees
to private respondents, and the appeals court's resolution, 2 dated June 20, 2000,
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In 1985, spouses Ramon Estanislao, Jr. and Dina Teotico Estanislao, petitioners herein,
mortgaged to respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. a parcel of land, registered in their
name under TCT No. 120717, together with the buildings and improvements thereon.
The mortgage was constituted to secure a loan of P200,000.00. For petitioners'
failure to comply with some of its conditions, the mortgage was extra-judicially
foreclosed and the property was sold on December 9, 1988 for P445,000.00 to
Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. as the highest bidder. The Certificate of Sale issued to the highest
bidder was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City on June 9, 1992.
On June 4, 1993, petitioner Ramon Estanislao, Jr. offered to redeem the property by
tendering to Atty. Humberto Basco, the notary public who conducted the sale, a PCIB
manager's check in the amount of P445,000.00 (Exh. E). The amount covered the
auction price alone as petitioner Estanislao allegedly did not know the amount of
interest and other charges/assessments. In his letter of June 4, 1993 enclosing the
manager's check, petitioner Estanislao requested that a purchaser's statement of
interest and other charges be furnished to him.
However, on June 15, 1993, Atty. Basco returned the PCIB check to petitioner
Estanislao on the ground that its amount did not include the interests, charges, and
penalties. In his letter (Exh. G; Exh. 24), Atty. Basco stated that no certificate of
redemption could be issued unless the amount was fully paid and settled.
Without waiting for purchaser's statement of interest and other charges which he
had requested, petitioner Estanislao again tendered to private respondents on June
21, 1993 the PCIB check for P445,000.00 and another PCIB manager's check (Exh. H)
for P81,521.27 to cover the interest. The checks were, however, rejected by private
respondents for being inadequate.
On July 14, 1993, petitioner Estanislao found from the records of the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan City that their property had been transferred in the name of
private respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership,
dated June 10, 1993 (Exh. I), was notarized by Atty. Basco and filed with the Registry
of Deeds on June 14, 1993. On June 15, 1993, private respondent Norberto Vasquez,
Acting Registrar of Deeds, ordered the annotation of the Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, the cancellation of TCT No. 120717 (Exh. A), and the issuance of TCT No.
265782 (Exh. J) in the name of Hi-Yield Realty, Inc.
On August 13, 1993, petitioner spouses brought suit against private respondents in
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, seeking the annulment of the Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, the cancellation of TCT No. 265782, and the payment of
damages and attorney's fees.
On December 7, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 128, Caloocan City, dismissed
petitioners' suit and ordered them to pay damages to private respondents. The
dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, this Court decides in favor of
defendants and ordering plaintiff-spouses Ramon Estanislao, Jr. and Dina Teotico
Estanislao the following:
1. To pay defendant Norberto Vasquez P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00
as attorney's fees;
 18
2. To pay defendant Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
3. To pay defendant Humberto B. Basco P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Cost against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision on March 20,
2000 affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. On June 20, 2000, it denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners contend that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
41.1. when it made findings and conclusions in its Decision not within the issues
raised before the trial court, and not supported by the evidence on record;
41.2. when it erroneously included as part of the redemption price the "other
charges" (taxes and assessments) although the petitioner was not aware thereof, and
no notice of taxes and assessment was filed with the Registry of Deeds;
41.3. when it had evidently and utterly disregarded the doctrines laid down by this
Honorable Court in the cases of Rosario vs. Tayug Rural Bank, Inc., 22 SCRA 1220, and
Castillo vs. Nagtalon, 4 SCRA 48, as regards liberal interpretation of redemption rules,
without even discussing, even in passing, why those cases decided by this Honorable
court are not applicable in the case at bar;
41.4. when it also absolutely disregarded the doctrine laid down by this Honorable
Court in the case of Rosales vs. Yboa, 120 SCRA 869, that interests of 1% monthly on
the redemption price shall commence to run only from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale, also without discussing, even in passing, why the said case is not
applicable in the case at bar;
41.5. when it misapplied the case of Conejero, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 16
SCRA 775, apropos the necessity of consigning the redemption price, in the case at
bar;
41.6. when it ruled that the appellants failed to present any evidence whatsoever in
support of the allegation of "fraudulent collusion and unholy alliance" among the
defendants-appellees with respect to the registration of the Affidavit of Consolidation
of Ownership and the issuance of the new TCT in favor of Hi-Yield Realty;
41.7. when it awarded moral damages and attorney's fees in favor of the respondents
contrary to the prevailing jurisprudence; and
41.8. when it failed to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioners including damages
and attorney's fees.4
We find the petition to be without merit.
First. Section 6 of Act No. 3135 provides:
In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor
or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property
subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may
redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of
the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four
hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.5
The references to §§464-466 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be understood to
be to §§29-31 of Rule 39 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which was the applicable law at
the time material to this case. It will be noted that while Act No. 3135, §6 speaks of
the right of a debtor to redeem property sold at auction sale in extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage "within the term of one year from and after the date of the
sale," which means within a period of 365 days, Rule 39, §30 of the 1964 Rules of
Court spoke of the right of a judgment debtor to redeem property sold at auction
"within twelve (12) months after the sale," which means within 360 days on the basis
of 30 days in a month. This is because Art. 13 of the Civil Code provides that "When
the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are
of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four
hours; and nights, from sunset to sunrise." The discrepancy was corrected in Rule 39,
§28 of the 1997 Rules of Court, effective July 1, 1997, which changed the period from
"twelve (12) months" to "one (1) year."
 19
Although the prevailing law at the time of the auction sale in this case was the 1964
Rules of Court, the question is actually merely of academic interest in this case,
because even if the period of redemption is 365 days, the tender of the full
redemption price made by petitioners on June 21, 1993 was 12 days late counted
from the expiration of the redemption period on June 9, 1993.
The right of redemption should be exercised within the period prescribed by law. As
explained by this Court in Basbas v. Entena:6
. . . [T]he right of legal redemption must be exercised within specified time limits; and
the statutory periods would be rendered meaningless and of easy evasion unless the
redemptioner is required to make an actual tender in good faith of what he believed
to be the reasonable price of the land sought to be redeemed. The existence of the
right of redemption operates to depress the market value of the land until the period
expires, and to render that period indefinite by permitting the tenant to file a suit for
redemption, with either party unable to foresee when final judgment will terminate
the action, would render nugatory the period of two years fixed by the statute for
making the redemption and virtually paralyze any efforts of the landowner to realize
the value of his land. No buyer can be expected to acquire it without any certainty as
to the amount for which it may be redeemed, so that he can recover at least his
investment in case of redemption. In the meantime, the landowner's needs and
obligations cannot be met. It is doubtful if any such result was intended by the
statute, absent clear wording to that effect.
Moreover, the tender of payment must be for the full amount of the purchase price.
Otherwise, to allow payment by installments would be to allow the indefinite
extension of the redemption period.7 Consequently, the payment tendered by
petitioners on June 4, 1993, while made within the period of redemption (365 days),
was ineffective since the amount offered did not include the interest but was limited
to the purchase price.
Indeed, Rule 39, §30 of the 1964 Rules of Court (now Rule 39, §28 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure) provided:
The judgment debtor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the
purchaser, at any time within twelve (12) months after the sale, on paying the
purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest
thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any
assessment or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and
interest on such last-named amount at the same rate . . .
Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the sale and
a duplicate filed with the registrar of deeds of the province, and if any assessments or
taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any lien other than that
upon which the redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner be given
to the officer and filed with the registrar of deeds; if such notice be not filed, the
property may be redeemed without paying such assessments, taxes, or liens.
In Bodiongan v. Court of Appeals,8 it was held:
In order to effect a redemption, the judgment debtor must pay the purchaser the
redemption price composed of the following: (1) the price which the purchaser paid
for the property; (2) interest of 1% per month on the purchase price; (3) the amount
of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid on the property after
the purchase; and (4) interest of 1% per month on such assessments and taxes . . .
The appellate court erred in ruling that the interest due from the mortgage was
P240,300.00, at one percent monthly interest of the auction price of P445,000.00,
computed from the date of sale on June 9, 1988 [December 9, 1988]. The interest on
the auction price should be computed not from the date of the sale, as the appeals
court appears to have done, but from the registration thereof. Since the period of
redemption begins only from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale in
the Registry of Deeds, the computation of the interest on the purchase price should
also be made to commence from that date.9 Hence, the interest due on the auction
price for 12 months, i.e., from June 9, 1992 to June 9, 1993, is only P53,400.00
(P445,000.00 x 1% x 12 months) and the amount of P81,521.27, which petitioners
tendered on June 21, 1993, was in excess of the accrued interest due. Nevertheless,
as the tender of payment of the interest and the purchase price of P445,000.00 was
late, such tender did not effect a valid redemption.
There are additional amounts to be made in order to effect a valid redemption
required by law, but, as respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. failed to comply with certain
requirements, petitioners' failure to pay these additional amounts may be considered
excused. As provided in Rule 39, §30 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the redemptioner
must also pay the assessment or taxes paid by the purchaser. However, the latter
must give notice to the officer who conducted the sale of the assessments or taxes
 20
paid by him and file the same with the Registry of Deeds. In fact, the Certificate of
Sale, (Exh. C; Exh. 3) issued to Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. in this case clearly stated:
It is hereby required of said highest bidder that a statement of any amount of
assessment or taxes, which may have been paid on account of this purchase, and
such other liens chargeable to a redemptioner, WITH PROOFS THEREOF, all in
accordance with Sec. 30, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court [now §28 of Rule 39 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure], should be submitted to this Office, for purposes of
computing the actual amount payable by MORTGAGORS/REDEMPTIONERS, in case of
redemption.10
If no such notice is given, the property may be redeemed without paying such
assessments or taxes.
Petitioners were not furnished by respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. such statement of
account.11 Neither was such statement filed with the Registry of Deeds. Respondent
Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. claimed that a statement of account (Exh. 8-C and Exh. 8-D) was
furnished the office of Atty. Basco, the notary public who had conducted the sale, as
received by Elizabeth Roque, an employee therein. 12 However, Atty. Basco denied
having received the statement.13Petitioners were therefore justified in not paying any
assessments or taxes which respondent Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. may have paid.
Second. Petitioners accuse private respondents of "fraudulent collusion and unholy
alliance" in the registration of the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and the
issuance of the new TCT to Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. We find this allegation to be without
basis. As already stated, the period of redemption expired on June 9, 1993 without
petitioners being able to pay the purchase price plus the interest required by Rule 39,
§30 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Hence, the consolidation of ownership in the
purchaser was justified.
Moreover, the records show that Atty. Vasquez, who was at the time Acting Registrar
of Deeds of Caloocan City, approved the registration of the Affidavit of Consolidation
of Ownership filed by the purchaser Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. on June 14, 1993 upon
payment by the latter of the registration fee.14 This was five days after the expiration
of redemption period on June 9, 1993.15 Atty. Vasquez denied knowing any of the
persons connected with Hi-Yield Realty, Inc. or Atty. Basco and that he only met them
for the first time during the pre-trial.16 For his part, Atty. Manuel Soriano, Jr., who is
the president and chairman of the board of Hi-Yield Realty, Inc., testified that he does
not personally know Atty. Vasquez, and that he never went to the Registry of Deeds
since a company employee usually took care of the registration process. 17
On the other hand, we find no basis for the award of moral damages to private
respondents. The law presumes good faith, and any person who seeks an award of
damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad
faith or with ill motive.18 It is not enough that one says he suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety, social humiliation, wounded feelings, and the like as a result of the
actuations of the other party.19 Proof of moral suffering must be introduced,
otherwise the award for moral damages is not proper. 20 In this case, the evidence
presented by private respondents is insufficient to overcome the presumption of
good faith.
Nor can the award of attorney's fees be sustained in the light of the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate. 21 No penalty should be imposed on
those who exercise such right in good faith, even though erroneously. 22 The fact that
private respondents incurred expenses to protect their rights does not necessarily
imply that the action which they were opposing was instituted in bad faith. The
award of attorney's fees must be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary
damages are eliminated.23
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages and attorney's fees to private
respondents is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Buena, J ., abroad.
21

NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
 22
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis
and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for,
his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner:
(a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas,
U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of
their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to
time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or
petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their
respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted
and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of
Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament
— divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of
the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of
which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the
lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court
on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of
which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963.
Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country,
and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent
was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that
even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system
(law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back
(renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has
a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of
proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from
ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated,
they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that
their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article
17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
 23
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law
of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide
that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of
this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change
the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must
have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision
in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to
govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that
he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was
the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the
law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national
law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 —
of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION/CONFLICT OF RULES
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
 24
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente
N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September
14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the
executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to
Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled
to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death
without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton,
etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E.
Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the
following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now
Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago,
and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except
my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that
she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at
any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit,
Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria
Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to
her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until
the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the
rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed,
of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be
possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final
account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition
are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b)
that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen
Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that
should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law
of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are
involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in
California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of
the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent,
she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights
and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property
in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is
sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952,
and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal).
Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
 25
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN
THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF
INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE
OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO
THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO
ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question
following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that
the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York
City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher,
was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed
in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there
for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was
teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However,
in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here
the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own
country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military
Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left
for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and
"CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed
at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in
the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
 26
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we
are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and
resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned
to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in
that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines
and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote
something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never
lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared
that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in
accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of
Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a
place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical
meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he
may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between
which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he
went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he
might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a
resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for
the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a
domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of
intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used
with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.
(Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term "national law"is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in
the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its
citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article
16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any
general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of
California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the
executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of
his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of
Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it
is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied.
We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the
case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the
deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof,
 27
which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the
validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in
the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary
provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile,
which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the
forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely
internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus
its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the
renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter
back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle
is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been
to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of
references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the
renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the
original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule.
It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have
accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the
second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that
greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more
strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law
problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both
accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum.
In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would
have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and
they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result
would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold
liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is
in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases
the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the
divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized
by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable
property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the
conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the
law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France,
the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French
statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if
a French court were called upon to determine how this property should be
distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus
applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply
the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court
and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is
what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow
the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule
of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers
the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense.
The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as
governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the
conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question
 28
which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the
subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved
has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the
question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto
would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according
to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of
the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question
before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its
rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the
rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The
doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2
Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its
application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are
quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are
to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign
state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory
'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of
foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals
abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall
be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the
act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that
one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination
of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his
domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality —
that is the English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while
the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and
the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own
intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to
citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are
not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting
to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary
law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will
directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he
was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions
about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions
about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control
devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules
should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the
property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of
the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in
the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New
York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a
personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the
 29

universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil.
the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil.
process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the
practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.) subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but
with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946
as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of the California Civil Code.
of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law,
enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with law of California..
the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to
the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers
to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased Makalintal, JJ., concur.
should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is
the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers
back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and
should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back
and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as
directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to
be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no
legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.